US vs VALDEZ
US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ
G.R No. L-16486 22 March 1921
FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was
sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat
consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and six others
among who was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel.
During their work, the accused began to abuse the men
with offensive words. Gargantel complained, saying that
it would be better if he would not insult them. The accused
took this as a display of insubordination, thus, he moved
towards Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening
to stab him. At the instant when the accused had attained
to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter, evidently
believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw
himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface
to be seen no more.
As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died
by drowning, as a consequence of having thrown himself
into the water and upon seeing himself threatened and
attacked by the accused. The Judgment rendered against
the accused. Having been convicted as the author of the
homicide, the accused alleged on appeal that he was only
guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries,
or at most of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death
of Venancio Gargantel.
HELD:
The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused,
enunciated the following doctrine:
That even though the death of the injured person should
not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of
the very grave wound which almost completely severed
his axillary artery , occasioning a hemorrhage impossible
to stanch under the circumstances in which that person
was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the
aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in
order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act
which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person
to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound
upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested
a determined resolution to cause the death of the
deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and
putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the
decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the
act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit
any error of law, as the death of the injured person was
due to the act of the accused.
The accused must, therefore, be considered the
responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel,
and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide.
The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance
the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so
great a wrong as that committed. ( Par.3, Art 9 Penal
Code)
PEOPLE V BINDOY
FACTS: Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of
Occidental Misamis, for appelant was stenced to 12 years
and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased with the amount of P1,000. The
crime charged against the accused is homicide.
In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a
tuba wineshop. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to
Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she
already have one, but Bindoy threatened to injure her if
she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife,
attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried.
Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see
what;s happening, instead got stabbed in the chest by
Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from
the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused and
with such violence that the point of the bolo reached
Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?
HELD: Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the
testimony of the accused, Pacas and Bindoy were actually
for the possession of the bolo. When Pacas let go of the
bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew towards
his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio
Omamdam came up and who was therefore hit in the chest
without Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it was
caused accidentally and without malicious intent because
he was only defending his possession of the bolo which
Pacas was trying to wrench away from him and his
conduct was perfectly lawful. The Court therefore
acquitted Bindoy based on the facts stated.
"In many criminal cases, one of the most important aids
in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by
the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the
motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to
indulge the criminal act."
PEOPLE V ALMONTE (READ FULL DIGEST)
BATACLAN V MEDINA
FACTS:
Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on
Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus,
Cavite, crashed and fell into a ditch. Apparently, its front
tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle into the ditch.
Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the
passengers were able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others
were trapped. It appears that the bus drivers and the
passengers who already got out did not try to help
Bataclan et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the
area came to their aid, they were carrying a burning torch
for illumination, but then a fierce fire started and engulfed
the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there was
a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch
the would-be rescuers were using.
The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.
The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract
of carriage where Medina undertook to take Bataclan to
his destination safely. The trial court also found that there
was negligence on the part of Medina since at the time of
the blow-out, the bus was speeding. There is no question
that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is
liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court
argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered
by Bataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of
which was the fire, which was not caused by Medina.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina,
owner of the bus company, which was the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan.
HELD:
Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the
overturning of the bus, because of the overturning, it
leaked gas which is not unnatural or unexpected. The
locals coming to the aid of the trapped passengers was
most likely because the driver and the conductor went out
looking for help. It is only natural that the would-be
rescuers bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM
and the place was unlit. The fire could also be attributed
to the bus driver and conductor because he should have
known, from the circumstances, and because he should
have been able to smell gasoline and therefore he should
have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come
under the codal provisions above-reproduced,
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Proximate Cause that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
PEOPLE V TOLING (READ FULL TEXT)
PEOPLE VS ABARCA
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant
Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of
murder with double frustrated murder. The case was
elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence
imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution,
abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all
existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required
the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he
wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In
compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us
that he wished to continue with the case by way of an
appeal.
On July 15, 1984 at around 6:00 PM, accused Francisco
Abarca went home and found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the
wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her
paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was
then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ranaway. The accused went to look for a
firearm at Tacloban City. At around 6:30 p.m. he got an
M-16 rifle and went back to his house. He was not able to
find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the hangout
of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mah-
jong and fired at him three times with his rifle. Koh was
hit and died instantaneously. Arnold and Lina Amparado
who were occupying the adjacent room were also hit by
the shots fired by the accused. Arnold and Lina Amparado
were rushed to the hospital and were rendered timely
medical assistance that prevented their deaths.
Legal Issues:
1. Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances can be applied in the instant case
dissolving the criminal liability of the accused for
the murder of the deceased.
2. Whether or not the accused is liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.
Holding:
1. Yes, Article 247 can be applied in the instant
case.
2. No, the accused is not liable for frustrated murder
for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
Reasoning/Policy:
Article 247 qualifies death to be under exceptional
circumstance when the following elements are present:
(1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them
in the act or immediately thereafter.
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife
and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. That he
went out to kill one of them immediately thereafter is
however vague. The length of time that passed between
the time the accused discovered his wife having sexual
intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was
actually shot took almost an hour. It must be understood
however that the shooting was the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused. The killing has been
motivated by the same blind impulse and was the direct
by-product of the accuseds rage. Satisfying both
provisions, Article 247 can therefore be applicable in this
case. As a result, accused is not criminally liable for the
death of the deceased as he was under exceptional
circumstance upon employing the act of killing.
As a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the
consequences of his act. However, that rule presupposes
that the act done amounts to a felony. Ruling that
Article247 can be applied in this case, accused was
therefore not committing a felony when he killed the
deceased. Having not committing a felony, it therefore
follows that the accused is not liable for the unintended
acts which followed, in this case, for the injuries suffered
by the Amparados.
Summary of Ruling by SC:
The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-
appellant was not committing murder when he discharged
his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under
exceptional circumstances is not murder. It cannot
therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder
for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. For the
separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we
therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto
mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its
maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than
destierro).
The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The
accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21
days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within
which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the
service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to
indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of
P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the
sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of
earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on
his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he
stored palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to
see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and
Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the
one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano
hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the
leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980,
Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano
paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On
November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital
where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found
the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected
the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day.
Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty
both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the
affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw
the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals
on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the
proximate cause of the latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected
with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms
of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the
wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day
from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that
at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death,
his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with
a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused
the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us
to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure
to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
URBANO V IAC
Facts: Urbano had a dispute with Javier due to latters
opening of irrigation system which flooded farmers
palay storage. Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo but they
had amicable settlement later on. 22 days after incident,
Javier died due to tetanus.
Issue: WON Urbano is criminally liable?
Held: No. Civil liabilities only. Death wasnt directly due
to the hacking. Proximate cause is that cause, w/c, in
natural & continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces injury & w/o w/c the result
wouldnt have occurred. The rule is that the death of the
victim must be the direct, natural, & logical consequence
of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused to be
proven beyond reasonable doubt (because this is a
criminal conviction). Infection of wound was efficient
intervening cause between wounding & hacking w/c was
distinct & foreign to the crime. The petitioner at the very
least is guilty of slight physical injury. But because
Urbano & Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators
to effect a compromise agreement, the criminal liability is
wiped out by virtue of PD 1508, 2(3) w/c allows
settlement of minor offenses.
PEOPLE V ORTEGA
FACTS:
October 15, 1992 5:30 pm: Andre Mar Masangkay
(courting Raquel Ortega), Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega,
Roberto San Andres, Searfin, Boyet and Diosdado
Quitlong were having a drinking spree with gin and finger
foods.
October 15, 1992 11:00 pm: Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia who were already drank joined them.
October 16, 1992 midnight: Andre answering a call of
nature went to the back portion of the house and Benjamin
followed him. Suddenly, they heard a shout from Andre
Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!)
Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of
Andre who was lying down being stabbed. Ariel got
Benjamin Ortega, Sr., Benjamins father while Diosdado
called Romeo to pacify his brother. Romeo, Benjamin and
Manuel lifted Andre from the canal and dropped him in
the well. They dropped stones to Andres body to weigh
the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to tell
anybody what he saw. He agreed so he was allowed to go
home. But, his conscience bothered him so he told his
mother, reported it to the police and accompanied them to
the crime scene.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat:
o cause of death is drowning with multiple stab wounds,
contributory
o 13 stab wounds
o stab wound on the upper left shoulder, near the upper
left armpit and left chest wall- front
o stab wound on the back left side of the body and the
stab wound on the back right portion of the body back
Manuel Garcia alibi
o He was asked to go home by his wife to fetched his
mother-in-law who performed a ritual called tawas on
his sick daughter and stayed home after
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story
o After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he saw
Andre peeking through the room of his sister
Raquel. Then, Andre approached him to ask where his
sister was. When he answered he didnt know, Andre
punched him so he bled and fell to the ground. Andre
drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm,
thereby immobilizing him. Andre then gripped his neck
with his left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable to
move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came, seized the
knife and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre then ran
towards the direction of the well. Then, he tended his
wound in the lips and armpit and slept.
RTC: Benjamin and Manuel through conspiracy and
the taking advantage of superior strength committed
murder
ISSUE: W/N Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for
murder.
HELD: NO. PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty
only of homicide. Manuel deserves acquittal
If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he should
have immediately reported the matter to the police
authorities. If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he
should have immediately reported the matter to the police
authorities. It is incredible that Diosdado would stab
Andre 10 times successively, completely ignoring
Benjamin who was grappling with Masangkay and that
Andre was choking him while being stabbed.
Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent
on the part of the accused to take advantage of such
superiority none shown
o Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was only
54
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
o The essential requisites
1. the intended act is felonious assisting Benjamin by
carrying the body to the well
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony - concealing the
body of the crime to prevent its discovery
3. the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily
caused by the actors wrongful acts (praeter intentionem)
still alive and was drowned to death
a person may be convicted of homicide although he
had no original intent to kill
Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamin
o Exempt by Article 20 of RPC
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal
liability. -- The penalties prescribed for accessories shall
not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to
their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees with the single exception
of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph
1 of the next preceding article.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which is
imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating
or mitigating circumstance, as in the case of Appellant
Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be
one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
PEOPLE V ULEP (SEE FULL TEXT)
Note: lawphil site is down. Research tom instead.
PEOPLE V VILLACORTA
On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store
to buy bread. Out of nowhere, Orlito Villacorta appeared
and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz
with a sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled.
Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a
nearby hospital where he was treated as out-patient. He
was discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002,
or 21 days after the stabbing incident, he returned to the
same hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus.
The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The
medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus infection
secondary to stab wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted
Villacorta for murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.
HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death
is not the stabbing done by Villacorta upon Cruz. There
was an efficient intervening cause which appeared
between the time of the stabbing and the time of the death
of Cruz.
In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into
consideration the fact that severe tetanus (the kind of
tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation
period of 14 days or less. In this case, the stabbing made
by Vilalcorta could not have caused the tetanus infection
as 22 days already lapsed from the time of the stabbing
until the date of death of Cruz. Something else caused the
tetanus other than the stabbing in short, Cruz acquired
the tetanus 14 days or less before February 15, 2003 and
not on the date of stabbing.
The court explained further:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with
a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused
the victims death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us
to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time [Cruz] was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign
to the crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries
based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of attempted nor
frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the
prosecution.
BELBIS V PEOPLE
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:
Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of
Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. On the night of
December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At
around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir, Joses live-in partner,
heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to
where Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It
was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by
Boboy (petitioner AlbertoBrucales), while Paul
(petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was
brought to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was
confined for 6 days. Jose was brought back to the hospital
on January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys
had inflamed due to infection. He died the next day.
Version of the Defense:
Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997,
petitioners were outside a store in engaged in a
conversation with other people when Jose went to them
and told them to go home. While on their way home, they
heard Joses whistle go off as the latter was following
them. Rodolfo asked Jose what is the matter and the latter
replied, What about? Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick
on Rodolfo, but the latter was able to evade it. The night
stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Rodolfo
and Jose grappled for the bolo while Alberto was merely
shouting at them to stop. Rodolfo eventually got hold of
the bolo but he suffered a wound in his hand
so Alberto took him to the hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible
to cast a reasonable doubt which would warrant his
acquittal
HELD:
No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim
but insists that he had done the deed to defend himself. It
is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim
but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the
accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by
credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise,
conviction would follow from his admission that he killed
the victim.
The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on
the part of the victim ceased when petitioner Rodolfo was
able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Rodolfo, who was
in possession of the same weapon, already became the
unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by
a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to
the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be
averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression. In the present case, four
stab wounds to the back of the victim are not necessary to
prevent the alleged continuous unlawful aggression from
the victim as the latter was already without a weapon.
Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the
incident and the death of the victim is not controlling
since what really needs to be proven in a case when the
victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. It can be
concluded from the doctors testimonies that without the
stab wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted with
an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure
that caused his death. The offender is criminally liable for
the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the
death of the victim. The petitioners are found guilty of
homicide.
CAUSES THAT PRODUCE A DIFFERENT
RESULT
PEOPLE V GONA (READ FULLTEXT)
PEOPLE V MABUG-AT (READ FULLTEXT)
PEOPLE V CAGOCO
FACTS
On July 24, 1932, Manila, the accused willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, without any just cause therefor
and with intent to kill and treachery, assaulted and
attacked Yu Lon by suddenly giving him a fist blow on
the back part of the head, treacherously, under conditions
which intended directly and especially to insure, the
accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself
arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might make,
thus causing him to fall on the ground as a consequence
of which he suffered a lacerated wound in the scalp and a
fissured fracture on the left occipital region, which were
necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death
of the said Yu Lon. Defendant was found guilty of murder
in the CFI, for which the defendant made an appeal.
Counsel enumerated the following assignment of error:
(1) that the trial court erred in finding the true assailant of
Yu Lon, (2) assuming that the appellant is such person,
the trial court erred in finding that the appellant struck his
supposed victim, (3) assuming that the appellant is such
person, and that the appellant did indeed strike Yu Lon,
the trial court erred in that the blow was struck in the rear,
(4) the trial court erred in finding that the identity of the
appellant was fully established, (5) the trial court erred in
convicting the appellant of murder (Art 248) rather than
maltreatment (Art 266).
DECISION COURT OF ORIGIN
Defendant was found guilty of murder by Judge Luis P.
Torres
ISSUE
W/N a naturally resulting injury from a direct
consequence of an unlawful act would make the aggressor
criminally liable
DECISION APPELLATE COURT
J. Vickers. Regarding the contention of the appellant that
striking Yu Lon at the back of the head would not possibly
cause him to fall forward on his face to the pavement, the
Court declared that the expert testimony shows that the
victim had undergone a natural phenomenon of falling
backwards on the pavement in an attempt to regain
balance. Another consideration was the slope of the
sidewalk, which could have made Yu Lon fall the
opposite direction from which he was struck, as he tried
to straighten up. The Court referred to paragraph 1,
Article 4 of the RPC which provides that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
what he intended; but in order that a person be criminally
liable, the following requisites must be present: (1) that a
felony was committed, and (2) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the offender. There is no doubt as to the
cause of the death of Yu Lon, which occurred as the direct
consequence of the blow dealt by the appellant, and the
fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an
injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his
unlawful act but is merely a mitigating circumstance (US
vs Rodriguez, 23 Phil 22).
Notes:
Appellate court mentioned the US vs Brobst case,
where it was held that death may result from a
blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal
region, notwithstanding the fact that the blow
leaves no outward mark of violence; that where
death results as the direct consequence of the use
of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased
or weakened condition of the injured person
contributed to his death, does not relieve the
illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
Companion of Yu Lon: YU YEE
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
PEOPLE V BALMORES
People vs. Balmores
Facts: Balmores was found guilty of attempted estafa
through falsification of a government obligation. He
attempted to cash in a sweepstakes ticket that was
obviously falsified (the ticket was split into , and the
winning ticket number written in ink at the bottom left
part of the halved ticket). He presented his falsified ticket
to a PCSO booth. The PCSO employee manning the booth
saw that the ticket was obviously falsified, and had
Balmores arrested. Balmores waived the right to counsel,
and pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted estafa.
Issue: WON Balmores committed an impossible crime.
Held: No; The recklessness and clumsiness of the act of
falsification did not make the crime an impossible one
under Paragraph 2 Article 4 of the RPC.1 The alteration of
a losing sweepstakes ticket would constitute a crime only
if an attempt to cash it were done, which is what occurred
in this case.
Intod vs. CA
Facts: Intod and company were tasked to kill Palang-
pangan due to land dispute. They fired at her room.
However, she was in another city then thus they hit no
one.
Issue: WON he is liable for attempted murder?
Held: No. Only impossible crime. In the Philippines,
Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime
an act which, were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate would constitute a felony against person or
family. Its purpose is to punish criminal tendencies. There
must either be (1) legal responsibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order
to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal
impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal
impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:
(1) The motive, desire and expectation is to perform
an act in violation of the law;
(2) There is no intention to perform the physical act;
(3) There is a performance of the intended physical
act; and
(4) The consequence resulting from the intended act
does not amount to a crime.
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to actor or beyond control
prevent consummation of intended crime.
Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is
not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had
the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to
be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was
impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the
other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid
criminal liability for an attempt. The factual situation in
the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
PEOPLE V DOMASIAN
FACTS:
March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking
with Tirso Ferreras, his classmate, along Roque street in
the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by
Pablito Domasian who requested his assistance in getting
his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico
agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to
Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man
went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became
apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking
him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced
him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told
him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his
father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another
tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from
where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to
a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed
to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then
boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente. As Enrico was
crying and being firmly held, Alexander Grate, the
tricycle driver became suspicious and asked Domasian
about his relationship with the boy who told him they
were brothers. Their physical differences and the wide
gap between their ages made Grate doubt so he
immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods
when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and
the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging
the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, Domasian
was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on
his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents,
who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already
looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after
Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the
release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy
would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note
was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the
hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it
to the NBI for examination
March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope
containing a ransom note demanding P1 million
otherwise Enrico will be killed. . Agra thought the
handwriting in the note was familiar so he referred it to
the NBI for examination and it turned out to be Dr.
Samson Tans signature.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with
the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
o Domasians alibi: at the time of the incident he was
watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and later
went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of
his eyeglasses
o Dr. Tans alibi: he was in Manila
Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed
Domasian.
RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and all accessory penalties
Appealed
ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping
kidnapping with serious illegal detention
HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may
consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but
also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of
his liberty
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding
that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible
crime which he says is not punishable.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the
same article, which clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime
of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already
been committed. The act cannot be considered an
impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment
of inadequate or ineffective means. The sending of the
ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing
the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article
267 although this too would not have been possible under
the new Constitution.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it, whether they act through physical volition of
one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. These acts
were complementary to each other and geared toward the
attainment of the common ultimate objective, viz., to
extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's
life.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover.
