Land Titles and Deeds
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS,
ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA
M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T.
ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU
MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL
UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU
BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA
S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH
JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T.
DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE
ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY,
HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA,
FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented
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Sections 1-13
by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY
BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO BLAAN
TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN
FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.
[1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the
IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the
Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition
be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of
the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples
(Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
Land Titles and Deeds
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion
to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and
the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et
al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree
with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray
that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors
filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in
their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found
within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;
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Sections 1-13
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter
into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of
natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more
than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular
area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
Land Titles and Deeds
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous
peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners
of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A.
8371 and its Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation
of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
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Sections 1-13
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground
that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban
filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await
the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7,
and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,

Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

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Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

SEPARATE OPINION C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

PUNO, J.: D. The Philippine Constitutions

PRECIS II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche A. Indigenous Peoples
entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on
Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner[1] wrote:[2] 1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the 2. Their Concept of Land
most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree,
ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering
history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy A. Legislative History
and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants
to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
jurisprudence must come to terms with history.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled
constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural 1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without
considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts 2. The concept of native title
to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all,
the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of (a) Cario v. Insular Government
protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more
importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people. (b) Indian Title to land

This Opinion discusses the following: (c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System. 3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

A. The Laws of the Indies B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is
a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

