SEPARATION OF POWERS
Vera
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners
FACTS: The petitioner alleged as a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged
in business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water, was
required by the respondent Board of Public Utility Commissioners to present detailed annual reports
respecting its finances and operations. The petitioner denied the authority of the board to require the
report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority
for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful
attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board.
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to
require every public utility as herein defined:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and
containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power.
HELD: There was no valid delegation of power. In the case at bar the provision complained of does not
lay "down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed." nor does it itself
prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and
discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act,
why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.
We believe that the Legislature has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation
of the Act of Congress.
Such provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is
valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the
facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public utilities and to
require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have
authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It
would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without
laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or
applied.
The act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it
could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others. The result of all the cases
on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other
appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details.
People vs.
FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was
elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of.
Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in
the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1
Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this
also constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom,
as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act 4221 or the old probation law is an undue delegation of legislative power on
the ground that there is no standard set by congress for its implementation.
HELD: Yes. There is undue delegation of power because there is no standard provided by Congress on
how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given
absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of
power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act
No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces
that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their
locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may
not avail of their right to probation. There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection
and a law which permits such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional
prohibition.
Lovina vs. Moreno
FACTS: The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the said municipality to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a
navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary
found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision dated 11
August 1959, ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati.
The respondent filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the
Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent
injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal. The objections of the appellees to the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the
Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be
noted that the Act (R. A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to
1 of 15
make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership, thereof is not
acquirable by adverse possession (Palanca vs. Commonwealth, 69 Phil. 449).
ISSUE: WON Republic Act No. 2056 constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial powers to the Secretary
of Public Works
HELD: NO.
Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial powers to the
Secretary of Public Works. Although the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily
involves the determination of some questions of fact, yet these functions, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law and are validly conferrable
upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly
required by Republic Act No. 2056, Section 2.
"Section 2. When it is found by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, after due notice and hearing, that
any dam, dike or any other works now existing or may hereinafter be
constructed encroaches into any public navigable waters or
waterways, or that they are constructed in areas declared as
communal fishing grounds, he shall have the authority to order the
removal of any such works and shall give the party concerned a period
not to exceed thirty days for the removal of the same: Provided, That
fishpond constructions or works on communal fishing grounds
introduced in good faith before the areas were proclaimed as fishing
grounds shall be exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided
such constructions or works do not obstruct or impede the free
passage of any navigable river, stream, or would not cause
inundations of agricultural areas: Provided, further, That should the
party concerned fail to comply with the order of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications within the period so stated in the order,
such removal shall be effected by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications at the expense of the said party within ten days
following the expiration of the period given the party
concerned: Provided, furthermore, That the investigation and hearing
to be conducted by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
under this section shall be terminated and decided by him within a
period which shall not exceed ninety days from the time he shall have
been notified in writing or a written complaint shall have been filed
with him by any interested party apprising him of the existence of a
dam, dike or any other works that encroaches into any public
navigable river, stream, coastal waters or any other public navigable
waters or waterways, and in areas declared as communal fishing
grounds: Provided, still furthermore, That the failure on the part of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications without justifiable or
valid reason to terminate and decide a case or effect the removal of
any such works, as provided for in this section, shall constitute an
offense punishable under section three of this Act: And provided,
finally, That the removal of any such works shall not impair fishponds
completed or about to be completed which do not encroach or
obstruct any public navigable river or stream and/or which would not
cause inundations of agricultural areas and which have been
constructed in good faith before the area was declared communal
fishing grounds."
The findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works under Republic Act. No. 2056 should be
respected in the absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as said findings are
supported by substantial evidence submitted to him.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General
FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this
was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that
the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by
Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case,
Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would,
in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present,
still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what
the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence,
the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision
to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed
by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
2 of 15
 Edu vs. Ericta
FACTS: Respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the Reflector Law (RA 5715) as an invalid
exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. In a manifestation he further
sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that said statute is upheld as constitutional,
Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner Edu, implementing such
legislation, be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.
- CFI Judge Ericta ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of
such administrative order.
ISSUE: WoN the Refelctor Law (RA 5715) and Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation
Commissioner Edu are unconsititutional.
HELD: NO.
RATIONALE
As to RA 5715: Valid exercise of Police Power of the State.
- The Reflector Law requires that all motor vehicles must have sufficient reflector lights or other similar
warning devices attached to the corners of said vehicles, otherwise said vehicles shall not be registered.
It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote
public safety.
- Justice Laurel in Calalang vs. Williams: Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state."
- Primicias v. Fugoso: Police power is "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people."
- Justice Malcolm: "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."
- Morfe v. Mutuc: Police power could be hardly distinguishable with the totality of legislative power.
- It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice
Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs."
- Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
- What is critical or urgent changes with the time." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably
vague and far from precisely defined.
- RA 5715 is a legitimate response to a felt public need, and is thus a valid exercise of police power by
the State.
- The Court says that our 1935 Constitutions philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire and of
unrestricted freedom of the individual. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the
amplest possible demonstration of government activity (police power). This was in response to
Respondent Galos reliance on his argument of laissez-faire predicated on American State Court
decisions.
