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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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The logic of ethnic terrorism

a
Daniel Byman
a
Rand , 1333 H Street, NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC, 20005 E-
mail:
Published online: 09 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Daniel Byman (1998) The logic of ethnic terrorism, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 21:2, 149-169, DOI: 10.1080/10576109808436060

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 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism

DANIEL BYMAN
RAND
Washington, DC, USA

Ethnic terrorism differs considerably from violence carried out for ideologi-
cal, religious, or financial motives. Ethnic terrorists often seek to influence
their own constituencies more than the country as a whole. Ethnic terrorists
frequently seek to foster communal identity, in contrast to an identity pro-
posed by the state. Ethnic terrorists often target potential intermediaries,
who might otherwise compromise on identity issues. A secondary goal of the
attacks is to create a climate of fear among a rival group's population.
Ethnic terrorism creates a difficult problem for the state: conventional
countermeasures may engender broader support for an insurgency or a sepa-
ratist movement even when they hamstring or defeat a specific terrorist group.
Because state strategies often backfire, an ideal strategy is to compel "in
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group" policingencouraging ethnic moderates through carrots as well as

sticks to punish radical activity.

The popular image of a terrorist is the Hezballah guerrilla driving a truck

filled with explosives into a U.S. Marine barracks. Assured of his place among
the martyrs, his face is illuminated by a beatific smile even as he faces certain
death. The image of this deadly threat pervades the policy community today. Yet
this focus ignores another widespread form of violence: ethnic terrorism. Ethnic
terrorists are neither limited geographically nor unique to the current time period.
They have been active around the globe: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Irgun in Palestine, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)
in Turkey, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland,
and the Basque separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasvna (ETA) in Spain are all
examples of ethnic terrorist groups.1
Although the modus operandi of these groups is hardly new, ethnic terrorism
as a phenomenon is neglected, its distinct makeup ignored. This essay will con-
sider how ethnic terrorism is a distinct phenomenon, different from other types of
terrorism. Who does an ethnic terrorist seek to influence? How do state actions

Received 14 May 1997; accepted 15 September 1997.

The author would like to thank Bruce Hoffman, Kenneth Pollack, Jeremy Shapiro, and
an anonymous reviewer for their comments and help on this paper. Particular thanks must
also go to the Council on Foreign Relations study group on terrorism, which critiqued an
earlier version of this work.
Address correspondence to Daniel Byman, RAND, 1333 H Street, NW, Suite 800,
Washington, DC 20005. E-mail: byman@rand.org

149
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 21:149-169, 1998
Copyright 1998 Taylor & Francis
1057-610X/98 $12.00 + .00
 150 D. Byman

affect ethnic terrorist groups? What is the relationship between ethnic terrorist
groups and more moderate political movements? How can ethnic terrorism be
countered? Understanding the unique characteristics of ethnic terrorism will help
analysts and policymakers appreciate its true nature, and thus enable them to
counter ethnic terrorism when it does arise.
Ethnic terrorism differs considerably from violence committed for ideological,
religious, or financial motives. Like other terrorists, ethnic terrorists attempt to
influence rival groups and hostile governments. But unlike other terrorists, ethnic
terrorists focus on forging a distinct ethnic identity and fostering ethnic mobiliza-
tion.2 In contrast to an identity proposed by the state, ethnic terrorists strive for
communal identity. They seek this identity through terrorist activities, which have
a twofold effect. First, terrorism creates communal bonds that result from the
retaliation of government or rival communities; secondly, the inevitable persecu-
tion that follows draws attention to their cause among the larger population, in-
creasing their numbers and financial support.
Yet another goal of many ethnic terrorists is to create a climate of fear
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among a rival group's population. This fear in turn leads to "voluntary" emigra-
tion and ethnic homogenization. In addition, terrorist attacks often polarize multiethnic
societies, increasing communal support for nonviolent ethnic political movements
of all stripes. Thus fear helps alter a nation's demographics and politics to the
advantage of ethnic radicals.
Because conventional countermeasures against terrorism may unwittingly en-
gender broader support for an ethnic insurgency or political movement, ethnic
terrorism poses a dilemma for the state. By retaliating against an ethnic terrorist
group, the state not only creates hostility toward the government but also height-
ens awareness of a cause that may otherwise have remained obscure. Retalia-
tion can also unwittingly undermine more moderate forces that may then be
forced to choose between being branded a traitor by terrorists or an extremist by
the government. The state also must guard against vigilantism, which will foster
a climate of fear, worsen communal relations in general, and undermine state
credibility among all groups. In the long term, violence by the state can poison
communal relations and lead to lasting hostility.
Solutions are limited. One state option is to enter the identity game itself in
an attempt to fracture violent ethnic groups by promoting new rival identities.
Another solution is sweeping punishment. But because strategies that punish the
innocent along with the guilty often backfire, an ideal response is to compel "in
group" policing, which provides incentives for ethnic moderates to punish radical
activity. Yet this measure is not without problems. Moderate forces are often too
weak or too fearful to do such policing on their own. Often suspicious of the
government, they may be reluctant to seek state assistance. To gain their coop-
eration, the government should encourage moderates to crack down on radicals
by offering them protection and giving them a greater voice in decision-making.
However, many governments refuse to make these concessions to moderates
because of their own ideology or ethnic chauvinism. Or they may be reluctant to
reward violence.
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 151

So the problem of ethnic terrorism remains. To illustrate the important role

of terrorist groups in ethnic conflict, this paper will examine the experiences of
the Kurds in Turkey, the Basques in Spain, Jewish radicals under the British
Mandate in Palestine, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and other ethnic struggles. The expe-
riences of these groups illustrate the phenomenon of ethnic terrorism. Although
these groups' particular fates vary by (among many other things) the groups'
objectives, the historical era, the level of outside support, and the response of the
state, they share many common experiences from which more general lessons
on the particular nature of ethnic terrorism may be drawn.
This paper has three parts. In the first I describe ethnic terrorism and con-
sider why it often does not fit standard models of terrorism proposed by students
of the subject. In the second I detail the distinct agenda of ethnic terrorists, as it
relates to both their ethnic community in general and to the population as a
whole. In the third part I assess potential means of countering the difficult chal-
lenges posed by ethnic terrorists.
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Characteristics of Ethnic Terrorism