According to Agra, Tan approached him 6 days before the
incident happened and requested a loan of at least
P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and
Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could
even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.
.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
PERALTA, J.:
A petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of
the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts: Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a
Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of
P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's
purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was
then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check
was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso
Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the
sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising
and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega
Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason
for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO
check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through
accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of
Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone;
but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor
and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega
Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from
Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told
Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally
into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega
Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of
Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and
was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed
petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her
purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino further
testified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the
phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.
Verification from company records showed that petitioner
never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid
Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the
dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment
operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills
provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with
fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were
given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she
was going along with Valencia's plan.
Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then
boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's
factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and
entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she
was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash
she actually brought out from the premises was the
P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon
returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were
arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time.
A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto,
Valencia and Capitle. RTC rendered its Decision finding
them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced each imprisonment
of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND
ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as
maximum.
The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial
court was MODIFIED, in that:(a) the sentence against
accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against
accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto
mayor medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle
is acquitted. Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,
Issue: Whether or not a worthless
check can be the object of theft.
Held: As may be gleaned from the aforementioned
Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal
property subject of the theft must have some value, as
the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing
stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the
law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated
check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently
dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the
crime of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court
must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and
applicable to the present case. In Intod (see doctrines laid
out in Intod), the Court went on to give an example of an
offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man
puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since
the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above
example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this
case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act
of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam
showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were
it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have
received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the
crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken
by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless,
because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega
Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the
P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the
cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no
moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People that
under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code there is only one operative act of execution by
the actor involved in theft the taking of personal
property of another. As of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of
theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in
this case. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino
to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched
only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee
bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense,
petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should
not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most,
the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked
money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen
proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have
the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a
different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately,
since said scheme was not included or covered by the
allegations in the Information, the Court cannot
pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would
violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at
all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another
possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, are
MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found
GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised
Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and
to pay the costs.
 The facts which have been proved beyond question are as
[G.R. No. 35066. September 7, 1931.] follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE Until a week before the crime, the accused lived maritally
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PURIFICACION with the Chinaman Felix Te Sue who was a married man.
ALMONTE, Defendant-Appellant. Because one Miguela Dawal, with whom he had also
lived maritally, threatened to bring suit against him unless
Teodosio R. Dio, for Appellant. he rejoined her, the Chinaman and the accused voluntarily
agreed to separate. From that time on Te Sue lived in the
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee. barrio of Guinlajon, municipality of Sorsogon, Province
of Sorsogon, together with the said Miguela Dawal. On
SYLLABUS the morning of October 1, 1930, the accused visited her
1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; PHYSICAL former paramour and on entering the house, found him
CONDITION OR NERVOSITY OF VICTIM AS with Miguela. When Te Sue saw her, he approached and
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INTERNAL told her to go away at once because her new paramour
HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN DEATH. When a might get jealous and do her harm. The accused insisted
person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage upon remaining, and on being pushed by Te Sue and
brought on by moving about against the doctors orders, Miguela, feeling that she was being unjustly treated, took
not because of carelessness or a desire to increase the hold of a small penknife she carried and stabbed the man
criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his in the abdomen. Horrified, perhaps, at her deed, she fled
nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by said to the street, leaving the blade sticking in her victims
assailant, the crime is homicide and not merely slight abdomen, and, taking the first bus that chanced to pass,
physical injuries, simply because the doctor was of finally went home. The injured man was at once taken to
opinion that the wound might have healed in seven days. the provincial hospital where he was given first aid
treatment, and Doctor Ortega performed a slight operation
2. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY. The accused is upon him, cleaning and sewing up his wound. It was not
then liable for all acts contrary to law and their natural and serious, according to the doctor, and might be healed in a
logical consequences. week; but on the sixth day the patient succumbed to
complications which we shall treat of later on. The
relatives of the deceased paid a little over P200 for the
DECISION hospital treatment and the expenses of his last illness.

In this instance the defense assigns the following alleged

IMPERIAL, J.: errors as committed by the trial court in its
judgment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Purificacion Almonte is charged with the crime of
homicide, the information reading as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned provincial fiscal charges Purificacion
Almonte with the crime of homicide, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about October 1, 1930, in the municipality of
Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforementioned
accused did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously beat,
attack, and assault one Felix Te Sue with a knife, which
she carried, producing a wound in the abdomen which
was the immediate cause of the death of the said Felix Te
Sue.
"Contrary to law.
"I. The trial judge erred in holding that the unnecessary
movements of the deceased while in the provincial
hospital of Sorsogon for medical treatment were caused
by the pain of the wound inflicted by the accused.
"II. The trial judge erred in holding the accused criminally
responsible for the secondary hemorrhage which caused
the death of the deceased.
"III. The trial judge erred in holding the accused
responsible for the death of the offended party as the
direct and immediate consequence of the wound inflicted
by the accused.
"IV. The trial judge erred in convicting the accused of the
crime of homicide as charged in the information instead
of lesiones leves as supported by the evidence in this
case."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Sorsogon, Sorsogon, November 7, 1930. The first three assignments of error raise questions of fact
and what really caused the death of the deceased. It is
(Sgd.) "JACINTO YAMZON strongly argued that the judgment appealed from is
erroneous in finding that the deceaseds movements,
"Provincial Fiscal" which Doctor Ortega declares were the cause of the
secondary hemorrhage that produced his death, were due
The accused pleaded not guilty, and after the trial, at to the pain felt after the operation and during his illness.
which she was represented by counsel, she was convicted It is contended that according to the record, the real cause
of the said crime of homicide, and sentenced to fourteen of the movements was, so the deceased himself declared,
years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, to the excessive warmth of the bed and the fact that he was
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, unaccustomed to such a bed. To ascertain this important
and to pay the costs. The defendant appealed. point requires a careful examination of the evidence upon
this particular.
 "A. Yes, sir.
Doctor Eduardo Ortega, in charge of the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital, a physician of admitted ability and "Q. Was the wound alone, as treated by you, sufficient to
skill, speaking of the patients physical condition when he cause the death of Felix Te Sue?
entered the hospital, testified as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "A. If the patient had lain in bed quietly, in order to avoid
increasing the congestion of the internal veins, there
"Q. What was the result of your examination? would have been no secondary hemorrhage.

"A. I found a wound in the abdomen, on the left side near "Q. But the wound you treated could have been healed?
the umbilical region; it was not deep and did not penetrate
very far, but it passed through the muscle tissue. "A. Yes, sir; it could have been.

"Q. What caused the death of Felix Te Sue? "Q. In how many days could it have been healed?

"A. He died of a secondary internal hemorrhage. "A. That wound, if there had been no secondary infection,
would have healed up in a week.
"Q. How?
"Q. You said that Felix Te Sue had been asked why he
"A. The wound was caused by a certain blow, because the moved about contrary to the physicians instructions;
penknife was not very sharp; the force of the blow which what instructions did you give him?
introduced the knife into the flesh produced a secondary
congestion of the internal organ so that any unnecessary "A. As soon as he had been admitted into the hospital, he
movement on the patients part would cause congestion was examined, and then made to lie in bed. Medical
of the veins, or would make them more congested and treatment was then administered, and he was given to
cause them to bleed. understand that he should remain in bed, for any
unnecessary movement might aggravate his condition,
"Q. And in the case of Felix Te Sue, did they bleed? and that what he needed was complete rest.

"A. He began to bleed after he had been twenty-four hours "Q. If he had not made those movements, do you think
in the hospital. death would have ensued?

"Q. Why do you call it a secondary hemorrhage? "A. I am very sure he would not have had that secondary
hemorrhage, because as a matter of fact, during the first
"A. There are many kinds of hemorrhages: Primary, in twenty-four hours he had no symptoms of having an
this particular case, if the wound had reached the internal internal hemorrhage.
organs and severed the veins of those organs it would be
called a primary hemorrhage because it was directly "Q. And that internal congestion of the veins, although
caused by the wound; but there was no immediate those veins contained more blood than usual, would not
hemorrhage after the wound was inflicted, but twenty- have caused the hemorrhage? That is to say, the veins
four hours later; in other words, there was what is called would not have burst, if the patient Felix Te Sue had not
a secondary hemorrhage. moved about, as you have said?

"Q. You also said that Felix Te Sue had made an "A. Yes, sir; that internal congestion would not have burst
unnecessary movement? if the patient had not moved about.

"A. Yes, sir. "Q. Can you tell us, doctor, why strangers who know
nothing about the care of the sick are placed in charge of
"Q. Can you tell the court what were those unnecessary a patient so delicate that his moving may cause his death,
movements? as indeed it did, in this case?

"A. Those movements were the following: The patient "A. The patient was not placed in the care of strangers; we
began by moving from side to side; then he would sit up have nurses to attend and see to the patient as often as it
at night, and perhaps jump out of bed, and begin walking is needed, besides the physicians visits to him; but even
about; when asked why he did that, contrary to medical in the presence of the doctor and the hospital attendants,
instructions, he explained that he could not lie down and after we had put the patient to bed, he continued to
because the bed was too warm, and that he was not used struggle with us.
to lying in bed.
