HUMBERTO LIM, JR. in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORP./ atty-in-Fact of LUMOT JALANDONI vs. ATTY.

NICANOR VILLAROSA

Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis Jalbuena married to her daughter Carmen Jalbuena
and Humberto Lim, Jr. herein complainant married to her daughter, Cristina Lim. Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni
owned 97% of Penta Resorts Corp (PRC). That the only property of the corp, is as above-stated, the
Alhambra Hotel constructed solely thru the effort of the sps Jalbuena on the parcel of land now claimed
by the Cabiles family. PRC had a case wherein respondent was its counsel. Later on, complainant had a
case against sps Jalbuena where the parties were related to each other and the latter sps. Were
represented by the respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent had allegedly withdrawn as
counsel for the complainants which respondent averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto
Lim to represent his wife as one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative
complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the family.

It is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client relationship wit hthe respondent before the latter
retained as counsel by the sps. Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainants representative.
Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Sps. Jalbuena when charged by respondents former
client Jalandoni of PRc and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting interests in violation of CPR.

ISSUE: WON there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by the respondent

HELD: The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases which confidential communication have
been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. The first part of
the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or in a
totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the
atty. Appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present
controversy. The rule prohibitions a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those
of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally
unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC. An atty.
Owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the confidences of the client
he cannot, w/out the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and for one
whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter.

The relation of atty. And client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by
reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. An atty may only retire from a
case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in
which event the Atty. should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. The
appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional
counsel. Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean to
respondents desire to withdraw as counsel Respondents speculations on the professional relationship
of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case. Respondent should not
have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel would be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped
appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28, 1999, the first hearing date. No order from the
court was shown to have actually granted his motion for withdrawal.

Thus, Atty. Villarosa is found guilty of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of CPR and suspended from
practice of law for one year.
NESTOR PEREZ vs ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE

Perez as brgy. Captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines sur, that in Dec 2001, several suspects for
murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila were apprehended and
jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal bldg. of Calabanga where the
accused were being detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign
the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing
the heirs of the murder victim; The extrajudicial confessions included herein the complainant as the
mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged.

Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, he
conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under
compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.

ISSUE: WON the respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR

HELD: Atty. De la Torre was guilty of violation of Rule 15.03 of CPR. He is suspended for three years from
the practice of law. The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila
and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time that atty. De la Torre was representing the said two
accused, he was also representing the interest of the victims family.

Under Rule 15.03 of the CPR, a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain
from representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. The prohibition against
representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. His representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of
double-dealing and infidelity to his clients. What is unsetting is that respondent assisted in the execution
by the two accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious
criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims.
Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better
judgment before conceding to accuseds choice of counsel.

LETICIA GONZALES vs ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA

Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales, they harassed Gonzales and asked her to
execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint, Gonzales thereafter filed against the
Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simole coercion and unjust
vexation; where respondents law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented
the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said sps., respondent should be disbarred from
the practice of law since respondents acceptance of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer
client relationship between complainant and respondents law firm and renders respondent liable under
CPR particularly Rules 10.01, 13.01, 15.02, 15.03, 21.02 and 21.02. Respondent alleged that he never
appeared and represented of such case since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared
and represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife
in the cases filed against them bur claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the sps pleaded
with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case.

ISSUE: WON respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR

HELD: Respondent is guilty violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the CPR. It is well-settled that lawyer is
barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as
the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers
are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. The proscription against
representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.

Respondents allegation that it was his brother who represented Gonzales, thus there could be no
conflict of interest is no merit. As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented
Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interest applies.

The court consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the Gatcheco
sps pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally which handled the civil case of
Gonzales. And it was observed that there was no malice and bad faith in respondents acceptance of the
Gatchecos cases as shown by the move of complainant to withdraw the case. Thus, for violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of CPR and taking consideration of mitigating circumstances, Atty. Cabucana is fined the
amount of P 2,000 with stern warning that a commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

ELESIO C. PORMENTO, SR. vs. ATTY. ALIAS A. PONTEVEDRA

Facts: Complainant Elesio Pormento, Sr. alleges that between 1964 and 1994, respondent Atty. Alias
Pontevedra is his familys legal counsel having represented him and members of his family in all legal
proceedings in which they are involved. Rift between complainant and respondent began when
complainants counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648 was dismissed. Same parcel of land is involved in
another case filed by the complainant against several persons accusing them of theft for allegedly
cutting and stealing coconut trees within the premises of the said lot. Respondent was employed
counsel of the accused in this Criminal Case No. 3159.

