Airbus Family Landing Gear

Messier-Bugatti-Dowty
Airbus Single Aisle Family Landing Gear

IN-SERVICE EXPERIENCE
Issue 4
A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

This document and the information therein are the property of Messier-Bugatti-Dowty, They must not be copied or communicated to a third party without the prior written authorization
of Messier-Bugatti-Dowty.
Foreword
This In-Service Experience is Messier-Bugatti-Dowty proprietary
Its use is strictly limited to Messier-Bugatti-Dowty customers
It shall never be copied nor transmitted to any other organisation without

Messier-Bugatti-Dowty authorisation
The information given in the In-Service Experience is not contractual
In no case may it supersede the applicable Messier-Bugatti-Dowty

Technical Publication (e.g. Component Maintenance Manual, Service
Bulletin, Service Letter, Product Deviation Authorisation etc..) for
operation and/or maintenance purpose.
The inclusion of a topic within the ISE does not mean that it is can be
considered to occur on a fleetwide or repetitive basis unless specifically
mentioned within the slide. In no circumstance can the ISE content be
used against MBD in any claim
1 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016
Airbus Single Aisle Family Landing Gear
CONTENTS
/01/ Solutions In Development /03/ Best Maintenance Practices

1. Nose Landing Gear 1. Lubrication of the Landing Gears
2. Main Landing Gear 2. Cleaning
3. General Checks
/02/ Recommended Solutions /04/ Landing Gear Product Information

1. Nose Landing Gear 1. A320/321 Serialisation SBs
2. Main Landing Gear 2. Restoration Information
3. Tracking the safe life of parts
4. New Products
5.EV Tooling Information
Note 1 : Revised or New Slides are identified with
Note 2 : On wing repair documentation previously known as RDAS is now known as RDDAS
/01/ Solutions In Development
1- Nose Landing Gear
1.5 Barrel Top Face
1.4 - Harnesses
1.3 Barrel Bush Migration

1.1 - Electrical Box
1.2 - Shock Absorber
1.6 Proximity Sensor

1.1 - NLG Electrical Box
CONTENTS
Electrical Box
P/N affected: D23119750-1, D23119751119

1.1 - NLG Electrical Box
Description/ Context Solution/Mitigation
Several cases of unscheduled removal were reported by various Introduction of AMM task in order to allow replacement
airlines;
of lamp bulb on-wing avoiding unscheduled removal of
In addition, few cases of NLG electrical box re-connection during
operation have been reported the electrical box
A MISP was opened in 2011 on these issues Reliability improvement with introduction of LED
instead of incandescent light
Consequence
Several cases of overpressure in the steering system potentially due to
hydraulic system reactivation or non-deactivation during towing phase. Status Update
AMM task now available
LED introduction on-going (will be covered by
Root Cause Investigation
dedicated MBD SB 580-32-3177)
Reconnection issue
=> aim is to perform modification on-wing
Analysis of MBD MRO and supplier repair feedback and in-service MISP has been considered closed
screening to identify candidate and then a root cause;
13 electrical boxes investigated (coming from warranty and in-service)
=> Electrical box not determined as the cause of the in-service issue
Reliability
Reliability analysis performed showing good behaviour of electrical box
in-service for several years
Analysis of MBD MRO and supplier repair feedback to determine
potential reliability improvements
Lamp identified as the main contributor to unscheduled removal
No link determined between electrical box and reconnection issue.

Reliability improvement with introduction of LED
1.2 - NLG Shock Absorber
CONTENTS
Shock Absorber Leakage - Dynamic Seal

Dynamic Seal P/N affected: S34852-343P99
Sliding Tube Chrome Flaking
Sliding Tube P/N affected: D66679

1.2 - NLG Shock Absorber Leakage - Dynamic Seal
Description/ Context Root Cause Investigation
Dynamic seal leakages have been reported across the fleet. In service investigation showed premature wear of the dynamic
Consequence seals.
Grounding of aircraft for removal of shock absorber to replace dynamic The average number of cycles performed by seals before
seal. leakage occurs is approximately 6500 cycles
46% of seals never cause leakage
Solution/Mitigation
Specific AMM task for dynamic seal replacement with leg at 45
degrees
SCRAPER
MBD recommends pro-active replacement as per SL 580-32-3150
Status Update
Redesign of the dynamic seal taking into account experience of
various dynamic seals used in MBD shock absorbers
Test results have shown increased reliability with the new seal
MBD and Airbus launched an in service evaluation (ISE) of the new
dynamic seal in order to validate the seal behaviour during aircraft
operation: 1 MBD SB will be issued for installation of the new
dynamic seal New dynamic seal
16 aircrafts participate to this ISE without any leakage reported so
far (with around 17404 FC accumulated)
MBD/Airbus are looking for airline candidates for In service
evaluation trial. Contact MBD/Airbus for participation in trial.
In service evaluation trial of the new dynamic seal in progress. Future actions will be determined
based on the ISE results.
h - NLG Sliding Tube Chrome Flaking
1.2
Operators reported chrome flaking on the sliding tube. MBD identified a Investigation determined that during the manufacturing process,
specific batch. cleaning and sand blasting at one source of supply was not
Note: Not all chrome detachments are linked to this batch issue. consistently applied, leading to variability of chrome adhesion.
Consequence Population of 200 sliding tubes identified across 60 operators
Grounding of aircraft for temporary repair until sliding tube replacement
Solution/Mitigation
MBD has issued RDDAS temporary repairs for this type of damage.
Contact AOG CSC (aogcsc@safranmbd.com) if this damage
occurs.
RDDAS issued by MBD can allow continued A/C operation around

45 days/200FC
Dedicated support provided and communicated to all 60 operators
MBD MRO network used to support the regions with rotable sliders
Status Update
Retrofit ongoing and support available
Warranty extended up to 1st overhaul for sliders concerned by Quality
batch.
Retrofit progressing and dedicated RDDAS support available on request.

1.3 - NLG Barrel
CONTENTS
Barrel Bush Migration
Barrel P/N affected: All

1.3 - NLG Barrel Bush Migration
Around 60 cases of migration were reported on The migration occurs during the operation
barrel at the actuating cylinder/barrel interface of actuating cylinder
The combination of :
Consequence Significant offset of actuating cylinder
Cracked sealant noticed kinematic
Burden in maintenance (bush replacement / Stiffness of the lug bush flange
TA request)
Then, axle bending leads to bush migration
in this particular configuration
Mitigation
MBD issued a Service Letter 580-32-3185 to mitigate the phenomenon in-service. The
mitigation consist to remove the sealant, inspect and clean the area and renew the sealant.
Solution
Some technical proposals are under discussion between MBD & Airbus engineering to
determine if design should be improved
Status Update
MBD Service Letter 580-32-3185 issued in December 2014 to mitigate the phenomenon in-
service
Embodiment of MBD Service Letter 580-32-3185 will permit to mitigate this phenomenon and avoid any
bush replacement
1.4 NLG Harnesses
CONTENTS
Harness Connector Corrosion

A/C affected: P/N affected:
A318/ A319/A320/A321 All P/Ns

1.4 Harness Connector Corrosion
Description/ Context
Some operators have reported corrosion of NLG /
MLG electrical connectors to MBD and Airbus.
Consequence
Corrosion may result in connector replacement in
service or at overhaul.
Status Update
The connectors comply to Airbus Supplier
Equipment Specification
MBD are supporting Airbus in the solution

development
Refer to Airbus TFU 32.00.00.007 R14

1.5 NLG Barrel Top Face
CONTENTS
Barrel Top Face Corrosion

/01/ In Service Experience
1.5 - NLG Barrel top face corrosion
Description/ Context Root cause investigation
Several cases of corrosion have been reported on the top Based on feedback from in-service and in shop, the main contributor is
face of barrel and on barrel bolt holes in service and in degradation of the sealant around the barrel bolts.
shop
After degradation of the sealant, moisture is able to go through the barrel
Consequence bolts leading then to protective treatment degradation and corrosion
The corrosion has to be removed by re-machining the top development.
face or the holes leading to higher overhaul costs This sealant degradation could be due to several contributors:
(additional repair or part replacement). Improper sealant application during potential previous maintenance tasks
Protective treatment degradation between Barrel and Upper support
Recommendation
Airbus ISI 32.31.00004 has been developed with MBD to
provide information about inspection of sensitive areas.
Regular visual inspection on this area could allow to
detect any damage on rubber sealant and prevent any
corrosion development
Mitigation
Segregation in the RC analysis between CIS and non-
CIS operation is under study with Airbus.
Target for this new disposition is Q3 2016
Life limitation at 1 TBO is under investigation on non-CIS
aircraft
Segregation of life limitations via RC under study to reduce Pre EV Barrel scrap

