Celedonio Manubag Jr. Case Digests Compilation Summer 2017 (Atty. Maligon)

Celedonio S Manubag Jr.
Case Digest Compilation Summer 2017

Professor: Atty. Malig-on
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

Self Executing Statutes
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, will provide
management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a managers
check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may
be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing
the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
Celedonio S Manubag Jr. Case Digest Compilation Summer 2017
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agrees.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to
public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to
match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other
ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of
the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner
as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements
and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts
and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
Oposa vs. Factoran 224 SCRA 792

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they
are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among
many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192
and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that
no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by

the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is
SET ASIDE.
Kilosbayan vs Morato GR No. 118910

FACTS:
[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the
same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375
(Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease
between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint venture which were found
in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be
submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, 1
(e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is
vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot
purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5) that
what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral crusade and political
agenda, using the Court as their forum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corp. is invalid.
HELD:
NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the
SC held:
xxx
(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the
charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;
(4) that under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has
authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in
association, collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or
conducts such lottery; and
(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be submitted to
public bidding as a condition for its validity.
RATIO:
E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on
lease are found in 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces
for government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these
provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be
applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a
contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of
course a contract of purchase and sale.
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture agreement the
present lease contract is [more] advantageous to the government. The question is whether
under the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous contract that could be obtained
compared with similar lease agreements which the PCSO could have made with other parties.
Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms could have been obtained by the PCSO
or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to
the government.
Francisco, et al vs House Speaker Gr No. 160261

Rules in Interpretation
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice
ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since
the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is
clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated
by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do
away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.
Santiago vs Guingona GR No. 134577

Political Question vs Justiciable Controversy
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the
11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S.
Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President. By
a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to
the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators
belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the
following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7
members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader
of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for
quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also
invoke the Courts judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority
and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. However, such
offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the
basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully
held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or
standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has
not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power
has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office
of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The latter belongs to
one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of
the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be accused of
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
Javellana vs Exec Secretary GR No. 36142

Political Question vs Justiciable Controversy
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite
cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any
of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This
is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class
suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged
that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution,
thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution;
without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution;
and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null
and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order,
decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or
political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has
been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in
force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or
not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the
1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of
the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the
US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the
qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of
suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizens
assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizens Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in
that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid
votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the
qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not orally or by
raising hands by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for,
since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System,
with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the
Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit
judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of
COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place
without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein
mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the
returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of
Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the
1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizens Assemblies is null and void, insofar
as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935
Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive.
But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the
citizens assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither
the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of
Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies
all over the Philippines. The citizens assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is
to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizens assemblies in
many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the
Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally
connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition
by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members
have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle
of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the
orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees
and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary
effects, issuedsubsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said
Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people,
under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that
the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution
by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the
respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said
Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies
the executive department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein
should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution,
either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that
said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the
Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with
Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in
force at the time of such plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court,
namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the
premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial
certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members
of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to
declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

Supremacy of the Constitution
FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the
NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC
and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the
LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc
won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and
Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a
letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in
Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from
the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation
of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.
RULING:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office,
devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party
discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount
of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is
that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as
sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as
members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration
of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or
removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Supremacy of the Constitution
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last
date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of
the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for
filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections
to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the
case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of
a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and
the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that
it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department

of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental
law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore,
the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was
still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as
depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be
"the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with
cost against the petitioner.
Magallona, et al vs Ermita GR No. 187167

Archipelagic Doctrine
Facts:
RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.
RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which
the government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.
RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in
compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one
baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough
Shoal as Regimes of Island.
Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of
RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens
the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the
economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the
classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens
who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.
First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to
demarcate the countrys maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized
that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of
nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to
establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical
miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to
measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines
measured in accordance to the treatythe role played by RA 9522. The contention of the
petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit.
The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total
maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with
the Philippines sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the
country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline
shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the
situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough
Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the
classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and States responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over
which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitutions delineation
of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the
Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and
sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution
hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of
water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not
bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the
generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a
municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since
the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated
thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of
archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the
demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within
such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to
UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by
it.
The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the
passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to
comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall
be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the countrys case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of
the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a
most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.
Tecson vs. Comelec GR No. 161434

Modes of Acquisition: Citizenship
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be
20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated,
on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23
January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining
order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR
161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the
President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born
citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date,
month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli,
res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis,
could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and
the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate
of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn
with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe
was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ,
and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a
public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate
his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be

material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
Mo ya Lim Yao vs. Commission on Immigration 41 SCRA 29

Modes of acquisition: Citizenship
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8
February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great
grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961
for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines
on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period
as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might
properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At
the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know
the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born
or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow
of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required
to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended
to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand
today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to
Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or
the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation
obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as
res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
Valles vs Comelec 337 SCRA 543
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she
is an Australian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at
that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902
and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship,
was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Bengson III vs HRET GR No. 142840

Mode of acquisition: Citizenship
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the
duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Co vs HRET 199 SCRA 692
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the
candidate is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship
of respondent Ong since Ongs father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned
Ongs residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;

2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
RULING:
1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at
bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the
HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondents father, an immigrant from China was
declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the
private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the
province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent
Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino mother, thus the issue of
citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of
the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has
sufficiently proved.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Balgamelo Cabiling, et al vs Commissioner GR No. 183133

Modes of acquisition: Citizenhip
FACTS:
The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino
mother. They were all raised, have resided and lived their whole lives in this country. During
their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs).Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however,
failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUE:
Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry encumbers
persons to become naturalized citizens of the Philippines.
RULING:
No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that
was belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to
elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the
statutory requirements for such election.The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over
half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is
equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Republic vs Dela Rosa GR No. 104654

Naturalization
FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act
No. 63 before the RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed
the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6
months before the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to
January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge
granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was
issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.

February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted
as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision
made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same
date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. The proceedings of
the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
Frivaldo vs Comelec 257 SCRA 731

Naturalization
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in
due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the
Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims
that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the
alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American
citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD
725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
Tabasa vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125 793

Naturalization: Reacquisition
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his father
became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was admitted
as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. The Consul
General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that his passport has been
revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with the
RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained
by the BID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and therefore, is
not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only person
entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her Philippine
citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who
lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied in
his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege
under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the
petition for repatriation.
Mercado vs Manzano G.R. No. 135083

Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance
FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the ground
that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the United States
of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual
citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running any public position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local
position.
RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per
se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification.
Jacot vs Dal and Comelec GR No. 179848

FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for
the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local
Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He
was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13
December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a
vice-mayor?
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all
those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign
citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their
special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
AAJS Member Calilang vs Dumatong GR No. 160869

FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing RA
9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other
Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and is not self-executing
provision.
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
Co Kim Cham vs Tan Keh 75 Phils 113

Kinds of Government: De Facto and De Jure
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings
in petitioners case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by
General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and
judgments of court during the Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower
courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the government
established during the Japanese occupation was no de facto government.
ISSUE:
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain
good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by
military forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as
judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after
reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically
refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the
courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depend upon the laws which
create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It
is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases not
of political complexion.
Lawyers League for Better Phils vs Aquino GR No. 73748, 73972

Kinds of Government: De Facto and De Jure
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the new government was installed through
a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizens actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people
that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held
its legitimacy.
Rulings:
1.Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The
holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have
a cause of action.
2. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of
the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government.
GP vs Monte De Piedad GR No. 9959

Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions

amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims
of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a
charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for
the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the
$80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the
right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-
General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with
interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered
in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency,
together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to
question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the
suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?
Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the
rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote
the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as parents of
the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.
Soriano vs Laguardia GR No. 164785, 587 SCRA 79

Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB,
separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the
religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse
effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in
Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that
petitioners suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior
restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the
paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the
power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be
avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication.
There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
Tanada vs Angara GR No. 118295

Theory of Auto-limitation
Facts:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus,
provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in
the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and
impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of
the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt
servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere
moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. Through WTO the
sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a
regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as
autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether
such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The
act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of
membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a
limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative
is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through
their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel GR No. 183591

Question: Is Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) a State within a State?
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the
local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from
their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the
mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters
of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest
in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as
to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest
in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed,
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept
of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the
BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with
the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional provision
just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the
MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the
proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be
put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers
are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF
1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is
vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to
a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
Peralta vs Director of Prisons 75 PHIL 285

Belligerent Occupation and its effects
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic
of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of
Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional
rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from the time of the
restoration of the Commonwealth?
HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid
since it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act
No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to
be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner
of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
Laurel vs Misa 77 Phil 856

Belligerent Occupation and its effects
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted
for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on
the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino
citizens was then suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines
upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
to the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does
not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense
to the same government and same sovereign people.
Republic vs Villasor 54 SCRA 83

Non-suability of the State
Facts:
The case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of The
Court of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds allocated for the Arm Forces of
the Philippines.
A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner
herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special
Proceedings. The respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the
said decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City and
Manila to execute the said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On
the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of
military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.
Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess
of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and
garnishment are null and void.
Issues:
Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.
Discussions:
The provision of Sec 3 Article XVI declares that the State may not be sued without its
consent. This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and
express an affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of
justice. Another justification is the practical consideration that the demands and
inconveniences of litigation will divert time and resources of the State from the more pressing
matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice of the public welfare.
As a general rule, whether the money is deposited by way of general or special deposit, they
remain government funds and are not subject to garnishment. An exception of the rule is a law
or ordinance that has been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid government
obligation.
Tan vs Director of Forestry 125 SCRA 302

Non-suability of the State
FACTS:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a
certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares,
within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was
turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine
others submitted their application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant
new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein (not
exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon)
promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the
Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of
Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the
Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of
Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but
the same was not granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the
order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)
RULING:
I
Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is therefore void ab
initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated May 30, 1963, the Director of
Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered
thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. (The license was
released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the
Director of Forestry to issue license was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the
Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and
said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date of the release
or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-

appellees can validly revoke his timber license. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state,
or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to
defeat the proper exercise of police power.
II
Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of
the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or
acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on
his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Republic vs Feliciano 148 SCRA 424

State cannot be sued without its consent
Facts:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the
Philippines to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent.
Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land consisting of four lots. The trial court
rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of
the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the
decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land
for more than 20 years under claim of ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to
present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence.
Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was
submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to allow
them to present their evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a
motion for execution with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot
be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by
Feliciano.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing
that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua
sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be
construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative
act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of
State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Ruling/s:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff
has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private
person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is
not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party
or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by
plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not
permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or
by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is
no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of
such consent.
PNB vs Pabala 83 SCRA 595

Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution
authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66
belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA).
Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the
questioned funds are of public character and therefore may not be garnished, attached or
levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on
the notice of garnishment.
Issues:
Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued.
Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited
with the petitioner bank is valid.
Discussions:
The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In this case, Consent
to be sued was given impliedly when the State enters into a commercial contract. When the
State enters into a contract, the State is deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of
sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of
public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
Rulings:
PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The
government has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its
sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject
to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Therefore, the petition of
PNB La Union is denied.
The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment. Funds of
public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. Thus, the
writ of execution be imposed immediately.
Department of Agriculture vs NLRC

Facts:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and
requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the
DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay,
as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA
and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and
executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on
execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ
of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim
against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the
cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issues:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.
Discussions:
Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should
first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the
States immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that
no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of
the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money
claims against the Government must be strictly observed.
Rulings:
No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State
may at times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in
Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government consents and submits to be sued upon any
money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as
a basis of civil action between private parties.
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the complainant security
guards clearly constitute money claims.
Sanders vs Veridiano 162 SCRA 88

FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo
city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently
residing in the Philippines and who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special
services department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their
employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter
addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officers report of the
reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.
Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which caused them to be
ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners.
ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the
acts for which the private respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called
to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official
character of the letters, the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the
United States government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government
sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents
must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites
States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were
committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.
Mobile Phil Inc v Customs 18 SCRA 1120

Immunity from suit
Facts:
This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre Service and the
Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service,
the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs
Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the
shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the
Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered
case plus other damages.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons
under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities
are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at
the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private
individuals.
Issues:
Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs can invoke state
immunity.
Discussions:
The Bureau of Custom, is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a separate juridical
personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all
other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. As stated in the law, agencies of the
government is not suable if it is performing governmental functions and if it an unincorporated
government entity without a separate juridical personality.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of
money and damages involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be
deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental
function of the Bureau of Customs. The Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate
government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its
being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its
governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit
extended to such government entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff should have
filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the
Government may be filed.
National Airports Corp vs Teodoro 91 Phil 203

Immunity from suit
FACTS:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly
made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation.
On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation was abolished by Executive Order
No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.
Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,
245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including
July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc.
which owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine
Airlines, Inc.
In 1951 to recover the above amount, The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party
complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved,
and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees
claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party
defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said Bacolod
Airport No. 2
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first,
because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical personality," and, second,
because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical
personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued."
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not government corporate agency may be sued
2. Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be sued
HELD
1. As a general rule, state cannot be sued without its consent and there can be no legal
basis against the authority that formulate the law and which the law depends. But the
exemptions are the unincorporated type of government and functioning for proprietary.
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune to suits.
Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity
was organized. however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract
with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to
the level of an individual from which 'it can be implied that it has given its consent to be
sued under the contract
2. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under section 3
of Executive Order No. 365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and
to grant concession rights, and under section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales
to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for. the use of any
property under its management. These provisions confer upon 'the Civil Aeronautics
Administration the power to sue and be sued, which is implied from the power to
transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to
prosecute and defend suits for and against the Mational Airports Corporation, having
acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of
the latter.
According to the court, the petition is denied with costs against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
PNB vs CIR 81 SCRA 314

Immunity from suit
Facts:
A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been
issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and
Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds:
That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve
the writ of execution was contrary to law and
That the funds subject of the garnishment may be public in character. In thus denying the
motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a
failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is denied for the
lack of merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the notice
of Garnishment dated May 6, 1970.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this certiorari
petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized
as a grave abuse of discretion.
Discussions:
According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government Agencies:
An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate judicial
personality. If the agency is incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.
From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him:
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading
company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its
privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself,
and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be
transacted.
Rulings:
No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The premise that
the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow
though that they were exempt from garnishment.
As stated in National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, a
government owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government. It may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court
processes just like any other corporation.
Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to
the rules of law governing private corporations.
Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge Firme 192 SCRA 692

Suability of an LGU
Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of
the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and
four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney.
However, the defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of
a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as
lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the
negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the
collision.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The
owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred
and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in a motion to dismiss.
Discussions:
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver acting in behalf of
the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary functions. Municipal corporations
are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity
when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by
law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Rulings:
Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the
State until trial. However, the respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with
the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its
judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise
of the municipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision,
he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When
the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if
it can, that the defendant is liable. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable
for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on
whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions.
Merrit vs GPI 34 Phil 311

Immunity from suit exceptions: Special Consent
Facts:
The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital
Ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or
horn. Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency
as a contractor was affected. The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanent injuries
and the loss of wages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. In order for
Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized the
plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said
suit.
On this appeal, Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred:
in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as
claimed in the complaint, and
in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days
and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by
plaintiff in his complaint.
On the other hand, the Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court
erred:
in finding that the collision between the plaintiffs motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged agent or
employee of the Government;
in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; and
in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
Issues:
Whether or not the Government is legally liable to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to
commence against it.
Whether or not the ambulance driver is considered as an employee of the government.
Discussions:
The waiver of immunity of the State does not mean concession of its liability. When the State
allows itself to be sued, all it does in effect is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if
it can, that the State is liable.
Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code reads that The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.
Rulings:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability
to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer
acting as a special agent. Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As stated by
Justice Story of United States The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all
its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of
the public interest.
USA vs Guinto 182 SCRA 644

Immunity from suit exceptions: Contracts
Facts:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect
suits against it to which it has not consented.
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said
base. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who
claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was
not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a
rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of
preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived
its non-suability, but trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts
done by them in the performance of their official duties.
Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state
as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its
admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles
in its relations with other states.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the
government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Rulings:
The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to
be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United
States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This
being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the
private respondents in the court below.
Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or
agents of the United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which
the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the
judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the
paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant
of the barbershop concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to
receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are
entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court
below for further proceedings.
Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon GR 54705

Immunity from suit exceptions: Contracts
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the
Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws
and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units
and was to take effect in a period of four years.
When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration,
he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with
the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated
the agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he
filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
Issues:
Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from
suit.
Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued
herein in their private capacities.
Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle
of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A
contrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of nations.
The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The
increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of
sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the
government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the
commercial activities of a state.)
Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity to suit. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri
gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of
a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private
entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of
Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the
respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the
discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent
shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy
immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent
in the receiving State outside his official functions.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said
provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any
professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.
Froilan vs Pan Oriental Shipping GR No. 6060

Immunity from suit exceptions: Litigation
Facts:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for
P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the
payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in
favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the
installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the
contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the
defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the
Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original
contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of
replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and
that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court
issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff s rights under the contract of sale, for the
reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to
dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights
he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental
refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof
and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was
allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel
mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.
Discussions:
When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself
of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual.
Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against
the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not
deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail
itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative
in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes
down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the
right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.
Amigable vs Cuenca 43 SCRA 360