"Q. Do you mean to say, then, that Felix Te Sue was
"Q. Do you mean to say that the patients movements fastened in his bed, and in spite of that he was able to leave
brought on the secondary internal hemorrhage? it and walk about?

"A. Yes, sir, they produced the secondary internal "A. He left his bed the first day after the operation, and
hemorrhage. immediately after it, when he was not fastened in because
he did not seem to be violent." (Pages 16-22, transcript of
"Q. And he died because of that secondary internal the stenographic notes.)
hemorrhage?
From the foregoing testimony it may be inferred: That the
deceased was stabbed on the left side of the abdominal
region, near the navel; that the wound did not involve any
internal organ; that upon arriving at the hospital, he was
submitted to a minor operation which consisted in
cleaning, medicating, and suturing the wound; that upon
his arrival, the patient was in a nervous state; that during
the operation they tied down the patient; that immediately
after the operation Doctor Ortega admonished him to keep
quiet because any movement he might make would
change his pathological state for the worse and bring
about dangerous complication; that in spite of this
admonition the deceased moved about, sitting up in bed,
getting up and pacing about the room; that because of this,
the internal vessels, already congested because of the
wound, bled, and the hemorrhage thus produced caused
his death.
The defense contends, with which the Attorney-General
agrees, that according to Doctor Ortegas testimony the
determining cause of Te Sues death was not the wound
inflicted by the accused, but his own carelessness in
moving about against the doctors orders, which produced
the internal hemorrhage. We agree with both parties that
according to Doctor Ortega, the immediate and
determining cause of the death was none other than the
internal hemorrhage produced by the rupture of the
abdominal blood vessels; but we cannot agree, in view of
the evidence, that the real cause of said death was not the
wound inflicted upon the victim. Carefully analyzing
Doctor Ortegas testimony, we reach the inevitable
conclusion that the internal veins were congested from the
beginning because of the force of the blow which
produced the wound, for that is what the doctor means
when he sais that "the wound was caused by a certain
blow, because the penknife was not very sharp, the force
of the blow which introduced the knife into the flesh
produced a secondary congestion of the internal organ so
that an unnecessary movement on the patients part would
cause congestion of the veins, or would make them more
congested, causing them to bleed" ; and that what really
impelled the patient to violate the doctors orders, by
sitting up in bed and pacing about the room, was not, as
the defense insinuates, a desire to aggravate the criminal
liability of the accused, but simply his nervous condition,
which was noted from the moment he entered the
provincial hospital. It was not the warmth of the bed or
his not being used to it that made the patient act as he did,
but the pathological state created by the illness brought on
by the wound from which he was suffering. We are
convinced that under normal conditions, if the patient had
not been ill, he would not have violated the doctors
orders, knowing, as he did, that the slightest movement
might occasion a complication or internal hemorrhage
capable of causing death.
The point raised by Viada in volume 3 of his work, pages
41 and 42, involves facts similar to those established in
this case, and we believe the decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain is perfectly applicable to this
case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Even when the doctors say that the death was due not so
much to the wound, which in a better constituted person
would have healed in thirty or forty days, as to the
patients purely nervous temperament, his irritability and
other causes, all of which depend upon his physical
constitution: should such a death be qualified as
HOMICIDE? The Supreme Court has ruled affirmatively:
Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences
of his act and in this case the physical condition and
temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil,
the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
violence of the means employed, but by the result actually
produced and as the wound which the appellant inflicted
upon the deceased was the cause which determined his
death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is
evident that the act in question should be qualified as
homicide, etc. (Decision of April 3, 1879, published in
the Gazette on the 16th of June.)"
In the case cited the doctors were of the opinion that death
was not an immediate consequence of the wound
received, but was rather due to the victims purely
nervous temperament, his irritability and other causes,
peculiar to his physical constitution. In the case in
question, it is sought to attribute the internal hemorrhage
that directly caused death, not to the wound or injury, but
to the patients movements, overlooking the fact that they
were due to his nervous condition, and that this state of
nervousness could only be the result of the wound
inflicted by the appellant. We hold, therefore, that the real
cause of death in this case was not the bodily movements
referred to, but the congestion of the internal veins
produced beforehand by the force of the blow which
caused the wound and the nervous condition of the
deceased.
In United States v. Sornito (4 Phil., 357), we held that "In
crimes against the life of a human being the results and
effects of the criminal acts must necessarily be taken into
consideration in order to establish the seriousness and
extent of the evil or injury produced and to define the
crime in accordance with the law. It must also be taken
into consideration that the guilty parties are responsible
under the law for all the unlawful acts executed by them
in violation of its principles and for all the consequences
of those acts."cralaw virtua1aw library
In United States v. Montes (6 Phil., 443), we also held that
"Where a person voluntarily and with intent of injuring
another commits an act which is notoriously unlawful, he
shall be held responsible for the consequences of his
criminal action, even though when such wrongful act
constitutes the crime of homicide it appears that he had no
intention of killing the deceased."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In United States v. Navarro (7 Phil., 713), we reaffirmed
the same principle holding that" the firm and unalterable
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (interpreting the
Penal Code now in force and effect) is that the crime of
homicide is committed when death ensues or follows, as
the result of a wound inflicted by another, whether the
death be the precise and necessary consequence of the
injuries or wounds, or whether death resulted from
accidents caused or brought on by reason of such wounds
or injuries received by the patient. (Judgment of the
Supreme Court of Spain, May 8, 1890.) It is the firm and
unalterable doctrine, and so held by the Court of
Cassation, that the aggressor is responsible for all the
natural consequences of the aggression when these
consequences do not owe their origin to acts or malicious
omissions imputable to the assaulted party. (Judgment of
the Supreme Court of Spain, May 30, 1892.)"
The same doctrine was laid down in United States v.
Monasterial (14 Phil., 391). Here it was held, among other
things, "persons who are responsible for an act
constituting a crime are also liable for all the
consequences arising therefrom and inherent therein,
other than those due to incidents entirely foreign to the act
executed, or which originate through the fault or
carelessness of the injured person, which are exceptions
to the rule not arising in the present case."cralaw
virtua1aw library
At this juncture it is well to remember that, as we stated
in the beginning, the patients nervous condition when the
complication or internal hemorrhage which caused death
set in, was an inherent physiological condition produced
by the wound in the abdomen. It goes without saying that
if he had not been wounded he would not have undergone
that extraordinary state and condition, nor have had to
leave his bed during the critical stage of his illness.
Lastly, in United States v. Zamora (32 Phil., 218), we held
that "One who performs a criminal act should be held to
liability for the act and for all of its consequences,
although both were inflicted upon a person other than the
one whom the felon intended to injure."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The cases which the Attorney-General cites in his brief
are not applicable, for the reason that in them all the
deaths were due to alien acts, malicious and imprudent,
performed by the injured persons themselves. We have
shown that in the case at bar the real and actual cause of
death of the deceased was the hemorrhage of the internal
veins, which had already been congested by the wound
produced and the patients nervous condition, rather than
the so-called bodily movements, and that these, if they
were the immediate cause of his death, were the direct
consequence of the patients pathological condition or
nervousness. At any rate, they are both traceable to the
wound inflicted by the accused.
The last assignment of error is but a corollary to the first
three, which have just been refuted, and it is contended
that the accused can only be convicted of slight physical
injuries, instead of the serious crime of homicide. If the
appellant must answer for all the consequences of her acts
voluntarily performed, as we have shown, it necessarily
and logically follows that she must be convicted of the
graver offense.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances
of not having intended to commit so serious a crime as
that committed, and of having acted with passion and
obfuscation. The first is shown by the fact that she made
use of a small penknife, and the second, by the fact that
before the attack she had been pushed out of the room
where the victim was, and that she considered such
treatment as an offense or abuse. The penalty must
therefore be reduced one degree or to prision mayor.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified and
the appellant is sentenced to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P500, to suffer the accessory penalties of
article 61 of the Penal Code, and to pay the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-27097. January 17, 1975.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and
JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, Defendants-Appellants.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor
Dominador L. Quiroz for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio (Counsel de Oficio), for Defendants-
Appellants.
SYNOPSIS
On a Bicol-bound train, Defendants, identical twins, ran
amuck, stabbed and wounded several passengers resulting
in the death of twelve persons and multiple injuries to
others. Of those who perished, eight, whose bodies were
found in the train, died of stab wounds. Four, who
apparently jumped from the moving train to avoid being
killed, were found near the railroad tracks. In the CFI, the
brothers were charged with multiple murder, multiple
frustrated murder and triple homicide. They pleaded not
guilty claiming self-defense as they were victims of
robbery-holdup. Convicted, they appealed assailing the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claiming that
their criminal liability was only for two homicides and
physical injuries.
The Court dismissed the theory of self-defense, credited
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and held
appellants responsible for eight killings, treated as
separate crimes of murder, and attempted murder
qualified by treachery. Because no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance was proven, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua instead of death was imposed
together with a separate penalty for attempted murder.