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C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral
domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control
and supervision in their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters
of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is
allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be
harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous
Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL
SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.
[3] This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory
of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that
was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12,
Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the
Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
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"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which
are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us,
in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in
those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the
natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they
now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free
and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within
which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and
to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And
those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just
prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be
disposed of at our will."[4]
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently,
all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The
Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and
concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian.[5] Private land titles could only be
acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land
grant from the Crown.[6]
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of
1893.[7] The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles
and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands
pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law,"
was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as
already amended by previous orders and decrees.[8] This was the last Spanish land
law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Land Titles and Deeds
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national
territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government,
through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v.
Murciano.[9]
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-
time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the
subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand,
purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court
ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not
objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that
their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the
Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone,
including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit
it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those
special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands
in the colonies."[10] The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws
recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to
what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the
disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence
of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be
followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until
regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands
should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786,
and the Royal Cedula of 1754.[11]
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
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"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands
belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the
kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands
not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was
not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had been in
the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of
the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a
time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed
prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the
intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the
possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the part
of the authorities."[12]
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in
his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.[13] For those
lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such
lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title
deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.[14]
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the
Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the
Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date
of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands,
whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said
subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x.
Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their
failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid
reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be
granted to others."[15]
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands
"wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton
construed these regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive
interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the
Land Titles and Deeds
1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus
as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves
a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must
make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his
deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."[16]
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in
force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands
by prescription, without any action by the State."[17] Valenton had no rights other than
those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed
to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect,
Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish
Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title
deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American Government in Act
No. 926."[18]
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect
titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;[19] and that the
government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States.[20] The term "public land" referred to all
lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown
open to private appropriation and settlement,[21] and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.[22]
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Sections 1-13
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This
new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but
limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges.[23] After the passage of the
1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially
the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory
provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the
Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.[24]
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under
Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission,
Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.
The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration
Act of 1898,[25] which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens
system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the
Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the
government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person
named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves.[26] The certificate of
title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted
upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and
negotiation.[27]
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization
and conservation of the natural resources of the country.[28] There was an
overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership
of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.[29] State ownership of
natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the
state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.[30]
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of
State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the
Land Titles and Deeds
Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the
Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.[31]
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization
of Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of
the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on
"National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
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"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this
concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the
Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these
people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands,
and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native
title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
Land Titles and Deeds
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;[32]
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject
to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if
the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the
ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.[33]
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to
self-governance and empowerment,[34] social justice and human rights,[35] the right
to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual
rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.[36]
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of
the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs
from each of the ethnographic areas-- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest
of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of
the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and
Central Mindanao.[37] The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by
former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure.[38]
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Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices.
When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-
judicial powers.[39] The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by
a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be
punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years
and/or fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.[40]
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the
1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169[41] and the United Nations
(UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[42]
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples-- refer to a group of
people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others,
who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial,
occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance
to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall
likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent
from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the
establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from
their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on
Land Titles and Deeds
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually
occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs
who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have
been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon,
Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of
islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region-- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg,
Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and
Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya;
Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of
Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III-- Aetas.
3. In Region IV-- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon;
Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and
Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon,
Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V-- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog,
and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay,
Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI-- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of
Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
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6. In Region VII-- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX-- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del
Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X-- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon,
Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the
Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental;
the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the
Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI-- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the
Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and
Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao
provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of
Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo,
Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South
Cotabato.
10. In Region XII-- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and
Iranon.[43]
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as
25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by
the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.[44] The strains from these groups eventually
gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic
reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in
the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic
and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders.
Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial
society.[45]
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering
became supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the
cultivation of the soil.[46] From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our
Land Titles and Deeds
ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life
where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was
influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical
climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.[47]
Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.[48]
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form.
They had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used
them not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression
of their literary moods.[49] They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that
they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives.[50] They had their
own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life
after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called
Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in
soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for
they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be respected. They
venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life, indicating the importance
of the relationship between man and the object of nature.[51]
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the
Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.[52]
The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one
hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato."
It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare
and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of
government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme
commander in time of war.[53]
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from
generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They
were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the
community.[54] The written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders
promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose.[55] The oldest known written
body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old
codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.[56] Whether
customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce,
usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and
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adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court
composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts
arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a
board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters.[57]
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in
land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social
order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the
community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the
soil and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay.[58] This ancient
communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of
resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance.
Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what
regulated the development of lands.[59] Marine resources and fishing grounds were
likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on the
kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land communities.[60] Recognized
leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance,
enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land
and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger
and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival.[61]
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in
Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over
territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and
Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan
and Subanon.[62] The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward
Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.[63]
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in
common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of
Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however,
has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.[64]
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive
economies where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the
fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and
profit.[65] Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership
Land Titles and Deeds
and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small
and separate communities.[66]
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the
Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks.
One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to
collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.[67] As early as 1551, the Spanish
government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives.[68] The
Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less
fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral
and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded
them by the same laws."[69]
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and
convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to
construct their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the
same.[70] With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos
through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal
point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos
law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them
ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.[71]
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all
lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or
realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants
were made to non-Filipinos.[72]
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the
concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish
colonial theory and law.[73] The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of
everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the
natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.[74]
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious,
classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided
them into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally
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came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim
communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.[75]
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by
the Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The
Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.[76]
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven
from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The
Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were
naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests
of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative
security.[77] Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were
not only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization
process, separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community.[78] Their
own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual
feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the
non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise
culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited
both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.[79]
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900,
addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the
same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American
Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of
those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to
which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should,
however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
practices and introduce civilized customs."[80]
Land Titles and Deeds
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more
in accord with humanity and with the national conscience."[81]
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-
Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a
geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities."[82]
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they
passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the
Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic
research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a
"special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau
dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in
Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.
[83]
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The
raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a
more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political
advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render
real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities into
the body politic, creating the Commission on National Integration charged with said
functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the
Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National
Integration (CNI).[84] The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT
during the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the
colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward
relationship.[85]
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the
Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce
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resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of
Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao.
[86] Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted
in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government initiative
and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands.
Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national
government in the name of national development.[87]
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national
cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."[88]
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural
minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred
to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was
given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be
considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies.
President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential
Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the
ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same
time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the
larger community."[89] In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the decree
recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.[90]
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the
Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy
certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were given up to
1984 to register their claims.[91] In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the
expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal
Filipinos.[92]
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000
Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam
project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their
land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del
Land Titles and Deeds
Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take
approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in
Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives.[93] Timber
concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other
projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous
peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural
environment.[94]
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino
created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.[95]
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal
Filipinos to preserve their way of life.[96] This Constitution goes further than the 1973
Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and
domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their
own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly
upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of
the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life
and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population.
[97] The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat
worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion
to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become
peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much
older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the
patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The economic
activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help.
The social structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions,
not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties
of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.[98]
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Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no
traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots,
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to
territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and
that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the
land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners.
Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong
to the present generation but the future ones as well.[99]
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except
the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.[100]
Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could either
be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by
marriage,[101] or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related
by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws
draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic
production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like
hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest
areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-
owned.[102] For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic
base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions
individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a
limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner
has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of
an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code.[103] Under Kalinga
customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except
in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to
sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.[104] Moreover, and to be alienated
should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it,
and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.[105]
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The
concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently
colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon
Land Titles and Deeds
indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior,
if not inexistent.[106]
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that
the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A.
No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a
consolidation of two Bills-- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,[107] Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as
Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476
and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.[108] At the Second Regular Session
of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background
on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered
from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive
migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many
of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion,
dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural
resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became marginalized. And
the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against
the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the
resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the
Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13
February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to legitimize the
wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant
homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."[109]
Senator Flavier further declared:
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"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared
for the land long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had
territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These
territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air,
plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their existence
as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic,
socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof
to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it;
and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."[110]
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed
a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of
parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian
Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional
laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine."
This exception was first laid down in the case of Cario v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of
the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is
termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in
subsequent cases."[111]
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705,
P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized
"native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains.
Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not
implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its
observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth
Land Titles and Deeds
and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and
supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess
their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae
inherent in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal
tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or
handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or
transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting
in favor and none against, with no abstention.[112]
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on
Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and
defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.[113]
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications
that would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure
and ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as
well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established
shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these
matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the
aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be
considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year
2000." [114]
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as
mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land
was enunciated in Cario v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had
vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.[115]
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After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous
Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are
defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. -- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government
projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied
by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed
and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as
a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Land Titles and Deeds
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains
comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and
includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship
areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands
which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly
the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.[116]
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
[117]
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures
embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Angel Alcala.[118] DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special
task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims
(CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
[119] The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation.[120] This
means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their
domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.[121]
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in
Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of
ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.
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Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and
upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned.
[122] The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or
indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to
decide in accordance with customs and traditions.[123] With respect to ancestral lands
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT).[124]
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the
Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.[125]
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2)
by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to
ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title-- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as
far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by
ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have
been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."[126]
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a
claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed
never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that
way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be
recognized and respected.[127] Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which
Land Titles and Deeds
shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated.[128]
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title.
Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over
their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands
and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands
held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public
lands and are private.
(a) Cario v. Insular Government[129]
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cario v. Insular
Government.[130] Cario firmly established a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court
146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this
land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that
his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his
father cultivated some parts of the land. Cario inherited the land in accordance with
Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no
document issued from the Spanish Crown.[131] In 1901, Cario obtained a possessory
title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.[132] The North American colonial
government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land
prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While
his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation[133] was proclaimed over his land
and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property with orders
to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cario, off the land.[134]
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's application for absolute ownership
to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government
appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and
dismissed Cario's application. The Philippine Supreme Court[135] affirmed the C.F.I.
by applying the Valenton ruling. Cario took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.[136]
On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended
that Cario failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880,
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which required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cario, on the
other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the
land never formed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme
Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering
nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in
the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory,
sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may
assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the
inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in
degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters
for it to decide."[137]
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice
was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of
"due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."[138] It
was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of
1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the
United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American
Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is
obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was
different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice
to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1,
1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights
Land Titles and Deeds
acquired there by the United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the
inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the
United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in
deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that
we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready
to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of
Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and
that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association,-- of the profoundest factors in human thought,-- regarded as their
own."[139]
The Court went further:
"[E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this,
if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt."[140]
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as
testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by
this title is presumed to "never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees
upheld in the 1904 decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found
no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the
decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some
land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of
the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were
admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
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"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear
proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To
begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error
seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the
native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For
instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited
for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands
viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs
them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in
the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this
recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).[141]
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway
over unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a
manner as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always
been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to
confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an
Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read
every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It
was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been
deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the
decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But
precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the
Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.[142] This title was sufficient, even
without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens
certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper
on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
Land Titles and Deeds
consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that
the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by
the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."[143]
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares
in Baguio Municipality in his name.[144]
Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it
upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his
argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or
military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the
Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to
which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have
made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position
of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights
and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The
argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an
important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the
Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."[145]
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire
length of the Cario decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native
title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the
University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In
1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native
Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.[146] This article was made after Professor
Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the
origin and development of Philippine land laws.[147] He discussed Cario extensively
and used the term "native title" to refer to Cario's title as discussed and upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
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In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native
title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cario "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title"
of the American Indians.[148] This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch,
considering that during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was
consistently made in reference to native Americans.[149] This was clearly
demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.[150]
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the
provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a
permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to
comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was
imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming
deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the
ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a
permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans,
introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the
public forests in which they roamed.[151] Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court
said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United
States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted,
can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of
the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is
for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated.
The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.[152]
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not
exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian
reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different
Land Titles and Deeds
parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been
made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the
country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is
that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the
government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful
reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the
segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States."[153]
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An
Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the
use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.[154] It may be set apart by an act of
Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and
prescription.[155]
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers
the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."[156] The aboriginal right of
possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or
nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable
territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.[157] It is a right which
exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in
numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their
aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting
their boundaries.[158]
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they
have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The
earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title
was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.[159]
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the
chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this
conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was
recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the European
discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the
potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the
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inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but
in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting
settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to
the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.[160] The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation making the
discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing
settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to
be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power
could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery
gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants,
they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised,
as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title
to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."[161]
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right
to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer-- whether to
England, France, Spain or Holland-- did this right belong and not to any other nation or
private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian
claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its
right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with
a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer
to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased
Land Titles and Deeds
the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer
gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not
convey a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of
possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the
complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive
power of acquiring that right."[162]
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day,
proves the universal recognition of this principle.[163]
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native
lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S.
citizens.[164]
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.[165] In this case, the
State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the
Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any
violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white
missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation of the
Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the
treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the
Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship
between the United States government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign
potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless
and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed their
protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the
extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of
that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the
Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other
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power. They assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted
with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as
subjects to the laws of a master."[166]
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct
territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within
their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate
trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their
rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All
these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the
several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the
soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than
the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a
restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the
Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct
from others." x x x.[167]
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our
Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."[168]
Land Titles and Deeds
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer
as against all other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,[169] this
title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian title of
occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain
possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land. The
discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land-- either
by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession-- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian
title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted
ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected the
rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to
be in themselves.[170]
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the
lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the
sovereign-- first the discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and
the United States-- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless
recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian
right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of
complete ownership.[171] But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes
"permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not
specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.[172] It is clear that this right of
occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right.[173] It is
vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as sovereign,
possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will.[174] Thus,
aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive
and continuous use and occupancy for a long time.[175] It entails that land owned by
Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot
be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen.[176] Such title as Indians
have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the
right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal
membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.
[177]
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily
used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general
laws.[178] Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public
domain.[179] On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain
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Sections 1-13
set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians.[180] Once set apart by
proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is
extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the
nation's power to dispose of, them.[181]
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land
claims of indigenous Americans.[182] And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is
recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal
point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to
native Americans.[183] Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title,
however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American
Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the
possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to
have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of
ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by
Congress.[184] The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment
by persons other than the Federal Government.[185] Although there are criticisms
against the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands,[186]
the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.[187]
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the
ancestral domains and ancestral lands.[188] The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy
and any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis--vis American
Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and enshrined in the
IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title
presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cario is the only case that
specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cario
did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains and lands.
Cario was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive
prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the
Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When
the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the
possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
Land Titles and Deeds
grant of the land.[189] The land ceases to be part of the public domain,[190] ipso jure,
[191] and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands[192] that the court declared that
the rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase
or grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-
in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish conquest.[193] Oh Cho, however, was
decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cario was cited to support the
applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify long,
continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public
agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the
concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens[194] and members of the
national cultural minorities[195] that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land
is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-
owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the
Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public
agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is
that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural
land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act 496-- Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial
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Sections 1-13
or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of
this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option
to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from
the approval of this Act."[196]
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not
domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and
occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial[197] or for a
period of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the
same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the
individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and
are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These
lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a
slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the
requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the
Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain.[198] Its provisions
apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not
been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having
been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."[199] Act 496, the Land
Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands.
Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the
benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land,
regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,[200]
from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act
has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20)
years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on
National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and
(d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and
ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories.
To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire
IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs
which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of
the ICCs/IPs.[201]
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of
customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domain."[202] It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their
ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is
a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the
concept of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse
possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on
administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48
(b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Thus:
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Sections 1-13
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than
twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid
the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall
be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for
such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of
land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted
in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free
patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under
the provision of the Public Land Law.[203]
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
Land Titles and Deeds
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."[204]
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally
public agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free
patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private.
Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the
possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed
judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled
to all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines
defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law
which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889.
Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily
includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right
to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it
produces,[205] the right to consume the thing by its use,[206] the right to alienate,
encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned,[207] and the right to exclude
from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner has
not transmitted such thing.[208]
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens
title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally
recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral
domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains
the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the
material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership
generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community
property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
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The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is
held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply
because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The
ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular
person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether
delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held.[209] These communal rights,
however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.[210]
Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in
common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned.[211] To allow such a right over
ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but
of the very community itself.[212]
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property,
much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum
of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single instance.
[213] Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the corporation.[214]
Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.[215]
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land
but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain.
This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs
themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It
belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands
are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following
limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary
laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a
period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"[216] the
IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that
has long existed under customary law.[217]
Land Titles and Deeds
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code
as a source of law.[218] Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom
should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable.[219] In other words,
in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly
proven, can define rights and liabilities.[220]
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a
specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil
law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.[221]
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The
CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of
the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.-- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over
the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to
the land, being people of the land-- by sheer force of having sprung from the land
since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's
brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land-- the possession of stewardship
through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and
land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.[222]
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine
Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
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Sections 1-13
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.-- The rights of ownership and possession of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights
include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.-- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the
right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or
used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation
and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms
and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.-- The right to stay in the territory and not to be
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed
consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.-- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural
catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable
areas where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.-- Right to regulate the entry of migrant
settlers and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.--For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have
access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
Land Titles and Deeds
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.-- The right to claim parts of the ancestral
domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and
intended for common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.-- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with
customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall
the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice
whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.-- The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.-- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or
property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws
and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.-- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property
rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/
IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an
unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to
redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of
transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains
which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership
includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b)
the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement;
(d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and
water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the
right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral
domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property
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Sections 1-13
rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping
with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but
not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral
Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and
Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural
resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development
of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
Land Titles and Deeds
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution."[223]
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources-- waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources-- are owned by the State.
The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization of these
natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake
the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by
itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production,[224]
joint venture,[225] or production-sharing agreements.[226] These agreements may be
for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress,
may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the
large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial
assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
30 of 90
Sections 1-13
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale[227] and small-scale
mining.[228] "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or
heavy mining equipment."[229]
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their
ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and
limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership-- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting
and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains."
It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by
the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds,
fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all
other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of
ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section
7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters
of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA[230] in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
Land Titles and Deeds
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters,
and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the
ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over
the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and
right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources.
The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form
or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over
"lands, waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those
expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence
clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include
the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land.
[231] The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section
7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It
is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these
provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership
over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the
constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.[232] Nevertheless, to avoid any
confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion
of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b)
merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.-- Subject to Section 56
hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied,
owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from
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Sections 1-13
allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate
the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to
receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold
the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon
the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights.[233]
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State
and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for
future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization,
and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of
Land Titles and Deeds
"ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." It
must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural
resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring
ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the
ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural
resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in
the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same
time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their
ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of
these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and
customary laws.[234]
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-
scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of
forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who
exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival."[235] Section 7 (b)
also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and
ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by
their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.-- The ICCs/IPs shall have
priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned
may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources
for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than
twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into
with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-
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Sections 1-13
making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP
may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of
the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural
resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein."
The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is
utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that
require technology other than manual labor.[236] The law recognizes the probability of
requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and
utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of
not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on
condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and
members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve"
the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the
development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority
rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The
grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources
and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to
whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of
the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong
to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that
the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution[237] in relation to Section 57
of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake the
development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it
may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the
natural resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said
agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter
into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
Land Titles and Deeds
petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its
agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a
non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall
ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The
agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral
domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of
and by itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural
resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an
agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an
agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or
foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the
ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the
ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which
option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right
to solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their
domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State
supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and
ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the
law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land
where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their
subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the
following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.-- All departments and other governmental
agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any
concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement.
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with
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Sections 1-13
any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based
investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned:
Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no
department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may
issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a
pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right
to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the
requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of
natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and
government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of
the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification
shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and
the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance
with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any
project granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of
any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be
issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any
ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other
agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or
license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/
IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been
obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that
do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the
said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism
stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during
the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into
the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right
Land Titles and Deeds
of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.[238] The
rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North
American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of
fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,[239] and
during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of
the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international
indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out
successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they
have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.[240]
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene.
This came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect
for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples'
environment, together with the national governments' inability to deal with the situation.
[241] Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental
protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda.
[242]
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies,
programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for
example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects
in Latin America.[243] The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to
some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the
projects of the Asian Development Bank.[244]
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and
declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national
unity and development.[245] The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs
with the international category of IPs,[246] and is heavily influenced by both the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.[247]
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries"[248] and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
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Sections 1-13
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination.
[249] ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent
Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law
made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with
a view to removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and
recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own
institutions, ways of life and economic development."[250]
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic
and religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the
Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly
foreign in origin or derivation.[251] Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has
resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous
peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of
Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems.[252] It
is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino
society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the
course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a
democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are
to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,[253] it is this Court's duty
to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and
affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775
Manila WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF
EN BANC BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707 Petitioners,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present: - versus -
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J., THE SECRETARY OF THE
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO, REGIONAL TECHNICAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,* MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA, RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO, AKLAN,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR., Respondents.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES, x--------------------------------------------------x
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ. DECISION
- versus -