Immunity from suit exceptions: Litigation
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case,
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the petitioner is a rightful owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion
of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner
then filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of ownership and possession of
the lot.
Defendants argue that the: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed
first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery had
already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral
damages, attorneys fees and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not given its
consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated
and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of
action against the defendants.
The court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs cause of
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate
jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiffs claim for compensatory damages, being a money
claim against the government; and that it had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over
said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the
complaint was dismissed.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Amigable, may properly sue the government under the facts of the
case.
Decisions:
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice
to a citizen.
Quoting the decision from Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Where the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit.
Rulings:
Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her
lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner,
she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at any time
because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of
possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at
the time of the taking.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest
on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the
government. In addition, the government should pay for attorneys fees, the amount of which
should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
Basco vs Pagcor GR No. 91649

Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. It waived the Manila Cit governments right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into the local governments right
to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy.
Issue:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the
municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act
which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to
tax.
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress, which has the power to create and abolish
municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the
power of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
2. The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by
P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National
Government has the power to issue license or permits for the operation of gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No.
1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual
role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places
it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality
of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by
P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to impose taxes and
fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
Tolentino vs Comelec GR No. 148334

Sovereignty of the People
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of
2001 were conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a
special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the
13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the
senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the
declaration of the 13th elected senator.
Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning
was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not
to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo
warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised
our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage, considering
that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again
On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.
The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as
required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill
such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. The law
charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the
additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled
and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not
be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible information
resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent showing of grave abuse
of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.
Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 Phil 171

Adherence to International Law
Facts
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before
the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during
such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal
atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the
law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using
as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war
crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in
such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the
case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issue
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office
and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with
Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of international law
includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other
international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle that all
persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of
war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by
these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most
especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a
signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if
not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of
Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules
as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very
provisions of this special law.
Philip-Morris vs CA GR No. 91332

Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to seek the reversal and setting
aside of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty
conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when
respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued
against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from manufacturing and selling MARK cigarettes in the
local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners respective symbols MARK VII, MARK
TEN, and MARK, also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation.
All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated
transaction, They Invoked provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
and Intellectual Property. As corporate nationals of member-countries of the Paris Union, they
can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or for unfair competition,
without need of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the Philippines, and
without necessity of actually doing business in the Philippines.
Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement and damages against
Fortune Tobacco before the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for manufacturing and selling
cigarettes bearing the trademark Mark which is identical and confusingly similar to Philip
Morris trademarks. The said act was dismissed. Hence, this petition at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs right of property to such trademark or
trade name.
Discussions:
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the
requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement
inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the
primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of
incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing
equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments
Ruling/s:
No. There is no proof that any of petitioners products which they seek to protect from any
adverse effect of the trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for
commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines.
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the
Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged
in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered
by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of
their right to be protected.
Sec. of Justice vs Lantion GR No. 139465

Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the
extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for
his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the
request. Charges include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed
to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the
extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice
denied request on the following grounds:
He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that
point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition
Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the
documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion
favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well
as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize
them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules
of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed
in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
Ichong vs Hernandez 101 Phil 1155

Conflict of Municipal and International Law
Facts:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed.
The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner
in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the
Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the
Philippines and China was violated according to him.
Issue:
Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided
that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.
The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the
said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and
the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
Govt of US vs Puruganan GR No. 148571

Doctrine of Tranformation
Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to
post bail for his provisional liberty.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.
Ruling/s:
No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of
the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead
of taking it, he ran away.
Gonzales vs Hechanova 9 SCRA 230

Conflict of Municipal and International Law
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No.
3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and
corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the
President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They
add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency
from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import
rice under its provisions. They contended that the government has already constitute valid
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and
3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 251 SCRA 569

International Law
FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated
raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a
band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated
July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional
limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the
explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and
state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious
ceremony. The children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the
flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population
which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do
not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Aglipay vs Ruiz 64 Phil 201

Freedom of religion
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating
that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of
religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for
the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a
weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in
accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the
production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held:
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration.
It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No.
4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The
issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of
the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international
importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman
Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or
purpose of the Government.
Ymbong vs Ochoa GR No. 204819

Freedom of Religion
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom

Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to ones freedom of
expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with
if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this
view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the
statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal
effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid
portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing
and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views
on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning
of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy
the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should
be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret
this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using
the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec.
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec
3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available
to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind
the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA.
Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine
whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies
of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would
violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus,
the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of
the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial
privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State
to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which
reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective
surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in
this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not
yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of
several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health care
institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service
provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are
exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of
the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do
not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on
the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It
has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where
the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the
various provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and responsible
parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer
a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void
for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726

State Policies
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of t
heCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
Valmonte vs Belmonte 170 SCRA 256

State Policies
FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General
Manager, requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular
Batasang Pambansa including the ten (10) opposition members who were able to secure a
clean loan of P 2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not possible,
an access to those said documents. Apart from Valmontes letter, he is stressing the premise of
the request on the present provision of the Freedom constitution at that time which is Art. IV,
Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Mr. Belmonte, aware that such request contains serious legal implications seek the help of Mr.
Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In Mr. Tiros reply letter, a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be;
that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not
be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General
Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to receive a reply,
they are now considering themselves free to do whatever action necessary within the
premises to pursue their desired objective in pursuance of public interest.
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After
petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
In his comment, respondent raise procedural objection to the issuance of a writ of mandamus,
among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent
claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS petitioners. However, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is therefore
asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no
cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the
documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
RULING:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people
to the state. Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not
absolute. Peoples right to information is limited to matters of public concern and is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977 provide for annual appropriations
for to pay for contributions, premiums , interest and other amounts payable to
GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the
Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature
of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence
and in strict compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore
the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed
properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and
were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its
tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were above
board.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and
its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the
indiscriminate dissemination of information. He further contends that in view of
the right to privacy, which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing
laws, the documents, evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed
outside the ambit of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the
landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando
stated that ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the court in Morfe is that the right
to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and
the government agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by
juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name
since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General manager, the respondent, invoke the
right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence,
may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions are
private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern which guarantees access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions only. Further, they argued that GSIS, is a governmental corporation
performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the peoples right to
access to official records.
This Dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated in

ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices, the
Court said that the government, WHETHER carrying out its sovereign attributes or
running some business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS , in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary
function would NOT justify the exclusion of transactions from the coverage and
scope of right to information.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the respondent General
Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow
petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to
members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to
reasonable regulations as to time and manner of inspection, not incompatible
with the decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO ORDERED.
Gonzales vs Office of the President GR No. 196231, 679 SCRA 614

Principles under our Presidential System
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues
relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein
petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats,
robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila
Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others.
Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the
Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation
to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was
lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the
Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city
Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by
the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant
the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal
Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal
without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for
failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due
notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision
finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave
Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed
for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez
for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action
when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day
of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police
service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder
of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government
officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident
through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and
gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions
for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from
submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The
prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner
was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia,
their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding
that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the
government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA")
entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the
change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off
the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's
apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House
of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the
PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice
passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President
the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are
violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal
from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrativedisciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's
authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government

officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners
cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on
the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two
apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable
conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to
exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent
of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same
Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government
officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities.
By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy
Ombudsman and aSpecial Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled an obvious gap inthe
law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for
in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article,
there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal
from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By
enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without
running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a Special
Prosecutor isImplied from his Power toAppoint. In giving the President the power
to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid
down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's
constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect
the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial
importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the
military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy Ombudsmandoes not
Diminish theIndependence of the Office of theOmbudsman. he claim that Section
8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of
the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms
of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where thequestioned acts,
falling short ofconstitutional standards, do notconstitute betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to
the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be
considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to
wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the
request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of
the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office
of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant
verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending
for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's
undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal
grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that
could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of
any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal
must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in
office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he
may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind
amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitionerBarreras-Sulit to determine theexistence of any
of the grounds forher removal from office as providedfor under the Constitution
and theOmbudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP
Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is
ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of
suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case
against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case
No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts
and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal
of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is
hereby DENIED.
Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs Public Service Commission 40 OG 8th Supp 57

Separation of powers
FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan

Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past
twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of
Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco
filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10
additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which
was made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied,
Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:

- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called
Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing
complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative
function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National
Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper
and suitable manner.
The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers

no property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental
control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing,
to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the
facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard,
so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.
In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should
be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the
party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to
be juris privati or private use only.
Santiago vs Comelec 270 SCRA 106

Reserved Lawmaking Power
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement

for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set
the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the
hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC
directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a
special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments,
among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an
enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by

peoples initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the

Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments
to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in
the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the
constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to

the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and
for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important
than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent
to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made
permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
Macias vs Comelec 32 SCRA 1

Composition of Congress
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental,
Misamis Oriental and Bulacan and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental.
They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA
3040, an act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged
that their respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less
representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and
void because:
It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the
members of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage.
It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the
population.
It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.
Issues:
Whether or not the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act
3040 is in accordance with the constitution.
Discussions:
The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as
may be according to the member of their respective inhabitants. A law giving
provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts than
those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of
proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution. Inequality of
apportionment law is arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of
equality. as held in Houghton County v. Blacker.
Rulings:
No. The Court concluded that the statute be declared invalid. Republic Act 3040
clearly violates the said constitutional provision in several ways namely:
It gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got
four only.
It gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three
only
Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than
both, five members having been assigned to it.
Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got
three only.
Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got
three.
Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less
inhabitants (379,904) got two. These were not the only instances of unequal
apportionment.
Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more
inhabitants have 2 each. And then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each,
whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte with 967,323
inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
Mariano, Jr. vs Comelec GR No. 118577

Facts: Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief, assailing unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Makati). Petitioners contend that (1) Section 2 Article I of RA 7854
failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8 Article X
and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new corporate existence of
the new city will restart the term of the present municipal elective making it
favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X of RA
7854 for adding a legislative district is unconstitutional and cannot be made by
special law.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation did not change
even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of
Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the citys
land area shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.
The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51.
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. Considering that these contingencies may or may
not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to
an actual case or controversy.
In Tobias vs Abalos, Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may
be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
Veterans Federation Party vs Comelec 342 SCRA 244

FACTS:
Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the
proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats
in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional
seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory.
HELD:
No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared
therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the election of party-
list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering

more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering
that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national
elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such
allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short
answer is No.
Barangay Association for National Advancement (BANAT) vs Comelec GR No.

179271
Facts:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections
which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered
the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while
the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI,
1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be
entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at
least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or
the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more
than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being
used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void
because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must
garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by
the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it
would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the
HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the
Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem
appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number
of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning,
the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number
of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis
to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for
a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties
get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.
Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted

obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes
cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists
garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every
two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in
R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In
the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called
the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given
to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for
party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a
total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of
the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be
the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule
shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234
which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) =
number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY
is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2
seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having
more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional
seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the
remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized
until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political
parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list
elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition
either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and
that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately
allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided
that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of
the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party
shall dominate the party-list system.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Comelec GR No. 2003766

FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was
denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The
COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names
of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections
have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections.
However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-
list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the
COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the
party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during
the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows
again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the
idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties
applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the
first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no
seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in
Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the
party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To require all
national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will
these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them
from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
SEMA vs Comelec GR No. 177597

Legislative Department
Facts:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the
province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted
against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative
districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other
municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with
power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this
law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of
Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the
1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later
amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as
to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S.
Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato
City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be
excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and
D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect
Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless
of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can

create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of
a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least
250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative
in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at
least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the
population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand,
ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of
legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create
are barangays not cities and provinces.
Bagabuyo vs Comelec GR No. 176970

Facts:
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO
Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts
in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law
in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was
created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased
the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and
Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay;
in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring
about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members
citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative
districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has
two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. This
easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only
250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
Marcos vs Comelec GR No. 119976

Legislative Department: Term of office
Facts:
Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the 1st district of Leyte stating
that she has been residing there for seven months. Incumbent, Cirilo Montejo
filed for motion for disqualification of Marcos for failing the required residency.
Marcos amended her certificate of candidacy to residing in the district since
childhood. COMELEC decided in favour of Montejo. Marcos received the highest

number of votes and her proclamation was suspended, hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Marcos failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Decision:
COMELEC resolution was set aside and directed to proclaim Marcos as duly
elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte. The essential distinction
between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken his abode ends. If a
persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave then
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
Aquino vs Comelec GR No. 120265

Legislative Department: Term of office
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move
Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner
on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a
period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only
that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a
resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that
time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his
parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy
for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his
leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe
indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does notengender
the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a
bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effecta
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actualchange
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of originshould be deemed
to continue.
Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board GR No. 157870

Legislative Department: Qualifications
Facts:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers
and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules
and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May
elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification
for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987
Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all

candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any
norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if
it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the
three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test is not tenable as it
enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in
the Constitution.
Dimaporo vs Mitra 202 SCRA 779
Term vs Tenure
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second
Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15
January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in
the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by
the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the
one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-
President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to

respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby
lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore
not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of
members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the
incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the
Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members
of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI
states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term
of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening
of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the
Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only
when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is
decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another
office or employment.
ISSUE:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS
FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND

PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be
considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office
facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this chapter on
accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section
1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public

officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition.
Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective
public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks
to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging
them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure
by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to
their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the
mandate which they have received from their constituents.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have
voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another
office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is
filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment
can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent
upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in
the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the
four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not
preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of

constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General
perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from
the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881.
When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that
petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim
Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable
legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing
the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question
the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the
government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are
bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It
is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is
subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
NOTES:
- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office
of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of
office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer
actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or
beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may
not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office
(see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a

Congressman may be shortened:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral
Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
Flores vs Drilon 223 SCRA 568

Disqualifications
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent
Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged
with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an
administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the
Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the

Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional
provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that
Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional

prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple
functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let
them function without the distraction of other governmental duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by
providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of
Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the
appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it
curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by
limiting his choice.
Liban vs Gordon GR No. 175352

Disqualifications
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition
to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against
respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of

Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to
Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049,
decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their
argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate
when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held
that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is
not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.
Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-
funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a
Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore,
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as
PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended
by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution
states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under
the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if
it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act
No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of

the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision
with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and
the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
II. THE ISSUE
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the
Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature;
it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was
not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the
very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will
consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis
mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter,
especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have
based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by
this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to
this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60)
years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by
virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the
creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly
in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid
constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit
in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui
generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective
from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution
and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The
PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged
on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the Geneva Convention
and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty
obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must
be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution,
instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize
under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision
of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under international
humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in
discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not
to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a
private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is
treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the

government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent,
under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso
facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of
the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its
existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter
was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has
responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its
humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to
the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities
but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international
community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must
therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second
sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.]
Concurring with Justice Antonio Carpio, who wrote the Decision, were then-Chief
Justice Puno and Associate Justices Quisumbing, Carpio Morales, ChicoNazario,
Velasco, and Leonardo-de Castro. Joining Associate Justice Nachura in his
Dissenting Opinion were Associate Justices Ynares-Santiago, Brion, Peralta, and
Bersamin. Then-Justice [now Chief Justice] Corona took no part.
Arroyo vs De Venecia GR No. 127255

Rules of Proceedings
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to
raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House
of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed
is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated
House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held:
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House
has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a
roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of
grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may
instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new
law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to
the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in
the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference
rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.
First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that
'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification

or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts
have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.
In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch
or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it
erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of
the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation
in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House
that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the
voting comes in.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be
taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon
the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive
of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking
the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit
upon the name of popular government.
(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of

power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States,
the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment
against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It

may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination
of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
Osmena vs Pendatun 109 Phil 863

Discipline of Members
FACTS:
Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their
capacity as member of the Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59.
Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of
infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special
Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59,
requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during
his privilege speech entitled A Message to Garcia wherein he spoke of
derogatory remarks of the Presidents administration selling pardons. For refusing
to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15
months for the serious disorderly behavior.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by
the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioners words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from
investigating the speech and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.
HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before
the legislative body itself as stated in the provision that xxx shall not be
questioned in any other place.
2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the
legislative body and not the judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly
on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the
contrary will amount to encroachment of power.
3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval
amounted to the suspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard
parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.
4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be
censured, committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 126055

Facts:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application
for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and
was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of
Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The
aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two
other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information,
Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant
of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was
just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was
filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a
senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to
suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine
the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he
is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may
be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can
she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be
suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a
pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or
not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a
valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal
on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal procedure.
Paredes vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 118364

Facts:
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur filed a case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the
same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto
Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a
Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio
claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in a
criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from
the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never
reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty.
Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but
he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his
side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman
recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public
Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order
of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes
by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the
court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of
two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it
appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding
from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as
a Member of the House of Representatives.
Mabanag vs Lopez Vito 78 Phil 1

Enrolled Bill Theory
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a

majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were
suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress
following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The
eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower
House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension
had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not
been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was
filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not
take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of
both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within
the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said
congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The
members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the
Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants.
Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance,
the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of
the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that

political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts
by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what
matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as
to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the
actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly
certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born
of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal
which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to
be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and
withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a
highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on
grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of
a proposal then into that of ratification.
Casco vs Gimenez 7 SCRA 347

Enrolled Bill Theory
Facts:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of
synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main
components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being
imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required
margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest
as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The
Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were
submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax
refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and
distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea
formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde).
Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which
provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this
provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. It further contends
that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and
between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea
formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill
before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea formaldehyde
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde.
HELD:
No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed
as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde
under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of

reaction. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently
distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of
the said law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is
printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill
which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde
is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved
by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.
US vs Pons 34 Phil 729

Probative Value of Journal
FACTS:
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the
steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of
wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently
delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities
noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any
listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained
tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381,
Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and
introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the
sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission
(Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law
was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the
Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case,
Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due
weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28,
1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond
these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this
particular case.
Astorga vs Villegas 56 SCRA 714

Journal entry vs Enrolled Bill
Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of
the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a
solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries
in the journal should be consulted.
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the
Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto.
Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment that was approved and the
Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal, when Senate sent its
certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment was
included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the
same. Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the
House of Reps, the Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President,
and sent to the President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The
Bill thus was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both
the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.
ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law

Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill
RULING:
Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs.
Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President
of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the
two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the
two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And
when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill
not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due
to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial
department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation
is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions,
although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the
attestation of the presiding officers is present.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the

certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication.
The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both
Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by
Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.
When courts may turn to the journal
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being
no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not
the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be
consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.

