Hume and Kant on Property

Daniel Attas
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Hume's concept of "Justice" and Kant's concept of "Right" refer to basically the same thing: a
morally valid, enforceable system of law. Within this system, for both Kant and Hume,
property plays a major part. Typically for writers of the enlightenment, property is taken as
almost synonymous with justice or (private) right. So both agree that it is crucial for an
understanding of political and legal morality to get a full sense of what property means, on
what it implies, and on how its rules are determined. From this point on there is hardly a shred
of agreement.

As far as I know (and I dont pretend to be an authority on this matter) Kant never read
Humes writings on property. Yet in his metaphysical works Kant famously credited Hume
for interrupting his dogmatic slumber, and a central motive for Kants critical project is to
save philosophy from the disastrous implications of Humean scepticism. Kant took Humes
analysis of the concept of cause and effect as a test case for metaphysics generally, so that
whatever problematic Hume draws from this case would apply not merely to the concept of
cause, but equally extend to all categories of the understanding. It is interesting to note in this
regard that Hume, discussing possession states that: This relation, then, is a species of cause
and effect; and as property is nothing but a stable possession, tis to be considered as the
same species of relation. (THN, 557; see also 360)

It would be, moreover, uncontroversial to claim the Kants moral project is inspired by the
drive to rescue morality from the grip of empirically informed theories of which
Sentimentalism is one prime example. And it would not be outrageous to maintain that
Humes ideas on morality constitute one such theory.

So I suggest it would be interesting to think what Kant would have made of Humes thoughts
on property had he actually read Hume; and whether Kants writing on property is best
understood as a direct response to Hume. Furthermore, it might be illuminating to search for
parallels between Hume's analysis of cause and effect and his analysis of property, as well as
Kant's responses to them both.

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I begin by presenting a sketch of Hume's theory of property. I shall then proceed to discuss
Kant's ideas, framing them as responses to concerns raised by Hume's account. Along the
way, I shall indicate the parallels between Hume's and Kant's discussion of property and their
respective views on causation.

Humes theory of property

Of all animals, says Hume, man is the least well equipped to sustain himself and overcome
the challenges with which he is confronted by nature. Society once formed compensates
individual man for his natural limitations. Greater power due to joining forces; increased
ability due to a division of labour; and more security due to mutual assistance all these are
necessary for overcoming the natural and huge inadequacies of man to cater for his needs. But
how is society formed? Contrary to the view of social contract theorists, Hume believes this
develops quite naturally: sexual attraction between couples, their concern for their offspring,
and the socialization of children living under the common care of their parents, makes men
and women in general more amenable to society. This however is not enough, for the equally
natural passions of self-love and partial love introduce a disruptive and unsocial force,
threatening an important source of human happiness. Three such sources may be identified:
first, internal or mental capabilities and enjoyment; second, external or corporeal capabilities
and pleasure; and third, possessions acquired by "our industry and good fortune". (THN, 539)
The first two sources of happiness are relatively secure since they either can't be taken away
or at least can't be taken and used without significant loss. As far as the third is concerned,
that of external possessions, since they may be seized and enjoyed without loss, they present a
great temptation to would-be invaders which in turn instils a sense of insecurity with regards
to them. This ensuing sense of insecurity, together with the fact of moderate scarcity, generate
conflict and endanger the survival of society and the vital advantages it affords.