Ethnic terrorism can be defined as deliberate violence by a subnational ethnic
group to advance its cause. Such violence usually focuses either on the creation
of a separate state or on the elevation of the status of one communal group over
others. Designed to foster identity as well as to advance standard political goals,
ethnic terrorism is often directed against symbolic targets. Unlike other terrorists,
ethnic terrorists often have a built-in audience among their own communal groups.
Ethnic terrorism bears many similarities to guerrilla conflict. In fact, it is often
seen by its practitioners as part of a proto-guerrilla movement.
Terrorism committed by communal groups differs in motive and in nature
from that committed by leftist or Utopian groups. Leftist and Utopian groups usu-
ally cite more encompassing visions when justifying their violence. The Shining
Path, for example, seeks to remake all of Peru through a new government and
society. Aum Shinrikyo's members believe that terrorism helps them fulfill their
Utopian dreams. Ethnic terrorists, in contrast, usually focus on the status of a
specific segment of the population, not the population as a whole. Furthermore,
there are barriers to membership in ethnic terrorist groups. Any believer can join
the Shining Path, but non-Tamils will find it hard to join the LTTE.
Ethnic terrorism also differs from religious terrorism, although the distinctions
often are blurred in practice. Usually, religious terrorists are far less nationalistic
than ethnic terrorists. Religious zealots believe that issues such as national iden-
tity artificially divide the community of believers. Religious terrorist groups are
also far more receptive to converts than are ethnically driven groups, unless the
religious community in question is bounded. In bounded religious communities,
religion's function in effect becomes communal. The 'Alawis in Syria, Jews, and
other groups operate far more as ethnic groups than as communities motivated
by and organized according to religious doctrine.
Some groups, of course, evolve from one type to another. Hezballah, for
 152 D. Byman

example, started as a religious movement seeking to turn Lebanon into an

Islamic state. In recent years, however, Hezballah has increasingly pursued com-
munal goals.3 Today Hezballah primarily seeks to advance the agenda of Leba-
nese Shi'a community (and to a lesser extent Shi'a worldwide) rather than a
particular religious tenet. Hezballah retains its pan-Islamic ideology, but its ideo-
logical goals are subordinated to more practical concerns of the Lebanese Shi'a
community.4

Errors in the Study of Terrorism

The study of ethnic terrorism suffers from several general limitations. First, scholars
focus too much on the materialist goals of political violence, ignoring its symbolic
value. Secondly, ethnic terrorism is often erroneously lumped together with other
forms of terrorism such as ideological or economic terrorism, to the point of
obscuring its distinct nature. Analysts also often ignore the relationship of ethnic
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terrorism to more mainstream groups, an oversight that often leads them to dis-
miss ethnic terrorist acts as politically irrelevant. The lack of distinction among
different types of terrorist groups can thus result in counterterrorism policies that
backfire.
Most definitions of terrorism gloss over the motives of the actor and focus
on its targets and audience. By and large, standard definitions of terrorism focus
on the unlawful nature of terrorism, its political purpose, and its relationship to
warfare.5 The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as violence "to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment there-
of. . . ." The Central Intelligence Agency, in its 1980 definition, describes terror-
ism as "the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or
groups. Terrorism has involved groups seeking to overthrow specific regimes, to
rectify perceived national or group grievances, or to undermine international
order as an end in itself." The State Department notes that terrorism is perpe-
trated against noncombatant targets.6 These definitions assume that whether or
not the target of a violent act is a combatant is essential to the definition of
terrorism.
Motives of terrorists are lumped together, despite the fact that the under-
standing of the target and audience of terrorism is crucial to prevention. Motives
vary: some groups seek a new regime, others an ideological triumph, and yet
others may yearn for their own state. These disparate motivations have little in
common. Some of these groups can be appeased by small, symbolic changes.
Others must be treated like criminals, as no amount of appeasement will lead
them to stop using violence. Finally, each type of group has a different relation-
ship with its country's people and with potential foreign sponsors.
Scholarly and government definitions also err when they focus exclusively on
the political nature of ethnic terrorism,7 ignoring the focus of ethnic terrorists on
the creation of a strong ethnic identity. In fact, ethnic terrorist acts are usually
intended to influence the political and social balance within the terrorists' own
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 153

ethnic community; although influencing the state's political decisions is the terror-
ists' nominal goal, it is usually a secondary concern.
Ethnic conflict also defies the very notion of innocent bystandersand not
just in the minds of the terrorists.8 The vast majority of ethnic conflicts, particu-
larly those that do not involve a strong state, occur essentially between militias of
the involved groups. Because the level of training and technology of the armies
involved is low, deciding who is a combatant and who is not is very difficult. On
closer examination, this confusion gets worse. Many of those involved in the
conflict are not part of a full-time struggle: A Rwandan Hutu may leave off his
farming, pick up a scythe, and murder his Tutsi neighbor. If he then returns to
the field, is he a combatant or a noncombatant? Finally, there remains a problem
of mobilization. If an ethnic group suspects that its mobilized neighbor will strike,
are these preemptively murdered victims combatants or noncombatants?
The uncertain status of many victims casts doubt on the standard assumption
that terrorism is focused on noncombatants. The emphasis on noncombatants is
useful in its distinguishing between terrorism and war. Yet with part-time or
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noncombatants representing many of its victims, ethnic terrorism lies on just such
an ambiguous analytic plane. A terrorist striking the United States can easily
distinguish between combatants (police and military forces) and noncombatants
(everyone else). An ethnic terrorist in Sri Lanka lacks such clarity when choos-
ing targets.
Confusion over communal terrorism extends to assessments of whether a
movement succeeds or fails. Many analysts contend that terrorism is not an
effective tool for promoting a group's agenda. James Adams, for example, ar-
gues that terrorism in general has not proved to be a serious, direct threat to
modern society.9 Similarly, Paul Wilkinson contends that "as a weapon against
well-established liberal democracies or against indigenous autocracies, terrorism
has proved an almost total failure."10 Walter Laqueur also notes that terrorism's
political impact generally is limited and often counterproductive.11
Should this generalization of terrorism's ineffectiveness apply to ethnic ter-
rorism? Because analysts do not focus on the role of terrorism in creating iden-
tity (discussed below), they often fail to assess whether a particular terrorist
group has achieved its objective. As a survey of Sri Lanka, Spain, Israel, Turkey,
Northern Ireland, and other regions plagued by communal terrorism reveals, vio-
lence plays a vital role in sustaining local conflicts. In these cases, terrorism has
not achieved its maximal objectives of an independent state, free of unwanted
outsiders. But terrorism helps to keep ethnic identities alive. As noted below, in
all these conflicts terrorism polarizes communities, prevents accommodation, and
often aids the cause of mainstream separatist groups.
A final and particularly pernicious analytic mistake is the exclusive focus on
the rational and material elements of violence. Many scholars who examine civil
violence see it as a tool used by groups to gain a greater share of state re-
sources.12 Ethnic terrorism, however, is not simply an effort to divide the spoils
of a state. Ethnic terrorism goes even further by trying to create new symbolic
stakes, determining who will be the key players in the new political game.
 154 D. Byman

