Poe-Llamanzares V COMELEC

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES-- -
SUPREME COURT 2815 DEC 28 A
MANILA HID: 11
EN BANC
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD

S. POE-LLAMANZARES,
Petitioner, ) ~--~ ..l n
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1
SUPREME COURT
-versus- G.R. No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT
EN BANC
RECEIVED
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEC 2 8 2015

ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO,
Respondents. BY: }uu?l
TIME: ID ~zi) 9
<::::::::;
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PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

-~:~
-with-
Extremely Urgent Application for

Ex Parte Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order I
Status Quo Ante Order and/ or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
..,_
Petitioner Senator MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-

LLAMANZARES, by counsel, respectfully states:
PREFATORY
The will of the people. is paramount. Section 1, Article II of

the 1987 Constitution states that "(s)overeignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them."
Petitioner is before the Supreme Court-the court of last

resort-because the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") has,
in a series of acts and pronouncements, reeking not just of the
usual grave abuse of discretion, but of outright hostility and
arrogance, has chosen to disenfranchise the sovereign people
and de_prive them of something rightfully theirs: the
consideration of petitioner as a viable and valid choice for
President in the next elections. The latest act of thinly disguised
2
oppression meted out by the COMELEC is the timing of the

release of its En Bane's 23 December 2015 Resolution, affirming
the COMELEC Second Division's 1 December 2015 Resolution in
SPA 15-001, cancelling Petitioner's certificate of candidacy, with
an ominous citation of its own Rule 37 that its decision will
"become final and executory after the lapse of five days from
their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court."l
The Resolution was released on 23 December 2015, a day
that the Supreme Court had priorly declared it would be
closed, and on the eve of a four (4) day holiday stretch,
thereby leaving the Petitioner only the fifth day-28
December 2015-to file her petition with and to ask for a
temporary restraining order from this Honorable Court. The
deliberate intent to inflict maximum prejudice on
Petitioner, by obstructing her opportunity to seek injunctive
relief, is obvious. Surely, this is irreparable damage not just
to Petitioner, but more importantly, to at least fifty (50)
million voters who are being deprived of a valid choice in
the electoral process, which must be urgently addressed.
The "maximum prejudice" was actually doubled, because

there were in fact two Resolutions released on 23 December
2015. The other Resolution was rendered in SPA Cases Nos. 15-
002, 15-007 and 15-139, originally handled by the COMELEC's
First Division, separate from the SPA No. 15-001 handled by the
Se,cond Division, which the COMELEC inexplicably failed to
:1, consolidate despite Petitioner's repeated pleas for consolidatiQ!J;
as after all, all four (4) cases concerned one and the same CQ,C
Gl!l.d involved common questions of fact and law. Petitioner asked
fb~ consolidation both at the division level, and before the Ert
Banc, ,but to no avail. Now she is doubly damaged by tlie
COMELEC's oppression as she is constrained to file two (2k.
petitions on the 28th of December-the only day left of her fr~
(5)-day period. That the assailed Resolutions all commonly
cancelled one and the same COC anyway, and yet Petitioner Js
forced to file two petitions, show the senselessness of the actions ..,
i
taken by the CO MELEC.
'i'
Petitioner thus asks for immediate relief from this
Honorable Court to prevent the COMELEC from inflicting ev~ '
fl more injustice, by enjoining the COMELEC from treating~ As
~,
Resol:utions as final and executory in any manner and dele~~.t~:;;
Petitioner's name from the official list of candidates a~~'*e ~.,;:
. official ballots to be printed for .the 2016 elections. On~x~ ?l;~~
TRO pr status quo ante order will the COMELEC be pre\?'ettj;:R ,
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: ~~titioner does not concede the validity of this Rule which shortens the period to q"4f}tj~~.
the decision of the COMELEC, given under Rule 64 and the Omnibus Election Cod,~ ;;tna .
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the Con&tttut1on. " .
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3
from subverting the very electoral process it is mandated to

uphold.
Petitioner is a top choice for President-emerging as the

top contender with another Presidential candidate according to
the latest Social Weather Stations ("SWS") survey released on the
very day that the COMELEC released its 23 December 2015
Resolutions.2 More than this, she is an incumbent Senator who
enjoys a mandate from over twenty (20) million Filipino voters-
the highest number of votes cast for a Senator in Philippine
election history. Such mandate was challenged, but ultimately
upheld, by the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the sole and exclusive
judge of Petitioner's qualifications as Senator, including her
natural-born Filipino citizenship.
Even before she was elected a Senator of the Republic,

Petitioner's life story has been an open book. The Filipino people
knew that Petitioner is a foundling, abandoned as a new-born
infant in Iloilo City and later adopted by Ronald Allan Kelly Poe
("Fernando Poe, Jr.") and Jesusa Sonora Poe ("Susan Roces").
The Philippine government, if not the Philippine state (through
its sovereign electorate), has consistently recognized Petitioner,
from infancy until adulthood, as a Filipino, if not a natural-born
Filipino, citizen.
Private respondent accused Petitioner,., of committing a

material misrepresentation in her COC for President when she
indicated therein that: (1) she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines; and (2) by 9 May 2016, she will be a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months. Private
respondent's theory is that Petitioner is not a natural-born
Filipino because she supposedly does not fall under any of the
five categories of citizens under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution (which was in force at the time of Petitioner's birth
in 1968). According to private respondent, since a foundling is
not mentioned in the enumeration of Philippine citizens in the
1 935 Constitution, the Latin maxim "expresio unius est exclusio
alterius" applies - the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
the other.
In "excluding" Sen. Poe from the categories of Filipinos,

private respondent simply argued that since Sen. Poe is a
foundling whose parents are unknown. From here, she jumps to
the illogical conclusion that she cannot show that she is a
Filipino. She supposedly cannot rely on jus sanguinis because
2 See, e.g., news article by Patricia Lourdes Viray, "Binay, Poe, tied in latest SWS poll" at
http:/ /www.philstar.com/ headlines/ 2015 / 12 /23 / 1535652 /binay-poe-tied-latest-sws-poll
(date of last access: 23 December 2015)
4
she cannot establish that her biological parents are Filipinos.

She is unable to show a blood relation.
Private respondent's theory is based on her misconception

of the nature and essence of a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a COC. It is premised on the erroneous assumption that
a candidate has the burden of proof whenever her qualifications
are questioned.
Sen. Poe is a natural-born citizen, and by 9 May 2016, she

will be a resident of the Philippines for ten ( 10) years and eleven
( 11) months. The Philippine Government (through the official
acts of the Office of the President, the Commission on Elections,
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of
Immigration), has repeatedly recognized her as Filipino, if not a
natural-born Philippine citizen, thereby giving rise to the
presumption that she possesses that status. The Filipino people
themselves recognized her as a natural-born Filipino when they
elected her as Senator. When that status was finally challenged
this year, it was upheld by no less than the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, which categorically ruled that Sen. Poe is a "natural-
born Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, who continues
to be so under the 1987 Constitution."
It is settled that the burden in an action under Section 78

of the Omnibus Election Code ("OEC") lies first and foremost
with whoever questions the qualifications of a candidate. Upon
him or her lies the burden of proving that a candidate is
disqualified. A candidate is not required to prove his or her
qualifications for the office, because the law presumes that he or
she is being truthful when he or she accomplished his or her
COC. Just as a person enjoys a presumption of innocence, he or
she also enjoys the presumption of being innocent of any
wrong. 3 It is also a basic rule in litigation that the party who
initiates the case, and who therefore stands to lose if neither
party presents evidence, has the burden of proof. This rule is
applied in favor of persons accused of the vilest crimes in
criminal cases, and of defendants in civil and administrative
cases. If private respondent would have her way, the rule should
be denied to Sen. Poe with respect to her eligibility for public
office, simply because she is a foundling.
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, instead

of requiring private respondent to prove, in the first instance, her
allegation that Sen. Poe is not a natural-born citizen, it placed
the burden on Sen. Poe to prove that she is born of Filipino
3 Sec. 3 (a), Rule 131, Rules of Court

5
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parents. But the only way that private respondent can prove that
Sen. Poe committed a false representation, with the intent to
deceive, is for her to prove that Sen. Poe indeed was born of alien
parents, and hence cannot be a natural-born citizen. It is not
enough for private respondent to prove that Sen. Poe is -.. .
foundling, for all that this proves is that Sen. Poe's parents are
unknown, not that they are not Filipino citizens, and that
therefore private respondent cannot prove that Sen. Poe is an
alien. Under the circumstances, all that private respondent was
able to accomplish is to create doubt on Sen. Poe's
qualifications. But a doubt as to a candidate's qualifications is
not sufficient justification for the COMELEC to cancel a COC.
The candidate's disqualification must be proven, and the
material misrepresentation proven as a fact, before it can cancel
aCOC.
As a final note, Petitioner submits that the core issue in

this case-whether a foundling is a natural-born Filipino-
transcends Petitioner's candidacy for President. What is at stake
in this case is not only a foundling's right to run for high public
offices, but the enjoyment of a host of even seemingly ordinary
rights or positions which our laws reserve only for natural-born
citizens.
The reality that a foundling will be deprived of these simply

because she was abandoned at birth, without any trace of her
,,biological parents, (a circumstance that is not of her own doiqg)
is highly material in this case. In the words of the Hon. J~sti~;
lat.er Chief Justice, Artemio Panganiban in the landiark
fa~valdo vs. COMELEC, "(i)n cases where the sovereignty of the''
penple, is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also
politically correct." ''
4
. Ror this and other reasons, this Petition must be grant~,
the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC reversed and s~t
aside, and Petitioner must be allowed to continue her candidacy,
t
and the electorate allowed to decide for themselves whether she
is qualified to be the President of the Republic of the Philippine~ .
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~' PARTIES . ij<.iltr

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~\ 1. Petit~oner ("Petiti~ner" or "Sen. Poe") i~ a Fili~~~Q~.::.9~~:.
legal age, marned and a resident of 106 Rodeo Dnve, Con~
Hills, 1Brgy. Ugong Norte, Quezon City. She may be served ~. ):;;_., ";. '.
p\~adings, processes, orders and the decision in this, c~.~~'

through undersigned counsel.
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2. Public respondent Commission on Elections

