El Desarrollo de Los Intereses Británicos en El Norte Chico

The Development of British Interests in Chile's Norte Chico in the Early Nineteenth
Century
Author(s): John Mayo
Source: The Americas, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Jan., 2001), pp. 363-394
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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The Americas
57:3 January 2001, 363-394
Copyright by the Academy of American
Franciscan History
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH INTERESTS

IN CHILE'S NORTE CHICO IN THE
EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY*
By 1820, much of Spanish South America had achieved independence,

and Spain was on the defensive in those areas where her flag still
flew. Amongst the countries that gained their independence in this
period was Chile, which after the battle of Maipti in April 1818, faced no
further threats to its existence from Spain. For many of the new nations, the
period immediately after independence was one of political instability, shad-
ing into civil war, and Chile was no exception. However, in comparison with
many of its neighbors, the period of instability was short, and the physical
destruction not great.
Between 1818 and 1831, the Chileans hammered out a political settle-
ment that guided their country for the rest of the century and beyond. The
only two countries who might have intervened abstained from interfering at
all. The first of these countries was Great Britain, mistress of the seas, and
possessor of the most modem and dynamic economy in the world and his-
torically an enemy of the Spanish empire. The emerging Latin American
nations wanted only the best relations with Great Britain, so there was no
obvious cause of friction. The second was the United States, whose natural
sympathies for would-be sister republics were muted by the necessity of
remaining on good terms with Spain, until certain pressing matters between
the two had been settled. Once these were settled in the Adams-Onis treaty
(1819), the successful course of the Independence wars, and Britain's neu-
tralizing of France meant that the United States, too, was content to observe
events, after issuing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.
When Chile and the other republics decisively broke their political ties
with Spain, they created-or had created for them-new relationships that
replaced the colonial ties. Latin America was already as much, or more, a part
*The author would like to thank the editor and her anonymous referees for cogent advice, which
greatly improved the article.
363
364 BRITISH INTERESTS IN CHILE'S NORTE CHICO
of the global economy, and particularly of its thrusting North Atla

which an expanding Europe had created, as were any of the formal
Even before independence, Latin America was being brought into t
economy over the objections and policies of Spain. The end of Spa
saw the replacement of both the objections and the policies by the new
lican governments. Instead, open trade became the desire, an aim
happily embraced by foreign merchants, and the result was an influ
eign goods and expertise that contributed to the rapid creation of
mercial ties, and in some cases to the political stability of the new r
INFORMAL TRADE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHILE, 1780s-18
Foreigners, and particularly the British, played a notable, if not very

role in an expanding contraband trade over the last few decades o
rule. Britons had established useful connections with Chilean entre
and gained some knowledge of conditions in the country. This facilitate
entry into the business arena of the new nation, and, once allowed to en
country, they began to apply their skills and expertise, to the mutual b
themselves and their hosts. This happened well before formal recog
Chilean independence by Britain. The flag followed trade.
Spain's Pacific monopoly was rather easier to enforce than that

Caribbean, though Drake and his successors showed that it was no
late.' However, direct contraband, on the Pacific littoral, as ag
normal abuse of the annual flotas to Portobelo and Veracruz, was
sional rather than a major threat for much of the life of the empir
the second half of the eighteenth century, and especially from the
contraband began to flow directly into Chile and South Ameri
coast. The opening of the southern whale fishery and the settlemen
tralia by the British meant that far more ships from England sailed th
seas in the normal course of their business than ever before. The
Good Hope route was no longer the only (though still far more con
route for journeys below the equator.
The breaking down of colonial monopoly even before the wars

pendence and the opening up of new trade routes meant that the w
of South America now became a more normal, if still not frequent
contraband. The outbreak of war between Spain and Britain in 180
I See O.H.K. Spate, The Spanish Lake (Canberna: Australian National University Press
Monopolists and Freebooters (London: Croom Helm, 1983), Vols. I & II of The Pacific sin
2 For a recent account of contraband on the flota, see C. Ward, Imperial Panama (Albuqu
versity of New Mexico Press, 1993).
JOHN MAYO 365
such enterprises patriotic endea

1805, Valparaiso, the principal w
to a blockade by three English
damage to trade.3 But according
contraband was a secondary obj
Pacific primarily for the whale
captains the opportunity to appr
profitable activities on the coast
these pursuits. The notorious ca
great nineteenth-century histor
strates this.
This ship, commanded by Tris

Pacific before 1808 'on the prete
chandise in the ports of Chile an
was her third trip that was to
voyage, in 1807, Bunker met one
ican nationality with whom he
certainly not planned as a whal
cargo was worth ?80,000, princi
do not concern us; it was a failu
colonial authorities that led to
ship. However, two aspects of th
of this paper.
The first is that it took the sh

enterprise, supported by shippe
were going to consignees in Ch
acted as agent for Chilean entr
demonstrated, then, what an em
the case in the five years before
the norm.6 In the case of the Sc
believe that they were dealing w
including the Marquis of Larrain
3 Sergio Villabos R. El comercio y la crisi

1968), p. 125.
4 Diego Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile, 16 vols. (Santiago: R. Jover, 1884-1902) VIII, p.
56 (pifia de plata, usually plata pifia was the silver end product of the 'patio process' before it was cast
into bars).
5 Ibid., p. 57.
6 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
7 Statement of J.E. Wolleter, W. Kennedy, I. Ellard 18 November 1808, National Library of Chile,
Barros Arana Papers, vol. 25-2 (3) f. 379. I owe this reference to Prof. Simon Collier.
the existence of the law was accepted, it might be broken, if one'

tions within Chile were good, and the offence not too blatantly obv
last few years of Chile's colonial life saw prices of imports fall as a
contraband and legitimate imports in neutral ships that entered with th
mission of the imperial government.8
The other aspect of the Scorpion affair to be noted is the role of

resident in Chile. Faulkner we have mentioned; more importan
future (and for this paper) was Dr. George Edwards. Before the Sc
was seized at Quilimari, she had visited Coquimbo, where Bunker h
Edwards, whom he had left at the northern port on one of his earl
ages. The doctor apparently tried to warn Bunker that he was sail
danger when he sailed south again,9 but Edwards survived the fur
was to play a role in subsequent events, over the next several deca
This contraband trade was to be a continuing factor as the captai
eral of Chile became the republic of the same name. The change o
legitimated the commerce, and made possible its painless expansion
the market would bear. Because contraband had existed, shippe
chants, and consumers all knew that there were opportunities out t
did government, hungry for revenue. Suddenly the atmosphere w
tious for free-trade-under conditions.
ORIGINS OF LEGAL TRADE
Chile's new rulers, then, after the creation of the first creole government,
were well aware of the possibilities of foreign commerce, and even of its
actualities, given the scale of foreign trade, overt and covert, in the years
before the rupture between crown and colony. One of their early acts, in
1811, was to issue a decree of open trade, which was designed to regularize
foreign commerce.'" This meant that all nations could freely and equally
trade with Chile; commerce was, however, to be taxed, both to provide rev-
enue for the government, and to give protection to those economic activities
whose production was considered of national importance." The stage was
now set for the development of legitimate commerce, and in the circum-
stances it was but natural that the English should lead the way.
8 Villalobos, pp. 150-157.