REYES, R.T., J.:

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated: AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay
in behalf of all those similarly situated, Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
Respondents. October 8, 2008
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
x--------------------------------------------------x on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of the

35 of 90
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Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-
shaped islands three barangays.[5]
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.[7]
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of
PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
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Sections 1-13
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.[10]
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition
for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land
of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest,
which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts:
(1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay
Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural
growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters
and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants
declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.[12]
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the
lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for
resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.[13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were
Land Titles and Deeds
involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15]
The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those
similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the
applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed
and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved
survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.[18]
The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.[19] The trial court cited
Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were
declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The Republic then
appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.
[24]
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Sections 1-13
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that
the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the
present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on
each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall
form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28]
and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They allege that
the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They
have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.[31]
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying
Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the
island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926,
known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner
for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested
right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions
of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority
Land Titles and Deeds
to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a
need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as
they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.
[33]
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to
acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE
TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY
LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
38 of 90
Sections 1-13
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER
THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA
141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY
AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION
FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring
supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R.
No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles
over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any,
to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not
involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation to Act
No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;[37] (b)
Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.
1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine
their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and
executive acts.
Land Titles and Deeds
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify
lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest
and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,[41] giving the
government great leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to
the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.[43] Of these, only
agricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22,
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted
under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of
the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the
agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what
terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the
way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51]
39 of 90
Sections 1-13
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the
method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which
were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry of
Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years
of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the
date of its inscription.[57] However, possessory information title had to be perfected
one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise,
the lands would revert to the State.[58]
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on
royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2)
concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title;
(4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to
wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.[61] The act provided for, among
others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and
by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of
agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x[65]
(Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which
Land Titles and Deeds
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as
the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and
made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for
the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality
of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public
domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904
was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on
December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain
other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to
the State.[71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73]
which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June
12, 1945, or earlier.[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all
holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act
No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976.
40 of 90
Sections 1-13
Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as
the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as
well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,[80]
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only
to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified.[82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[83]
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[84] There must still
be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants
were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They
call for proof.[87]
Land Titles and Deeds
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88]
and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a
statement in these old cases that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[90]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did
not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify
lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines
had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and
agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.[91] This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late
Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in
which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released
by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing
the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of
the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber
and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications
41 of 90
Sections 1-13
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.[93]
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in
Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.
[94]
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an
argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as
disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already
classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take
these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and
totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing
with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption
applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title
under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants
or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act
No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian
doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was
better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
Land Titles and Deeds
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in
effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a
question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral
within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other,
mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of
the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have
been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in each case it is a
question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the
proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains
than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show
that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be
classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber
or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided
upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for
one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter
of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or
the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The
fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to
decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to
one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under
the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the
Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what
portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral
land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry,
supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the
facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands.[96] Act No.
42 of 90
Sections 1-13
2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the
Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or
reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then,
courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.[97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration
court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the
courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without
an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the
propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the
Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v.
The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue.
The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the
general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a
residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here,
the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.
Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the
old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they
were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as
agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Land Titles and Deeds
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)
years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private ownership.
Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.
[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain.
It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect
titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments
title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the
legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping
and Resource Information Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified
land of the public domain.
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Sections 1-13
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass
of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay
Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705
may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt,
has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay
appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover;
or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism
industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution[112] classifying
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by
dense growths of trees and underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui
v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted
to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees,
nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
Land Titles and Deeds
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber
land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One
is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the
legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its
forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial
establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued
by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone.
Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private
ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay
into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made
Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private
lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable[118] does not by itself
classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference
not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section
3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes
that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers
under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of
Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and
disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development.
44 of 90
Sections 1-13
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended
to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have
identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064.
This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to
ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of
the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine
environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for
tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.[119]
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four
(64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and
Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag
Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan,
Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the
designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly
beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President.
Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]
Land Titles and Deeds
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-
meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much
less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President
through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification,
subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion
of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest
under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land
without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained
an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,
[124] the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
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Sections 1-13
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same
result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.[125] (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If
the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be
no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice[126] on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the
word reclassification. Where there has been no previous classification of public forest
[referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject
of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed
for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification
of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public
domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated
as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial
or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.[128]
Land Titles and Deeds
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did
not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine
Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the
absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a
government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land
possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the
wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory
rights.[130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June
12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that
private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are
not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation
commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
46 of 90
Sections 1-13
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally
bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As
the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of
Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The
Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the
island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are
bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito
ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the
loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title
does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title,
such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by
law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title
to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present
land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives.
Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease
some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve
as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between
progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry
v. Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that
should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many
more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For,
forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common
knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a
number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds
dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological
erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

47 of 90
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

The Facts
FIRST DIVISION
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 155450 Decree No. 381928[4] in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
represented by the Regional (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio
Executive Director, Department of Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified
Environment and Natural Resources, Present: as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject
Regional Office No. 2, property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said
Petitioner, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No.
CARPIO, 11585[5] (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- versus - CORONA, and On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,[6] issued in the name of the Province of
Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer
COURT OF APPEALS, Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in the name of the private respondents,
HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
VICTORIA TURINGAN,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the
CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF Promulgated: Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN, (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the
Respondents. August 6, 2008 filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No.
381928.
D E C I S IO N
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to
CARPIO, J.: conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.
The Case
The investigating team reported that:
This is a petition for review[1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September 2002[3]
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag,
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within
amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the
nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as
reconsideration. alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of
the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.