Judgment modified by setting aside the death sentence
and ordering the payment of indemnity of P12,000.00 to
each set of heirs of the eight victims and P500.00 to the
victim of attempted murder.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY OF
TESTIMONY; NOT AFFECTED BY MISTAKE IN
THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED. The
mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for
Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their credibility,
Even the trial court confounded one twin for the other and
such confusion was unavoidable because the twins are
very identical. The controlling fact is that those witnesses
confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed
several passengers.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY
DISCREPANCIES THEREIN. The discrepancies in
the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses do not
render the same unworthy of belief. They signify that the
witnesses did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not
compare notes.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY FOR CRIMES;
RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNINTENDED RESULTS OF
A FELONY. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from the which he
intended." The presumption is that "a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary act." (Sec. 5(c),
Rule 131, Rules of Court). The rule is that "if a man
creates in another mans mind an immediate sense of
danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in
so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such
a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which
result." (reg. v. Halliday, 61 L.T. Rep.(N.S.) 701, cited in
U.S. v. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497, 500).
4. MURDER; SELF-DEFENSE; THEORY OF
ACCUSED INCREDIBLE. The twins theory off self-
defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9,
which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more
persons could have held them up without being readily
perceived by the other passengers. They would have made
an outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them.
The injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to
the blows which the other passengers inflicted on them, to
stop their murderous rampage.
5. ID.; ACCUSED NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR DEATHS
NOT RESULTING FROM STAB WOUNDS. Of the
victims, four were found dead along the railroad tracks.
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving train
to avoid being killed but in so doing they met their
untimely and horrible deaths. No one testified that those
four victims jumped from the train. Neither was there
testimony showing that the proximate cause of their
deaths was the murderous conduct of the accused. The
absence of eyewitnesses-testimony as to the jumping
from the train of the four victims precludes the imputation
of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly
deaths of the said victims.
6. ID.; CHARGED OF MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED
MURDER DISMISSED IN INSTANT CASE. The
charged of multiple frustrated murder based on the
injuries suffered by the other victims was dismissed by
the trial court for lack of evidence. The offended parties
involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
7. ID.; SEPARATE CRIMES OF MURDER
COMMITTED IN INSTANT CASE; TREACHERY &
CONSPIRACY ATTENDANT TO THE COMMISSION
THEREOF. The eight killings and the attempted
killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and
attempted murder qualified by treachery. The unexpected,
surprise assaults perpetuated by the twins upon their co-
passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would
act like juramentados and who were unable to defend
themselves was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins diabolical objective to
butcher their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins
evinced conspiracy and community of design.
8. ID.; ID.; NO COMPLEX CRIME. The eight killings
and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of
different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as
constituting a complex crime under Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act
constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary for committing the other."cralaw virtua1aw
library
9. ID.; PENALTY; EIGHT RECLUSION PERPETUA
AND A SEPARATE PENALTY FOR ATTEMPTED
MURDER IMPOSABLE IN INSTANT CASE. The
death penalty imposed by the trial court was not
warranted. As no genetic mitigating and aggravating were
proven, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its
medium period of reclusion perpetua, with a separate
penalty for attempted murder.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted
murder, sentencing them to death and ordering them to
indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2)
Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B.
Erminio, (5) Modesta R. Brondial, (6) Isabel Felices and
(7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay
Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-
966). The judgment of conviction was based on the
following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are
natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine)
kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They
are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were
forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older
than Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much.
However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44
tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonios daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a
laundrywoman since September, 1964. Joses three
children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also
since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter
from Leonora telling him that she would give him money.
To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and
sold the meat to Joses wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided
to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was
able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants
and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to
Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog,
Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on
board an Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the
train, arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila at
about seven oclock in the morning of January 8th. It was
their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which
brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter which
Aniano Espenola, a labor-recruiter, had given them, they
were able to locate an employment agency where they
learned the address of the Eng Heng Glassware.
Antonios daughter was working in that store.
Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they
proceeded to her employers establishment. Leonora gave
her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis, Antonios grandson,
gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in
the right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city.
The twins returned to the agency where they ate their
lunch at Juans expense. From the agency, Juan took the
twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day,
January 8th, for their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol
express train at about five oclock in the afternoon. The
train left at six oclock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from
the rear of the dining car. The coach had one row of two-
passenger seats and another row of three-passenger seats.
Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the
two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the
fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back
door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the
window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a
woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle.
That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than
one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some
passengers were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two
men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head
resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). On the two-
passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where
the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman,
who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who
was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a
woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-
month old baby. They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train
stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some
chicos which they put aside. The vendors alighted when
the train started moving. It was around eight oclock in
the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed,
Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B)
stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim
stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the
sleeping old woman who was seated opposite him. She
was not able to get up anymore. 1 others were picked up along the railroad tracks between
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with
her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but before she could
escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with
which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade
entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm.
Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the
passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who
had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered
inside the coach. 2 Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies
Among the passengers in the third coach was
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort
who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his
wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to
the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed
him that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he
had come from. He immediately proceeded to return to
coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man
sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a distance of
ground nine meters, he saw a man on the platform
separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between
the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade
pointed outward. He shouted to the man that he (Rayel)
was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and
Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon
the count of three, or he would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife
by clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the
blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed
himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and
was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had
fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors
(Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform when
he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite
her was stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the
train. He was in the dining car when he received the
information that there were killings in the third coach. He
immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach,
he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio
stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and
a woman who was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan
(Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims
were prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made
a thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about
to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and
repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his
pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and
stepped on Antonios buttocks and wrested the scissors
away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the
blows administered to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four
Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train
and turned them over to the custody of the Calamba
police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The
bloodstained scissors and knife were turned over to the
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while
Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were
brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The
dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria
Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were
autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer
took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and
J-2).
were found in the train, died from stab wounds,
namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer,
Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines
Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee,
San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial, 58, married, housekeeper,
Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio, 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street,
Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2,
N to N-2, O to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to
T-2).
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks.
Apparently, they jumped from the moving train to avoid
being killed. They were:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53, married, carpenter,
Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila.
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez,
Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda, 52, married, farmer, Lopez,
Quezon and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-
D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4, C-5, C-6, C-10, J,
J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X,
Mrs. Amanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma,
Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D
to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn
January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound
inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was first
brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she
was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National
Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined for
thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury, she
was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish
for one month, thereby losing an expected earning of one
hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with her
child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred
pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag
which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9,
1965 Constabulary investigators took down the
statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet,
Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant
Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling brothers
were taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel
also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the
train he was stabbed by a person "from the station" who
wanted to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his
assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might
have died and others that might not." He clarified that in
the train four persons were asking money from him. He
stabbed one of them. "It was a holdup."
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to
rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as
he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill
everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded
because he was stabbed by a person "from Camarines"
who was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his
assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two
persons who were demanding money from him and who
were armed with knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died
due to the stabbing, he commented that everybody was
trying "to kill each other" (Exh. 1-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the
scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the
scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out
the scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him
to avenge himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against
the Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao,
Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of
Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965
filed against the Toling brothers an information for
multiple murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated
murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three
persons who died after jumping from the running train to
avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel
de oficio, pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio
Naawa rendered the judgment of conviction already
mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants counsel de oficio assails the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues that the
appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the
alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two
homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as
distinguished from appellants statements, Exhibits 1 and
8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad
Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went
to the ticket counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose.
To pay for the tickets, he took out his money from the
right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder
in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed that four
men at some distance from them were allegedly observing
them, whispering among themselves and making signs.
The twins suspected that the four men harbored evil
intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed
them. They were facing the twins. They were talking in a
low voice. The twins sat on a two-passenger seat facing
the front door of the coach, the window being on the right
of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men,
whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions
towards them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other
two seated themselves behind them. Some old women
were near them. When the train was already running, the
man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached
Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his throat while
the other man who was sitting near the window and who
was holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick
Antonios right pocket, threatening him with death if he
would not hand over the money. Antonio answered that
he would give only one-half of his money provided the
man would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonios) place
was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly
drew out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long
including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants
and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the
floor with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was
picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom
he had stabbed as those shown in the photographs of
Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and 5-B)
and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B).
While Antonio was stabbing the second man, another
person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the
forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on
the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar
on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained
consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised
him. His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed
with the scissors the man who had wounded his brother.
Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the
back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the
middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men
whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. He
fell down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit
A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the
scissors which he himself had used. He recovered
consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him
out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a
physician of the North General Hospital who treated them
during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who
testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio
Toling:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-
1/2 inches each, mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and
"Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior
axillary line level of 3rd ICS, right, penetrating thoracic
cavity" (chest wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the
paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating
the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the
spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch
from the midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were
discharged from the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for
the twins rampageous behavior, which resulted in the
macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made the
following observations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"What could be the reason or motive that actuated the
accused to run amuck? It appears that the accused
travelled long over land and sea spending their hard-
earned money and suffering privations, even to the extent
of foregoing their breakfast, only to receive as
recompense with respect to Antonio the meager sum of
P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and
with respect to Jose to receive nothing at all from any of
his three children whom he could not locate in Manila.
"It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are
queerly alike, a fact which could easily invite some people
to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very close
resemblance. Like some persons who easily get angry
when stared at, however, the accused, when stared at by
the persons in front of them, immediately suspected them
as having evil intention towards them (accused).