9 The details are in Barros Arana, op. cit., and the Statement of Wolleter et al.
10 Effectively, this decree extended the colonial comercio libre to the rest of the world. It was not,
and was not intended to be, the 'free trade' later practised and propagated (with less success) by the
British later in the nineteenth century.
11 Eduardo Cavieres Figueroa, Comercio chileno y comerciantes ingleses 1820-1880 un ciclo de his-
toria econ6mica (Valparaiso: Instituto de Historia Universidad Cat61lica de Valparaiso 1988), p. 59.
JOHN MAYO 367
England had all the necessary el

for export, demand for imports, a
and receive-the goods. These
desire-for trade, manufacturing c
any other needed services, as w
these general factors, England's
meshed very well with Chile's eco
For around 100 years from 175

principal producers of copper.'2
ceased to be able to meet the dem
and Cornishmen looked for work.
raw material, which was carried i
Wales. Chile's own merchant marine was far too small to handle this trade.
And, as this paper shows, some Cornish miners traveled to the republic to
ply their skills.
The Spanish reoccupation of Chile between 1814 and 1817 not unnatu-
rally slowed the process of Chile's integration into the larger trading world,
but the re-establishment of patriot rule saw the appearance of British mer-
chants in some numbers. The decline of Spanish influence in Chilean com-
merce has been documented by John Rector. In the last decade of 'formal',
if dislocated, Spanish rule, 1808-1818, Spaniards (70 percent) and Chileans
(17.5 percent) made up 87.5 percent of the forty most important merchants;
there were no Britons.'4 In the following decade, the Chilean proportion had
increased to 27.5 percent, the Spanish had declined to 7.5 percent, while the
British made up the largest single national group: 40 percent.'5 In 1822,
Maria Graham noted of Valparaiso 'The English shops are more numerous
than any [of foreign nationality]' and commented, 'the preponderance of the
English language over every other spoken in the chief streets, would make
one fancy Valparaiso a coast town in Britain'.'6
12 R.K. Johns, Cornish Mining Heritage (Adelaide: Department of Mines and Energy, 1986), p. 10.
13 For the British smelting industry, see L. Valenzuela, Tres estudios sobre el comercio y lafundacidn
de cobre en Chile y en el mercado mundial 1830-1880 (Santiago: Librerfa Chile Ilustrado, 1995), pp. 17-
54; an example of the export of technology and men, I. Auhl, The Story of the 'Monster Mine' The Burra
Burra Mine and its Townships (Burra Burra: Investigator Press, 1986), ch. 20. Chilean muleteers also
played a role in the development of this Australian mine, ch. 16.
14 J.L. Rector 'Merchants, Trade, and Commercial Policy in Chile: 1810-1840' (unpub. Ph.D. diss.,
Indiana University, 1976), p. 251. The rating is based on customs statistics in Santiago and Valparaiso.
15 Ibid., p. 253.
16 Maria Graham, Journal of a Residence in Chile during the year 1822 (London: Longman, Hurst
etc., 1824 rep. 1969), pp. 130-131. While one accepts the sincerity of Mrs. Graham's opinion, one won-
ders which 'coast town' in Britain she had in mind.
Trade with Chile was not the only incentive for foreign merchant
the port. Valparaiso quickly assumed the role of an entrepOt, beco
center for the foreign commerce of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, as
Chile's own trade, while the small northern port of Coquimbo attai
importance in the exporting of metals.'7 It was the trade in metals
to attract British attention to the Norte Chico (Lesser North)"8 f
early in Anglo-Chilean economic relations, and it was there that t
British investments in the country were to be made.
EARLY BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE NORTE CHICO
The Norte Chico comprised, in 1820, the northernmost of

provinces, Coquimbo, and consisted largely of arid lands running n
the Atacama desert lying between the Andes and the sea. To the nor
Bolivian Atacama, to the south, temperate Chile. Rivers and their f
ning from the mountains to the sea provided the only habitable a
there the population was concentrated, living in small towns and v
on small farms. Rainfall was light, and not to be relied upon, rangi
about one inch a year in Copiap6 in the north to ten inches in Coqu
the south. But if the province was poor in agricultural terms, it w
minerals and these had been exploited from colonial times. With t
tion of independence, foreigners made their appearance.
In part, this was to continue the colonial trade. In 1826, the Briti
at Valparaiso reported to the Foreign Office that: 'Prior to the Re
two-thirds of the Copper produced were shipped to Lima, and from
by the Philippine Company to Calcutta by way of Manilla. . . . 9 C
of course, was the capital of British India, and after some dislocatio
by the war, Indian interests began to trade directly with Chile:
In the Year 1816, the Calcutta Country Ships first made their appearan
from that time until 1824, they have carried off two-thirds of the Copper
duced, and England and the United States have had their proportional S
of the remainder.20
But increasingly English demand replaced Asian, and Britons
17 Cavieres, op. cit., p. 60; R.A. Humphreys (ed.) British Consular Reports on the Tra
tics of Latin America, 1824-1826 (London: Camden Third Series LXIII, 1940), pp. 95-96.
18 'Norte Chico' is a later usage, to distinguish the region from the 'Norte Grande,' the nit
acquired as a result of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), but its use has become accepted for
19 No. 36 C.R. Nugent to G. Canning, Valparaiso, 22 Dec. 1826 F.O. 16/5, Public Reco
Kew (hereafter F.O.).
20 Ibid. 'Country Ships' referred to ships based in India and engaged in Asian trade, as
ships of the East India Company, which handled all legal trade between England and India.
JOHN MAYO 369
actively involved in organizing

nations. After the patriot victor
many of the British and Ameri

Coquimbo, and advanced their Cap
ing the Mines and procuring Rem
risk and more certainty than that
This marked the beginning o

mining, a participation which d
rest of the century.
Individual Britons seem to have

Amongst the first was the alrea
arrived in Coquimbo on one of
on shore, he met Isabel Ossand
nationality, and even his Anglic
children, one of whom, Agustin
has survived until the present;
to help many of his compatriots
even to keep some tenuous conn
So when Britons arrived in Coq

not enter unknown country. Wh
attractive, and how they learnt
certain that very soon after patrio
were in place, and where they
follow. The Norte Chico was the
impecunious population did no
sound like 'a coast town in Britai
captains and supercargoes, who
picked up. There were informan
views would carry authority. Al
tion to be had. In 1817, the Ang
made an official report on the N
Minerfa, which was published tw
21 Ibid.
22 Enrique Bunster, Chilenos en California (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1954), p. 147. Bunster
says he arrived in 1807, another source has his arrival as early as 1802, as surgeon on the whaler Back-
house: L.C. Derrick-Jehu, 'The Anglo-Chilean Community,' Family History 3:17/18 (Nov. 1965), p. 169.
The figure of eight children is Bunster's; Derrick-Jehu says three.
23 'Noticia general de los minerales de las provincias del Norte de Chile on su estado actual: prop6-
nense algunos medios de mejorarlo--trabajada por Don Carlos San Lambert en octubre de 1817,' El
Teldgrafo 6, 10, 17 August, 14 Sept. 1819.
Of course, it is unlikely that this journal circulated in Europe, b

copies may have been sent to England by merchants on the coast o
scientifically-minded visitors. In any case, Lambert himself retur
land at some stage, but not before he had acquired further practi
edge of the country and its mining industry. In May 1820, we find
ing some pastures (presumably for the draught animals needed i
from the church of Copiap6, the surety being provided by
Goyenechea, a member of a well-known regional family, and in t
ing year he is mentioned as owning mining establishments. He wa
called a Frenchman and 'a German Gentleman,' but we do not kno
described himself. He was born in Strasbourg, in France, in 1793.
his wife was English, his economic connections British, he kept
in English, so for the purposes of this paper, he is accepted as a p
British diaspora. He died in England in 1876.24 His knowledge
clearly became known, and desirable, to influential people.
So far as we know, Lambert published nothing in Britain on h

and observations. Others did, amongst whom was Alexander C
F.R.S. In 1825 he published his Travels in South America,25 and,
bert, he had returned to England after his visit to South America
personal knowledge would have been available to interested parti
well connected, having gone to Brazil as private secretary to Edw
ton, the British minister to the Imperial Court.26 Caldcleugh w
Chile, in the Norte Chico, by 1825 and was to die in the country,
Another mining engineer with personal knowledge of the count