Identity Creation
The ethnic terrorist group begins the struggle by strengthening ethnic identity. In
this effort the terrorist often faces an uphill struggle: region, tribe, sect, family, and
state all are rival sources of identity for individuals. So the first task for the terrorist is
to make ethnicity politically salient for the larger ethnic community. It is not
surprising, then, that one of the most common demands of ethnic terrorists, and of
ethnic political movements in general, concerns language. Many peoples base their
claim to nationhood on language.13 Through language such vital identity compo-
nents as history, national myths, and politics are formulated, maintained, and
crafted. Control of this language often results in control of an identity.
Deliberate attempts to influence individual identity are nothing new. Many
leaders, as part of their efforts to build strong states, attempt to forge disparate
loyalties into a new, single national identity. As Massimo d'Azeglio famously
observed, "We have made Italy, now we must make Italians." Ethnic terrorists
turn d'Azeglio's observation on its head. They seek first to create a nation, and
from there to attain a state.
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The identity sought usually contradicts rival identities proposed by the state
and, at times, by the dominant ethnic group. Thus, to be Basque is to not be
Spanish. To be a Kurd is to not be Turkish. The ethnic identity not only affirms
its distinct nature; it rejects other identities that rival it politically. Such a function
is the first mission of ethnic terrorists. If successful, it gives them far more
staying power than other terrorist groups and eventually the means to become an
ethnic insurgency. As Arline and William McCord contend, "For a separatist
movement to emerge, people must first be convinced that they share something
in common against an enemy."14
When ethnic terrorism is successful, culture becomes the stuff of politics.
Speaking Basque in Navarre, attending a rally on the anniversary of the Battle of
Kosovo, or reciting lines from the Kurdish epic Mem-u-Zinall are political acts.
Terrorism makes this link more explicit, tying cultural observance to political
struggle. Graffiti, vandalism of state icons, and other nonviolent but destructive
acts are often motivated by the same concerns that drive terrorists. The preva-
lence of violent acts against symbols thus is more easily understood.
Even when the terrorist act itself does not succeed, it often serves to ad-
vance the purposes of identity creation. The violence and destruction call atten-
tion to identity issues and make the distinction between "us" and "them" sharper.
ETA even discovered that its failures served its purposes better than its suc-
cesses. Arrests of ETA members and subsequent punishments expanded popular
knowledge of ETA and drew many Basques into politics.15 Violent "successes,"
on the other hand, often alienated many more moderate Basques.
Terrorism can increase communal identity even when few members of a
community consciously support political violence. Ethnic terrorists have an ad-
vantage over other terrorists: their agenda usually has some resonance with a
preexisting, well-defined group of people. Thus, their acts are often considered
retaliation or rebellion against repression rather than acts of random violence. For
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 155

example, through their violence militant Tamils have given intellectuals and Tamils
in general a greater sense of respectability and reduced their perceived subordi-
nation to the Sinhalese political establishment.16
Even more beneficial to identity creation than terrorist violence, however, is
the state response to violence. State repression creates identities and mobilizes
individuals. The Sri Lankan government response to LTTE violence has given
rise to the perception that the Sri Lankan state and army act only in the interest
of the Sinhalese.17 Often, weak identities become politically salient when out-
siders create an awareness of them. The Basque separatist group ETA made
this goal explicit: it sought to force the government to lash out blindly and create
a backlash that would increase popular support for the guerrillas.18 Similarly, the
Irgun sought to conduct operations against the British that would compel British
security forces to intern, interrogate, and otherwise harass the Jewish community
as a whole.19
Such an approach is shrewd. Successfully defeating terrorism almost invar-
iably requires an infringement of civil liberties. More often than not, it involves
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paramilitary activity. Searches often involve humiliating, and even violent, meas-
ures that are applied to a population at large, engendering tremendous resent-
ment.20 Although such intrusive state activity may not generate support for
terrorism per se, it is likely to increase resentment of the government, highlight
divisions between suspect and nonsuspect communities, and otherwise play into
the hands of terrorists.
A harsh state response is particularly effective in creating a separate iden-
tity. Because governments must respond to terrorism or risk being seen as feck-
less, they are likely to choose "tough," high-profile responses that often give a
terrorist group the publicity it seeks. The response to terrorism often involves
indiscriminate revenge killings and even widespread massacres by governments,
which makes the terrorist cause even more popular. In Turkey, for example,
government attempts to silence Kurds in the early 1980s backfired, creating massive
support for the separatist PKK.21 Brutal repression is often the handmaiden of
successful nationalism. As Michael Ignatieff noted after the Iraqi government
massacres of the Kurds during its attempt to destroy the Kurdish insurgency:
"But after seeing Halabja, you realize one thing very clearly: autonomy will never
do. It is a stopping point along the way to a destination. But it cannot ever be
the end of the road. For Halabja happened, and for a people who have known
genocide, there is only one thing that will do: a nation-state of their own."22 This
phenomenon, alas, is easily recognized by students of ethnicity and nationalism.
The violence and fear created by the state and the terrorists lead the wider
communities to see each other as enemies.
When repression comes from a rival population, ethnic identity is particularly
likely to become defined in opposition to both the state and rival communities.
This change can lead to a stronger, more distinct identity among nonmilitants as
well as greater support for an insurgency or terrorist group. After a violent pro-
test and a brief Muslim uprising in Algeria in 1945 in which 103 Europeans were
murdered, for example, a vengeful European population killed at least a thousand
 156 D. Byman

(and perhaps far more) Muslims indiscriminately.23 Although many Muslim politi-
cal figures in Algeria did not support the initial violence, their attitudes became
more extreme after the 1945 massacres, and many came to see violence as the
only possible solution. Today Bosnia faces the same issue. As Mikica Babic, a
Bosnian schoolteacher, lamented: "We never, until the war, thought of ourselves
as Muslims. We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered because
we are Muslims, things changed. The definition of who we are today has been
determined by our killers."24 The Algerian and Bosnian cases, though not cases
of ethnic terrorism, demonstrate how peaceful communities can rapidly change
their identities and attitudes toward violence in response to government repres-
sion.
States, however, are caught in a bind: ignoring violence may encourage ter-
rorism and is likely to lead to further intercommunal violence. Because the ter-
rorist seeks a response, he or she will perpetuate even greater outrages until the
state or rival communities react to their satisfaction. Moreover, a failure to re-
spond leads to uncertainty, which can become particularly lethal. When the state
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does not respond to terrorist actions, communal groups become unsure of their
security and may take up arms as a result. Barry Posen has described this
situation as an ethnic security dilemma.25 In such situations, groups fall back on
their own resources for security and often organize for self-protection. This very
mobilization, however, is seen as preparation for conflict, which in turn alarms
other groups, thus perpetuating a cycle of insecurity.
This argument that violence strengthens identity is corroborated by its nega-
tive: the comparative identity weakness of many communal groups that have not
used violence. Without violence, it is hard to attract attention among one's own
group. Moreover, it is easier for the state to propose rival identities, a new na-
tional identity that embraces all citizens. Berbers in Morocco, for example, have
not coalesced as an ethnic group despite a common language and culture. Ethnic
activists have argued that it is their refusal to use violence that has hurt their

