SECONDDIVISION

[G.R.No.141066.February17,2005]

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.

DECISION
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:

[1]
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the
RegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Branch3ofBohol,inCriminalCaseNos.7068,7069and7070convicting
herofviolationofB.P.Blg.22,otherwiseknownasTheBouncingChecksLaw.
Thefactualbackgroundofthecaseisasfollows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC,
docketedasCriminalCaseNos.70687070.TheInformationinCriminalCaseNo.7068allegesas
follows:

That,sometimeinMayorJune1990,intheCityofTagbilaran,Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthis
HonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,conspiring,confederating,andmutuallyhelpingwithoneanother,
knowingfullywellthattheydidnothavesufficientfundsdepositedwiththeUnitedCoconutPlantersBank
(UCPB),TagbilaranBranch,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfully,andfeloniously,drawandissueUCPB
CheckNo.284743postdatedJuly7,1990intheamountofNINETHOUSANDSEVENTYFIVEPESOSAND
FIFTYFIVECENTAVOS(P9,075.55),payabletoAlfredoOculam,andthereafter,withoutinformingthelatter
thattheydidnothavesufficientfundsdepositedwiththebanktocoveruptheamountofthecheck,didthenand
therewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslypasson,indorse,giveanddeliverthesaidchecktoAlfredoOculam
bywayofrediscountingoftheaforementionedcheckshowever,uponpresentationofthechecktothedrawee
bankforencashment,thesamewasdishonoredforthereasonthattheaccountoftheaccusedwiththeUnited
CoconutPlantersBank,TagbilaranBranch,hadalreadybeenclosed,tothedamageandprejudiceofthesaid
AlfredoOculamintheaforestatedamount.

[2]
ActscommittedcontrarytotheprovisionsofBatasPambansaBilang22.

The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly
worded,exceptfortheallegationsconcerningthenumber,dateandamountofeachcheck,thatis:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
[3]
P12,730.00
(b)CriminalCaseNo.7070UCPBCheckNo.106136datedJuly22,1990intheamountofP8,496.55.
[4]

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two
[5]
accusedpleadednotguiltytothecrimescharged.
 The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in
[6]
1989,spousesAdronico andEvangelineLadongabecamehisregularcustomersinhispawnshop
[7]
business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
P9,075.55loanfromhim,guaranteedbyUnitedCoconutPlantersBank(UCPB)CheckNo.284743,
[8]
postdatedtodatedJuly7,1990issuedbyAdronico sometimeinthelastweekofApril1990and
duringthefirstweekofMay1990,theLadongaspousesobtainedanadditionalloanofP12,730.00,
[9]
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico
betweenMayandJune1990,theLadongaspousesobtainedathirdloanintheamountofP8,496.55,
[10]
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued byAdronico the
[11]
threechecksbounceduponpresentmentforthereasonCLOSEDACCOUNT whentheLadonga
spousesfailedtoredeemthecheck,despiterepeateddemands,hefiledacriminalcomplaintagainst
[12]
them.
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient
depositortheaccountwasclosed,theLadongaspousesclaimedthatthecheckswereissuedonlyto
guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they
[13]
mature and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
[14]
issuancethereof.
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty
beyondreasonabledoubtofviolatingB.P.Blg.22,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:

Premisesconsidered,thisCourtherebyrendersjudgmentfindingaccusedAdronicoLadonga,aliasRonie,and
EvangelineLadongaguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtintheaforesaidthree(3)criminalcases,forwhichthey
standchargedbeforethisCourt,andaccordingly,sentencesthemtoimprisonmentandfine,asfollows:

1.InCriminalCaseNo.7068,for(sic)animprisonmentofone(1)yearforeachofthem,andafineinthe
amountofP9,075.55,equivalenttotheamountofUCPBCheckNo.284743

2.InCriminalCaseNo.7069,for(sic)animprisonmentforeachofthemtoone(1)yearandafineofP12,
730.00,equivalenttotheamountofUCPBCheckNo.284744and,

3.InCriminalCaseNo.7070,with(sic)animprisonmentofoneyearforeachofthemandafineofP8,496.55
equivalenttotheamountofUCPBCheckNo.106136

4.Thatbothaccusedarefurtherorderedtojointlyandsolidarilypayandreimbursethecomplainant,Mr.
AlfredoOculam,thesumofP15,000.00representingactualexpensesincurredinprosecutingtheinstantcases
P10,000.00asattorneysfeeandtheamountofP30,302.10whichisthetotalvalueofthethree(3)subject
checkswhichbouncedbutwithoutsubsidiaryimprisonmentincaseofinsolvency.