mining industry, was John Miers, whose two volume Travels in
La Plata came out in 1826.27 Miers' operations in Chile had not b
cessful. A friend wrote,
24 Contrato, 4 May 1820, ff 70-71, Fianza, 23 September 1820, ff 727-73, Poder, 3 Febr
88-89 Notarial de Copiapo, Vol 21, Archivo Nacional de Chile (hereafter ANCNC); Seymo
January 1845, CR 114 A/421, Warwickshire Record Office; John Mayo and Simon Collier
in Chile's Norte Chico Journal of Charles Lambert 1825-1830 (Boulder: Westview Press, 19
left 'under ?900,000' divided amongst his son, who received 'his works and business, with
assets, and all his other property in Chili, also a pecuniary legacy of ?250,000', and his th
who each received ?100,000. In addition, he left ?25,000 'to be distributed among the
employ in England and Wales and scientific societies in Great Britain.' The Times, 1 Septe
25 Travels in South America during the Years 1819-20-2 7; containing An Account of the
of Brazil, Buenos Aires, and Chile, 2 vols. (London; John Murray, 1825).
26 Ricardo Donoso, 'Alexander Caldcleugh,' Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografia 1
155.
27 Travels in Chile and La Plata including Accounts Respecting the Geography, Geology
Finances, Agriculture, Manners and Customs, and the Mining Operations in Chile. Collected
idence of Several Years in the Countries, 2 vols. (1826; reprint, London: Baldwin, Craddock
JOHN MAYO 371
Mr. Miers
came to Chile with a la
for stamping
metal, and other ma
try in a much higher state of adva
apparatus into excellent flour mi
lishment is at least one hundred y
This sympathetic observer put h

the English investors in Chilean
technology in a technologically
industry. She was to note anothe
I was grieved to see a great quant

rolling copper, lying on the shor
pier. This machinery has been reg
the government, because some par
Relations with national and local authorities could be critical to the success
or failure of an enterprise, as Miers' failure bore witness.
Miers had gone to Chile in 1819, and left some time between 1822, when
Graham saw him, and 1826, when his book came out. This was the year after
the burst of British investment in Chilean mines; had the book come out ear-
lier, it might have cooled investors' ardor. But perhaps not: rationality was an
early casualty of the investment boom in Latin America in the first half of the
1820s.30 In any case, Miers was presumably in London where his expertise,
like that of Lambert and Caldcleugh could have been called upon. However,
unlike them, he did not return to Chile; his venture, in which he lost thou-
sands of pounds, left him unenthusiastic about Chile and the Chileans.
Caldcleugh, Lambert and Miers all had some professional knowledge of

mining, and of conditions in Chile, and the sales of Caldcleugh's and Miers'
books, possibly even the writing of them, must have been influenced by the
heady atmosphere of the boom. But this movement peaked and then crashed
in 1825 and the books themselves came out too late to have influenced the
London capitalists who put together the mining companies to exploit the
Norte Chico. On the other hand, it is clear that Lambert and Caldcleugh,
both of whom were to be employed by the companies, must have lent their
knowledge to the 'Associations,' though selective use was made of it. One
wonders what Lambert thought of the prospectus of the Chilian Mining
28 Maria Graham, op. cit., p. 186.

29 Ibid., p. 301.
30 For a good account of this boom, see Frank Griffith Dawson, The First Latin American Debt Crisis
The City of London and the 1822-25 Loan Bubble (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1990).
Association (his employer) which asserted that 'Chile was pe

long been independent, and enjoyed a healthy climate, abundant
wood, and a good supply of cheap labor.'3" At that time, Spain s
accept Latin American independence, let alone Chile's, the politi
was endemically unstable, and water and wood in the Norte Chi
abundant as could be expected in a desert, as Lambert would hav
But the mineral wealth of the region was undoubted. And if th

information of the engineers was not available to whet the
investors, there were other sources of information available to
after all, still a small, but literate, investing public. Amongst t
Molina's The Geographical, Natural and Civil History of Chile, t
and published in the United States in 1808, and in London the n
while the works of Humboldt and Alcedo also appeared in transla
first two decades of the century. More up to date and to the poi
tain Basil Hall's Journal, the second edition of which appeared i
Hall was an exact observer, who provided much useful infor
Chilean mining.
It was possible, then, for English investors to secure reliable

knowledge of the scene of their speculation. That the results wer
astrous was not because of actions in the Norte Chico; indeed Br
Chile, and particularly English merchants were to consolidate a
position in the copper industry in the region even as the compa
lapsed. By 1830 none of the mining firms survived in its origina
some British miners and British commission houses generally we
as full and equal partners in the industry.
FAILURE OF THE MINING COMPANIES AND THE EXPANSION O

BRITISH INFLUENCE
The story of the rise and fall of the companies has been well
where, and will only be outlined here.33 There were four such
formed in January, one in March and one in June 1825. They wer
the Chilian Mining Association with a nominal capital of ?1,0
Anglo-Chilian Mining Association with ?1,500,000, the Chilian a
vian Mining Association with ?1,000,000, and the United Chilian
tion with ?500,000. The amounts actually paid up were far l
31 Dawson, op. cit., p. 103.

32 Captain Basil Hall, R.N. Extracts from a Journal, written on the Coasts of Chile, Per
in the years 1820, 1821, 1822, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co. 2nd ed
33 See Claudio Veliz, 'Egafia, Lambert, and the Chilean Mining Associations of 182
(Nov. 1975), pp. 637-663.
JOHN MAYO 373
?75,000, ?120,000 and ?50,000 fo

sums were formidable amounts i
approximately five pesos, so tha
lic both actually well off, and con
course, be readily acknowledged
was not to be realized.
In February 1825, The Times reported a slow market, in which 'even the
shares of the foreign mining associations partook of the general depression,'
and in August, the newspaper noted 'a panic,' and stated, 'In the market for
foreign securities and shares, no sales whatever could be effected without a
very serious sacrifice.....'35 The result of this depression was that all of these
ventures failed. This was, perhaps, one of the earliest examples of a metro-
politan depression affecting a 'third world' economy. The Associations failed
because their shareholders could not, or would not, put up further capital, and
development in Chile had not proceeded far enough to produce any revenues
to offset the drying up of capital inflows from England. Events in Chile itself
had nothing to do with the failures, though the memory of them was to deter
similar investments at least until the nitrate era at the end of the century.
So ended the only large scale attempt by British capital to become a con-
siderable player in Chilean copper mining. However, if the British were not to
become great copper miners in Chile (and throughout the nineteenth century
Chileans controlled the bulk of their copper industry) they did become
omnipresent actors in the Norte Chico, playing an indispensable role as middle
men, which by and large was accepted almost as natural by contemporaries.
This did not happen by accident, and we turn now to its achievement.
The failure of British capital in the Norte Chico was no more a defeat for
British interests than was the rebuff at Buenos Aires in 1806-07. Rather,
both events changed the direction (and perhaps the nature) of British pene-
tration into the region. But the underlying bases of Britain's connections
with South America, in general, and Chile in particular, however that rela-
tionship was to be worked out, remained. These included providing pur-
chasers for raw materials, manufactured goods for consumers, shipping to
carry the trade, middlemen to organize it (and provide credit), expertise,
insurance, and so on. All of this was carried on under the largely benevolent
gaze of the two governments, the local one providing law and order, and set-
ting the rules, the British through offshore naval officers, and-later resident
diplomats, ensuring that legitimate British interests were respected.
34 Veliz, op. cit., p. 640.