Ethnic Terrorism as a Defensive Phenomenon

Perceived discrimination along economic, political, or cultural lines can trigger
tremendous resentment and cause ethnic terrorism. In addition to the hardship
posed by such discrimination, it also often symbolizes the exclusion of a particu-
lar group from the polity. Rival groups often respond with their own claim to
group legitimacy, therefore creating an awareness of a subordinate group iden-
tity.27 Indeed, identity creation often is the primary reason that culturally aware
individuals become terrorists: they fear that their culture and way of life will be
swallowed by those of rivals.
Like all unnecessary murder, terrorism requires a rationalization. Yet the ra-
tionalization for ethnic terrorism is often grounded in reality. Rival cultures really
do want to subordinate their people and discriminate against them. Rape, murder,
and slavery are historical realities, and they can occur again. It is no wonder that
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 157

the language of terrorism in the name of cultural defense often falls on receptive
ears.
Ethnic terrorism is not necessarily limited to downtrodden groups. The Sikhs,
for example, are the majority community in Punjab and have done well economi-
cally, socially, and politically. Fearing discrimination under a Hindu-dominated state
and concerned that their distinct culture will be swallowed whole by their Hindu
neighbors, many Sikhs began to engage in terrorism against the government.28
The Sikh militants' goal is not to gain more status but to preserve the status they
fear they will lose.

Group Maintenance
Once an identity exists, it must then be mobilized. It is not enough for an indi-
vidual to feel loyalty to an ethnic group: he or she must also support the identity
against any rival claims. Thus, for identity to become politically effective it must
organize. Just as terrorism serves the process of identity creation, so too does it
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help these newly created identities organize for the political struggle.29 Terrorists
groups will perish if they cannot recruit, train, and deploy their members. To
carry out their goals, they need resources, usually in the form of money, weap-
ons, vehicles, and intelligence. They also need a communications network to en-
sure that leaders and followers coordinate their actions.
When a terrorist group functions alongside a well-established guerrilla group,
it can play an even more important role. In such instances, terrorists function for
guerrilla movements almost as special operations forces do for regular armies.
Terrorists can destroy a rival's command and control structure. They can pro-
vide logistic and financial support for guerrillas. Perhaps most important, they can
also threaten individuals who collaborate with a regime, making it hard for a
government to elicit regular and reliable intelligence about a guerrilla movement.30
Almost every ethnic terrorist group actively raises funds among its own people.
This can involve soliciting money from supporters by running businesses. Terror-
ists also rob banks and extort money through blackmail.31 ETA, for example, has
killed several businessmen for not paying protection money.32
By calling attention to a group and its cause, terrorist acts fulfill another
organizational goal: recruitment into the movement. Radical groups commonly vie
for the same members, particularly young disaffected males. They regularly try
to carry out high-profile actions against symbolic targets in order to attract these
new recruits. For example, the goal of many Irgun attacks was to attract younger
Jews to their organization. Although the Irgun conducted many of its attacks
against the British, much of its focus was on the Jewish community in Pales-
tine.33 Modern groups follow the same pattern. ETA operationsparticularly
those carried out during the Franco eraserved to highlight the Basque cause
among the population in general. Similarly, even when PIRA and Fatah opera-
tions failed, their example of struggle in the face of opposition often boosted the
morale of Irish Catholics and Palestinian Arabs, respectively, and helped recruit-
ment efforts.34
 158 D. Byman

At times group maintenance becomes the primary goal of an ethnic terrorist

group, subsuming even its identity-strengthening agenda. ETA today, for example,
is composed largely of brigands who impose "taxes" on compatriots under a veneer
of communal protection. Indeed, ETA's few victims today are almost entirely
wealthy Basques who refuse to be extorted. For such groups, a political solution,
no matter how favorable, may leave them without a means to make a living.

Impact on Rival Populations

Ethnic terrorism creates fear among political victims. Fear serves two purposes.
First, it silences talk of compromise and accommodation by discrediting the politi-
cal system and the mediation process. Second, it stimulates emigration and popu-
lation transfers.
Using fear generated by violence against noncombatants to galvanize popula-
tion transfers is a time-honored tactic in ethnic struggle. In Sri Lanka in 1983,
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Sinhalese activists in Colombo deliberately targeted leading Tamils in order to

remove them from the capital.35 The LTTE regularly killed, tortured, and ex-
pelled non-Tamils from northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.36 In 1947
Irgun and Stern Gang members killed the 254 Arab inhabitants of the village of
Deir Yassin in a deliberate attempt to frighten the Arab population away from
the villages and other areas that the Jews wanted for their own.37
Ethnic terrorism thus helps groups "win the census" by changing an area's
demographics. Menachem Begin later rationalized the Irgun attack on Deir Yassin,
claiming, "The massacre was not only justified, but there would not have been a
State of Israel without the victory at Deir Yassin."38 However unpleasant it is to
admit, Begin may be correct. Without the tremendous population transfers that
accompanied the 1948 war, Israel would either not exist today or would exist in
a quite different form.39 Indeed, the very existence of ethnic enclaves poses a
problem that can increase incentives to use terrorism. Enclaves are nightmares
for defenders, who must worry about potential traitors within their ranks. Not
surprisingly, ethnic terrorists often concentrate on ethnic cleansing as a means of
eliminating potentially hostile pockets before they have a chance to arm and
strike.40
The reward for such ethnic cleansing comes during the negotiated settlement
that ends communal violence. Despite the best intentions of negotiators, new
borders often are determined by communal boundaries that exist after the per-
petuation of violence. In Israel after the 1948 war and in Bosnia after the dis-
integration of Yugoslavia, boundaries were determined largely by where com-
munities lived at the end of the fighting. Thus, ethnic cleansing "pays." It is
rewarded at the negotiating table.
Ethnic violence can also undermine an incipient democracy, which might
otherwise bring multiethnic societies together. Violence reduces confidence that
the winner of an election will respect minority rights or allow its former rivals a
voice in decision-making. Thus all sides are unlikely to honor the elections. More-
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 159

over, group leaders cannot propose compromises for fear that they will be branded
traitors and replaced by hard-line rivals.41 Problems are particularly likely to arise
when electoral systems do not provide incentives for interethnic cooperation.42
Although ethnic terrorists deliberately try to create a rival identity to that
proposed by the state, their actions can also foster a national identity hostile to
their particular group. Tamil violence in Sri Lanka, for example, helped to spawn
violent Sinhalese groups that vehemently opposed any symbolic concessions to
Tamil nationhood. Such hostility is a by-product of terrorist efforts to promote
division and prevent compromise.