("COMELEC" or the "Commission") is a body established under
Section 1, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. It holds office at
the Palacio del Gobernador, Gen. Luna St., Intramuros, Manila,
where it may be served with pleadings, processes, orders and the
decision in this case.
3. Private respondent Estrella C. Elamparo ("private

respondent" or "Elamparo") is, on information and belief, a
Filipino and of legal age. She may be served with pleadings,
processes, orders and the decision in this case at the 8th Floor,
Pacific Star Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue car. Makati Avenue,
Makati City
II.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
4. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in

relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It seeks
to nullify, for having been issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the COMELEC's Resolution dated 1 December
2015,4 rendered through its Second Division, and the Resolution
dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission- En Banc5 in SPA
No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
4.1. Certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions

are attached hereto as Annexes "A" and "B". s
III.
TIMELINESS OF THIS PETITION
5. On 1 December 2015, Petitioner, through her counsel

of record at the COMELEC, received a copy of the Resolution
promulgated by the COMELEC's Second Division on even date.
Under Section 7, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure9
("COMELEC Rules") Petitioner had five (5) days from receipt
thereof within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Since
4 Hereinafter, "1 December 2015 Resolution" or "COMELEC Second Division Resolution"

s Hereinafter, "23 December 2015 Resolution" or "COMELEC En Banc Resolution"
s Copies of the Separate Opinion of Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia, and Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion of Chairman J. Andres D. Bautista in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), as received
by Petitioner's counsel of record in the COMELEC, are attached hereto as Annexes "B-1"
and "B-2" respectively.
9 As amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523
7
the fifth day, 6 December 2015, was a Sunday, Petitioner filed

her Verified Motion for Reconsideration the fallowing day, 7
December 2015.
6. Petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration was

denied in the 23 December 2015 Resolution, which her counsel
of record received on that same day. Under Section 3, Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court, Petitioner has thirty (30) days from notice of
judgment or final order or resolution to be reviewed within which
to file a pe"tition for certiorari with this Honorable Court, which
period is interrupted by the filing of a motion for reconsideration
if allowed by the procedural rules of the Commission concerned.
Under the same Rule, if the motion for reconsideration is denied,
the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari within the
remaining period, which shall not be less than five (5) days in
any event, reckoned from notice of denial. Hence, this Petition is
timely filed.
IV.
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS AT THE COMELEC,
THE FACTS, AND THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS
A. Antecedent Proceedings
7.On 15 October 2015, Sen. Poe filed her Certificate of

Candidacy 10 for President in the 9 May 2016 national elections
("COC for President" or "2015 COC"). The following day, herein
private respondent Elamparo filed a verified Petition to Deny Due
Course or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy ("Petition a quo" or
"Elamparo Petition"), 11 which was refiled on 21 October 2015. 12
Said Petition questioned Sen. Poe's citizenship and residence
qualifications. In gist, Elamparo argued that: (a) as Sen. Poe was
a foundling, she is not a natural-born Filipino; (b) assuming Sen.
Poe is a natural-born Filipino, she could not have regained such
status under Republic Act No. 9225 ("R.A. No. 9225"); (c) and
natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
Elamparo likewise argued that Sen. Poe did not have the
required ten years' residence in the Philippines as her residence
could be counted at the earliest only from July 2006 when she
reacquired citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Respondent
Elamparo also contended that Sen. Poe was bound by the
declaration in her 2012 Certificate of Candidacy for Senator
("COC for Senator" or "2012 COC") that her residence before the
May 2013 elections was six (6) years and six (6) months only.
10 Annex "C" hereof

11 Annex "D" hereof
12 Annex "E" hereof
8
8. Summons 13 was served on Sen. Poe on 4 November

2015. She timely filed her Verified Answer. 14 In gist, Sen. Poe
argued that: (a) the petition did not state a cause of action as it
did not state that Sen. Poe's parents were aliens; (b) the petition
did not make sufficient allegations that there was an intent to
misrepresent on the part of Sen. Poe; (c) the COMELEC did not
have jurisdiction as the petition was actually a petition for quo
warranto, which could be filed only if Sen. Poe wins the
Presidency; (d) the burden of proof was on Elamparo, and it is
not sufficient for her to merely state that Sen. Poe's parents were
unknown; (e) the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations
show that foundlings were considered citizens; and (f)
foundlings are presumed under international law to have been
born of citizens of the place where they are found, which
presumption is supported by the Rules of Court and the
admitted circumstances of Sen. Poe's birth. In respect of the
other questioned qualification, Sen. Poe argued that: (a)
residence is a matter of evidence and she reacquired her
domicile in the Philippines as early as 24 May 2005; (b) that she
could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-
born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225; and (c) the statement
regarding the period of residence in her 2012 Certificate of
Candidacy for Senator was a mistake made in good faith, not
binding and should give way to evidence on her true date of
reacquisition of domicile pursuant to Romualdez-Marcos vs.
\I, COMELEc.1s Sen. Poe likewise argued that there being no cl~
case of misrepresentation, the Elamparo Petition is merely ~,p.
<ilc~tio~ to usurp the sovereign's. right to decide 8: .politi6.aj ;i.
quest10n-whom to elect as their leader. Her pos1t10n wp.s,
outlined under the following affirmative defenses: '~; :i.,
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES.
A.I.
THE PETITION A QUO FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF

ACTION AGAINST SEN. POE.
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1 ~ Annex "F" hereof. The following day, or on 5 November 2015, herein Petitio~r:~ri(tf a'
Motio.n for Immediate Consolidation and Motion to Defer Proceedings, praying 'for <tj}.e
c-~1Solidation of SPA No. 15-001 (DC) with SPA No. 15-002 (DC), filed by Fra,pC,is .. ,
'F~tad, and SPA No. 15-007 (DC), filed by Antonio P. Contreras, both questio~
candjfi8FY of herein Petitioner. An Amended Motion for Immediate Consolidqtion -.
likewise filed by herein Petitioner on 11 November 2015. Copies of the foregoing mot*'
foJ?.. consolidation are attached hereto as Annexes "F-1" and "F-2" respectively.
r<1 Annex "G" hereof ,,.
15 G.R. Nos. 119976, 18 September 1995 '
9
A.1.1. The Petition does not contain allegations which, if

hypothetically admitted, would make false the
statement in Sen. Poe's COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen; and
A.1.2. The Petition does not allege that Sen. Poe's

representations in her COC regarding her natural-
born Filipino citizenship and her period of residency
in the Philippines (assuming these representations are
false) were done wilfully or deliberately to "mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise
render (her) ineligible."
A.2.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS LACKS JURISDICTION

OVER THE PETITION A QUO.
A.2.1. The DOJ, and not the Commission on Elections, has

primary jurisdiction to revoke the B.I. 's 18 July 2006
Order which: (a) found Sen. Poe presumptively a
former natural-born Filipino; and (b) approved her
petition for reacquisition of natural-born Filipino
citizenship. Insofar as the Petition assails the B.I. 's
Order, the same is a prohibited collateral attack on
Sen. Poe's natural-born Filipino citizenship.
,i'
A.2.2. The Petition is essentially a petition for quo warranto

because it seeks to establish the ineligibility of Sen.
Poe for the Presidency. The Petition is therefore
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, and it may be filed only if Sen.
Poe is proclaimed President of the Philippines in May
2016.
B.
SEN. POE DID NOT MAKE ANY MATERIAL

MISREPRESENTATION IN HER CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY FOR THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT IN THE 9
MAY 2016 ELECTIONS.
B.1.
SEN. POE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE

PHILIPPINES.
10
B.1.1. Even though foundlings are not expressly mentioned

in Section 1, A11icle IV of the 1935 Constitution, it
was nevertheless the intent of the framers of the 1935
Constitution to include them as citizens of the
Philippines under paragraphs (3) and/or (4) of
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
B.1.2. Under applicable treaties and "generally accepted

principles of international law," a child born in the
Philippines in 1968 of unknown parents, is a natural-
born Filipino.
B.1.3. Sen. Poe re-acquired her natural-born Philippine

citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
B.1.4. Sen. Poe executed a sworn renunciation of her U.S.A.

citizenship prior to the filing of her COC as President
in the May 9, 2016 elections. This sworn
renunciation is in full force and effect and has not
been withdrawn or recanted.
B.2.
ON 9 MAY 2016, SEN. POE WILL BE A RESIDENT OF THE

PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST 10 YEARS AND 11 MONTHS.
B.2.1. It is well-settled that in order to re'establish one's

domicile of choice in the Philippines, only the
following requisites must concur: (a) residence or
bodily presence in the Philippines; (b) an intention to
remain in the country (animus manendi); and (c) an
intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non
revertendi). Sen. Poe satisfied all three (3) requisites
no later than 24 May 2005.
B.2.1.a. From 24 May 2005 up to today, Sen.

Poe has been physically or "bodily"
present in the Philippines.
B.2.1.b. Animus Manendi

Sen. Poe's physical presence in the
Philippines since 24 May 2005 was
always coupled with an intent to stay
permanently in the country.
B.2.1.c. Animus Non Revertendi

Sen. Poe had abandoned her residence in
the U.S.A. since the first quarter of
I l
11
2005, without the intention of returning

there.
B.2.2. Sen. Poe could legally reestablish her domicile of

choice in the Philippines even before she reacquired
her natural-born Philippine citizenship on 7 July
2006.
B.2.3. Sen. Poe committed an honest mistake, on a difficult

question of law, when she stated in her COC for
Senator in the 13 May 2013 elections that her "period
of residence in the Philippines before 13 May 2013"
is "6" years and "6" months. Sen. Poe had the legal
duty to correct this honest error, and could not be
bound (by estoppel) to repeat it, when she filed her
COC for President in the 9 May 2016 elections.
c.
CONSIDERING THAT THE PETITION NOT ONLY FAILS TO
STATE, BUT LACKS A CAUSE OF ACTION, AND IS ALSO
BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, IT IS RELEGATED TO NOTHING BUT AN
ACTION TO USURP THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE TO ANSWER A PURELY POLITICAL
QUESTION - SHOULD SENATOR POE SERVE AS THE
NEXT PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES? "
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9. The Summons received by Sen. Poe contained a Noif!J;.

qfJ-iearing directing the parties to pre-mark their evidence 16 .9;1 on
November 2015 and to attend a hearing on 10 November 20l;Q.
The parties complied with both directives. ~i
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10. During the 10 November 2015 clarificatory hearing~,.

the parties exhaustively discussed their respective positions. At,
the end of the hearing, the parties were given time to file the'ir
respective memoranda with formal offers of evidence 17 , which
they eventually did. ls
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16 ~en. Poe's marked exhibits in the proceeding a quo, which were also marked in .. t~e .. ,
pr6ceedings for SPA No. 15-002 (DC) (entitled Francisco S Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mqry cf!fiGieY(i
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) (entitled Antonio .J>f !;~1;;.
,: Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, responden,t),4 -.
SPA N01. 15-139 (DC) (entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Nat&,1
Sonora Poe- Llamanzares, respondent), are summarized in a table attached to thi~'~
a~i Anne}I: "H". Faithful reproductions of Petitioner's exhibits which were marked
offered in the proceeding a quo are attached hereto as Annex "I-series". :z~~ '
17 A CP of Sen. Poe's Memorandum with Formal Offer of Evidence ("Poe Memora~au
attacfied as Annex "J" hereof. A copy of Elamparo's Memorandum ("Elam
.M~morandum") is attached as Annex "K" hereof. ' . __::~/ ," ,
la,J\ copy of the 24 November 2015 Order of the COMELEC Second Division is attael}ed..
hereto as.. Annex "L". +
12
B. The Facts
11. The fallowing facts are culled from the admissions of

the parties in the pleadings or otherwise supported by the
evidence or found by the COMELEC itself. The respective bases
are appropriately footnoted.
12. Sen. Poe is a foundling; she does not know who her
biological parents are. She was born on September 3, 1968 in
Jaro, Iloilo. However, immediately after her mother gave birth to
her, she was abandoned in the Parish Church of Jaro, where a
certain Mr. Edgardo Militar found her .19 Mr. Edgardo Militar
chose to place herein petitioner in the care and custody of his
relatives, the spouses "Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar."20
13. On 6 September 1968, Mr. Emiliano Militar reported

to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Ilalio ("OCR-Iloilo") the fact
that, on 3 September 1968, herein petitioner was found in the
Parish Church of Jaro.21 In her Foundling Certificate, 22 herein
petitioner's full name was indicated to be "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar."
14. When herein Petitioner was five (5) years old, the
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernaudo Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Races) filed a petition for her
adoption. On 13 May 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan
("San Juan Court") rendered a Decision granting the petition of
the Spouses Poe, 23 and ordering a change in herein petitioner's
name "from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." 24
14.1. In a Certificate of Finality dated 27 October

2
2005, 5 Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Soria, certified that the
San Juan Court's Decision dated 13 May 1974 "has never
been supplemented, amended or modified by any
subsequent Order coming from the Court and therefore has
qlr_e~dy _become F~NAJ.J._"
19 Elamparo Petition, p. 3, par. 5; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.1; Sen. Poe's Foundling
Certificate/Certificate of Live Birth marked as Exhibit "l"; COMELEC Second Division
Resolution, p.2, Fact No. 2.
20 See Exhibit "l"
21 Elamparo Petition, p. 3, par. 6; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.2; COMELEC Second Division
Resolution, pp. 2-3, Fact No.2
22 See Exhibit "l"
23 Elamparo Petition, p. 3, par. 7; Poe Memorandum par. 2.3; COMELEC Second Division
Resolution, p. 3, Fact No. 3.