As to Administrative Order No. 2: Constitutional
- Admin. Order No. 2 has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.
There is also a section on dimensions, placement and color of said reflectors. Provision is then made as
to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted."
- under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land
Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with
its provisions.
- What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power
the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does
not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority.
- A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and
delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law,
to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the
legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
- Standard: at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down
fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
- The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained is "safe transit upon the roads."
- J.B.L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes.
- It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code.
Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on
public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a
categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate
rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose.
Agustin vs. Edu
FACTS: Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction
229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had
warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to
reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It
was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due
process.
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense f car
owners at 56-72 pesos per set.Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and
undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a regulation.
To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.
ISSUE: Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?
HELD: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than
the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.The case also says that police power is state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the
general welfare.
3 of 15
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a citizen
to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record
in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing the
statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive
were fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its installed when parked for 30
minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate any constitutional
provision.
LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes
rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of
ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the declaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.
Toledo vs. CSC
FACTS: Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the
Education and Information Department of the Comelec on May 1986, at which time Toledo was already
more than 57 years old. Toledos appointment papers and his oath of office were endorsed by the
Comelec to the CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for exemption
from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAPwhich prohibits the appointment of persons
57 years old or above into government service without prior CSC approvalwas secured. Petitioner
then reported for work.
Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo Circular 5
issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from the beginning Toledos appointment. Petitioner
appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto officer and his appointment voidable, and moved for
reconsideration but was denied, hence the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N CSRPAP provision is valid
HELD: No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no provision
prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into government service of any person already 57 years old.
Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which prohibits such, was purely the creation of CSC.
Marcoss PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and superseded RA 2260, also
provided that rules and regulations shall become effective only 30 days after publication in the OG or in
any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC adopted the CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of
appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807; prohibition was purely created by CSC.
The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law which it was
meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating rules and
regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying
the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or restriction on the employment
of 57-year old persons in the statuteor any provision respecting age as a factor in employmentthere
was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter. The power vested in the
CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or
execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to Toledo of a
provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published as required by both RA 2260 and
PD 807. The argument that it was a mere reiteration of existing law and circularized cannot stand as
formerly discussed.
Also, Toledos separation from service was through no fault of his own.Petition granted.
Chiongbian vs. Orbos
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by
administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region,
and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the
Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
FACTS: Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of
Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities
of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and
Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of
creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao.
Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be
included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region
shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the
President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on
October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative
Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will
become parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region
XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of
Region IX.
Petitioners wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that:
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing
regions some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of
Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz and restructure them to new
administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point,
that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions."
The transfer of the provinces are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other
words, reorganization.
4 of 15
Petitioners furthermore contended that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is
delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not Congress needs to provide a sufficient standard by which the President is to would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
be guided in the exercise of the power granted.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
2.) Whether or not the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the
regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga to Pagadian since it should be the acts of Congress. WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
HELD: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it
be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
that of the challenged legislation. Constitution.

While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the
qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This
means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon
the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous
provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, 13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust
noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Santiago vs. COMELEC COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss
the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition,
the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the
hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the Tatad vs. Secretary of DOE
oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December
18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special FACTS:The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes". Under the deregulated
environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream
by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement," subject only to
monitoring by the Department of Energy. The President implemented the full deregulation of the
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372. Petitioner contend that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180
in the other modes of initiative. constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it
does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining
ISSUES: WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative. when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide
any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

5 of 15
ISSUE: Whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.
HELD: NO. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the
law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180 provided
that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event.
Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to
postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the
end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President he is
to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
ADDITIONAL INFO: R.A. No. 8180 however declared unconstitutional based on its anti-competition
provisions that cannot be allowed by the Court to stand even while Congress is working to remedy its
defects. At a time when our economy is in a dangerous downspin, the perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180
threatens to multiply the number of our people with bent backs and begging bowls. Court is annulling
R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled
by Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for
Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and not for this Court
to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution. Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may
cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our
Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-
normal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution.
THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
Contemporaneous Construction Commissioner vs. Hypermix Feeds Corp.
FACTS: On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the
Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive list of
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these
factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food
grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%. CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for
protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the
release of the articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to
cover the tariff differential.
On 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported
and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China. Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003
was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation,
prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated
when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for
twenty (20) days from notice. Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss. The trial court GRANTED
the petition and the subject Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO
FORCE AND EFFECT. petitioners appealed to the CA. The appellate court, however, dismissed the
appeal.
ISSUE: WON CMO 27-2003 is valid even without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative
Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.
HELD: NO. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
given the force and effect of law.
Likewise, in Taada v. Tuvera, we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents
and texts of such decrees.
6 of 15

Also, the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported
article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even
before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when
it no longer required the customs officer's prior examination and assessment of the proper
classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new
and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
People vs. Maceren
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
inharmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect itsgeneral provisions. By such
regulations, the law itself cannot beextended. An administrative agencycannotamendan actofCongress.
FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 whichpenalizes electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Lawand the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the
complaint andheld that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicialdepartments cannot consider
the same. On appeal, theCFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, thisappealto theSC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?
HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheriesexceeded their authority in issuing
the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does notexpressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it.Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect couldhave been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to anexecutive official the power to declarewhat acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize theissuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for
in the law itself. Where thelegislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgaterules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and
boards,which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do notrepresent a valid precise of
the rule-making power.
Cruz vs. Youngberg
FACTS: Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of tenlarge cattle imported
by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155,
which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.
He also asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle
diseases in the country. The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was
declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded
because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from
giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The CFI
dismissed the complaint because of petitioners failure to file another complaint. The petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court. Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared
unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be
allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared
unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective.
ISSUES
1. WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional
2. WON the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-
General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in theact constitutes an unlawful
delegation of the legislative powers
3. WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law
HELD:
1.No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by
implication. The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so.
Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The latter was passed by the
Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle
diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of
industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects
within the scope of the police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands has the right to the
exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
At the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and it cannot
be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act.
2.No. The true distinction is between the delegations of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made. There is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
3.No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. Itdoes not
permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not an
amendment but merely supplemental to Tariff Law.
KMU vs. Garcia
FACTS: On June 26,1990, Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos issued memorandum circular No. 90-395 t
o then LTFRB, Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial buses operators to charge passeng
ers within a range of 15% above and 15% below, the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. On
December 5, 1990 private respondent PBOAP filed an application for fare rate increase to P0.085 and ag
ain it was reduced to P0.065 per kilometer rate. The application was opposed by the Philippine Consum
er Foundation Inc. that the proposed rate were exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application c
ontained no allegation on the rate o return on December 14, 1990. Public respondent LTFRB granted th
e fare rate increase on March 16, 1994. Petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the u
pward adjustment of bus fares, it was dismissed for lack of merit, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Provincial Bus Operators has the power to reduce and increase fare rated ba
sed on the circular order issued by the LTFRB?
HELD: Supreme Court held that the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a
fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an un
7 of 15
due delegation of legislative authority, Potestas delegata non delegari protest what has been delegat the decision of the administrative agency will be
ed further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the t made.
rust reposed in the delegate inandated to discharged it directly. Furthermore rate fixing or making is a d
elicate and sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and sound discretion wit The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
h the settle goal at arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both public utility and the public. preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions.

RATE FIXING: It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by
May not delegate to a mere constituent unit the rule making authority legislatively vested in the head law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking
of an executive department such being an abdication of responsibility by the latter. of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case.

As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the
requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met.
American Tobacco vs. Director of Patents
In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual
FACTS: Petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to "give the substance of
Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the
designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.
provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly
prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to
the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of
determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark,
Abejo vs. Dela Cruz
and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.
FACTS: Case involves a dispute between the principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell
Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction
Philippines, Inc.(Pocket Bell) namely spouses Abejos and the purchaser, Telectronic Systems, Inc.
over the above-mentioned cases.
(Telectronics) of their minority shareholdings and of shares registered in the name of spouses Bragas.
With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the majority stockholder, holding 56% of the
The Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the
outstanding stock and voting power of the corporation Pocket Bell. Telectronics requested the
afore-quoted Rule 168 to read as follows:
corporate secretary of the corporation, Norberto Braga, to register and transfer to its name, and those
of its nominees the total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares in the corporation's transfer book, cancel the
168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. The Director of Patents shall have original
surrendered certificates of stock and issue the corresponding new certificates of stock in its name and
jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, [In the event that the Patent Office is provided with an
those of its nominees. The latter refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in the corporate
Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases,
books, asserting that the Bragas claim pre-emptive rights over the Abejo shares and that Virginia Braga
instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original
never transferred her shares to Telectronics but had lost the five stock certificates representing those
jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of
shares. This triggered off the series of intertwined actions between the protagonists, all centered on the
Patents within three months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be governed by
question of jurisdiction over the dispute. The Bragas assert that the regular civil court has original and
Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said
exclusive jurisdiction as against the SEC, while the Abejos and Telectronics, as new majority
sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be [P25.00.] Such inter partes
shareholders, claim the contrary. Respondent Judge de la Cruz issued an order rescinding the order
proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of
which dismissed the complaint of the Bragas in the RTC, thus holding that the RTC and not the SEC had
Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official designated by the Director, but all judgments
jurisdiction. Respondent judge also revived the TRO previously issued restraining Telectronics' agents or
determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed
representatives from enforcing their resolution constituting themselves as the new set of officers of
by him.