1.6 - NLG Proximity Sensor System
CONTENTS
NLG Proximity Sensor
Proximity sensor mechanism P/N affected:

Post SB 580-32-3155 / 3157

Description/ Context Root cause investigation
Some airlines reported abnormal play on NLG Proximity sensor Some proximity sensor mechanism have been recovered from
mechanism (post-SB 580-32-3155 / 3157) either during maintenance maintenance check for laboratory analysis:
check or after troubleshooting (in case of 24/25Ga fault triggered). Wear is mainly noticed at level of bushed lever and greased
pin
Consequence
High rate of parts replacement during maintenance check Analysis is still on going to correlate in-service data with
Potential risk of Operational Interruption linked to proximity sensor mechanism free play leading to loss of signal.
mechanism issue Sample analysis is on-going via MRO to assess level of wear
at Overhaul.
Mitigation
Replacement of worn or damaged parts
Preventive maintenance according to Airbus AMM
Task 32-21-00-210-802-A
Status Update
Engineering analysis on-going.
MRO sampling on-going.
Investigation report to be shared between MBD and Airbus in Q1 2016

Report conclusion will drive decision on the way forward
Feedback from Customer is needed in case of event related to 24/25GA
Investigations on going. MBD to gather additional data from operators

2 - Main Landing Gear
2.6 Pintle Pins
2.5 - Lockstay Actuator
2.4 - Sliding Tube 2.1 - Harnesses
2.3 - Quick Release Coupling

2.2 - Torque Link Damper

2.1 - Harnesses
CONTENTS
Harness Connector Corrosion

A318/ A319/A320/A321 All P/Ns

2.2 Harness Connector Corrosion
Some operators have reported corrosion of NLG /
MLG electrical connectors to MBD and Airbus.
Consequence
Corrosion may result in connector replacement in
service or at overhaul.
Status Update
The connectors comply to Airbus Supplier
Equipment Specification
MBD are supporting Airbus in the solution

development
Refer to Airbus TFU 32.00.00.007 R14

2.2 - Torque Link Damper
CONTENTS
MLG Torque Link Damper Loose Bolts

A319/A320/A321 201404001

2.2 - Torque Link Damper Loose Bolts
There have been reports of the bolts that attach the torque link
damper becoming loose. These bolts attach the torque link
damper to the upper torque link. The torque link damper is also 5mm additional material
attached by the torque link apex pin. added to the face.
Consequence
Corrosion to the bolts and the bolts becoming loose, although the
torque link damper cannot become detached as it is also attached
by the torque link apex pin.

Thread tapping was in some cases not to the full depth required.
The thread inserts when installed in these holes became tapered.
When the bolts for the torque link damper were installed in the
tapered insert the bolts would not torque correctly.
Solution
A revised damper with increased depth of the tapped holes had
been produced for the EV MLG, the revised damper will also be
available as a modification to the Enhanced MLG.
The modification to apply the revised torque link damper is under
final approval, VSB expected Q3 2016.
The modification to apply the revised torque link damper is under approval.
2.3 - Quick Release Coupling
CONTENTS
MLG Quick Release Coupling Hydraulic Leaks

A318/ A319/A320 201042031

2.3 - Quick Release Coupling Hydraulic Leaks
MBD have received a number of reports of hydraulic fluid
leakage from above the union nut on the brake flexible
hydraulic hose elbow at the junction of the Quick Release
Coupling.
Consequence
Hydraulic fluid spilling on hot brakes may cause brake smoke
or brake fire during taxi-in or parking phases.

On parts returned to MBD, galling damage was observed on
the non threaded parts of the mating faces of the QRC and
flexible hose which can be caused by vibration.
Some cases coincide with piston housing loose on MBD
brakes Ref: VSB C20225-32-3391, SL F6137-32-3389 and
Airbus TFU 32.42.27.037 due to non-compliant locking bolt
assemblies Galling damage
Mitigation
Airbus Alert Operators Transmission -A32N005-14 dated 11
Sep 2014 calls for a one-time visual inspection of the QRC and
the MLG brake piston housing bolts on A318, A319 and A320
aircraft equipped with MBD MLG Brake assemblies PN
C20225508, C20225509 and C20225510.
Status Update
MBD is continuing to monitor occurrences in service.
MISP closed.
2.4 - MLG Sliding Tube
CONTENTS
MLG Sliding Tube Thermal Damage and Cracking

A318/A319/A320/A321 All P/Ns
Axle Overheating Damage

A321 All P/Ns
Slave Link Lug Crack

A318/A319/A320/A321 201271304, 201522353

2.4 - MLG Sliding Tube Thermal Damage And Cracking
Operators have reported local chromium plate detachment
Investigation has shown increased Shock Absorber velocity and Bearing
friction between the Sliding Tube and Lower Bearing can lead to this
and base material cracks on the main barrel diameter.
damage.
A/C Flying into CIS Regions have been particularly affected
and a low numbers of operators outside of the CIS region Damage typically occurs in the working region of the Lower Bearing
have also been affected. during the taxi phase of operation.
Consequence Runways and taxiways with increased surface roughness can increase
Increased risk of unserviceable Sliding Tubes at next shop the probability and severity of damage.
visit.
Cracking to the sliding tube.
Base metal thermal damage on
Increased risk of Shock Absorber fluid leakage.
rear of slider
Mitigation
MBD has provided RDDAS temporary repairs for this type of
damage. Contact AOG CSC (aogcsc@safranmbd.com) if this
damage occurs.
Repetitive inspections for CIS operators including DVI and MPI
inspections.
Operators may choose to reduce greasing intervals in this
area. Particularly if flying into CIS region where it is
recommended to grease weekly.
Chromium plate detachment on
rear of slider
Solution Solution
Mitigation actions and a solution are available.

2.4 - MLG Sliding Tube Thermal Damage And Cracking
Solution
MBD SB 200-32-307, 201-32-58, 200-32-
310, and 201-32-60. The new standard of
bearing includes:
A new low friction inner liner and shorter

retaining pins
The inner liner consists of a lead
impregnated PTFE layer mounted on a
bronze backing
Existing Lower Bearing assemblies can be
modified at overhaul
New lower
The embodiment of the new Lower bearing
Bearing is currently controlled by Airbus,
affected operators out of the CIS region subassembly
Inner liner
can request the solution from Airbus. 201587212
201646300 Area of
wear
Status Update
Post Mod
Endurance limits to be published by Airbus
Lower
into Airbus SB A320-23-1386. Acceptable
The life of the bearing in the CIS region will be Bearing In-service
5800 FC. condition
Further analysis of bearings is not expected to
allow any improvements on this.
Liners are being returned by some operators

outside of the CIS region for wear analysis.
Back to Description
Solution available to remove need for repetitive inspections and prevent in-service damage

2.4 - MLG Axle Overheating Damage
Description/ Context Mitigation
MBD has received reports of local On all A321 aircraft, a regular greasing of the
chromium plating detachment and base MLG Axle outer diameter and Axle Sleeve
metal overheating on the innermost
inner diameter is recommended to be
chromium plated Axle diameter (next to the
Brake Flange). Damage is found to be performed every 2000 FC. Refer to TFU
more common on A321 Aircraft. 32.11.00.005 and Airbus SIL 32-130.
MBD has issued RDDAS temporary repairs

Consequence for this type of damage which requires at
Risk of Sliding Tube being deemed minimum acid etch to PCS 3600. Contact
unserviceable. AOG CSC (aogcsc@safranmbd.com) if this
damage occurs.
Repair off-wing is covered by applicable CMM

Root Cause Investigation repairs. For damage exceeding this a repair
Most likely cause of overheating is fretting solution has been developed but is subject to
between the Axle Sleeve and innermost approval by a Repair Concession.
chromium plated Axle land.
Status Update
Subsequent heat generation can, in some
cases, be sufficient to change the All MBD information on root cause effects has
microstructure and properties of the base been passed to Airbus to assist with solution
metal. development at interface level.
MBD recommend regular greasing of Axle refer to Airbus SIL and TFU.
MLG Sliding Tube Slave Link Lug Crack
2.4 - MLG Sliding Tube Slave Link Lug Crack
Description/Context Root Cause Investigation
At overhaul 2 sliding tubes from different operators were found to The fracture propagated from a burr in 1 of the 4 slave link lug
have a crack in the Sliding Tube slave link lug area when NDT tested holes. The fracture did not extend into the barrel of the sliding tube
at overhaul
Suspect population identified, MBD VSB to be updated with the
Possible Consequence population expected Q2 2016.
Scrapping of Sliding Tube if crack found
Crack in Principle Structural Element therefore airworthiness
directive expected Slave Link Lug location (aft)
Mitigation / Solution
MBD VSB released to check for burrs at overhaul, Airbus SB and
Airworthiness Directive Expected to Mandate Inspection at overhaul
or on-wing.
De-burring operation at manufacture has been improved.
Inspection and Mitigation in development for Enh sliding tubes in service