24 See Exhibit "2"
2s Exhibit "2-A"
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13
14.2. On 11 April 1980, the OCR-floilo received

the San Juan Court's Decision which was "included in the
Official Record File of the Office." 26 Thereafter, OCR-floilo
noted on herein petitioner's Foundling Certificate27 that she
had been adopted by the Spouses Poe on 13 May 197 4.
The following hand-written notation appears in the column
on the right-hand side of herein petitioner's Foundling
Certificate reserved for "accomplish(ment)" by OCR-floilo:
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe

and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San
Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May
13, 1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 138.
14.3. In compliance with the San Juan Court's

Decision, the OCR-floilo also appears to have indicated on
herein petitioner's Foundling Certificate that her middle
name ("Contreras") and last name ("Militar") would be
replaced with "Sonora" and "Poe," respectively. The names
of Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe were also
written on herein petitioner's Foundling Certificate, in the
boxes or spaces reserved for the names of those legally
considered as herein petitioner's parents.
15. Soon after herein Petitioner turned eighteen, she

applied for registration as a voter with the local office of the
COMELEC in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, the
COMELEC issued in her favor a "Voter's Identification Card" for
Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.2s
16. On 4 April 1988, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

Republic of the Philippines issued to Petitioner a Philippine
Passport (with No. F927287)2 9 which was valid for five (5) years,
or until 4 April 1993. This passport stated, in part, that "(t)he
Government of the Republic of the Philippine requests all
concerned to permit the bearer, a citizen of the Philippines to
pass safely and freely and, in case of need, to give (her) lawful
aid and protection."
26 A copy of OCR-floilo's Certification dated 11 November 2005 was marked as Exhibit "2-
B''.
27 See Exhibit "1"
28 Elamparo Petition, pp. 3 to 4, par. 8; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.4; COMELEC Second
Division Resolutton, p. 3, Fact No. 4. Sen. Poe's 1986 Voter's Identification Card was
marked as Exhibit"3"
2 9 Marked as Exhibit "4". See also, Poe Memorandum, par. 2.5; COMELEC Second Division
Resolution, p.3 Fact No. 5

14
17. Petitioner initially pursued a college degree in

Development Studies at the University of the Philippines,
Manila. However, in 1988, she transferred to the Boston College
in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, U.S.A. In 1991, she graduated
from Boston College with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political
Studies.3o
18. On 27 July 1991, Petitioner married Teodoro Misael

Daniel V. Llamanzares31 at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish at
San Juan City, Metro Manila. Petitioner's husband is a citizen
of both the Philippines and the U.S.A. from birth. 32 When
Petitioner married her husband, he was already based in the
U.S.A.
19. Petitioner had been raised a Filipina, and her parents

had instilled Filipino values in her. 33 Petitioner thus willingly
chose to live with her husband in the U.S.A. and to raise their
children there. Thus, on 29 July 1991, Petitioner left for the
U.S.A. 34
20. Petitioner and her husband have three children. Their

eldest child, Brian Daniel ("Brian"), was born on 16 April 1992 in
the U.S.A. Their daughters, Hanna MacKenzie ("Hanna") and
Jesusa Anika ("Anika"), were both born in the Philippines, on 10
July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively.35
,.,.
, _\ ;
4
21. Although Petitioner and her family lived in the U.S:::~t~
they kept close ties to the Philippines. They travelled frequeh~.
. to. the country to visit relatives and friends. Petitioner and ;he~'"'
.; Jilisband had always intended to return to the Philippines.36 c, '
r '\~ . : -~ ~~
22. After July 1991, Petitioner continued to secure ';,:

Philip:gine Passports from the DFA. On 5 April 1993, the DFA :
' ~
issued to petitioner Philippine Passport No. L881511, 37 and . on.

.
19 May 1998, the DFA issued in her favor Philippine Passport

No. DD156616.38
..... .,, ~
",.
-~ ,,
;t;:,:,;..
3o. Efamparo Petition; p. 4, par. 9; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.6; COMELEC Second Di.visio~-~)~
. j?esolution, p. 3, Fact No. 6 .... ,, ' ,;,/>
_31 Elamparo Petition, p. 4, par. 10; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.7; COMELEC Second IJ.i.qis"'
,. Resolutior, p. 3, Fact No. 7 ~
,3 2 lamparo Petition, p. 4, par. 10, second sentence; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.8; COMEL
Sep9nd Division Resolution, p. 3, Fact No. 8
,; .j/ f9e Memoran?-i:m, par. 2.8 !i
... 34 Elamparo Petztzon, p. 4, par. 11; Poe Memorandum, par.2.8

35 Poe Jfeinorandum, par. 2.8.1
36 Poe Memorandum, par. 2. 9
37;Mttrked as Exhibit "4-A"
38 Marked as Exhibit "4-B"
't,,
..<'~; -~-
15
23. Despite living in the United States for more than ten
(10) years, it was only on 18 October 2001 that Petitioner
became naturalized as a citizen of the U.S.A.39 On 19 December
2001, the U.S.A. "Passport Agency" in Washington issued U.S.A.
Passport No. 01703779340 to her.
24. In 2003, Petitioner's father declared his candidacy for

President of the Philippines in the May 2004 elections. 41
25. On 8 April 2004, Petitioner travelled to the

Philippines together with her daughter, Hanna. 42 Petitioner was
pregnant at the time with her youngest daughter, Anika.
Petitioner returned to the Philippines as she wanted to give
moral support to her parents during her father's campaign. She
also wanted to give birth to Anika in the Philippines. As
discussed earlier, Anika was born on 5 June 2004. On 8 July
2004, petitioner returned to the U.S.A. 43 with her two daughters.
26. In May 2004, in an election marred with controversy

and widespread reports of cheating, Petitioner's father lost the
Presidency.
27. A few months later, or on 11 December 2004,

Petitioner's father was admitted at the St. Luke's Medical Center
in Quezon City. 44 He eventually slipped into a coma. 45
/
28. As soon as she was informed of her father's fast-

deteriorating medical condition, Petitioner, who was then in the
U.S.A., rushed to leave for the Philippines. 46 She arrived in the
country in the evening of 13 December 2004, but her father died
shortly thereafter, on 14 December 2004. 47
29. The untimely death of petitioner's father was a severe

emotional shock to the family. Thus, Petitioner stayed in the
country to comfort her grieving mother. 48 She also wanted to
assist in taking care of the funeral arrangements for her father
and settling his estate. Petitioner stayed in the Philippines until
3 February 2005. 49
39Elamparo Petition, p. 4, par. 12; Poe Memorandum par. 2.10; COMELEC Second Division
Resolution, p. 3, Fact No. 10
40 Marked as Exhibit "5"
41 See also Exhibit "41", p. 2, par. 5; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.11
42 See Exhibit "5"; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.12
4 3 See Exhibit "5"; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.12
45 Id., p.2, par. 5; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.14

46 Id., p. 2, par. 6; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.15
47 Id., p. 2, par. 6; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.15
4 s Id., p. 2, par. 7; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.16
4 9 See Exhibit "5"; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.16
16
30. As a result of the untimely demise of her father, and

her desire to be with and to comfort her grieving mother,
Petitioner and her husband, sometime in the first quarter of
2005, decided to return to the Philippines for good. 50 They
consulted their children, who likewise expressed their wish to
relocate permanently to the Philippines. 51 The children also
wanted to support their grandmother and Petitioner.
31. 1!1 2004, petitioner had already resigned from her

work in the U.S.A. and she never again sought employment
there. In early 2005, Brian and Hanna's schools in Virginia,
U.S.A., were likewise notified that they would be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester.52
32. As early as March 2005, Petitioner and her husband

began obtaining quotations and estimates from property movers
regarding the total cost of relocating to Manila all of their
household goods, furniture, and cars then in Virginia, U.S.A.
One of these property movers was Victory Van International, a
private freight forwarding company, with whom Petitioner and
her husband had a series of e-mail correspondence from 2005
up to 2006. 53 The spouses also intended to bring along their pet
dog, and they inquired with Philippine authorities on the
procedure to accomplish this in August 2005.
,;'
33. On 24 May 2005, or shortly before the start of the

academic year in the Philippines, Petitioner returned to the
country.54 Her three (3) children also arrived in the country in
the first half of 2005.55 Petitioner's husband, on the other hand,
stayed in the U.S.A. to finish pending projects, and to arrange
for the sale of the family home there. 56
34. After their arrival in the Philippines from the U.S.A.,

Petitioner and her children initially lived with Petitioner's mother
at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan City. 57 The existing
living arrangements at the house of Petitioner's mother even had
to be modified to accommodate Petitioner and her children. 58
Petitioner's mother also assigned to Petitioner her father's long-
50 See also Exhibit "41'', p. 2, par. 8; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.17

51 Id., p. 2, par. 8
52 Poe Memorandum, par. 2.18
5 3 These email correspondence were marked as Exhibits "6-series," and attached to the
Affidavit of Teodoro V. Llamanzares, which was marked as Exhibit "42". See also, Poe
Memorandum, par. 2. 19
5 4 See Exhibit "5" , at p. 10; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.20
56 Id., p. 2, par. 9; Poe Memorandum par. 2.20

57 Id., p. 2, par. 8; Poe Memorandum par. 2.21
58 Id., pp. 2 to 3, par. 10; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.21
17
time driver, because Petitioner and her family would henceforth

be based in the Philippines. sg Meanwhile, Petitioner and her
children prepared for the start of the school year, with Brian and
Hanna attending Philippine schools starting June 2005.
34. l. Petitioner enrolled Brian in Grade 8 at the

Beacon School in Taguig City, for the Academic Year 2005
to 2006.60 In 2006, Brian transferred to La Salle Green
Hills, where he graduated from high school in 2009. 61
34.2. Hanna was enrolled in Grade 2 at

Assumption College in Makati City for Academic Year 2005
to 2006. She eventually finished her elementary and
secondary education at the same school. 62
34. 3. Anika was just under a year old when

