THE HOLY SEE vs.THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR. and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

Facts: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land (Lot 5-A) consisting of 6,000 square meters
located in Paraaque which was registered in the name of The Holy See. The land was donated by the
Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty
over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D registered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC).The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting
as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.
(Starbright).

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to Starbright, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Starbright insists
that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See argued that Starbright should clear the land or
else the earnest money will be returned. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and
damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The
Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign
immunity by entering into a business contract.

The Holy See forthwith elevated the matter to the Supreme Court invoking the privilege of
sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
The Department of Foreign Affairs thereafter filed a motion of intervention claiming that it has a legal
interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of the Holy See.

Issue: Whether or not DFA has the personality or legal interest to intervene in the case in behalf of the
Holy See?

Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity from suits?

Ruling: Yes. In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign
or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to
convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign
state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make
a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the
defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
"suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only
the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion."

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to
first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be
sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, (1972), the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, the U.S.
Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the
Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent
Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus
curiae.

In the case at bench, the Court allowed the Department of Foreign Affairs to file its
memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity. In some cases, the defense of
sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by through their private counsels. In cases
where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their
own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.

Sovereign Immunity

Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art
II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts
and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the
society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that
diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the
Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity
rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

It shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety
in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a
governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it
merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.