The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated
and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in
this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No.
9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can
do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved
by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President
and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into
the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill
was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed
both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew
their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive,
for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and
holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to
fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.
Morales vs Subido 27 SCRA 131

Journal entry vs Enrolled Bill
FACTS:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at
least three years but does not possess a bachelors degree. Morales was the chief
of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to
his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was
designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo
Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as
acting chief but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead,
Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10
of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person
may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree
from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as

chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of
any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years;
or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at
least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the
police department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however
argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version
was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelors degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high
school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has
served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved
by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only
change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by
producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according
to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring
upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of
the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially
published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the
enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their
respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the
labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the

legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals
must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To
what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have
such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon
but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now
decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to
be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.
Abbas vs Electoral Tribunal 166 SCRA 651

Independent from Congress
FACTS:
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect
in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the
time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators.
Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from
partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested
parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification
sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the
following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence
of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a
proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining
members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification,
this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to
the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD:
The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and
powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial
and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-
Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on
any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
Pimental vs HRET GR No. 141489

Judicial Review
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in
accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which
included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups
and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House.
Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations,
including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta
Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga
Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay
(ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives
to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each.
Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure
involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to
occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear
that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated
any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the
present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were
composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political
parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman
of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to
cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list
representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the
Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentels letter to the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy
B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000,
Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the
HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.
They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the
CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8
February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with
GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to
amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an
additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the
members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended
petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath
to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer
and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from
APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no
party-list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to
include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its
district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to
the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution
explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among
their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for
House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose,
within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy
the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal. These
constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to
choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However,
under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the
exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls
for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.
[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-
list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA.
The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-
list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET
and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the
House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET
or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in
the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process.
The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the
time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not
consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the
primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at
this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA
in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are
bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
Codilla vs De Venecia GR No. 150605

Judicial Review
Facts:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the
4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a
disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of
petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioners
proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty
of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was
proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however
reversed and a new resolution declared respondents proclamation as null and
void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution
publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
Issues:
Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid.
Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.
HELD:
The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against
petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently
found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being
violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore,
respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not
represent the electorates choice.
Since the validity of respondents proclamation had been assailed by petitioner
before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said
that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued
to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions
or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since
respondents eligibility was not the issue.
The facts had been settled by the COMELECen banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its
(Comelecs) Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial.
Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition regardless of
personal judgment or opinion.
Guingona vs Gonzales GR No. 106971

Commission on Appointments
Facts:
As a result of national elections on May 1992, the Senate was composed by the
following by parties: LDP IS, NPC 5, Lakas 3. Applying the mathematical
formula agreed by parties they are entitled to twelve seats. On the organization of
the Senate, Majority Floor Leader Romulo nominated eight senators for
Commission on Appointments. Senator Guingona objected on the nomination of
Osmea.
Issue: Whether or not the Constitution requires the election and presence of 12
senators in the Commission?
Decision:
Constitution does not require the election and presence of 12 Senators for the
Commission to function. Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional
collegial bodies which perform their functions even if their composition is
expressly specified by the Constitution.
People vs Jalosjos GR No. 132875

Privileges
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.
ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the sovereign will.
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws., this simply means that all persons similarly situated
shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The Court
cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to
the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
League of Cities vs Comelec GR No. 176951

Powers of Congress
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League
of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas
assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA
9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through
their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained
a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills.
The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga,
Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents
signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether
the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as
for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing
cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are
thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present
case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in
2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for
the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government
units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into
Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450
of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56

Non-delegation of Powers
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed
a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied.
He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was
also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a
motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of
the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th
branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to
the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No.
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution
also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power
to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This
Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands
of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon
the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of
the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for
provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no
probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no
argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual
situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation
officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation
without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the
probation system.
US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1

Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor
General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution
of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive
Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice
to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher
than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the
said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering
that there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the
power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is
elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question
here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at
which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the
organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination
of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could
not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing
must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was
no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not any cause
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain undefined conditions to fix the
price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say
whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law
should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was any cause, or
what was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it
specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In
the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was
made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or
qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of rice
at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive order No. 53.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits
and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the
said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-
delegation of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to

govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot
be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law
may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to

the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
Palaez vs Auditor-General 15 SCRA 569

Facts:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of
any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil
action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for
the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said
that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370
which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President,
under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios
were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from
the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further
maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to
create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the
President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with

reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may
require which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the
public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as
the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes
hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially
and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
Tatad vs DOE 281 SCRA 353

Test of Valid Delegation
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The
deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and
the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does
not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the
world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the
peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power, and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating the
downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March
1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe is to
time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the US
dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform,
decline as meaning to take a downward direction, and stable as meaning
firmly established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be
given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive
department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it
co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is
bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in
RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.
Kiluysang Mayo Uno vs Garcia 239 SCRA 386

FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda
allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within 15% above
and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed by
the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were
exorbitant and unreasonable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and
increase fare rates based on the order of the LTFRB
HELD:
The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of
fixing rates of public services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such
delegation is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern
life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare
range is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari protest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. A further delegation of power would constitute a negation
of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge
it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change their fares
would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators.
Abakada Guro Party List vs Executive Secretary

Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT
Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new
law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5
and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%,
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of

the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year

exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase
the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because
such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that
VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be
included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the

government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President the legislative power
to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility
and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass
to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also
effectively nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority
to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance,
by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the
VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which
can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to
the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to
determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not
the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity
of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of

ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation
of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be
exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that
the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12%
rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a
duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the
12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
1%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the

two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is
to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses
all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader
perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate
statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to

the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not
delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
Lawyers Movement Against Monopoly and Poverty GR No. 164987

FACTS:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who
have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political,
economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above
provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of
lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It
does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and
identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the
Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the
authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in
fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore,
impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of
PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media
preaching the evils of pork barrel.
ISSUES:
1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are
met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the
Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner
contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens
and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here,
the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF
funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the
unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
II.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not
lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To
justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was
presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the
Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion.
Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the
form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law
which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend
projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by
the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of
projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the
Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that
individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF.
So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and
the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
_______________
NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and
(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Belgica vs Executive Secretary GR No. 208566

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus,
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs
-of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation
of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided
for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional
and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they
pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional,

and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-
delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e)
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which
govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congressrole must
be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step
beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of
the law.
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects was declared
constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF
THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b) and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to

calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE
BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A PRIORITY. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT
SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.
Araullo vs Executive Secretary

Powers of Congress
Facts:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a
certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive
and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program
did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and
portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made
by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming
that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive
for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects
were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M
for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1),
Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by
the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is
a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds
refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited
by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget
deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case
at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer
or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no
cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this
was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment
of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the
GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer
to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among
other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it
is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer
to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no
basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for
the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections
have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act
prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable.
The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous
projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it
may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially
so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the
DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative)
that they have not acted in good faith.
Demetria vs Alba 148 SCRA 208

Powers of Congress
Facts:
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa
sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing
funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of
1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the
said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD:
No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege

granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or
not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is
to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers,
but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities
render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item
to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.
Guingona vs Carague 196 SCRA 221

Powers of Congress
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,
entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177,
entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed
Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic

appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,
therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates
to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it

being higher than the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it
does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for
the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is
not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More
especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated
to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
PCCG vs COCOFED GR No. 147063

Powers of Congress
Facts:
The PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and
provisional takeovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real
or personal. Among the properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of
stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of the
alleged one million coconut farmers, the so-called Coconut Industry Investment
Fund companies (CIIF companies) and Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr.
In connection with the sequestration of the said UCPB shares, the PCGG, on July
31, 1987, instituted an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages docketed as Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan.
On November 15, 1990, upon Motion of Private Respondent COCOFED, the

Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB
shares on the ground that herein private respondents in particular, COCOFED
and the so-called CIIF companies had not been impleaded by the PCGG as
parties-defendants in its July 31, 1987 Complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages.
This Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for
Certiorari docketed as GR No. 96073 in this Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of
Cojuangco, the anti-graft court ordered the holding of elections for the Board of
Directors of UCPB. However, the PCGG applied for and was granted by this Court a
Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the election. Subsequently, the Court
lifted the Restraining Order and ordered the UCPB to proceed with the election of
its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the sequestered shares to be voted
by their registered owners.
On February 23, 2001, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. filed the Class Action
Omnibus Motion referred to earlier in Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0033-A,
0033-B and 0033-F, asking the court a quo:
1. To enjoin the PCGG from voting the UCPB shares of stock registered in the
respective names of the more than one million coconut farmers; and
2. To enjoin the PCGG from voting the SMC shares registered in the names of the
14 CIIF holding companies including those registered in the name of the PCGG.
Issue:
Who may vote the sequestered UCPB shares while the main case for their
reversion to the State is pending in the Sandiganbayan?
Ruling:
This Court holds that the government should be allowed to continue voting those
shares inasmuch as they were purchased with coconut levy funds funds that are
prima facie public in character or, at the very least, are clearly affected with
public interest.
General Rule: Sequestered Shares Are Voted by the Registered Holder
At the outset, it is necessary to restate the general rule that the registered owner
of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. (Sec.
24, BP 68) This principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the
government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a general
rule, exercise acts of dominion. On the other hand, it is authorized to vote these
sequestered shares registered in the names of private persons and acquired with
allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if it is able to satisfy the two-tiered test devised by the
Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo (G.R. No. 115352, June 10, 1993) and PCGG v.
Cojuangco Jr., (133197, Jan. 27, 1999) as follows:
(1) Is there prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and
thus belong to the State?
(2) Is there an imminent danger of dissipation, thus necessitating their continued
sequestration and voting by the PCGG, while the main issue is pending with the
Sandiganbayan?
Sequestered Shares Acquired with Public Funds Are an Exception
From the foregoing general principle, the Court in Baseco v. PCGG (Baseco) and
Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas, G.R. No. 91925, April 16, 1991) (Cojuangco-Roxas) has
provided two clear public character exceptions under which the government is
granted the authority to vote the shares:
(1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities
who/which registered them in their own names, and
(2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds
somehow landed in private hands.
The exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must
yield to truth; that public property registered in the names of non-owners is
affected with trust relations; and that the prima facie beneficial owner should be
given the privilege of enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie fact of
ownership.
The public character test was reiterated in many subsequent cases; most
recently, in Antiporda v. Sandiganbayan. (G.R. No. 116941, May 31, 2001)
Expressly citing Cojuangco-Roxas, this Court said that in determining the issue of
whether the PCGG should be allowed to vote sequestered shares, it was crucial to
find out first whether these were purchased with public funds, as follows:
It is thus important to determine first if the sequestered corporate shares came
from public funds that landed in private hands. In short, when sequestered
shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have
been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However,
when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are
shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2)
purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-
tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public character exceptions in Baseco v.
PCGG and Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the
shares.
UCPB Shares Were Acquired With Coconut Levy Funds
In the present case before the Court, it is not disputed that the money used to
purchase the sequestered UCPB shares came from the Coconut Consumer
Stabilization Fund (CCSF), otherwise known as the coconut levy funds. This fact
was plainly admitted by private respondents counsel, Atty. Teresita J. Herbosa,
during the Oral Arguments held on April 17, 2001 in Baguio City. Indeed in
Cocofed v. PCGG, this Court categorically declared that the UCPB was acquired
with the use of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund in virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 755, promulgated on July 29, 1975.
Coconut Levy Funds Are Affected With Public Interest
Having conclusively shown that the sequestered UCPB shares were purchased
with coconut levies, we hold that these funds and shares are, at the very least,
affected with public interest. The Resolution issued by the Court on February 16,
1993 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 96073, stated that coconut levy funds
were clearly affected with public interest; thus, herein private respondents
even if they are the registered shareholders cannot be accorded the right to
vote them. We quote the said Resolution in part, as follows:
The coconut levy funds being clearly affected with public interest, it follows that
the corporations formed and organized from those funds, and all assets acquired
therefrom should also be regarded as clearly affected with public interest.
The utilization and proper management of the coconut levy funds, raised as they
were by the States police and taxing powers, are certainly the concern of the
Government. It cannot be denied that it was the welfare of the entire nation that
provided the prime moving factor for the imposition of the levy. It cannot be
denied that the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the
national economy. It is, therefore, the States concern to make it a strong and
secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant segment of the population
but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of the
imperatives of economic stability. The coconut levy funds are clearly affected with
public interest. Until it is demonstrated satisfactorily that they have legitimately
become private funds, they must prima facie and by reason of the circumstances
in which they were raised and accumulated be accounted subject to the measures
prescribed in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, and 14 to prevent their concealment, dissipation, etc.,
which measures include the sequestration and other orders of the PCGG
complained of. (Italics supplied)
To repeat, the foregoing juridical situation has not changed. It is still the truth
today: the coconut levy funds are clearly affected with public interest.
To stress, the two-tiered test is applied only when the sequestered asset in the
hands of a private person is alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth.
Hence, in PCGG v. Cojuangco, we allowed Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. to vote the
sequestered shares of the San Miguel Corporation (SMC) registered in his name
but alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth. We did so on his
representation that he had acquired them with borrowed funds and upon failure
of the PCGG to satisfy the two-tiered test. This test was, however, not applied to
sequestered SMC shares that were purchased with coco levy funds.
In the present case, the sequestered UCPB shares are confirmed to have been
acquired with coco levies, not with alleged ill-gotten wealth. Hence, by parity of
reasoning, the right to vote them is not subject to the two-tiered test but to the
public character of their acquisition, which per Antiporda v. Sandiganbayan cited
earlier, must first be determined.
Coconut Levy Funds Are Prima Facie Public Funds
To avoid misunderstanding and confusion, this Court will even be more categorical
and positive than its earlier pronouncements: the coconut levy funds are not only
affected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie public funds. Public
funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any political subdivision of
the State; more specifically, taxes, customs duties and moneys raised by operation
of law for the support of the government or for the discharge of its obligations.
(Beckner v. Commonwealth, 5 SE2d 525, Nov. 20, 1939) Undeniably, coconut levy
funds satisfy this general definition of public funds, because of the following
reasons:
1. Coconut levy funds are raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of
the State.
2. They are levies imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and
its farmers.
3. Respondents have judicially admitted that the sequestered shares were
purchased with public funds.
4. The Commission on Audit (COA) reviews the use of coconut levy funds.
5. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), with the acquiescence of private
respondents, has treated them as public funds.
6. The very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character.
We shall now discuss each of the foregoing reasons (among others), any one of
which is enough to show their public character.
xxx
3. Respondents Judicially Admit That the Levies Are Government Funds.
Equally important as the fact that the coconut levy funds were raised through the
taxing and police powers of the State is respondents effective judicial admission
that these levies are government funds. As shown by the attachments to their
pleadings, respondents concede that the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
(CCSF) and the Coconut Investment Development Fund constitute government
funds x x x for the benefit of coconut farmers.
4. The COA Audit Shows the Public Nature of the Funds.
Under COA Office Order No. 86-9470 dated April 15, 1986, the COA reviewed the
expenditure and use of the coconut levies allocated for the acquisition of the
UCPB. The audit was aimed at ascertaining whether these were utilized for the
purpose for which they had been intended. Because these funds have been
subjected to COA audit, there can be no other conclusion than that they are prima
facie public in character.
Having shown that the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public
interest, but are in fact prima facie public funds, this Court believes that the
government should be allowed to vote the questioned shares, because they
belong to it as the prima facie beneficial and true owner.
In sum, we hold that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
grossly contradicting and effectively reversing existing jurisprudence, and in
depriving the government of its right to vote the sequestered UCPB shares which
are prima facie public in character.
The Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order SET ASIDE. The PCGG shall
continue voting the sequestered shares until Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0033-
A, 0033-B and 0033-F are finally and completely resolved.
Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works 110 Phil 331

Powers of Congress
FACTS:
Ra 920 (An act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953
containing an item for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension of Pasig feeder road terminals currently
projected and planned subdivision roads, which were not yet constructed, within
Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta. The provincial governor of
Rizal, Pascual, questioned the constitutionality of the item in RA 920, it being not
for a public purpose. The lower court dismissed the petition upon the ground that
petitioner may not contest the legality because the same does not affect him
directly. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does petitioner have legal standing to sue?
RULING:
Yes.
It is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who
will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are as
many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing the
disbursement of public funds.
Thus, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes
requiring expenditure of public moneys.
Thus, the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Where the land on which feeder roads were to be constructed belongs to a
private person, an appropriation made by congress for that purpose is null and
void, and a donation to the government made five months after the approval of
the Act does not cure the basic defect of the law.
Cruz vs Paras 123 SCRA 569