Petitioner and her family relocated to the Philippines in
May 2005. Anika was therefore not yet of school age at the
time. However, she celebrated her first birthday (not to
mention her succeeding birthdays) in the Philippines on 5
June 2005. Anika eventually attended pre-school at the
Learning Connection in San Juan City, from January to
March 2007, 63 and thereafter, at the Greenmeadows
Learning Center in Quezon City, for Academic Year 2007 to
2008.64 Anika's Kindergarten and Elementary school
years6s were spent at Assumption College {the same school
as her sister, Hanna), which is where she is curreatly
enrolled as a sixth grader. ..
~~,
t~' ., 35.
Shortly after arriving in the Philippines, Petitione~~-~,, ;;
immediately submitted herself to the local tax jurisdiction by
registering and securing a TIN from the BIR (dated 22 July ~J<l
2005).p 6 .:, ri_,

';~.
!~},.
36. Sometime in the second half of 2005, Petitioner~~~

mother discovered that her former lawyer who had handled
Petitioner's adoption in 197 4, and who was then already
deceased, had failed to secure from the OCR-floilo, a new
if._
5\!,Jsi., pp. 2 to 3, par. 10; Poe Memorandum, par. 2. 21 '' '~. ! 21

60 E'xhibit "7" is Brian's Official Transcript of Records from the Beacon School. . ., ,i, ~~L
r,61 Exhibit "7-A" is a Certification dated 15 April 2015 issued by the Registrar of La Salle...,:''
Green Hills, Ms. Sandra Bernadette F. Firmalino. ... ,~ \"".<J.';~~ 1,;
<>2 Exhibits "7-B" and "7-C" are Hanna's Perma~ent Records at the Assumption Coll~'. i'.s< ~.,t
an Elementary and Secondary Student, respectively. . ' .if d:;>.,
63.!$xhibi't "7-D" is a Certificate of Attendance dated 8 April 2015 issued by the D1r~~~,:;::
f":~.<l!l the ~e~rning Co~nection, -~s. ~ulie Pascual Penal?za. . . :lf:{:. '::~~" ~ ~
M Exh1b~t "7-E" is a Certlf1cat10n dated 14 Apnl 2015 issued by Directress.. of 1'l-~'.~.;,;;
Greenfueadows Learning Center, Ms. Anna Villaluna-Reyes. : ) '
65, Exhibit "7-F" is Anika's Permanent Record at the Assumption College as an Elemen~J:Y i'"'
S'tu"dent.
66 Marked.as Exhibit"8"
n ,.
18
Certificate of Live Birth indicating Petitioner's new name ("Mary

Grace Natividad Sonora Poe") and stating that her parents are
"Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora." Thus, on 8
November 2005, Petitioner's mother executed an affidavit67
attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the
OCR-floilo. Eventually, on 4 May 2006, OCR-floilo issued a new
Certificate of Live Birth6 8 in the name of "Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe."
37. In the meantime, in the second half of 2005, Petitioner

and her husband had acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place
Condominium (and its corresponding parking slot), located at
194 Wilson Street, San Juan Metro Manila, to be used as the
family's temporary residence.
37 .1. On 20 February 2006, the Register of

Deeds for San Juan City issued to Petitioner and her
husband CCT No. l l 985-R69 covering Unit 7F of One
Wilson Place, and CCT No. 11986-R70 covering the parking
slot for Unit 7F.
37.2. On 25 April 2006, Unit 7F of One Wilson

Place and its corresponding parking slot were declared, for
real estate tax purposes, in Petitioner's and her husband's
names. 71
,.,,
37 .3. Petitioner and her family lived at One

Wilson Place until the completion of their family home at
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City.n This matter is discussed
in paragraph 41.1. below and sub-paragraphs.
38. On 14 February 2006, Petitioner briefly travelled to

the U.S.A. for the purpose of supervising the disposal of some of
the family's remaining household belongings. Around this time,
Petitioner and her family's furniture and other household goods
were still in the process of being packed for collection, storage,
and eventual transport to the Philippines. 73 Petitioner donated to
the Salvation Army some of the family's personal properties

11 Marked as Exhibits "13" and "14" are Declarations of Real Property Nos. 96-39721 and
96-39722 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of San Juan City, respectively covering
Unit 7F and its parking slot.
72 See also Exhibit "41", p.3, par. 11
73 Exhibit "6-series", e-mails dated 8 February 2006, 10 February 2006, and 15 February
2006 from Victory Van International to Petitioner
19
which could no longer be shipped to the Philippines. 74 Petitioner

returned to the Philippines shortly after, or on 11 March 2006. 75
39. In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially

informed the United States Postal Service of the family's change,
and abandonment, of their former address in the U.S.A. 76 The
family home in the U.S.A. was eventually sold on 27 April
2006. 77
40. !n April 2006, Petitioner's husband resigned from his

work in the U.S.A., and on 4 May 2006, he returned to the
Philippines. Beginning July 2006, he worked in the Philippines
for a major Philippine company.
41. Meanwhile, in early 2006, Petitioner and her

husband acquired a vacant 509-square meter lot at No. 106,
Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Barangay Ugong Norte, Quezon
City (the "Corinthian Hills Lot") where her family could finally
establish their new family home.
41. 1. On 1 June 2006, the Register of Deeds for

Quezon City issued to Petitioner and her husband Transfer
Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 29026078 covering the
Corinthian Hills Lot.
41.2. Petitioner and her husbanel: eventually built

a house on the Corinthian Hills Lot. To this day, this house
is their family home. 79
42. After Petitioner and her family settled themselves, she

turned her attention to regaining her natural-born Filipino
citizenship. She was advised that she could legally reacquire her
natural-born Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."80
74 Marked as Exhibits "15" and "15-A" are receipts dated 23 February 2006 issued by the
Salvation Army showing the donation of these household belongings.
75 See Exhibit "E" for Elamparo
7 6 Exhibit "16" is an e-mail from the U.S.A. Postal Service, sent on 28 March 2006 to
Petitioner's husband, confirming the latter's submission of a request for change of address
to the U.S.A. Postal Service.
7 7 Exhibit "17" is a Final Statement issued by First American Title Insurance Company
0
which indicate s as Settlement Date: "04-27 /2006".

7 9 See also Exhibit "42", p. 3, par. 11
80 Poe Memorandum, par. 2.30

20
43. On July 7, 2006, Petitioner took her Oath of

Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225,81 to wit:82
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will

support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
44. On 10 July 2006,8 3 Petitioner filed with the B.I. a

sworn petition8 4 to reacquire her natural-born Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and its implementing
rules and regulations. Upon advice, and simultaneous with her
own petition, Petitioner filed petitions for derivative citizenship8S
on behalf of her three children who were all below eighteen (18)
years of age at that time. 86
44.1. In support of her application, and in

compliance with the implementing rules and regulations of
R.A. No. 9225, Petitioner submitted to the B.I. a copy of her
Philippine Passport which the DFA had issued to her on 19
May 1998. 87 ,.,,
45. On 18 July 2006,88 the B.I. issued an Order89 gra~~ng

herein Petitioner's applications, which states in pertinent part:
~. , ~ (j:
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of . " '-."'t;

ii'
the instant petition indicate that the petitioner was a former citizen
of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents
and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen; thereafter,
became an American citizen and is now a holder of an American '
passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has taken her oath of .
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006 and
;.,
.
~
. 81 Elamparo Petition, pA., par. 13; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.31; COMELEC Second Division
Re~olutton, p. 4, Fact No. 10 ,, . . ,, , '
s~ Herei~ petitioner's Oath of Allegiance under R.A. 9225 was marked as Exhibit "19'" .~{:.?
1
4 83 Elamparo Petition, p. 14, par. 14; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.32; COMELEC $econ~
Resolution, p. 4, Fact No. 11 \'f ,.,~.:;"'lf!l.
84 See Exhibit "20" if 1"tf""c;;'
85 See Exhibits "21", "21-A" and "21-B" ': .t;,,
}6. ~l~mparo Pe!ition, p. 14, par. 14; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.32; COMEL~~ ~~GR~ti
,? 'DwzswnResolutzon, p. 4, Fact No. 11 Jc:...fi..~; \l}~~;
87 See Exhibit "4-B" '"14,~ .,,,, . ~
88 fkldmparo Petition, p. 14, par. 15: Poe Memorandum, par. 2.33; COMELEC ~cq.~/
.~. .Division Resolution, p. 4, Fact No. 12 . !', 1
. J9 A certified true copy of Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 dated 18 July 2006 was mar1<:ed ~~
Exhibi\"22". It is also marked as Exhibit "D" for private respondent Elamparo. k ,.
!,_
21
so is thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine

Citizenship. 90
In the same 18 July 2006 Order, Petitioner's three children,

Brian, Hanna and Anika, were "deemed Citizens of the
Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of R.A. No. 9225."
46. On 31 July 2006, 91 the B.I. issued Identification

Certificates ("I.C.") in Petitioner's name and in the names of her
three children. 9 2 Petitioner's I.C. states, in part, that she is a
"citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225) in relation to
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum
Circular No. AFF-2-005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed
by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006."
47. On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC registered

Petitioner as a voter at Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. 93
48. On 13 October 2009, or over two (2) years before her

U.S.A. Passport was set to expire (on 18 December 2011), 94
herein Petitioner secured from the DFA her new Philippine
Passport with No. XX4 73199995 (which was valid until 12
October 2014).
49. On 6 October 2010,96 President Benigno S. Aquino III

appointed Petitioner as Chairperson of the MTRCB,97 a post
which requires natural-born Philippine citizenship. Petitioner
did not accept the appointment immediately, because she was
advised that, before assuming any appointive public office,
Section 5(3), R.A. No. 9225 required her to: (a) take an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (b) renounce
her U.S.A. citizenship. She complied with both requirements
before assuming her post as MTRCB Chairperson on 26 October
2010. 98
90 Underscoring supplied
91 Elamparo Petition, p. 14, par. 16; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.34; COMELEC Second
Division Resolution, p. 4, Fact No. 13
92 Certified true copies of Identification Certificate Nos. 06-10918 (in herein petitioner's
name), 06-10919 (in Brian's name), 06-10920 (in Hanna's name), and 06-10921 (in
Anika's name), were marked as Exhibits "23", "23-A", "23-B" and "23-C".
93 The stub of herein petitioner's application form, showing the date of such application
was marked as Exhibit "24". See also, Poe Memorandum, par. 2.35; COMELEC Second
94 See Exhibit "5"
95 Marked as Exhibit "25". See also, Poe Memorandum, par. 2.36; COMELEC Second
97 See Exhibit "26"
98 A certified true copy of petitioner's Certificate of Assumption of office as MTRCB
Chairperson was marked as Exhibit "26-A".
22
50. On 20 October 2010, 9 9 Petitioner executed before a

notary public in Pasig City an "Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" of even date. 100 The affidavit states:
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of

legal age, and presently residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive,
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state
that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily
renounce my United States nationality/ American citizenship,
together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance
and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this renunciation
intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free will, free of any
duress or undue influence.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my

signature this 20th day of October 2010 at Pasig City,
Ph 1'l'1ppmes.
IOI
50.1. Petitioner, through counsel, submitted102

the above affidavit to the B.I. on 21 October 2010. 103
50.2. At no time after Petitioner executed the

above affidavit did she ever use her 1,U.S.A. Passport fr
;,!
again.104 Thus, Petitioner's U.S.A. Passport No.
0170377931os and her travel records from the BJ. 106
indicate no use of petitioner's U.S.A. Passport after her
renunciation of U.S.A. citizenship on 20 October 2010. 107
Since taking her oath of allegiance to the Republic on 7
July 2006, Petitioner's travel records from the B.I. indicate
only the following dates of use of her U.S.A. Passport:
Departures Flight No.