48 of 90
Land Titles and Deeds
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and
occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472
Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.[8]
Thus, the investigating team claimed that a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 was only
released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982.
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land
Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the
cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper
court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and
declaration of nullity of titles[9] on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of
2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still
classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore,
was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion
was classified as alienable and disposable.
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.[10] Private
respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and
that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed
to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a
certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also
maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of
the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.[11] Private respondents also stated that not
all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an
effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real party
in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind
against private respondents.[12]
49 of 90
Sections 1-13
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of
decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.[13]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which
this court may annul are those which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available. The Amended
Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such
circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for
Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for
Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It
merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot
2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued
on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or
Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the
provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in
the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper
trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[14] (Citations
omitted)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Land Titles and Deeds
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer
available;
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended
complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate
a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
Turingan;
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original
proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court
of First Instance over the land;
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.
The Ruling of the Court
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds,
we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no
merit.
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.[15]
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the
Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public
domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in
favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland,
portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the
Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree
and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the
provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.
50 of 90
Sections 1-13
xxxx
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of
the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of
timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that
said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or
jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151,
consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect
whatsoever.[16] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking
to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over
the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was
classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable.
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of
petitioners failure to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available.
In Ancheta v. Ancheta,[17] we ruled:
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner
need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration
of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no
fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the
RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either
collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[18]
Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the
action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
Land Titles and Deeds
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of petitioner.
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were
factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with
Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[19]
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a
trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court
or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for
the complete and proper determination of the case.
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses
Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed
portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when
Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent
4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were
alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the
Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify
or reclassify lands of the public domain.
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim.[20] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.[21]
51 of 90
Sections 1-13
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular
Government,[22] we ruled:
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by
the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and,
provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical
person x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State
for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed
alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as
mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law,
during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps[24] petitioner
attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part
of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National
Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no
statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.[25]
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,
[26] which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion
of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
Land Titles and Deeds
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which
have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed,
and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by
the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.
However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of
the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries
established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession
or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis
supplied)
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as
lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the
classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in
Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se
alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8,
trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has
not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was
not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to annul the
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration
court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was
alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal
had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural
land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as
provided in Act Nos. 926[28] and 2874. The Court ruled:
52 of 90
Sections 1-13
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of
the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to
lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a
private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express
declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since
July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court
issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original
certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land
was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive
possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land
registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for
was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree
No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject
property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral
land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag
proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government,
which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did
not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural.
Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision
rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of
the 1935 Constitution which provides:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or

to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral
lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were
subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration
of the Government established under this Constitution.[29] When the Commonwealth
Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already
an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree
No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the
Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration
of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

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Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of
Topic: Purpose and meaning of Torrens System of Registration Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day
of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original
certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the
Republic of the Philippines petition of the defendant also included said wall.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered
that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been
EN BANC included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a
petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915 committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The
lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's
vs. land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall,
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. in the name of the defendant.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants. Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the
D.R. Williams for appellee. owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the
said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said
petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for
under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment
or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other
words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that
part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the
defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the
defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more
than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by
simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the
registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the
alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was
not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered
in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land

54 of 90
Land Titles and Deeds
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a
stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted
at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course,
it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens
system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with
all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an
action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17
Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51
American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third
parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the
decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all
parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are
all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the
validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The
registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he
had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee
simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open
document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged,
or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding,
after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is
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Sections 1-13
nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been
registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same
parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future
litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to
the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the
certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need
not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an
adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system
can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons,
has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the
"torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory
provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion
of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part,
comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs.
Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L.
R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds
however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of
prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two
certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System,"
supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the
Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where
two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While
Land Titles and Deeds
the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates
for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not
be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees;
subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land
Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of
registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of
one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except
for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set
aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent
certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a
person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of
two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when
one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the
person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course,
presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The
real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not
now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land
Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the
absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in
adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case
56 of 90
Sections 1-13
land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different
persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the
appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of
the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in
a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders,
to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and
contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them,
they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They
had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning
the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide
otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond
the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to
quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the
purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon
the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense
incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land
by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six
years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or
sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done
thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties
under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration
al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the
present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner,
and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration
in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the
registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his
failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a
default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating
such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set
up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the
land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in
Land Titles and Deeds
the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against
impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine
invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that
the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between
original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is
discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general
rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor;
that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the
earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later
certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon
the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and
112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected
against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights
in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent
purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully
included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case
Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the
same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used
in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a
mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same,
by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot,
including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the
phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these
examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections
are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be
regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving
meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate"
ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the
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Sections 1-13
owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original
certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The
record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be
charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of
every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620,
629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of
its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs.
Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs.
Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20
Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact
which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object
of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one
may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule
that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule
of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and
useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be
recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts
allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance
of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason
of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land,
after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he
Land Titles and Deeds
was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide
in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe
the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as
obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can
plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the
law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just
as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public
record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the
owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all
of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor?
We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such
purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied
to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of
the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be
applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the
original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser"
of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of
notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the
prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original
certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to
minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the
phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases
where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original
certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the
rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land
included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that
Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold
his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land
now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said
strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The
record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the
appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name
of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the
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appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that
these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule
contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the
later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for
damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the
first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original
certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against
one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original
certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge
with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,
resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and
who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting
from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the
land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the
ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the
view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other
registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered
and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system,
that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of
the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal
rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and
exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to
make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore
made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the
predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Land Titles and Deeds
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TRENT, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the
reasoning and authority on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original
holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the
later certificate, where there has been no transfer of title by either party to an innocent
purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in permitting the
double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under
the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later
certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later
certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the
issuance of the later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority
opinion sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled
to the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that
the rules laid down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly
subject to exception, and of course of no binding force or authority where the
reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable to the facts developed in a
particular case.
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In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the
proposition set forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would
seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in
the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all
the requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the matter in
hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and equitable rule when two
persons have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the same land,
under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title
and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard should be
protected, in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be
applied in cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act;
for it is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of
titles by the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes
the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the absence of statutory
provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the
parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking into
consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid
them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a
case wherein the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still
more forceful reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well
settled equity rule that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that
which first occurred will be given the preference." But it is universally laid down by all
the courts which have had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it should be the last
test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable ground for
preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16
Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or
overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail
so as to deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the
earlier certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of
the earlier certificate of title should not be heard to invoke the "just and equitable rule"
as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own title protected and the
Land Titles and Deeds
title of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any case
wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while
the holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its
issuance by merely entering his appearance in court in response to lawful summons
personally served upon him in the course of the proceedings for the issuance of the
second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier certificate, instead
of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment to be entered against
him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am
contending for by reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes
to demonstrate that as between the original holders of the double or overlapping
registration the general rule should prevail, because both such original parties must
held to have been fault and, their equities being equal, preference should be given to
the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the
reasoning whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor
of the original holder of the earlier certificate against purchasers from the original
holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such purchasers can in
no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said, negligence may
and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can he claim to
be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a
duly registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described
in a certificate of title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down
under the various systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens
system) insists that a purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration
Court, is charged with notice of the contents of each and every one of the thousands
and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land registry office, so that
negligence may be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that all or any part of the
land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of any one of the
thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an
earlier date than the date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is
contended that he cannot claim to be without fault should he buy such land because,
as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that the land purchased by him had
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been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a comparison of the
description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be
found in the land registry office.
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by
the introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of
land. The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of
registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the
vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands
conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with notice
of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the registrar so that his
failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land
registration, instead of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure,
and instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of
the land record and registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of the title before
purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and uncertainty of any
attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title to lands
purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the
torrens system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly
modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature
undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others dealing in registered lands
from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands furnished
by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to a ruling
which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents
of every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be
imputed to him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of
such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act
desires to avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such
lands have been made the subject of double or overlapping registration, what course
should he pursue? What measures should he adopt in order to search out the
information with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor
Land Titles and Deeds
is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy
which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to the
fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course
open to him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or
overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive
comparison of the registered boundary lines contained in the certificate of title of the
tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in all the earlier certificates of
title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of the author of
the new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly
registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be
acquired may be imputed to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the
respective equities of the holders of lands which have been the subject of double or
overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of
a registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be
entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another
applicant, if it appears that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default
judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of
Land Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he
has actual notice that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant,
claiming the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is
necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in those proceedings, invite the
court's attention to the certificate of title registered in his name, and thus, at the cost of
the applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from the double or
overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system of
land registration which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a
holder of a registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he
has actual notice that it is being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as
a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his lands become subject to double or
overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject an innocent purchaser,
holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from the double
or overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land under a
manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are
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otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only
where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly applicable as
between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later certificate of registry to the
same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right
of the holder of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing
with registered lands can confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally
forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other certificate in case
of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to determine which of the
certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of that question in favor of either
one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of the registered title of
the other and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole
system for the registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that
mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done
thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties
under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking into consideration all
the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down
in the majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has
actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the latter
certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he has received personal notice of
the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the pendency of
such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it
holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to
appear and defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule.
It is true that the order of publication in such cases having been duly complied with, all
the world is charged with notice thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in the
absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in permitting a default judgment to be
entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to
defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate. Such
a holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of
requiring the holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court"
and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his
lands; and I agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place an
unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not contemplated
Land Titles and Deeds
by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden is placed
upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to him
when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him
adjudicating title to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he has
actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is
entered and despite the fact that he has been personally served with summons to
appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective
parties," it seems to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting
equities set up by an innocent purchaser who acquires title to the land under a
registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate who permitted a default
judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency of the
proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent
purchaser in cases such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of
convenience and public policy which militate in favor of the recognition of his title
rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown,
unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put
to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had
with regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so
directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the land registration law was
enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate of registered lands
other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific occasions
wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land
Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum
by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his claim of
ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent purchaser and in favor of the
holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that under consideration must
inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or overlapping registrations by
encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to
permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part of
their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency
of judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any
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Sections 1-13
appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight
trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in which their
own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and
ownership in the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration
without actual notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of
things to be so rare as to be practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration
almost invariably occurs in relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or claimants.
It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double registration can take place, in the
absence of fraud, without personal service of notice of the pendency of the
proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such notice
to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which
application for registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner
can, even by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a
successful conclusion without actual notice to the adjoining property owners must be
rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original
holder of a certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the
records of the Court of Land Registration with reference thereto and with no
knowledge that any part of the land thus purchased was included in an earlier
certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate
of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against him in the Court
of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of
title in favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired title,
and this despite the fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings and was personally served with summons to appear and
defends his rights in the premises. It seems to me that there can be no reason for
doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties, and further that the
judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the
number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and
defend their titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land
Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and probability of loss and
damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands generally, arising out
of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land
Registration.
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