Issue: WON Atty. Pontevedra was guilty of violating Canon 15

Held: Yes. Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 provides that A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The Court found conflict of
interests in respondents representation of herein complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 and his
subsequent employment as counsel of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3159. It cannot be denied that
when respondent was the counsel of the complainant in the civil case, he became privy to the
documents and information that complainant possessed with respect to the said parcel of land. Hence,
whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against complainant any information
given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have
precluded him from appearing as counsel for the opposing side.

GAMILLA V. MARINO

Facts:
Atty. Eduardo Marino Jr. was the president of the UST Faculty Union. Theres a long history of
collective bargaining agreement between UST and UST Faculty Union. During the series of agreements
between UST and the UST Faculty Union, Atty. Marino was removed from his position but continued to
serve as a lawyer for the UST Faculty Union. In the end, the UST Faculty won and was awarded 42 million
pesos for back wages, salaries, additional compensations, etc. Complainants are members of the UST
Faculty Union questioning the lack of transparency in the disbursement of the monetary benefits (42M)
for the faculty members, and prays for the expulsion of Atty. Marino for failure to account for the balance
of 42M ceded to them by UST and the attorneys fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted from the
benefits allotted to faculty members.

Issue: Whether or not the 4.2M attorneys fees is proportionate to the legal services rendered by Atty.
Marino

Held: No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear
differentiation between his legal services and his tasks union president comprising in all probity the same
duties for which he has collected a hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore, there was
lack of notice and transparency in Atty. Marinos dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty Union
when he obtained 4.2M as attorneys fees. A simple accounting of the money that he and others
concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the details of the agreements, would have
enlightened the faculty members about the probability of conflict of interests on respondents part and
guided them to look for alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a disciplinary
case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering
the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice
not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern
measure against respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action. Hence,
Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including
circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and
dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all
transactions with his client.

QUIAMBAO V. BAMBA

Facts:
Quiambao charges Atty. Bamba with violation of CPR for representing conflicting interests when
the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time representing her in another case, and for
committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. Atty. Bamba is the counsel of Allied Investigation
Bureau (AIB) and its president and managing director (Quiambao). Atty. Bamba is the counsel of
Quaimbao in an ejectment case. Later on, Quiambao resigned from AIB. While the ejectment case was
still ongoing, Atty. Bamba, as the counsel of AIB, filed a replevin case against Quiambao.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.

Held:
Yes, Atty. Bamba is guilty. Suspended for 1 year.
At the time Atty. Bamba filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB, he was still the counsel of record
of Quiambao in the pending ejectment case. Under Rule 15.03, a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. This is founded
on the principles of public policy because it is the only way that litigants can be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

3 Tests of Conflict of Interests:

1. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the
same time, to oppose that claim for the other client
2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty
of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
in the performance of that duty
3. Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment

PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on, Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent.
Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance
praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.
After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill-gotten wealth.
The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by
Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions
alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al.
and became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

ISSUE: WON Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza?
HELD: NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved
in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and
even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act
of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept
of 'matter under Rule 6.03.
The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure
provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition. The subject
'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the
subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan,
et al.
The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes
without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and
substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.
Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the
recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently
remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former
government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern
does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing
the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides.

HEIRS OF FALAME V. BAGUIO

FACTS
Plaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that their father engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry (in which Lydio and his brother
Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty. Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) A
special power of attorney executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his
attorney-in-fact; and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before the respondent, in which Raleigh
stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the case.
Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in the said case, Lydio
still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and counsel of his businesses until his death
in 1996.
However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, filed
a compliant against the plaintiffs involving the same property that was the subject matter in the first case.
Said complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds,
TCT issued as a consequence of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage.
 Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging that by acting as counsel
for the spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they were impleaded a defendants, respondent
violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. They contend that the spouses Falames interests are
adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.
The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving Investigating
Commissioner Winston Abuyuans report and recommendation for the dismissal of this case.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Baguio violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: Yes, he violated the rule. Rule 15.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.
The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest that which his duty
another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. The rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients confidence once reposed
should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. The protection given to a client
is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys
ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them.
It even survives the death of the client.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as
defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent
was established despite the fact that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or
charged for.
As defense counsel in the first civil case respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the
property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as
counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same
property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which
debase respondents rights as co-owner. The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason
of Lydios death or through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is
not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to the of Lydio. And while plaintiffs have
never been respondents clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydios ownership of it
which respondent maintained in the first civil case.