WithCostsagainsttheaccused.

[15]
SOORDERED.

[16]
Adronicoappliedforprobationwhichwasgranted. Ontheotherhand,petitionerbroughtthe
casetotheCourtofAppeals,arguingthattheRTCerredinfindinghercriminallyliableforconspiring
withherhusbandastheprincipleofconspiracyisinapplicabletoB.P.Blg.22whichisaspeciallaw
[17]
moreover,sheisnotasignatoryofthechecksandhadnoparticipationintheissuancethereof.
 [18]
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. It held that the
provisionsofthepenalcodeweremadeapplicabletospecialpenallawsinthedecisionsofthisCourt
[19] [20] [21]
inPeoplevs.Parel, U.S.vs.Ponte, andU.S.vs.Bruhez. It noted that Article 10 of the
RevisedPenalCodeitselfprovidesthatitsprovisionsshallbesupplementarytospeciallawsunless
thelatterprovidethecontrary.TheCourtofAppealsstressedthatsinceB.P.Blg.22doesnotprohibit
the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
principleofconspiracymaybeappliedtocasesinvolvingviolationsofB.P.Blg.22.Lastly,itruledthat
thefactthatpetitionerdidnotmakeandissueorsignthechecksdidnotexculpateherfromcriminal
liabilityasitisnotindispensablethatacoconspiratortakesadirectpartineveryactandknowsthe
partwhicheveryoneperformed.TheCourtofAppealsunderscoredthatinconspiracytheactofone
conspiratorcouldbeheldtobetheactoftheother.
PetitionersoughtreconsiderationofthedecisionbuttheCourtofAppealsdeniedthesameina
[22]
ResolutiondatedNovember16,1999.
Hence,thepresentpetition.
PetitionerpresentstotheCourtthefollowingissuesforresolution:

1.WHETHERORNOTTHEPETITIONERWHOWASNOTTHEDRAWERORISSUEROFTHETHREE
CHECKSTHATBOUNCEDBUTHERCOACCUSEDHUSBANDUNDERTHELATTERSACCOUNT
COULDBEHELDLIABLEFORVIOLATIONSOFBATASPAMBANSABILANG22ASCONSPIRATOR.

2.ANCILLARYTOTHEMAINISSUEARETHEFOLLOWINGISSUES:

A.WHETHERORNOTCONSPIRACYISAPPLICABLEINVIOLATIONSOFBATASPAMBANSABILANG
22BYINVOKINGTHELASTSENTENCEOFARTICLE10OFTHEREVISEDPENALCODEWHICH
STATES:

Art.10.OffensesnotsubjectoftheprovisionsofthisCode.Offenseswhichareorinthefuturemaybepunished
underspeciallawsarenotsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisCode.ThisCodeshallbesupplementarytosuchlaws,
unlessthelattershouldspeciallyprovidethecontrary.

B.WHETHERORNOTTHECASESCITEDBYTHEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSIN
AFFIRMINGINTOTOTHECONVICTIONOFPETITIONERASCONSPIRATORAPPLYINGTHE
SUPPLETORYCHARACTEROFTHEREVISEDPENALCODETOSPECIALLAWSLIKEB.P.BLG.22
[23]
ISAPPLICABLE.

Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
becauseshehadnoparticipationinthedrawingandissuanceofthethreecheckssubjectofthethree
criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals
gravelyerredinapplyingtheprincipleofconspiracy,asdefinedundertheRPC,toviolationsofB.P.
Blg.22.Shepositsthattheapplicationoftheprincipleofconspiracywouldenlargethescopeofthe
statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a
person,likepetitioner,whohadnoparticipationinthedrawingorissuanceofchecks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the
CourtofAppealsthatsomeprovisionsoftheRevisedPenalCode,especiallywiththeadditionofthe
second sentence inArticle 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not
provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
RevisedPenalCodetoit.
Article10oftheRPCreadsasfollows:
ART.10.OffensesnotsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisCode.Offenseswhichareorinthefuturemaybe
punishableunderspeciallawsarenotsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisCode.ThisCodeshallbesupplementary
tosuchlaws,unlessthelattershouldspeciallyprovidethecontrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are
madepunishableunderspeciallawsarenotsubjecttotheprovisionsoftheRPC,whilethesecond
makestheRPCsupplementarytosuchlaws.Whileitseemsthatthetwoclausesarecontradictory,a
sensibleinterpretationwillshowthattheycanperfectlybereconciled.
Thefirstclauseshouldbeunderstoodtomeanonlythatthespecialpenallawsarecontrollingwith
regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of
[24]
statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. Lex specialis
derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been
eliminatedaltogether.Thesecondclausecontainsthesoulofthearticle.Themainideaandpurpose
of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws,
unlessthelattershouldspecificallyprovidethecontrary.
[25] [26]
TheappellatecourtsrelianceonthecasesofPeoplevs.Parel, U.S.vs.Ponte, andU.S.
[27]
vs. Bruhez rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles
under the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of
[28]
Article 22 of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the
retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S.vs.Ponte involved the application of
[29]
Article 17 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the
commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No.
[30]
1740.U.S.vs.BruhezcoveredArticle45 ofthesameCode,withreferencetotheconfiscationof
theinstrumentsusedinviolationofActNo.1461,theOpiumLaw.
B.P.Blg.22doesnotexpresslyproscribethesuppletoryapplicationoftheprovisionsoftheRPC.
Thus,intheabsenceofcontraryprovisioninB.P.Blg.22,thegeneralprovisionsoftheRPCwhich,by
theirnature,arenecessarilyapplicable,maybeappliedsuppletorily.Indeed,intherecentcaseofYu
[31]
vs.People, theCourtappliedsuppletorilytheprovisionsonsubsidiaryimprisonmentunderArticle
[32]
39 oftheRPCtoB.P.Blg.22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals underArticle 17 in U.S.vs.Ponte. For once conspiracy or
actioninconcerttoachieveacriminaldesignisshown,theactofoneistheactofalltheconspirators,
andthepreciseextentormodalityofparticipationofeachofthembecomessecondary,sinceallthe
[33]
conspiratorsareprincipals.
Allthesenotwithstanding,theconvictionofthepetitionermustbesetaside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreementconcerningthecommissionofafelonyanddecidetocommitit.Tobeheldguiltyasaco
principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
[34]
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of
activeparticipationintheactualcommissionofthecrimeitselformayconsistofmoralassistanceto
[35]
hiscoconspiratorsbymovingthemtoexecuteorimplementthecriminalplan.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant
AlfredoOculam,petitionerwasmerelypresentwhenherhusband,Adronico,signedthechecksubject
[36]
ofCriminalCaseNo.7068. WithrespecttoCriminalCaseNos.70697070,Oculamalsodidnot
describe the details of petitioners participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioners
involvementinthecommissionofthecrime,eitherbyadirectactofparticipation,adirectinducement
ofhercoconspirator,orcooperatinginthecommissionoftheoffensebyanotheractwithoutwhichit
would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be
attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this
inferencecannotbestretchedtomeanconcurrencewiththecriminaldesign.
[37]
Conspiracymustbeestablished,notbyconjectures,butbypositiveandconclusiveevidence.
Conspiracytranscendsmerecompanionshipandmerepresenceatthesceneofthecrimedoesnotin
[38]
itselfamounttoconspiracy. Evenknowledge,acquiescenceinoragreementtocooperate,isnot
enoughtoconstituteoneasapartytoaconspiracy,absentanyactiveparticipationinthecommission
[39]
ofthecrimewithaviewtothefurtheranceofthecommondesignandpurpose.
[40]
AstheCourteloquentlypronouncedinacaseofrecentvintage,Peoplevs.Mandao:

Tobesure,conspiracyisnotaharmlessinnuendotobetakenlightlyoracceptedateveryturn.Itisalegal
conceptthatimputesculpabilityunderspecificcircumstancesassuch,itmustbeestablishedasclearlyasany
elementofthecrime.Evidencetoproveitmustbepositiveandconvincing,consideringthatitisaconvenient
andsimplisticdevicebywhichtheaccusedmaybeensnaredandkeptwithinthepenalfold.