Carson, J., concurs.

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Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

their names. Two of them maintained that they had acquired their respective lots by
Republic of the Philippines virtue of valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on inheritance.
SUPREME COURT
Manila After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 1 He held in part as follows:
FIRST DIVISION
The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land in question,
necessarily have the lawful right to the physical possession of the land. The owner of a
land has a right to enjoy and possess it, and he has also the right to recover and
G.R. No. 86787 May 8, 1992 repossess the same from any person occupying it unlawfully.

MILAGROS TUMULAK BISHOP, JUANA PANGILINAN, EMILIO MAXIMO, ANITA
PANGILINAN, MAGDALENA ROSETE, MANUEL DACUT, RECTO DIESTA, VIRGINIA
NOVICIO, and LINDA BONILLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL AND JESUSA
SALANG, respondents.
Saturnino Bactad for petitioners.
CRUZ, J.:
The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases resolving the
same issue, the answer will not change.
In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic,
Zambales, with a total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions are in the
possession of the petitioners. The entire parcel is registered in the name of the private
respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29018.
On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of
possession of the lots in question. The plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered
owners of the land. In their answer, the defendants claimed that the lots were part of
the public domain and could not have been registered under the Torrens system. All
alleged long and continuous possession of the lots and produced tax declarations in
Art. 428 New Civil Code
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in
order to recover it.
There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of
the land in question have also the corresponding right to the recovery and possession
of the same. The defendants who are in physical occupancy of the land belonging to
the plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to unjustly withhold the possession of the said
land from the plaintiffs. The defendants' occupancy of the land in question is unlawful
and in violation of plaintiffs right to the recovery and possession of the land they
owned. The evidence presented by the defendants claiming as per certifications of the
Bureau of Forestry that the land occupied by them is within the alienable and
disposable public land, deserves scant consideration as the said certification are
without basis in law. The moment the land in question was titled in the name of the
plaintiffs, it ceased to become a part of the public domain as the same became the
private property of the registered owner, the herein plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the
land made in the names of the defendants are not evidence of title, it appearing that
the land is already titled to the plaintiffs. The registration of the land in the names of the
defendants with the Assessor's Office for taxation purposes and the payments of real
property taxes by the defendants can not and does not defeat the title of the plaintiffs
to the land. The fact that the defendants have been in occupancy of the land in
question for quite a period of time is of no moment as prescription will not ripen into

64 of 90
Land Titles and Deeds
ownership because the land is covered by a torrens title. Acquisitive prescription will
not be available to land titled under Art. 496.
PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds and so holds
that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in question are entitled to the
possession of the same, and that the defendants who are occupying the land
belonging to the plaintiffs in violation of the right of the latter, are duty-bound to restore
possession of the same to the titled owners, the herein plaintiffs.
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August 22, 1988. 2
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners then came to this
Court, urging reversal of the courts below.
They allege that:
1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have been
validly registered under the Torrens system.
2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.
3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith entitled to
the rights granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.
The petition has no merit.
On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an
Original Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That
certificate is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The
resumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that certificate. This presumption
covers the finding that the land subject of the certificate was private in nature and
therefore registrable under the Torrens system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it
must be shown that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case
and that there was actual fraud in securing the title. 3 Neither of these requirements
has been established by the petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the
Bureau of Forestry that the land in question was alienable and disposable public land.
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Sections 1-13
The trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for lack of
legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body cannot prevail
against court decision declaring the land to be registrable.
Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any other
representative of the Government for that matter, entered any opposition to the land
registration proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. No
less importantly, an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud
prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of
registration 4 and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this late hour. And
collaterally at that.
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must
also possess it does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by the private
respondents of their tax declarations on the land is no indication that they have never
acquired ownership thereof or have lost it by such omission.
The second ground must also be rejected.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to
eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if
it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and
regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand
the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and
continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect contending
that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary
principle that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by
prescription. 5
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby: 6
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quite title to land; to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his
land.

Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with
use and has long become a settled rule of law.

In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot
invoke the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the
constructions they have made on the lots in dispute.

A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the
time he builds on it. 7 This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because they knew
at the very outset that they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.

The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain
and even submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land
was in fact registered under the Torrens system and such registration was constructive
notice to the whole world, including the petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not
take the trouble of checking such registration. At any rate, the point is that, whether the
land be public or private, the petitioners knew they had no right to occupy it and build
on it. The Court of Appeals was correct in calling them squatters for having entered,
without permission or authority, land that did not belong to them.

In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are asking
us to overturn long established doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the Torrens
system and the indefeasibility of titles issued thereunder for the protection and peace
of mind of the registered owner against illegal encroachments upon his property. We
are not disposed to take this drastic step on the basis alone of their feeble arguments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so

ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

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Land Titles and Deeds
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO and
EMELITA MAGCAMIT, defendants-appellants.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court *
(now Court of Appeals) dated January 31, 1984, reversing the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District, Branch III, and of the
resolution dated August 28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration filed thereof.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court are as follows:
On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of
a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or
less 105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses
Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private
respondents) as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with
right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on
December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made
absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for the
sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the
instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with the
P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of
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Sections 1-13
P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued. From the
execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse
and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property
in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without
the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter
to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by
Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property involved in this
case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of
P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of
the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale on June 28, 1974. The
petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was
issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff.
On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor sold
the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, TCT
No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in the
name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974. It was only in July 1974, that private
respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued
covering the property in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in
favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner
NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas
spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused to
accept the payment. On July 31, 1974, counsel for private respondents made a formal
demand on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo to comply with their obligation under the
terms of the absolute deed of sale; and soon after reiterated to the NGA, the offer to
pay the balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On August 13,
1974 petitioner in its reply informed counsel of private respondents that petitioner is
now the owner of the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the
same.
Land Titles and Deeds
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject
property were asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner filed a
suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria,
Laguna, but the case was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the
petitioner and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be
declared the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in possession
of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said property, then, to
order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and conditions
as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises. (Record on Appeal,
pp. 2-11).
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner (defendant therein) maintained that it was
never a privy to any transaction between the private respondents (plaintiffs therein)
and the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo that it is a purchaser in good faith
and for value of the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the title is
now indefeasible, hence, private respondents' cause of action has' already prescribed.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 16-22).
After due hearing, the trial court ** rendered its decision on March 17, 1981, in favor of
the petitioner, the dispositive portion of said judgment reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property
in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same;
(2) ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to defendant National
Grains Authority;
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay
plaintiffs the sum of P56,000.00 representing the amount paid pursuant to the
Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Tuluyan marked Exhibit "3", with legal interest thereon from
January 31, 1972 until the amount is paid, to pay an additional amount of P5,000.00
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Sections 1-13
for and as attorney's fees, an additional amount of Pl0,000.00 as moral damages,
another amount of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs of
this suit. (Rollo, P. 35).
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
1984, reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed and set aside and
another one is rendered ordering the National Grains Authority to execute a deed of
reconveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration and cancellation of transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-75171 and the issuance of another title in the names of
plaintiff-appellants, and ordering defendants-appellees Paulino Vivas and Engracia
Lizardo to pay the National Grains Authority the sum of P78,375.00 (Exh. 3) within
thirty (30) days from the receipts of the writ of execution. No damages and costs.
(Rollo, p. 19).
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was
denied. (Rollo, p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of May 20, 1985, the petition was given due course and the parties
were required to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 128). The memorandum
for the petitioner was filed on July 3, 1985 (Rollo, p. 129) while the memorandum for
the private respondents was filed on August 26, 1985 1 Rollo p. 192).
The main issue in this case is whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement
between the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the sellers, and private respondents, the
buyers, to deliver the certificate of title to the latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a
breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by petitioner NGA, an
innocent purchaser for value.
It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in favor of private
respondents, namely: (a) the conditional sale with right to repurchase or the 'Kasulatan
Land Titles and Deeds
Ng Bilihang Mabibiling Muli" which was registered under Act 3344 and (b) the deed of
absolute sale or "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" which was not registered; (2) the
condition that the Certificate of Title will be delivered to the buyers upon its issuance
and upon payment of the balance of P40,000.00 is contained in the deed of absolute
sale; and (3) the land in question at the time of the execution of both sales was not yet
covered by the Torrens System of registration.
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase
may be binding on third persons, it is by provision of law "understood to be without
prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the Administrative Code,
as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case, it will be noted that the third party NGA, is
a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a better right than
private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the suspensive condition is
not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo and
private respondents.
In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents prayed among
others, for two alternative reliefs, such as: (a) to be declared the owners of the
property in question or (b) to order the declared owner to reconvey or transfer the
ownership of the property in their favor.
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the
Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although
unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership
and the possession of the property in question. In fact, they argue that they have been
and are still in possession of the same openly, continuously, publicly under a claim of
ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase on December 2, 1971 (Rollo,
p. 165). It is stressed that not until the month of July, 1974 did the plaintiff learn that a
title had been issued covering the property in question (Rollo, p. 15).
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of
title to land under the Torrens System is an action in rem not in personam, hence,
personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may
have jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal
notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the
State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of
title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a to proceeding in rem which
69 of 90
Sections 1-13
shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown (Moscoso vs. Court of appeals,
128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack, et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxas
vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
41 Phil. 120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is thus evident that respondents'
right over the property was barred by res judicata when the decree of registration was
issued to spouses Vivas and Lizards. It does not matter that they may have had some
right even the right of ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of
title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the
encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as
existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such
certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world,
including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209
[1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said ruling, if
the purchaser is the only party who appears in the deeds and the registration of titles
in the property registry, no one except such purchaser may be deemed by law to be
the owner of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions
provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner
herein.
Thus, it has been invariably restated by this Court, that "The real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the
possibility of losing his land." "An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not
allowed (Dominga vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361; Singian vs. Manila Railroad, 62 Phil. 467)."
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land
belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is
Land Titles and Deeds
then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the
defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value (Angeles vs. Sania, 66 Phil. 444 [1938], emphasis supplied).
It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in
procuring the registration of the property in question. On the contrary, their application
for registration which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was with complete
knowledge and implied authority of private respondents who retained a portion of the
consideration until the issuance to said spouses of a certificate of title applied for under
the Torrens Act and the corresponding delivery of said title to them. The question
therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728 but in the breach of contract
between private respondents and the Vivas spouses. Petitioner NGA was never a privy
to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any knowledge at the time of the
execution of the mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive condition in the deed of
absolute sale much less of its violation. Nothing appeared to excite suspicion. The
Special Power of Attorney was regular on its face; the OCT was in the name of the
mortgagor and the NGA was the highest bidder in the public auction. Unquestionably,
therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first as an innocent mortgagee
under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent purchaser for value in the public
auction sale.
Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the land
which was not even in the possession of the supposed mortgagors, nor present any
witness to prove its allegations in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE
to show its being a mortgages in good faith and for value (Rollo, p. 110).
Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing
with property covered by a torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate of title to
indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance
thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the torrens title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 545
[1985]).
More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank is not required before accepting a
mortgage to make an investigation of the title of the property being given as security
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Sections 1-13
(Phil. National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and
where innocent third persons like mortgagee relying on the certificate of title acquire
rights over the property, their rights cannot be disregarded (Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA
489 [1985]).
Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred in ruling that
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) complaint insofar as it prays that they be
declared owners of the land in question can not prosper in view of the doctrine of
indefeasibility of title under the Torrens System, because it is an established principle
that a petition for review of the decree of registration will not prosper even if filed within
one year from the entry of the decree if the title has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No. 1529, Sec. 32). The setting aside of
the decree of registration issued in land registration proceedings is operative only
between the parties to the fraud and the parties defrauded and their privies, but not
against acquirers in good faith and for value and the successors in interest of the
latter; as to them the decree shall remain in full force and effect forever (Domingo vs.
The Mayon Realty Corp. et al., 102 Phil. 32 [19571). Assuming, therefore, that there
was fraud committed by the sellers against the buyers in the instant case, petitioner
NGA who was not privy therein cannot be made to suffer the consequences thereof As
correctly declared by the trial court, the National Grains Authority is the lawful owner of
the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title.
As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to
reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that there is
absolutely no reason why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value, should reconvey
the land to the private respondents.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
City, now Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

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Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

THIRD DIVISION Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated October 25,
D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED, 2004 which reversed and set aside the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Petitioner, Quezon City, Branch 216, dated November 8, 2001.

The Facts
- versus -
Subject of this controversy is a parcel of land identified as Lot Plan Psu-123169,[4]
containing an area of Two Hundred Forty Thousand, One Hundred Forty-Six (240,146)
square meters, and situated at Barangay (Brgy.) Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon
RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO PANES, SALVADOR CEA, ABOGADO MAUTIN, City (subject property). The property is included in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
DONARDO PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO PERALTA and HILARION MANONGDO, No. 200519,[5] entered on July 19, 1974 and issued in favor of B.C. Regalado & Co.
Respondents. (B.C. Regalado). It was conveyed by B.C. Regalado to petitioner D.B.T. Mar-Bay
G.R. No. 167232 Construction, Inc. (DBT) through a dacion en pago[6] for services rendered by the
latter to the former.

Present: On June 24, 1992, respondents Ricaredo P. Panes (Ricaredo), his son Angelito P.
Panes (Angelito), Salvador Cea, Abogado Mautin, Donardo Paclibar, Zosimo P.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Peralta, and Hilarion Manongdo (herein collectively referred to as respondents) filed a
Chairperson, Complaint[7] for Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. 200519 and all Titles
CHICO-NAZARIO, derived thereat (sic), Damages, with Petition for the Issuance of Injunction with Prayer
VELASCO, JR., for the Issuance of Restraining Order Ex-Parte, Etc. against B.C. Regalado, Mar-Bay
NACHURA, and Realty, Inc., Spouses Gereno Brioso and Criselda M. Brioso, Spouses Ciriaco and
PERALTA, JJ. Nellie Mariano, Avelino C. Perdido and Florentina Allado, Eufrocina A. Maborang and
Fe Maborang, Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura, Spouses Oscar Ikalina and
the Register of Deeds (RD) of Quezon City. Subsequently, respondents filed an
Promulgated: Amended Complaint[8] and a Second Amended Complaint[9] particularly impleading
DBT as one of the defendants.
July 31, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x In the Complaints, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner and claimant of the
subject property which he had declared for taxation purposes in his name, and
assessed in the amount of P2,602,190.00 by the City Assessor of Quezon City as of
DECISION the year 1985. Respondents alleged that per Certification[10] of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) National Capital Region (NCR) dated
NACHURA, J.:

72 of 90
Land Titles and Deeds
May 7, 1992, Lot Plan Psu-123169 was verified to be correct and on file in said office,
and approved on July 23, 1948.
Respondents also claimed that Ricaredo, his immediate family members, and the
other respondents had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions of the
subject property, and their possession preceded the Second World War. To perfect his
title in accordance with Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), Ricaredo filed
with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 82 a case docketed as LRC Case No. Q-91-011,
with LRC Rec. No. N-62563.[11]
Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the publication
requirements for the Notice of Initial Hearing with the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), it was discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an
overlapping of portions of the land subject of Ricaredos application, with the
subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by then, already been
conveyed by B.C. Regalado to DBT.
Ricaredo asseverated that upon verification with the LRA, he found that the
subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado was deliberately drawn to cover portions of the
subject property. Respondents claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the
preparation of the subdivision plan did not actually cover the subject property. They
asserted that from the records of B.C. Regalado, they gathered that TCT Nos. 211081,
[12] 211095[13] and 211132,[14] which allegedly included portions of the subject
property, were derived from TCT No. 200519. However, TCT No. 200519 only covered
Lot 503 of the Tala Estate with an area of Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Fifteen
(22,615) square meters, and was different from those mentioned in TCT Nos. 211081,
211095 and 211132. According to respondents, an examination of TCT No. 200519
would show that it was derived from TCT Nos. 14814,[15] 14827,[16] 14815[17] and
T-28.
In essence, respondents alleged that B.C. Regalado and DBT used the derivative titles
which covered properties located far from Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City
where the subject property is located, and B.C. Regalado and DBT then offered the
same for sale to the public. Respondents thus submitted that B.C Regalado and DBT
through their deliberate scheme, in collusion with others, used (LRC) Pcs-18345 as
73 of 90
Sections 1-13
shown in the consolidation-subdivision plan to include the subject property covered by
Lot Plan Psu-123169.
In his Answer[18] dated July 24, 1992, the RD of Quezon City interposed the defense
that at the time of registration, he found all documents to be in order. Subsequently, on
December 5, 1994, in his Motion[19] for Leave to Admit Amended Answer, with the
Amended Answer attached, he admitted that he committed a grave mistake when he
earlier said that TCT No. 200519 covered only one lot, i.e. Lot 503. He averred that
upon careful examination, he discovered that TCT No. 200519 is composed of 17
pages, and actually covered 54 lots, namely: Lots 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 582, 586,
655, 659, 686, 434, 495, 497, 299, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 493, 692, 776, 496, 785,
777, 786, 780, 783, 505, 654, 660, 661, 663, 664, 665, 668, 693, 694, 713, 716, 781,
779, 784, 782, 787, 893, 1115, 1114, 778, 669 and 788, all of the Tala Estate. Other
lots included therein are Lot 890-B of Psd 36854, Lot 2 of (LRC) Pcs 12892 and Lot 3
of (LRC) Pcs 12892. Thus, respondents' allegation that Lots 661, 664, 665, 693 and
694 of the Tala Estate were not included in TCT No. 200519 was not true.
On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura
(Spouses Tabangcura) filed their Answer[20] with Counterclaim, claiming that they
were buyers in good faith and for value when they bought a house and lot covered by
TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado, the latter being a subdivision developer and
registered owner thereof, on June 30, 1986. When respondent Abogado Mautin
entered and occupied the property, Spouses Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of
Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97 which rendered a decision[21] in
their favor.
On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and
occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C.
Regalado in the formers favor; that respondents were not real parties-in-interests
because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over the property had yet to be
determined by the RTC where he filed his application for registration; that the other
respondents did not allege matters or invoke rights which would entitle them to the
relief
prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that the action
inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.[22]
The RTC's Rulings
Land Titles and Deeds
On June 15, 2000, the RTC through Judge Marciano I. Bacalla (Judge Bacalla),
rendered a Decision[23] in favor of the respondents. The RTC held that the testimony
of Ricaredo that he occupied the subject property since 1936 when he was only 16
years old had not been rebutted; that Ricaredo's occupation and cultivation of the
subject property for more than thirty (30) years in the concept of an owner vested in
him equitable ownership over the same by virtue of an approved plan, Psu 123169;
that the subject property was declared under the name of Ricaredo for taxation
purposes;[24] and that the subject property per survey should not have been included
in TCT No. 200519, registered in the name of B.C. Regalado and ceded to DBT. The
RTC further held that Spouses Tabangcura failed to present satisfactory evidence to
prove their claim. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Certificate of Title No. 200519 and all titles derived thereat as null and void
insofar as the same embrace the land covered by Plan PSU-123169 with an area of
240,146 square meters in the name of Ricaredo Panes; ordering defendant DBT
Marbay Realty, Inc. to pay plaintiff Ricaredo Panes the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000) pesos as attorneys fees plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On September 12, 2000, DBT filed a Motion[25] for Reconsideration, based on the
grounds of prescription and laches. DBT also disputed Ricaredos claim of open,
adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30)
years, and asserted that the subject property could not be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession because it is covered by TCT No. 200519.
While the said Motion for Reconsideration was pending, Judge Bacalla passed away.
Meanwhile, on January 2, 2001, a Motion[26] for Intervention and a Complaint in
Intervention were filed by Atty. Andres B. Pulumbarit (Atty. Pulumbarit), representing
the Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo Estate. The intervenor alleged that the subject
property formed part of the vast tract of land with an area of 117,000 hectares, covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 779 issued by the Honorable Norberto
Romualdez on March 14, 1913 under Decree No. 10139, which belongs to the Estate
of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo. Thus, the Complaint[27] in Intervention prayed
that the RTCs Decision be reconsidered; that the legitimacy and superiority of OCT
74 of 90
Sections 1-13
779 be upheld; and that the subject property be declared as belonging to the Estate of
Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo.
In its Order[28] dated March 13, 2001, the RTC, through Acting Judge Modesto C.
Juanson (Judge Juanson), denied Atty. Pulumbarits Motion for Intervention because a
judgment had already been rendered pursuant to Section 2,[29] Rule 19 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
On April 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] stating that there appeared to be a
need for a clarificatory hearing before it could act on DBT's Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, a hearing was held on May 17, 2001. Thereafter, supplemental
memoranda were required of the parties.[31] Both parties complied.[32] However,
having found that the original copy of TCT No. 200519 was not submitted to it for
comparison with the photocopy thereof on file, the RTC directed DBT to present the
original or certified true copy of the TCT on August 21, 2001.[33] Respondents moved
to reconsider the said directive[34] but the same was denied.[35] DBT, on the other
hand, manifested that a copy of TCT No. 200519, consisting of 17 pages, had already
been admitted in evidence; and that because of the fire in the Office of the RD in
Quezon City sometime in 1988, DBT, despite diligent effort, could not secure an
original or certified true copy of said TCT. Instead, DBT submitted a certified true copy
of Consolidated Subdivision Plan Pcs 18345.[36]
On November 8, 2001, the RTC, through Judge Juanson, issued an Order[37]
reversing the earlier RTC Decision and dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. The
RTC held that prescription does not run against registered land; hence, a title once
registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open or notorious possession.
Moreover, the RTC opined that even if the subject property could be acquired by
prescription, respondents' action was already barred by prescription and/or laches
because they never asserted their rights when B.C. Regalado registered the subject
property in 1974; and later developed, subdivided and sold the same to individual lot
buyers.
On December 18, 2001, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[38] which the
RTC denied in its Order[39] dated June 17, 2002. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to
the CA.[40]
The CA's Ruling
Land Titles and Deeds
On October 25, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated November
8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000. The
CA held that the properties described and included in TCT No. 200519 are located in
San Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao, Quezon City while
the subject property is located in Brgy. Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's testimony that there is a gap of
around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not disproved or refuted.
The CA found that Judge Juanson committed a procedural infraction when he
entertained issues and admitted evidence presented by DBT in its Motion for
Reconsideration which were never raised in the pleadings and proceedings prior to the
rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches and
prescription clearly appeared to be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's
Motion for Reconsideration was not based on grounds enumerated in the Rules of
Procedure.[41]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[42] which was, however, denied by the
CA in its Resolution[43] dated February 22, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following as grounds for this Petition:
I.
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO ALLEGE PRESCRIPTION IN ITS ANSWER IS NOT A
WAIVER OF SUCH DEFENSE.
II.
IT IS NOT ERRONEOUS TO REQUIRE THE PRODUCTION OF A CERTIFIED TRUE
COPY OF TCT NO. 200519 AFTER THE DECISION ON THE MERITS HAS BEEN
RENDERED BUT BEFORE IT BECAME FINAL.
III.
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Sections 1-13
A REGISTERED LAND CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
IV.
THE TESTIMONY OF ENGR. VERTUDAZO ON THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION OF LOT 503 IN AN INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT IS UNRELIABLE.
V.
MR. PANES HAS NEVER BEEN IN OPEN, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
YEARS.[44]
Distilled from the petition and the responsive pleadings, and culled from the arguments
of the parties, the issues may be reduced to two questions, namely:
1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in
the latter's Motion for Reconsideration?
2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject
property?
Our Ruling
We answer the first question in the affirmative.
It is true that in Dino v. Court of Appeals[45] we ruled:
(T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed
time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97;
Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc.
v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may
do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, [f] Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an
answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or
even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been
Land Titles and Deeds
asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v.
Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua
Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in
default (PNB v. Perez; 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint,
or otherwise established by the evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, one of the inherent powers of courts is to amend and control its processes so
as to make them conformable to law and justice. This includes the right to reverse
itself, especially when in its opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment,
and adherence to its decision would cause injustice.[46] Thus, the RTC in its Order
dated November 8, 2001 could validly entertain the defenses of prescription and
laches in DBT's motion for reconsideration.
However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous. The
RTC failed to consider that the action filed before it was not simply for reconveyance
but an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
Verily, an action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action for
reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of
the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the
original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance
of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. The rule is that the
registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD constitutes constructive notice to
the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken
place at the time of registration.[47]
However, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the plaintiff, as the
real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive
period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such
a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a
suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[48] Thus, in Vda. de Gualberto
v. Go,[49] this Court held:
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Sections 1-13
[A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed
or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule
applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of
the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession
of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming
to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that
his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and
its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Insofar as Ricaredo and his son, Angelito, are concerned, they established in their
testimonies that, for some time, they possessed the subject property and that Angelito
bought a house within the subject property in 1987.[50] Thus, the respondents are
proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title because persons having legal, as
well as equitable, title to or interest in a real property may bring such action, and title
here does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing
the suit.[51]
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held, nonetheless,
that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed
within the prescriptive period provided by law. Therefore, laches will not apply to this
case, because respondents' possession of the subject property has rendered their
right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by
laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to
constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice.
Laches will operate not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather
to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation.[52]
Albeit the conclusion of the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001, which
dismissed respondents' complaint on grounds of prescription and laches, may have
been erroneous, we, nevertheless, resolve the second question in favor of DBT.
Land Titles and Deeds
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in
derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.[53]
Article 1126[54] of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46[55] of Act No. 496 (The
Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 47[56] of P.D. No. 1529 (The Property
Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is unavailing not only
against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors. Possession is
a mere consequence of ownership where land has been registered under the Torrens
system, the efficacy and integrity of which must be protected. Prescription is rightly
regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to suppress fraudulent and stale
claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their
representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the
defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.[57]
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is
baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of
lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws.
Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the
respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.[58]
Moreover, it may be stressed that there was no ample proof that DBT participated in
the alleged fraud. While factual issues are admittedly not within the province of this
Court, as it is not a trier of facts and is not required to re-examine or contrast the oral
and documentary evidence anew, we have the authority to review and, in proper
cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts when the findings of fact of the trial
court are in conflict with those of the appellate court.[59] In this regard, we reviewed
the records of this case and found no clear evidence that DBT participated in the
fraudulent scheme. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[60] this Court gave due
importance to the fact that the private respondent therein did not participate in the
fraud averred. We accord the same benefit to DBT in this case. To add, DBT is an
innocent purchaser for value and good faith which, through a dacion en pago duly
entered into with B.C. Regalado, acquired
77 of 90
Sections 1-13
ownership over the subject property, and whose rights must be protected under
Section 32[61] of P.D. No. 1529.
Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor
to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. It is a
special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing to the creditor, who
accepts it as an equivalent of the payment of an outstanding debt. In its modern
concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective novation of the
obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an
obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while the debt is
considered as the purchase price.[62]
It must also be noted that portions of the subject property had already been sold to
third persons who, like DBT, are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value,
relying on the certificates of title shown to them, and who had no knowledge of any
defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the subject property.[63] To disregard these
circumstances simply on the basis of alleged continuous and adverse possession of
respondents would not only be inimical to the rights of the aforementioned titleholders,
but would ultimately wreak havoc on the stability of the Torrens system of registration.
A final note.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system of
registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not
be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's
agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to
third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a
stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted
in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system would forever be sullied by the ineptitude
and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.[64] Thus, where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the
court cannot disregard those rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The
effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate
of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone
dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

