Chavez vs.

Court of Appeals
Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard

24 SCRA 663 (1968)

Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car
together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other
accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of
owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal
grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed.
Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state
witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in
favor of the fiscal.

Petitioner was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been
violated to warrant writ of HC?

HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did
not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;

Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original
claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to
the guilty

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional

remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accuseds
constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction
and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by
collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even
if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the
accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the
writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs.
Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as
to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in
that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of the proceedings due
to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires by providing Counsel for
an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional
guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release of habeas corpus.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose
case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper.
Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto

BORJA VS. MENDOZA [77 SCRA 422; G.R. NO.L-45667; 20 JUN 1977]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu.
However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge
Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o
First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was
alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional
rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without
requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case
was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be
annulled because there was no arraignment.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he

was not arraigned.

Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so
that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense
he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence
against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It
is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the
opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then,
he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the
constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining
convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With
the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel
being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with
petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being
null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of
the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent

Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside.
Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated
November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is
nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for
the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect
and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the
arraignment of petitioner.

PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the
Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel
moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in
the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the
prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double
Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint,
b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d)
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge
upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy
as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with
the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the
case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for
the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial
on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with

the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel
there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment
against him is revived by the fiscal.

PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the
Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel
moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in
the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the
prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double
Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint,
b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d)
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge
upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy
as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with
the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the
case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for
the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial
on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with

the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel
there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment
against him is revived by the fiscal.

Carredo v People 183 SCRA 273 (1990)

03/10/2011

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trial in absentia not allowed when it is necessary to establish the identity of accused by the witness
Facts: Accused after arraignment waives his right to appear in court during the trial while under a bond.
At the presentation of the principal witness the court issued a subpoena to the accused to appear on
trial for the purpose of meeting the witness face to face, however he did not appear with the
justification of his waiver. Subsequently the municipal judge issued order of arrest of the accused with
confiscation of his cash bond and ordering the bondsman to show cause why no judgment shall be
rendered against him.

Issue: Whether or not an accused may be compelled by the court to appear before the court despite
waiver in favor of trail by absentia.
Held: The court held that such waiver only constitutes a waiver of the right of the accused to meet the
witness face to face. It does not in effect deprive the prosecution of its right to require the presence of
the accused for the purpose of identification by its witnesses which is vital in the conviction of the
accused. It does not further release the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court
whenever so required. The accused is accorded with the right to waive his own personal right but not his
duty and obligation to the court.

MELO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT/ SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE

FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin
Obillo with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the body,
requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing
his habitual labor for the same period of time.

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night, the
victim died from his wounds. Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution and the
information was amended.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was denied.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy.

HELD:

Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:

If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy,
and may also require the witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the trial.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It meant that when a
person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any
other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense.

The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only
exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
SAME OFFENSE under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second
offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two
offenses are identical.

There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice versa.

This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the
first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide
against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which
charges the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new
and distinct offense.