Powers of Congress
Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night
clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the
municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or
calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to
them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An
Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the
Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement
within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered
city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions,
cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power
to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is
worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal
council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not
in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed.
The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs
would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence
this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
RULING:
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within
the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the
power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if,
as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was
prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the
morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending
to all "the great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that

between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former
is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix
the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit
the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the
decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to
apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses,
because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial
correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the
meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary
result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination
of their business.
3. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory
power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board GR No. 75697

Power of Congress
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators
adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the
National Internal Revenue Code provided that:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be
subject to sales tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every
sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion

picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where
the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or
any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the
operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have
caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and
a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractors specific, amusement
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million
annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum
from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180
Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the
viability of the movie industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held:
Taxation has been made the implement of the states police power. The levy of the
30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the
flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in
pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the
underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry,
there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering
the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral
fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and
unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally
violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in
theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video
establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayors permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Tobias vs Abalos GR No. 114783

Powers of Congress
Facts:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong,
filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the
enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same
legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three
provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The
bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of
congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district.
Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San
Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the
members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners
stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
minimum population requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of
number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?
Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards
to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from
its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a
liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted
by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by
law. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A.
No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law
of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met,
the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress
of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630

Powers of Congress
Facts:
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this
revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did
not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was referred to
the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is
amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB
1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just
becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that
Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that
such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or
concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must
come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where
Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as
revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a
mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Bolinao Electronics Corp. vs Valencia 11 SCRA 486

Presidential Veto
Facts:
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They
operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They
were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for
operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of
CBNs continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused
damages to his department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his
has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted
that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting
Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the
Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations
particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there
can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencias department
they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom.
And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget
Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.
If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains.
Gonzales vs Macaraig 191 SCRA 452

Veto Power
FACTS:
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys
veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently
of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90).
Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore,
she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16
(FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section
25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise
of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by
the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto
`provisions of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it
does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item,
which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The
SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions
are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16
(FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of

the Presidents veto power.
Philconsa vs Enriquez GR No. 113105

Veto Power
Facts:
The General Appropriations Act appropriated Php 86.3 billion for debt services.
Congress added a special provision which provided that the amount appropriated
shall be used for payment of the national debt only and not to be paid to the
liabilities of the Central Bank. The appropriation for DPWH also provided that the
maximum amount to be contracted for the maintenance of national roads and
bridges should not exceed 30% the appropriation for medicines by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines required approval Congress for the release of funds.
In the General Appropriations Act of 1994 the appropriation for the Armed Forces
of the Philippines contains a provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings
in the appropriation to augment the pension and gratuity fund of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. The President vetoed the authorization given by the
Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension and gratuity fund. Several
Senators questioned the validity of the veto.
Issue:
Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Congress can not include in the general

appropriations matters that should be enacted in a separate legislation and if it
does so, the inappropriate provision must be treated as an item and can be
vetoed by the President.
The provision in GAA authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension and gratuity fund violates Section 25 (paragraph 5) and Section 29
(paragraph 1) of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Only the President is
authorized to augment items from savings in the general appropriation to the
executive branch. Also pursuant to Section 29 no money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Tanada vs Tuvera 136 SCRA 27

Effectivity of Laws
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as

well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of
the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general

applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.
PVB Employees vs Judge Vega GR No. 105364

Effectivity of Laws
FACTS:
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the
rehabilitation of Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette
in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their
residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.
In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to
reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega
continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA
7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in
the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
RULING:
Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval.
Aquino signed it into law on January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became
effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not necessary for its
effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it
took effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the
petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after
15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise
provided.
Senate vs Ermita GR No. 169777

Legislative Inquiry
Facts:
1. Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464
issued by the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power
and prayed that said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of
departments obtain the consent of the President before they can validly appear
before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants
executive privilege on all classified or confidential information between the
President and the public officers covered by the EO.
2. The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various

officials of the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on
the North Rail project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of
Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other
unlawful provisions of the contract covering the said project. The Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to officials
of the AFP.
3. Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the

hearing. On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite
this development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were
subsequently relieved for defying the Presidents order.
4. Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group),
for certiorari and prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court
challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
RULING:
YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence
it deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of

the Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of
inquiry with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information,
recourse must be had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the government is a
proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case.
2. Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized

exemptions to the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of executive
privilege. It is defined by Schwartz as the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts and the Congress. (e.g. state secret
privilege, informers privilege, generic privilege)
3. The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under

Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. The oversight function of Congress may
be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
4. Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch

whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible.
5. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the

public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof
may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials
are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.
Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)
6. A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the

question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinct
functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain
to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that
may be used in legislation while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of Congress may only
be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation.
7. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege,
and not by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power the president on whom the executive
power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of
impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This
is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the
constitutional independence of the judiciary.
On the constitutionality of EO 464
8. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the

Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department

heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of
Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances
must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it
constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
9. Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O.
464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it
sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess
the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is
valid. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b)
is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing
precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with
an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully
insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is
justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of
inquiry of Congress.
10. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of

E.O. 464 is, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.
11. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464,
however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible. Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive
branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise,
we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the
operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater

value our right as a people to take part in government.
Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon GR No. 89914

Legislative Inquiry
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for
engaging in devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on
the alleged take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged
"takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of
Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo
Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they
know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez.
Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that
their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case
before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC
continued its investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief,
claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of
the defendants of the civil case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC
to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.
RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an

elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. The Court has provided that the
allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform
under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political
question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in
purported aid of legislation.
2. No.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for
in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of
future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is

not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether
or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA
No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or
39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is
to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator
Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the
herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the
banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is
claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons
should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness
testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before the
Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose objections
whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal
his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Standard Charter vs Senate GR No. 167173

Legislative Inquiry
FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in
Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities
Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of
a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial
hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were
cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting
a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the
inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach
upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the
foregoing cases.
RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution,
as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to
denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered
foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-

judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise
of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an
essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may

or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish
for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives
cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal
culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation,
respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it
may include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons
who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence,
contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the
prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
Negros Oriental II Electric Coop vs SP 155 SCRA 421

Legislative Inquiry
FACTS:
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an
investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of
public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II (Negros
Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO
II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and
Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the power to
investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the
[old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power.
The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with
it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD:
No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP
337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the
power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal
provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the
issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the
statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the
subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant
of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance
of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies
to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly
granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the
power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish
the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said
legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even
assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the
subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for
being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually
possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
Arnault vs Nazareno 87 Phil 29

Legislative Inquiry
FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine
Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among
the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created by a Senate
resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase
price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault
refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution
committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until
he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas
Corpus
ISSUE:
Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions
in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD:
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty
to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a
witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during
the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be
too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.
Neri vs Senate Committee GR No. 180643

Executive Privilege
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was
then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the
COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed
him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a
result, the Senate cited him for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by
executive privilege.
RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential
communications privilege. It pertains to communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential. Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the
constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents unique
constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power. - i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Macalintal vs Presidential Electoral Tribunal GR No. 191618

Executive Power
Facts:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court
and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs
decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the
respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of
the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec
12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing
on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of
all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII
of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that
in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme
Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential
elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in
the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is

essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the
explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the
COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution.
Soliven vs Makasiar 167 SCRA 393

Executive Immunity
FACTS:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was
charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a
complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file
a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.
However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be
placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to
be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may
not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable
for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other
than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also
demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal
case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person.
Estrada vs Desierto GR No. 146710

Executive Immunity
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were
begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11
senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his
post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to
petition the government for
exercise of the people power redress of grievances which
of revolution which overthrew only affected the office of the
the whole government. President.
extra constitutional and the intra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new resignation of the sitting
government that resulted from President that it caused and
it cannot be the subject of the succession of the Vice
judicial review President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of

relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence

bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned
constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his
final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in
the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.
As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress
has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present
enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the
judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that
the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Almonte et al vs Vasquez GR No. 95367

Executive Privilege
FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service
Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The
subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally
disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate
around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They
claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena
duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and salary
vouchers of EIIB employers.
RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based
upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself
transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a
consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.
EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and
information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other
considerations.
Doromal vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 85468

Prohibitions
FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as
president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC)
which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth
Council (or NMYC).
An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said
violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the
jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of
the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers
and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling
the information filed by the Tanodbayan.
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal
International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the
President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower &
Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was
invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information
that was filed against him.
The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary
investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the
same subject matter.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the
Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations
involve the same subject matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was
granted by the Supreme Court.
RATIO:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part
of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having
participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of
Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in
which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not...
during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its
denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to
the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the
Constitution.
Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted
at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary
investigation must be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction
over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the
defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their
absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court
so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The
Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the
proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317

Prohibitions
FACTS:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284
which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU)
assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of
EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override
the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2),
Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting
the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from
doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Public Interest Center vs Elma GR No. 138965

Prohibitions
FACTS:
Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He
accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may
receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as

unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
For consideration is the Omnibus Motion, dated 14 August 2006, where
respondent Magdangal B. Elma sought: (1) the reconsideration of the Decision in
the case of Public Interest Center, Inc., et al. v. Magdangal B. Elma, et al. (G.R. No.
138965), promulgated on 30 June 2006; (2) the clarification of the dispositive part
of the Decision; and (3) the elevation of the case to the Court en banc. The
Solicitor General, in behalf of the respondents, filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 11
August 2006, with substantially the same allegations
ISSUES:
1) WON the respondents motion for reconsideration of the Decision in the case of
Public Interest Center, Inc., et al. v. Magdangal B. Elma, et al. (G.R. No. 138965),
promulgated on 30 June 2006 is granted by the Court;
2) WON respondents concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are
unconstitutional; and
3) WON the elevation of the case to the Court en banc is granted.
RULING:
After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents Omnibus Motions, we
find that the basic issues that were raised have already been passed upon. No
substantial arguments were presented. Thus, the Court denies the respondents
motion for reconsideration.
In response to the respondents request for clarification, the Court ruled that
respondent Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are
unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This ruling does not render both
appointments void. Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices,
respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he
accepted the second office as CPLC.1 In its Decision, the Court declared that the
concurrent appointments of the respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were
unconstitutional. It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in
violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are
incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of
executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an
executive agency, are subject to the review of the CPLC, such appointments would
be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the
PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
However, had the rule thereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of these
two incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section allows the
concurrent holding of positions only when the second post is required by the
primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio
capacity. Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the
second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require
his appointment as CPLC.
There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to the Court en
banc. What is in question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent
Elmas concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty, law
or agreement.2 The mere application of constitutional provisions does not require
the case to be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the
respondent, the decision of the Court in this case does not modify the ruling in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that Section 3
of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that
the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a
Division may be appealed.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the respondents motion for reconsideration and
for elevation of this case to the Court en banc.
Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668

Executive Power
FACTS:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to
order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents
to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the
Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of
the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.
Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to
do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been
ratified by the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the
President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travelfrom the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the rightto travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in
this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the
"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state".
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the
national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of
others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It
would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return
to ones country in the same context as those pertaining tothe liberty of abode
and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a
well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the
law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his
family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino
has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their
return tothe Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Biraogo et al vs Phil Truth Commission GR No. 192935

Executive Power
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all
the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a
fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as
to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve

economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and
the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of
the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a
body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E.
O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In
private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of
the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever
funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to
the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing
of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and
the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it
can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1
in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane

to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
Pichay vs Office of Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs GR No. 196425
Executive Powers
DENR vs DENR Employees GgGR No. 149725

Power to Control
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order
issued by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of
the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum
was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region
12 Office.
RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control
power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering
the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter
ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly
repudiated the same.
Mondano vs Silvano 97 Phil 143

Power to Control
FACTS:
Monsende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action
Committee against Mondano, the duly elected and qualified mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, Surigao accusing him of rape committed on Monsendes
daughter and concubinage with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal
dwelling. Days after, Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to
Silvosa, the provincial governor, for immediate investigation and appropriate
action. Silvosa then issued Administrative Order 8 suspending Mondano from
office after which, the Provincial Board then proceeded to hear the charges
against Mondano over his objection.
Hence, Mondano filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
enjoin the Provincial Board from further proceeding with the hearing of
administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension
issued by Silvosa is illegal and without effect. In response, the Provincial Board
invokes Section 79 of the Revised Administrative Code which clothes the
department head with direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction . . ." and to that end "may order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate
an official or person who shall conduct such investigations..
ISSUE:
WON the Provincial Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of
control over a mayor
HELD:
No.
Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Under this constitutional provision
the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he
has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by
law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in
section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act
or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not
extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises
only general supervision as may be provided by law.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and
investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the
charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not
being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the
charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question."
The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of
those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with performance of his
duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve "neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or any other form of maladministration of office." True, they may
involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board may act
and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code
referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the
provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even provincial
fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the
offended party who is 28 years of age and the crime of concubinage cannot be
prosecuted but upon a sworn complaint of the offended spouse. The charges
preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao,
not being those or any of those specified in section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is
unauthorized and illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the
municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to
Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of
moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a
final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor
must suspend a mayor not because hes acting as an agent of the Executive but
because of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.
Villena vs Secretary of Interior 67 Phil 451

Power of Control
FACTS
Upon the request of Secretary of Interior, Division of Investigation of Department
of Justice, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of Villena, mayor of Makati,
Rizal, which as a result was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious
abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. Secretary of
Interior then recommended to the President for the suspension of Villena to
prevent possible coercion of witnesses, which recommendation was granted

verbally by the President. Secretary of Interior then suspended Villena from office.
Hence, a petition was filed by Villena alleging that the Secretary of Interior has no
jurisdiction or authority to suspend and much less to prefer by himself
administrative charges against him. On the other hand, the Solicitor General
contends that Section 79 in relation with Section 86 of Revised Administrative
Code expressly empowers the Secretary of Interior to order the investigation of
any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department and that although Section 2188 of Revised Administrative Code,
invoked by Villena, empowers the provincial governor to receive and investigate
complaints made tender oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office said section
however, does not preclude Secretary of Interior from exercising power vested in
him.
ISSUE:
WON Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation
HELD:
Yes.
As regards the challenged power of the Secretary of Interior to decree suspension
of Villena pending an administrative investigation of the charges against him,
there is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor
of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears
lodged in the provincial governor by Section 2188 of Administrative Code which
provides that The Provincial Governor shall receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted under
Section 2188 of Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean
that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of Interior from
exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that
the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in
virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative
Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the
manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal
incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the

incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and
to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President
were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to
suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued
to give way for an impartial investigation.
In the deliberation of this case it has also been suggested that, admitting that the
President of the Philippines is invested with the authority to suspend the
petitioner, and it appearing that he had verbally approved or at least acquiesced
in the action taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the suspension of the
petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the
act of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines.
(Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency gihapon, since ni-approve man ang
President verbally sa suggestion to suspend Villena, then the acts of the Sec.
Interior are the acts of the President himself)
Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc vs Pano 21 SCRA 895
FACTS
Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a pasture land in
Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansan, Province of Davao. He ceded his rights and
interests to a portion of the said land to Lacson-Magallanes Corp. That portion
ceded was officially released from the forest land as pasture land and declared an
agricultural land.
A year after, Lacson-Magallanes Corp. filed its own sales application covering the
entire area which was then protested by Pano and others averring that they are
the actual occupants of the part thereof covered by the said sales application. The
Director of Lands following an investigation of the conflict rendered a decision
dismissing the complaints of Pano and his companions. A motion of
reconsideration was as well denied.
On appeal to Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, it was also dismissed
hence this appeal to the President. Executive Secretary Pajo by authority of the
President decided the controversy and modified the decision of Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and declared that it would be for the public
interest that Pano along with other who are mostly landless farmers depending on
the land for their very existence, be allocated that portion on which they have
made improvement s and directed that the land be subdivided into lots of
convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants without prejudice to the

corporations rights to reimbursement for the cost of surveying the portion. Due
to the said decision, Lacson-Magallanes Corp,filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the decision of Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force
and effect
HELD:
The decision is not contrary to law and therefore cannot be assailed.
The Presidents duty to execute laws is of constitutional origin. So too, is his
control of all executive departments. It is correct to say that the constitutional
powers of the President must be exercised by him in person however, it does not
mean that said powers cannot be delegated to his Executive Secretary and
perform the powers in his stead. The President is not expected to perform in
person in all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of
the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule
which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional set up the
Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President
has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse the order that
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources including those that the
Director of Lands may issue. The assumed authority of Executive Secretary is to be
accepted as it is only the President who may rightfully revoke such authority.
Therefore, unless action taken is disapproved or reprobated by Chief Executive,
acts done shall remain the acts of the Chief Executive and cannot be successfully
assailed.
Ganzon vs Ca 200 SCRA 271

Power of General Supervision over LGUs
FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against
him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits
of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the
suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove
local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego,
can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation,
and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a
mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision
by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of
control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things
which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But
from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by
imposing a 600 day suspension.
Dadole vs COA GR No. 125350