35 The Times, Feb. 7 and Aug. 30 1825, quoted in Veliz, op. cit., p. 641 and 642.
So in Chile, where Britons did not own the copper, the activitie
vidual Britons helped in the mining process and ensured that the
tion system' was fully employed, moving copper to England and e
and bringing in imports. The Royal Navy watched over the proc
tating it when possible (and carrying silver for the miners and m
In the absence of diplomats, the navy's officers took their place,
in 1818, the commander in chief urged the appointment of a 'co
agent' at Santiago,
the distance from Valparaiso (90 miles) being so considerable as to pr

the officer commanding his Majesty's ships stationed at the latter pla
transacting business with the existing authorities, and particularly
making those personal representations which are always attended wi
effect here.36
The first consul general was appointed in 1823. He in turn sent

Coquimbo in 1824, who became consul in 1825. However, it may
that the Royal Navy and the merchants involved had already est
workable relations with both public and private interests by the
arrived. The original contacts were made well before the officials
while the difficulties associated with the struggle for independenc
memories by 1823.
In the period between the achievement of independence a

Britons were not the most numerous direct traders with the Norte Chico.
These were North Americans. United States' ships had begun trading with
Chile as early as was possible, and in the first year of independence more
American ships entered Chilean ports than those of any other nation. How-
ever, it is significant that the value of imports from, and exports to, Britain
was greater than for the United States. And of 11 sailings of American ships,
only two were returning directly to the United States.37 What had begun for
Britons as trade between peripheral parts of the world economy-Calcutta
and Chile-became the organization of commerce between a primary pro-
ducing economy, Chile, and the metropole, initially England, but then
Europe as a whole. This short period saw the role of Britons evolve from
organizing the short-lived Chile-Calcutta trade, through a brief attempt to
36 Bowles to Croker, Amphion, Buenos Aires, 7 June 1818 in G.S. Graham and R.A. Humphreys. The
Navy and South America 1807-1823 (London: Navy Records Society, 1962), p. 238.
37 Dorothy Burne Goebel, 'British-American Rivalry in the Chilean Trade, 1817-1820, Journal of
Economic History 2 (November 1942), p. 195. The 'rivalry' does not seem to me to be established by the
author. Rather, it seems to be a case of furor consularis. United States' consular reports did speak of
rivalry, but surviving business records indicate commercial competition rather than national rivalry, and
foreign merchants tended to cooperate with each other in relations with Chilean officials.
JOHN MAYO 375
become large-scale copper produ

middleman in Chile's integratio
would last for the rest of the cent
The initial contacts between B

were indirect, consisting of ven
have lasted from 1816 to 1824,
In the Year 1825 and 1826 the exp

about thirty five thousand Quinta
a considerable part found its way t
Chile having within that period a
However, the demand provided

British and American merchant
have stimulated production to r
60,000 quintals from then until
a Londoner, John Sewell, who c
Calcutta ships 'shortly after th
was in charge of disposing of th
sumably he liked what he saw, f
from his consignors, he stayed.39
When the agents of the Minin

were not coming to terra incog
compatriots, men such as John
haps in a small way, but who
tapped. Others who were active
later to be British consul at Coq
Agustin Edwards, and Edward H
apparently lured him from med
When the companies arrived, t

English standards backward, cop
local, willing to advance credit
companies had to find the copp
mining zone, in competition wit
not welcome the competition, a
personal contact were already
38 No. 36, Nugent to Canning, Valparais

affected by the first Burmese War of the m
(Santiago: Universidades de Chile, 1961, p.
39 B. Vicufia Mackenna, El Libro de Cobre
vantes, 1883), p. 160.
authorities. If the Norte Chico was not terra incognita, neither wa

territory: the British had to create their position against competition.
now to how they did it.
CHARLES LAMBERT IN THE NORTE CHICO
The sources are various, but mutually reinforcing. Historians

British consular reports at least since Humphreys' 1940 collectio
similarly used and added to Humphreys and Graham's selection of
patches. Valenzuela and Volk have used Chilean and metropolitan
add to our knowledge and understanding of this period.40 But t
official, whether government dispatches, reports etc., or notari
recordings of particular cases. The everyday perceptions of partici
erally are lacking (and this is likely to continue, given the odds a
serving such documentation). We are lucky, then, to have a unique
from the period, the Journal of Charles Lambert.4' Lambert obvio
privately, but in the Journal he gave his own views, including co
persons and policies that he could not have vented publicly.
So what can we learn about British penetration of the Norte Chi

period, aided by the established authorities, and this new one
'signed an agreement to take the management of the business of
Mining Association for the term of five years.'42 His salary was t
per year, plus ?1,000 expenses for getting to Chile and settling in
percent of profits. Should the contract be cancelled, he was to re
and his return costs to England. While in Chile, he was to be num
the company, was prohibited from working on his own account,
give up any other interests he might have in the republic.43 On the f
this was a favorable agreement, and the disagreements that subs
occurred seem not to have been occasioned by salary matters. How
possibilities for friction were indicated in a note Lambert made
40 R.A. Humphreys, British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin Ameri
L. Valenzuela, 'The Chilean Copper Smelting Industry in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Pha
sion and Stagnation, 1834-1858' JLAS, 22; S.S. Volk, 'Mine Owners, Money Lending, an
Mid-Nineteenth Century Chile: Transitions and Conflicts,' HAHR 73:1 (1993).
41 Journal from 29th January 1825 to 20th February 1830 (MS formerly in the posses
Miriam Blakemore. All references are by her courtesy. References are to dates not pages.
date). The journal was recently privately donated to the Archivo Nacional de Chile. Pub
John Mayo and Simon Collier (eds), Mining in Chile's Norte Chico Journal of Charles
1830 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).
42 CL 29 Jan. 1825.
43 Archivo Nacional de Chile, Archivo Judicial de Coquimbo, legajo 25, pieza 6, ffs 11-1
reference to Prof. Simon Collier.
JOHN MAYO 377
Aires on his way to Chile. He wr

after noting that the CMA's bus
I learnt from him [Mr. Brittain] th

preceded Lambert to South Amer
?1,000, that he had already drawn
Brittain supposed a part of this m
mines, and a part kept for our arri
The details are not important, exc

carrying on business over long
was, of course, taken for grante
tions moved at the same pace, a
case, there were two variable
depression was inexorably, if sl
its attendant complications, and
not party to decisions he believe
these commissioners. The depres
ence in the production of Chilea
to the middleman role. Charles
vidually the most successful for
The losers in this initial Brit

investors. When their stockholde
calls for capital, the mining asso
stranded high and dry with purch
meet their costs. The losers in E
least some (or anyway, one) of th
But the copper (and silver) remai
demand made possible, and some
contracts or contacts for the futu
While the companies were orga

sumably availing themselves of
they apparently also sought inf
agents. In May 1825, Consul Gen
tions from one of the mining c
within days of the Association's
cerning Chilean laws governing
the time taken to transmit the i
value. Nugent explained that th
44 Brittain was a pioneer British merchant

45 C.L. Journal 27 June 1825.
have been submitted to me by Two Gentlemen in London who sub

themselves as Chairman and Deputy Chairman of a Board of Directors o
Anglo-Chilian Mining Association, I have thought it prudent, in order to
the imputation of improper disclosure on subjects connected with this
try, to reply through the medium of the Foreign Office.
The Foreign Office received the letter on 27 September and forwar

24 October. By then the Association was past being reassured by t
that the ban on exporting precious metals was likely to be 'abolish
the duties on coined metals reduced 'for were the duties more mod
Source of Revenue to Chile would be augmented by holding out le
tation to smuggling: a System carried on very extensively at present
munications this slow threw heavy responsibility on the men in t
which in good times would have required strong nerves, large res
much patience from the men in London. The economic crisis in fa
tered any prospect of success at the London end, so all was to dep
what happened in Chile, where the agents of the various Asso
arrived during the course of 1825.
Lambert, having crossed the Andes, arrived in Santiago on 2 Sep

when his parent association was already in deep trouble at home.47
conferred with his colleague Cameron, and they determined that
should proceed to Coquimbo 'with all the miners [C.L. had brough
from Cornwall with him] and get hold of as much as possible of t
Silver mine lately discovered. . .' and Cameron would go to 'Co
(Concepcion) to make purchases there (8 Sept.).
Lambert left Santiago on 11 September, and arrived at Coquimb

twenty-fourth where he immediately went to Edwards' house. Whi
road he initiated plans for the future which showed his practicality
knowledge of the country, as is demonstrated in the following journ
He recorded his decision to send an employee to Illapel to buy mine
would be done in cooperation with 'the most respectable merchant
ticular, his man should choose mines 'filled up with water':
which worked by the means of the country would offer a profit after h
the water taken out of them. For the other abandoned mines are gene
unoccupied if not because they ceased to give profit worked by the mea
this country, European means not to be introduced excepting slow
mines being not to be possessed without work, I took that determination
46 No. 27, Nugent to Planta, Valparaiso, 22 May 1825, F.O. 16/2.

