Persons and Family Relation Course Oultine
Gonzalo vTarnate
2 EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
a. Tanada v Tuvera
b. Deroy v CA
4 PROSPECTIVITY OF LAW
a. Atienza v brilliantes
B. Carlos v sandoval
C. Cheng v Sy
D. Carolino v Senga
6 WAIVER OF RIGHTS
A. Famanila v CA
B. Guy v CA
9 Duty Of The Court/Judge To Render
Judgement
a. Silverio v RP
14 Obligatory Effect Of Penal Laws
a. Del socorro v Wilsem
15 Nationality Theory
a. Pilapil v ibay-somera
b. Recio v Recio
c. Quita v CA
d. Elmar Perez v CA
e. San luis v San luis
f. Lavadia v Heirs of luna
g. Noveras v Noveras
h. Orion Saving Bank v Suzuki
i. Del socorro v Wilsem
16 LAW GOVERNING REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY
a. Orion Savings bank v Suzuki
19 PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHT
a. Far Eastern Bank v Pacilan
b. Uypiching v Quiamco
c. Cebu Country Club v Elizagaque
d. Calatagan Golf Club v Clemente
e. Ardiente v Javier
f. Sesbreno v CA
g. Saladaga v Astorga
21 ACTS CONTRARY TO MORALS
a. Buenaventura V CA
22 UNJUST ENRICHMENT
a. Filinvest b Ngilay
b.
c. Bliss Development v Diaz
26 ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING A CRIMINAL
OFFENSE BUT SHALL PRODUCE A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES
a. Castro v. People
27 LIABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVANT OR
EMPLOYEE
a. Ledesma v CA and Delmo
b. Campugan v Tolentino
29-35 CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A
CRIMINAL OFFENSE
a. People v Bayotas
b. Frias v San Diego-Sison
c. Daluraya v Olivia
d. Basilania v Villacruz
e. People v Dyosaldo
36 PREJUDUICIAL QUESTION
a. Tuanda v Sandiganbayan
b. Beltran v People
c. Pasi v Lichauco
d. Yap v Cabales
e. Dreamwork v Janiola
f. Pimentel v Pimentel
g. Consing Jr. v People
h. People v Arambulo
40-41 PERSONALITY SPRINGS FROM BIRTH
a. Quimiguing v Icao
b. Continental Steel v Montano
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP.,
and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
176 SCRA 778
August 25, 1989
Facts:
10 November 1972, herein private
respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing
agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager, discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of
pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior
Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice
President and General Manager Herbert Hendry.
A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that
he was number one suspect and ordered him
one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to
work after said leave, Hendry called him a
crook and a swindler, ordered him to take a
lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his
handwriting, signature and initials for police
investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a
private investigator. Private investigation was
still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded
negative results; reports from Manila police
investigators and from the Metro Manila Police
Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias.
Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila
a total of six (6) criminal cases against private
respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination
of his employment from petitioners in January
1973, effective December 1972. He sought
employment with the Republic Telephone
Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter
to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed
by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias,
then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge
Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay
him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for
damages to private respondent.
Held:
Yes. The Court, after examining the
record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have
indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified: when
Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases
against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry)
scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos
cannot be trusted.) as well as against Tobias
(crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter
to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed
by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the
filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against
private respondent. All these reveal that
petitioners are motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to private respondent. The imputation
of guilt without basis and the pattern of
harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
Wassmer vs. Velez
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz
Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954.
On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left
a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone
their wedding because his mother opposes it.
Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not
heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and
Velez failed to answer and was declared in
default. Judgement was rendered ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual
damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary
damages, P2,500 as attorneys fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for
amicable settlement was given chance but
failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to
marry is an actionable wrong in this case.
Held:
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
formally set a wedding and go through all the
necessary preparations and publicity and only to
walk out of it when matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable
and unjustifiable to good customs which holds
liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New
Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry
is actionable under the same, moral and
exemplary damages may not be awarded when
it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
RICARDO QUIAMBAO v. ADRIANO OSORIO
The antecedents are as follows:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein
private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero,
Justina Gasa Bernardo and Felipe Gasa, against
herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the
then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 2526, it was alleged
that private respondents were the legitimate
possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot
No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate
situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon, Rizal, by
virtue of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482
executed in their favor by the former Land
Tenure. Administration [which later became the
Land Authority, then the Department of Agrarian
Reform]; that under cover of darkness,
petitioner surreptitiously and by force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a
400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts
"staka" over said portion and thereafter began
the construction of a house thereon; and that
these acts of petitioner, which were unlawful per
se, entitled private respondents to a writ of
preliminary injunction and to the ejectment of
petitioner from the lot in question.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed his
Answer to the complaint, specifically denying the
material allegations therein and averring that
the Agreement upon which private respondents
base their prior possession over the questioned
lot had already been cancelled by the Land
Authority in an Order signed by its Governor,
Conrado Estrella. By way of affirmative defense
and as a ground for dismissing the case,
petitioner alleged the pendency of L.A. Case No.