2.5 - Lockstay Actuator
CONTENTS
Lockstay Actuator Leakages

A318/A319/A320/A321 114095 series

2.5- Lockstay Actuator Leakages
A number of warranty claims have been received by MBD recommends frequent completion of the below (as often as weekly or even daily) and immediately
after actuator installation.
MBD for Lock-stay Actuator Leakages. Typical 1. Ensure the MLG is in the down locked position and is safe in accordance with AMM procedures
findings on actuators are; cracked / pockmarked seal 2. Using a Lint free cloth and a small amount of cleaning fluid; clean the Lockstay Actuator Piston Rod OD
elastomer and worn / torn atmospheric side back-up to remove any old Hydraulic Fluid, Dirt, Debris or Contamination. Ensure that no cleaning fluid gets
inside the actuator past the scraper seal assembly.
ring. 3. Using a Lint free cloth dry the Lockstay Actuator Piston Rod OD
Consequence 4. Using a Lint free cloth apply a layer of Hydraulic fluid onto the Lockstay Actuator Piston Rod Chrome
Plated Diameter
Potential for hydraulic fluid leakage and
NOTE: MBD recommends using the same Hydraulic Fluid as used in the Aircraft Hydraulic System to
unscheduled maintenance ensure compatibility.
Economic burden to repair leaking units Status Update
MBD will investigate another actuator to investigate for any possible regional or environmental effects,
Root Cause Investigation depending on the results a solution for fluid in-compatibility may be implemented.
Primary Factor
Operators are invited to contact MBD regarding repeat cases of lockstay actuator leakages so that
another actuator can be investigated.
Use of Skydrol LD-4, Hyjet IV-A+, Skydrol PE-5, and
Hyjet V may result in a gland fill percentage greater
than 100% increasing the risk of back-up ring extrusion
and / or frictional related damage to the seal. Possible
geographic / environmental factors have been
identified, suggesting further investigation of another
actuator is required to confirm the correct root cause.
Secondary Factors (cannot individually cause a leakage)
1. The Piston Rod Surface Finish is smoother than
recommended. Which reduces the amount of fluid
that can sit in troughs on the piston rod OD Cracked /
increasing seal friction pockmarked
2. Piston Rod wiping (with and without cleaning fluids) seal
in scenarios where the seal is not allowing sufficient
fluid to pass and form a lubricating layer on the Worn / torn
piston rod increases seal friction back-up ring
Root cause identified and mitigating actions available to operators

2.6 - Forward Pintle Pin Retaining Bolts
CONTENTS
Forward Pintle Pin

Retaining Bolts
A/C affected: A318/A319/A320/A321

/02/ Recommended Solutions
2.6 Forward Pintle Pin
MBD has received a report from an operator of multiple occurrences of MBD recommend the following:
Chrome plate detachment and base metal corrosion on A320 and A321
MLG Forward Pintle Pins. Another operator found a Forward Pintle Pin Check for signs of corrosion product when performing maintenance or
that was rotated and had fractured lugs. inspections in the area
When greasing at this location, ensure that greasing is performed
Consequence effectively and check the condition of the extruded grease for signs of
In all cases the damages were discovered during routine inspections metallic particles
and did not result in any direct impact on the operation of the aircraft. If there is doubt about the condition of the Pintle Pin then consider
However if the base metal of the pin is corroded there is an increased investigating further.
risk of fracture of the Forward Pintle Pin which could lead to collapse of
the MLG.

The investigation into the root cause of the damage is on-going however it is
expected that ineffective lubrication in the region may be causing increased
friction between the Forward Pintle Pin and the Aircraft Spherical Bearing.
Regular and effective greasing is effective mitigation.

1- Nose Landing Gear
1.7 - Retraction Actuator
1.1 - Unlock Actuator Inspection
1.4 -Panel and Barrel 1.2 - Shock Absorber Cylinder

Greasing Ducts Colouration
1.5 - Turning Tube
1.3 - Proximity Sensor System
1.6 NLG ICY Modification 1.8 - Torque Links

NLG Leg P/N affected: All P/N

1.1 - NLG Unlock actuator
CONTENTS
Unlock actuator Inspection

P/N affected: D23076000 series

1.1 - NLG Unlock Actuator Inspection
Cases of spherical ball partial or complete migration. Root cause a combination of:
Insufficient swaging and/or
Consequence
Installation of specific long bolts P/N D62597
Risk of incomplete NLG retraction or down-locking.
Solution
Bolt P/N D62597 must be replaced as per MBD SB 580-32-3169
SB contains instructions for correct swaging and check improvements
MBD SB 589-32-3169 available on MBD portal
Embodiment of MBD SB will prevent bearing migration and unlock actuator damage.

1.2 - NLG Shock Absorber Cylinder
CONTENTS
Shock Absorber Cylinder Colouration
P/N affected:
D65519

1.2 - NLG Shock Absorber Cylinder Colouration
During scheduled shock absorber removal, a few
cases of marks noticed on the cylinder has been
reported by operators.
Consequence
Customer requests for technical recommendation
Potential delay in maintenance schedule
Marks are due to friction, bronze deposit or heating

Brownish marks do not require any further action
Bluish marks require NDT (FPI + Stress Scan)
Solution
Service Letter 580-32-3172 available on MBD portal.
Brownish mark on sliding tube
MBD SIL provides the procedures necessary for different colour indications

h
CONTENTS
NLG Proximity Sensor

h
Cases of Lever Pin showing wear. pre-mod
Consequence
Risk of seizure leading to rod-link bending or rupture
Potential In Flight Turn Back linked to proximity sensor
issue
Solution/Mitigation
Pin lubrication ducts introduction;
Rod link reinforcement (from aluminium to steel)
Status Update
post-mod
Embodiment of MBD SBs will reduce risk of rod-link bending and potential for In Flight Turn Back

1.4 - NLG Barrel & Panel
Panel Greasing Ducts and

Barrel Greasing Ducts
A318/A319/A320/A321 All

h
1.4 - NLG Barrel & Panel Greasing Ducts
Grease could be accumulated on Barrel and Panel hinge pin leading
to grease overpressure inside the blanking cap cavity
Consequence
Lack of grease on outside area of pintle pins
Presence of dried grease inside the greasing duct
Solution/Mitigation
Modification of grease duct to improve the way out for the grease
Machining of current greasing ducts
Replacement by new one
Improvement of pintle pins greasing
Status Update
Airbus issued a covering SB 32-1417
Embodiment of MBD SB will reduce risk of lack of grease or presence of dried grease

1.5 - NLG Turning Tube
CONTENTS
Turning Tube Lug Corrosion

Turning Tube P/N affected: D65520 ; D59418 ;D62385

1.5 - NLG Turning Tube Lug Corrosion
Corrosion has been found on the inner The corrosion seen in this area is a result
diameter of the turning tube lug at the upper of moisture ingress between the bush and
torque link attachment.
the turning tube lug inner diameter
Consequence
Repair required for removal of corrosion.
Solution/Mitigation
Preventative maintenance practices are outlined in the Airbus SIL 32-144 to mitigate such
corrosion: Turning tube lug
Grease lubrication points frequently between the turning tube and upper torque link- MBD
recommendation is every 200 FC
Check sealant is continuous around the bushes within the turning tube lugs area
Check sealant is continuous and well coated in the nut and around the head of the pin
between the barrel and the upper torque link
MBD have included a local repair into relevant CMMs
If repair is outside of CMM scope, contact AOG CSC (aogcsc@safranmbd.com ), to apply
for a RDDAS Temporary Repair.
MBD SIL 580-32-3184 has been issued to inform operator about CIC application to help
prevent corrosion (CMM will be updated accordingly in September 2015)
Status Update
Use of anti-corrosion compound for the affected area is under analysis.
Water/moisture ingress path
SIL 580-32-3184 released and CMMs repair will be updated in September 2015
to introduce corrosion inhibiting compound in area
h
1.6 - NLG New Configuration Leg (ICY)
Description/ Context New LRUs created:
More than 20 versions of NLG legs in service, depending on weight variants. ICY
requested by operators at FAIR Working Group.
Consequence
Technical adaptation could be needed on AOG basis
Management of different versions of spares
Various CMM/AMM documentation to refer in service
Solution/Mitigation
A modification kit has been produced to create a common NLG
4 to 6 man hours required
3 new LRU are created:
Servicing placard kit
Green or yellow circuit kits
TPIS or Non TPIS kits
Configuration harmonization (Reduction in NLG versions, ICY with old parts
increased, ease in spares management);
Flexibility for customers (new LRU managed through AMM tasks)
Status Update
MBD SB 580-32-3173 embodiment subject to a dedicated support CSC & CSM
to be contacted
MBD SB 580-32-3173 issued to cover this new configuration
CMM documentation created/updated to include new P/N standard (post MBD
SB 580-32-3173)
Airbus issued a covering SB 32-1392 & SIL 32-136 1Dependant on weight variant compliance
Implementation will lead to an ease in configuration management. Post SB spares can be used on any A320
Aircraft1. Customization possible with optional kits. MBD SB is a prerequisite of any further modification.
1.7 - NLG Retraction Actuator
CONTENTS
Retraction Actuator Leakage

