Well Experts

Ormen Lange Wells

1 02.12.2005 BSA EK MP
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Document Control Sheet

Title: Ormen Lange

Author(s): Bernt S. Aadny
Issue Date: 02.12.2005
Document Number: WE 00105

Approval: Approved by:

_____________________
Mike Pollard,
Project Manager, Well Experts
Location / Hardcopy
Last Update Time Check: 02 December 2005

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 Ormen Lange Wells

A report presented to the Norwegian Petroleum Authority by Well Experts.

Contents: Page:

1. Summary 2

2. Description of audit 3

3. The construction of Ormen Lange wells 4

4. Review of important issues 5

4.1 Qualification of equipment
4.2 Pressure testing of the TRSSSV
4.3 TRSCSSV - Downhole safety valve
4.3.1 Non-equalizing valve
4.3.2 Equalizing valve
4.4 Tubing hanger
4.5 Tubing connectors
4.6 Liner hanger
4.7 Lower completion

4.8 Contingencies
4.9 Training and personnel involvement

5. Outstanding issues 15

Summary 15

Nomenclature 16

References 16

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1. Summary

This report presents a short review of the Ormen Lange wells.

The well design is evaluated, and the test reports for some critical downhole components are
evaluated.

The design and the planning are well carried out to a considerable detail level, a work of high
quality. Critical components have undergone extensive testing, which qualifies them. Some
testing is in its final phase.

Although alternative solutions are possible, no major problems were discovered in the review.

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2. Description of audit.

This audit is one of several audits regarding well design towards operators on the Norwegian
shelf.

The objective is to review Shell/Norsk Hydro practices for well barriers, surveillance and
testing, and, qualification and application of new technology.

Petroleumstilsynet has performed similar audits towards several operating companies, with
different focus. Usually it has been performed after incidents like well failures. This
particular audit is different as it is performed before the Ormen Lange field is developed.

The Ormen Lange wells are the first gas wells on the Norwegian continental shelf producing
through 9-5/8 in. production tubing, called "big-bore" wells. The large production rates from
these wells require application and qualification of new technology. This audit is limited to
the well.

This audit will not review all of the documentation developed for the project, only selected
reports directly related to the audit.

The participants are from the Petroleum Safety Authority:

Sissel stb, team leader

Hilde H. Lken
Arne M. Enoksen
Bernt S. Aadny, advisor

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3. The construction of Ormen Lange wells
An overview of the selected base case design will be presented below.

Figure 3.1: Base case design for Ormen Lange pre-drilled wells.

The design shown is a result of many analyses. Some design factors are:

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 -A long 9-5/8 in. liner from top reservoir to intermediate casing to eliminate borehole
stability problems in the Rogaland shales.

-Two production/completion packers where both the 7 in. and the 9-5/8 in liners is part
of the production strings.

-9-5/8 in. production tubing, called a "big-bore" producer.

-Double downhole safety valves, deep set to avoid hydrate problems.

The completion is a simple design. The wells are designed for 20 years of operation without
workover. In addition to a robust design, all equipment is quality checked.

In this report we will not present further description of the wells, but refer to the
comprehensive main drilling programme, ref.1, which contains the following chapters:

1. Non-conformances and HSEQ

2. General Information
3. Well objectives
4. Delivering scope contingency and flexibility
5. Operating schedules
6. Location data
7. Geophysics and geology
8. Reservoir technology
9. Formation evaluation and data acquisition
10. Drilling and completions fluids
11. Cementing fluids philosophy
12. Directional drilling
13. Casing design
14. Subsea
15. Completion
16. Well clean up
17. Operations
18. Activity summary
19. Appendix A: Template locations, safe handling zones and seabed layout maps
20. Appendix B: Formation evaluation and data acquisition
21. Appendix C: Drilling and completion fluids
22. Appendix D: Hole cleaning
23. Appendix E: Cement programme
24. Appendix F: Directional drilling
25. Appendix G: Casing design
26. Appendix H: Subsea equipment
27. Appendix I: Completion design
28. Appendix J: Operation schedules
29. Appendix K: Blow Out Preventer (BOP) Diagram
30. Appendix L: Drilling hazards of offset wells
31. Appendix M: Barrier diagrams
32. Appendix N: Well suspension and abandonment
33. Appendix O: Wellhead and conductor interface diagram

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34. Appendix P: Relief well trajectories
35. Appendix Q: List of abbreviations
36 Appendix R: List of figures

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4. Review of some important issues
4.1 Qualification of equipment

The operators identified early in the development equipment that have critical functions, are
new technology or may fail due to excessive loads. In the following we will present the
results from some of these equipment qualifications.