1 November 2006 SQ071
20 July 2007 PR730
31 October 2007 PR300
,Resolution, p. 4,' Fact No. 18 _,.
100 Herein Petitioner's Affidavit of Renunciation was marked as Exhibit "27".
102 Elamparo Petition, p. 6, par. 20; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.38. l; COMELEC Second
103 The transmittal letter to the B.I. was marked as Exhibit "28" and the Affidavit referred
to therein was marked as Exhibit "28-A".

J04 See Exhibit "5" and Exhibit "I"
105 See Exhibit "5"
106 Sen Poe's travel records with the B.l. were marked as Exhibit "I" below.
101 Poe Memorandum, par. 2.38.2; COMELEC Second Division Resolution, p. 5, Fact No. 15
23
20 April 2009 PR104

31 July 2009 PR730
15 November 2009 PR103
27 December 2009 PRl 12
27 March 2010 PR102
Arrivals Flight No.

4 November 2006 SQ076
23 July 2007 PR731
8 May 2008 PR103
21May2009 PR105
3 August 2009 PR733
50.3. Petitioner's "Affidavit of Renunciation ot

Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" dated 20 October
2010 has never been recanted or withdrawn and, therefore,
remains in full force and effect. In fact, this affidavit of
renunciation was effectively affirmed and reiterated on 12
July 2011 and on 14 October 2015, as discussed in the
paragraphs below.
,,,
51. On 21 October 2010, in accordance with Presid~ntial
Decree No. 1986 and Section 5 (3) of R.A. No. 9225, Petitiqper
took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB, before:~
' lRresident Benigno S. Aquino III. Her oath of officeios states: ';"
./'
PANUNUMASAKATUNGKULAN
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na ...

itinalaga sa katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie and .,
Television Review and Class(fication Board, ay taimtim na
nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa
abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking
kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y
,,
gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking ,., '.
:)
itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas; na ~ ,.
.&
tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga ,4~,~ {
batas, mga kautusang legal, at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng m&,a;~,!~F.
sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng Republika ng ~.
. . ), .
.~ii
' ., ~
,
.h.~..;"~
~, ,.,.
,.f "'" ;* ;, -\l
it~
<f
,.10s A certified true copy Sen. Poe's Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson was mar~~d aj).
~~hibit "29"; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.39; COMELEC Second Division Resolution, p. ~{fact
No. 17
~ti
11;,
.;::,
,,.
-
24
Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito, nang

walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong

ika-21 ng Oktubre 20 I 0, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas. 109
52. To ensure that even under the laws of the U.S.A., she
would no longer be considered its citizen, Petitioner likewise
renounced her U.S.A. citizenship in accordance with the laws of
that country. However, Petitioner was not legally required under
Philippine law to make another renunciation, as her earlier
renunciation of U.S.A. citizenship on 20 October 2010 was
sufficient to qualify her for public office.110
52.1. On 12 July 2011, 111 Petitioner executed

before the Vice Consul at the U.S.A. Embassy in Manila, an
Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States.112
52.2. On the same day, Petitioner accomplished a

sworn "Questionnaire"113 before the U.S. Vice Consul,
wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 210ctober 2010, with the intent, among
others, of relinquishing her U.S.A. citizenship.
52 .3. In the same Questionnaire, Petitioner stated

that she had resided "Outside of the United States," i.e., in
the "Philippines," from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991
and from "05 2005" to "Present." On page 4 of the
Questionnaire, Petitioner stated:
I became a resident of the Philippines once again since

2005. My mother still resides in the Philippines. My
husband and I are both employed and own properties in the
Philippines. As a dual citizen (Filipino-American) since
2006, I've voted in two Philippine national elections. My
three children study and reside in the Philippines at the time I
I performed the act as described in Part I item 6. 1 14

110 Poe Memorandum, par. 2 .40
1 11 Elamparo Petition, p. 6, par. 21; Poe Memorandum, par. 2.40.1; COMELEC Second

112 Petitioner's Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States was
marked as Exhibit "30" below
113 The Questionnaire was marked as Exhibit "30-A''.
114 Undescoring supplied
25
53. On 9 December 2011,1 15 the U.S.A. Vice Consul

issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States." 116 Said Certificate attests that under U.S.A. laws,
Petitioner lost her U.S.A. citizenship effective 21 October 2010,
which is when she took her oath of office as MTRCB
Chairperson. This fact is likewise reflected on the last page of
Petitioner's former U.S.A. Passport. 117
54. On 27 September 2012, Petitioner accomplished her

COC for Senator, 11 8 which she filed with the COMELEC on 2
October 2012. Section 12 of the COC was, again, an affirmation
of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which
Petitioner had taken on 7 July 2006 (and which she had re-
affirmed on 21 October 2010 when she took her oath of office as
MTRCB Chairperson). Section 12 of the COC states:
I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO. I
WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS, AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES. I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON
MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION.
55. During the 13 May 2013 National Elections,

Petitioner ran for and was overwhelmingly elected as Senator.
She garnered over 20 million votes, the highest among her fellow
Senatorial candidates, and a record in Philippine election
history. On 16 May 2013, Petitioner was proclaimed Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines.119
56. On 19 December 2013, the DFA issued to Sen. Poe

Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530 12 0 (valid until 18 December
2018), and on 18 March 2014, the DFA issued in her favor
Philippine Passport No. EC058886l121 (valid until 1 7 March
2019). Like her earlier Philippine passports, these two (2) most

116 Petitioner's Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States was marked as Exhibit
"31".
11 7 See Exhibit "5"
118 A copy of petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy for Senator is marked as Exhibit "32".
See also, Poe Memorandum, par. 2.42


120 Marked a~ Exhibit "33". See also, Poe Memorandum, par. 2.44; COMELEC Second

121 Marked as Exhibit "34". See also, Poe Memorandum, par. 2.44; COMELEC Second
26
recent passports uniformly state that Sen. Poe is a "citizen of the

Philippines."
57. On 15 October 2015, Sen. Poe filed with COMELEC

her COC for President in the 9 May 2016 national and local
elections. 12 2 In her COC, she stated that she is a "NATURAL-
BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN' and that her "RESIDENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016' would be
"10" years and "11" months (counted from 24 May 2005).
57 .1. In her COC for President, Sen. Poe again

affirmed the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines which she had taken on 7 July 2006 (when she
reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship), on 21
October 2010 (when she took her oath of office as MTR CB
Chairperson), and on 27 September 2012 (which she
executed her COC for Senator in the 13 May 2013
election). Item No. 13 of Sen. Poe's COC for President
states:
I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE
THERETO. I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS, AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES. ,,,. I IMPOSE
J.
THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,':"
WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF ~,j;ti'
EVASION. , ii ..t
;;:
...
~: ~.
,,
""!' .....
57.2. Attached to Sen. Poe's COC for President)s ,,,.

an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"~
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon: ,
City on 14 October 2015. In this affidavit, Sen. Poe ...
stressed, among others, that her "Affidavit of Renunciatin <
',
of Allegiance to the United States of America and ::

Renunciation of American Citizenship" 12 3 executed on 20 .
October 2010 had not been recanted. She also emphasized. ~f
that, effective 21 October 2010, she was no longer a U.S.A. '
citizen, even under U.S.A. laws. .~
';) "
'.t;
57.3. However, in order to obviate any f~r~'l:
objection to her qualifications, in paragraph 3 of sa~i,4
'}
Octobe~ 2? 15 affidavit, Sen. Poe af~~med ~d reit~rat~.9~~~ .
'; .i renunc1at10n of her former U.S.A. c1tizensh1p, to wit: '<;'i.... , ~ ", r.01 '
1~2 4See private respondent Elamparo's Exhibit "B" Ji

123 .Exhibit "27" in the proceeding a quo
,,.
)
, ...
..
-- - - -,~~~
27
Although I have long ceased to be a U.S.A. citizen,

and without implying that my previous renunciation of
U.S.A. citizenship was in any manner ineffective or
recanted, but solely for the purpose of complying with the
requirements for filing my Certificate of Candidacy
('COC') for President in the 9 May 2016 election
(specifically. Item 10 of the COC) and in light of the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Amado vs.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015) that
'(t)here is no law prohibiting (me) from executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only avert
possible questions about (my) qualifications." I hereby
affirm and reiterate that I personally renounce my previous
U.S.A. citizenship, together with all rights, privileges,
duties, allegiance and fidelity pertaining thereto. I likewise
declare that, aside from that renounced U.S.A. citizenship, I
have never possessed any other foreign citizenship. 124
C. The COMELEC Resolutions
58. In its Resolution dated 1 December 2015, the Second

Division of the COMELEC ("Second Division") first ruled that
herein petitioner's statements in her 2015 COC, i.e., that she
would have a residence of ten ( 10) years and eleven (11) months
up to the day prior to the May 2016 elections, and that she is a
natural-born Filipino, were false. "
58.1. On residence, the Second Division said that

since Petitioner put six years and six months in her COC
for Senator in the May 2013 elections, then she was a
resident only from November 2006 and was therefore six
months short of the required residence for the Presidency.
The 2012 COC was considered as an admission against
interest binding on Sen. Poe, and her claim of honest
mistake was disregarded. The Second Division likewise
stated that assuming that Sen. Poe was once a natural-
born Filipino, her residence could be counted only from
July 2006 when she reacquired citizenship under Rep. Act
No. 9225. All of Sen. Poe's evidence showing that she was a
resident from 24 May 2005 when she returned from the
U.S.A. were not even discussed and plainly disregarded by
the Second Division.
58.2. The Second Division likewise ruled that Sen.