P/N affected: D23613000

1.7 - NLG Retraction Actuator Leakage
Cases of premature leakages (recently delivered actuators) have Components affected are NLG actuating cylinders P/N
been noticed in service, and through warranty claims since 2010. D23613000 Serial Numbers from MA0723 up to and
Consequence including MA1418
Potential operational impacts able to create AOG situation and/or Replacement of the affected static seal NAS1611-233
flights cancelled not experienced to date is sufficient to prevent similar leakage.
Root Cause Investigation Status Update

Investigations have been performed on several actuators recovered MBD Service Letter 580-32-3183 released in April 2014
from in-service to cover technical and commercial aspects
Static leakage has been highlighted during investigation
Quality investigation performed permitting to determine 2

contributors of the static leakage :
1. Squeeze of a specific static seal NAS1611-233 batch below
MBD specification
2. Inner diameter of the actuator cylinder P/N D65540 with a
specific tolerance in the static seal area
These 2 contributors taken separately would not cause any leakage

of the actuating cylinder from the static seal area and no specific
preventive or corrective action is required in that case.
Replacement of the affected seal enough to prevent similar leakage.
MBD SIL released to cover technical and commercial aspects
1.8 - NLG Torque Links
CONTENTS
Torque Link Apex Pin Rupture

Torque Link Apex Pin P/N affected: D64433

H
1.8 - NLG Torque Link Apex Pin Rupture
Several cases of apex pin rupture have been reported during aircraft Investigation has identified :
operation.
External bending loads in Apex pin due to contact with
Consequence towbarless tractor doors
Possible NLG overload, and/or damage to NLG Tyres or torque links. No free-play within locking mechanism (nut over-torquing)
Solution/Mitigation
The following solutions were established:
New locking system which provides adequate free-play avoiding pin
overloading
Shorter torque link apex pin to increase clearance to the tractor
Figure showing shorter pin and new locking mechanism
Status Update
MBD SB 580-32-3178 has been approved by Airbus, MBD SB 580-32-
3173 is a prerequisite. Fracture at thread
Embodiment of MBD SB will significantly reduce the possibility of apex pin rupture.

2 - Main Landing Gear
2.1 - Retraction Actuator
2.10 - Main Fitting
2.2 - Pintle Pins
2.9 - Lockstay Actuator Hoses
2.8 Side Stay

2.3 - New Charging Labels
2.7 - Sliding Tube
2.4 - Lower Bearing
2.6 - Torque Link Damper Disk Spring
2.5 - Harnesses

2.1 - MLG Retraction Actuator
CONTENTS
Hydraulic Ports
P/N affected:
201590 & 114193 series
Cylinder Corrosion
P/N affected: 201590 series

h
2.1 - MLG Retraction Actuator Hydraulic Ports
Diameter
Description/ Context Open end of increased
Repetitive inspections of retraction actuators were Retraction Actuator
introduced by Airbus ISB A320-32-1298 to check the
condition of the hydraulic ports at the open end of retraction
actuators.
Consequence
Possibility of hydraulic leakage.
Repetitive inspections required .

MBD testing using updated in-service data introduced the
possibility of cracks occurring in the hydraulic ports at the Piston Rod
open end of the retraction actuator.
Solution/Mitigation Hydraulic Ports

A solution is available to modify the affected hydraulic ports and remove repeat inspection
requirements by expanded the diameter of hydraulic ports using a cold working method.
A new production standard cylinder is available that does not require the repeat inspections.
Rework of existing units is available (MBD SB 200-32-299 & MBD SB 201-32-51)
Recommended before 20,000 FC, embodiment after 20,000 FC risks causing damage to
cylinder
Embodiment of MBD SBs will remove the need for inspections and reduce the risk of hydraulic leakage.
2.1 - MLG Retraction Actuator Cylinder Corrosion
Corrosion has been found in the retaining ring groove of enhanced in-service retraction actuator cylinders.
Consequence
There is limited reparability in this location, and likely that corroded cylinders will be considered unserviceable.
Root Cause Investigation Corrosion

Three factors combine to cause the corrosion.
Design mitigates risk
Sealant application can allow voids in sealant to Sealant Application Improved
of galvanic corrosion
remain. To reduce risk of moisture
ingress
Moisture from scraper seal will tend to flow into any Thin Chromium Plate added
voids present in the assembly. To add corrosion protection to
Galvanic difference between the base materials in
base metal ROD RETAINING RING
the assembly causes an electrochemical reaction. Material Change

Addition protection of
Solution/Mitigation GLAND
Cadmium Plate & Primer
Paint
EASA AD No.: 2013-0283R1, FAA AD No.: 2014-23- Increased To increase corrosion resistance
05, and Airbus SB A320-32-1408 require replacement chamfer
and overhaul of affected actuators within 18 months To suit chromium

plate
(from 13/12/13).
MBD SB 200-32-318 & 201-32-66 introduce a new
CYLINDER
Production Solution Sealant Introduced
standard of cylinder which is repairable with improved
Increased Cylinder O/D
protective treatments. Primer Paint added to To reduce risk of moisture
providing more cylinder ID ingress
MBD SB 200-32-311 & 201-32-61 modifies the reparability
existing cylinder with improved protective treatments. For corrosion resistance
Embodiment of MBD Service Bulletins will reduce corrosion.

2.2 - MLG A320/A321 Forward Pintle Pin Retaining Bolts
CONTENTS
A320/A321 Forward Pintle Pin

Retaining Bolts
A/C affected:
A318/A319/A320/A321

2.2 - MLG A320/A321 Forward Pintle Pin Retaining Bolts
Description/ Context Pre - mod
Cases of cross bolt fracture which retains the pintle pin
Consequence
Could result in subsequent loss of pintle pin.

Additional external loads caused fractures of the cross
bolt in the pintle pin.
Solution/Mitigation A320
MBD Service Bulletin introduces 2 stub bolts to A321 Post - mod
replace the one cross bolt that secures the pintle pin.
MBD SB 200-32-261 parts are superseded by A320 Post - mod

serialised parts from SB 200-32-271.
Solution/Mitigation A321
MBD Service Bulletin introduces new stub bolts
connected by a bowden cable to replace the one
cross bolt that secures the pintle pin.
MBD SB 201-32-22 parts are superseded by

serialised parts from MBD SB 201-32-40.
Embodiment of MBD SB 201-32-22 will reduce the risk of loss of the pintle pin

2.3 - MLG New Charging Labels
CONTENTS
MLG New Charging Labels

A/C affected:
A318/A319/A320/A321

2.3 - MLG New Charging Labels
Labels that show the weight on wheels inflation pressures
were deemed to be unclear
Consequence
Possible incorrect servicing of the shock absorber

Based on in-service feedback from operators, the
charging labels were unclear.
Solution
MBD SB 200-32-302 and MBD SB 201-32-53 (A321)
introduces new charging labels with increased clarity.
New charging labels introduced with increased clarity

2.4 - MLG Lower Bearing
CONTENTS
Lower Bearing Outer Diameter Corrosion

Lower Bearing P/N affected: Pre SB 200-32-297
Lower Bearing Inner Diameter Corrosion

Lower Bearing P/N affected: 201587213 only

2.4 - MLG Lower Bearing OD Corrosion
Fretting and corrosion has been found on the outer diameter of the lower
bearing during seal change and scheduled maintenance.
Consequence
Potential hydraulic fluid leakage, replacement of lower bearing in extreme
cases and possible damage to main fitting at interface.

Investigations have determined that the root cause of this corrosion is
fretting of the OD of the lower bearing and liner, this results in degradation
of the anodised coating and exposes the base material.
Mitigation
Possible repairs available on application of MBD RDDAS
Note: In some cases bearings are required to be replaced
Solution
MBD SB 200-32-297 & 201-32-49 issued.
Introduction of a new lower bearing sub assembly with an extended
liner which reduces the possibility of fretting and corrosion on the OD of
the Lower Bearing.
Improved corrosion resistance noted from post mod lower bearings in
service.
Pre-mod Post-mod
New lower bearing available. Improvement in corrosion performance evident.