The most relevant regulations are given in the PSA Facilities Regulations (ref. 2). Here the
requirement for a downhole safety valve is defined, and also qualification requirements and
load determination requirements. The PSA Activities Regulations (ref. 3) defines the
regulations related to the operations. We will in the following address a few aspects from
these regulations.

4.2 Pressure testing of the TRSSSV

The PSA Activities Regulations (ref. 3) section 44 is important for the present analysis. The
Maintenance program section 44g) states:
"The NORSOK D-010 standard, chapters 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, the ISO 10417 standard and the ISO 10423 standard
chapter 9 should be used for well control and well intervention equipment, subsurface safety valves and
Christmas threes with the following additions:
a).
b).
c) In a new well, the Christmas three and all valves subjected to well pressure should be pressure tested
to design pressure upon installation and at least once every third month thereafter,
d) All newly installed subsurface safety valves should be pressure tested in the direction of flow every
month for three months before the interval can be increased to three months. Christmas threes and
subsurface safety valves should be tested every third month at least three times before the interval can
be increased to six months.
e) Valves to the production annulus should be tested to the same interval as the Christmas threes.

The issue of pressure testing has been a subject of discussion. A reduced test frequency might
be preferable from an operational point of view; however, this is not acceptable according to
regulations. Shell has developed a plan to analyze and approach this issue as follows. The
following is a quote from a Status note (ref. 4).

"Background

In a presentation given to Ptil on March 2nd 2005 regarding the status of the TR-SSSV qualification
testing, the Ormen Lange team indicated that a reduction of the regulatory inflow test frequency was
being considered. Main considerations for reducing the test frequency are:

-Ormen Lange TR-SSSV is not "off the shelf", but has undergone very extensive qualification
testing tailored to worst-case Ormen Lange Operating conditions.

-The Ormen Lange configuration, with dual hot-stacked TR-SSSVs with independent control
lines and subsea wells at 850 m water depth, will have a considerably lower overall risk than
other fields in the Norwegian sector.

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 -The operational risks associated with frequent inflow testing, for example due to hydrates or
formation damage caused by MEG injection into the wells, can become significant for Ormen
Lange.

In a meeting with Ptil on October 20th 2005, the options for valve integrity testing were presented. As
part of the way forward, it was indicated how the project intends to further pursue the issue of testing
frequency. As requested at this meeting, this note presents a short view of the ongoing and planned
work regarding testing frequencies.

Workplan TR-SSSV Testing Frequencies

1. Decision on self-equalizing TR-SSSV

A non-equalizing TR-SSSV has been qualified for Ormen Lange. Qualification testing of the self-
equalizing version of that valve is currently undergoing. In case of a successful test, the decision will
be taken to use self-equalizing TR-SSSVs for Ormen Lange wells. In case the test is not successful, the
Ormen Lange wells will be equipped with the qualified non-equalizing TR-SSSVs.

2. Risk study with Exprosoft

A study will be carried out by Exprosoft to investigate the following aspects:

-Overall safety availability of primary and secondary well barriers as a function of alternative
test philosophies and testing frequencies.

-Comparison between Ormen Lange risk levels and comparable fields.

The study will be carried out in Q1 and Q2 of 2006, with a final report expected by July 2006.

3. Evaluation of Exprosoft study and potential application for exemption

The Exprosoft study and consequences for Ormen Lange will be evaluated. Based on the overall risk
levels for Ormen Lange compared to other fields in the Norwegian sector, the preferred testing
philosophy and optimum testing frequency will be determined.

The results of the study and the consequences for Ormen Lange will be discussed with Ptil. In case the
optimum testing frequencies are not in accordance with the applicable regulations, a formal exemption
will then be applied for."

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4.3 TRSCSSV - Downhole safety valve

The downhole safety valve is a critical element. Two of these will be installed in each well.
Because 7 in. valves are required, new technology is needed. Shell decided to test valves
from three vendors, Baker-Hughes, Halliburton and Schlumberger. Each of these vendors
delivered valves to be tested by DNV. The valves were initially run through an extensive test
programme where all valves failed initially. Ref. 5 summarizes these initial tests. The
objective for the first tests was to establish basis for further review and testing.