47 C.L. Journal 2 Sept. 1825. Future references to the Journal will be omitted, the text m
the source and date.
JOHN MAYO 379
sidering it a folly to pretend to s

certainly give no profits except by
Here he demonstrated several q

('the most respectable merchant') t
est that man further in the Association's affairs. The choice of water-filled
mines demonstrated knowledge of local conditions, for these were potentially
rich ones that were abandoned because of flooding, not because they were
worked out. His engineering knowledge and his Cornish miners' skills could
empty these and make them workable. He showed too, in his reference to the
'the means of the country,' his awareness that European methods were not a
panacea.49 The strength and skill, 'primitive' though the latter might be of
Chilean miners, were often compared favorably to that of European miners
throughout the century. And they were cheaper. Also he indicated that he knew
that Chilean mining law required that a mine had to be continuously worked
for a claim to remain valid (a potentially ruinous provision).
This policy of taking up unworked, abandoned and waterlogged mines

was put into effect immediately. A history of Copiap6 noted the appearance
of what the author called the English Mining Company toward the end of
1825, investing its capital working mines and buying ore. Also, through its
agents Alejandro Delon, Martin Thomas, and its 'skilled assayer' Rafael
Esbry, the company claimed almost all the mines and mining areas of gold,
silver, and copper that until then had been abandoned.50 And it bought mines,
sometimes from influential people, such as the regidor decano from whom
Lambert and another of the company's managers, 'Carlos' Dobson, bought
the Nantoco property in 1826.5'
In Coquimbo, he took a step that may be regarded as a master-stroke in

establishing his own, and by extension his Association's and the general
British, interest in the Norte Chico. Yet it gets little mention in the Journal.
On 30 September, he mentions 'agreed with the Governor about a Contract
with the government about the loan and sent to Mr. Ingram. Mr. Dobson, the
Directors after having it legalized by the English consul'. Nowhere did he
mention what the loan, or contract (if they were one and the same) was, but
luckily the British consul did:
a proposal made by Mr. Charles Sn Lambert Principal commissioner of the
48 C.L. Journal 18 Sept. 1825.

49 This was a view his contemporary John Miers shared: Miers, Travels, II, pp. 380-381.
50 C.M. Sayago, Historia de Copiapo (1874; reprint, Buenos Dires, Editorial Francisco de Aguirre
S.A., 1973), pp. 423-424. These three men are all mentioned in Lambert's journal.
51 Venta, 15 May 1826. ANC Notarial de Copiapo, Vol 22.
chilian mining Association to the provincial Assembly of Coquim

advance the sum of 100,000 Dollars, as a loan to the Province of Coqui
has been acceded to by that Body. The terms, which are at a premium
pCent in favor of the Contractor are thought to be fair and advantageo
both Parties. The Loan is to be liquidated within 18 months and Mr. Sn
bert had his Guarantee in custom House Dues, & other collateral securit
The money was 'to enable Coquimbo to bear her Quota of natio
thens'-in this case the conquest of Chilo6 from the Spaniards.
This was but an early example of decisions made by Lambert th
his fellow commissioners, Cameron and Dobson, mounting concer
he too had his differences with his colleagues, the CMA was not a
ship. But in this case the results were happy, except for the Spania
duly lost Chilo6. And it would be hard to overestimate the effects
generous, if profitable, gesture upon the patriotic Chileans who r
province. It may not be a coincidence that Consul Carter, in the sam
reporting the loan, informed his superior in Valparaiso that the p
assembly had abrogated the law prohibiting the export of p
(uncoined silver), something that the mercantile community had w
some time.
CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH INFLUENCE IN THE NORTE CHICO
While the ownership and working of mines, both for precious metals and
for copper, was the objective of the English mining companies, there were
variations on this theme that they could follow. The development (or pur-
chase) of a mine inevitably tied up capital, and indeed it was the consider-
able capital of the English companies that was to have enabled them to
establish themselves and to become large players in the industry. Lambert,
for example, devoted much time to the selection and purchase of viable
properties from the moment of his arrival in the Norte Chico. Also the com-
panies could buy ores and refine them in their smelters instead of, or as a
supplement to, working their own mines. However, they ran out of time, and
despite their large capital, which made them unique in this period, they
failed. Their contribution to the establishment of the British position of the
Norte Chico was real, but in some ways intangible. Men (and some of their
families) came to Chile who otherwise would not have, bringing with them
skills, and contacts useful to the mining industry, and a few properties were
salvaged from the debris. However, the consolidation and perpetuation of
this position was the result of more indirect factors than the ownership of
52 Carter to Nugent, Coquimbo, 5 Oct. 1825, F.O. 16/4.
JOHN MAYO 381
mines; indeed, Britons were n

influence came to be based on
One of
these services was the
interests.Where the moneymen
backed by merchants; and if th
merchant backing. There was
Spanish America) a commercial
together the two sides: capitalis
miners who needed money to co
of habilitacidn, or financing or f
plies, or both, that enabled the m
itador (enabler) also organized t
It was so well established that Miers asserted 'The several associations
raised in London with the view of working the mines of Chile will probably
find it more to their interest to act the part of habilitadors, and not that of
miners, for they will discover that the natives can work the mines with much
greater economy than they can.'5 (It is an interesting question whether the
Associations might have survived had they followed this course, rather than
buying mines. They would then have had an asset-ores or refined copper-
realizable on the market for cash, rather than mines in an economy where they
had themselves been-briefly-a major, if not the principal, source of cash).
Under the system, the habilitador provided the funds for the mining oper-
ations-upon conditions. A British observer described the habilitador as 'the
mining capitalist, and his character is that of a diligent, saving man of busi-
ness, very different in habits from the miner, who is generally an extrava-
gant and improvident person.'54 This man advanced money or goods, or
both, to a miner (or to someone claiming to own the mining right to a par-
ticular area) against the future gains of the enterprise. As security, he had
first call on the miners' production, usually buttressed by an exclusive con-
tract to supply all the miner's needs in capital and goods, at least until the
debt was paid off. Such an arrangement allowed the miner to operate-and
even to keep-his claim, while providing little or none of the operating cap-
ital, while the habilitador found a profitable use for his surplus funds in a
short-term investment.
Lambert's Journal demonstrates a little of this, but in general his success

was built on owning what he worked, and paying as he went. This (highly
profitable) caution would have made small business for the British commu-
53 Miers, Travels. II, p. 380.

54 Basil Hall, Extracts II, p. 49.
nity. While his considerable presence was a constant in the region until t
mid-century, and of course enriched himself and his immediate allies, it w
the activities of others who built up and sustained the English presence
the region. Amongst these, the house of Sewell & Patrickson became the
most visible. Both men were active in Chile's foreign trade in the 1820s. F
example, in April 1824, Arthur Donnelly of Calcutta gave his power of att
ney to Thomas Patrickson of the 'British business' in Valparaiso, presum
ably as a result of earlier participation in the India trade."5 In the same ye
John Sewell gave his power of attorney to a merchant firm in Lima
Patrickson also acted as surety for a compatriot who was renting one of t
tobacco monopoly's stores in Valparaiso.57 They also acted together
Sewell & Patrickson, or as Patrickson Sewell & Co in matters such as
purchase of property, or the guarantee of a deal."8 According to Vicufia
Mackenna, John 'Swell' (sic) established his house at Valparaiso in 1822, i
account with Fletcher Alexander & Co. of Calcutta, and advanced funds t
the Chilean house of Rodriguez, Cea & Co.; Rodriguez, Cea failed, a
Sewell, now in partnership with Patrickson took over the failed firm's asse
Their firm became dominant in the Huasco valley at one stage payin
between 40 and 50,000 pesos in monthly wages.59 And they were not alon
'More than 70 percent of the most active merchants trading in Huas
copper in the period 1818-1840 were foreigners, agents of foreign merch
houses, or recently naturalized Chileans.'60 According to Sewell's son, hi
father was the first foreign habilitador in Chile, and in due course the fir
introduced new methods of smelting into the republic.6' Its success benefi
from the failure of Rodriguez Cea & Co., which was unable to meet
debts, and it in turn was the beneficiary of its own credit relations wit
British houses, and especially with William Gibbs & Co.
Gibbs & Co. represented another avenue of British penetration in Chile.