"To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on
the part of the accused coupled with their unfounded
suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who
happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-
control and actuated them to run amuck."cralaw
virtua1aw library
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9
the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the
limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had no
choice but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through
some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins
must have sensed that their co-passengers were talking
about them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks
or jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial
minds, they might have entertained the notion or
suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of
their ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by
stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to
their co-passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into
violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the
conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution
witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a
confusion was unavoidable because the twins, according
to a Constabulary investigator, are "very identical. Thus,
on the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and
Liberato Tamundong, after pointing to the twins, refused
to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who
was Jose. They confessed that they might be mistaken in
making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3,
1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is
Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn statements
(Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing, their
own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and
11). Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who
was armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who
was armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution
witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was
armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with
the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he
was armed with a knife, while Jose declared that he was
armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at
the Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which
he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old
pair of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the
person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted
to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing
himself on the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That
conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate,
Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had a
wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea
subdued after the former had stabbed several persons with
a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not
Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of January
9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking
Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from
their credibility. The controlling fact is that those
witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they
stabbed several passengers.
Appellants counsel based his arguments on the
summaries of the evidence found in the trial courts
decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants
Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not
particularize on the supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each
other. The main point of Rayels testimony is that he saw
one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and
apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldeas testimony is
that he knocked down the other twin, disabled him and
prevented him from committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayels testimony that Aldea took
the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea.
Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on
the platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not
render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify
that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies
or did not compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid
succession in the coach of the train and it was nighttime,
it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give
identical testimonies (See 6 Morans Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People v. Resayaga,
L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no
doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of
the twins but they did not observe the same events and
their powers of perception and recollection are not the
same.
Appellants counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa.
He contends that no one corroborated her testimony that
one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman
sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins.
The truth is that Mrs. Mapas testimony was confirmed by
the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who
admitted that they stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that
persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab
wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And
there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own
admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to
mention the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and
the CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins
culpability, since they were caught in flagrante delicto,
the CIS investigators did not bother to get the statements
of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that
no one actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning
to end because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to
leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing commotion
and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full
personal knowledge of how the twins consummated all
the killings.
On the other hand, the twins theory of self-defense is
highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was
lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could
have held up the twins without being readily perceived by
the other passengers. The twins would have made an
outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. The
injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to the
blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop
their murderous rampage.
Appellants view is that they should be held liable only
for two homicides, because they admittedly killed
Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical
injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling
stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that view.
Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing
judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the
Samar hinterland, who reached manhood without coming
into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban
areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in
reviewing the evidence. We are convinced that the record
conclusively establishes appellants responsibility for the
eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be
indemnified, according to the trial court, because they
died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of
Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission
of her name in the trial courts judgment was probably due
to inadvertence.
According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely,
Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C.
Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple
traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions, contusions,
lacerations and fractures on the head, body and
extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-
2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving train
to avoid being killed but in so doing they met their
untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not
adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be
indemnified. As to three of them, the information charges
that the accused committed homicide. The trial court
dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the
train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by
testimony showing that the proximate cause of their
deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the
twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for
their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended." The
presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131,
Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another mans mind
an immediate sense of danger which causes such person
to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the
person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for
the injuries which result" (Reg. v. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep.
[N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. v. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against
whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes
himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and
in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the
instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible
for homicide in case death results by drowning"
(Syllabus, U.S. v. Valdez, supra. See People v. Buhay, 79
Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping
from the train of the four victims already named precludes
the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants
for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by
the other victims. The charge of multiple frustrated
murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano
Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida
Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial
court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the
offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries
inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be
treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted
murder qualified by treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16],
Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults
perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers, who
did not anticipate that the twins would act like
juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves
(even if some of them might have had weapons on their
persons) was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins diabolical objective to
butcher their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins
evinced conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were
perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot
be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article
48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where
"a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other."
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal
o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo
hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito
compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario
para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo). (1
Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the
rule, when there is "acumulacin material de las penas",
is that "si son varios los resultados, si son varias las
acciones, est conforme con la lgica y con la justicia que
el agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid,
p. 652, People v. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one
attempted murder. (See People v. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058
where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen
persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen
separate murders, one frustrated murder and two
attempted murders; People v. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the
Panampunan massacre case, where six defendants were
convicted of fourteen separate murders; People v.
Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who fired
successively at six victims was convicted of six separate
homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four
murders; People v. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving
eleven murders; U.S. v. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. v.
Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People v. Cabrera, 43
Phil. 82, 102-103; People v. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044;
People v. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People v. Lawas, 97 Phil.
975; People v. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People v. Umali,
96 Phil. 185; People v. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 236; People
v. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437,
where the crimes committed by means of separate acts
were held to be complex on the theory that they were the
product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances
were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be
imposed in its medium period or reclusion
perpetua (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The
death penalty imposed by the trial court was not
warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be
imposed on the appellants. No modifying circumstances
can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial courts judgment is modified by
setting aside the death sentence. Defendants-appellants
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as
coprincipals, of eight (8) separate murders and one
attempted murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight
(8) reclusion perpetua for the eight murders and to an
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum for the attempted murder
and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set
of heirs of the seven victims named in the dispositive part
of the trial courts decision and of the eighth victim,
Susana C. Fernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and
an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of
the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate
paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should
be observed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 206227, August 31, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. STANLEY BUENAMER Y
MANDANE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 7, 2012 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 04881,
which affirmed with modification the May 18, 2010
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 09-272017, finding
appellant Stanley Buenamer y Mandane (Buenamer)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide, as defined and penalized in Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
Buenamer and his co-accused Jerome Lambada y
Landero (Lambada) were indicted for the felony of
robbery with homicide for staging an armed robbery
inside a passenger FX taxi and causing the death of one
of the passengers therein. The indictment against them
alleged
The undersigaed accuses STANLEY BUENAMER y
MANDANE and JEROME LAMBADA y LANDERO of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about October 20, 2009 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other,
with intent to gain and by means of force, violence, and
intimidation, to wit: by boarding a passenger FX taxi
going to Espaa Blvd., Sampaloc, this City, announcing a
hold up then pointing their guns to its passengers and
FERRARIE TAN y OALLESMA and divesting from him
his black bag containing a Sony PSP colored black with
casing and one (1) brown envelope with cash money in
the amount of P5,460.00, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the
same, against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the
said FERRARIE TANy OALLESMA in the amount of
more than P5,460.00, Philippine Currency; that on
occasion of or by reason of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling themselves to take, rob and carry
away the personal properties of the passengers, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon said FERRARIE
TAN y OALLESMA when he chased the said accused
who boarded a passenger jeepney in order to escape, but
was boxed when he held on the handle bar of the jeepney
causing him to [lose] his grip and [fall] from the jeepney
and thereafter was ran over by the rear tire of said jeepney,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Arraigned on December 7, 2009 both accused, assisted by
counsel, entered a negative plea to the crime charged.
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits followed.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau (MTPB)
Enforcers Peter Paul de Jesus (De Jesus), Raymond
Buaron (Buaron), and James Mendez y Dones (Mendez),
Police Officer 3 Jay Santos (PO3 Santos), Diana David y
Del Pilar (David), Carolyn Tan (Carolyn), and Dr. Romeo
Salen (Dr. Salen). Their collective testimonies tended to
establish the following facts:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn October 20, 2009, at
around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, David was on board
a passenger FX taxi on her way home from Quezon City
to Sampaloc, Manila, when along Espaa Boulevard,
corner Maceda Street in Sampaloc, Inanila, a hold-up was
announced by Buenamer and Lambada. The armed duo
demanded for the wallets, cellphones, and other valuables
of the FX passengers, The two threatened to shoot and
blow up the brains of anyone who resisted them
("pasabugin ang ulo namin"). David heard the now
deceased Ferrarie Tan (Ferrarie), who was then wearing a
nurse's uniform, crying and pleading to the robbers that
he had already given to them his cellphone, a Sony PSP,
and that he was only a student. Nevertheless, the armed
robbers proceeded to divest, as indeed they divested, the
passengers of their personal effects, including David's
own Nokia cellphone and coin purse.
When the FX stopped at an intersection along Maceda
Street and Espaa Boulevard in Sampaloc, Manila, David
quickly got off the FX and shouted for help. Traffic
enforcers and bystanders heard her shout and plea for
assistance, and at once chased after Buenamer and
Lambada who were trying to flee from the scene of the
crime. Not long after this, David saw the lifeless Ferrarie
lying along Espaa Boulevard in Sampaloc.
De Jesus was an MTPB traffic enforcer on duty along
Espaa Boulevard when the incident took place. De Jesus
testified that he responded to David's call for help, along
with another MTPB traffic enforcer, Mendez. David told
the traffic enforcers that the fleeing suspects had boarded
a red jeepney. So De Jesus quickly rode his motorcycle
and went after the red jeepney which was carrying the
robbers. One of the robbers got off at Florentino Street in
Sampaloc, Manila. Here, De Jesus was able to apprehend
Buenamer after a tricycle accidentally ran over the latter.
Buenamer was beaten up by the by-standers, and then
brought to the barangqy hall nearby, where people there
were able to recover from him a bag containing a Sony
PSP, cellphone, a gun with several bullets, a pay slip with
brown envelope, and money.
Another MTPB employee, traffic enforcer Mendez, also
heard David's shout for help, and when David pointed to
the jeepney where the hold-uppers were, he (Mendez)
went near the jeepney, just in time to see a person in white
uniform holding on to the estribo (the handle bar) of the
jeepney. Mendez testified that he saw, this person's hands
reaching inside the front seat of the jeepney, trying to
regain possession of his Sony PSP, cellphone and other
valuables from Buenamer who was then sitting in front of
the jeepney, near the driver; that he then saw Buenamer
strike or box that other person (who turned out to be
Ferrarie), causing Ferrarie to fall off; and that after
Ferrarie fell off, the jeepney's rear tire ran over Ferrarie.