Terrorist Groups, Insurgencies, and Popular Movements

Nonviolent mainstream groups have an ambivalent relationship with terrorist or-
ganizations. On the one hand, terrorism creates broad popular support for an
ethnic agenda and mobilizes a community. On the other hand, terrorism often
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brings the hard hand of the state down on a community as a whole. Such am-
bivalence often leads to violent disagreement between moderates and radicals
over the best tactics to use and the ultimate agenda to pursue.
Mainstream ethnic movements often capitalize on terrorist violence. In the
Basque country, for example, the political movement Herri Batasunawhich
shares many of ETA's goalsmight hold a demonstration that the police would
break up. ETA would then retaliate by killing a policeman. When police in turn
killed or arrested ETA members, Herri Batasuna would use this occasion to hold
another demonstration.43 Over time ETA's policies have helped nonviolent Basque
groups make tangible electoral gains. Both the mainstream Basque Nationalist
Party (PNV) and Herri Batasuna have done well in elections. Rival "Spanish"
partiesparties that try to bridge the gap between Basques and the rest of
Spainare discredited because they do not focus exclusively on Basque issues.44
The Basques are hardly alone in their mix of nonviolent and violent politics.
Surveys suggest that many Catholics share the goals and grievances of the Pro-
visional Irish Republican Army but spurn their tactics. Instead they often support
extreme, but nonviolent, political groups.45
Clever moderate leaders can capitalize on extremist pressure even as they
denounce extremist activities. In 1944 Menachem Begin, as leader of the radical
Irgun, told mainstream Haganah representatives: "You could exploit our opera-
tions to increase your pressure on the Government, certainly while expressing
reservations about them. We think that your duty would have been to invent us,
had we not existed. . . ."46 David Ben-Gurion, the Haganah leader, did just that.
During the civil violence of 1947, he made a point of noting that the Irgun and
even more radical Stern Gang were not under the Haganah's command.47 The
Palestinians learned from their rivals' success. Yasir Arafat deliberately created
the Black September Organization to operate as a terrorist agent while the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization (PLO) pursued a more moderate course.48
The climate of fear created by terrorists is particularly important for ethnic
 160 D. Byman

insurgencies. Even when a population does not support an insurgent group's cause,
fear of terrorist violence can lead individuals to cooperate. This cooperation in
turn provides insurgents with necessary sanctuary and provisions while denying
regime forces vital intelligence. When an insurgency is active, the line between
the insurgent and the terrorist blurs, and their activities overlap. Insurgents do not
need to win the hearts and minds of a population; often all they need is to
convince the population not to denounce them, a goal accomplished through fear.49
At the very least, fear of terrorist retaliation will discourage potential collabora-
tors from aiding a regime.50
Political movements can also act as fronts for terrorist groups. The political
arm of a terrorist group provides social services and education, runs businesses,
and contests elections. By serving as a home base for part-time militants, politi-
cal movements provide a source for recruiting new members to the terrorist
groups.51 If successful, the political arm allows the terrorist group to achieve
many "group-maintenance" functions quite openly, while the violent activists con-
centrate on disrupting elections, fostering hardened identities, and other means of
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achieving their radical agenda.52

Sometimes the interests of a mainstream movement and terrorist groups con-
flict. Many terrorists seek to prevent moderate tactics such as the success of
negotiations. Although state concessions may meet a mainstream group's agenda,
they reduce the incentives of an ethnic group to support radical solutions to their
problems. Often terrorists will not compromise on identity issues, particularly when
compromise might spell the end of their organization.
Ethnic terrorism is thus often directed toward more moderate ethnic group
leaders and supporters. The LTTE branded many of its rivals as traitors when
they considered talks with the government. Soon, its Tamil victims outnumbered
its Sinhalese victims. Similarly, the Janatha Vimulkthi Peramuna (JVP)the Sin-
halese paramilitary groupregularly employed violence to silence potential
opponents.53 ETA spent much of its time punishing informers and government
interlocutors, both Basque and non-Basque.54 ETA increased its paramilitary ac-
tivity at times because it feared that more moderate groups such as the PNV
would compromise with the government and support autonomy rather than out-
right independence.55 Many of the victims of anti-Israel terrorism have been
Arab moderates, not Israelis or Jews. These groups created a climate of terror
that discouraged talk of compromise.
Some governments or counterinsurgency agencies either ignore or encourage
such fratricidal conflict, hoping to weaken the opposition in general. The Turkish
government, for example, regularly arrests Kurdish activists who do not use vio-
lence, making the mistake that colonial powers made when they attempted to
remove the most visible signs of opposition to their rule.56 Similarly, after PIRA
bombings in 1972, a British crackdown actually helped radicals come to the fore.
The British did not know who was at fault, and they arrested their most visible
opponents, who were usually relative moderates.57 Such arrests, however, almost
invariably eliminate or intimidate potential moderates, making an eventual com-
promise far more difficult to achieve.
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 161

The International Aspect of Ethnic Terrorism

If the focus of ethnic terrorism is on local issues and identities, why might an ethnic
terrorist group strike at an international target such as the United States? Terror-
ists often justify such strikes as punishment for foreign support of their rivals.
Palestinian groups have killed U.S. civilians, ostensibly because of U.S. support
for Israel. Similarly, the LTTE has attacked many Indians. But if the true goal of
ethnic terrorism is to weaken the resolve of outside power, such punishments often
backfire. In many of these cases the outside government simply responds by
devoting more resources to government attempts to repress terrorism.
Although revenge is no doubt a real if counterproductive motive, striking at
international targets serves several more practical purposes for ethnic terrorist
groups. Perhaps the most important of these is that tremendous publicity is gen-
erated for the group that commits an act of international terrorism. Ethnic terror-
ists, like terrorists of all stripes, have learned that international targets provoke
more media and government attention than do domestic targets. A second at-
traction of international targets is that they force a state response. States can
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ignore strikes on their own citizensparticularly states those that are not democ-
racies. Foreign governments, however, noisily demand action. By striking for-
eigners, a group can compel a state to crack down on activities they might
otherwise have ignored.
International involvement often leads to the spread of ethnic terrorism. Tamil
terrorism spread from Sri Lanka to India, largely because of the Indian state's
involvement in the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. Similarly, Kurdish terrorists in Iran
received modern weapons and logistics support from Iraq, leading to cross-border
raids. Like other political and terrorist groups, ethnic terrorists will not ignore new
foes and will often prefer international over domestic targets because of the added
publicity.
More often than not, successful ethnic terrorist groups receive some form of
aid from outside powers or diaspora communities. Diplomatic pouches can be
used to smuggle weapons, embassies can serve as operating bases, and foreign
governments can provide terrorists with crucial intelligence.58 In comparison with
members of other types of terrorist movements, however, ethnic terrorists rely
more on kinsmen or a haven in foreign countries and less on foreign govern-
ments. The Basques often operate from the Basque region of France, and Kurdish
groups regularly operate out of neighboring states. Diaspora communities also
provide money and organizational support for terrorist groups. The PIRA has
long received financial support from U.S. citizens, particularly Irish-Americans.
In all these cases, the external provision of aid coupled with a safe haven com-
plicates the government's ability to use military solutions as an effective means
of fighting communal terrorism.