4.3.1 Non-equalizing safety valve

Reference 6 defines the procedures for the tests, whereas Ref.7, summarize results from
further testing. Below we will quote the conclusions from this study:
"The Baker Oil Tools TRSCSSV, model TSM-5 SS prototype, as redesigned 2004, was found to be the
best alternative among the 3 for the Ormen Lange application. This is mainly because it sustained the
demanding conditions during closing in a flowing gas well than the other valves.

It did not, however, seal well at low differential pressure across the flapper, for which the Halliburton
valve sealed best.

Therefore the recommendation for the Baker valve is subject to one condition: The differential
pressure to be applied during the field valve leak tests (inflow tests) will be above 30 bar. The time for
field leak tests increases significantly for the Ormen Lange gas well TRSCSSV with increased
differential pressure between the flowline and the well.

There are also subjects identified that should be followed up prior to and during manufacturing of the
production valves. Most of these apply to all valves requiring high reliability and thereby also the
Baker valve:

One should verify by adequate in-house tests the lower limit of the differential pressure when:

- The valve has been exposed/contaminated by fines

- The gas pressure is released slowly at the same time as the valve is in 45 deg. position with the flapper
pin pointing slanted upwards, as the leak test combined conditions from test 5 and 6.
The detailed test procedure should be evaluated when the field test procedure has been established.
This could be conducted at the manufacturers test facilities by simple means, provided sufficient gas
can be made available.

Specific items for quality assurance follow up are:

1. To specify tighter acceptance criteria for leak rates during the manufacturers QC test in the
workshop.
2. Improve the QC on the component dimensions and actual materials in general.
3. Improve the QC on the dimensional tolerances stack-up that affects the flapper hinge
clearances/performance.
4. Improve the QC on the filing system for manufacturers documentation.

All valves' flapper hinge components have been deformed. It is therefore assumed that this is
impractical to avoid as long as a valve type with a flapper design is used.

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 The second valve alternative is the Halliburton valve. This valve should be redesigned with respect to
its internal components' ability to absorb the forces caused by closure in a flowing well. The
components of most concern would be the flow tube and the flow tube upward end stop arrangement.
The latter should also assure that the hydraulic piston is not subject to the violent impact forces from
the flow-tube after the piston has reached its end stop.

The third valve alternative is the Schlumberger valve. This should be redesigned with respect to its
secondary seal, flow tube and reduced opening pressure.

The Lock Open Tools.

The Baker LOT successfully passed the in-house tests and the DTL 3rd party test. The LOT supplied
by Halliburton and Schlumberger were not subject to tests at DTL because of their deformed flow
tubes. A subsequent in-house test with the Halliburton LOT after the gas slam tests at the Halliburton
facility was attempted without success.

Further, the LOT for both Halliburton and Schlumberger were assessed to have more uncertain design
and operational features that the Baker LOT."

As seen above, Bakers valve were found to be the best. This non-equalising valve is accepted
with the concerns identified above.

4.3.2 Equalizing safety valve

Both equalising and non-equalising safety valves are considered for Ormen Lange. These
two concepts have some differences in application, especially related to pressure tests.

A qualification test was conducted on an equalising Baker TRSCSSV. The report of these
tests is given in Ref. 8. This valve did not qualify. Below is a summary from ref. 8:

"1.2.1.1 Equalising valve

The valve equalising function failed after the final test at the final slam. After disassembly it was
observed that parts of the equalising poppet valve were missing. It was concluded that the parts may
have disappeared due to the total number of valve operations including the slams, not only the final
slam. This assumption was based on the fact that there were no parts or bonding compound left in the
threaded hole for the screw keeping the parts in place.

Otherwise the small size of the equalising valve require a long time for pressure equalising in offshore
leak tests, as predicted (Ref.: DNV rep. 2004-1014-R3). The vent rate recorded during the tests was
measured to a magnitude 2.8 Sm3/min for start venting 5 MPa over a differential pressure of 1.9 MPa.
Some disturbances early are the test phase could have resulted in a tolerance problem caused by the
flow-tube entering the space outside the plunger. A tolerance study indicates that this is a slight
possibility."

