Republic of the Philippines

Department of Labor and Employment

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
National Capital Region
Quezon City

ACILA BUBAN ARANDA

Complainants,

-versus- NLRC NCR Case-09-11116-14

ALPHABETHOUSE CREATIVE LEARNING

CENTER/TERESITA GODINEZ

Respondents
x-------------------------------------------x

COMMENTS/OPPOSITION to the MEMORANDUM ON APPEAL

(COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE)

COMPLAINANT-APPELLEE, assisted by the undersigned Public Attorney

respectfully registers her opposition to Respondents memorandum of appeal and in
support thereof avers that;

1. Contrary to the narration contained in respondents-appellants

memorandum on appeal, the facts are herein stated:

Complainant, Aranda was engaged by respondents on June 4, 2000 as

nanny/school assistant to respondents pre-school clients. Her average earning
amounted to P9000.00 per month.
On November 19, 2013, complainant Aranda was operated for removal of
multiple myoma and adenomyosis. The operation was with full knowledge and
consent of respondent Alphabethouse. In fact, respondent Godinez assisted her
in the preparation of her Philhealth and SSS documents needed for the
operation. On December 15, 2013, complainant Aranda visited Alphabethouse to
inform them that she still cannot report to work for at least three to six months as
per instruction of her doctors. However, she was later on given a doctors advice
that she can report on February 19, 2014. Thus, on January 20, 2014
complainant reported to Alphabethouse and personally informed Godinez that
she is fit to resume work on February 19, 2014 as certified by her doctor (Dra.
Rosario R. Buenafe) in her SSS Sickness Notification. Respondent Godinez said
it was okay and told complainant to just take the needed rest. On February 19,
2014, armed with her SSS Sickness Notification Form containing her Fit-to-
resume-work certification, she reported to Alphabethouse and informed them that
she is reporting for work. To her surprise, respondent Godinez informed her that
they are no longer admitting her because her co-employee, a certain Norma,
already replaced her.
Complainant repeatedly returned to Alphabethouse to beg respondent
Godinez to allow her to resume work but Godinez repeatedly told her that they
cant admit her because she was replaced already. Sometime on March, 2014,
respondent Godinez, after refusing complainant to attend their Moving Up
Program, told complainant not to come back anymore. Aggrieved, complainant
sought the long arms of the law to protect her interest thus the filing of the above-
stated complaint against respondents.

2. The Honorable Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and
at the same time no abandonment on the part of herein complainant/appellee.
Complainant disagrees on the ruling that she was not illegally dismissed.

Respondents/appellants effectively dismissed herein complainant when

respondent Godinez refused to admit complainant when complainant returned
from her sick leave, coupled by the fact that complainants replacement has
already been hired. Had Godinez did not intend to dismiss herein complainant,
then Godinez should have readily admitted complainant when complainant
returned. The refusal or the failure of respondents/appellants to admit
complainant/appellee back to work manifests a clear intent on the part of
appellant Godinez to terminate complainant/appellee. The absence of a
termination letter as implied by the Honorable Labor Arbiter does not refute the
claim of illegal dismissal. Of course, illegal dismissal can happen many times
even if there is no termination letter. The mere fact that an illegal dismissal case
was filed before the NLRC is a proof that there is a clear case of dismissal to
speak of for complainant/appellant would not spend her energy and emotion in
filing the instant case had she not suffered grave injustice when her only bread
and butter for 13 years was not unjustly stolen from her by appellant Godinez.

3. It is misleading on the part of herein appellant/respondents to claim that

they had been consistent since the start of the proceedings that they were and
have always been waiting for appellee to return to work. The truth is that they
refused to admit appellee/complainant back to work thats why complainant
sought the refuge of the law by filing the instant case. Complainant/appellee was
consistent in demanding that she be reinstated. Her complaint and prayers
before the Honorable Court included reinstatement which clearly manifests her
intention to return to work. For respondent/appellant to claim that they had been
consistent in waiting for complainant to return to work is an outright lie. The
Honorable Labor Arbiter is correct when he ruled that complainant did not
abandon her job.

4. Respondents/appellants anchor their opposition to the award of separation

on the basis of social justice as granted by the Honorable Labor on their theory
that the Labor Code is devoid of any provision that grants separation pay on the
basis of social justice. Respondents/appellants must be reminded that labor is
not only governed by Labor Laws but also by other laws and decisions of the
Supreme Court which form part of the law of the land. The Constitution being the
highest law of the land expressly grants social justice as basis for the awards of
separation pay. Strictly speaking, however, it is not correct to say that there is no
express justification for the grant of separation pay to lawfully dismissed
employees other than the abstract consideration of equity. The reason is that our
Constitution is replete with positive commands for the promotion of social justice,
and particularly the protection of the rights of the workers. The enhancement of
their welfare is one of the primary concerns of the present charter. In fact, instead
of confining itself to the general commitment to the cause of labor in Article II on
the Declaration of Principles of State Policies, the new Constitution contains a
separate article devoted to the promotion of social justice and human rights with
a separate sub- topic for labor. Article XIII expressly recognizes the vital role of
labor, hand in hand with management, in the advancement of the national
economy and the welfare of the people in general. The categorical mandates in
the Constitution for the improvement of the lot of the workers are more than
sufficient basis to justify the award of separation pay in proper cases even if the
dismissal be for cause. (PLDT vs. NLRC, No. L-80609, August 23, 1988).