There is no natural remedy to this inconvenience, as Hume would put it. As pointed out, the
natural affections of partiality are responsible for the insecurity and conflict. The remedy
rather flows from artifice: human judgment and understanding that produce at once a
sensibility to the advantages of society together with the observation that insecurity of
possessions is the main hindrance to its peace and stability. Property, that is to say, the
stability of possession, is instituted by convention for the sake of peace and security of

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society. Not a direct promise or contract inform such convention but mutually reinforcing
expectations similar in kind to the expectations of two rowers pulling the oars of a boat in
harmony without any sort of explicit or implicit promise. Just like the use of language or
currency, gradually progressing by trial and error, and by the internalization of principles.
Such a convention is in everyone's interest the benefits of peace and stability being so much
greater than the gains of raiding the possessions of others or the attempt to implement some
controversial principle of distribution such as tracing efficiency, merit or need. Not because
these are unworthy grounds of entitlement, but because it would be near impossible to agree
in society over what might constitute utility, merit or need. This would only raise controversy
and conflict, undermining what justified the institution of property in the first place, namely,
"to cut off all occasions of discord and contention". (THN, 553) This end of justice has
implications for what property might be and for what might be done with it. Justice must be
workable, the notions it uses and tests it requires will be as far as possible open to full view
and hence the object of convergence and agreement rather than to endless squabbles.

It is perhaps at this kind of view that Rousseaus remark is directed: The laws always so
occupied with property and so little with persons, because their object is peace not virtue1
But as far as Hume is concerned the contrast neednt be so stark. What makes justice in the
sense of property as stable possession a moral concept (i.e. a virtue) is the sentiment it
elicits of sympathy with injustice towards others. That is to say, with violation of their
property, its seizure, confiscation, or harm. The sort of injustice that when directed at us
would never fail to irritate, displeases us when we see this kind of injustice directed at others.
And whatever displeases, asserts Hume, is called vice, whatever pleases virtue. (THN,
551)

After presenting a justification for the institution of property, Hume proceeds to offer an
explanation and justification of how particular allotments of property are to be determined.
What are the specifics of the institution which human beings establish by convention? What
are the rules for the assignment of properties to particular individuals?

Concerning the original allocation established with the institution of property, Hume proposes
a thought experiment: what would people in a savage state choose to do? How would they go
about instituting property and assigning individual allotments to each? This is surprising
coming from Hume since he does not think of political institutions as the outcome of

1
J-J. Rousseau, Emile, p. 37.

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conscious design. Rather, they are developed by degrees and reason-bypassing processes. Yet
there is no harm in such thought experiments as long as we are not tempted to take them on
face value. Anyway, men in this original state would agree to the rule assigning property, i.e.
constant possession, to whoever is at that moment in immediate possession. This rule is
"natural", not in the sense that the most morally virtuous, or those most likely to make best
use, acquire property. But in the sense that it is the rule most appealing to our imagination and
would out do any other rule "to cut off all occasions of discord and contention" simply
because it is the most salient solution. The problem is that the idea of the person-possession
relation is "fragile" unstable, and unclear - and must be helped. But here all analogies fail
neither reason nor public interest can provide a solution. Convention can be based on nothing
but the imagination. To illustrate Hume recounts the story of two Greek messengers, racing to
lay claim on behalf of their colonies to an abandoned city. The accepted rule is that the first to
touch the gates of the city takes possession. One of the messengers, seeing he was not as fast
as the other, threw his spear at the gates thus managing to "touch" the gates first. Who then
was the true legitimate appropriator? Hume's response:

For my part I find the dispute impossible to be decided, and that because the
whole question hangs upon the fancy, which in this case is not possess'd of any
precise or determinate standard, upon which it can give sentence. (THN, 559n)

Consider the following: why does it matter that these are official messengers rather than
ordinary citizens of their respective colonies? Why does it matter that they touch the gates
rather than the walls or any other part of the city? Why does it matter that they actually reach
or touch the city rather than catching sight of the city or claiming it first in some other way?
The significance of their status as messengers, of the gates, and of physical touch is all purely
conventional, and the only justification is their appeal to our imagination.

Once property is established there are further ways by which it is appropriated. Among
others: by prescription (in time), by accession (of the fruits), and by succession (by
inheritance). Hume illustrates how each of these is similarly underdetermined by reason and
how frivolous considerations, appealing to our imagination are all that arbitrarily determine
the conventions of property.