was primarily a commission house when it arrived, importing goods fro
England either on consignment or own account, and exporting Chilean pr
55 Poder, 24 April 1824, ff 70-71. I am indebted to Dr. R. Couyoumdjian for assistance in procurin
notarial references. Notarial de Valparaiso, Vol. 31, Archivo Nacional de Chile hereafter ANCNV.
56 Poder, 31 May 1824, f 99, ibid.
57 Estanco, 2 October 1824, f 174 ibid. One of the principals of the estanco was Diego Portales; th
contact is an example of many useful ones British merchants made with important Chileans.
58 Ibid, Venta, 6 December 1824, f 213; ibid, vol 32, Fianza, 26 April 1825, f 49.
59 Vicufia Mackenna, op. cit. pp. 317-320. Referring to the marriages of Sewell and other Britons
Vicufia noted that England became master not only of Chile's copper, but of its women 'more valued t
gold.'
60 Volk, 'Mine Owners and Money Lenders,' p. 74.
61 Enrique Sewell to B. Vicufia Mackenna, 12, 20 Dec. 1882, Archivo Vicufia Mackenna, Archivo
Nacional, Santiago de Chile.
JOHN MAYO 383
duce on the same conditions, wh

ance, etc. both to its own tied c
and to anyone else needing them
opportunity for profits, the mor
goods and services to Sewell & P
period, in turn receiving the co
tion. Most Norte Chico miners ap
an habilitador. Even the wealth
against current shipments, whi
miners' business (Lambert appa
'among other eccentricities [he]
By dealing with Sewell & Pa

keeping track of advances made
contracted, not to mention t
Patrickson must have felt abou
well established 'native' firm
mately, did Sewell & Patrickson
paraiso recommended
Patrickso
met with heavy reverses in his
family to provide for;'63 soon a
on.) A relationship begun in the
in 1837, which had reached $25
Gibbs noting 'the peculiar disad
must be continued under whate
them up acquires a right superi
Dealing with habilitadores, th

oneself (Gibbs was only able to
it protected one from the most d
established their economic infl
British credit, skills, services,
Navy was the basis of a position
in this period. It did not matter t
British, nor that England was n
tination of the cargoes dealt wi
62 Gibbs Papers (Guildhall Library, Lond

what the other eccentricities were.
63 J. White to J. Walpole, Valparaiso, 27
64 Gibbs Papers MS 11033/3 Annual Rep
65 Gibbs Papers MS 11033/3 Annual Rep
66 Gibbs' further success is discussed in
1851-1886 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987
TABLE 1
SHIPPING RETURNS, JULY-DECEMBER 1825
Arrivals Departures
Number of Cargo Number of Cargo
Nationality Vessels Tonnage ($) Vessels Tonnage ($)
British 8 1,209 79,127 6 793 130,115
Chilian 8 531 19,800 8 531 7,550
N. American 17 5,064 120,000 16 4,704 441,600
Other 4 847 12,420 4 847 33,000
37 7,651 231,347 34 6,975 612,265
Source: Carter to Canning, Coquimbo, 31 Dec. 1825, F.O. 16/4.

The peso ($), always called dollar in English Language correspondence,
five to the pound sterling.
environment, and had no exclusive privileges. The

based on their unrivaled resources, gave them a p
trade, which was in fact not reflected in the trade
For example, at the end of 1825, the consul

Carter, submitted trade returns for his district th
very clearly number two. Table 1 gives the rel
months ending 31 December, 1825.
In the absence of a shipping series for the period

say how typical these figures were. Goebel's pape
United States' predominant position at Valparaiso
1817-1820.67 Nor do we know how many of the s
entrepOt trade, or were whalers, and so did not re
trade as such. Moreover, the information conveyed
misleading if taken at face value. For example, they
came from, nor where they were going. This matt
table mentions that 'a North American Merchant
landed at this Port, british Manufactured Goods-sa
@ 40,000 Dlls.'68 There is no way of knowing what
arriving or departing, came from the ship's own coun
Given the growth and enterprise of the United States
era, it seems fair to assume that a considerable par
67 Goebel, 'British-American Rivalry', pp. 195-198.

68 Carter to Canning, Coquimbo, 31 Dec. 1825. EO. 16/3.
JOHN MAYO 385
behalf of third parties, as the Un

ducer of manufactured goods, whi
Certainly we cannot assume fro

States enjoyed an equivalent posit
dispatch provides qualitative evid
the mining companies had arrived
reported:
the Province of Coquimbo seems to have taken up an improved and extended

commercial Position. Various causes have arisen to produce a new Impulse to
Trade. Already three distinct mining Associations from England have taken up
their Residence in this City, with Powers to employ british Capital to the
Amount of 31/2 Millions of Pounds Sterling in working the Mines of Gold,
Silver, and Copper, with which this Province abounds....
And he anticipated the lifting of the old duties on the export of uncoined
silver 'must soon draw here many British Shipping, and much additional
british capital' while the discovery of a new silver mine 'is another Event,
which cannot fail to disperse wealth throughout the Province, produce
increased means of paying for our manufacturers; and will ultimately lead to
an augmented Consumption of them.'69
So it seems clear that trade figure do not accurately reflect either the
extent of trade carried on by Britons, or their actual influence in the region.
Further, the figures are incomplete, in that they do not include the 'treasure'
carried by the Royal Navy. At this time, silver was still an important export
from the Norte Chico, and much of it was exported on naval vessels, whose
captains and the Royal Naval Hospital at Greenwich received a small com-
mission for the service. For this, the consignors received security, efficiency
and discretion, and both the statistician and the historian are left in the dark.
The amounts could be considerable. In 1829, H.M.S. Menai brought a total
of $1,481,639 back from the west coast. Of this, about $250,000 was
shipped from Callao, the rest from Valparaiso and Coquimbo. Callao
appears to have been a regular trans-shipment point for silver from Mexico,
as well as Peruvian ports. Valparaiso also acted as a receiving center for
treasure en route to Europe, (though unless the shippers of the cargo are
named, it is not possible to be certain where cargo originated).70
This service was offered to all. The largest shipper from Callao was Tem-
pleman & Co., a British house, but this was obviously not a dominant posi-
69 Ibid.
70 Capt. T. Bourchier, H.M.S. Menai to Admiralty, Spithead, 23 September 1829. PRO. Adm 1/1577.
tion, while the similar place in the Chilean trade was Aguirre,
Moriarte, presumably a Chilean firm; 'Geo Edwards Esqr & Co's
shipped from Coquimbo to Wylie, Miller & Co. at Valparaiso is a f
cation of Edwards' small scale of operations." On another car
$485,360, the freight was $11,195, of which Greenwich Hospital r
$2,985, the rest going equally to the captain and the commander-in
PROTECTION OF BRITISH INTERESTS
A note on the Royal Navy's role is in order here. Until well into the cen-
tury, Royal Navy ships were stationed on the west coast of Latin America
to protect British interests. In the years before formal recognition of inde-
pendence and the appointment of consuls, their captains were Britain's
diplomatic representatives to the new countries as well as naval officers;
generally they performed this task effectively, satisfying both the British
government, and the new, and occasionally anxious, regimes. As a rule,
government on both sides was anxious to encourage trade, but administra-
tions in the new republics relied largely on duties on foreign trade for the
revenue that funded the normal conduct of business. The costs of this
reliance bore heavily on the merchants who conducted the trade, both
native and foreign, as did the venality of the officials overseeing the admin
istration of it. The result was widespread contraband, generally known
generally practiced, and generally winked at. The Royal Navy wa
inevitably involved.
In the first place, it carried legally much 'treasure,' and its captains gained
financially from this; hence, disinterestedness might be hard to maintain
when a captain's consignors were accused of illegal acts, and he had to
refuse cargoes.73 Secondly, the actual carrying on of the business could wel
be dependent upon a Royal Naval presence. The consul general at Val-
paraiso explained to the newly arrived Rear Admiral Otway in 1826, the:
necessity of a Vessel being constantly stationed at Arica and Quilca [in Peru]
.. the constant vigilance of the Revenue Officers requires that suspicion
should be lulled, which can only be done by the regular presence of a Man of
War: an occasional arrival tending only to keep them more on the alert. I must
here premise that "Plata Pifia" is a prohibited article from Peru; but at the
71 Ibid.
72 Detailed list of treasure 16 July 1830. Adm/32. This referred to the cargo of HMS Heron.
73 See Gough, B.M. 'Specie Conveyance from the West Coast of Mexico in British Warships 1820-
1870: an Aspect of the Pax Britannica,' Mariners Mirror 69 (1983), for a discussion of the trade with
a more important silver producer than Chile, but which covers the organization of the naval end very
thoroughly.
JOHN MAYO 387
same time state it is, with coined