Power of General Supervision over LGUs
FACTS:
RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P
1,260 each through yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue increased the budget from 1260 to
1500 for each judge.
Hence, Department of Budget and Management issued a Local Budget Circular
(LBC) 55 providing a set of conditions which they may refer to in giving the
allowances:
-the grant is not mandatory on the part of LGUs
-all contractual and statutory obligations of LGU including the implementation of
RA 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget
-that budgetary requirements should be satisfied with or complied with
-that the LGU has fully implemented devolution of function/personnel in
accordance with RA 7160
Acting on the DBM directive, Mandaue City Auditor issued notice of disallowance
of Dadole and other RTC Judges in excess of the amount authorized by LBC. Due to
this, Dadole and other RTC Judges protested against the notice of disallowance
but City Auditor treated the protest as motion for reconsideration and indorsed it
to COA. In turn COA referred the motion to the head office but was denied.
Hence, Dadole in behalf of other judges, filed this petition.
ISSUE:
WON LBC 55 of the DBM is void foregoing beyond the supervisory powers of the
President for not having been published
HELD:
Yes, LBC 55 is null and void.
We recognize that although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local
Government Units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power
of Control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Section 4,
Article 10 of the 1987 PH Constitution provides:
President shall exercise general supervision over local governments..
Clearly then, the President can only interfere with the affairs and activities of LGUs
if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the
Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, President or
any of his alter egos cannot interfere with local affairs as long as concerned local
government units act within the parameters of the law and Constitution.
In this case, it is to be seen that LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement
as the said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the
additional allowances granted to judges. Thus we need not belabor the point that
the finances of city government may allow grant additional allowances higher
than P1,000 if the revenues of said city government exceed its annual
expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual
revenues of 40million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant
allowances of more than P1000 each, to say, ten judges inasmuch as the finances
of city can afford it.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing criterion found in Section 458 of RA 7160. The
DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by
imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with law it sought to implement.
In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
Furthermore, the said circular was not published.
GPI vs Springer 50 Phil 259

Power Appointment
Facts:
This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government
of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who
were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee
created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the
validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act
No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National
Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of
the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the
Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting
power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37

which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the
NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the
Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was
considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of
the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as
well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the
Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of
Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the
government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their
election into the Board of NCC.
Issue:
Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid.
Rulings:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of
powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public
office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office.
Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a
government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To
extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and
the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of
executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are
exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public
office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of
persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable
because it does not weaken the executive branch.
Sarmiento vs Mison 156 SCRA 549

Presidential Appointments
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague
as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as

unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the
office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors,
other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of
the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if
the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By
following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a

bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that

need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Concepcion-Bautista vs Salonga 172 SCRA 160

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art.
VII, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of
government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint."
Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved
Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of
her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.
RULING:
1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the
appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is
within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence
of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally
delimited power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to
confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to

appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their
very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the
review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that
are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
Rufino vs Edriga GR No. 139554

FACTS:
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No.
30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a
Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President
Marcos issued PD 15, the CCPs charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into
a non-municipal public corporation free from the pressure or influence of
politics. PD 15 increased the members of CCPs Board from seven to nine
trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased
further the trustees to 11.
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino
asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and
appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the term of President
Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo,
Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili (Cabili), and Manuel T. Maosa
(Maosa).
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven

new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga
group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees were:
1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar

N. Endriga
2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Maosa

5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile

Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and
assumed the performance of their duties in early January 1999.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this
Court questioning President Estradas appointment of seven new members to
the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15,
vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of
the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x. In case only one trustee
survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]. The Endriga group claimed
that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the
Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of
the CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the
Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosas
term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and
control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states
that the CCP shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals granted the quo warranto petition. The
Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP
trustees. On the other hand, the appellate courts Decision ousted the Rufino
group from the CCP Board.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could
only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than
the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the
authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers
of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP
trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being
repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the
appointment only of officers lower in rank than the appointing power.
On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino groups motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga groups motion for
immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is constitutional and CCP trustees have the
authority to appoint and elect their fellow trustees when there is vacancy.
RULING:
NO. The SC ruled that Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 as amended which authorizes
the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of CCP
is unconstitutional.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the Presidents power of control under
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c)
of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically
from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-
perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public
office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP shall enjoy autonomy of
policy and operation x x x. This provision does not free the CCP from the
Presidents control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision
may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and
undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to
the Presidents power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the Presidents control
over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the Presidents influence. By
stating that the President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices, the
1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to
control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater
than, and subsumes, influence.
Aytona vs Castillo 4 SCRA 1

Limitation of Appointing Power
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner
Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado
Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order
no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by
former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute
appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President
Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank.
Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was
validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new
President, should be considered void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were
valid.
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous
President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He
was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming
President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or
obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as
incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail
himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up

vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and
the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of
350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few
hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be
regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness
and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Jorge vs Mayor 10 SCRA 331

Limitation on Appointing Power
FACTS:
Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Bureau of Lands
through regular and successive promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos
Garcia ad interim Director of Lands in December 13, 1961, he took his oath of
office on the 23rd, his appointment was transmitted to the CoA in 26th. In May
1962, CoA confirmed the said ad interim appointment.
President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 revoking ad interim
appointments extended and released by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session
of Congress that ended on December 13 1961.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Macapagal administration,
informed Jorge that pursuant to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on
Jorge that his appointment was among those revoked by Admin Order No. 2, and
that his position of Director of Lands was considered vacant. Jovencio Mayor had
been designated by the President to be Acting Director of Lands. Jorge instituted a
petition for mandamus and quo warranto, claiming that he is the legally appointed
Director of Lands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as
valid revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment.
RULING:
No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no
evidence on record that it was made and released after the joint session of
Congress that ended on the same day. It is a matter of contemporary history, of
which this Court may take judicial cognizance, that the session ended late in the
night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In the
absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the
appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the
regular course of business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor
intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands
unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the CoA and thereafter, the
office never became vacant.
De Castro vs JBC GR No. 191002

Limitation on Appointing Powers
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of

former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days
after the Presidential election in 2010.
After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the
position of Chief Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial
Bar Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken
into consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President from
making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next
Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5)
candidates for the position from the most senior of the Associates of the court
and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the
President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme
Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the
Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice..
RULING:
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in
the Constitution.
If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the
appointment of Chief Justice, then they should have expressly stated it in the
Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT), Article VII and
Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).
Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the
Executive Department.
Guevara v Inocentes 16 SCRA 38

Appointments
FACTS:
On November 25, 1965, Onofre Guevara took his oath as an Undersecretary of
Labor after his appointment was extended ad interim on November 22, 1965. The
appointment was questioned by Rauol Inocentes on the ground that Guevaras
appointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress. At around midnight
of January 22, 1966, the Senate adjourned its session. The House of
Representatives continued its session and adjourned upon learning the Senates
adjournment. In the case of Guevaras appointment, Congress, through the
Commission on appointments has not acted on it while the special session is
being conducted.
ISSUE:
Whether the ad interim appointment of Onofre P. Guevara is valid.
RULING:
Art. VII, Sec. 10, Subsection 4 of the 1935 Constitution: "the President shall have
the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress"
The validity of an ad interim appointment shall be allowed when (a) until
disapproval of the Commission on Appointments and (b) adjournment of
Congress, whether special or regular session. In this case, the second mode of
termination took effect when the Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight
of January 22, 1966 which made the appointment of petitioner Guevara
ineffective. The contention that the Commission on Appointments should be first
organized before the second mode can be made effective is untenable because
they are two different and separate modes of termination.
Since the termination of ad interim appointment cannot be separated, the well-
known maxim in statutory construction applies. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemus.
Matibag vs Benipayo GR No. 149036

Appointments
FACTS:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting

Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O.
Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a
"Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other
commisioners in an ad interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated
April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as
Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and
reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-
Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioners reassignment in a Memorandum
dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically,

Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-
in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department.
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April
10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of
employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until
June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18,
2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, Exempting
the Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the
COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. Petitioner also filed an
administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo,
alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election
Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07,
s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and
regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner
filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in
office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the
basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporary appointmentprohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress.
De Rama vs CA GR No. 131136

90 day ban on appointment
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner
Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service
Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14)
municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the former
mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the
appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the
validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved
by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioners failure to
present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said
appointments.
Issue:
whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
Ruling:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but
only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of
applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of
the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code
specifically provides that an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be
withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in
effect until disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on

the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided
in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement
between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of
other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
Gonzales vs Office of the President GR No. 196231

Power of Removal
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues
relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein
petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats,
robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila
Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others.
Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the
Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation
to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was
lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the
Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city
Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by
the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant
the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal
Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal
without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for
failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due
notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision
finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave
Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed
for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez
for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action
when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day
of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police
service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder
of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government
officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident
through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and
gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions
for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from
submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The
prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner
was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia,
their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding
that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the
government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA")
entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the
change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off
the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's
apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House
of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the

PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice
passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President
the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are
violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal
from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who
belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrativedisciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's
authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners
cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on
the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor [(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor,
may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for
the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.] . A harmonious
construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads
to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the
President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the
manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section
21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline
over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of
"check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern
that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from
administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy
Ombudsman and aSpecial Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled an obvious gap inthe
law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for
in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article,
there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal
from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By
enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without
running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a Special
Prosecutor isImplied from his Power toAppoint. In giving the President the power
to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid
down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's
constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect
the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial
importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the
military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy Ombudsmandoes not
Diminish theIndependence of the Office of theOmbudsman. he claim that Section
8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of
the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms
of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where thequestioned acts,
falling short ofconstitutional standards, do notconstitute betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to
the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be
considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to
wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the
request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of
the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office
of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant
verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending
for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's
undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal
grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that
could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of
any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal
must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in
office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he
may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind
amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitionerBarreras-Sulit to determine theexistence of any
of the grounds forher removal from office as providedfor under the Constitution
and theOmbudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP
Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is
ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of
suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case
against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case
No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts
and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal

of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is
hereby DENIED.
Llamas vs Orbos 202 SCRA 844

Pardoning Power
FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended
for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less
than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was
pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension
imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in
criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase after conviction by final
judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of
executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an
administrative case, allegedly because the word conviction refers only to
criminal cases.
ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive
clemency in administrative cases.
HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under
criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised
only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion
of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view
that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the
quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.
Torres vs Gonzales 152 SCRA 272

Pardon Distinguished from Parole
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president
w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In
1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring
that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his
pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as
they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is

necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
HELD:
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department
has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order
that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated
the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional
prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the
authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of
the Government [has] such power been entrusted.
Vera vs People 7 SCRA 152

Pardon distinguished from Amnesty
FACTS:
Petitioners Juan Vera, Expedito Serrano and Romeo Plantado, including intervenor
Alfredo Oliveros, were found guilty of the crime of homicide by CFI of Camarines
Sur dated July 25, 1966. However, at the time the decision of the respondent CFI
was promulgated and read to petitioners on August 23, 1966, the judge who
rendered and signed it, the Honorable Jose T. Surtida, had ceased to hold office as
of July 31, 1966. On appeal, all the herein petitioners including intervenor, no
jurisdictional question was included among the alleged errors. Then came the
decision of respondent CA on February 13, 1969. Thereafter, the present
petitioners, including the intervenor, filed petition for certiorari before Supreme
Court on July 2, 1969 to review the aforesaid decision of respondent CA. Three
legal questions were raised, in such petition. Again, no jurisdictional question was
raised. Two motions for reconsideration were thereafter filed, however both
motions for reconsideration were denied on August 26, 1969. Thus, this petition
for certiorari. Petitioners rely on Jimenez v. Republic as well as the earlier case
of People v. Court of Appeals as authority for the view that a decision
promulgated by the judge who prepared it after he had left the bench could have
no binding effect.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners could still raise the question that Judge Surtida having retired
previous to the promulgation of the sentence, it must be declared null and void.
RULING:
It is assumed, of course, that the court that renders the sentence is one of
competent jurisdiction. It is an admitted fact in this case that respondent Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, presided by the then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was
vested with jurisdiction to try and decide the case against petitioners. The canons
of fairness are not thereby set at naught. Petitioners cannot rightfully complain of
having been the victims of arbitrary governmental action. They were given all the
opportunity to defend themselves not only before the respondent Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur but likewise before respondent Court of Appeals. In an
earlier petition for certiorari, to review the judgment of respondent CA, they did
not meet with success because of their inability to demonstrate that they failed to
receive the protection that due process accords every accused. What was said by
Justice Cardozo fits the occasion: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in
maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are
of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be
inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of
reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be
the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due
to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed
to a filament. We are to keep the balance true."
Monsanto vs Factoran GR No. 78239

Effect of Pardon
FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the
entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without
the necessity of a new appointment
The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a
former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position
and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment
before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt
the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason
of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was
still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of
conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said
to have been terminated or forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether
before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt
of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots
out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent
as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents
any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching;
if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores
him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence
(which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has
been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the
pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly
untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a
poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.
Torres vs Director of Bureau of Prisons GR No. 122338

Effect of violation of a Pardon
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president
w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In
1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring
that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his
pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as
they were still on appeal.
ISSUE:
whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of
the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his
original sentence.
HELD:
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department
has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order
that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated
the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional
prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the
authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of
the Government [has] such power been entrusted.
Macaga-an vs People 152 SCRA 430

Who may of amnesty
FACTS:
In a decision on July 15, 1981, the 22 petitioners were charged and convicted in 33
cases for estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. The
total amount of Government funds (treasury warrants) involved was overP2.7
million.
Petitioners moved to close their cases on ground that they had been given
amnesty by former President Marcos on January 28 1986. The Sandiganbayan
required them to submit originals or authenticated copies of their amnesty
papers, which they were unable to produce. Petition was denied.
According to the petitioners, they were given conditional amnesty on Feb 2, 1985,
through the 3rd and 11th Amnesty Commission (sic) of Lanao del Sur and Marawi
City, subject to the approval or final action of the President of the Philippines,
pursuant to PD 1082.
The Amnesty Commission recommended the approval of their amnesty or grant

of executive clemency.
January 22, 1986: Former Governor Mohammed Ali Dimaporo made written
representations with Marcos concerning the applications during a political rally of
the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan. Marcos apparently wrote the following on the upper
right hand corner of Dimaporo's letter: "Approved" and signed the same with a
partly illegible date.
Petitioners also state that the original copies of the amnesty papers were lost or
destroyed at Malacanang "during the February 1986 bloodless military revolution"
and could not be located.
In a MR, petitioners sought to present secondary evidence of the amnesty, but the
Sandiganbayan did not allow it. Court also held that amnesty benefits under PD
1082 were never available to them. Petitioners seek certiorari in SC, claiming that
amnesty statute PD 1082 is applicable to them, NOT PD 1182. and that they
should be allowed to present secondary evidence of the amnesty given by
Marcos.
ISSUES:
W/N PD 1082 applies to the petitioners. NO
HELD/RATIO:
PD 1082 does not apply to the petitioners because their acts were not offenses of
rebellion.
The offenses for which amnesty may be granted under the provisions of PD 1082
are acts which were done in furtherance of resistance to the Republic by members
and supporters of the MNLF and the Bangsa Moro Army and other anti-
government groups with similar motivations and aims.
Resistance = offenses of rebellion/ insurrection/ sedition under Crimes Against
Public Order
There is nothing in the case to indicate that the acts petitioners were convicted
were "in the furtherance of resistance to the duly constituted authorities of the
Republic of the Philippines." On the contrary, the acts of which the accused were
convicted were ordinary crimes (albeit carefully plotted and systematically carried
out by numerous accused) without any political complexion and consisting simply
of diversion of public funds to private profit.
Petitioners fall under persons expressly disqualified from amnesty, stated in Sec
2(a) of PD 1182, which repealed PD 1082. Petitioners applications for amnesty
were also filed beyond the time limit provided in PD 1182
PD 1182 SEC. 2 (a) Persons Disqualified:

Those who have promoted, maintained or headed a rebellion or insurrection or
who, while holding public office or employment took part therein, engaged in war
against the forces of the Government, destroyed property or committed serious
violence, exacted contributions or diverted public funds from the lawful purpose
for which they had been appropriated
Although PD 1182 covers the same subject matter as PD 1082, PD 1182 makes no
mention of the MNLF nor of the Bangsa Moro Army but rather relates to all
groups fighting the government of the Republic. PD 1182, unlike PD 1082, covers
the entire territory of the Republic of the Philippines, while P.D. 1082 covers only
some of the provinces in Mindanao and Sulu and Tawi-Tawi and some of the cities
there located.
In addition, P.D. 1182 included a repealing clause, which rescinded and/or

modified all laws, decrees, instructions, rules and regulations inconsistent with
that decree.
The supposed approval of the former President done in 1985, in clear conflict with
the restrictions in the very decrees he promulgated, cannot be given any legal
effect.
It may be supposed that Marcos could have validly amended PD #s 1082 and 1182
so as to wipe away the restrictions and limitations found in the decrees. But
Marcos did not amend his own decrees and he must be held to the terms and
conditions that he himself had promulgated in the exercise of legislative power.
Petition DENIED.
IBP vs Zamora GR No. 141284

Military Powers
Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress
may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using
the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms,
and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power
to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones
in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there
can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of
the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of
the PNP.
Lacson vs Perez 357 SCRA 756

Military Powers
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38)
on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders
and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for
prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the
appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist
arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that
they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against them.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests
and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,
accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities
intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed
prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for
mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual
warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for
such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no
legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not
prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were
neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they
expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the
hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their
alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have
been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is
uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are
not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their

undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and
all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners
without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
David vs Macapagal-Arroyo GR No. 171396

Military Powers
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O.
No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary,
. . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided
in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples
Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24,
2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily
Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at
about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence
of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were
several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and
AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search
and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
ISSUE:
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP
1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices
conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
RULING:
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP

1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a

validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of
valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]

justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of
inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David
was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices
conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search
and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room,
or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2)
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section
9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All
these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Fortun vs GMA GR No. 190293