Criminalliabilitycannotbebasedonageneralallegationofconspiracy,andajudgmentofconvictionmust
alwaysbefoundedonthestrengthoftheprosecutionsevidence.TheCourtruledthusinPeoplev.Legaspi,from
whichwequote:

Atmost,theprosecution,realizingtheweaknessofitsevidenceagainstaccusedappellantFranco,merelyrelied
andpeggedthelatterscriminalliabilityonitssweepingtheoryofconspiracy,whichtous,wasnotattendantin
thecommissionofthecrime.

Theruleisfirmlyentrenchedthatajudgmentofconvictionmustbepredicatedonthestrengthoftheevidence
fortheprosecutionandnotontheweaknessoftheevidenceforthedefense.Theproofagainsthimmustsurvive
thetestofreasonthestrongestsuspicionmustnotbepermittedtoswayjudgment.Theconsciencemustbe
satisfiedthatonthedefensecouldbelaidtheresponsibilityfortheoffensechargedthatnotonlydidhe
perpetratetheactbutthatitamountedtoacrime.Whatisrequiredthenismoralcertainty.

Verily,itistheroleoftheprosecutiontoprovetheguiltoftheappellantbeyondreasonabledoubtinorderto
overcometheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocence.

Insum,convictionmustrestonhardevidenceshowingthattheaccusedisguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthe
crimecharged.Incriminalcases,moralcertaintynotmerepossibilitydeterminestheguiltortheinnocence
oftheaccused.Evenwhentheevidenceforthedefenseisweak,theaccusedmustbeacquittedwhenthe
prosecutionhasnotprovenguiltwiththerequisitequantumofproofrequiredinallcriminalcases.(Citations
[41]
omitted)

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its
evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional
presumptionofthepetitionersinnocencemustbeupheldandshemustbeacquitted.
WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionisGRANTED.TheassailedDecision,datedMay17,1999,of
theCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CRNo.20443affirmingtheDecision,datedAugust24,1996,ofthe
Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the
petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline
LadongaisACQUITTEDofthechargesagainstherunderB.P.Blg.22forfailureoftheprosecutionto
proveherguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Puno,(Chairman),Callejo,Sr.,Tinga,andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.