Our understanding is that the equalising valve did not pass the tests, and that further
development and testing will be carried out.

4.4 Tubing hanger

During selection of the tubing hanger one chose different strength and steel qualities in tubing
and hanger. It was decided to carry out a test program to qualify the tubing hanger. The test
report is expected at the end of 2005.

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4.5 Tubing connectors

The tubing connectors on the 7 in. production are of the type SM13CrM110 VAM TOP HC
type. Test programs for the connectors is given in Ref. 9.

In this test program the connectors were loaded to 90 % of the yield strength in tension,
compression and in internal and external pressures. In addition, maximum and minimum
torque values were applied. All six specimens passed the tests successfully.
The connectors are further tested by Sumitomo, refs. 10, 11. Ref. 10 successfully tested the
seal tightness properties of the connections, whereas Ref. 11 checked the make up torque,
studied thread galling and confirmed that the connection can be rated to 100 % in tension.

Test programs for the 9-5/8 in. and the 13-3/8 in. connections are under way. Reports
expected at the end of 2005.

4.6 Liner hanger

The liner hanger is a weak link with respect to possible leaks to seabed. After considering
several scenarios, the following is the chosen solution for Ormen Lange. The 9-5/8 in. liner
hanger is set inside the 13-3/8 in. production casing. Both the 9-5/8 in and the 13-3/8 in
casings constitutes the production casing. The liner is placed on top reservoir, and will be
cemented minimum 200 m. The production packer is set inside the 9-5/8 in liner.

The test report for the liner hanger is expected at the end of 2005.

4.7 Lower completion

Ormen Lange has a high potential for sand production. For that reason gravel packs and sand
screen has been designed for the flow conditions expected. A considerable qualification and
testing of equipment is performed.

FIV is used during the completion operation to avoid MEG to contact the reservoir and lead
to production impairment. This valve is also quality checked. When the gravel pack is
installed, the FIV will close. The FIV can be tested from both sides, and have a success ratio
of 98 %.

If the FIV test is not positive, it will be closed/open over again. If the second test is not
acceptable, another Halliburton bridge plug will be set in the 7 in. tubing.

The test report for the lower completion is expected at the end of 2005.

4.8 Contingencies

Because problems may arise during drilling of some of the wells, some contingency solutions
are planned. Below a brief summary of some contingencies will be presented.

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Damage to 13-3/8 in. casing
If damage is detected in the intermediate casing before drilling the 12-1/4 in hole, a sidetrack
will be drilled from the 20 in. casing.

Alternatively, if intermediate casing damage is detected after setting the 9-5/8 in. liner, there
are several contingency solutions. If a leak is detected in the upper part of the 13-3/8 in.
casing, a tieback casing may be installed, consisting of a 10-3/4 x 9-5/8 in casing (scab liner).
The drawback is that this limits the completion to a 7 in. system.

An expandable clad is also considered. This solution depends of the position of the damage
and the clearance. Under optimal condition the full 9-5-8 in production system can be kept.

Shallow setting of 9-5/8 in. liner

During drilling the 9-5/8 in liner may not reach designed setting depth. Reasons can be
borehole stability issues or simply mechanical liner landing problems. For this case several
options exists.

Drilling can continue to top reservoir. An expandable casing can be placed across the open
hole. The reservoir can be drilled to TD with an 8-1/2 in. hole. One may also drill directly to
TD and set a liner down to top reservoir. Alternatively can both options be used but with
cemented liner.

Damage in 9-5/8 in. liner or liner hanger

For this case a tieback packer will be set inside the 13-3/8 in. casing.
Integrity failure in a shallow hydraulic liner hanger, may be solved by installing an
expandable 7-5/8 in x 9-5/8 in expandable. This is a more complex solution but beneficial
from a production point of view. Finally, if damage occurs deep in the 9-5/8 in liner, a
sidetrack is the option.