Military Powers
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan
family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent
civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24,
2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for
identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009,
President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009,
Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the Presidents
action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act,
the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUES:
Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the]
writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and academic?
RULING:
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have
become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]
YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the]
writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate
that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the
constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The
issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is
unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two
reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress
could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the
same. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in
exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension,
only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the

power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only
when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through
such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to
review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable controversy.
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they
have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the
operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President
did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be
enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those
who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in
court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court
respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President
intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely
populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly
disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government
presence.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The
Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot
and academic.
Nicolas vs Romulo GR No. 175888

Diplomatic Power
FACTS:
This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against
Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer
imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal
laws and the crime was committed within the countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant
to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted
custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before
the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not
ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
HELD:
The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to
be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA
has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its
obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose
and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act
within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted
that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as
the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only
be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of
implementation of its provisions.
Bayan vs Zamora 342 SCRA 449

Diplomatic Power
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered
into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was
treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-
President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of
the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines
the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
ISSUE:
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
RULING:
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of
the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must
be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case
of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25,
Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national

referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a

treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of
America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution

are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its
language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA

only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the
elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty.
xxx xxx xxx
The records reveal that the United States Government, through

Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government
has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United
States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Pimentel vs Executive Secretary GR No. 158088

Diplomatic Power
Facts:
On December 28, 2000, the Philippines through the Charge d Affairs Enrique A.
Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations, signed the Rome Statute
which established the International Criminal Court. Thus, herein petitioners filed
the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of
the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
Issue: Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate for ratification the copy of
the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President.
Held:
The Supreme Court rule in the negative.
The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority
in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations.
As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested
with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested
in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it.
Vinuya vs Romuo GR No. 162230

Diplomatic Power
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the
Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid
to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the
Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment
of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully
satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to
the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the
bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support
programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were
implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not

espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department
has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims
against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is
well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe political
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the
Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has
his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would
be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our
relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this
region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would
mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally

committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle,
where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys
conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion
to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan,
from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further
steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals
to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual
is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By
taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its
own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own
right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose
behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they
have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if
means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All
these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the
position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter
this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace
was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is
an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community
of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those
arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection;
they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens
norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not
admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Go Tek vs Deportation Board 79 SCRA 17

Deportation of undesirable aliens
Facts:
The Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek, a
Chinaman, residing in Ilagan, Isabela and in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
It was alleged in the complaint that in December 1963, a number of NBI agents
searched an office on O' Donnel St. in Sta. Cruz, which was believed to be the
headquarters of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of
the United States" and among those arrested was Go Tek.
Go Tek was an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of
that guerilla unit.
Also, as further alleged, there were several fake dollars found in his possession
and that he had violated Art. 168 of the RPC and rendered himself an undesirable
alien.
The prosecutor prayed that after trial the Board should recommend to the
President of the Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an
undesirable alien, and that "his presence in this country having been, and will
always be and a menace to the peace , welfare, and security of the community".
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature
because there was a pending case against him in the city fiscal's office of Manila
for violation of Article 168.He contended that the board had no jurisdiction to try
the case in view of the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan that the board may deport
aliens only on the grounds specified in the law.
The Board, in its resolution of April 21, 1964 denied Go Tek's motion. The Board
reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the State my exercise
its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding
body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in
whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation
proceeding.
Go Tek filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition action against the
Board.
CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek, citing the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan, stating that
mere possession of fake dollars is not a ground for deportation under the
Immigration Law; and that under section 37(3) of the law before an alien may be
deported for having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of
one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude a conviction is and that
since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article 168, the
deportation was premature.
The Board appealed to the SC alleging that the decision was contrary to law.
The parties stipulated that the Deportation Board is an agency of the President of
the Philippines charged with the investigation of undesirable aliens and to report
and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein.
Issue:
Whether the President has the power to deport undesirable aliens?
Ruling:
Yes.
The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to
deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code:
SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a
foreign power residing in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported
expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own
country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground
upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and
he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine the opposing witnesses.
On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law provides that certain aliens
may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
Commissioner's warrant "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of
the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien." Thirteen
classes of aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specified in
section 37.
So, under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected
(1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code and
(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of
Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens .That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation". According to Justice Johnson, that
when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued in the
country is injurious to the public interest, he may, even in the absence of express
law, deport them. The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their
continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified .
The Deportation Board is composed of the Undersecretary of Justice as chairman ,
the solicitor General, and a representative of the Secretary of National Defense
(Executive Order No. 455 dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M).
Section 69 and Executive Order No. 398 provides that, the Deportation Board, do
not specify the grounds for deportation. Paragraph (a) of Executive Order No. 398
merely provides that "the Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon complaint of
any person is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescribed in
section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code to determine whether a subject of a
foreign power in the Philippines is an undesirable alien or not, and thereafter to
recommend to the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien.
As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutional provision

defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant
the Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in
the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest
of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also
devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory."
The reasons may be summed up in a single word: the public interest.
Also, It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent
on a prior judicial conviction in a criminal case.
Endencia vs David 93 Phil 696

Judiciary Salary
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio
and Jugos salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section
9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax
from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the
said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in
judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec
9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their
continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received
by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This
specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.
Nitafan vs CIR 152 CRA 284

Judiciary Salary
FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all
with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court,
from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to
the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is
anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."
ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax
applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not
clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of
the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the
framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of
judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has
been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax.
Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.
De la Llana vs Alba 112 SCRA 294

Security of Tenure
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,
seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129
which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a
suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision
of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and
judges as provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and
justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of
their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition
must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the

office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is
in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Santiago vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188

Judicial Power
FACTS:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his
graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the
honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who
composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming
that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has
become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that
there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings
is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari
is a remedy against judicial function
ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of

judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court.
In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a
tribunal for hearing and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment
and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the
judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is,
and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine
when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the
subject matter of adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before
them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be
a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from
is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to
determine.
Daza v Singson 180 SCRA 496

Judicial Power
FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political
parties represented in that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in
the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former
party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its

representation in the CoA by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving
this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new set
of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the
assumption of his seat by the Singson. Acting initially on his petition for
prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same
day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election
thereto is permanent. He claimed that the reorganization of the House
representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved
is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be
reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the
legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Garcia vs Board of Investments 191 SCRA 288

Judicial Power
FACTS:
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation,
applied for registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a
new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified
the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted
an amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change
of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan
requested a copy of BPCs original and amended application documents. The BoI
denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give
their consent to the release of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of
the Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these documents
absent consent to disclose. The BoI subsequently approved the amended
application without holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the amended
application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to
the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcias Constitutional right to have access
to information on matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the
Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an interest in
the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real,
and vital because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they
breathe The Court also ruled that BPCs amended application was in fact a
second application that required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing
to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that all

applications and their supporting documents filed under this code shall be
confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the consent of
the applicant, the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure on
the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court ruled that it had
jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application, amended application, and
supporting documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, the
Constitution does not open every door to any and all information because the
law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny. Thus it
excluded the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial
information of the applicant BPC, and matters affecting national security from its
order. The Court did not provide a test for what information is excluded from the
Constitutional privilege to access public information, nor did it specify the kinds of
information that BPC could withhold under its ruling.
PACU vs Sec. of Education 97 Phil 806

Judicial review
FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts
No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and
was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school
and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty
to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the
Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a

general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines
so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance
with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said
Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise,
inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same,
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education
before opening a school is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in
support to the first proposition of the petitioners they contended that the
Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a school and any
law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative
submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable
controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional
question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act
and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was
dismissed by the court.
ISSUES
Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth
Act no. 180 may be declared void and unconstitutional? Or is there an actual
controversy?
RULINGS
No, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court.
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in

danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely
invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative
action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the
public.
Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their
protection against actual interference.
In the case at bar, petitioners raise that first, the act deprives the owner of the
school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property
without due process of Law. It needs to be pointed out that none of the
petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to
operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do not
assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their
permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally
need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation.
Moreover, petitioner insist that there was unlawful delegation of Legislative

powers upon the Secretary of Education. This attack is specifically aimed at
section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a

general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines
so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance
with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said
Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise,
inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same.
This is void of merit because to confer, by statute, upon the Secretary of Education
power and discretion to prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate
and efficient instruction to be observed by all private schools and colleges, is not
to unduly delegate legislative powers. Abuse, if any, by the officials entrusted with
the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of
such statute.
The Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient
instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school
calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of
students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been
satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did
and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in
charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum
requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of
any private school.
It should be noted that if any of the Department circulars or memoranda issued by

the Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seek to establish complete
control of the various activities of private schools, it would surely be invalid. In
order that a circular or memorandum issued by the Department of Education may
be constitutionally assailed, the circular or memorandum must be indicated, the
wrong inflicted or threatened must be alleged and proved, and the constitutional
point raised and argued specifically. There has been no undue delegation of
legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and
memoranda issued by the Department of Education since they fail to indicate
which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being
capricious or pain nuisance.
Tan vs Macapagal 43 SCRA 678
Judicial Review
FACTS:
Petitioners Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V. Fernandez filed a

petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of
themselves and the Filipino people questioning the range of the authority of the
1971 Constitutional Convention and have the court declare that the Con-Con is
"without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the 1935Constitution and Republic
Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the
present Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than
the form now outlined in the present Constitution the Convention being merely
empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without
altering the general plan laid down therein."
Such a plea was sought to be compressed in a five-page pleading. It is

understandable, therefore, why the petition could hardly be characterized as
possessed of merit.
Accordingly, the Court issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on the last day
of the same month a printed thirty-two page motion for reconsideration.
Based on such motion, it can be concluded that petitioners are oblivious of the
authoritative precedents in the jurisdiction. The approach is not distinguished by
its conformity with the law as it stands. Considering, however, the compulsion of
the fundamental principle of separation of powers, this Court cannot exercise the
competence petitioners would erroneously assume it possesses, even assuming
that they have the requisite standing, which is the first question to be faced.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi?
2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case?
RULINGS
1. No, because it is an unchallenged rule that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement ."
The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury, in consequence of its enforcement .Taxpayers only have standing on
laws providing for the disbursement of public funds.
2. No, because at the time the case was filed the Constitutional Convention
has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the 1935
constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review.
The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already.
Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of
power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive
and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties,
judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfil its duties well. The court may not
interfere until the proper time comes ripeness
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it,

there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made
concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be
instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command
of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine
loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is
controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration cannot therefore be sustained.
Dumlao v Comelec 95 SCRA 392
Judicial Review
FACTS
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections
of January 30, 1980.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired.
He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two
however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a
taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office
of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars
persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision
that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUES
Whether or not the filed petition is an actual case or controversy
subject to judicial review?
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing?
3. Whether or not Section 4 of BP blg. 52 is invalid?
RULINGS
1. No, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners fell short of the necessity
that the case bean actual controversy. It is basic that the power of judicial review
is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
In the case at bar, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of
BP52 nor is any party seeking for his disqualification. No petition seeking Dumlaos
disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that
constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on
Certiorari. This is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in
effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without
the benefit of a detailed factual record.
2. No, the long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement"
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not
in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it
cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of
disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective
positions. Neither one of them has been alleged to have been adversely affected
by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional. Their
is a generalized grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake.

In the absence of any litigable interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking
judicial redress.
3. The Court made a partial declaration of nullity of only the objectionable
portion of the provisions in question.
Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal
breach.
Due to the impelling public interest involved and the proximity of the elections,
the strict procedure for judicial relaxed. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 4 of BP
52 was not discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution. The equal protection clause of the constitution
does not forbid all legal classification. It only proscribes arbitrary and
unreasonable classification.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized the purpose of such classification was to
allow emergence of younger blood in local governments. Regarding the
accreditation of Comelec in pursuance to BP 52, it was held that charges for
committing any act of disloyalty to the state should not be a basis to disqualify a
candidate. An accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the first paragraph of Sec. 4
of BP 52 while the second paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP 52 as null and void for being
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to the
accused. That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact."
Ople vs Torres gg293 SCRA 141

Judicial Review
FACTS
Petitioner Ople prays the invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy.
Administrative Order No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general

circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies,
who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. Accordingly, the court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. The establishment of a National Computerized Identification

Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the
President of the Republic of the Philippines is, therefore, an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines.
B. The appropriation of public funds by the President for the

implementation of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive
right of congress to appropriate public funds for expenditure.
C. The implementation of A.O. No. 308 insidiously lays the groundwork

for a system which will violate the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution.
Respondents counter-argues that:
A. The instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a

judicial review;
B. A.O. No. 308 [1996] was issued within the executive and
administrative powers of the president without encroaching on the legislative
powers of congress;
C. The funds necessary for the implementation of the identification

reference system may be sourced from the budgets of the concerned agencies;
D. A.O. No. 308 [1996] protects an individual's interest in privacy.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the instant petition is a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial
review?
RULINGS:
Yes, because it is a well-settled rule that before a court may resolve the question
of constitutionality of a statute, there should be the presence of (1) an
appropriate case, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party rasising the
constitutional question, (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
possible opportunity, and the necessity that the constitutional question be passed
upon in order to decide the case.
In the case at bar, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold
and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308
is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No.
308.
Further, the ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the
fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face.
His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its
fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January
19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a
notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that
representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the
national identification system. All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality
of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality.
It cannot be aruged that facially A.O. No. 308 violates the right to privacy.
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-
defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law
or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict
scrutiny.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of
A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness
of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent.
Kilosbayan vs Guingona 232 SCRA 110
Legal Standing
FACTS:
In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line
lottery system which will establish a national network system that will in turn
expand PCSOs source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it.
A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged
that:
1. PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign
owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad);
2. PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding
and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity;
3. The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a

telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed
to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed to set up such;
4. PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act

(R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto
and telecommunications systems.
PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive
Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a
collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building of the
network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by
the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
HELD:
Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.
1. On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign ownership was

reduced to 40% though.
2. On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
whether domestic or foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between
PCSO and PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO
and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they used, i.e., a contract
of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense
shall build, operate, and manage the network system including its facilities
needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and all
it does is to provide its franchise in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of
such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.
Joya vs PCGG GR No. 96541

Legal Standing
Facts: The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President
Corazon Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between the Republic of the
Philippines and Christies of 82 Old Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan
Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of antique silverware in the custody of Central
Bank. This was approved on 14 August 1990 and the consignment was signed the
following day. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit submitted audit
findings to the President the assets subject of auction were historical relics and
had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by law. As Filipino citizens,
taxpayers and artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have
legal personality to restrain respondent from acting contrary to preserving artistic
creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
Decision:
Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing
means a personal and substantial interest ion the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the members
of thereof and the silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos
administration was toppled and the said objects were confiscated it did not mean
that ownership has passed to the government without complying with
constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation.
If these were already acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the
true owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said
objects that have become publicly owned.
Chavez vs Public Estate Authority GR No. 133250

Legal Standing
FACTS:
In July 2002, Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation lost a case (PEA-Amari
Scandal) before the Supreme Court involving certain reclaimed lands. Upon
receipt of the adverse decision, Amari filed a Motion for Inhibition asking the
ponente of said case, Justice Antonio Carpio, to inhibit from the case on the
ground that before Justice Carpio was appointed to the Supreme Court, he wrote
a column in the Manila Times newspaper where he questioned the legality of the
agreement between the Public Estates Authority and Amari regarding the said
reclaimed property (PEA-Amari deal). Amari insists that Justice Carpio already
prejudged the issue as his bias and prejudice were already apparent. Amari also
prays for a re-deliberation after Justice Carpio inhibits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Justice Carpio should inhibit from the case by reason of the said
Manila Times column.
HELD:
No. In the first place, the decision was already promulgated when Amari filed its
motion requesting Justice Carpio to inhibit. The rule is that a motion to inhibit
must be denied if filed after a member of the Court had already given an opinion
on the merits of the case. Reason: a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate
upon the action of the Court (only to) raise an objection of this sort after a
decision has been rendered.
Second, judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just
because they have written legal articles on the law involved in the case.
Third, looking at Justice Carpios Manila Times article, his article questioned the
legality of the PEA Amari deal on the basis of the lack of public bidding. In this
particular case before the Supreme Court, the issue of the absence of public
bidding was not raised by any of the parties involved hence, Justice Carpios write
up had nothing to do with the very merits of the case.
Gonzales vs Narvasa GR No. 140835

Legal Standing
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional
Reform (PCCR) and of the positionsof presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order
No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the
same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds
that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 43
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining
any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only
Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according
to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to
create a publicoffice and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither
does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being
violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of
the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so
as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional

issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is
no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by
the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7
of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. Being that
case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to
be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of
the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such
a representation.
Pimentel vs Ermita 472 SCRA 587

Legal Standing
FACTS:
While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo, through Executive

Secretary Eduardo Ermita, issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim

appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they
were previously appointed in an acting capacity.Petitioners senators filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued.
They assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments,

whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the President can issue
appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
According to the Solicitor General that petitioners may not claim legal standing as
Senators because no power of the Commission on Appointments has been
infringed upon or violated by the President. If at all, the Commission on
Appointments as a body (rather than individual members of the Congress) may
possess standing in this case.
Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise its certiorari
jurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of the President. Petitioners further
contend that they possess standing because President Arroyos appointment of
department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session impairs
the powers of Congress.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing?