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Kants theory (as a response to concerns raised by reading Hume)

What in Humes account would have unsettled Kant? Basically, its strong empirical basis:
First, the understanding of property as a physical realtion between owner and asset, and its
justification following from convention based on advantage to society (a proto utilitarian
account). Second, the reliance on sentiment to explain its morality, (specifically on the
sentiment of sympathy). What if the sentiment is lacking, or weaker, or stronger might there
not be a sort of self-indulgence? Third, the arbitrariness and contingency of the specific rules
of property, grounded as they are merely on the imagination. This would seem to deprive
property of the a priori status Kant would wish it to have.

1. What is property?

Property according to Hume, then, is mere stable or constant possession. Never going beyond
the physical and what is perceived, Hume pictures property as a special relation between
subject (the owner) and object (the owned asset). Somewhat reminiscent of the idea of cause
and effect, accustomed as we are to see them appear one after the other, that the appearance of
the former raises the expectation to see the latter, and so we come to attach to them the idea of
causality. Similarly, the possessive relation is formed on the basis of habit of seeing owner
and asset together and with the aid of imagination imputing to them this special relationship.
It is thus that original acquisition, the legal sanction of property, is determined such that
whoever happens at that moment of legalisation to be in physical possession of an asset, or
who we are used to see in such possession, will be awarded legal title.

For Kant this will definitely not do. Lacking as it does any firm objective a priori basis,
Hume's system cannot endow property with the required moral validity and necessity. Thus
the first thing Kant notes is that constant and stable possession is still not property. Just as the
habit of perceiving cause and effect constantly together still fails to capture the idea of
causality as a necessary connection of bringing about;2 so property is more than mere stable
possession. For property, according to Kant, requires that a thing be considered mine even
when I'm not in possession of it. Something will be mine not merely if as long as I am holding

2
"The very concept of cause so obviously contains the concept of necessity of the connection with an effect and
a strict universality of the rule, that the concept [of cause] would be entirely lost if one pretended to derive it, as
Hume did, from a frequent association of that which happens with that which precedes, [and a thereby arising
custom of connecting representations". (Kant, CPR(B) 5)

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on to it no one may forcibly take it out of my hold, nor even if such possession is indefinitely
long. The essence of property is such that I may leave the asset and expect it to be there,
untouched when I return. This is what Kant calls mere intelligible possession as opposed to
physical or sensible possession.

I cannot call an object in space (a corporeal thing) mine unless, even though I am
not in physical possession of it, I can still assert that I am actually in some other
(hence not physical) possession of it. I will not be able to say that the land on
which I have lain down is mine because I am on it, but only if I can assert that it
still remains in my possession even though I have left the place. (MM, 70)

It follows that property is not at all a relation between an individual and a thing, Kant
ridicules this way of picturing it:

Someone who thinks that his right is a direct relation to things rather than to
persons would have to think (though only obscurely) that since there corresponds
to a right on one side a duty on the other, an external thing always remains under
obligation to the first possessor even though it has left his hands; that, because it
is already under obligation to him, it rejects anyone else who pretends to be the
possessor of it. So he would think of my right as if it were a guardian spirit
accompanying the thing, always pointing me out to whoever else wanted to take
possession of it and protecting it against any incursions by them. (MM, 82)

Rather we must understand property as a relation among all individuals with respect to a
thing. So that by appropriating a thing and making it mine everyone else is now burdened
with an obligation towards me not to interfere with my freedom of choice with respect to it.
Assuming, of course, that my appropriation was morally valid. Since it is implausible that I
could unilaterally impose such obligations on everyone, we cannot view taking possession as
something achieved in the intimacy of appropriator and thing, but must instead assume that all
individuals are present and there to sanction the original acquisition by what Kant calls an
omnilateral agreement. It is not a mere matter of convergence, by habit or laziness of the
imagination, that convention approves of what is there already, transforming mere physical
possession into stable or constant physical possession. Property is of a completely different
order. It implies a moral relation between owner and everyone else, rather than a mere
physical (or in Kants terms, sensible) relation between owner and asset which in some