Pocket Bell and from assuming control of the corporation and discharging their functions. The Abejos
filed a MR, which motion was duly opposed by the Bragas, which was denied by respondent Judge
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that
the amendment of the rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear
ISSUES: (1) Who has jurisdiction?
and decide inter partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the
(2) WON the corporate secretary may refuse to register the transfer of shares in the corporate books.
present petition for mandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of
petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
HELD: (1) The Court ruled that the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction and that the SEC correctly
ruled in dismissing the Bragas' petition questioning its jurisdiction, that "the issue is not the ownership
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of hearing officers other than the Director of Patents is a
of shares but rather than on-performance by the Corporate Secretary of the ministerial duty of
violation of due process.
recording transfers of shares of stock of the Corporation of which he is secretary." The dispute at bar, as
held by the SEC, is an intra-corporate dispute that has arisen between and among the principal
HELD: No. It is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency
stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell due to the refusal of the corporate secretary, backed up by
vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which
his parents as erstwhile majority shareholders, to perform his" ministerial duty" to record the transfers

8 of 15
of the corporation's controlling (56%) shares of stock, covered by duly endorsed certificates of stock, in
favor of Telectronics as the purchaser thereof.
(2) NO. As pointed out by the Abejos, Pocket Bell is not a close corporation, and no restriction over the
free transferability of the shares appears in the Articles of Incorporation, as well as in the bylaws and
the certificates of stock themselves, as required by law for the enforcement of such restriction. As the
SEC maintains, "There is no requirement that a stockholder of a corporation must be a registered one in
order that the Securities and Exchange Commission may take cognizance of a suit seeking to enforce his
rights as such stockholder." This is because the SEC by express mandate has "absolute jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all corporations" and is called upon to enforce the provisions of the
Corporation Code, among which is the stock purchaser's right to secure the corresponding certificate in
his name under the provisions of Section 63 of the Code.
document, the contents/entries therein made in the course of official duty are prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein
The CSC, including the CSCRO 1 in this case, being an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers, is
not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases, subject only to
limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As earlier opined, these basic requirements
of due process have been complied with by the CSC, including the CSCRO 1. No rule is more entrenched
in this jurisdiction than that the findings of facts of administrative bodies, if based on substantial
evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. Stated in another manner, as a general rule,
factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the CSC, that are affirmed by the CA, are conclusive
upon and generally not reviewable by this Court.

Donato vs. CSC Lupangco vs. CA

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Alejandro V. Donato, Jr. which seeks to reverse FACTS: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. Donato, Jr. was a secondary school teacher at the issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for
San Pedro Apartado National High School in Alcala, Pangasinan while Gil C. Arce held the position of admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
Assessment Clerk II at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of the said municipality. On October 5, No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall
1998, the Management Information Office of the Civil Service Commission in Diliman, Quezon City receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
received an anonymous letter-complaint requesting an investigation on the alleged dishonest act center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned
committed by Donato, Jr. It was alleged that Donato, Jr., falsely representing himself as Arce during the or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including
Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in 1995, took the said examination in behalf of the examination day.
latter. The Civil Service Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) No. 1, San Fernando City, La Union, found Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of
them guilty since there was substantial evidence. Specifically, the ID picture of Donato, Jr. pasted on the the Rules and Regulations of the Commission
Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination above Arces name. The On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
CA also held that Donato, Jr. and Arce were correctly found liable for dishonesty and falsification of accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
official document. others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with
a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the
Donato, Jr. and Arces claim of violation of their right to due process when they were found latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
administratively liable, allegedly despite the absence of witnesses against them, was given short shrift
by the CA. (He was not put on the witness stand and was not subjected to cross-examination.) He Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had
maintains that the presence of his ID picture above Arces name could be made by any person by simply no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution
pasting it over another ID picture for an evil purpose. He also raised another contention that the PSP
was erroneously considered as evidence when what was presented during the proceedings conducted In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and
by the CSCRO 1 was only a photocopy thereof enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it
found to be unconstitutional
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC and CA erred in ruling that the petitioner is liable for the charges of Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals
dishonesty and falsification of official document.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
HELD: NO. The petitioners contention that his right to due process was violated because he was not
able to cross-examine the person who had custody of the PSP is unavailing. In administrative HELD: It is not Constitutional. The questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose
proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim
explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities
ruling complained of. Such minimum requirements have been satisfied in this case for, in fact, hearings The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
were conducted by the CSCRO 1 and the petitioner and Arce actively participated therein and even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent
submitted their respective evidence. Moreover, they were able to seek reconsideration of the decision PRC Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right
of the CSCRO 1 and, subsequently, to elevate the case for review to the CSC and the CA. to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees
as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained
Likewise unavailing is the petitioners protestation that the PSP was not identified and formally offered from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
in evidence. It has been a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the duly accomplished form of the Civil accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.
Service is an official document of the Commission, which, by its very nature is considered in the same They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their
category as that of a public document, admissible in evidence without need of further proof. As official personal growth.

9 of 15
 Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs. Oil Industry Commission the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
FACTS: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease and Dealer Agreement"
employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the
entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation(hereinafter known as Shell) originally
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
in the year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969.The latter was filed and registered with the OIC.While
petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B. Yap defaulted in his obligations
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean that it can in
upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
demand letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these demands letters forcing
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are
petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell sent
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and submit evidence in
of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement."
support thereof;
Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC persisted in asserting
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
right of petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision within which to pay his judgment debt to
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law
denied it.
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
ISSUE: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual disputes between a
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision
gasoline dealer and an oil company.
rendered.