Problems in Countering Ethnic Terrorism

The usual tried-and-tested means of countering terrorism are often not effective
in fighting ethnic terrorism. Particularly futile is the use of moral outrage. State-
 162 D. Byman

ments declaring ethnic terrorists to be outlaws and other such legal and rhetorical
tools do not work. Such steps provide little leverage against terrorist groups,
which often believe themselves to be key to their community's survival. Tradi-
tional law enforcement techniques also present a conundrum for officials. In
most well-ordered societies, the state enforces order through deterrence: indi-
viduals fear that they will be punished if they transgress certain laws. To make
deterrence effective, however, law enforcement officials must be renowned for
arresting and punishing violators so that individuals are convinced that the state
will punish violence. A favorable reputation depends on publicity. Silent victories
over criminals will not give the state the reputation it needs to deter future crimes.
However, many communal terrorists use the publicity of a trial to attract atten-
tion to their cause. Furthermore, any perceived irregularities in the trial will be
seized on by more mainstream groups to drum up support for their cause. Even
when officials diligently capture and punish terrorists, ethnic terrorists are not
deterred, as they do not equate arrest and imprisonment with defeat.
The hazy boundary between an ethnic terrorist group and more mainstream
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movements also leads to problems when states use police tactics to prevent
violence. Often the very tactics needed to thwart an ethnic terrorist group help
to ensure that an ethnic movement as a whole gains greater support. As noted
earlier, widespread arrests and increased monitoring of a community can lead to
greater resentment of a government and increased sympathy for a terrorist group.
A counterterrorism campaign that is successful in operation can fail in strategy.
Such a campaign, especially if highly publicized, may attract more members to
the terrorist cause over the long term. Clamping down often results in disaffec-
tion, which in turn bolsters the moderate cause.
Concessions to moderates, however, convey the message that terrorism pays.
A political movement that can sustain violence in the face of an initial crack-
down can often rightly claim that its violent campaign led the state to make
concessions that it would never have made without the threat of violence. In its
effort to crush the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government has offered potential
moderates far more autonomy than it did before the LTTE began its bloody
crusade. Similarly, the electoral gains of the PNV and Herri Batasuna suggest
how effective terrorism can be in helping ethnic movements achieve political
gains. Currently peaceful ethnic movements around the globe can rightly con-
clude that violence is a useful tool for advancing their cause.
Terrorism, unfortunately, is an ideal tactic for separatists in multiethnic de-
mocracies. For those with a separatist agenda, the purpose of elections is to
polarize communities, not bring them together. Terrorism forces a polity to di-
vide further along communal lines. Thus electionsthe West's panacea for civil
disputesoften backfire.

Better Ways to Fight Ethnic Terrorism

The ideal way to counter ethnic terrorism is through "in group" policing, in which the
ethnic group as a whole identifies, ostracizes, and suppresses radicals. As noted
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 163

earlier, ethnic terrorists, unlike more ideological radicals, have a close relation-
ship with the mainstream and can capitalize on this relationship to strengthen their
organizations. These ties, however, can also be turned to the government's ad-
vantage. Ethnic group members are far more likely than outsiders to know the
radicals in their community and are thus better able to help suppress them. Such
cooperation is especially important, as crackdowns without "in group" policing fail
and often backfire by discrediting moderates and weakening their organizations.
Thus authorities should encourage groups to police themselves.59 Such self-
monitoring is far more effective and causes less resentment in the community as
a whole. For example, when the Irgun's 1944 and 1945 attacks on the British
angered the mainstream Haganah by threatening to reverse its political gains,
Haganah leaders cooperated fully with British authorities. As David Ben-Gurion
declared when he announced his cooperation with the British authorities, "All the
long tradition of Jewish mercy must be forgotten, if we want our people to have
mercy in the future. . . . I am sure that I do not exaggerate when I say that the
terrorists constitute a far greater danger to us than they do to the authorities and
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the police."60 Haganah leaders worked with British officials, leading to the
capture of Stern Gang and Irgun activists. The Haganah handed 1,000 Irgun
activists over to the British. Although this angered many Jews, it temporarily
destroyed the Irgun's operational capability as its activists were imprisoned, cap-
tured, or killed. Furthermore, Irgun fluids dried up, recruitment stopped, and train-
ing halted.61 Later, when the British lost the support of the Haganah, they proved
unable to suppress the Irgun. In later years the British committed perhaps 100,000
troops to Palestine, hanged radical leaders, and imposed martial lawall with
only limited success.62
A first step toward encouraging "in group" policing is to recognize and pro-
tect the forces of moderation. The Haganah only cooperated with the British
against the Irgun because its members believed that the British would eventually
carry out a political settlement that benefited the Jewish communitya settle-
ment that Irgun assassinations threatened.63 Until recently, Western officials and
Israeli doves criticized Arafat and Fatah for missing political opportunities that
would allow them a strong negotiating position with the Israelis. Concessions for
Arafat were difficult, however, as rejectionist states and extreme Palestinian move-
ments would have retaliated against him.64 Saving Arafat from his own people is
politically difficult for his ostensible foes: Who among the Israelis wanted to talk
with Arafat, let alone protect him? Yet some Israeli officials slowly accepted the
need to work with Palestinian moderates against more radical elements.
In general, a crackdown against terrorists should err on the side of caution with
regard to moderate political activists. The state should ensure that it does not
decapitate moderate forcesa policy that requires excellent intelligence as well
as prudence on the part of politicians. Strong moderate forces are necessary as
interlocutors to the community in general and, ideally, as sources of information
on radical groups. A failure to win over moderates, on the other hand, strengthens
the radical cause as it demonstrates that compromise offers no hope of success.
India and Spain provide examples of successful "in group" policing. In the
 164 D. Byman