[1]
Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (now retired) and concurred in by Justices Portia AlinoHormachuelos
andEloyR.Bello(nowretired).
[2]
OriginalRecords,pp.12.
[3]
Id.,p.3.
[4]
Id.,p.5.
[5]
Id.,pp.2931.
[6]
AlsoknownasRonie.
[7]
TSNofDecember3,1991,TestimonyofAlfredoOculam,pp.47.
[8]
Id.,pp.1621.
[9]
TSNofDecember4,1991,TestimonyofAlfredoOculam,pp.23.
[10]
TSNofJanuary28,1992,TestimonyofAlfredoOculam,pp.12.
[11]
TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 19 TSN of December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo
Oculam,pp.1and3TSNofJanuary28,1992,TestimonyofAlfredoOculam,p.1OriginalRecords,p.128.
[12]
TSNofDecember4,1991,TestimonyofAlfredoOculam,pp.2and4TSNofJanuary28,1992,TestimonyofAlfredo
Oculam,p.2OriginalRecords,p.125.
[13]
TSN of August 23, 1993, Testimony of Evangeline Ladonga, pp. 78, 1112 and 15 TSN of December 20, 1993,
TestimonyofAdronicoLadonga,p.18.
[14]
TSNofAugust23,1993,TestimonyofEvangelineLadonga,p.10TSNofDecember20,1993,TestimonyofAdronico
Ladonga,pp.2426.
[15]
OriginalRecords,p.124.
[16]
Id.,p.126.
[17]
CourtofAppeals(CA)Rollo,p.28.
[18]
Rollo,p.133.
[19]
No.18260,January27,1923,44Phil.437.
[20]
No.5952,October24,1911,20Phil.379.
[21]
No.9268,November4,1914,28Phil.305.
[22]
Rollo,p.39.
[23]
Rollo,pp.6970.
[24]
Bayan(BagongAlyansangMakabayan)vs.Zamora,G.R.No.138570,October10,2000,342SCRA449,483.
[25]
NoteNo.19,supra.
[26]
NoteNo.20,supra.
[27]
NoteNo.21,supra.
[28]
ART.22.Retroactiveeffectofpenallaws.Penallawsshallhavearetroactiveeffectinsofarastheyfavortheperson
guiltyofafelony,whoisnotahabitualcriminal,asthistermisdefinedinRule5ofArticle62ofthisCode,although
atthetimeofthepublicationofsuchlawsafinalsentencehasbeenpronouncedandtheconvictisservingthe
same.
[29]
ART.17.Principals.Thefollowingareconsideredprincipals:
1.Thosewhotakeadirectpartintheexecutionoftheact
2.Thosewhodirectlyforceorinduceotherstocommitit
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
[30]
ART. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. Every penalty imposed for the
commissionofafelonyshallcarrywithittheforfeitureoftheproceedsofthecrimeandtheinstrumentsortools
withwhichitwascommitted.
SuchproceedsandinstrumentsortoolsshallbeconfiscatedandforfeitedinfavoroftheGovernment,unlessthey
be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerceshallbedestroyed.
[31]
G.R.No.134172,September20,2004.
[32]
ART.39.Subsidiarypenalty.Iftheconvicthasnopropertywithwhichtomeetthefinementionedinparagraph3ofthe
next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight
pesos,subjecttothefollowingrules:
1. Iftheprincipalpenaltyimposedbeprisioncorreccionalorarrestoandfine,heshallremainunderconfinement
untilhisfinereferredintheprecedingparagraphissatisfied,buthissubsidiaryimprisonmentshallnotexceedone
thirdofthetermofthesentence,andinnocaseshallitcontinueformorethanoneyear,andnofractionorpartof
adayshallbecountedagainsttheprisoner.
2.Whentheprincipalpenaltyimposedbeonlyafine,thesubsidiaryimprisonmentshallnotexceedsixmonths,ifthe
culpritshallhavebeenprosecutedforagraveorlessgravefelony,andshallnotexceedfifteendays,ifforalight
felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be
imposedupontheculprit.
4. Iftheprincipalpenaltyimposedisnottobeexecutedbyconfinementinapenalinstitution,butsuchpenaltyisof
fixedduration,theconvict,duringtheperiodoftimeestablishedintheprecedingrules,shallcontinuetosufferthe
samedeprivationasthoseofwhichtheprincipalpenaltyconsists.
5.Thesubsidiarypersonalliabilitywhichtheconvictmayhavesufferedbyreasonofhisinsolvencyshallnotrelieve
himfromthefineincasehisfinancialcircumstancesshouldimprove.
[33]
People vs. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, 176 People vs. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No.
128886,November23,2001,370SCRA448,469Peoplevs.Quinicio,G.R.No.142430, September 13, 2001,
365SCRA252,266.
[34]
Peoplevs.Pickrell,G.R.No.120409,October23,2003,414SCRA19,33Peoplevs.Bisda,G.R.No.140895,July
17,2003,406SCRA454,473Peoplevs.Pagalasan,G.R.Nos.131926&138991, June 18, 2003, 404 SCRA
275,291.
[35]
Peoplevs.Caballero,G.R.Nos.14902830,April2,2003,400SCRA424,437Peoplevs.Ponce,G.R.No.126254,
September29,2000,341SCRA352,359360.
[36]
TSNofDecember3,1991,TestimonyofAlfredoOculam,p.20.
[37]
Peoplevs.Tamayo,G.R.No.138608,September24,2002,SCRA540,553Peoplevs.Melencion,G.R.No.121902,
March26,2001,355SCRA113,123.
[38]
Peoplevs.Leao,G.R.No.138886,October9,2001,366SCRA774Peoplevs.Compo,G.R.No.112990,May28,
2001,358SCRA266,272.
[39]
Peoplevs.Natividad,G.R.No.151072,September23,2003,411SCRA587,595.
[40]
Peoplevs.Mandao,G.R.No.135048,December3,2002,393SCRA292.
[41]
Id.,pp.304305.