After this Mendez mounted his motorcycle and went after
Buenamer who fled the crime scene.
Still another MTPB traffic enforcer presented by the
prosecution was Buaron. This traffic enforcer testified
that he was the one who apprehended Lambada
somewhere near the vicinity of the North Cemetery along
Bonifacio Avenue; and that he then brought Lambada to
Police Station No. 1 in Quezon City because the police
authorities of Quezon City insisted on asserting
jurisdiction over his case.
PO3 Santos of the Manila Police Department was the
police investigator who prepared the Crime Report,
Booking Sheet, and Arrest Report for Buenamer and
Lambada. It was also PO3 Santos who took the sworn
statements of David, Mendez, and De Jesus. PO3 Santos
testified that it was he who recovered a Sony PSP, black
cellphone, a brown envelope with the name "Tan,
Ferrarie," a pay slip containing P5,460.00s and a 138
caliber revolver with seven live bullets.
Carolyn was the mother of the victim. She identified her
son Ferrarie at the Universal Funeral Parlor, despite his
broken face. She testified that her son was a registered
nurse at the Ospital ng Makati and was earning P6,000.00
every 15 days. She claimed that she spent P2 million for
the interment and burial of Ferrarie.
Dr. Salen, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Manila Police
District Crime Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem
examination on the corpse of Ferrarie. Dr. Salen testified
that the victim's corpse was already in a state of rigor
mortis when he examined it; that he found a 10 x 3 cm.
lacerated wound on Ferrarie's forehead, abrasions from
the right and left side of the following: nose; chest; knees;
feet; thighs; and; from the victim's abdomen; and two
lacerated wounds at the lower lip and on the chin.
According to Dr. Salen, Ferrarie's ribs were fractured and
his lungs macerated.
The accused waived their right to present their defense.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 18, 2010, the RTC rendered judgment finding
Buenamer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide. The RTC however found
Lambada-guilty merely of simple robbery. The RTC
disposed thus
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused STANLEY BUENAMER guilty beyond.
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as principal
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
As for the accused JEROME LAMBADA, judgment is
hereby rendered finding him guilty of the crime of
Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as principal
and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of Two (2) years, Ten (10) months and Eleven (11) days
of prision correccional as minimum TO Six (6) years,
One (1) month and Eleven (11) days of prision
mayor medium, as maximum.
The accused are likewise directed to pay the amount of
P5,460.00 and the value of the Sony PSP taken from
Ferrarie Tan.
Accused Stanley Buenamer is also ordered to pay the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.4chanrobleslaw
Dissatisfied with the RTC's disposition, Buenamer
appealed to the CA, arguing that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since his identity
as the alleged perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently
established, Buenamer also contended that the mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(3) of the RFC should have
been appreciated in his favor because he had no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as mat he committed.
Buenamer insisted that when he hit or boxed Ferrarie on
the arm, he had no intention of killing him at all.
Riding of the Court of Appeals
On June 7, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC and ruled that
Buenamer's appeal was without merit. The; CA found that
the prosecution was able to prove the identity of
Buenamer through the testimonies of David and Mendez,
both of whom were eyewitnesses to the crime. The CA
noted in particular that David was able to see the face of
Buenamer inside the passenger FX taxi because David
was herself a passenger in that vehicle.
As to Buenamer's invocation of the mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(3) of the RPC, the CA
he,id that this plea was unavailing. The CA ruled that all
the elements of the crime of robbery were present when
Buenamer and Lambada held up the passengers of the FX
taxi. The CA stressed that the felony of robbery with
homicide is committed once it is clearly shown that the
criminal intention of the felon is to rob, and that there is a
killing which occurs before, during, or after the robbery.
The CA thus disposed as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Decision dated May 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33, Manila in Criminal Case No. 09-
272017 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
Accused-appellant is found GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua, and is ordered to pay P75,000.00 as civil
damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From that Decision, Buenamer took the present appeal
and in support thereof now contends that the CA's
Decision was contrary to the evidence, the law, and
jurisprudence.
Buenamer insists that the prosecution was not able to
positively identify the perpetrators of the crime since the
alleged eyewitness, David, was not in a position to
recognize them; that when the traffic enforcers heeded
David's call for help and ran after the suspects, they did
not know who to pursue; and that in any event, the
mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 3 of
the RPC should benefit him because he did not intend to
kill Ferrarie when he hit the latter's right arm that caused
the latter to fall off the passenger jeepney and be run over
by the jeepney's rear tire.
Our Ruling
The appeal will not prosper.
We hold that both the RTC and the CA correctly found
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony
of robbery with homicide. Indeed, we are satisfied that in
this case the prosecution was able to satisfactorily
establish the elements of robbery with homicide, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) The taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) The property taken belongs to another;
(3) The taking is with animo lucrandi;
and cralawlawlibrary
(4) By reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
All the elements mentioned above are present in this case.
In point of fact, the prosecution succeeded in showing that
the primary aim or objective of the malefactors Buenamer
and Lambada was to rob the passengers of the FX taxi.
Prosecution witness David, a passenger of the FX taxi in
which the two robbers staged the heinous felony, was
herself a victim of the robbery that was staged by the
malefactors that afternoon of October 20, 2009 along
Espaa Boulevard in Sampaloc, Manila. David positively
identified Buenamer as the very perpetrator of the crime
together with his co-accused Lambada. David testified
that she saw the faces of these two malefactors when these
two boarded the FX taxi at the Pantranco terminal in
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that Buenamer and
Lambada, then armed with firearms, declared a hold-up
on board the moving vehicle, after which these; two
divested the passengers of their personal belongings,
while threatening the passengers that they would blow off
their heads ("pasabugin ang ulo namin") should the
passengers resist the robbery. By taking the personal
belongings and valuables of the passengers, employing
force, violence, and intimidation, end motivated
moreover by animus lucrandi or intent to gain or profit,
and thereafter hitting Ferrarie causing him to fall from the
passenger jeepney resulting to his death, there can be no
question that Buenamer did commit robbery with
homicide.
Traffic enforcer Mendez saw Buenamer box or strike
Ferrarie who, in consequence of such a blow, lost his grip
on the estribo (or the handle bar) of the moving vehicle,
and fell off that vehicle, and was at once ran over by the
vehicle's right rear tire, resulting in Ferrarie's sustaining
lacerated wounds, and numerous abrasions in various
parts of his body mat ultimately led to his death. In the
face of these actual, incontrovertible facts, there can be no
doubt that all the elements of robbery with homicide are
present in this case.
Buenamer insists than his identity as the perpetrator of the
crime was not clearly established because David was not
in a position to recognize him.
We are not persuaded. David, who was a co-passenger of
the now deceased Ferrarie that fateful afternoon of
October 20, 2009, categorically declared that it was
Buenamer and Lambada who perpetrated the hold-
up:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[Private Prosecutor] Atty. ARNULFO PELAGIO
Q Now, you said that there were two male persons
who boarded the FX, what about the other one,
would you be able to recognize him also?
THE WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Again, will you please look inside the Courtroom
and tell the Honorable Court if he is inside the
Courtroom?
Note:At this point the Witness is pointing to accused
Stanley Buenamer y Mandane.
Q Now, after this male person who was seated at the
middle seat announced the hold up and pointed the
gun to the driver, what happened next, Madam
Witness?
A He told [us] to bring out the cellphones and wallet,
sir. And then he [threatened] to kill us if we will not
give our belongings to them and if ever we will fight
back then he will [blast] our heads away [pasabugin
ang ulo namin], he will fire at our heads.7
And, no less clear, and convincing, is the testimony of
traffic enforcer Mendez about the identity of Buenamer.
Mendez was one of the traffic enforcers who immediately
responded to David's plea for help about the robbery hold-
up; in fact, this witness boarded the very vehicle where
the robbery hold-up took place. And, as his testimony
attests, there can be no doubt or question that Buenamer
was one of the perpetrators of this heinous
crime:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
QCould you tell us that incident, Mr. Witness?
ABecause that hour is a rush hour, we were directing
traffic at that time at our jurisdiction Sir when all of a
sudden we heard a voice from a woman coming from
my right side asking for assistance.
QCould you recall the words that you heard from the
woman?
A"Tulungan nyo po kami hinohold-up kami."
QUpon hearing those words from that woman, what did
you do Mr. Witness?
AI approached her and she pointed to the jeepney where
the hold-uppers boarded.
QCould you please describe to us, Mr. Witness, the
jeepney?
AIt is a red jeepney.
QAfter x x x Diana pointed to you the jeepney where the
hold-uppers transferred, what did you do?
AI approached the jeepney and I saw a person wearing
white clothes was holding at the "estribo" in the
passenger side of the jeepney and that person cannot
ride at the front portion because [sic] of the jeepney and
so he was being drag [sic] by the jeepney.
QYou said that the person wearing white uniform [was]
holding at the bar or the "estribo" of the jeepney at the
right side, could you tell us which hand was x x x
holding on to the bar?
AHis right hand, Sir.
QWhat about his left arm?
AWhat I saw [was] that that person wearing white
uniform [was] getting something from [the] person
seated inside the jeepney.
QAfter you saw this incident, what happened next after
that?