sole return to British Commodity.7
Here, the Royal Naval presence

the better. Clearly, Royal Navy c
ing had not prepared them. In g
where changes in the law reduce
trouble, though they were occasi
Until the arrival of consuls in th

act quite often in protection of Br
while still under Spanish cont
squadron for trading with the ene
More positively, from a Chilean
(and so protect merchant proper
ated between the British merchan
merchants) and the Chilean gove
law, or in protesting against taxes
authority. When one captain we
admiralty replaced him.7" To sum
'was capable of doing effectively,
vent the abuse of the right of
power from intervening.'76 It did
Spanish American governments, b
vidual commanders may have act
Protection, of course, went bey

ities solely to provide. Relation
cal, given that local officials cou
tion seemingly secured by grant
national government, of course
local goodwill, secured by the a
have seen Lambert's loan to the
but Britons were not behind in
ing relationships with important
Charles Lambert is an examp
74 Carter to Rear Admiral R.W. Otway,

at the least, was that the Royal Navy should tu
ests of 'British Commerce'.
75 A. Rector, 'Merchants, Trade', pp. 121-125.
76 Graham and Humphrey, op. cit., p. xxxiv. The last duty seems never to have figured amongst the
real concerns of commanders in the Pacific.
arranged the loan was Francisco Antonio Pinto, later to be presi

29); Lambert became on 'the most intimate of terms' with him. H
many of the elite in his journal-names like Ossa, Matta, Vicu
with whom he did business, indeed knew very well. (These a
known Norte Chico families of the period, familiar then to all c
raries, and still to historians of both the region and the nation, for n
of them were national figures). Clearly, he was prepared to cultivate t
men. In 1825, he decided not to purchase a property when he disc
of the local magnates also was interested: 'I considered it was of
make an enemy to the company of that man, who enjoyed a grea
ity here.'77 And he joined the system (an indication of its openn
time); in 1828 he became a member of the cabildo (council),
served as acting intendant for a couple of weeks, as well as being
governor of La Serena (the capital of Coquimbo province). This 'f
tion' with the locals did not mean he ignored the apparatus of Bri
He entertained the captains of visiting Royal Navy ships, and visi
and was on good terms with Consul Carter. What he did, then, wa
general objective of the local community, to make money, but he
them, not against them, using their rules, and where applicable, t
ods. He was no slave of the European technology he brought wit
demonstrated the practicability of building a security network
indigenous and expatriate sources that allowed one to get on with
ness without friction with either. When the Journal ends in Feb
he was on passage to Valparaiso on board H.M.S. Sapphire, (which
rying upwards of $600,000 from Mexico).78
Behind him he left chaos. Chile was entering the last phase of t
between Liberals and Conservatives that was to end later in 1830 with the
decisive victory of the latter. The trouble had reached Coquimbo late in
1829, and Lambert recorded without comment a few incidents, but it may be
presumed his visit to Valparaiso was partly caused by the situation. For those
Britons remaining behind the situation seemed parlous: there was no Royal
Navy ship in the bay, not even a British merchant ship on which to take
refuge, and their natural allies amongst the local magnates were fighting
among themselves. The consul was seriously alarmed and asked for a war-
ship as soon as possible, or failing that, that the transport Arab be sent, 'to
wait a few weeks, she would afford me and my Family an Asylum on board,
and perhaps convey us to Valparaiso, or even to England if the just Fears and
77 C.L. Journal 5 Nov. 1825. The man concerned was an opulent miner-trader and later governor of
La Serena, J.M Munizaga.
78 No. 30 R. Ad. Baker, H.M.S. Warspite to Admiralty, Rio, 14 April 1830. Adm 1/32.
JOHN MAYO 389
Apprehensions, which I at presen

ized.'79 In the following month, f
self, in similar terms; in the even
seems likely that the Royal Na
anyway. Captain Bingham's endor
was unsympathetic:
This statement in my opinion is m

have become Chilian subjects by the
intermeddling with Chilian Politics.
magistrate, and has compromised hi
Party opposed to the Government
Ross married a daughter of Edward
The Uriarte or Government Party b
and Co. is naturally full of Terror.
This situation appears to demons

chants: their 'home,' i.e. British s
allies defeated. In the event, thei
removing Edwards from an offic
at foreigners anyway, and then P
Bingham would have maintained
real danger, may be doubted: he w
and British diplomats and naval o
British property, while being sen
tics. There was, in fact, no practi
(who might or might not be natu
claiming protection. Largely, it a
George Edwards seems never to
famous son Agustin, despite busi
Spanish to them and acted chile
Ross (also Agustin's father-in-law
years British consul at Coquimbo.
he unhesitatingly used his British
least 90 percent of the time, the
one hand, and a pragmatically, if
the part of the Chileans meant th
79 Carter to John White, Coquimbo, 14 Feb

eral's absence.
80 Undated note by Bingham on Edwards & Co., Wyllie Miller & Co., J.A. Walker and David Ross
to Carter, Coquimbo 25 March 1830. ADM 1/33 P.R.O. Bingham also stated that the situation was now
calm.
CONCLUSION
By 1826, then, the British were firmly established in the Nort

their position based securely on the enterprise of individual Brito
region and British demand:
England, & British India have received from the year 1817, at least, o
of the whole Produce of this Province in Payment for British & British
Manufactures; the latter supplied direct from India & a good Portion
former through the United States of North America, and other indirect
nels. The present free and direct intercourse must destroy all indirect
and the future annual Remittances of gold, Silver & Copper to Englan
be very considerable.
This despite the fact that the mining companies,
though they have been here many Months, they do not appear to have e
much into the actual Working of Mines, certain difficulties having ari
England as to the Payment of bills drawn by the several Commissioner
for mining Purposes, have perhaps prevented them from entering as a
and as extensively in mining Occupations as the Design & Object of thei
eral Establishments would otherwise lead them to engage in.8'
In fact, the mining associations made little impact on the copper

after the first wave of capital, men and equipment broke on Chile'
Carter's limpid prose describes a situation from which they never r
Yet they were not needed. The integration of Chile into the North
economy proceed without the injections of large amounts of foreig
and only the selective use of foreign hands and skills. In the inte
context of the period, these had to be predominantly British, but t
never alone. Table 2 shows the trade of Coquimbo in the rather d
half year to 30 June 1830.
As usual, there was a comfortable excess of exports over imports

was frequently the case, the number of British vessels was second
United States, among foreigners. In addition, the Royal Navy may
ried away an additional 100,000 pesos. But the point is that the bu
exports was in foreign bottoms, and presumably consigned to fore
While the copper lasted, this was the pattern. At the time when
political control was decisively ended, European economic tie
strengthened and enlarged-under new management.
The dominant metropolitan power in the new dispensation, Brita
81 Carter to Canning, Coquimbo, 3 Oct. 1826 FO. 16/5.
JOHN MAYO 391
TABLE 2
SHIPPING RETURNS, COQUIMBO,
Arrivals Departures
Number of Value of Number of Value of
Nationality Vessels Tonnage Cargo ($) Vessels Cargo ($)
British 4 834 8,000 6 203,079
North American 15 4,090 24,710 15 131,075
Chilian 9 750 30,000 9 10,000
French 1 130 - 1 3,000
29 5,804 62,710 29 367,154
Source: Return of British & Foreign Trade of Coquim

16/13.
and claimed, no special rights in Chile.