Poe was not a natural-born Filipino. It said that foundlings
are not in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
28
Constitution and applied expressio unius est exclusio

alterius. The Second Division also disagreed that the
framers of the 1935 Constitution had intended that
foundlings be included within the enumeration. It also said
that the international law principles and conventions cited
by Sen. Poe were inapplicable for being inconsistent with
the jus sanguinis requirement in the Constitution or not
binding or adhered to by the country.
59. On the issue of whether there was a deliberate

attempt fo mislead, misinform or hide a fact from the electorate,
the Second Division ruled that that there was such intent with
respect to the claim of residency. It said that the declaration of
ten years and eleven months in the 2015 COC was intended to
hide the fact that Sen. Poe had earlier stated under oath in her
2012 COC that she had been residing in the Philippines only
since November 2006.
59 .1. The Second Division threw a bone on the

issue of citizenship, saying that the citizenship of
foundlings is a question of first impression and until it is
resolved by the Supreme Court, Sen. Poe's assertion that
she is a natural-born Filipino may be presumed to have
been made "in utmost good faith."
Sen. Poe promptly filed a Verified Motion for

60.
Reconsideration 125 She argued, first, that there was no deliberate
intent to hide anything false with respect to her claim of
residence. She pointed out that several months before the filing
of her 2015 COC, Rep. Tobias "Toby" Tiangco of the United
Nationalist Alliance {"UNA") had already brought out in public
the matter of petitioner's stated period of residency in her 2012
COC, and that Sen. Poe had already acknowledged the mistake
and publicly explained how she committed the error. She
likewise said that several months before the filing of her 2015
COC, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her at
the Senate Electoral Tribunal by one Rizalito David, who had
also questioned her 2012 COC. Sen. Poe demonstrated that in
her 31 August 2015 Verified Answer in that casel26 ("SET
Answer"), she already made it of record that as of 13 May 2013,
she had been residing in the Philippines "for more than six (6)
years and six {6) months" already. Pertinent clippings, videos
and the SET Answer were attached to Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
125 Annex "M" hereof. Faithful reproductions of the Annexes to this Verified Motion for
Reconsideration are likewise attached.
126 SET Case No. 001-15, entitled "Rizalito Y. David, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent"
29
60.1. Sen. Poe likewise showed that her claim of

residence of ten ( 10) years and eleven (11) months was
true. She cited Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections 127 (already previously cited in her Verified Answer
in the proceeding a quo yet inexplicably ignored by the
Second Division) to show that a mistake in a COC
committed in good faith may be corrected, that residence is
principally a question of fact, and that the mistaken
statement in the COC is not decisive. Sen. Poe also
presented her proof of residence since May 2005, which
were all disregarded by the Second Division.
60.2. Sen. Poe also showed that the Second

Division had misapplied the rule on admission against
interest. This rule means that it is only a piece of evidence
which may be admitted, but it is not conclusive. Likewise,
Sen. Poe argued that the application by the Second Division
of the rule on estoppel meant that a party who is already
aware of a previous error would be compelled to repeat
such error and would never be permitted to correct it.
60.3. With respect to the formulation of the

Second Division that her residence could be counted only
from July 2006 at the earliest when she reacquired
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, Sen. Poe cited
jurisprudence that said law treated citizenship
independently of residence. Sen. Poe also distingUitihed
Coquilla vs. COMELEC, relied upon by the Second Divisiqn~
t'~ from her case. She demonstrated that in Coquilla, t):lere',
was a dearth of evidence showing that the candidate .hat1 :
actually established residence, or even intended to r~sid;;:k
in the Philippines. In contrast, Sen. Poe had numeroli~ ~
proof, all disregarded by the Second Division, showingrth~t
; "fl,,,.. ..
she had re-established residence here for more than a year

before she reacquired her natural born citizenship.
60.4. On the matter of citizenship, Sen. ~Po~

showed that her claim of natural born citizenship .. was
correct. There is nothing in the Constitution or in any ;l~~
~ or jurisprudence excluding a foundling from natural~ ho~
citizenship. The Senate Electoral Tribunal in its .p
dated 17 November 2015 in SET Case No. 001-1-S_,'"'
;.7
,." Decision"), s8:id t~at the fact that she is "a foun~;Jltri:ict\~
,;.-
not carry wit?. it the proof. ~h~t (Sen. Poe's) , ~e1i1:8=,
r' were/are not citizens of the Philippines. On the contrary;'~\
f:
.12 7 G.I}. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
'-t::
30
did not exclude the possibility that her parents are citizen<:>
of the Philippines. xx x." 128 She further argued that there is
nothing in the language of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution which definitely excludes foundlings from the
enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, and that there is
no way that she, as a foundling, can be categorically
excluded from the enumeration of who are Filipino citizens
under the 1935 Constitution, unless herein private
respondent Elamparo herself presents evidence that
Petitioner's father and mother are both aliens.
60.5. Addressing the Second Division's

formulation that a recognition of the natural-born
citizenship of a foundling would result to an "absurd
situation" wherein natural-born citizenship is accorded to a
person "with no known bloodline to a Filipino parent" yet
denied "to a child with a known bloodline to a Filipino
mother" 129, Sen. Poe pointed out that a child with a known
bloodline to a Filipino mother is a natural-born citizen
under the 1987 Constitution, and that moreover, a child
born of a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution is
not placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis a foundling. The
former is actually given the right to choose her citizenship,
which is denied not only to a foundling, but to other
citizens as well. Once the election is made, such child is
considered a natural-born citizen. A f6undling is only
presumed to be natural-born.
60.6. Sen. Poe further contended that there is

nothing in the Constitutional definition of natural-born
Filipino citizenship 130 which confines such status "solely
and exclusively" to actual proof of blood relationship to a
Filipino father or mother.131 The definition of natural-born
citizenship does not say "those born of a Filipino father or
mother proven as a fact", or even "those born of a Filipino
father or mother", but rather, "those who do not have to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Filipino
128 Decision dated November 17, 2015 in SET Case No. 001-15 (hereinafter, "SET
Decision"), p. 19 (Underscoring supplied)
129 COMELEC Second Division Resolution, pp. 23-24
130 Sec. 2, art. IV, 1987 Constitution
131 Indeed, considering that the filiation of children is sometimes also a presumption
created by law (e.g., children conceived or born during the marriage of their parents are
presumed to be the child of the husband, and their legitimate filiation cannot be impugned
but by the husband himself or his heirs and only on limited grounds during a limited
period), the Constitution cannot provide for such definition. In other words, tying natural-
born Filipino status to actual proof of the existence of a blood tie between a child and a
Filipino parent would be tantamount to requiring each Filipino citizen to prove, through
scientific evidence such as DNA, that they are beyond the shadow of doubt the biological
child of a parent who is Filipino.
31
citizenship."132 Clearly, the definition of natural-born

citizenship is broad enough to contemplate citizenship ex
lege or by operation of law, apart from naturalization,
which always involves a positive act on the part of an alien
who wishes to acquire Philippine citizenship.
60.7. Sen. Poe likewise contended that the

Second Division's conclusion that the international
conventions and other evidence of generally accepted
principles of international law she invoked, was erroneous
and made out of jurisdiction, and that instead, it ought to
have given persuasive weight to the final and executory SET
Decision which ruled that: "(Sen. Poe) is a natural-born
citizen under the 1935 Constitution and continue (sic) to be
a natural-born citizen as defined under the 1987
Constitution, as she is a 'citizen of the Philippines from
birth, without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect (her) Philippine citizenship."'
61. Private respondent Elamparo also filed a Motion for

Partial Reconsideration 133 on 7 December 2015, wherein she
sought a reconsideration of the Second Division's finding that
Petitioner did not commit a material misrepresentation with
respect to her citizenship. Private respondent also filed, on 2
December 2015, even before the finality of the Second Division
Resolution, an Urgent Motion to Exclude 13 4 Sen-: Poe from the list
of candidates and the ballots for the 2016 elections. Petitioner
opposed these motions through an Omnibus
Comment/Opposition 5 filed on 14 December 2015.
13
62. On 23 December 2015 (or on a day that this

Honorable Court was closed and therefore unable to grant any
relief to Sen. Poe, and just before the start of a four (4) day long
holidays from 24 to 27 December 2015), the COMELEC En Banc,
by a vote of five (5) to one (1) (with Chairman Andres Bautista
dissenting and Commissioner Christian Robert Lim
abstainingt36), promulgated its Resolution of even date denying
Sen. Poe's Motion for Reconsideration, for the reasons discussed

133 Annex "N" hereof
134 Annex "0" hereof
135 Annex "P" hereof. On 16 December 2015, herein Petitioner filed before the COMELEC
En Banc an Omnibus Motion (a) to consolidate cases before the Commission en bane, and (b)
to set the cases for clarificatory hearing, which, however, was not acted upon by the
COMELEC. As mentioned, the COMELEC En Banc decided to promulgate on 23 December
2015 two separate Resolutions for the motions for reconsideration of the First Division and
Second Division Resolutions cancelling herein Petitioner's COC. A copy of herein
Petitioner's Omnibus Motion dated 16 December 2015 is attached hereto as Annex "P-1".
136 Reportedly, he and private respondent used to be associates in the same law office.
32
in the 1 December 2015 Resolution, and further on the following

grounds:
Re: Sen. Poe's residency in the Philippines
62.1. It is not true that the Second Division

supposedly "rel(ied) on a single piece of evidence" (Sen.
Poe's 2012 COC), "to the exclusion of all others," in
deciding when Sen. Poe commenced her residence in the
Philippines. That the Second Division "entirely omitted" to
mentioned the evidence of respondent," does not mean it
"did not consider them at all."
62.2. After taking a look "one by one" at Sen.

Poe's evidence, it appears that they were all "executed
before July 2006." This is supposedly "fatal" because,
according to Coquilla vs. COMELEC, Japzon vs. COMELEC
and Caballero vs. COMELEC, "the earliest possible date
(Sen. Poe) could have re-established her residence in the
Philippines is when she re-acquired her Filipino Citizenship
on July 2006."
62.3. Supposedly, Coquilla teaches that it is the

act of "obtain(ing) an immigrant visa .... and an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR)" that "effectively waives an
alien's status as a non-resident." Sen. Poe "does not
appear to have perfarmed this act." '-.,
'::;),*'
t,
62.4. Sen. Poe's 2012 COC, which shows thaf stJ.ei
started residing in the Philippines only "on Novemb'~r\
2006," is "entirely inconsistent with her declaration" irt.her...
present 2015 COC that she "was a resident since .Mayt
2005." Sen. Poe's arguments were correctly struck dowh.
"on the basis of this contradiction." , . '" ~,..;.
62.5. Sen. Poe's statement on her residence in

her 2012 COC is an "admission against interest," which i~:
the "best evidence" "afford(ing) greatest certainty of th~
facts in dispute." It is "fair to presume" that the 2012 COC
1i" "corresponds with the truth, and it is (her) fault if it :tf.o
~ not." Also, a COC, "being a notarial document, has ib.
favor the presumption of regularity," and to "contr~(;i~Cf.:t
fact stated therein, there must be evidence that iffi: .
convincing and more than merely prepor..derant." .,J,:l~~~ .... """. :~
I
~~f"
.>
'
J
l 62.6. Therefore, while the COMELEC En ~fifia/A*\)

\ appeared to have abandoned the Second Division's stanee
"
~'~~
that Sen. Poe's 2012 COC is "binding," it still held tha1fSen+
$.
...
33
Poe "failed to discharge" her "heavy burden" of presenting

"clear, convincing and more than preponderant evidence"
that it is the 2015 COC "that is correct and that the
statements made in the 201(2) COC were done without bad
faith."
62. 7. Although Sen. Poe acknowledged and

explained her honest mistake in her 2012 COC, in a public
interview in June 2015 and in her Verified Answer before
the SET, these were "nonetheless delivered at a time when,
at the very least, the possibility of respondent running for
President of the country in 2016, was already a matter of
public knowledge." "By then, [Sen. Poe] could have already
been aware that she cannot maintain her declaration in the
201 (2) COC as it would be insufficient to meet the 10-year
residency requirement for President."
62.8. "That there does not appear on record 'any

significant event in (Sen. Poe's) life which would lead to her
reckoning her residency in the Philippines as of November
2006, is not a definitive badge of good faith by (Sen. Poe)."
"That a thing does not appear on record does not translate
to it being inexistent."
Re: Sen. Poe's natural-born Philippine citizenship