AI saw the person holding the iron bar was hit on his arm
so he fell down and he was r[a]n over by the last tire of
the jeepney, Sir.
QCould you tell us who was that person which you
said hit the arm of the person wearing white uniform
while he was holding at the iron bar or "estribo"?
AYes, Sir. Because I was near them.
QCould you tell us who is that?
AStanley Buenamer, Sir.8
Anent appellant's claim that the CA erred in not
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, this Court agrees with the CA that this
mitigating circumstance cannot be invoked by the
appellant. "This mitigating circumstance addresses itself
to the intention of the offender at the particular moment
when the offender executes or commits the criminal
act"9 - an intention that must comport, amongst others,
with the weapon/s used by the offender and the mode of
attack adopted by the latter, vis-a-vis the injuries
sustained by his victim. Thus, in People v. Gonzalez,
Jr.,10 we explained -
[t]his mitigating circumstancs is obtaining when there is
a notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of
the commission of the crime is manifested from the
weapon used, the mode of attack employed, and the
injury sustained by the victim. x x x
Here, the records showed that Buenamer boxed or struck
Ferrarie with such force that the latter lost his grip on
the estribo or handle bar of the vehicle, fell off and run
over by the vehicle's rear tire. He subsequently died. The
legal postulate enshrined under Article 3 of the RPC
decrees that every person shall be held responsible
for all the natural and logical consequences of his
felonious act. And, complementing this Article 3 is
Article 4 of the same RPC, which provides that "criminal
liability shall be incurred (1) by any person committing a
felony, although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended." These two articles of the RPC
must thus apply with implacable force against appellant;
he must be called to account for all the natural and logical
consequences of his felonious act; and hence must be
deemed to have incurred criminal liability, although the
felonious act he committed might have been different
from that which he intended.
Nonetheless, the Ca's award of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 is hereby upgraded to P75,000.00
in conformity with recent jurisprudence. In addition,
appellant must pay exemplary damages in the amount of
P75,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 7, 2012 in
CA-G.R.CR-H.C. No. 04881, is AFFIRMED subject to
the MODIFICATION that the appellant Stanley
Buenamer y Mandane is condemned to pay the heirs of
Ferrarie Tan moral damages in the increased amount of
P75,000,00 and exemplary damages of P75,000.00. The
award of civil damages, also in the amount of P75,000.00
is maintained. These monetary awards shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 32066. March 15, 1930.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GONA
(Mansaca), Defendant-Appellant.
Jose Ma. Capili, for Appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. HOMICIDE; MISTAKE AS TO VICTIM. As a
result of a quarrel, the defendant endeavored to kill D, but
by mistake, killed M. Held, that his mistake in killing one
man instead of another did not relieve him from criminal
responsibility and could not even be considered a
mitigating circumstance.
DECISION
OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant was charged before the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Davao with the crime of
homicide, the information reading as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about October 26, 1928, in the municipal
district of Pantukan, Province of Davao, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, the said
accused voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with a
bolo which he then carried, assaulted the Mansaca
Mapudul, causing him a mortal wound on the left side of
the neck and that, as a consequence of said wound, the
said Mapudul died."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon trial the court below found the defendant guilty as
charged in the information and taking into consideration
the extenuating circumstance of non-habitual
intoxication, sentenced him to suffer twelve years and one
day of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. From this
sentence the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of
October 26, 1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated a
reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems
to have been a liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and some
of the men present became intoxicated, with the result that
a quarrel took place between the Mansaca Dunca and the
defendant. Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the
house and were followed by Mapudul and one Awad. The
defendant left the house about the same time with
intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the
evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant,
he mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicted on him a
mortal wound with a bolo.
There can be no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul
and that he is guilty of the crime charged, but his attorney
argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no
intention to kill the deceased and committed the crime by
mistake, he should have been found guilty of homicide
through negligence under paragraph 1 of article 568 of the
Penal Code and not of the graver crime of intentional
homicide. This contention is contrary to earlier decisions
of this court. In the case of United States v. Mendieta (34
Phil., 242), the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure
Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro Acierto, even that, in
view of the mortal wound which he inflicted upon the
latter, in no way could be considered as a relief from his
criminal act. That he made a mistake in killing one man
instead of another, when it is proved that he acted
maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from
criminal responsibility. Neither do we believe that the fact
that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should
be considered as a mitigating circumstance."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against
the defendant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-25459 August 10, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAMON MABUG-
AT, Defendant-Appellant.
Vicente Sotto for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed
upon Ramon Mabug-at the penalty of twelve years and
one day cadena temporal, with the accessories of the law,
to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P700 and to
pay the costs, for the crime of frustrated
murder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The appellant appealed from this judgment, making two
assignments of error as committed by the trial court, to
wit:
1. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated
murder, and chanrobles virtual law library
2. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by
the defense, finding the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused
and Juana Buralo was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous
of the accused on account of the latter having frequently
visited the house of one Carmen. Their relations were
such that the accused invited Juana to take a walk on the
afternoon of August 9, 1925. Juana refused him, later
sending him a note of excuse. On the third day, or the
night of August 11th, the accused went to the threshold of
Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to
take part in some devotion. There the accused, revolver in
hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come
downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused
said: "If you do not want to go upstairs, I will get Juana
and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill
him." chanrobles virtual law library
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta
Buralo came downstairs, when they went in the direction
of their house. The accused, who was seen by the two
girls, followed them without saying a word. It is only a
short distance from the house where the devotion took
place to that of the offended party, the houses being
adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs, the
accused, while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a
shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo,
the bullet passing through a part of her neck, having
entered the posterior region thereof and coming out
through the left eye, which was completely destroyed.
Due to proper medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did not
die and is on e of the witnesses who testified at the trial of
this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the
accused is not responsible for the crime, contends that the
crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of
a firearm, with injuries, it not having been proven that it
was the accused's intention to
kill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The relations existing between the accused and Juana
Buralo, his disappointment at her not accepting his
invitation to take a walk, the fact that the accused,
revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at the
house where the devotion was being held, later following
her to her house, and especially having aimed at her
person--the head--are facts which, in our opinion, permit
of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was
the accused's intention to
kill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs.
Montenegro (15 Phil., 1), it was held:
We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the
discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient
to sustain a finding of the intention to kill, and there are
many cases in the books wherein the attendant
circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging
a firearm at another the actor was not in fact animated by
the intent to kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the intention
with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper
and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all
the attendant circumstances so far as they are developed
by the evidence; and where, as in the case at bar, a
revolver is twice discharged point-blank at the body of
another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of
the body, it needs but little additional evidence to
establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was
intended for another, does not alter his criminal liability.
(Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.) chanrobles virtual law library
The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the
complaint are evidence premeditation and treachery.
Even when there is sufficient proof of premeditation
(which we do not believe has been sufficiently
established), yet, it cannot be considered as a qualifying
circumstance in the present case, because the person
whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta
Buralo, who was hit by the bullet, but her aunt Juana
Buralo. Had evident premeditation been proven, and there
being no other qualifying circumstance of frustrated
murder present in this case, the acts should be held to be
frustrated homicide and punished with the maximum
degree of the penalty prescribed by law. (Question 2, p.
28, 1890 ed., Viada's Penal Code.) But, the fact is that
treachery was proven and must be taken into
consideration in this case, because the accused fired at
Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to insure
the execution of the crime without running any risk
himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said
offended party. The treachery which, according to the
evidence, would have attended the crime had the bullet hit
Juana Buralo was present in this case because the
offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going
upstairs with their backs towards the accused when he
fired his revolver. The Supreme Court of Spain, in a
decision of May 7, 1885 (Viada, do., pp. 29, 30), in
holding a crime to be murder and not homicide, stated the
following:
Considering that, according to the concept of treachery as
it is explained in article 10 of the Civil code dealing with
said circumstance, it is evident that in firing the gun which
Alejandro Sola was carrying which caused the death of
Nazario Iigo, he employed means which tended to
insure the commission of the crime without any risk to
himself arising from any defense that might be made by
the offended party, for neither the wounded party
Bartolome Lobejano, at whom the shot was aimed in
order to kill him so that he might not testify as to the
assault committed upon him shortly before, as held by the
trial court, was not in a position to defend himself in any
way, nor could Nazario Iigo become aware of any
attack so unjustified, rapid and unforeseen; considering,
further, that the purely accidental circumstance that as a
result of the shot a person other than the one intended was
killed, does not modify, in the instant case, the elements
constituting the crime of murder qualified by the
treachery with which Alejandro Sola acted, whether with
respect to the wounded Bartolome Lobejano or to the
deceased Nazario Iigo, for which reason the rules of
article 65 are not applicable herein, the culprit not having,
in fact, committed a crime different from that which he
intended, taking into consideration the substantial and
intrinsical meaning thereof, etc.
Although the case just cited refers to the crime of
consummated murder, the doctrine sustained therein is
applicable to the case at bar so far as the concurrence of
treachery as a qualifying circumstance is
concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused
having intended to kill and performed all the acts of
execution, which would have produced the crime of
murder but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal
Code.) chanrobles virtual law library
We find no merit in the first assignment of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In regard to the second, it appears beyond a reasonable
doubt that the facts enumerated above constitute the crime
of frustrated
murder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, we find no other aggravating
circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the
law and the facts proven, the same is hereby affirmed in
all its parts costs against the appellant. So ordered.