968, an administrative case before the Office of
the Land Authority between the same parties
and involving the same piece of land. In said
administrative case, petitioner disputed private
respondent's right of possession over the
property in question by reason of the latter's
default in the installment payments for the
purchase of said lot. Petitioner asserted that this
administrative case was determinative or private
respondents' right to eject petitioner from the
lot in question; hence a prejudicial question
which bars a judicial action until after its
termination.
After hearing, the municipal court denied the
motion to dismiss contained in petitioner's
affirmative defenses. It ruled that inasmuch as
the issue involved in the case was the recovery
of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction
to try and hear the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-
1576 a petition for certiorari with injunction
against public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio
of the Municipal Court of Malabon and private
respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment
case until after the resolution of said petition. As
prayed for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a
restraining order enjoining further proceedings
in the ejectment case.
In his answer, respondent municipal judge
submitted himself to the sound discretion of the
CFI in the disposition of the petition
for certiorari. Private respondents, on the other
hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
maintaining that the administrative case did not
constitute a prejudicial question as it involved
the question of ownership, unlike the ejectment
case which involved merely the question of
possession.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent
Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No.
C-1576 alleging the pendency of an
administrative case between the same parties
on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968
and praying that the petition for certioraribe
granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed
and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed
to decide the matter exclusively.
Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case
to be one of prior possession, the CFI dismissed
the petition for certiorari and lifted the
restraining order previously issued. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
order, adopted in toto by intervenor Land
Authority was denied for lack of merit. Hence,
this appeal filed by petitioner Quiambao and
intervenor Land Authority with the Court of
Appeals, and certified to Us as aforesaid.
The instant controversy boils down to the sole
question of whether or not the administrative
case between the private parties involving the
lot subject matter of the ejectment case
constitutes a prejudicial question which would
operate as a bar to said ejectment case.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be
that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal.[1] The
doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play
generally in a situation where civil and criminal
actions are pending and the issues involved in
both cases are similar or so closely-related that
an issue must be preemptively resolved in the
civil case before the criminal action can proceed.
Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a
civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause
the suspension of the latter pending final
determination of the former.
The essential, elements of a prejudicial question
as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the
resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being
respectively civil and administrative in character,
it is obvious that technically, there is no
prejudicial question to speak of. Equally
apparent, however, is the intimate correlation
between said two [2] proceedings, stemming
from the fact that the right of private
respondents to eject petitioner from the
disputed portion depends primarily on .the
resolution of the pending administrative case.
For while it may be true that private
respondents had prior possession of the lot in
question, at the time of the institution of the
ejectment case, such right of possession had
been terminated, or at the very least, suspended
by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the
Agreement to Sell executed in their favor.
Whether or not private respondents can
continue to exercise their right of possession is
but a necessary, logical consequence of the
issue involved in the pending administrative case
assailing the validity of the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of
the disputed portion to petitioner. If the
cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then
private respondents would have every right to
eject petitioner from the disputed area.
Otherwise, private respondents' right of
possession is lost and so would their right to
eject petitioner from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more
prudent course for the trial court to have taken
is to hold the ejectment proceedings in
abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and
pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such
move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's
right of possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is to needlessly require not
only the parties but the court as well to expend
time, effort and money in what may turn out to
be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur
2d tells us:
"The court in which an action is pending may, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the
action in abeyance to abide the outcome of
another pending in another court, especially
where the parties and the issues are the same,
for there is power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of causes on its dockets
with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of
parties to the second action cannot be properly
determined until the questions raised in the first
action are settled the second action should be
stayed".[2]
While this rule is properly applicable to instances
involving two [2] court actions, the existence in
the instant case of the same considerations of
identity of parties and issues, economy of time
and effort for the court, the counsels and the
parties as well as the need to resolve the
parties' right of possession before the ejectment
case may be properly determined, justifies the
rule's analogous application to the case at bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19
SCRA 502, provides another analogous situation.
In sustaining the assailed order of the then
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental
ordering the suspension of the criminal case for
falsification of public document against several
persons, among them the subscribing officer
Santiago Catane until the civil case involving the
issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged
document shall have been decided, this Court
cited as a reason therefor its own action on the
administrative charges against said Santiago
Catane, as follows:
"It should be mentioned here also that an
administrative case filed in this Court against
Santiago Catane upon the same charge was
held by Us in abeyance, thus:
'As it appears that the genuineness of the
document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 [ Richard
Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.]
is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397
of the Cebu Court of First Instance, action on
the herein complaint is withheld until that
litigation has finally been decided. Complainant
Celdran shall inform the Court about such
decision.'[3]
If a pending civil case may be considered to be
in the nature of a prejudicial question to an
administrative case, We see no reason why the
reverse may not be so considered in the proper
case, such as in the petition at bar.
Finally, events occurring during the pendency of
this petition attest to the wisdom of the
conclusion herein reached. For in the
Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it
was stated that the intervenor Land Authority
which later became the Department of Agrarian
Reform had promulgated a decision in the
administrative case, L.A. Case No. 968 affirming
the cancellation of Agreement to Sell No. 3482
issued in favor of private respondents. With this
development, the folly of allowing the ejectment
case to proceed is too evident to need further
elaboration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the
then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.