2.5 - Corrosion of LB IDs behind DU-B Liners
Description
An operator has reported that during DU-B liner replacements their bronze
lower bearings suffer from corrosion at the interface with the DU-B liner. The
corrosion is de-alloying corrosion which removes the zinc, aluminium and
manganese alloying components from the lower bearing ID and deposits them
on the OD of the DU-B Liner.
Consequence
On-wing RDDASs can be requested from MBD for temporary repair to
remove the corrosion.
Or replacement of Lower Bearings Assembly and then subsequent
replacement of bronze bushing at MRO.
Root Cause
The corrosion has been caused by excessive moisture present in the region
as a result of contamination of grease with an aqueous fluid before the grease
is pumped into the lower bearing, or introduction of moisture into the Lower
Bearing region during other Landing Gear maintenance activities (such as
cleaning or de-icing operations).
Solution / Mitigation
This can be avoided by taking care not to contaminate grease before use on
the aircraft. Additional care should be taken during cleaning / de-icing
operations to ensure that there is no moisture ingress past the sliding tube
scraper seal.

2.5 - MLG New 1M And 2M Axle Harnesses
CONTENTS
MLG New 1M and 2M Axle Harnesses

A/C affected:
A318/A319/A320/A321
Overhauled 2M Harnesses
A318/A319/A320/A321 Enhanced only

2.5 - MLG New 1M And 2M Axle Harnesses
There have been cases reported where
the tachometer connectors have been
installed to the wrong sensor.
Consequence
Incorrect reading of the wheel
revolutions to the BCSU

Incorrect installation between the
tachometer connectors and the
sensor
Solution/Mitigation
MBD SB 200-32-304
(A318/A319/A320) /201-32-56 (A321)
Service Bulletin introduces yellow
sleeves on all the cables to all the Axle
inboard connections for clearer
identification.
Embodiment of MBD SB will reduce the risk of incorrect installation

/02/ RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
2.5 - Overhauled 2M Harnesses
Some overhauled 2M MLG Leg harnesses have had arcing events
FWD
in the area below the center of the torque links.
Consequence
There is a cockpit warning that the auto brake system is disabled.
There are no structural consequences.
Clamp block
Investigation found that the contractor that overhauled the Area where 2M
harnesses had used cables of an incorrect specification and that Harness has had
damage
the cables were shorter than required. Also the lower conduit
subassembly did not have the drain holes in the correct position.
Solution
MBD has identified the affected population
The contractor for the harness repair has updated their
procedures
MBD SL A320-A33 has been released to provide guidance on
the desired physical condition of the 2m harness following any
refurbishment , repair, or restoration.
Retrofit actions completed by MBD MRO for affected Airlines and SL released.
2.6 - MLG Torque Link Damper Disk Spring
CONTENTS
MLG Torque Link Damper Disk Spring

A/C affected:
A319/A320/A321

2.6 - MLG Torque Link Damper Disk Spring
Some torque link damper springs have fractured
when the torque link damper has been
disassembled for inspection.
Consequence
Potential internal damage to the damper
No effect on MLG operation.

The disk springs were found to have fractured in
a fatigue mode
Solution/Mitigation
MBD SB 200-32-268 (A319/A320) / 201-32-28
(A321) introduces new disk springs which have
increased fatigue life.
Affected Disk Springs
Embodiment of MBD SB will reduce the risk of fracture of the disk springs

2.7 - MLG Sliding Tube
CONTENTS
Axle End Cracks

Sliding Tube P/N affected: All P/Ns
Dowel Hole Deformation and cracks

Sliding Tube P/N affected: All P/Ns

2.7 - MLG Axle End Cracks
MBD has received some reports of cracks at the threaded end of
the Sliding Tube Axle. Cracks have been located at the Axle Nut On a number of occasions deformation has been observed on the end
Locking Bolt holes and also in the plain section between the holes. of the Axle in the cracked areas. This indicates an impact has
occurred.
Consequence
No evidence of crack propagation by fatigue has been observed in
Risk of Sliding Tube being un-repairable at the next shop visit. components investigated by MBD.
Solution/Mitigation It is most likely that cracking has formed due to the presence of
residual stress. Residual stress is most likely to have been imparted
MBD recommends care is taken not to impact the ends of the through impact at the end of the Axle.
MLG Axles. Use the Axle Thread Protector mentioned in the
AMM. The following notes are included in the AMM:
MBD has provided off wing Repair Concessions for a number of

instances where this damage has been found.
Contact AOG CSC (aogcsc@safranmbd.com) if this damage
occurs on wing.
Take care to protect Axle ends. Use the Axle Thread Protector specified in the AMM.
2.7 Dowel Holes Deformation and Cracks
MBD has investigated a case of deformation and cracking around the dowel holes at the top The investigation revealed that all 6 dowel holes were
end of the Sliding Tube. The damage was found by the operator during scheduled cracked and that there was higher than normal stress scan
maintenance and did not have any direct operational impact. readings in the base material of the sliding tube.
Consequence The deformation and cracking observed was caused by
higher than normal velocity collisions of the Retaining Collar
Following the investigation into the reported case the Sliding Tube and several Shock with the Upper Diaphragm Tube following extension of the
Absorber internal components were unserviceable due to the damage sustained. Sliding Tube during take off. These high velocity collisions
In the theoretical extreme case of rupture of all 6 dowel holes, the Sliding Tube would be are the result of underdamped extensions of the Sliding
retained within the main fitting by the Torque Links. Although retraction of the gear would not Tube which are caused by an incorrect balance of hydraulic
be possible, the gear would still be able to support the aircraft during a subsequent landing. fluid.
Solution / Mitigation Upper Dowel Pin

Retaining Collar
Ensure that the servicing is performed correctly in Diaphragm
accordance with the AMM, so that the correct balance Tube
of hydraulic fluid and Nitrogen is maintained at all
times. Keep records of all shock absorber Pitot Tube
maintenance.
Sliding Tube
Upper
Bearing
Visible Crack and MPI image of further cracking Main Fitting Subassembly
Caused by ineffective maintenance simple preventive measures can be taken.

2.8 Side Stay
CONTENTS
Lower Side-Stay Detachment

Applicability: All Upper & Lower Side Stay
Attachment Pins :
201521xxx
201584xxx
201659xxx
MLG Cuff Link and Banana Link
Side Stay Double Locking

A/C affected:
A318/A319/A320/A321
Upper Cardan Pin Life Limit

A320 Pre-EV 201163620 only

2.8 - Lower Side-stay Detachment
Description / Context Location of Upper
attachment pin
One incident has occurred where the lower side stay
attachment pin detached from the landing gear during
landing.
Consequence
In this case, the aircraft taxied safely to the gate. However,
there is a risk of landing gear collapse.
Location of
Lower
attachment
pin
Probable root cause: insecure fastening of the lower side
stay attachment pin.
After the incident, only the pin was found. The
associated fastening components were not found.
Mitigation / Solution
Operators are reminded that Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) procedures must be
followed to ensure correct assembly and disassembly of the side stay.
Unlocked washer tabs before

locking and sealant application
Follow AMM procedures for assembly and disassembly of side stay

2.8 - MLG Cuff Link And Banana Link
Operators have reported 4 fractures of the cuff sub-
assemblies
Consequence
Potential for incorrect locking of the lock spring.
Inspection requirements to Airbus SB A320-32A1224

Investigations have shown that the cuff fractures were
due to stress corrosion cracks which were possibly
induced by moisture ingress.
Solution/Mitigation
MBD SB 200-32-267 & SB 201-32-27 introduces
Banana Link Banana Link
reinforced cuff and banana links which gives improved
resistance to stress corrosion and improved strength
properties. Cuff subassembly
Embodiment of MBD SB will reduce the risk of fractures of the cuff and remove the requirement for
inspection

2.8 Sidestay Cardan Double Locking
Description/ Context Status Update
New locking end caps and bolts for the upper AD released to mandate the installation of new end caps and bolts.
and lower Sidestay Cardan joints - To MBD SBs 200-32-315 and 201-32-63 released.
introduce double locking to the Joints. Kits available, contact retrofit@safranmbd.com to place orders
see table for applicability
Affects all A320/A321 MLG with the exception Please note availability of kits is staggered over the AD
of EV Compliance Time (currently June 2021).
Commercial Policy
Kits discounted by 50% for duration of the
AD compliance time, see SBs for prices.
MLG Type Kit number Comments

A320 MAF2175A320-200 Upper and Lower Joints
A321-200 MAF2175A321-200 Upper Joint Only
A321-100 MAF2175A321-100 Upper and Lower Joints
MBD SBs released. Kits available - Contact MBD Retrofit to order.