NAKPIL V. VALDES

FACTS
Valdes is Jose Nakpils accountant, consultant and lawyer.
Nakpil got interested in the purchase of a summer residence in Baguio but due to lack of funds,
he asked Valdes to buy it for him and hold it in trust.
 Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had the title issued in his
name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix of Joses estate. And, Valdes
law firm filed for the settlement of Joses estate.
Baguio property became an issue because the property was not included in Joses inventory of
estate, but the loans used to purchase the property were charged under his name.
The title to the property was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes family realty corp.
Valdes accounting firm handled the inventory of Joses estate but also, handled the claims of
Joses creditors- Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC.

ISSUE: w/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the code of professional
ethics

HELD: Yes. The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is.
Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full disclosure of the facts
among all concerned parties, as to the extent of conflict and probable adverse outcome.
The preparation of claims of the creditors against the estate is obviously improper because he
had to fight for one side, the claims he was defending against for the other side.
The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was not supported by evidence. His
resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he was absent for quite some time but returned to
work during the tenure of the litigation of claims. Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case.
The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the certainty of such
existence but mere probability for it to exist.
Even though he could have committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant, the
court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for misconduct committed outside the legal field,
as the good moral character requirement is not only a requisite for entrance to the bar but a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.
A lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal profession.

HORNILLA V. SALUNAT

FACTS
Complainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of the real properties of PPSTA corporation.
Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) and
at the same time the counsel of the PPSTA Board of Directors.
Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest.

ISSUE: Can a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members of the board of the same corporation in
a derivative suit?

HELD: No, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of representing conflicting interest and is
admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
The Court in this case explained the nature of a derivative suit. Where corporation directors have
committed a breach, ultra vires acts, or negligence a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other
stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation is the real party
in interest, while the stockholder who files a suit for the corporations behalf is only the nominal party.
The test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
A situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors
unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest.

PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ

FACTS
Pacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). Multitel
was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment
schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares
of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to Precedent.
Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ,
a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then on, they
constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and
Precedents relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare
standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established
between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time. There was an
attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didnt push through.
After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for the
return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopezs clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that
she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing
something for them and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about.
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent
demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first 900,000;
then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even when Pacana went to the states, they continued
communicating and he continued sending her money for the case.
Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his family
to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer.
------------
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as
his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently
kasi. -------- Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work.
-----------
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the
free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ----
Candy
 When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as attorneys
fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never happened though.
Lopez also ignored Pacanas repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him.
Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred her.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests.

HELD: Yes. Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for
engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana, who,
at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the
establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable
consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only
in the form of "friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to
complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by
the SEC.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was either
to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the
opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for
complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and
violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and,
later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that
she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to
absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon
her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money
they invested with Multitel.

PALM V. ATTY. ILEDAN

Facts:
Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She filed a case
of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the
stockholders meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-
laws of the corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the
attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of Soledad who
was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.

Issue: Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?
Held: No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have been
given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or
adoption of new by-laws may be effected by the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote
thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of
members of a non-stock corporation. It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments
to the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the
amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws. The documents are public records and could
not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed
amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-
laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus,
the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation
of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed
by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against
its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against
Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further,
respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A
lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that
arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated

TEODOSIO VS. NAVA

A.C. No. 4673.April 27, 2001

Facts:
Respondent Mercedes Nava used to be the manager of Melanie Batislaongs lending business and, in
that capacity, dealt with several borrowers, including Leticia Espinosa and Maria Gilda Palma. Due to
acts of mismanagement committed by Nava, Batislaong, sued Nava for accounting and damages and in
turn, Nava charged Batislaong, Espinosa and Palma with estafa.
While the complaints against them were pending preliminary investigation, Espinosa and Palma hired petitioner
Atty. Hector Teodosios services in seeking the annulment of certain trust receipt agreements allegedly
falsified by Nava, which was the basis of the criminal complaints against them. As a
r e s u l t , T e o d o s i o f i l e d o n t h e i r b e h a l f c i v i l cases against Nava and Batislaong for
annulment of contract and damages. Teodosio impleaded Batislaong as Navas co-defendant
because Espinosa and Palma wanted to settle the balance of the amount
they had borrowed from Batislaong through Nava but they were unsure to whom the payment
should be made. Both were, therefore, impleaded so that they could interplead who between
them should receive the payment. After Teosdosio had filed these cases Batislaong
offered to hire him as her counsel not only in the civil case s h e h a d f i l e d a g a i n s t N a v a
b u t a l s o i n t h e two estafa cases, filed against her by Nava. He claims that he agreed to represent
Batislaong in these cases only after he had explained to her the nature of the complaints filed by
Espinosa and Palma against her and Nava in the Civil Cases.
Nava filed a complaint against Teodosio for representing clients with conflicting interests in violation of
Rule 15.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Teodosio admits that Batislaong, Espinosa, Palma
are his clients but denies that their interests are conflicting and contends that his clients in fact have a
common interest against respondent Nava.
Teodosio submitted affidavits executed by Batislaong, Espinosa, and Palma stating that
they have no complaints in the way petitioner handled their cases and that each
of them was aware that the other was represented by petitioner. He further submitted another
set of affidavits executed by Espinosa and Palma stating in detail the
extent of their knowledge of petitioners involvement in Batislaongs cases as well as the basis of
their consent for him to act as their common counsel. Nava assails the affidavits of Batislaong,
Espinosa, and Palma on the ground that they were notarized by a lawyer from petitioners law firm
and that they do not bear the data as to the residence certificates of the affiants. She also
claims that Teodosio failed t o a s k t h e c o u r t t o d e c l a r e B a t i s l a o n g i n default despite
the latters failure to answer the complaints filed by Espinosa and Palma, and contends that this is proof
of petitioners bias for her (Batislaong).
When the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan recommended the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors, however in Resolution XIII-99-23 of February 23, 1999,
found petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and ordered
him suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be suspended for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility Rule 15.03?
NO, the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Held:
Court held that Teodosios conduct did not amount to a violation of the Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. U n d e r C a n o n 6 o f t h e p r e v i o u s
C a n o n s o f P r o f e s s i o n a l E t h i c s , a l a w y e r i s d e e m e d t o represent
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty
to another client requires
h i m t o o p p o s e . T h e r u l e i s d e s i g n e d t o remove from attorneys the opport
u n i t y t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e s e c r e t s o f c l i e n t s obtained during the existence
of the client-attorney relation. Teodosio contends that based on the causes of action of the
cases involving Batislaong on o n e h a n d a n d E s p i n o s a a n d P a l m a o n t h e other, he could
simultaneously represent them w i t h o u t a n y p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n o f t h e client-
attorney confidentiality. In the cases filed by him for Espinosa and Palma, it is only
N a v a a g a i n s t w h o m t h e f o r m e r h a v e a n adverse interest as it was t
h e l a t t e r w h o allegedly falsified the trust receipt
a g r e e m e n t s t o t h e p r e j u d i c e o f P a l m a a n d Espinosa. Indeed, were it not for the offer
of Palma and Espinosa to settle their obligation, there would have been no need to implead
B a t i s l a o n g a s a d e f e n d a n t . O n t h e o t h e r hand, in the other cases in which Batislaong is a
party, either as plaintiff in Civil Case or
a s a n a c c u s e d i n C r i m i n a l C a s e s , n e i t h e r Palma nor Espinosa are parties. Indeed, it
is Nava who is the respondent in the first case and the private complainant in the last two
criminal cases. Under the foregoing circumstances, the danger
that petitionerm a y a b u s e h i s c l i e n t s c o n f i d e n c e s t o t h e detriment of the other is absent.
Even granting that the interests of Espinosa, Palma, and Batislaong are conflicting, Teodosio cannot be
held liable for acting as their common counsel in view of the fact that, as stated in their affidavits,
petitioner explained to them the consequences of his representation and that they gave their consent to
the same. Indeed, Espinosa and Palma stated that it was they themselves who brought Batislaong to
petitioners office so that the latter could engage his services. The fact that the first set of affidavits
were uniformly notarized by an associate in petitioners law firm and that they did not state certain data
relating to the residence certificates of the affiants do not adversely affect their validity absent any
proof that the affiants did not execute them of their own volition or that their signature therein are not
authentic.