Ref. 12 gives a detailed presentation of various contingency configurations that may arise
during the drilling phase of the wells. The following chapters are presented:
1. Scope
2. Conductor cementation and position
3. Unable to land and lock the conductor
4. Surface casing cementing and running
5. Lack of integrity in 20" surface casing
6. Hole problems and losses below 20" shoe
7. Contingency in the 12-1/4" OH for the production liner
8. Contingency for inadequate 13 5/8" shoe strength
9. Inadequate shoe strength at the top reservoir
10. Failed 13 5/8" casing
11. Shallow set 9 5/8" liner
12. Damage 9 5/8" liner/liner hanger
13. Side track contingency
14. Pilot hole contingencies
15. Decision matrix for Contingency Configurations
16. Final barrier status for selected contingency configurations

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4.9 Training and personnel involvement

Shell has developed KM (Knowledge Management), which is a system and a database that
containes history, ongoing operations, questions/answers and experiences from other wells.
The main objective is to make important information available. It is not replacing other
reporting systems, but it is developed because Shell found gaps in other information exchange
systems.

The Risk register is a live document, intended to contain all risks evaluations around a project
or an operation. Conventional HAZIDs and HAZOPs are intended reduced and replaced.

SIMOPS is an important issue. DNV is working on identifying risks with falling objects on
the template. Safety zones will be established. Only one derrick will be used to work on the
wells, even if West Navigator is equipped with two derricks. The other derrick will be used
for preparatory work.

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5. Outstanding issues

At the date of this report, the following reports are not finished.

Final test report for the equalising TRSCSSV.

The second report on the equalizing safety valve is expected at the end of 2005. After that, a
decision will be made of which of the two valve types will be installed on Ormen Lange.

Lower completion (gravel pack - screens).

This report is expected in week 47, 2005

Connection testing of 9-5/8" and 13-3/8" connections.

Report expected mid-December 2005.

Testing of tubing hanger and liner hanger

Report expected week 47 2005.

Strategy for pressure testing of downhole safety valves.

Expected established July 2006.

Summary

This report presents a short review of the design of the Ormen Lange wells.

The well design is evaluated, and the test reports for some critical downhole components are
evaluated.

The design and the planning are well carried out to a considerable detail level, a work of high
quality. Critical components have undergone extensive testing, which qualifies them. Some
testing is in its final phase.

Although alternative solutions are possible, no major problems were discovered in the review.

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Nomenclature
HSEQ Health, Safety and Equipment Qualification
TRSCSSV downhole safety valve
QC quality control
LOT lock-open tool
MEG metyl etylen glykol
FIV flow valve
KM knowledge management
SIMOPS simultaneous operations
HAZID/HAZOP hazard analysis
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority (Ptil)
DNV Det Norske Veritas

References
1. Ormen Lange Main Drilling and Completion Programme. Doc. No. 37-1B-NS-K15-007, Final,
01.12.2004A/S Norske Shell E and P Ormen Lange.

2. Regulations Relating to Design and Outfitting of Facilities etc. in the Petroleum Activities (The Facilities
Regulations). Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) 3 Sept. 2001.

3. Guidelines to Regulations Relating to Conduct of Activities in the Petroleum Activities (The Activities
Regulations). Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA), 1 January 2002 (Updated 1 January 2005).

4. Status Note: Ormen Lange - Ongoing and planned work regarding inflow testing frequencies of sub-surface
safety and tree valves. A/S Norske Shell E&P Ormen Lange, from Roel Aretz, date 15.11.2005.

5. TRSCSSV test data overview and basis for conclusions. ExproSoft DNV, Doc. no.: 2004-DNVEx-3-041.

6. Qualification procedures for new technology. Recommended Practice DNV-RP-A203, Sept. 2001, Det
Norske Veritas.

7. TRSCSSVs - Ormen Lange application - Comparison. Report No. 2-20, Det Norske Veritas, date: 2004-11-
12.

8. Baker Equalising TRSCSSV Tests 2005. Report No.C20,Det Norske Veritas. date: 2005-06-21

9. Test Results Summary of 7" 32.0 # SM13CrM110 VAM TOP HC for Norsk Hydro Ormen Lange Project.
R&D Job No. IR140. VAM PTS Company, date 6-20-05.

10. Qualification Test Results of 7" x 32.0# SM13CRM-110 x F6NM75 VAM TOP HC Tubing Hanger.
Report G3130, Sumitomo Metal Industries, October 2005.

11. Qualification Test Results of 7" x 32.0# SM13CRM-110 x AISI420 VAM TOP HC Tubing Hanger. Report
G3131, Sumitomo Metal Industries, October 2005.

12. Ormen Lange Contingency Well Configurations. A/S Norske Shell E&P Ormen Lange. Doc. date:
05.12.2004

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