HELD: The OIC has no jurisdiction. The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. Detailed reading of
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby
power to hear and decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen
course a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative
the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
agencies like respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.
requirements set forth.
As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):" . . . It may be conceded that the
Legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise
of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions, but in so doing,
the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-
judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA
with, the performance of administrative duties which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over
a matter exclusively vested in the courts." FACTS: Petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., was registered as a non-pioneer enterprise with public
respondent BOI having been so issued, on 16 October 1989, a Certificate of Registration under
Executive Order No. 226, also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, in the manufacture of
glazed floor tiles. Among the specific terms and conditions imposed on First Lepantos registration were
that:
Ang Tibay vs. CIR 1. The enterprise shall export at least 50% of its production; (and)
2. The enterprise shall produce only glazed floor tile
FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union First Lepanto was, by virtue of its registration, granted non-fiscal and fiscal incentives by the BOI,
(NLU). NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid. The COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR), decided including an exemption from taxes on raw materials and tax and duty exemption on its imported capital
the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed equipment.
a motion for opposing the said motion.
Private respondent Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc., a competitor of First Lepanto, is also
ISSUE: What is the function of CIR as a special court? registered with the BOI as a non-pioneer producer of ceramic tiles (Certificate of Registration No. 89-
427).
HELD: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. First Lepanto requested for an amendment of its registered product to ceramic
103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is tiles in order to likewise enable it to manufacture ceramic wall tiles; however,
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is before the BOI could act on First Lepantos request for amendment, Mariwasa and
essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc., already had on file their separate complaints with the
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic BOI against First Lepanto for violating the terms and conditions of its registration
law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in

10 of 15
 by the use of its tax and duty-free equipment in the production of ceramic wall
tiles.
BOI rendered a decision finding First Lepanto guilty and imposing on the latter a
fine of P797,950.40 without prejudice, however, 1) to an imposition of additional
penalty should First Lepanto continue to commit the same violation; and 2) to the
Boards authority to consider/evaluate First Lepantos request for an amendment
of its certificate of registration, including, among other things, a change in its
registered product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles.
On 06 August 1992, another verified complaint was filed by Mariwasa with the BOI which
asseverated that, despite BOIs finding that First Lepanto had violated the terms and conditions of its
registration, the latter still continued with its unauthorized production and sale of ceramic wall tiles.
Respondent BOI dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Mariwasa went to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review, with an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, assailing the decision of the BOI. On 17
February 1992, the appellate court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the BOI and First
Lepanto from enforcing or executing the assailed ruling. First Lepanto moved for the dismissal of the
petition and to lift the restraining order. Court of Appeals rendered its now disputed
decision annulling the 10th December 1992 decision of the BOI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Under Chapter II, Art. 7(8) of E.O. No. 226, the BOI need not cancel the certificate of a registrant
found to have infringed the terms and conditions of its registration. Rather significant is the fact that to
hold the BOI from taking action on First Lepantos application would be to defeat the declaration of
investment policies expressed in the law; viz.:
ART. 2. Declaration of Investment Policies. - To accelerate the sound development of the national
economy in consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism and in pursuance of
a planned economically feasible and practical dispersal of industries and the promotion of small and
medium scale industries, under condition which will encourage competition and discourage
monopolies.
The BOI is the agency tasked with evaluating the feasibility of an investment project and to
decide which investment might be compatible with its development plans. The exercise of
administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by the
government agency concerned and not by the courts. BOI has allowed the amendment of First Lepantos
product line because that agency believes that allowing First Lepanto to manufacture wall tiles as well
will give it the needed technical and market flexibility, a key factor, to enable the firm to eventually
penetrate the world market and meet its export requirements.
Santos vs. NLRC
FACTS: In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Benjamin A. Santos,
former President of the Mana Mining and Development Corporation (MMDC), questions the resolution
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter
Fructouso T. Aurellano who, having held illegal the termination of employment of private respondent
Melvin D. Millena, has ordered petitioner MMDC, as well as its president (herein petitioner) and the
executive vice-president in their personal capacities, to pay Millena his monetary claims. Millena was
hired to be the project accountant for MMDC and terminated just because of rainy season,
deteriorating peace and order situation and little paperwork. He requested that he be reimbursed the
advances he had made for the company and be paid his accrued salaries/claims.
Petitioner Santos argued that public respondents have gravely abused their discretion in finding
petitioner solidarily liable with MMDC even in the absence of bad faith and malice on his part.
Petitioner also averred that he had never received any notice, summons or even a copy of the
complaint; hence, he said, the Labor Arbiter at no time had acquired jurisdiction over him. The NLRC
dismissed the motion for reconsideration because the petitioner was already represented by Atty.
Perez, the authorized counsel of MMDC.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether or not the petitioner is personally liable/solidarily liable with MMDC.
b.) Whether or not the NLRC should follow the Rules of Court in the observance of the legal processes
for acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
a.) He is not personally liable. It is basic that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate
and distinct from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to
which it may be related. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or
nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the
separate corporate personality. Petitioner Santos, therefore, should not have been made personally
answerable for the payment of private respondents back salaries
b.) NO. Although as a rule, modes of service of summons are strictly followed in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, such procedural modes, however, are liberally
construed in quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial compliance with the same being considered
adequate. Moreover, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired not only by
service of summons but also by voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.