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unexplained manner blocks any interference. Hence, original acquisition, according to Kant
has three aspects, none of which have a physical character: (1) apprehension becoming
aware that a thing is vacant. That no one has yet laid a claim to it. (2) Signalling declaring
one's intention - by means of language or other sign - to take possession of the thing. This
doesn't require the physical occupation or taking of the thing, though it may be that too in so
far as this would signal one's intention. (3) Appropriation receiving the validation of a
general will that such an acquisition is compatible with the moral law, i.e. with everyone
else's freedom, and thus binding everyone else to refrain from interference. (MM, 80-1)

So, Kants first worry reading Hume would be the inadequacy of the idea of property as stable
physical possession. Just like the idea of causality, it must go beyond mere appearances.
Property is what Kant calls intelligible possession and it relates to the super-sensible realm of
moral obligation. Moreover, the justification of property must not be based on the empirical
contingent grounds of peace and security. On a par with causality it must be based apriori, on
its compatability with (practical) reason.

2. The morality of property

On Humes view what gives property its normative significance is convention: our way and
habit of seeing things and the expectations this raises with regard to behaviour. Empirically,
the peace and security of society depend on it, and consequently so do all the advantages that
society affords. The sentiment of sympathy merely confirms its moral value. Of course this
could have been otherwise: if human constitution was different and education and
socialization were more effective, or if social engineering or creative legislation were to
create other means to uphold and maintain society in working order, there would be nothing
unjust in a society that fails to respect property. Here too there is a parallel to what Hume has
to say about causality. It appears then that this idea of necessary connexion among events
arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these
events after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the
appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. (EHU,
p. 75) This idea of necessary connection derives from an internal feeling or sensation, not
from the understanding. As the sentiment of sympathy confirms the virtue of property, so
does belief (or one would say mere belief) confirm the validity of causation. And though
Hume does not go so far, we may draw the further parallel that as the pragmatic concern of

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sustaining society may make property necessary, so the pragmatic concerns of scientific
advance and going about our lives may make causation necessary.

Such empirically informed view of justice and property would have horrified Kant. Property,
as a central concept of right, must be shown to be sanctioned by a priori reason. With this aim
in mind Kant provides what he calls a Postulate of Practical Reason with respect to Rights,
that allows any external thing as something that could objectively belong to some person. The
argument is difficult to make out and will need some interpretation. This is how it begins:

It is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as mine, that is, a
maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of choice would in itself
(objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius) is contrary to rights. (MM, 68)

I think Kant presents a reductio argument starting with a premise that will ultimately be
rejected:

(1) Maxim - it is impossible for me to have an external object of choice (a thing) as

mine.

(2) Law based on, universalization of, the maxim some objects are such that in
themselves they can belong to no one.

In themselves, that is, not because they are owned by anyone else. Something about them,
objectively as Kant would say, prohibits their ownership.

(3) If there are objects that are beyond control in this way, then this restricts freedom of
choice contrary to the Principle of Right.

This needs some explanation. The universal principle of right states that any action is right if
it can coexist with everyones freedom in accordance with a universal law (MM, 56). In
other words, only what cannot coexist with everyones freedom can be wrongful. Therefore,
objects, the possession of which may be compatible with the freedom of everyone else
according to a universal law, if they cannot be owned this must be on the basis of some
consideration other than freedom, and as such is contrary to the Principle of Right that
restricts freedom only on the basis of freedom.

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 Therefore, (4) rejection of (1): it is possible for me to have any object of my choice as
mine.

By this Kant establishes that property is a priori possible. Not because of mere habit or
convention confirmed by moral sentiments, but because its negation would be incompatible
with Practical Reason. Furthermore, Kant wants to show that property is not merely a priori
possible, but that it is also necessary.

(5) if there was no way of making an object mine, reason would unnecessarily restrict
freedom.