Basque region, the conflict today is almost entirely between moderate and radical
Basques. In effect, moderate Basques, satisfied with the high level of autonomy
they have gained from Madrid, have sided with the government. Terrorism, while
still a problem in Basque areas, has steadily declined in recent years. Similarly, in
India the central government has worked with mainstream groups in Assam and
has successfully ended the Assamese terrorist threat. Crackdowns or trials be-
come internal affairs, creating less resentment because outsiders are not involved.
The Indian example also points to how democratic means can help reduce
the potential for ethnic terrorism. Although democracy in highly divided societies
often backfires, it can, when implemented properly, reduce violence. If the cen-
tral government is willing to devolve power to the local level, and if it does not
seek to impose an identity on disparate ethnic groups, it can then offer power
sharing as a reward to encourage moderates to cooperate. Elections, by encour-
aging proportional representation systems and the formation of cross-ethnic par-
ties, are ways to bring communities together rather than polarize them. After
Indian independence, despite tremendous potential for civil violence, many crises
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were averted because the government satisfied the linguistic and cultural de-
mands of many groups. In contrast, the Indian government in the 1980s sought
more central control over Kashmir, a development that led to ethnic terrorism
and eventually a widespread ethnic insurgency.
Democratic solutions are particularly useful when terrorist groups become
brigands that care only for enriching themselves. Such groups, over time, lose the
support of their own people. Should a strong moderate group emerge, it can use
law-and-order methods, and even a broader crackdown, with little opposition from
the mainstream community.
In addition to "in group" policing, governments might consider fostering an
identity that competes with that promoted by the terrorists. When the Kurdish
insurgency in Turkey heated up in the 1990s, the Turkish government began to
foster a distinct identity among Turkey's Alevi community. Though the Alevi
were Kurdish in nationality, they have a religion and tradition distinct from those
of other Kurds.65 The Alevis, a sect of Islam often persecuted as heretical, were
interested in distinguishing themselves from Kurds in general. Israel has also
toyed with identities, culling the Druze and Christians from the Israeli Arab popula-
tion in an attempt to weaken the community as a whole. Such divide-and-rule
attempts are risky, however, diminishing any hope of nation-building and increasing
the potential for internecine violence. Indeed, states using divide-and-rule policies
may be trading tomorrow's peace for today's compromise.
When outside states support ethnic terrorism, the problem becomes more
difficult. Radicals can often escape from "in group" policing by finding a haven
across the borders. Similarly, the radicals' military and financial strength is often
much higher than it would have been with just local support. In such cases the
ideal solution is to transfer some "in group" policing duties to the host state in
question. Because states often are reluctant to police violent ethnic communities,
some level of coercion is required. Intimidation can include military force, inter-
national sanctions, or efforts to isolate a regime politically.
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 165

Such policies, of course, depend on a state's goals and political flexibility.

Coercing an ethnic group's backers is difficult even for a strong state. When
ethnic hatred runs high, even limited moderation may be impossible. Moreover,
concessions on autonomy or even cultural rights may be ideologically or politi-
cally impossible. Failure to grant such concessions, however, is likely to provide
ethnic terrorists with a steady supply of recruits.
It is important to recognize that solutions are not always possible. Moderates
willing to police radicals in their community are difficult to find, but even if they
are found, they are often too few in number to overcome the radicals. Moreover,
government leaders do not always have the political leeway to make the neces-
sary concessions to terrorist groups. Indeed, this is particularly common when a
terrorist group is successful: few leaders want to be seen as appeasing violent
groups.

Conclusions
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Policymakers and analysts alike must recognize that ethnic terrorism often differs
considerably from other types of terrorism. Ethnic terrorism has its own goals
and its own vulnerabilitiesthat analysts should recognize when examining how
to cope with this problem.
One key is the relationship that a government has with a mainstream ethnic
opposition movement. The mainstream can be the terrorists' greatest ally, ad-
vancing its agenda and helping recruitment while the terrorists engage in the dirty
work. On the other hand, a mainstream movement can be a terrorist group's
greatest nightmare, as it can identify, and destroy, terrorist cells within a commu-
nity without provoking a backlash. Fighting terrorism requires understanding this
uncertain relationship and learning how to turn it to the government's advantage.
States should try to improve a mainstream movement's desire to police radi-
cals in its own community. Concessions, when necessary, must be made in re-
sponse to gestures from the mainstream movement, before rather than after
terrorist acts. Moreover, they must be linked to steps by mainstream leaders to
rein in ethnic terrorists. By giving moderate forces more influence, the state can
often drive a wedge between moderates and radicals. Intelligence and security
are particularly important areas of state cooperation. The state needs intelligence
not only for operational successes against radical groups66 but also for political
success. The state must know whom to approach and whom to arrest. It must
make collaboration safe by protecting moderates against their own communities.
Indeed, one danger governments must avoid is being too successful against
moderate ethnic opposition movements. When highly politicized communal groups
lack legal resources, they are more likely to turn to violence, particularly if the
movement has splintered into small violent factions. The Sikh movement, for
example, became a hydra-headed monster with no central control after the cen-
tral government cracked down on the Sikh cause. These divisions, while making
it hard for the community as a whole to advance its cause, also made it difficult
for the government to stamp out violence.67
 166 D. Byman

A useful test case of "in group" policing is the current spate of terrorism
against Israel by Palestinian radicals of Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad.
The Israeli government has at times tried to use Yasir Arafat's PLO to police
the Palestinian people in general, yet the PLO is often reluctant to crack down
hard on radicals for fear of a popular backlash. Despite this reluctance, Israeli
intelligence officials have argued that fighting terrorism effectively would be im-
possible without the PLO. If this approach succeedsand many years will pass
before this can be determinedour knowledge of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of "in group" policing will be greatly enhanced.
The international community also can help fight terrorism, though only in
limited ways. In general, ethnic terrorism is a domestic matter. Because intelli-
gence and local area knowledge usually are far more important than money or
firepower, outside states can do little to help. Even so, the international commu-
nity can act to sanction or coerce outside backers of terrorist groups. It can also
crack down on diaspora communities that support terrorism abroad.
Governments with restive ethnic groups often must choose between stopping
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terrorist violence or preventing ethnic movements from achieving their particular

goals. Concessions to mainstream groups can enlist them to the government's
side and encourage them to carry out "in group" policing. Although such mod-
eration may reduce violence, it nevertheless rewards groups that use violence.
Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet. Preventing and countering ethnic terrorism
is difficult at best. It demands many trade-offs. Recognition of the thorny issues
that surround ethnic terrorism is a first step toward solving its many problems.