Medenilla vs. CSC
FACTS: Petitioner Ardeliza Medenilla was a contractual employee of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) occupying the position of Public Relations Officer II. In 1987, Medenilla was
detailed as Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Manpower
Management. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 124 dated January 30, 1987, a reorganization ensued
within the DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern together with
the guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was issued. Included in the revised staffing
pattern is the contested position of Supervising Human Resource Development Officer. On January 2,
1989, the petitioner was appointed to the disputed position. On January 27, 1989, private respondents
jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting the appointment of
the petitioner to the position. The protestants alleged that since they are next-in-rank employees, one
of them should have been appointed to the said position. On August 2, 1989, the task force on
reorganization dismissed the protest. Not satisfied, the private respondents appealed the decision to
the Civil Service Commission. Thus, on February 28, 1990, the Commission resolved to disapprove the
promotional appointment of Ardeliza Medenilla to the position of Supervising Human Manpower
Development Officer.
11 of 15
ISSUES:
1. WON CSCs argument is correct in stating that petitioner must possess superior
qualifications in order to be preferred over the private respondents.
2. WON The Civil Service Commission pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, is
authorized to revoke appointments.
HELD:
1 .No. t can be readily seen that the petitioner possesses superior qualifications. As earlier stated, she is
a cum laude graduate of the University of the Philippines. She was ranked No. 1 in the department wide
training program handled by a private firm. Two of the respondents were ranked way below while a
third did not even participate. She was commended for exemplary performance as facilitator during the
Second Congress of Women in Government. She received the highest grades from De la Salle University
in her MBA studies. She helped draft the human resource program for the entire DPWH. Inspire of her
being a new employee, she was assigned to conduct seminars on Performance Appraisal Systems and
on Management by Objectives and Results for the DPWH. She was precisely drafted from a private firm
to assist in human resource planning for the DPWH. Her work is apparently highly satisfactory as the
top administrators of the DPWH not only appointed her but have asked the respondent Commission to
validate the appointment. The respondents rely on Section 4 of R.A. 6656, which reads:
Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference
for appointment to new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their
former positions or if there are not enough comparable positions, to position next lower in
rank.
Undoubtedly, old employees should be considered first. But it does not necessarily follow that they
should then automatically be appointed. The preference given to permanent employees assumes that
employees working in a Department for longer periods have gained not only superior skills but also
greater dedication to the public service. This is not always true and the law, moreover, does not
preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the government
service. If, after considering all the current employees, the Department Secretary cannot find among
them the person he needs to revive a moribund office or to upgrade second rate performance, there is
nothing in the Civil Service Law to prevent him from reaching out to other Departments or to the
private sector provided all his acts are bona fide for the best interest of the public service and the
person chosen has the needed qualifications. In the present case, there is no indication that the
petitioner was chosen for any other reason except to bring in a talented person with the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications for important assignments in the Department.
There is no legal fiat that a vacancy must be filled only by promotion; the appointing authority is given
wide discretion to fill a vacancy from among the several alternatives provided for by law.
In this case, the contested position was created in the course of reorganization.1wphi1 The position
appears to be a new one. The applicability, therefore, of the next-in-rank rule does not come in clearly.
Besides, as earlier stated, said rule is not absolute. There are valid exceptions.
2. NO. SC already ruled on several occasions that when the appointee is qualified, the Civil Service
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment. It is not within its prerogative to revoke an
appointee on the ground that substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power, another
person has better qualifications for the job. Once the function is discharged, the participation of the
Civil Service Commission in the appointment process ceases. The only purpose of attestation is to
determine whether the appointee possesses the requisite civil service eligibility, no more than that is
left for the Civil Service Commission to do. The rationale of this doctrine is that the power of
appointment is essentially discretionary. The discretion to be granted to the appointing authority, if not
plenary must at least be sufficient.
After all, not only is the appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the administration of
the office but he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can
efficiently discharge the functions of the position (see Villegas v. Subido, 30 SCRA 498 [1969]). As
between the Commission which only looks into paper qualifications and the appointing authority who
views not only the listed qualifications but also the prospective appointees themselves, the work to be
accomplished, the objectives of the Department, etc., the Court sustains the Department Head.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Masangcay vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before the
Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial numbers l-8071, l-
8072 and l-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in
violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated September 2,
1957, and its unnumbered resolution date March 5, 1957. Inasmuch as he opened said boxes not the
presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, as required in the
aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court. In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to
appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the
aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the Commission on October 21, 1957 and entered a
plea of not guilty. Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo
guilty as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of
P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial
jail of Aklan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5 of the Revised Election Code is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that
exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government. In other words, it is
contended that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null
and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty
under the principle of separation of powers.
The Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise
quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its
jurisdiction.
The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is administrative
in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission.
12 of 15
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the
charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an
administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the
distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities.