Since exercising the sort of choice with respect to an object that ownership allows is one form
of freedom, then if making an object mine were impossible, freedom would be restricted for
no valid cause. It therefore follows that:

(6) there must be a way of making (designating) an external object mine.

By this it is established that property is not only a possible but a necessary concept of right.
The parallel to Kants discussion of the concept of cause and effect is rather moot but I will
offer it nonetheless. Having conceded Humes point that we do not simply perceive causation
in the things or events themselves but it is rather a faculty of the mind that imposes it on our
experience, Kant denies that it is our imagination and habit that are the source this idea. Were
it so causation would turn out to be a purely contingent generalization drawn from experience.
Kant wants to show that the concept of cause and effect (like all categories of the
understanding) is firstly a priori possible (in that it does not contradict reason), and secondly
necessary (in that without it no experience is possible). The former he does in the first part of
the Analytic of Concepts in the Critique of Pure Reason, the latter in the Transcendental
Deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding.3

So, Kants second worry reading Hume would be the sentiment-based moral validity of
property. Just like the epistemic validity of causality, the moral validity of property must be
based a priori. Property is a priori possible in so far as it is compatible with (the universal
principle of practical) reason. It is necessary in so far as it is an indispensable means to
freedom, without which the idea of right would be void.

3
see also: Prolegomena 30

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3. What is the status of specific rules of property?

When it comes to specifying the rules by which property is allocated and regulated Hume
appears to be quite amused by how human imagination and fancy manage to bear on the issue
with hardly any factual or normative basis at all. In a series of long discussions and examples
relegated to footnotes, Hume gives an account of the arbitrary and groundless contours human
convention draws around the notion of property.

Not in the main text because there is hardly anything of philosophical principle that Hume has
to say in favour of one way or another of regulating property. As long as the rules are
consistently followed, and that they do not strain our imagination, the institution of property
continues to serve its primary purpose: to minimize conflict and maintain peace and social
stability.

As the specific correlations are drawn from (or into) experience, attaching the necessity of the
concept of causation to events we come to associate by habit, so the specific rules of property
are whatever we care to draw by our ease of imagination and that we consistently apply to
cases in hand.

Superficially Kant's position is not dissimilar. The specific rules governing property its
acquisition, prescription, bequest, and transfer - are not a priori. But, whereas for Hume these
rules are established by the imagination, for Kant they are legislated according to the moral
law. These specific rules are but one possible way by which society interprets and legislates
the necessary principle of property. This again is reminiscent of Kant's view of causation.
Specific rules of cause and effect are only learnt from experience. Unlike the law of causality
itself, they are synthetic a posteriori claims. But they are not mere rules of correlation as
Hume would see them; they are laws applying the a priori concept of causality to perceived
correlations. Thus, on the basis of an experienced correlation among events A and B, we do
not say merely that whenever A happens B is sure to follow, but that A tends to bring about B
by a causal relation.

So this is Kant's third worry: the arbitrariness and contingency of the specific rules of
property, grounded as they are merely on the imagination, would undermine the status Kant
would wish property to have. Just as specific causal laws, though learnt from experience, are
applications of the apriori law of causality, so specific laws governing property are not mere
correlations validated by the imagination, but instances of the apriori law of property.

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Conclusion

In this paper I proposed to analyse Kants discussion of property as if it were a direct response
to Hume. I have tried to show that there are interesting parallels between Humes treatment of
causation and his account of property. Moreover, there are similar parallels between Kants
metaphysics presented as a response to Hume and his account of property. This result should
not be too surprising for the following reasons:

First, Hume explicitly states more than once in the Treatise that the relation of property is a
species of the relation of cause and effect (though whatever he meant by that remains to me
obscure). Second, Kants ethical project is an attempt to rid morality of all empirically based
considerations, and Humes theory is empirically based if any theory is. Last, there is the
tautological, though by no means trivial, reminder that, after all, Hume is Hume and Kant is
Kant.

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