,,,
62. 9. "The burden of proving that she 1s a
natural-born Filipino citizen is upon respondent [ Sen.
Poe]."
62.10. The COMELEC is "not completely bound by

the SET Decision," and, despite the "final and executory"
nature of the Decision, the COMELEC is "not precluded
from making decisions on the cases . . . that (are)
inconsistent with or even against the Decision of the SET."
Unless the SET Decision is affirmed by the Supreme Court,
it does not "form part of our legal system entitled to
adherence." Moreover, the issue before the SET was the
"eligibility of respondent for Senator," whereas the issue
before the COMELEC was "the existence of material
representation in (Sen. Poe's) subject COC."
63. In the same 23 December 2015 Resolution, the

COMELEC En Banc also resolved two (2) other motions that were
pending before it, as follows:
(a) It granted the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed

by private respondent and, therefore, held that Sen.
-
34
Poe deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or

hide a fact from the electorate when she stated in her
2015 COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
The COMELEC En Banc relied on three (3) of Sen.
Poe's exhibits which supposedly demonstrate a
"pattern of misrepresenting" her status as a Filipino
citizen. It also held that "jurisprudence" on the issue
of the foundling's citizenship is "not necessary,"
because the Constitution is "clear and unequivocal."
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc accepted private
respondent's position that the Second Division should
not have taken judicial notice of circumstances which
would "engender in (Sen. Poe) a well-founded belief
that she is a true Filipino." In granting this motion, it
does not appear that the COMELEC En Banc
considered Sen. Poe's arguments in her Omnibus
Comment/ Opposition to that motion. These
arguments, and even the filing of said
Comment/ Opposition, are definitely nowhere
mentioned in the 23 December 2015 Resolution.
(b) The COMELEC En Banc also DENIED private

respondent's Motion to Exclude Sen. Poe's name from
the ballot in the 2016 elections. The COMELEC En
Banc pointed out that, under its rules, "it is clear and
express that no execution of the r December 2015
Resolution of the Commission's Second Division may
be done while this Resolution on the motions for
reconsideration has yet to attain finality. Therefore,
Petitioner's Motion to Exclude may not be entertained
as of this moment."137
64. Hence, this Petition. Sen. Poe has no other plain,

adequate and speedy remedy apart from this Petition, especially
considering the undue haste with which Petitioner's opponents
would like her name stricken out of the list of candidates and
the ballots, and the COMELEC En Bane's ominous citation of its
own Rule 37 that its decision will become "final and executory
after the lapse of five days from [its] promulgation, unless
restrained by the Supreme Court." In fact, this petition for
certiorari is the only remedy that Petitioner has, given by Section
7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and recognized by applicable
jurisprudence.
137 Underscoring supplied.

.....
35
v.
GROUNDS FOR THIS PETITION
THE COMELEC 138 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF SEN. POE'S CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT IN THE 9 MAY 2016
ELECTIONS.
A.
THE COMELEC ACTED WHIMSICALLY

AND CAPRICIOUSLY, IGNORED SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND DISREGARDED
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD IN RULING
THAT SEN. POE MADE A FALSE
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION IN HER
COC FOR PRESIDENT WHEN SHE
STATED THEREIN THAT HER "PERIOD
OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP
TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016"
WOULD BE "10" YEARS AND "11"
MONTHS.
A.1. ,-
~'{
The COMELEC had the positive
"
,-_-'' .'
duty to consider and weigh Sen.
Poe's evidence showing that she C,
~r
..
)J;i
.;:t'>,
had reestablished her domicile of

choice in the Philippines as early
as 24 May 2005. The COMELEC's ;,; -:-
~~ ../
refusal to perform this positive
duty, and its gross and
inexcusable misappreciation of
Sen. Poe's evidence, are
;1
unquestionably acts of grave $..''
abuse of discretion amounting to

,\,
lack or excess of jurisdiction, .,.,
which warrant setting aside the '!'.
,, COMELEC's findings of fact on \
the issue of Sen. Poe's residence.

,,
it
i'
. ', ,:~,- ,' ~"

f38 Unless indicated otherwise, the COMELEC En Banc and the Second Division~qf th,e
COMELEC shall be referred to collectively as the "COMELEC." '
~-~~
;'j..
36
A.1.a. The COMELEC disregarded

the settled principle
enunciated in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC,
reiterated in Perez vs.
COMELEC, that a
candidate's statement in
her certificate of candidacy
is not decisive of the issue
of residence. The fact of
residence always prevails
over a candidate's
statement about his or her
residence.
A.Lb.The COMELEC acted

whimsically and
capriciously in
automatically concluding
that Sen. Poe's statement
in her COC for President
concerning her period of
residence is false, simply
because her earlier COC for
Senator supposedly
contradicts that statement.
The COMELEC should have
determined, independent of
Sen. Poe's COC for Senator,
whether the period of
residence stated in her
COC for President is false.
A.2.
The COMELEC disregarded the

basic principle that residence is
an issue of fact, and cited
_ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ inapplicable jurisp_rqqep~e_, wh=e-=-n=--
it ruled that the commencement
of Sen. Poe's domicile in the
Philippines should start, at the
earliest, when she reacquired her
natural-born Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.
37
A.3.
Considering that: (a) Sen. Poe's

statement in her COC for Senator
is not binding or conclusive; and
(b) a foreigner may legally
establish her residence in the
Philippines even before
repatriation and even without a
permanent resident visa, the
COMELEC had the positive duty
to consider Sen. Poe's evidence
showing that she had
reestablished her domicile of
choice in the Philippines as early
as 24 May 2005. The COMELEC's
refusal to perform this positive
duty and its utter disregard of 1
Sen. Poe's evidence are I
unquestionably acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to I
lack or excess of jurisdiction. I1
;r.
A.4. i
In ruling that Sen. Poe was

"estopped" from asserting a
period of residence inconsistent
with her COC for Senator, and in
ruling further that a person's
domicile of choice may
commence only upon repatriation J:-'i-
and/ or the possession of a .J,'.
permanent resident visa, the

COMELEC applied a "very
,',
legalistic, academic and technical
approach to the residence
requirement" which "does not \....; :::'' ',
satisfy" and is completely
divorced from the "simple,
practical and common-sense
rationale for the resill~nce
requirement."
A.5.
The COMELEC ignored evidence

of Sen. Poe's honesty and good
38
faith when it ruled that she had

concealed her supposed
"ineligibility" for the Presidency,
and that she supposedly intended
to mislead or deceive the
Philippine electorate, when she
stated in her COC for President
that her "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE
UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY
09, 2016" would be "10" years
and "11" months.
B.
THE COMELEC ACTED WHIMSICALLY
AND CAPRICIOUSLY, IGNORED SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND DISREGARDED
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD IN RULING
THAT SEN. POE MADE A FALSE
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION IN HER
COC FOR PRESIDENT WHEN SHE
STATED THEREIN THAT SHE IS A
"NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
B.1.
1
.\i: The COMELEC disregarded the

'4(..
legal impact of the 17 November ,,"
. ~
2015 Decision of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal ("SET") in SET ;,"i"
Case No. 001-15, which became ~p ~--~.
final and executory on 3

~
December 2015, or after the '
" '~
petition a quo was deemed
submitted for resolution. The 't'
SET Decision negates the falsity

of Petitioner's representation in
her COC for President that she is
a natural-born Filipino. Sen. Poe ..
cannot be a natural-born Filipino . ,,:.-
;-~.
~;'
as a Senator, but not a natural-

,, born Filipino as a candidate for ":...~it,
;Y,
the Presidency.
~ .,..,,~
B.2.
rh
The COMELEC disregarded

settled and long-standing
~11t :;:,
<;.'
"' '""' ,fl
39
jurisprudence that the burden of

proof in proceedings under
Section 78 of the OEC, in relation
to Rule 23 of the COMELEC
Rules, is on the petitioner, when
it ruled that Sen. Poe had the
burden of proving her natural-
born citizenship.
B.3.
The COMELEC acted whimsically,

capriciously, contrary to common
sense and logic, and in
contravention of the letter and
spirit of the fundamental law, in
concluding that a foundling like
Sen. Poe is excluded from the
enumeration of Philippine
citizens under Section 1, Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution.
B.4.
The COMELEC disregarded

applicable international human
rights instruments ratified by the
Philippines which create an
affirmative obligation to consider
foundlings as natural-born
citizens of the country.
B.5.
The COMELEC disregarded the

basic constitutional law concept
of "incorporation" and igi:iored
applicable settled jurisprudence
on the matter, when it ruled that
the Philippines is supposedly
"not bound" by the 1930 Hague
Convention and Certain
Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws (the
"1930 Hague Convention") and
the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness
("Convention on Statelessness"),
40
simply because the Philippines

"is not a signatory" to these two
treaties.
B.6.
The COMELEC gravely abused its

discretion when it chose to
interpret the provisions on
citizenship in a manner that runs
contrary to the fundamental
principles animating the 1987
Constitution.
B.7.
The COMELEC ignored the

Constitutional and settled
jurisprudential definition of a
"natural-born Philippine citizen"
when it ruled that: (a) although
every child has a right to acquire
a nationality, Sen. Poe cannot be
considered a "natural-born"
Filipino; and (b) a foundling
cannot be considered a "natutal-
born" Filipino under
international law because
applicable international
conventions and instruments do
not use the phrase "natural-born"
in referring to citizenship or
nationality.
B.8.
::'
,~
f,
The COMELEC acted with grave

abuse of discretion in ruling that
the recognition of foundlings as
natural-born
contravene
Filipinos
the
would
1935
t
it
Constitution and the principle of
jus sanguinis.
B.9.
The DOJ, and not the COMELEC,

has the primary jurisdiction to
41
revoke the B.I.'s 18 July 2006

Order which: (a) found Sen. Poe
to be presumptively a former
natural-born Filipino; and (b)
approved her petition for
reacquisition of natural-born
Filipino citizenship. Insofar as
the COMELEC held that Sen. Poe
was not qualified for the B.I. 's
Order, the same is a prohibited
collateral attack on Sen Poe's
natural-born Filipino citizenship.
B.10.
The COMELEC ignored evidence

of Sen. Poe's honesty and good
faith when it ruled that she
supposedly intended to mislead
or deceive the Philippine
electorate, when she stated in
her COC for President that she is
a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN."
,.,-
c. ! .........
THE COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT

;; 'f; JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE
PETITION A QUO, DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF ANY FALSE MATERIAL
REPRESENTATION IN SEN. POE'S COC ~
FOR PRESIDENT.
-~
C.1. ...~.
In the absence of a false material

~ representation in Sen. Poe's COC
, ,( for President, the petition a quo
should have been dismissed v.
~'
outright for being a premature
petition for quo warranto which
,, is within the sole and exclusive
;::.. ..." jurisdiction of the Presidential
rf Electoral Tribunal ("PET").
~
42
C.2.
In the absence of a false material

representation in Sen. Poe's COC
for President, the cancellation
thereof effectively deprives the
Filipino people of their sovereign
prerogative to decide a purely
political question, that is-who
will be the 16th President of the
Republic of the Philippines?
VI.
DISCUSSION
THE COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF SEN. POE'S CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT IN THE 9 MAY 2016
ELECTIONS.
65. The extraordinary writ of certiorari which Sen. Poe

respectfully prays for in this Petition may be issued if the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the cancellation of her
COC for President.
66.In Alliance for Nationalism and Democracu vs.