2.8 - Sidestay Upper Cardan Life Limit
An AD has been released, it has been decided to reduce the life limit for
During an A320-200 77T main landing gear fatigue test, an certain installations of the P/N 201163620 MLG upper cardan (see below
upper cardan PN 201163620 was found with a crack, table for information).
emanating from the grease hole / main lug intersection.
This AD requires implementation of the new life limits, as applicable, and
replacement of any affected MLG upper cardan units that have already
Consequence exceeded the reduced limit.
This condition, if not corrected, could lead to MLG upper Status Update
cardan fracture and in worse case MLG collapse. AD 2014-0141 released.
MBD SB 200-32-312 has been published with rework instructions to
achieve full life.
Fatigue crack emanated from grease hole
Crack
Grease holes
AD 2014-0141 and MBD SB 200-32-312 released.

2.9 - MLG Lock Stay Actuator Hoses
CONTENTS
Lockstay Actuator Hose Corrosion
Hose Leakage Near Swivel Coupling

Hoses A318/A319/A320/A321 20165519(3/4/5/6)

2.9 - MLG Lockstay Actuator Hose Corrosion
Operators have reported corrosion to hose end
fittings
Consequence End fittings
Hydraulic leakage

Hoses
Corrosion was found to be in the threads of the
swivel housing
Solution
MBD SB 200-32-300 and MBD SB 201-32-52 Crack on
(A321) introduces a more corrosion resistant
swivel
material of the end fittings.
housing
MBD SBs introduce new end fittings which are more resistant to corrosion
2.9 - MLG Lockstay Actuator Hose Leakage Near Swivel Coupling
Description/Context
2 Cases of Post SB 200-32-300 Lockstay Actuator Hose leakages
near the swivel coupling location on the hose.
Possible Consequence
If leak occurs whilst aircraft on ground may result in an AOG and
delays to source a spare hose.
If leak occurs in flight then may result in in-ability to retract MLG and
an in flight turn back.

The hose leakage on the subject aircraft is a result of an attempt to
undo the 13/16 Hex or 11/16 Hex of the Swivel coupling end fitting to
disconnect the Swivel coupling from the hose socket during AC
maintenance. This joint should only be used during hose production.
Mitigation/Solution
Operators should not use the 11/16 and the 13/16 Hex when
removing or installing the Lockstay actuator hoses . AMM will be
Swivel coupling Hose Socket
updated to include these notes due Q4 2016.
SimpleMBD
solution available,new
SBs introduce AMM to fittings
end be updated
which to
arereduce risk of future
more resistant occurrence.
to corrosion
2.10 - MLG Main Fitting
CONTENTS
Main Fitting Inner Bore Corrosion

A318/A319/A320/A321 All PNs
Main Fitting Inner Bore Corrosion RDDAS Guidelines
Main Fitting Inner Bore Corrosion FAQs

2.10 - MLG Main Fitting Inner Bore Corrosion
Description/Context Root Cause Investigation
Estimated ~3% of fleet affected and ~50 cases of Main Fitting corrosion have been
reported since the introduction of a modified Lower Bearing with a longer outer liner The root cause of the corrosion is a combination of:
in 2008 (MBD SBs 200-32-297 & 201-32-49). All cases have been repairable. Inherent micro-cracking of the flash chrome plus moisture ingress can
Possible Consequences lead to corrosion . This corrosion causes chrome lift/detachment.
Shock absorber fluid leakage and consequent unscheduled maintenance. Fretting between the Lower Bearing and Main Fitting, which (in the
A requirement to perform an on-wing repair, to remove corrosion damage. presence of lifted/detached chrome) damages the attached flash chrome
Extreme cases of corrosion may necessitate MRO repair. and exposes the base metal further.
Mitigation
Refer to Airbus SIL 32-144 (especially page 45) for Corrosion Prevention
Recommendations.
On-Wing:
If you find this damage, make an RDDAS request to MBD AOG CSC
(aogcsc@safranmbd.com) and request the current reporting template.
RDDAS limitation: next overhaul
MBD SLs A320-A31 & A321-A19 (application of a CIC Wipe) may be
performed at any convenient opportunity (RDDAS or no RDDAS) to
increase inspection interval.
Maximum RDDAS inspection interval: 8000FC/48 months.
Solution
At overhaul Main Fittings are modifiable (MBD SB 200-32-371 & 201-32-65):
Main Fitting bore machined to accommodate a thicker layer of chrome
Chrome wiped with primer paint to fill surface micro-cracks
This will be embodied on new manufacture in August 2015. RDDAS Guide
On-Wing MBD SLs A31 & A19 issued Sep. 2014 to apply CIC wipe to area
MISP Closed, Solutions Available

2.10 - MLG Main Fitting Inner Bore Corrosion RDDAS Guidelines
General Guidelines
Main Fitting Inner Bore Corrosion RDDASs must take a number of variables into account before a RDDAS can be issued. FAQs
Blends in the sealing lands must provide enough material support to maintain the shock absorber sealing function.
Blends in the locating bore must provide enough support for the lower bearing during landing gear operation and maintain fatigue stresses within acceptable limits,
where the support has been removed or is not sufficient the RDDAS would be rejected and off-wing repaired would be required (including installation of an over-
seize bearing).
Case Case Description Blend Size Max Depth Comments

Seen
1 Locating Bore Deep Blend Height 80mm x Width 140mm 0.9mm
2 Primary Seal Land Deep Height 37mm x Width 23mm 0.7mm Blend is near seals and RDDAS is subject to
Blend satisfactory sealing of the shock absorber.
3 Long Blend in Locating bore Height 50mm x Width 250mm 0.42mm Remaining section above blend provides support for
bearing.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Note: this slide is for information only and is not authorisation for future repairs
2.10 - MLG Main Fitting Inner Bore Corrosion FAQs
Customer Question (Main Fitting): Customer Question (Lower Bearing):
I need to repair a pre-SB* Main Fitting (at overhaul) in the area where the I have repaired a Main Fitting in the area where the Lower Bearing
Lower Bearing locates, but the only CMM Repair is for a post-SB* Main locates and want to install an oversize Lower Bearing with a long outer-
Fitting. How do I process the repair? liner. However, SB 200-32-297 / SB 201-32-49 does not include the P/Ns
* SB 200-32-317 (A320), SB 201-32-65 (A321) of oversize Lower Bearings. How do I proceed?
MBD Response: MBD Response:

You first need to embody the re-identification aspect of the SB*. In practice, You first need to embody the re-identification aspect of the SB by
this means you must assign the applicable post-SB P/N to the Main Fitting, cancelling the strike numbers on the applicable nameplates. Then you
both in documentation and on the part, in accordance with the SB* can refer to the CMM Repair for the Main Fitting, where the Option 2
instructions. Then the CMM Repair will be applicable to your Main Fitting. Post SB table contains the P/Ns of the long outer-liner oversize Lower
Bearings. More FAQs
Main Fitting Flow Chart Lower Bearing Flow Chart

1. Embody the re-identification aspect of the SB: 1. Embody the re-identification aspect of the SB:
Assign the applicable post-SB P/N to the Main Fitting
Cancel the strike numbers on the applicable
(both in documentation and on the part), in
accordance with the SB*. nameplates in accordance with SB instructions.
2. Perform the CMM Repair: 2. Refer to the CMM:
Now that your Main Fitting is identified with a post- Now that your MLG is identified as being post-SB, refer
SB* P/N, you can perform the CMM Repair. to the Option 2 Post SB table in the CMM Repair,
which contains the P/Ns of the long outer-liner
oversize Lower Bearings.

2.10 - MLG Main Fitting Inner Bore Corrosion FAQs
Customer Question (Main Fitting): Customer Question (Lower Bearing):
Is there any concern that the wet primer will mix with hydraulic fluid? Is it possible to apply the SB on-wing?
MBD Response:
MBD Response: No because the chrome plating is a shop procedure. See the on-wing
No, the wet primer application procedure calls for the wet primer to be solution (Service Letter) for way forward.
wiped dry. The objective is not for the primer to stay on the surface but
to impregnate the microcracks.
Customer Question (Lower Bearing):

Customer Question (Lower Bearing): What is the maximum allowable blend depth for a RDDAS if there are
What will be the design in this area for the new EV MLGs? corrosion findings?
MBD Response: MBD Response:

Same as existing solution i.e. Thicker chrome plating (a small number of Due to the number of variables (Blend Width, Height, Depth and
EV MLGs do not have the solution embodied). Location), MBD is currently processing RDDASs on a case by case
basis.
Customer Question (Lower Bearing):
Does CIC wipe need to be re-applied if the shock absorber is
disassembled for any reason before overhaul?
MBD Response:
MBD recommends the reapplication of CIC wipe in the area at any
convenient opportunity, as a best practice.