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC. VS ERNESTO SANTOS & RIVERLAND, INC.
G.R. No. 1530004
November 5, 2004

Facts:

Subject of the present petition for review on certiorari is the Decision, dated January 30, 2002, as well as
the April 12, 2002, Resolution of the Court of Appeals, The appellate court reversed the Decision, dated
October 4, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, and likewise denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

On October 26, 1990, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement which amicably ended all their
pending litigations. The pertinent portions of the Agreement, include the following: (1) Defendant
Foundation shall pay Plaintiff Santos P14.5 Million on (a) P1.5 Million immediately upon the execution of
this agreement and (b) The balance of P13 Million shall be paid, whether in one lump sum or in
installments, at the discretion of the Foundation, within a period of not more than two years from the
execution of this agreement; (2) Immediately upon the execution of this agreement (and [the] receipt of
the P1.5 Million), plaintiff Santos shall cause the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Cases; (3) Failure of
compliance of any of the foregoing terms and conditions by either or both parties to this agreement
shall ipso facto and ipso jure automatically entitle the aggrieved party to a writ of execution for the
enforcement of this agreement.

In compliance with the Compromise Agreement, respondent Santos moved for the dismissal of the
aforesaid civil cases. He also caused the lifting of the notices of lis pendens on the real properties
involved. For its part, petitioner SVHFI, paid P1.5 million to respondent Santos, leaving a balance of P13
million.

On October 28, 1992, respondent Santos sent another letter to petitioner inquiring when it would pay
the balance of P13 million. There was no response from petitioner. Consequently, respondent Santos
applied with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, for the issuance of a writ of execution of its
compromise judgment dated September 30, 1991. The RTC granted the writ.

Petitioner, however, filed numerous motions to block the enforcement of the said writ. The challenge of
the execution of the aforesaid compromise judgment even reached the Supreme Court. All these efforts,
however, were futile.

On November 22, 1994, petitioner's real properties located in Mabalacat, Pampanga were auctioned. In
the said auction, Riverland, Inc. was the highest bidder for P12 million and it was issued a Certificate of
Sale covering the real properties subject of the auction sale. Subsequently, another auction sale was
held on February 8, 1995, for the sale of real properties of petitioner in Bacolod City. Again, Riverland,
Inc. was the highest bidder. The Certificates of Sale issued for both properties provided for the right of
redemption within one year from the date of registration of the said properties.

On June 2, 1995, Santos and Riverland Inc. filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages alleging
that there was delay on the part of petitioner in paying the balance of P13 million.

Issues:

a) W/N the CA committed reversible error when it awarded legal interest in favor of the respondents
notwithstanding the fact that neither in the compromise agreement nor in the compromise of judgment
by the judge provides for payment of interest to the respondent?

b) W/N the CA erred in awarding legal interest to the respondents although the obligation of the
petitioner to the respondent is to pay a sum of money that had been converted into an obligation to pay
in kind?

c) W/N respondents are barred from demanding payment of interest by reason of the waiver provision
in the compromise agreement, which became the law among the parties.

Held:

On October 4, 1996, the trial court rendered a Decision dismissing the respondents' complaint and
ordering them to pay attorney's fees and exemplary damages to petitioner. Respondents then appealed
to the Court of Appeals.

The only issue to be resolved is whether the respondents are entitled to legal interest.

The appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court: WHEREFORE, finding merit in the appeal, the
appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered ordering appellee SVHFI to pay
appellants Santos and Riverland, Inc.: (1) legal interest on the principal amount of P13 million at the rate
of 12% per annum from the date of demand on October 28, 1992 up to the date of actual payment of
the whole obligation; and (2) P20,000 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

Delay : Delay as used in this article is synonymous to default or mora which means delay in the
fulfillment of obligations. It is the non-fulfillment of the obligation with respect to time. In the case at
bar, the obligation was already due and demandable after the lapse of the two-year period from the
execution of the contract. The two-year period ended on October 26, 1992. When the respondents gave
a demand letter on October 28, 1992, to the petitioner, the obligation was already due and
demandable. Furthermore, the obligation is liquidated because the debtor knows precisely how much
he is to pay and when he is to pay it.

The petition lacks merit

In the case at bar, the Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties on October 26, 1990. It
was judicially approved on September 30, 1991. Applying existing jurisprudence, the compromise
agreement as a consensual contract became binding between the parties upon its execution and not
upon its court approval. From the time a compromise is validly entered into, it becomes the source of
the rights and obligations of the parties thereto. The purpose of the compromise is precisely to replace
and terminate controverted claims.