RULINGS:
No, because considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments

from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as
members of Congress. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while
Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress.
Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on

Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmea
have standing in the present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel,
Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived
prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition.
Petitioners may not claim legal standing as Senators because no power of the
Commission on Appointments has been infringed upon or violated by the
President.
If at all, the Commission on Appointments as a body (rather than individual

members of the Congress) may possess standing in this case.
Estrada vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 148560
Legal Standing
FACTS
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted

under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as
amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c)
it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself and in connivance with
his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking
undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or
influence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY himself directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL value of four billion ninety seven million eight
hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three and seventeen centavos
(p4,097,804,173.17), more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage of the filipino people and the
republic of philippines through any or a combination or a series of overt or
criminal acts, or similar schemes or means.
Respectively or a total of more or less 1,847,578,057.50; and by collecting or

receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with john does
jane does, commissions or percentages by reason of said purchases of shares of
stock in the amount of 189,700,000.00 more or less, from the belle corporation
which became part of the deposit in the equitable bank under the account name
'jose velarde'
ISSUES
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 7080 violates the due process clause for its
vagueness?
2. Whether or not it violates the constitutional rights of the accused to know

the nature and clause of the accusation against him?
RULINGS
1. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in
the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the
Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that

words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly

accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of

combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another
in spatial and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for

"combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1,
par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to
(6) of Sec. 1 (d).
Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to

achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful
scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused
and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid
common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts
must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a
criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a

sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning
and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated
to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense
with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
2. On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that
Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the
crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is
obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all
other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence
which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused
is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number
of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern
and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by
the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
Umali vs Guingona GR No. 131124

Legal Standing
Facts:
Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. However, a confidential memorandum against him was sent to President
Ramos and thus forwarded to Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption for investigation. Umali complied with the pleadings and hearings set
by PCAGC. Umali and his lawyer did not raise clarficatory questions during the
hearing. PCAGC foud prima facie evidence to support the charges and President
Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. He appealed to the Office of the President
but was denied. He elevated it to RTC alleging that he was not accorded due
process and deprived of security of tenure. Petition for Certiorari was denied. CA
reversed the decision and was elevated to SC. One of Umali raised the issue of the
constitutionality of PCAGC as a government agency.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of Umali was raised at the earliest opportunity?
Decision:
In lieu of the supervening events AO 152 was lifted. Regarding the
constitutionality of PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the RTC. It was certainly too late to raise the said issue for
the first time at such a late stage of the proceedings.
Laurel vs Garcia 187 SCRA 797

Legal Standing
FACTS
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the
Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al.
was filed, the respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's
resolution dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were consolidated on
March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the parties in the Laurel case were
deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed
a motion for an extension of 30 days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed
by a second motion for an extension of another 30 days which we granted on May
8, 1990, a third motion for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a
fourth motion for extension of time which we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling
the attention of the respondents to the length of time the petitions have been
pending. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for
30 days to file a reply. We noted his motion and resolved to decide the 2 cases.
The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by
the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with
Japan, the Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese
government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and
building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the
site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when
the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the
Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has
been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties
starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a
minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one
bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements, has not yet materialized.
The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court.
Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225 million floor price
became merely a suggested floor price.
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The
petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to
anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the
alleged unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the
property to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These petitions have been

consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective is the same - to
stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
RULINGS
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on
his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much
because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so
because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether
or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy
determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering
the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of
property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
Hacienda Luisita vs PARC GR No. 171101
Legal Standing
FACTS
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to

DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing
the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the
Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the
SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of
the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether
they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It
thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule
meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their
signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed
names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
2. Whether or not Section 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
RULING
1. Yes, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in
this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not
limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made
by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of
laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced
acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted
from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI.
The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the
Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not
only were they allowed to retain the benefits and home lots they received under
the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
2. No, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the Lis mota of the
case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer
one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its
July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of
the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.
Serrano de Agbayani vs PNB 38 SCRA 42
Declaration of Unconstitutionality
FACTS:
Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the
loan, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery
of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit
against both alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long
prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the
other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the
period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26,
1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium
was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time
during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower
court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of
plaintiff.
ISSUE:
W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium
Law before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect
of the declaration of Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD:
YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular
conduct, private and official. 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order
prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences
are attached. Precisely because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a
valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers,
this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number
and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiffs suit is thus manifest. From July
19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short
of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945,
the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision
of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight
days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of
the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be
availed of as a defense.
Salazar vs Achacoso 183 SCRA 145

Declaration of Unconstitutionality
FACTS
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez
sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the
complaint against him. On the same day after knowing that petitioner had no
license to operate a recruitment agency; public respondent issued a Closure and
Seizure Order No 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will be a seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid
license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the
same code.
A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by
media men and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They
served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team
confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for
the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and
hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec
2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and
were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration validly issue

warrants of search and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
RULINGS
No, because under the new Constitution, it is only a judge who may issue warrants
of search and arrest:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the
state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No
longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest.
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. Section 38, paragraph (c), of
the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to
Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of
Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have
the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in
illegal recruitment.
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the
avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment.
The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause
the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after
proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-
seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and
entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018,
giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized

representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such
non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that
his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead
to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the
office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other
implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies,
establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for
overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.
The Court reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent declaring Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor
Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is,
obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend
to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of
the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia

argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant.
A warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void.
People vs Ramos 88 SCRA 486
Additional Powers of the Supreme Court
FACTS
The appellant was found guilty of rape and sentenced to a "prison term ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the
offended party Elisa Malana the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency taking into consideration the
principal penalty imposed, and to pay the costs," by the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan, Branch V.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals the 5th Division thereof "after a careful and
painstaking evaluation of the evidence [found] that appellant is guilty as charged.
"But instead of rendering judgment and imposing a penalty, said court stated.
However, since the imposable penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua
(Art. 335 Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 4111), this Court, instead of
entering judgment, hereby certifies this case to the Supreme Court for final
determination, pursuant to the provision of Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court."
ISSUES
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the jurisdiction to render a judgment
imposing the penalty of death or of life imprisonment?
RULINGS
Yes, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.
Sec. 12 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court states as follows:
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division, the said division

should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall
forthwith certify the case had been brought before it on appeal.
In People of the Philippines vs. Amado Daniel (G.R. No. L-40330), November 20,
1978), the Court, through Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said: "this Court directs
that, henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty
of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any
criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less
than the reclusion perpetua, the said Court, with a comprehensive written
analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, render judgment
expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua
as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith
certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for review."
Restrains the Court of Appeals from doing is not the act of rendering judgment,
which necessarily includes imposing the corresponding penalty, but that of
"entering judgment thereon." It is maintained that, considering that the known
connotation of the term "entering judgment" contemplates judgments that are
already final and executory, it follows that there is no prohibition against the Court
of Appeals "rendering" the appropriate judgment, as long as no entry thereof is
made, which in effect means that the decision containing the penalty is to be
elevated to the Supreme Court in the same fashion as judgments of the Courts of
First Instance of the same nature. It is further pointed out that if Courts of First
Instance have jurisdiction and power to impose the penalties of reclusion
perpetua and death in appropriate cases, there is no reason why the Court of
Appeals should be held to be devoid of such prerogative.
People vs Mateo GR No. 147678
Additional Powers of the Supreme Court

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
10 counts of rape and to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral
damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General assailed the factual findings
of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by
virtue of express provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion
or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense
for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in
character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favour of the
accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has
been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of
herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be
sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from
the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma,
i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the
Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court
of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
Villavert vs Desierto GR No. 133715

Power of the Supreme Court
Facts:
An administrative charge for grave misconduct was filed against Villavert, Sales &
Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer
recommended the dismissal of the case. However, Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas
issued a Memorandum finding Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27
of RA 6770.
Issue:
May decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases be appealed to the
Supreme Court?
Held:
No. In Fabian vs. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of
the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies,
like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court.
Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as
reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.
Yao vs CA GR No. 132428

Requirement as to decisions
FACTS
George Yaos legal dilemma commenced when the Philippine Electrical

Manufacturing Company (PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General
Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, Remandaman
was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with
the GE logo and design. Assessing that these products were counterfeit, PEMCO
applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch
49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter
seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.
The indictment charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and in conspiracy sold
fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and
containers, making them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and
inducing the public to believe them as such.. Both accused pleaded not guilty. The
MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court
declared that the prosecution failed to prove that he was still one of the Board of
Directors at the time the goods were seized.
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied. He then appealed
to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). Judge Adoracion Angeles
rendered a one-page Decision which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision.
YAO filed a motion for reconsideration and assailed the decision as violative of
Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial
court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on
appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.
YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal. The Court of
Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days to file the Appellant's Brief.
However, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution declaring that the
decision of RTC has long become final and executory and ordering the records of
the case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment.
YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the
resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal but the Court of Appeals denied
the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit.
ISSUES
Whether or not Yao was denied due process?
RULINGS
Yes he was. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO transgressed
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing

therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
The Court finds that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and,
therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision achieved
nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which
could easily be done. The Court cannot consider or affirm said RTC decision as a
memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity. It
merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or
resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for
resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the

Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.
It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties
to litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The losing party
is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted,
should he believe that the decision should be reversed.
While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal is
statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead
afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his case, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his

complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
mere technicalities. The Court withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at
bar for its palpable failure to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates
thereby denying YAO of his day in court and reminding also all magistrates to heed
the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Fr. Martinez vs CA GR No. 123547
Requirement as to decisions
FACTS:
Petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City,
entered into an oral contract with private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and
his sister Manuela De la Paz regarding the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe
Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the sum of P15,000.00. The aforesaid lot is
located along Maharlika Road near the Municipal Hall of Cabanatuan City.
At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia De la Paz,
mother of private respondents, although the same had already sold it to private
respondent Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 26,
1976. Private respondent Manuela subsequently registered the sale in her name
on October 22, 1981.
When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents De la Paz
were accompanied by their mother, since petitioner dealt with the De la Pazs as a
family and not individually. He was assured by them that the lot belonged to
Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would give a downpayment of
P3,000.00 to private respondents De la Paz and that the balance would be payable
by installment. After giving the P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started the
construction of a house on the lot after securing a building permit from the City
Engineers Office on April 23, 1981, with the written consent of the then registered
owner, Claudia de la Paz. Consequently, petitioner also began paying the real
estate taxes on said property.
On October 6, 1981, the construction of the petitioners house was completed

and on January 31, 1983, petitioner completed the payment for the lot.
However, private respondents De la Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale they
promised to petitioner. On October 28, 1981, in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Right
to Repurchase, private respondents De la Paz sold three lots with right to
repurchase the same within one year to private respondents spouses Reynaldo
and Susan Veneracion for the sum of P150,000.00.
Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold
to the spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter from private respondent
Reynaldo Veneracion on March 19, 1986, claiming ownership of the land and
demanding that they vacate the property and remove their improvements
thereon. Petitioner, in turn, demanded through counsel the execution of the deed
of sale from private respondents De la Paz and informed Reynaldo Veneracion
that he was the owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same
from private respondents De la Paz.
The matter was then referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay of San Juan,
Cabanatuan City for conciliation, but the parties failed to reach an agreement. On
May 12, 1986, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion brought an action for
ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Cabanatuan City against
petitioner and his mother. The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner,
thus prompting private respondent Veneracion to elevate the matter to the
Regional Trial Court where it ruled in favor of the latter by virtue of their prior
registration to the Register of Deeds.
Petitioner filed a petition for review for the ejectment case before the Court of
Appeals where it ruled in favor of private respondent Veneracion. Petitioner then
filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Hence, this case.
ISSUES
Whether or not the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals violated the Constitution for not stating the legal basis?
RULINGS
No, such act is not a violation.
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides that No petition for
review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. The Supreme Court ruled
that this requirement has been complied with by the Court of Appeals by
declaring in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling because
petitioner had not raised anything new to provide further basis for the
reconsideration.
The CAs resolution states: For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of
Our Decision filed by the petitioners. Evidently, the motion poses nothing new.
The points and arguments raised by the movants have been considered and
passed upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus, We find no reason
to disturb the same.
Maceda vs Vasquez 221 SCRA 464
Judicial Department
Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by
certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision
for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January
31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had
been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for
decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior
courts
Held:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC
for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over

all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint
and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Noblejas vs Teehankee 23 SCRA 405

Judicial Department
Facts:
Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he isentitled
to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI.
He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those
covered by the title. The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas,
requiring himto explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge,
he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary
Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES).
Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge).
Ruling:
No. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and
privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or
removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers
because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of
supervisory control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto,the
control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
Petitioners theory that the grant of privilege of a Judge of First Instance

includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and
to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result
in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom
the legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. This include (a)
the Judicial Superintendent of the DOJ; (b) the Assistant Solicitors General; (c) the
City Fiscal of Quezon City; (d) the City Fiscal of Manila and (e) SEC Commissioner.
Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial

function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the
Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is
appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character.Still,
the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or
executive functions.
Petition is Dismissed.
Manila Electric Co. vs Pasay Trans 57 Phil 600

Judicial Department
FACTS:
The case at bar relates with a petition of the Manila Electric Company (MEC, pet),
requesting the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the
terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the
Pasig bridge of the MEC and the compensation to be paid to the MEC by such
transportation companies.
Act NO. 1446, Section 11

Relates with the legal act of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, to act on the petition.
ISSUE
Concerns the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.
HELD & RATIO

Act 1446, Section 11 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be
improper and illegal for the members of the SC, sitting as a board or arbitrators,
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the
MEC.
The decisions of the Board of Arbitration shall go through the regular court system
(Trial Courts Court of Appeals SC). They will be reviewed by the lower courts
and will ultimately be reviewed by themselves. The SC cannot sit as members of
the Board of Arbitration because it is not within their jurisdiction to decided on
cases on purely contractual situations.
Sec. 11 of Act 1446 provides:
Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or

corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of
the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use
such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such
other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the
Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final.
Said Act provides that for every franchise granted, terms as to the usage and
compensation to be paid to the grantee shall be fixed by the members of the
Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators, a majority vote is required and this
is final
Pursuant to said Act, MERALCO filed a petition before the court requesting the
members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms
upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig
bridge of the MERALC
Copies were sent to affected transpo company (one of which is the Pasay Transpo)
and to Atty-Gen which disclaimed any interest.
ISSUES: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court can sit as arbitrators
and fix the terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case
HELD: No
The Supreme Court represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the
Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional
rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining
to or connected with the administering of judicial functions
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26).
When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme
Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court
acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators
A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and
possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be
exercised by the Supreme Court.
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required
or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties
being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial,
Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction
or power, or perform any other duty.
section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of
a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be
improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition
of the Manila Electric Company.
SB ng. Taguig vs Judge Estrella AM No. 01-1608-RJJ

Lower Courts
FACTS:
The present controversy stemmed from an election protest filed by then

mayoralty candidate Ricardo R. Papa, Jr. against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate
proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections. The case
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and was eventually raffled to the
sala of respondent judge. The issue narrowed down to the determination of the
number of Garcia votes that should have been considered stray, there having been
another candidate named Garcia.
A revision committee was formed and thereafter reported that Papa objected to a
total of 11,290 ballots and 3,049 were plain Garcia votes. Respondent judge
issued an order directing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to examine
the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of both parties. After the
examination of the NBI, the ballot boxes were ordered by the respondent to be
removed from his custody and transferred to another RTC Branch. The NBI
submitted its report and Garcia moved to be furnished with the said report.
Respondent judge denied the motion. Only the court was furnished with the copy
of the NBI report. After several motions and petitions for the resetting of the
promulgation of judgment, a judgment was promulgated in favor of Papa. On the
day of the promulgation of judgment, Garcia was given only by the respondent
judge a few minutes to go over several pages of questioned documents. In his
complaint, Garcia alleged that respondent judge gave unwarranted benefits to
Papa, which caused undue injury to him as well as the people of Taguig by
depriving them of their duly elected mayor. Respondent judge denied Garcia's
allegations. The Court referred the matter to the Court Administrator for report
and recommendation.
The Office of the Court Administrator consented to the Comelec's finding that the
respondent's action showed utter disregard of the appropriate procedure required
of him, resulting in the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters.
ISSUES:
Whether the judge is impartial?
RULINGS:
Yes. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be
the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence (Rule1.01, Canon
1).
Indeed, in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and
applicable laws unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism
(Rule 3.02, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Thus, the Court has continually reminded members of the bench that; The Judge
should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must
view himself as a priest for the administration of justice is akin to a religious
crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of
themost sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service
with impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence repose in him.
On this score, the court finds pertinent their ruling in the recent case of Evelyn
Agpalasin vs. Judge Ernesto M. Agcaoili (A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12, 2000),
that; A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, he
scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element
in determining his judicial course.
He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity. A decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will
nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a
magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest.
Verily, a judge must promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. These stringent standards are intended to assure parties of just and
equitable decisions and of a judiciary that is capable of dispensing impartial
justice in every issue in every trial.
Ynot vs IAC 148 SCRA 659
The Lower Courts
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer
confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O.
due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard
before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the
improper exercise of legislative power by the former president
under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given
emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.
Issue:
Is the E.O. constitutional?
Held:
The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the
contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so
heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really
presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an
existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president
under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid
controvery. In the due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it
would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying
down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to
adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing
conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they
be confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against
arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a
passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power
which both restrains and is restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in
626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it cant be
said that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport
prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due
process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a
court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the
method toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or
his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of
powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51

The Lower Courts
FACTS:
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case.
On the same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for
time within which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge,
Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino
submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his
decision, his decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The
promulgation of the decisions was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now
contending that the court can no longer promulgate judgment because by January
1976, the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower courts must decide
on cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted
period.
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date
of last day of filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day,
the 3-month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to
rule on the case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28,
1975. The date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of
court. Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period
because November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976,
could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a
later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?

Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity
of this constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be
decided or resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the
Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts.
In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The
provision is mandatory, its merely directive. Extensions can be granted in
meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as mandatory will only be
detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court
judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal
construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.
De Roma vs CA 152 SCRA 205

The Lower Courts
FACTS
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma.
She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as
guardian of Rosalinda.
Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the
estate.
This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier
donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth

P10,297.50. There is no dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties
cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation.
The private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of
the Civil Code.
Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate
because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not
officious.
ISSUES
Whether or not we should dwell on the error assigned by the petitioner?
RULINGS
No, there is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner
regarding the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the
12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution.
As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said provision was merely directory and
failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of
jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in
Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the
courts of justice, indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition
of the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years.
Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Baluyot vs Holganza GR No. 136374
Scope of Civil Service
Facts:
On March 13, 1992 petitioners as resident of Barangay Cruz represented by

petitioner Timoteo Baluyot et.al filed for specific performance and damages
against UP respondent contending that they have been in open, peaceful, adverse
and continuous possession in the concept of an owner of that parcel of land in
Quezon City
In 1979, UP approved the donation directly to the said residents for about 9.2
hectares and that UP backed out to proceed with the donation and the execution
of the legal instrument was not formalized.
Afterwards, the negotiation of donation was resumed thru the defendant Quezon
City government under the terms contrary to the right of the bonafide residents
of the said barrio.
Petitioners apply for writ of injunction that was issued to restrain defendant UP
from ejecting plaintiffs and demolishing their improvements on the Riceland. Also,
petitioners seek enforcement of the Deed of donation made by UP defendant to
the Quezon City government.
Under the said Deed of Donation the donee shall after lapse of 3 years transfer to
the qualified residents by way of donation the individual lots occupied by them.
However, UP President had failed to deliver the CTC to enable Quezon City
government to register the Deed of Donation.
The defendant UP had continuously, unlawfully refused to comply the obligation

to deliver the title despite several requests and conferences.
Revocation and reversion of a Deed of Donation without Judicial declaration is

illegal and prejudicial to the rights of the bonafide residents in Barangay Cruz na
Ligas Quezon City.
By reason of deception, the residents reiterate the claim of ownership of 42

hectares which are included in the tax declaration under the name of UP.
The plaintiff prayed for the declaration of the Deed of Donation as valid and
subsisting.
The trial court rendered its decision that petitioners did not have a cause of action
for specific performance on the ground that the Deed of donation had already
been revoked denying the injunction.
However CA ruled in favor of UP
Issue: Whether petitioners has the right to seek enforcement of the Deed of
Donation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, because there is a stipulation pour
autrui
Under the Civil Code Art 1311
(READ ART. 1311 ON REQUISITES OF STIPULATION POUR AUTRUI)
That if a contract should contain, some stipulation in favour of a 3rd person. He

may demand its fulfilment provided that he communicated his acceptance to the
obligor before its revocation.
The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon
a 3rd person.
Allegations are sufficient to bring the petitioners action within 2nd paragraph of
Art. 1311 on stipulation pour autrui
1. That the Deed of donation contains some stipulation that Quezon city
government is required to transfer donation to the barrio residents.
2. Its stipulation is part of conditions and obligations imposed by UP as donor

upon Quezon City government donee.
3. The intent of the parties to the deed of donation was to confer a favour
upon petitioners by transferring lots occupied by them.
4. Conference were held between the parties to convince UP to surrender CTC

to the city government which donation had been accepted by petitioners by
demanding fulfilment and that private respondents were aware of such

acceptance.
5. All allegations can be fairly inferred that neither of private respondents

acted in representation of the other, each private respondents had its own
obligation in view of conferring a favor upon petitioners.
Manila Public School Teachers Association vs Sec. of Education GR No. 95445

Facts:
September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day. There
is no question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not
conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in G.R. No.
95590, 4 they converged at the LiwasangBonifacio in the morning whence they
proceeded to the National Office of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly.
Issue:
Do public teachers have the right to strike?
Ruling :
No, the manila public school teachers association has no right to strike during
class hours.
The dissenting opinions, however, would anchor their defense of the public school
teachers on their right to petition the government for redress of grievances.
Social Security System vs The Court of Appeals GR No. 85279

Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unionsdemands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the courtaction for
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for
staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restrainingorder pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on
the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor
Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security
System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil
Servicelaws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not
covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from
striking.
Issue:
Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.
Ruling:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice
provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct
peacefulconcerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No.
180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation
that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees
enjoinsunder pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employeesfrom staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing government
employees tostrike they are prohibited from doing so.
Bitonio, Jr. vs COA GR No. 147392

Ban on double compensation
Facts:
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of
the Bureau of Labor Relations in theDepartment of Labor and Employment. As
representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a
per diemfor every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed
the payment of per diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court
ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet

members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the
receipt of compensation therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated
September 19, 1997, implementing Senate Committee Reports No. 509.
In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme
Court modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the
prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials
given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary
and other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not
covered by the prohibition.
He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after
the Civil Liberties Union case became final, authorized the payment of per diems;
in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to
have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as
interpreted in theCivil Liberties Union case.
COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioners motion for

reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for
his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the
Secretary of Labor.
Held:
The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.
The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for hisboard
meetings sitting as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of
Directors of the PEZA.
The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his
capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is
prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment,
such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in
behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner
who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a
better right than his principal.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant
to the Constitution. No law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is
more superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the
flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No.
8748 to cure such defect. The option of designating representative to the Board by
the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the paragraph as to
payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted,
considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set
by the Constitution.
Cayetano vs Monsod 201 SCRA 210

COMELEC
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution
provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special

proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
Javier vs Comelec 144 SCRA 194

COMELEC
Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be
members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial
board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the
same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On
certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was
set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner.
Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a
former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the
2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en
banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor
General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by
virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge
as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we
have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The
litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their
rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must
trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with

what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only
to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in
which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The
judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Canisoca vs COMELEC
COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Canicosa and private respondent Lajara were candidates for mayor in
Calamba, Laguna during the May 1995 elections. After the canvassing, Lajara was
proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvasser. Thereafter, Canicosa filed
with the COMELEC a petition to declare failure of election and to declare null and
void the canvass and proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds and
anomalies in casting and accounting of votes, preparation of election returns,
violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting and delay
in the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the
office of the Municipal Treasurer. In its decision, the COMELEC en banc dismissed
the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration
of failure of election.
HELD:
There are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared,
namely:
The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; or
After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes.
Averment that more than one-half of the legitimate voters were not able to vote
is not a ground which warrants a declaration of failure of election.
The grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition do not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Before COMELEC can act on a
verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, at least two (2) conditions
must concur:
No voting has taken place in the precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if
there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in failure to elect; and
The votes that were not cast would affect the result of the election. From the face
of the instant petition, it is readily apparent that an election took place and that it
did not result in a failure to elect.
The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to
vote which is a justiciable issue properly recognized by the regular courts.
Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections, the final list of voters was posted in
each precinct. Based on the lists thus posted Canicosa could have filed a petition
for inclusion of registered voters with the regular courts.
The correction of the manifest mistake in mathematical addition calls for a mere
clerical task of the board of canvassers. The remedy invoked was purely
administrative. The issue concerning registration of voters, which Canicosa cited
as a ground in his petition for declaration of failure of election, is an administrative
question. Likewise, questions as to whether elections have been held or whether
certain returns were falsified or manufactured and therefore should be excluded
from the canvass do not involve the right to vote. Such questions are properly
within the administrative jurisdiction of COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon
directly by the COMELEC en banc without having to pass through any of its
divisions. The provision in the constitution mandating the COMELEC to hear and
decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by
COMELEC en banc, not applicable if the case about to be resolved is purely
administrative in nature.
Aruelo, Jr. vs CA 227 SCRA 311

Rule-Making
Facts:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the
respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his
answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had
lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to
dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part
III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not
suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day
period to file his answer.
Issue:
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading
beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose
proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule
1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and
bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC.
Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and
proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election
contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited
jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it

provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests orquo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing
of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the
Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
Flores vs COMELEC
COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the
highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with
Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent
Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the
petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and
installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two
votes as stray from the latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed
the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for
Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been
considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and
Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the
petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground
that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A.
6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial
court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final and non-
appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking
cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay
election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?
Held:
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more
significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing
that the COMELEC shall Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their
decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision
rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly
to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679,
insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a
barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared
unconstitutional.
Garces vs CA 259 SCRA 99

Review of decisions
FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte
on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio
Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed
by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But
she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from
assuming office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department,
with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling
booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte
which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order.
Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the
COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion
as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces
be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same
was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the
case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only

on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter
court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7,
Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo
warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters referred
under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this
Controversy.
The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The
settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to
the COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
elective regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational
set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective,
official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative
questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with
the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
*Petition denied
Luego vs CSC
Commission on Audit
Facts:
Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but the CSC
approved it as temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by
the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be
appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is
revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by
Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order
and the validity of the respondents appointment.
Issue:
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the
basis of this finding, order his replacement.
Held:
No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was
therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it
was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent
CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall
have inter alia the power to approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service .and disapprove those where the
appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When
the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with
the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that
another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion
vested solely in the city mayor.
Office of the Ombudsman vs Madriaga GR No. 164316

The Ombudsman
FACTS:
The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan
Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same
school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules
Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They were
subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted
out the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted
out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is
merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials
HELD:
Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman
administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure

compliance therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman
of the power to recommend the imposition of penalty on erring public officials
and employees and ensure compliance therewith.
The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the
questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of
any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring
officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that
the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer
concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to
be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution
and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed
through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.
The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the
phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to
impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely
recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The
implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed
through the proper officer.
Cruz vs Sec. of DENR 347 SCRA 728

Patrimony
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources
are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.
Lee Hong Kok vs David 48 SCRA 372

Patrimony
FACTS:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto,
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application,
the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent,
covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued
an original certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant
HELD:
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate
of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by
private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued
for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor
had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as
their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the
grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government
may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant
cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and
the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:
The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately

embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its
capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character.
In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution.
Republic vs Republic Estate Corp. GR No. 103882

Patrimony
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the
reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and
adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities
may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for
the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an
agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the

agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the
contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land
than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was
affirmed by the CA with modifications.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area.
II. Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the
commerce of man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of
the respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged
areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide
terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach
scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we
cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the
intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been
found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra
vires and null and void.
Ramirez vs Vda. De Ramirez 111SCRA 704

Patrimony
FACTS:
Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a
French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to
the widow, and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership.
Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and
2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the
ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional
prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
ISSUE:
WON the ground for the opposition is correct.
HELD:
No, it is not correct.
The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire
private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in
favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land
in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
Nadeco vs PVB
Patrimony
Facts:
The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which
ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered
mainly by the National Development Company. The law outlined the procedure
for filling claims against the Agrix Companies and created a claims committee to
process these claims. Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is
section 4(1) thereof providing that all mortgages and other liens presently
attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby
extinguished. Earlier, the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private
respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978
over three parcels of land situated in Los Baos, Laguna. During the existence of
the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of salvaging this
and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by
President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan credit was filed by PNB
against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and invoked that the same
was extinguished by PD 1717.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for
payment without prejudice to PD 1717.
Held:
Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under
the protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well s penalties and
charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot
simply be taken by law from one person and given to another without just
compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not
permitted under the constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract
between Agrix and the private respondent without justification. While it is true
that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle will apply
only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be
considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of
greater number.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not
being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a
lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest
and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking
without due process of law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the
secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal
protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor
controlled by the government, should have been created only by general and not
special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes with purely private
agreements without any demonstrated connection with the public interest, there
is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.
Albano vs Reyes 175 SCRA 264

Patrimony
Facts:
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) board directed the PPA management to
prepare for the public bidding of the development, management and operation of
the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) at the Port of Manila. A
Bidding Committee was formed by the DOTC for the public bidding. After
evaluation of several bids, the Bidding Committee recommended the award of the
contract to respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI).
Accordingly, Rainerio Reyes, then DOTC secretary, declared the ICTSI consortium
as the winning bidder.
On May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the same with
directives that PPA shall still have the responsibility for planning, detailed
engineering, construction, expansion, rehabilitation and capital dredging of the
port, as well as the determination of how the revenues of the port system shall be
allocated for future works; and the contractor shall not collect taxes and duties
except that in the case of wharfage or tonnage dues.
Petitioner Albano, as taxpayer and Congressman, assailed the legality of the award
and claimed that since the MICT is a public utility, it needs a legislative franchise
before it can legally operate as a public utility.
ISSUE: Whether a franchise is needed for the operation of the MICT?
Held: No. While the PPA has been tasked under E.O. No. 30 with the management
and operation of the MICT and to undertake the provision of cargo handling and
port related services thereat, the law provides that such shall be in accordance
with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations. P.D. 857 expressly
empowers the PPA to provide services within Port Districts whether on its own,
by contract, or otherwise.
Even if the MICT is considered a public utility, its operation would not necessarily
need a franchise from the legislature because the law has granted certain
administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the
operation of public utilities. Reading E.O. 30 and P.D. 857 together, it is clear that
the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and
management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by
another by contract or other means, at its option.
Doctrine: The law granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant
licenses for the operation of public utilities. Theory that MICT is a wharf or a
dock, as contemplated under the Public Service Act, would not necessarily call
for a franchise from the Legislative Branch.
Republic vs PLDT 26 SCRA 620

Patrimony
FACTS:
Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the
right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between
the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government
Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private
respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where
no agreement is had between them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone
System can be a valid object for expropriation.
HELD:
Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may
require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation.
The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both
telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of
right of way.
Lagman vs Torres 282 SCRA 337

Patrimony
Facts:
The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 An Act Deregulating
the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation process
has two phases: (a) the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase
through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not
provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when
the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor
when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title one subject
requirement of the Constitution.
Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on
undue delegation of power.
Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition
Discussions:
The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue
all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject
indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, the Court states
that:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or
companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular
business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the
whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which
one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the
other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding
between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding
company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting
competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity,
controlling its production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with
freedom of trade without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade
refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end.
Rulings:
The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court has adopted a liberal
construction of the one title one subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b)
providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is
the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less
on imported petroleum.[i][20] We shall, however, return to the validity of this

provision when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.
Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180
that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory
and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus,
the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The
discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before
the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment
of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil
and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: The State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Defensor-Santiago vs COMELEC GR No. 127325

Amendments and Revisions to the Constitution
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement

for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set
the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the
hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC
directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a
special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments,
among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an
enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by

peoples initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the

Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments
to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in
the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the
constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to

the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and
for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important
than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent
to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made
permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
Lambino vs COMELEC GR No. 174153

FACTS:
Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes
comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative
district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This
has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment
to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by
adding Art XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift
the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the
Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC.
Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only
binding to the parties within that case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people.
The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present
the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often
pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the
proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the
proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition
contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they
did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a
proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s
by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-
be parliament to enact more rules.
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be
decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of
constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.
***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by

the Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act
6735 is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples
initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.
Sanidad vs COMELEC 73 SCRA 333

FACTS:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16
Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things,
the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991,
by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite
of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No.
991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October
16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire
to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to
the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political
in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to
initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution
sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and
effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said
Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass
upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving
the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and
decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten
Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only
of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all
other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a
limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in
sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

Celedonio Manubag Jr. Case Digests Compilation Summer 2017 (Atty. Maligon)

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Celedonio Manubag Jr. Case Digests Compilation Summer 2017 (Atty. Maligon)

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Celedonio S Manubag Jr.

Case Digest Compilation Summer 2017

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

Oposa vs. Factoran 224 SCRA 792

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by

Kilosbayan vs Morato GR No. 118910

Francisco, et al vs House Speaker Gr No. 160261

Santiago vs Guingona GR No. 134577

First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

The Petition is DISMISSED.

Javellana vs Exec Secretary GR No. 36142

Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department

Magallona, et al vs Ermita GR No. 187167

Tecson vs. Comelec GR No. 161434

misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be

Mo ya Lim Yao vs. Commission on Immigration 41 SCRA 29

Valles vs Comelec 337 SCRA 543

Modes of acquisition: Citizenship

Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

Bengson III vs HRET GR No. 142840

1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

Balgamelo Cabiling, et al vs Commissioner GR No. 183133

Republic vs Dela Rosa GR No. 104654

February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.

Frivaldo vs Comelec 257 SCRA 731

Tabasa vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125 793

Mercado vs Manzano G.R. No. 135083

Jacot vs Dal and Comelec GR No. 179848

AAJS Member Calilang vs Dumatong GR No. 160869

Co Kim Cham vs Tan Keh 75 Phils 113

Lawyers League for Better Phils vs Aquino GR No. 73748, 73972

GP vs Monte De Piedad GR No. 9959

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions

Soriano vs Laguardia GR No. 164785, 587 SCRA 79

Tanada vs Angara GR No. 118295

The Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel GR No. 183591

Peralta vs Director of Prisons 75 PHIL 285

Laurel vs Misa 77 Phil 856

Republic vs Villasor 54 SCRA 83

Tan vs Director of Forestry 125 SCRA 302

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-

Republic vs Feliciano 148 SCRA 424

PNB vs Pabala 83 SCRA 595

Department of Agriculture vs NLRC

Sanders vs Veridiano 162 SCRA 88

Mobile Phil Inc v Customs 18 SCRA 1120

National Airports Corp vs Teodoro 91 Phil 203

PNB vs CIR 81 SCRA 314

Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge Firme 192 SCRA 692

Merrit vs GPI 34 Phil 311

USA vs Guinto 182 SCRA 644

Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon GR 54705