/03/ Best Maintenance Practices
3 - Landing Gear - Best Maintenance Practices
Lubrication of Landing Gears

3.1. NLG Lubrication Recommendations
3.2. MLG Lubrication Recommendations
3.3. General Lubrication Recommendations
3.4. Signs of In-Effective Lubrication
3.5. Lubrication of Threads
3.6. Clay vs Lithium Grease
Cleaning
3.6. General Recommendations
General Checks
3.7. Sealant
3.8. Protective Treatments
3.9. Hoses and Harnesses
Effective preventative maintenance will reduce the risk of part degradation and improve gear reliability
3.1 - NLG Lubrication Recommendations
The greasing intervals given in
Upper panel & barrel hinge Airbus MPD are the minimum
pintle requirement. MBD, on advice from
operators has highlighted sensitive
areas where operators may wish to
reduce their greasing intervals
should they feel the need (pro-
actively or through previous
experience).
24/25 GA target lever

pin
Torque links and apex pins
Lower Bearing
Effective greasing will reduce the risk of part degradation and improve gear reliability

3.2 - MLG Lubrication Recommendations
The greasing intervals given in
Airbus MPD are the minimum
requirement. MBD, on advice from
operators has highlighted sensitive
areas where operators may wish to
reduce their greasing intervals
should they feel the need (pro- Retraction Actuator
actively or through previous Pins
experience).
Pintle Bearings Forward and

Aft
Lower Bearing Dowel Pins, particularly

if flying into the CIS region where
weekly greasing is recommended Upper and Lower Torque
Very dynamic location and operation on rough Links
runways and taxiways has been proven to
reduce grease longevity therefore more frequent
grease replenishment is recommended.
Effective greasing will reduce the risk of part degradation and improve gear reliability
3.3 - General Lubrication Recommendations
Lubrication Information:
Greasing operations are expected to fulfill two different functions:
Lubrication
Indirect protection of metallic parts against corrosion
Greasing minimises friction in joints and expels trapped moisture dirt and debris from joints interface
locations.
Greasing and lubrication of the landing gear need to be performed as per MPD Greasing intervals as a
minimum
Recommendation during Greasing

Fully replenish all old grease at every greasing interval, by injecting grease until only fresh grease is seen to
extrude (purging) for full grease renewal
Replenishing grease throughout a path/joint will prevent solidification of the grease inside the greasing
paths
Note:- This is only possible for joints where grease is expelled externally
Do not mix greases of different types / specifications
If grease is changed, fully purge joint with new grease and reduce greasing interval for a short period of
time
Use only approved lubricants from the Airbus Consumable Materials List
Ensure grease is within its shelf life
Ensure grease is kept in sealed containers before use

3.4 - Signs of In-Effective Lubrication
Signs of In-Effective Lubrication Signs that a grease path is blocked
During Greasing Application extruded grease may Grease gun give excessive back pressure
contain debris Excessive grease may extrude from around grease
Excessively worn protective treatments, chromium adaptor..
plate and possible exposure of base metal. During disassembly greasing path may be visibly
Base material may be corroded. blocked
No grease extrude from joint or orifice
In-effective lubrication Effective Lubrication,

excessive wear and base normal wear.
metal exposure.
Blocked Greasing path lack

of effective lubrication

3.5 - Lubrication of Threads
Application of jointing compound on threads and splines is important to prevent degradation.
An application of suitable lubricant/ Jointing compound on to threads before assembly as per

AMM/ CMM practices (i.e Molykote DX paste as per below image) will lubricate the thread
interface and prevent protective treatment damage during assembly.
Lubricants and jointing compounds used for this application are not resistant to hydraulic oils
and will absorb moisture over time, so ensure that a fillet of sealant is always present to provide
additional protection.

3.6 - Clay vs Lithium Grease
MBD has received frequent questions and requests regarding lithium based
greases for use on all families of landing gear.
The Airbus AMM currently allows use of either Lithium or Clay based
greases.
MBD documentation and deliveries currently complies with the grease

specified on the purchase order from the Type Certificate Holder of the
aircraft. For Single Aisle Aircraft this is currently Clay Based Grease Mobil
28.
MBD recognizes that some operators have a preference for Lithium grease
over Clay based grease; however the introduction of Lithium grease into
MBD documentation will not take place until requested by the Type
Certificate Holder.

3.6 - General Cleaning Recommendations
DO NOT USE Vapour cleaning or high pressure spraying equipment (MBD also recommends operators
DO NOT use low pressure spraying equipment). These cleaning methods lead to potential moisture
ingress, sealant damage and part corrosion in particular:
Removal of protective treatments and damage to fillets of sealant on Structural Parts resulting
in corrosion
Moisture ingress inside Interference Fits (Lug and Bush Interfaces) resulting in lug corrosion
Damage to Electrical Equipment resulting in short circuiting or false indications
Damage or degradation to Sealed (Hydraulic) Units (see below)
If you do use low pressure spray equipment when washing Sealed

(Hydraulic units) then:
Do not direct the jet to the gland ID: This could force
water past the scraper seal lead to moisture ingress
result in corrosion on internal parts.
Do not direct the jet to external valves: this may
remove sealant and lead to moisture ingress.
Follow and use only AMM approved cleaning methods and fluids.
AMM External Cleaning Washing of Hydraulic
AMM Main Landing Gear Cleaning Units - Do not direct jet to
this location (Gland ID)

3.7 - General Checks - Sealant
Inspection and repair is recommended at regular intervals and/or when damage is noted during
any visual inspection.
Visually Inspect joints to ensure sealant is present and forms a continuous unbroken profile.
Any damage to sealant should be repaired / replaced in line with relevant AMM/CMM.
Cracked
sealant could
identify bush
migration /
rotation.
Ensure
sealant is
present and
Cracked sealant could indicated bush/Migration or rotation. continuous
If Migration or bush rotation has occurred then refer to applicable AMM/CMM or approved
documentation (In some cases this is covered in a service bulletin)

3.8 - General Checks - Protective Treatments
Protective Treatment prevents base material from corrosion. Any

damage to protective treatment could result in corrosion and part
degradation.
Paint Loss has resulted
in corrosion on this
Signs that a Protective Treatment is Damaged MLG
Visual defects present
Old exuded grease may include particles of protective treatments
Corrosion / corrosion product evident in the area
Base material exposed
Causes of Protective Treatment Damage

Ingress of moisture into a joint, Stagnant water in a joint,
Abrasive damage (Internal wear and external chaffing), General
weather damage FOD damage, Chemical damage/attack (de-
icing fluids, hydraulic fluids, etc), Physical damage from
mishandling
Replenishment of Protective Treatments

Follow relevant AMM/CMM to reapply the protective treatment

3.9 - General Checks - Hoses and Harnesses
Damage to the Harness and protective treatment could occur when these two components
come in contact with each other during the operation
When inspecting hoses and harnesses, look out for worn sections, leakages, deformation,
kinks, scratches, FOD / protective treatment damage. Also ensure that the back shells are not
cracked or damaged. If any of these damages are encountered, the part must be replaced,
refer to the relevant AMM / CMM.
Do not perform unauthorised modifications or repairs to harness and hoses as this can have
unforeseen results and consequences.