Notes
1. Throughout this essay I use the terms "ethnic" and "communal" interchangeably.
Both terms I define as a group of people bound together by a belief of common heritage
and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, perceived kinship ties, language,
and history. Examples of ethnic groups are Kurds (a common language, perceptions of a
shared history) and Jews (belief in a common ancestry reinforced by a common religion
and history.)
2. Walter Laqueur is one of the few authors to explore communal terrorism, which he
labels separatist-nationalist terrorism, as a distinct category of terrorism in general. See
Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), p. 203.
Other works of interest to students of ethnic terrorism include Grant Wardlaw, Political
Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-measures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990 [1982]), and Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan,
1977).
3. For an excellent overview of Hezballah's development, see Magnus Ranstorp,
Hizb' Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1997). A more impressionistic description of Hezballah can be found in Hala Jaber,
Hezballah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
4. Although a terrorist group may espouse a mixed bag of agendasnationalist,
religious, or leftistthe determinant of whether a group is "ethnic" should follow Walter
Laqueur's path of identifying a group by its members. A terrorist group is "ethnic" when
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 167

"the colour of skin, or national identity, or religion are the decisive actors, not the 'class
origin' of the opponent." Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, p. 207.
5. David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and Inter-
national Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), p. 52.
6. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism:
1993, U.S. Department of State Publication 10136, April 1994. Scholars too share this
bent. James Adams's definition of terrorism notes that terrorism is "often at the cost
of casualties to innocent victims." James Adams, The Financing of Terror (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 10. Cindy Combs defines terrorism as "a dramatization of
the most proscribed kind of violencethat which is perpetrated on innocent victims."
Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997),
p. 8.
7. See, for example, Wardlaw's definition of terrorism, which focuses on how it is
intended to coerce a group into acceding to a terrorist group's demands, and Wilkinson's,
which notes that terrorism is intended to terrorize individuals into conceding to political
demands. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 16, and Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal
State, p. 49. Similarly, Tucker's excellent survey of government definitions notes that
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they share a focus on terrorism's political nature. Tucker, Skirmishes on the Edge of
Empire, p. 52.
8. Scholars have tried to avoid the messiness of ethnic terrorism by distinguishing
between terrorists and guerrillas. E. Moxon-Browne, for example, claims that guerrillasin
contrast to terroristsrespect the rules of war. E. Moxon-Browne, "The Water and the
Fish: Public Opinion and the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland," in British Perspectives
on Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 42. Such a
distinction, however, falls apart in reality. No modern guerrilla group has entirely avoided
targeting the innocent.
9. Adams, The Financing of Terror, p. 237.
10. Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorist Movements," in Terrorism: Theory and Practice, ed.
Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979),
p. 105.
11. Laqueur, "Terrorism," p. 10.
12. For two useful descriptions of such an instrumental view of political violence, see
Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Ac-
tion," American Political Science Review 80:2 (June 1986), pp. 471-487; and Robert Bates,
"Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary
Africa," in State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas, ed. Donald Rothchild
and Victor Olorunsola (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).
13. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978),
p. 395.
14. Arline McCord and William McCord, "Ethnic Autonomy: A Socio-historical
Synthesis," in Ethnic Autonomy: Comparative Dynamics, ed. Raymond Hall (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 427.
15. John Sullivan: ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi, 1890-1986
(New York: Routledge, 1988) p. 71.
16. W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, Ethnic Strife and Politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi,
1994), p. 172.
17. Warnapala, Ethnic Strife and Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 172.
18. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, p. 44.
19. J. Bower Bell, Terror Out of Zion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 106. For
 168 D. By man

a more personal view of the Jewish fight against the British, see Menachem Begin, The
Revolt (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1972).
20. Moxon-Browne, "The Water and the Fish," pp. 48-49.
21. Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurds, Turks, and the Alevi Revival in Turkey," Middle
East Report 26:3 (July-September 1996), p. 7.
22. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging (New York: Noonday Press, 1994), p. 199.
23. Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace (Penguin, 1987), p. 27.
24. As quoted in Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic
Civil Wars," International Security 20:4 (Spring 1996), p. 144.
25. Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35:1 (Spring
1993), pp. 27-47.
26. Author's interviews of Berber intellectuals, conducted in June 1996.
27. For more on this general phenomenon, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in
Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 185-216.
28. Paul Wallace, "Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis of Identity,"
in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995), p. 359.
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29. Indeed, much of the battle between a terrorist group and a government comes
down to issues of organization. Can a government deter or coerce individuals into not
joining a terrorist group or, better yet, into siding with the government? Can the terrorist
group silence potential "traitors" and maintain its organization in the face of the govern-
ment's onslaught?
30. Wilkinson, "Terrorist Movements," in Terrorism: Theory and Practice, p. 109.
31. The Irgun raided banks, threatened affluent Jews, and raised funds abroad to
gain money. Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas Drove the British Out
of Palestine (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995), p. 67.
32. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, p. 225.
33. Bell, Terror Out of Zion, p. 107.
34. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, p. 208.
35. Warnapala, Ethnic Strife and Politics in Sri Lanka, p. 166.
36. Shantha K. Hennayake, "Sri Lanka in 1992," Asian Survey 33 (February 1993),
p. 159.
37. Edgar O'Ballance, Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism (San
Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1979), p. 26.
38. O'Ballance, The Language of Violence, p. 27.
39. For a superb and comprehensive examination of how Israel dealt with the Palestin-
ians during and after the 1948 war, see Benny Morris, 1948 and After: Israel and the
Palestinians (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
40. For more on this concept, see Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict."
41. Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," p. 156.
42. For more on ways to promote interethnic cooperation through electoral systems,
see Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic
Conflict Management," in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph
V. Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 451-476.
43. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, p. 227.
44. Ibid., p. 229.
45. Moxon-Browne, "The Water and the Fish," p. 41.
46. Zadka, Blood in Zion, p. 51.
47. O'Ballance, Language of Violence, pp. 27-28.
 The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism 169

48. Adams, The Financing of Terror, p. 90.

49. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority (Chicago: Markham,
1970), p. 10.
50. Wilkinson, "Terrorist Movements," in Terrorism: Theory and Practice, p. 104.
51. Donatella della Porta, "Left Wing Terrorism in Italy," in Terrorism in Context, pp.
126-127.
52. Walter Laqueur, "Terrorism: Looking to the Future," Current, no. 386, p. 9.
53. Warnapala, Ethnic Strife and Politics in Sri Lanka, pp. 171, 176-180.
54. Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, p. 68.
55. Ibid., p. 232.
56. The French colonial government made this mistake in Algeria, as it arrested the
more moderate National Liberation Front members, leaving the movement in the hands of
the radicals. Ironically, the current government of Algeria has made a similar mistake,
arresting the more moderate Islamic Salvation Front leaders, helping the more militant
Armed Islamic Group dominate the opposition.
57. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, p. 210.
58. Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire, p. 17.
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59. This concept of "in group" policing is drawn from James D. Fearon and David D.
Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review 90:4
(December 1996), pp. 715-735.
60. As quoted in Nicholas Bethell, The Palestinian Triangle (New York: B. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1979), p. 184.
61. Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 88, 133-135; Bethell, The Palestinian Triangle, pp.
180-190.
62. Zadka, Blood in Zion, pp. 52-53 and 142. As Stern Gang member Itzhak Shamir
noted, "We were really a hunted group . . . The prisons were the only place where we were
a majority." As quoted in Bethell, The Palestinian Triangle, p. 160.
63. Bell, Terror Out of Zion, pp. 126-127.
64. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, p. 223.
65. Bruinessen, "Kurds, Turks, and the Alevi Revival in Turkey," p. 10.
66. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 31.
67. Wallace, "Political Violence and Terrorism in India," p. 407.