As to the remaining P13 million, the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are clear and
unambiguous. It provides that the balance of P13 Million shall be paid, whether in one lump sum or in
installments, at the discretion of the Foundation, within a period of not more than two (2) years from
the execution of this agreement.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 30, 2002 of the Court
of Appeals and its April 12, 2002 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 55122 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.

ATTY. CATALAN v. ATTY. SILVOSA

A.C. No. 7360

Atty. Catalan filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa with 3 causes of action, one of which is that Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he has previously appeared as
prosecutor.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon. He appeared as public prosecutor in PP
v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon for the complex crime of double frustrated murder. Atty. Silvosa displayed
manifest bias in the accuseds favor them being relatives. He was then relieved from handling the
Esperon case then later, as private lawyer and counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail
pending finality of judgment.

Issue: WON the motion filed by the accused to post bail bond pending appeal is sufficient to establish a
lawyer-client relationship and thus violates Rule 6.03 of the CPR

Held: Yes. Rule 6.03 of the CPR states that A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service. When he entered his appearance on the Motion, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03
which provides that A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts. An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his
professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement
of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings,
or advocating his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients case in open court.

SEARES, JR. V. ATTY. GONZALES-ALZATE

Adm. Case No. 9058

Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was the legal counsel of Robert Seares, Jr. when he ran for the position of
Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the May 2007 elections. He lost but successfully ran in the 2010
elections. With him barely two months in office, one Carlito Turqueza charged him with abuse of
authority, oppression and grave misconduct in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Abra. Atty. Gonzales-
Alzate represented Turqueza as counsel. Seares, Jr. asserted that she intentionally made false and
hurtful statements in the memorandum she prepared in that administrative case in order to attack him.
He further asserted that she violated Canon 15, Canon 17, and Canon 18 of the CPR for negligently
handling his election protest, for prosecuting him, her former client, and for uttering false and hurtful
allegations against him.

Issue: WON Atty. Gonzales-Alzate violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests
when she assisted Turqueza in his administrative case against Seares, Jr., her former client

Held: No. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits an attorney from representing a
party in a controversy that is either directly or indirectly related to the subject matter of a previous
litigation involving another client.

Representing conflicting interests would occur only where the attorneys new engagement would
require her to use against a former client any confidential information gained from the previous
professional relation. The prohibition did not cover a situation where the subject matter of the present
engagement was totally unrelated to the previous engagement of the attorney. To constitute the
violation, the attorney should be shown to intentionally use against the former client the confidential
information acquired by her during the previous employment.

ARTEZUELA V. ATTY. MADERAZO

A.C. No. 4354

Facts: The respondent, Atty. Maderazo, was the counsel for complainant Lolita Artezuela. The latters
small carinderia was rammed by a vehicle Allan Echavia was driving. They filed a damage suit against
driver Echavia but was dismissed allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her husband.
Artezuela filed a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that while acting
as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document
was even printed in respondents office. Complainant further averred that it was the respondent who
sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her
consent.
The Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Commissioner Ingles issued a
Report finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue: WON Atty. Medrazo was guilty of violating Canon 15

Held: Yes. To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a consel-of-record of one party need not also
be consel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the
adverse party. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading
of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. A lawyer
represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-
client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties.

SAMSON V. ATTY. ERA

A.C. No. 6664

Facts: Ferdinand Samson and his relatives fell prey to the pyramiding scam of ICS Corporation led by
Emilia Sison. They engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist them in the criminal prosecution for several
counts of estafa. Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson discussing the possibility of amicable
settlement guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to
ICS Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They acceded. Later, they found out that they cannot
liquidate the property because it is now registered under Bank Wise Inc.

Atty. Era did not respond to the group of Samson prompting them to engage another lawyer only to find
out later on that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases involving the same pyramiding scam.

Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion of the compromise settlement between Samson and Sison had
terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his group. The case was
referred to the IBP and they found the respondent guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests.

Issue: WON Atty. Era was guilty of violating Canon 15 of the CPR

Held: Yes. The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate when they entered into the compromise
settlement, for the fact remained that he still needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement
as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the
trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal
cases did not ipso facto cause the termination of the cases not only because the compromise would
have applied only to the civil aspect and excluded the criminal aspect.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. He was expected to exert his best efforts and
ability to preserve the clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served
the ends of justice.