And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was sentenced
accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt,
and so its decision is null and void.
Velasquez vs. Nery
FACTS: Petitioners Jose Velasquez and Justina Velasquez are the agricultural lessees of a certain
riceland Petitioners Jose Velasquez and Justina Velasquez are the agricultural lessees of a certain
Riceland. The subject property was originally possessed and claimed by respondent Martin Nery. In an
action for annulment and reconveyance, the Supreme Court decided and declared in 1972, that
Lorenzos are co-owners of the land together with Martin Nery. Lorenzos filed an action for partition
against their co-owners Martin and Leoncia Nery before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch. In a compromise agreement submitted by the parties, the latter agreed to sell the said land to
respondent Delta Motors Corporation.
Petitioner Jose B. Velasquez, in his capacity as agricultural leasehold tenant, filed an action before the
then Court of Agrarian Relations against private respondents for the redemption of the subject
property, as he has information that the said land is offered for sale. However, Delta Motor Corporation
already purchased the subject property for P2,319,210.00, evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Petitioners
Velasquez seek to redeem the said land from Delta Motors for the sum of P8,800.00 anchoring his right
under Presidential Decree No. 27. The Court of Agrarian Relations rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the reasonable value of the land is P2,319,210.00 and not P8,800.00.
Petitioner appealed the case to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision of
the lower court. Not satisfied with the decision of the appellate court, petitioners now elevated the
case to this court in a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations is right in rendering a decision that the
reasonable redemption price of the land is P2,319,210.
HELD: The review sought by petitioners does not fall under any of the grounds warranting the exercise
of this Court's discretionary power. The matter of what is the reasonable redemption price being
factual, precludes this Court from reviewing the factual findings of the appellate court. The findings and
conclusions of the Intermediate Appellate Court that the sum of P2,319,210 is the "reasonable price" is
supported by evidence.
It is the established doctrine in this jurisdiction supported by unbroken line of decisions that such
findings of facts and conclusions cannot be reviewed on appeal by certiorari.
As a general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Agrarian Relations will not be disturbed on appeal
where there is substantial evidence to support the same and all that this Court is called upon to do
insofar as the evidence is concerned, is to find out if the conclusion of the lower court is supported by
"substantial evidence".
Substantial evidence in support of the findings of the Court of Agrarian Relations does not necessarily
import preponderant evidence as is required in ordinary civil cases. Substantial evidence has been
defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that of the
trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.
Lumiqued vs. Exevea
FACTS: Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Jeannette Zamudio,
the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged
that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance
worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks
after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the
complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the
second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of
counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the
date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The
Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated as well as his right to security of
tenure.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not
an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason,
in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was
not accused of any crime. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of
determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against
him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the
law.
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to
be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was
not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly
act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones
side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by
Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property. Public office is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process. But
when the dispute concerns ones constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is
deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be
invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was proven, as in
this case, that the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all
public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
13 of 15
 Jamil vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Abdullah A. Jamil and private respondent Alinader Balindong were among the
mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur, during the May 8, 1995
elections. Private respondent objected to the inclusion of four election returns from Precinct Nos. 5, 10-
1, 20-1 and 20 on the following grounds: a) Precinct Nos. 5 and 10-1 - the election returns were
prepared under duress; b) Precinct No. 20-1 - the election return was spurious, the Chairman, Poll Clerk
and Third Member of the Board of Election Inspectors did not sign the election return; c) Precinct No.
20 - the canvassed election return was not an authentic copy as the original was missing. This Election
returns is set aside and summons will be issued for the two BEIS who failed to affix their signatures and
explain the alleged increase of votes of a candidate and the use of unauthorized envelope without seal
containing ER and thereafter a ruling on the matter shall be rendered.
The first Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBC) took cognizance of the objection and thereby
ordered the exclusion of those contested precincts pending further investigation. However, when the
new Municipal Board of Canvassers was constituted, the said objections were denied and proceeded to
the proclamation of the petitioner, Abdullah A. Jamil as the Mayor-elect of the Municipality.
Private respondent filed an urgent motion before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of
petitioner as the winning candidate for mayor on the ground that the proclamation was without the
authority of the COMELEC, and to constitute a new Board of Canvassers. The Second Division of the
COMELEC, proceeding from the premise that the election returns from Precincts Nos. 5, 10-1 and 20-1
were excluded by the Sansarona MBC applying the Omnibus Resolution of the COMELEC dated June 29,
1995, issued an order disposing thereby:
...the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to ANNUL the proclamation of
petitioner Abdullah A. Jamil made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del
Sur on June 10, 1995 and June 26, 1995, respectively, it being contrary to law and jurisprudence; and,
to RELIEVE the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur, chaired by Mr. Casan
Macadato of its duties and functions as such.
ACCORDINGLY, the Regional Election Director, Region XII, Cotabato City, is hereby DIRECTED to
constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers for the Municipality of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del
Sur, which shall forthwith RECONVENE and PROCLAIM candidate ALINADER ALINDONG as the lawfully
elected Mayor of the Municipality of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur.