instance on whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the
evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will in no
way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
[65]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision dated October 25, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the Complaint filed by the respondents for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

78 of 90
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

Chapter II (Sections 4-13) . . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta.
Topic: Office of the Register of Deeds: General Function Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of
Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and
Republic of the Philippines Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and
SUPREME COURT Eduardo S. Baranda The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez,
Manila Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also have
TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering the private
THIRD DIVISION respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that
the writ of possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having been denied,
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988 a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners, Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on certiorari
vs. denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The motion for
SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also
TEODOSIO, respondents. stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the
entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant case
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners. G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs of possession and demolition issued in the
respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827 before the
Rico & Associates for private respondents. Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the implementation of the writ; that
counsel for the respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a
concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and
demolition and that petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: the filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26,
1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ' to maintain the status quo,
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo.
the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues discussed
and the instant case is the same a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent court have
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining
6406. Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render the
petition moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take
the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated cognizance of issues already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the
December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows: petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of possession
and demolition is likewise ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)

79 of 90
Land Titles and Deeds
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same
date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents (Baranda
and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and
March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a
resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered
the same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our Resolution
dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.
64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided
by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7,
1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in
G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983
Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496,
therefore she must register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and that of
Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the same
is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and
void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and
subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia,
all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
80 of 90
Sections 1-13
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision
Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--
G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration
and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito,
on the ground that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for
Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo
Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and
Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this Court. They
prayed that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon.
Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the
Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled
to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another
motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated
October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for implementation by
the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and
January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
Land Titles and Deeds
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through
counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of
Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of
Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting
Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of the writ of possession was
granted by the Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution dated
September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to
register the Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia on December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order of this Court dated
November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria
Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court
pursuant to its order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was
filed within the thirty (30) days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable,
the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of this
order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared
annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of
Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private
respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for
81 of 90
Sections 1-13
explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation
asking for clarification on the following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT
T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the
Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted by implication (by
virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the
implementation of the writ of possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-25772 and
the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution
dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in G.R.
No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the implementation of our
resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the execution of
the decisions to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to
apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of
the resolutions of this Court. No further motions in these cases will be entertained by
this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November
6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the
order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the
same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562
in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer
Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil
Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated
in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial
court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the
cancellation of lis pendens.
Land Titles and Deeds
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing
the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates
of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23
denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order
dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate
his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of
the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is
pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the
petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately
cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion
and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration
of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on the
second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of the
action such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or
buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has
been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall
82 of 90
Sections 1-13
be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which
the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-111560,
T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now
pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo
Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject Notice
of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled upon the registration of the
certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending, stating
the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was
based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate
Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can
order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court
resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and
granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No.
15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis
pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid
and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue
is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No.
64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido,
Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is
Land Titles and Deeds
pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated
October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why
respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting
Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of
titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that
Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in
Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871,
among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues
raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge
Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as null and void the transfer certificate of
title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3,
Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No.
62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the
reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and
83 of 90
Sections 1-13
declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre
in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long
before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents
herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the
final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court
ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the
reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the
registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he
would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a
warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in
litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends
to gamble on the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora
v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.)
(Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this
case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v.
Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a
proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the
proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as
for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the
main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the
plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the
prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of
Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra)
Land Titles and Deeds
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the
Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly
the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be
cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of
Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section
77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof
which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights
of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of
Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled
by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the
same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the
private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of
Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the
order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties
subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein)
touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over
Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of
Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of
title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration
84 of 90
Sections 1-13
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference
to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of
Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of
the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the
function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title
is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third International
Dictionary of the English Language the word shall means "ought to,
must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of
doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of
Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds
Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part
of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871
filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517
under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued
by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs
against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

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Land Titles and Deeds
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta
No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a
duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an
instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be
annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one
Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548,
appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in
favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of
undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three
different buyers. The pertinent entries read:
Entry No. 5658. Sales.
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Sections 1-13
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided
portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this
Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said area of
3,710 square meters and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby
substituted to succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided
portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original
Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ...
and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all
rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...
Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying an undivided
portion of an area of 15,000 square meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate
of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu
thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights,
participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an
additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No.
548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino
Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres
Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th
day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-owner's
Land Titles and Deeds
copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the
Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration,
who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated
April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner
observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property described in the
Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold undivided portions thereof
on three different occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside
from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's
duplicates which are presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in
addition to the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-
owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for the donees
that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was unauthorized is beside the
point. Unless and until a court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these
titles are presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.et
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want
to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing
section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall
be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under this provision,
according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is not required,
first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in
the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-co-owners in
this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor
was illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that
there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered
owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented
constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the
corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies
of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As
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Sections 1-13
correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the
issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality
being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There
being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity
may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated
on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be
issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical
entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by
the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the
action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of
the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor,
Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a
liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its
implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse
may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the result of
future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of
the property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio
Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its registration,
namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property which he donated was more
than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he
had sold portions of the same land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC
No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of
the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances
executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the
outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be
protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Capistrano, J., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.

Footnotes

*Section 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more persons.
Where two or more persons are registered owners as tenants in common, or
otherwise, one owner's duplicate certificate may be issued for the whole land, or a
separate duplicate may be issued to each for his undivided share.

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Land Titles and Deeds
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of
land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by
original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M.
Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer
certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following
grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio
Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal
property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil
Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the
surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating the existing
law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).
89 of 90
Sections 1-13
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is necessary
that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse
and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and
that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of another
document ratifying this sale executed by their father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on
a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to
register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of
title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the
respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent reiterated
the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other
legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision of the
respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for
dismissal of the petition.
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus
does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep.
Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to
compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on
his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real
properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.1
Land Titles and Deeds Sections 1-13

Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days
of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest does
registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the
denying their registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing
instruments shall be registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and
know their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to
existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.
then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be
decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is
registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated afterwards. (Gurbax affirmed, at petitioner's cost.1wph1.t
Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil. 182-183).
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act concur.
1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For Sanchez, J., concurs in the result.
under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is Footnotes
supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to 1In re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228; Smith Bell
be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows: & Co., Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61; Register of Deeds, Pasig,
Rizal vs. heirs of Hi Caiji, et al., 99 Phil. 25, 29-31; Mendoza vs. Abrera, et al.,
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When L-10519, April 30, 1959; Agricultural Credit Cooperative Association of Hinibiran vs.
the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or Yulo Yusay, et al., L-13313, April 28, 1960; Dulay, et al., vs. Herrera, L-17084, August
memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument 30, 1962.
presented to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the
Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted
to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register
of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in
writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of
the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after
notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken
or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest
disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a

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