the country. In the middle of the century
1,934 in a total population of 1,439,120
ever, where they lived is a significant i
influence: 708 in Valparaiso, the princi
698 in the mining provinces of the nort
(245), an essentially transient group, th
was merchant (230).82 The new relation
the provision of services and skills, the
areas where they might most profitably
lished themselves in the Norte Chico on
backed by their nation's impersonal
whether imperial, or personal.83
The British presence in the Norte Chic

overall British position in Chile, but not
by the mid 1840s, Britain was both t
importer from, Chile,84 a position that
solidation of independence. In a sense
habilitador of English endeavors in Chi
82 Calculated from Censo general de La Reptiblica

83 The only other significant centers of British popu
may be explained by the capital function itself, and the
(287), a principal center of Chile's grain trade, and of
84 Many sources state this. A convenient one is L.
M6xico y Centroamerica (1844-1880)' Boletin de la A
79, 1968, p. 208.
sense of the Chilean economy as well), and with no more guarantee

vidual success than had Sewell & Patrickson, or the mining ass
The agents of this British position were the commission houses, wh
ported miners such as Sewell, Patrickson, Hardy, and many more,
turn habilitated small miners and built up British influence in th
Chico. Most of these houses were branches of firms in England, u
London or Liverpool, who provided the capital and theoretically
final say. This metropolitan link was in normal times a source
strength, providing credit and goods for the Chilean branch, but i
a dependent relationship, so that when the metropole became dep
did the Chilean branches-just as had happened to the Mining Asso
of 1825. The relationship between metropole and periphery was n
that between habilitador and client, with its attendant dangers. But
all relationship worked very well.
And even the mining associations, though apparently not their

stockholders, enjoyed some life after death, in the shape of the C
Mining Company which was formed in 1836, 'based on the mining
ties, interests, and contacts in the Copiap6 area established in tho
attempts.'"8 The associations themselves, however, were but a mem
vived by a less ambitious but more robust combination of mercha
miners who accepted what they found, adapted to it and only slow
duced changes. What they found appeared at first glance somewhat
dating. As an early guide book remarked, in its Peru-Chile volu
political geography of South America must be regarded as at pres
very imperfect, and as it were, transitive state.'86 But in Chile the opp
ties and resources were there, and if the English associations fell v
their speculative foundations, their successors, less ambitious on t
hand, and more realistic on the other, helped the Norte Chico make
icant economic contribution to Chile's emergence from its 'transiti
to a condition of stability and 'progress,' that great nineteenth cent
tive, far earlier than in most parts of the continent. These Briton
make Chile's participation in the expansion of the North Atlantic
smoother and more profitable through their expertise and invest
well as more national, through their cooperation with local intere
individuals, than was the case in many of its neighbors.
85 Veliz, op. cit. p. 653; Vicufia Mackenna op. cit. pp. 165-168.
86 The Modern Traveler, A Popular Description, Geographical, Historical and Topograp
Various Countries of the Globe Peru-Chile. (London: James Duncan; Oliver and Boyd, Ed
Dyle, Glasgow; R.M. Tims, Dublin, 1829), p. 230.
JOHN MAYO 393
The establishment of the Briti

players in their own right and a
ures was the result of several f
tionships clandestinely acquired
were well placed to enter into b
Norte Chico, early attempts to w
when the capital dried up, but t
merchant capital looking for ou
habilitadores, such as Sewell & P
Valparaiso, who acquired domin
extent, working of mines in th
demand increased.
Such men, and their merchant backers, acted as the middlemen in getting
Chilean production into the world market. In this sense, they were the agents
of the expanding North Atlantic economy, and particularly of England, from
whence they came. Their knowledge of this market, and their skills, com-
bined with Chile's rich and easily produced raw materials, eased and per-
haps speeded Chile's entry into the world market, helping Chile's relatively
quick escape from post-independence instability to a somewhat authoritar-
ian but nonetheless real rule of order. Their effectiveness was increased by
their 'social skills' in dealing with the Chilean elite, into which some of
them married, and with whom they were constantly engaged in business
deals. Some became de facto members of the ruling group. For example, in
January 1828 Lambert became a member of Coquimbo's cabildo, and in
October of the same year, acted as intendant of the province for two weeks.87
Such abilities, skills and knowledge more than made up for the lack of cap-
ital. They were perhaps fortunate that at this stage of their development the
working of Chile's mines required little capital, but they made the most of
their opportunities in any case.
Such good relations made it generally unimportant that the flag followed
trade by some little time, and when it did arrive, could be only of limited
assistance. Warships are blunt instruments, especially in peacetime, and pro-
vided only a few options in dealings with local authorities. In the event, the
support provided by their commanders was generally constructive and not
offensively obtrusive to the Chileans, who in fact appreciated the navy's
occasional support of law and order. Nor did the consuls, once they arrived,
87 C.L. 12 January, 21 October 1828. It is significant that the dominant figure in the elite, Diego Por-
tales, was a merchant, and personally involved in the copper business. He did business with both Sewell
and George Edwards. Rector, 'Merchants, Trade,' pp. 140-141.
greatly affect the position. Relations between Britons and Chileans were
securely based on ties of mutual respect, which conveniently involved pro
its for both sides. And so they continued for the rest of the century.
University of the West Indies JOHN MAYO

Bridgetown, Barbados

El Desarrollo de Los Intereses Británicos en El Norte Chico

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El Desarrollo de Los Intereses Británicos en El Norte Chico

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The Development of British Interests in Chile's Norte Chico in the Early Nineteenth

THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH INTERESTS

By 1820, much of Spanish South America had achieved independence,

of the global economy, and particularly of its thrusting North Atla

INFORMAL TRADE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHILE, 1780s-18

Foreigners, and particularly the British, played a notable, if not very

Spain's Pacific monopoly was rather easier to enforce than that

The breaking down of colonial monopoly even before the wars

such enterprises patriotic endea

This ship, commanded by Tris

The first is that it took the sh

3 Sergio Villabos R. El comercio y la crisi

the existence of the law was accepted, it might be broken, if one'

The other aspect of the Scorpion affair to be noted is the role of

ORIGINS OF LEGAL TRADE

8 Villalobos, pp. 150-157.

England had all the necessary el

For around 100 years from 175

EARLY BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE NORTE CHICO

The Norte Chico comprised, in 1820, the northernmost of

But increasingly English demand replaced Asian, and Britons

actively involved in organizing

many of the British and Ameri

This marked the beginning o

Individual Britons seem to have

So when Britons arrived in Coq

Of course, it is unlikely that this journal circulated in Europe, b

So far as we know, Lambert published nothing in Britain on h

Another mining engineer with personal knowledge of the count

This sympathetic observer put h

I was grieved to see a great quant

Caldcleugh, Lambert and Miers all had some professional knowledge of

28 Maria Graham, op. cit., p. 186.

Association (his employer) which asserted that 'Chile was pe

But the mineral wealth of the region was undoubted. And if th

It was possible, then, for English investors to secure reliable

FAILURE OF THE MINING COMPANIES AND THE EXPANSION O

31 Dawson, op. cit., p. 103.

?75,000, ?120,000 and ?50,000 fo

34 Veliz, op. cit., p. 640.

the distance from Valparaiso (90 miles) being so considerable as to pr

The first consul general was appointed in 1823. He in turn sent

In the period between the achievement of independence a

become large-scale copper produ

The initial contacts between B

In the Year 1825 and 1826 the exp

However, the demand provided

When the agents of the Minin

When the companies arrived, t

38 No. 36, Nugent to Canning, Valparais

authorities. If the Norte Chico was not terra incognita, neither wa

CHARLES LAMBERT IN THE NORTE CHICO

The sources are various, but mutually reinforcing. Historians

So what can we learn about British penetration of the Norte Chi

Aires on his way to Chile. He wr

I learnt from him [Mr. Brittain] th

The details are not important, exc

The losers in this initial Brit

While the companies were orga

44 Brittain was a pioneer British merchant

have been submitted to me by Two Gentlemen in London who sub

The Foreign Office received the letter on 27 September and forwar

Lambert, having crossed the Andes, arrived in Santiago on 2 Sep

Lambert left Santiago on 11 September, and arrived at Coquimb