Further, complainant/appellee had been a faithful employee of

respondent/appellant for 13 years. During the span of her employment with
herein respondents, she was never committed any major infractions. Her
devotion to respondents/appellants is beyond question. It was only when she
was illegally dismissed by herein respondents that their relationship turned sour.
It is for this reason that complainant/appellee firmly believes that the application
of social justice to grant separation pay is in proper as correctly held by the
Honorable Labor Arbiter.
 In the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Antonio citing the earlier case of
Eastern Shipping Lines v. Sedan the Court held;

But we must stress that this Court did allow, in several instances,
the grant of financial assistance. In the words of Justice Sabino de
Leon, Jr., now deceased, financial assistance may be allowed as a
measure of social justice and exceptional circumstances, and as an
equitable concession. The instant case equally calls for balancing
the interests of the employer with those of the worker, if only to
approximate what Justice Laurel calls justice in its secular sense.

In this instance, our attention has been called to the following

circumstances: that private respondent joined the company when
he was a young man of 25 years and stayed on until he was 48
years old; that he had given to the company the best years of his
youth, working on board ship for almost 24 years; that in those
years there was not a single report of him transgressing any of the
company rules and regulations; that he applied for optional
retirement under the company's non-contributory plan when his
daughter died and for his own health reasons; and that it would
appear that he had served the company well, since even the
company said that the reason it refused his application for optional
retirement was that it still needed his services; that he denies
receiving the telegram asking him to report back to work; but that
considering his age and health, he preferred to stay home rather
than risk further working in a ship at sea.

In our view, with these special circumstances, we can call upon the
same "social and compassionate justice" cited in several cases
allowing financial assistance. These circumstances indubitably
merit equitable concessions, via the principle of "compassionate
justice" for the working class. x x x

In the present case, respondent had been employed with the

petitioner for almost twelve (12) years. On February 13, 1996, he
suffered from a "fractured left transverse process of fourth lumbar
vertebra," while their vessel was at the port of Yokohama, Japan.
After consulting a doctor, he was required to rest for a month. When
 he was repatriated to Manila and examined by a company doctor,
he was declared fit to continue his work. When he reported for
work, petitioner refused to employ him despite the assurance of its
personnel manager. Respondent patiently waited for more than one
year to embark on the vessel as 2nd Engineer, but the position was
not given to him, as it was occupied by another person known to
one of the stockholders. Consequently, for having been deprived of
continued employment with petitioner's vessel, respondent opted to
apply for optional retirement. In addition, records show that
respondent's seaman's book, as duly noted and signed by the
captain of the vessel was marked "Very Good," and "recommended
for hire." Moreover, respondent had no derogatory record on file
over his long years of service with the petitioner.

Considering all of the foregoing and in line with Eastern, the ends of
social and compassionate justice would be served best if
respondent will be given some equitable relief. Thus, the award
of P100,000.00 to respondent as financial assistance is deemed
equitable under the circumstance.

Further, the Court explaining the necessity for the awards of separation
pay on the ground of social justice said There should be no question that where
it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work
standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both
just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the
company. For example, a subordinate who has irreconcilable policy or personal
differences with his employer may be validly dismissed for demonstrated loss of
confidence, which is an allowable ground. A working mother who has to be
frequently absent because she has also to take care of her child may also be
removed because of her poor attendance, this being another authorized ground.
It is not the employee's fault if he does not have the necessary aptitude for his
work but on the other hand the company cannot be required to maintain him just
the same at the expense of the efficiency of its operations. He too may be validly
replaced. Under these and similar circumstances, however, the award to the
employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy
even if the separation is for cause. (PLDT vs. NLRC, No. L-80609, August 23,
1988).
 5. Clearly, the Court in upholding the mandate of the Constitution
allows the grant of separation pay on the basis of Social Justice even to
dismissed employee. If separation pay is allowed on the basis of social
justice to legally dismissed employee, then the more it should be applied
on employees who are found not dismissed or who have not abandoned
their employment just like in the case of complainant appellee.

6. It is fervently prayed by complainant-appellant that this Honorable Body will

not be swayed by the attempt of the respondent-appellants to mislead in the
absence of evidence to prove their claims.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Office, after judicious

consideration of the facts of this case, judgment be rendered in favor of the
complainant-appellant ordering the dismissal of this instant appeal and affirm the
decision of the Honorable Labor Arbiter Benedicto Kato.

Other relief, just and equitable under the premises, is likewise prayed for.

Ocotber 9, 2015, Manila

Other reliefs are likewise prayed for.

Department of Justice
PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE
Manila District Office
th
4 Floor Godino Bldg.,
350 Arroceros St., Ermita, Manila

BY:
ATTY. WYLVER B. POOTEN
Public Attorney I