Pursuant to the August 24, 1995 order of the COMELEC, the newly constituted Municipal Board
of Canvassers, this time headed by Darangina Cariga, proclaimed private respondent Alinader Balindong
winner in the election after having obtained a total of 2,499 votes.
Petitioner Jamil insists that his proclamation by the Macadato Board as winner in the mayoralty
race of the said municipality was based on a complete canvass, all election returns having been
included therein, while the proclamation of private respondent Balindong by the Cariga Board was
based merely on an incomplete canvass, as the three election returns from Precinct Nos. 5, 10-1 and
20-1 were excluded from the canvass.
ISSUES:
First, which of the two proclamations made by two different MBCs in Sultan Gumander, Lanao
del Sur is valid - the proclamation of petitioner Abdullah Jamil dated June 26, 1995 by the Macadato
Board or the proclamation of private respondent Alinader Balindong dated September 5, 1995 by the
Cariga Board.
Second, whether the manner and procedure by which the members of respondent COMELEC
voted in the instant case was in accord with their own Rules of Procedure.
HELD:
1.) Both proclamations of petitioner and private respondent are invalid. Petitioner Jamil was
proclaimed on June 26, 1995 after Casan Macadato, chairman of the second MBC, conducted an
investigation with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of the returns from Precinct Nos. 5, 10-1 and 20-
1 and after he submitted his investigation report, which he alone signed, to the COMELEC on June 5,
1995 merely recommending the inclusion of the three returns in the canvass. As we have mentioned
above, said investigation report was not in form or substance a ruling of the MBC because it did not
make a definitive pronouncement or disposition resolving the issues regarding the questioned returns
but only a recommendation to the COMELEC. There being no ruling on the inclusion or exclusion of the
disputed returns, there could have been no complete and valid canvass which is a prerequisite to a valid
proclamation.
The proclamation of private respondent Balindong for the same reason was null and void, as it
was not predicated on a complete and valid canvass, but on supposed rulings of the Sansarona
MBC which merely set aside for further investigation the three challenged election returns from
Precinct Nos. 5, 10-1 and 20-1. Said proclamation had clearly no basis in fact and in law. It is
a settled rule that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid
proclamation. All of the votes cast in the election must be counted and all the returns presented to the
board must be considered as the disregard of the same would in effect disenfranchise the voters
affected. A canvass cannot be reflective as the true vote of the electorate unless all the returns are
considered.
2.) No. It was not in accord with their own rules and procedures. The fatal infirmity that vitiated
petitioners proclamation was the violation of Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits
the proclamation by the Board of Canvassers of a candidate as winner where returns are contested,
unless authorized by the COMELEC. No authority had been given by the COMELEC to the MBC for the
proclamation of petitioner Jamil.
Uy vs. COA
FACTS: Petitioners were among the more than 60 dismissed permanent employees of the Capitol of
Agusan del Sur by the newly incumbent Governor Paredes. They contended that the dismissal was a
political vengeance because he hired new employees. The Governor averred that the dismissal was not
illegal because it was due to the reduction in work force due to lack of funds and it is a valid ground of
terminating the services of the employees. The Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) held the
dismissal illegal and ordered their reinstatement but Governor Paredes refused to abide from the order.
The MSPB issued an Order dated April 19, 1993 which directed the Provincial Government of Agusan
del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits for the period that they had been
out of the service until their reinstatement. The matter was thereafter brought before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) which issued an order directing the Governor to reinstate the employees with the
caveat that should he fail to do so, the CSC would be constrained to initiate contempt proceedings
against him and other responsible officials As a result, the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur,
through its Acting Provincial Treasurer, refused to release petitioners remaining back salaries and other
monetary benefits. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by respondent COA,
because the claims are personal liability of Governor Paredes and not the Provincial Government of
Agusan del Sur.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back
wages of illegally dismissed employees.
14 of 15
HELD: We hold that respondent COA is bereft of power to disallow the payment of petitioners' back
wages. The case at bar brings to the fore the parameters of the power of the respondent COA to decide
administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds. Undoubtedly, the exercise of this power
involves the quasi-judicial aspect of government audit. As statutorily envisioned, this pertains to the
"examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities". The process of government
audit is adjudicative in nature. The decisions of COA presuppose an adjudicatory process involving the
determination and resolution of opposing claims. Its work as adjudicator of money claims for or against
the government means the exercise of judicial discretion. It includes the investigation, weighing of
evidence, and resolving whether items should or should not be included, or as applied to claim,
whether it should be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part. Its conclusions are not mere opinions
but are decisions which may be elevated to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.

The action taken by COA in disallowing the further payment by the Provincial Government of Agusan
del Sur of backwages due the petitioners amended the final decision of the MSPB. The jurisdiction of
the MSPB to render said decision is unquestionable. This decision cannot be categorized as void. Thus,
we cannot allow the COA to set it aside in the exercise of its broad powers of audit. The audit authority
of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Payment of backwages to illegally dismissed
government employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable. This is the reason why the Acting Provincial Treasurer, despite the pendency of his
query with the COA, proceeded to release government funds in partial payment of the claims of
petitioners.

15 of 15