/04/ Landing Gear Product Information
1. A320/321 Serialisation SBs 2. Restoration Information
3. Tracking the safe life of parts 4. New Products
5. EV Tooling Information

/04/ Landing Gear Production Information
4.1 - MLG A320 Serialisation Service Bulletins
It is a requirement of the Airbus MPD that all the life limited parts can be
tracked
This was introduced by a number of Service Bulletins:
200-32-271 (Retraction actuator pins and forward pintle pin cross bolts)
Refer to Airbus SB A320-32-1213 for compliance
Introduction of a new serialised parts from SB 200-32-271 will also accomplish SB
200-32-261
200-32-282 (Torque link apex pin nut)
200-32-283 (Side stay parts)
Introduction of the new serialised Cuff and Banana link subassemblies from SB 200-
32-283 will also accomplish SB 200-32-267
200-32-284 (Retraction actuator)
The Serialisation Service Bulletins include a method to produce the unique tracking numbers
The operators should make sure that the applicable strike numbers are marked on the strike
plates
Embodiment of MBD SBs will help to track the safe life of the parts
4.1 - MLG A321 Serialisation Service Bulletins
It is a requirement of the Airbus MPD that all the life limited parts can be
tracked
This was introduced by a number of Service Bulletins:
201-32-29 (Retraction actuator pins and forward pintle pin cross bolts)
Refer to Airbus SB A320-32-1213 for compliance
Introduction of a new serialised parts from SB 200-32-29 will also accomplish SB 201-
32-22
201-32-39 (Torque link apex pin nut)
201-32-40 (Side stay parts)
Introduction of the new serialised Cuff and Banana link subassemblies from SB 201-
32-40 will also accomplish SB 201-32-27
201-32-41 (Retraction actuator)
The Serialisation Service Bulletins include a method to produce the unique tracking numbers
The operators should make sure that the applicable strike numbers are marked on the strike
plates Continued
Embodiment of MBD SBs will help to track the safe life of the parts

4.2 - NLG Restoration Information
Based on MBD experience and in-service feedback, MBD has issued a SB

which provides the recommended restoration tasks to perform at the end
of the TBO period (during overhaul process)
The recommendations provided in this MBD SB advise on the restoration

activity that needs to be performed to maintain continued safe and reliable
operation.
2 categories have been defined :

Concept A => parts requiring a complete overhaul as per the relevant CMM
Concept B => parts submitted only to visual inspection and tests as per relevant
CMM; if a finding is noticed during visual inspection or the test then the part should
be submitted to a complete overhaul as per relevant CMM
Continued
MBD SB 580-32-3170 provides all restoration tasks to perform on NLG

4.2 - MLG Restoration Information
The Restoration Service Bulletins were produced by

MBD to define the minimum requirements that need
to be achieved at an overhaul
These Service Bulletins must be used in conjunction
with the Airbus MRBR and MPD documents
The Service Bulletins list the items that are identified
with a life limitation that require a full restoration
On condition units that are accepted after a
satisfactory test at overhaul will not have had a full
restoration
MBD SB 200-32-295 and 201-32-48 provides all restoration tasks to perform on MLG
4.3 - MLG Tracking the Safe Life of Parts
The Service Bulletins are issued to help Operators to track the safe life of the parts
The safe life data is included in the Airbus Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) and the SBs
The data in the MBD SB is in three sections

Parts which tests indicate have not achieved the full design life are listed in Appendix A,
the Safe Life Limits for these parts are listed in the Airbus ALS Part 1 (ALS Part 4 contains
system equipment).
Parts which tests indicate have achieved the full design life are listed in Appendix B, the
Safe Life Limits for these parts are listed in the Airbus ALS Part 1 (ALS Part 4 contains
system equipment).
Parts with a recommended replacement within 60,000 landings are listed in Appendix C of
the MBD SBs, with the recommended replacement data, these parts are not included in
the ALS
MBD SB 200-32-230 and 201-32-08 (A321) will help to track the safe life of the parts
4.4 - A320 Landing Gear New Products - Context
New NLG and MLG are under development

Driven by new specifications encompassing product
improvement and new programme requirements
1 NLG version (common across all AC variants) and
2 MLG versions (A320 & A321)
Will be applicable to both current A320 family
aircrafts and the NEO aircraft.
The new landing gears are derived from the

current production standards with
improvements where required
Continued

4.4 - Interchangeability
The new gears will be compatible with some existing A320

Aircraft.
Higher structural requirements mean existing A320 gears are NOT

compatible with A320 NEO airframe.
MBD and Airbus are working together to deliver the latest

improvements to the existing fleet.
Continued

4.4 - NLG & MLG Structural Reinforcements
NLG structural improvements

Main Fitting
Dragstay
Sliding Tube
Turning Tube
Torque link
Shock absorber internals
Secondary structural items
(pins, wheel axle nut, uplock assembly)
MLG structural improvements

Main Fitting
Sliding Tube
Sidestay
Continued
4.4 - NLG In-Service Corrosion Protection Improvements
Upper Support / column interface

Change of column material to Corrosion
Resistant Steel
Articulation points
Corrosion inhibitor compound in lug cavities
Improved bush assembly techniques (thicker
cadmium on bushes and wet primer
assembly)
Axle / Sliding Tube (spacer) interface

Corrosion inhibitor compound / jointing
compound
Improved sealant scheme
Continued
/04/ A320 Landing Gear New Products
4.4 - NLG Operational Improvements
Harness chaffing resolution

New routing of Upper 1M and 2M harnesses
New junction box technology
Retraction Actuator bearing

Change of rod material to Corrosion Resistant
Steel
Caged split spherical bearing
Towing indications
Painted visual indication of the 2 angular limits
Continued
4.4 - In-service Corrosion Protection Improvements
Bushes
Change of assembly process to use wet
primer method
Main Fitting to Upper Diaphragm

Tube Interface
New environmental seal
Improved corrosion prevention methods
applied to area
Jacking Dome
Improved protection scheme and assembly
methods
Design change to improve drainage
Continued
4.4 - MLG Operational Improvements
New Upper Bearing Assembly for A320

MLG
Threaded assembly to harmonize A320 & A321
Changeover valve indicator

Improved visual aid for identification of secondary
seal activation
Improved Damper and Torque Link

interface
New wire inserts
Longer bolts
4.5 EV Tooling Information
A320 EV NLG socket for use with new

barrel nut.
A320 CMM 32-27-70 T46934
A320 and A321 EV MLG Upper Cardan Nut

Socket to torque the new Lower Cardan
Nut
A320 CMM 32-12-79 DRT69679
A321 CMM 32-12-80 DRT69681
A320 and A321 EV MLG Lower Cardan Nut

Socket to torque the new Lower Cardan
Nut
A320 CMM 32-12-79 - DRT69678
A321 CMM 32-12-80 - DRT69680
A320 EV MLG fixture to drill locking plate 55-4505016-

00 for threaded upper bearing assembly.
CMM 32-12-82 F28183000
A320 EV MLG spanner to torque the Upper Bearing

onto the Slider Locking Plate
CMM 32-12-82 T47412 Upper Bearing
A320 EV MLG threaded

cone to protect sliding tube
threads during lower
bearing
CMM 32-12-82 T47411
Sliding Tube
Piston Nut
A320 and A321 EV MLG torque

adaptor for use on Retraction
Actuator Piston
CMM 32-31-04 - PN 144465
END

Airbus Family Landing Gear

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Messier-Bugatti-Dowty

Airbus Single Aisle Family Landing Gear

A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

This In-Service Experience is Messier-Bugatti-Dowty proprietary

Its use is strictly limited to Messier-Bugatti-Dowty customers

It shall never be copied nor transmitted to any other organisation without

The information given in the In-Service Experience is not contractual

In no case may it supersede the applicable Messier-Bugatti-Dowty

/01/ Solutions In Development /03/ Best Maintenance Practices

/02/ Recommended Solutions /04/ Landing Gear Product Information

1.5 Barrel Top Face

1.3 Barrel Bush Migration

1.6 Proximity Sensor

3 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

P/N affected: D23119750-1, D23119751119

4 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

No link determined between electrical box and reconnection issue.

Shock Absorber Leakage - Dynamic Seal

Sliding Tube Chrome Flaking

Sliding Tube P/N affected: D66679

6 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

RDDAS issued by MBD can allow continued A/C operation around

Dedicated support provided and communicated to all 60 operators

Retrofit progressing and dedicated RDDAS support available on request.

Barrel Bush Migration

Barrel P/N affected: All

9 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

Harness Connector Corrosion

11 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

MBD are supporting Airbus in the solution

Refer to Airbus TFU 32.00.00.007 R14

Barrel Top Face Corrosion

13 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

14 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

NLG Proximity Sensor

Proximity sensor mechanism P/N affected:

15 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

Investigation report to be shared between MBD and Airbus in Q1 2016

Feedback from Customer is needed in case of event related to 24/25GA

Investigations on going. MBD to gather additional data from operators

16 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

2.6 Pintle Pins

2.5 - Lockstay Actuator

2.4 - Sliding Tube 2.1 - Harnesses

2.3 - Quick Release Coupling

17 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

Harness Connector Corrosion

18 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

MBD are supporting Airbus in the solution

Refer to Airbus TFU 32.00.00.007 R14

MLG Torque Link Damper Loose Bolts

A/C affected: P/N affected:

20 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

Root Cause Investigation

MLG Quick Release Coupling Hydraulic Leaks

A/C affected: P/N affected:

22 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

Root Cause Investigation

MLG Sliding Tube Thermal Damage and Cracking

Axle Overheating Damage

Slave Link Lug Crack

24 / A320 Family - In Service experience Landing Gear - Issue 4 - February 2016

Mitigation actions and a solution are available.

A new low friction inner liner and shorter