COMELEC, 139 this Honorable Court defined "grave abuse of
discretion" as "the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, pr~iudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or
to act at all in contemplation of law."140
67. The COMELEC gravely abuses its discretion when it

acts in contravention of settled law, jurisprudence and rules of
evidence or procedure.
67 .1. In Information Technology Foundation of the

Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, 141 this Honorable Court
held that there is grave abuse of discretion "when an act is
139 G.R. No. 206987, 10 September 2013

141 G.R. No. 159139, 13 January 2004
~
I
43
done contrary to the Constitution, the law or

jurisprudence."
67.2. Regio vs. COMELEC, 14 2 is authority for the

proposition that the COMELEC commits grave abuse of
discretion when it "ignor(es) the rules on evidence" or
"issues a ruling in "gross cdntravention of established rules
on evidence."
97.3 In Varias vs. COMELEC,143 the Supreme

Court held that the "(u)se . of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
decision makers action with grave abuse of discretion." In
footnote 25 of the Varias case, the High Court noted that in
Pecson vs. COMELEC, 144 citing Almeida v. Court of
Appeals, 145 the High Court ruled that "a court abuses its
discretion when it . . . relies on clearly erroneous factual
findings, considers clearly irrelevant or improper
factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies
on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its
factual or legal conclusions."
68. The COMELEC correctly heldl 4 6 that the elements of a

Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, in relation to Section
74 of the OEC and Rule 23 of the COMELEC,.,Rules, are three-
fold:
a. First, there must be a "false" representation in the

COC. Both Section 78 of the OEC and Section 1, Rule
23 of the COMELEC Rules state that the "exclusive"
ground that may be raised in the Petition is that a
"representation contained (in the COC) as required by
law is -
false."
-
b. Second, the false representation must pertain to a
"material" fact, or those which concern the
"candidate's qualifications for elective office,"
including her citizenship and residence.14 7
c. Third, the false material representation in the COC

must amount to a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
142 G.R. No. 204828, 3 December 2013

143 G.R. No. 189078, 11 February 2010
144 G.R. No. 182?65, 24 December 2008
145 489 Phil 649 (2005)
146 1 December 2015 Resolution, at p. 15
14 7 Mitra vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010; Dela Pena vs. Osmena and
COMELEC, G.R. No. 209286, 23 September 2014
44
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render

a candidate ineligible," or it should have been made
"with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidate's qualifications for public
office." 14 s
69. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the
first and third elements were established in the proceeding a
quo. If the COMELEC had weighed and considered Sen. Poe's
evidence and relied on settled and applicable law and
jurisprudence, it would have inevitably realized that Sen. Poe's
assertions in her COC for President about her citizenship and
residency were neither false nor intended to deceive.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC arbitrarily disregarded Sen. Poe's
evidence. The COMELEC likewise ignored basic law, rules and
jurisprudence on the definition of "natural-born" citizenship, the
burden of proof in petitions under Section 78 of the OEC, the
international law doctrines of "transformation" and
"incorporation," the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the basic
elements of reestablishment domicile of choice in the Philippines
and the non-"decisive" nature of statements on residence in et.
certificate of candidacy.
70. As a consequence, the COMELEC evaded its positive

duty to dismiss the petition a quo and, instead, ordered the
4~ancellation of Sen. Poe's COC for President. For these, and 'ilie.
reasons to be discussed in detail below, Sen. Poe respectfuify
submits that a writ of certiorari is in order in this case. ." .
~' j,.
A. THE COMELEC ACTED

. ,.
WHIMSICALLY AND CAPRICIOUSLY, '~

IGNORED SETTLED ...
JURISPRUDENCE AND
DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD IN RULING THAT SEN.
POE MADE A FALSE MATERIAL
~'
REPRESENTATION IN HER COC
FOR PRESIDENT WHEN SHE
STATED THEREIN THAT HER
"PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY
BEFORE MAY 09, 2016" WOULD BE
;'* "10" YEARS AND "11" MONTHS. _
t_J ______________________________________________
,:' i~
<\ ;,, '
..! H
148 Id.
~ '.;~
;;t'
':<,
~t
45
A. l. The COMELEC had the positive

duty to consider Sen. Poe's
evidence showing that she had
reestablished her domicile of
choice in the Philippines as
early as 24 May 2005. The
COMELEC's refusal to perform
this positive duty and its utter
disregard of Sen. Poe's
evidence are unquestionably
acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, which
warrant setting aside the
COMELEC's findings of fact on
the issue of Sen, Poe's
residence.
71. The settled definition of "residence" in election law is

that it is "synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."1 4 9
In Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, 150 this Honorable Court
held: I
In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile

to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes
the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently.151
In other words, "domicile" is simply a function of "presence" and

"intention." It is ultimately a question of fact. Therefore, when
an issue of residency is brought before the COMELEC, its
positive duty, which it cannot evade, is to carefully evaluate and
weigh the evidence. The same formulation applies to the
determination of whether one has established a new domicile of
choice.
14 9 Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, 24 November 1941 (citing Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil.
645); Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009; Jalosjos vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012 (citing Lim bona v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 391, 401)
150 G.R. Nos. 119976, 18 September 1995, citing Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941)
i
46
72. It is well-settled that in order to acquire a new

domicile of choice, three (3) requisites must concur: 152
(a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(b) an intention to remain there (animus manendi);

and
(c) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus

nan revertendi)
Curiously, the COMELEC did not even mention these three basic
requirements for reestablishing domicile of choice in the
Philippines in any of its assailed Resolutions.
72.1. Even in Japzon 153 (which the COMELEC

cited in its assailed Resolutions and which is the primary
legal basis for this Honorable Court's recent ruling in
Caballero 1 S 4 ), the High Court stressed the significance of
the elements of intention and physical presence in
determining domicile of choice. In Japzon, this Honorable
Court stated that "(t)he length of his residence . . . shall be
determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice .... " 1 55 Japzon 156 also relied on Papandayan, Jr. vs.
COMELEC157 which provided a "summatie5n of the different
principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the
residency qualification for elective local officials." This
summary again emphasized that residence is essentially a
factual issue of "physical presence" and "intention."
72.2. After summarizing the core principles

related to the residency qualification, this Honorable Court
in Japzon158 stressed that this matter is ultimately a
question of fact, which requires a careful examination of
the evidence presented by the parties, thus:
Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan,

Jr. that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the residency qualification requirement.
152 Mitra vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010; Japzon v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, citing Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 430 Phil. 754 (2002)
153 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
154 G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2012
156 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
151 G.R. No. 147909, 16 April 2002
158 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
47
As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he

complied with the one-year residency requirement for
running for public office is a question of fact. Its
determination requires the Court to review, examine and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties before the COMELEC.159
73. Sen. Poe's documentary and testimonial evidence

proving her residence in the Philippines since 24 May 2005 are
summarized below (See Annexes "H" and "I-series" hereof):
Exh. Formally offered by Sen. Poe (among

Description
No. other ouroosesJ to orove that:
"5" U.S.A. Passport Sen. Poe returned permanently to the
No. 017037793 Philippines on 24 May 2005, and from
which the U.S.A.- that point onwards would always return
Washington to the Philippines after every trip to a
Passport Agency foreign country
issued to Sen. Poe
on 18 December
2001, consisting
of 13 pages
"6- E-mail exchanges I 1. Sen. Poe's family decided to return

series on various dates and permanently reside in the
" from March 18, Philippines soon after the death of
2005 to September Sen. Poe's father, i.e.,f sometime in the
29, 2006 between first quarter of 2005; ,..
" :~,iii
Sen. Poe and/or I 2. As early as March 2005, Sen. Poe a?'i.tJ
her husband and her family already had the definj,te
representatives of: intention to abandon their U.S.A. ~
.;l le residence and return to the ,.,
(1) Victory Van ,;I,'
Corporation, and Philippines for good;

(2) National 3. As early as March 2005, Sen. Poe had .
~ ~-%
''-'
Veterinary begun the process of relocating and ~~

Quarantine re-establishing her residence in the
, ~~
Service of the Philippines;

Bureau of Animal 4. This process continued from March
Industry of the 2005 to early 2006; -~
Philippines, 5. As early as February 2006, but no
consisting of 23 later than April of the same year, Sen.
~ pages Poe and her family had all their
valuable movable properties, including 'l(j1.
':'""
{ household goods, furniture, toys an~

1 vehicles, packed and stored for
relocation to the Philippines; ai:-d ,: ;_;;
6. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will b"(}4EC
resident of the Philippines for ten.,.,.('..,.l:Ql
__ ,x-
":f
years and eleven (11) months t",,f: ~ +ai
L ~-;-.,
8 1
" "' Official Transcriot I 1. Sen. Poe enrolled her
,,_:i.,
1f
1s9 Underscoring supplied
~'
1~
\"'"'
.,,
~\Ji..
!~:
~
48
of Records for children in Philippine schools before

Brian Daniel Poe June 2005;
Llamanzares, 2. Sen. Poe's school-aged children
issued by The transferred to and began attending
Beacon School, Philippine schools starting June 2005;
consisting of 1 3. Sen. Poe's children had been
a e continuously attending Philippine
"7-A" I Certification dated schools since June 2005;
April 15, 2015 4. Sen. Poe intended to reside, and had
issued by the been actually residing, permanently in
Registrar of La the Philippines since May 2005; and
Salle Green Hills, 5. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be a
Ms. Sandra resident of the Philippines for ten ( 10)
Bernadette F. years and eleven (11) months
Firmalino,
consisting of 1
page
"7-B" I Elementary Pupil's
Permanent Record
for Hanna
Mackenzie P.
Llamanzares,
issued by the
Assumption
College, consisting
of 2 pages
"7-C" I Secondary
Student's
Permanent Record
for Hanna ,,.
Mackenzie P.
Llamanzares,
issued by the
Assumption
College, consisting
of 2 pages
"7-D" I Certificate of Same as Exhibit "7", and further, to prove
Attendance dated that Sen. Poe enrolled her youngest child,
April 8, 2015 Anika, in Philippine schools as soon as
issued by the she was of schooling age, and that she
Directress of the had been continuously attending school
Learning in the Philippines
Connection, Ms.
Julie Pascual
Penaloza,
consisting of 1
page
"7-E" I Certification dated
April 14, 2015
issued by
Directress of The
Greenmeadows
Learning Center,
Ms. Anna
Villaluna-Reyes,
49
-
consisting of 1
page
"7-F" I Elementary Pupil's
Permanent Record
for Jesusa Anika
Carolina P.
Llamanzares,
issued by the
Assumption
College, consisting
of 1 page
"8" I Identification Card 1. Shortly after Sen. Poe returned to the
issued by the Philippines permanently in May 2005,
Bureau of Internal she secured for herself a T.I.N. (239-
Revenue ("B.I.R.") 290-513-000) from the B.l.R.;
to Sen. Poe on 2. In the first quarter of 2005 and no
July 22, 2005, later than May 2005, Sen. Poe had
consisting of 1 abandoned her residence in the
page U.S.A., and, from then on, she
intended to reside permanently in the
Philippines; and
3. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be a
resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months
"11" I Condominium 1 i. In the first quarter of 2005 and no

Certificate of Title later than May 2005, Sen. Poe had
("CCT") No. abandoned her residence in the
11985-R covering U.S.A., and, from then on, she
Unit 7F of One intended to reside, a-S she did actually
Wilson Place, and physically reside, permanently in
which the Registry the Philippines;
of Deeds for San I 2. In the second half of 2005, Sen. Poe
Juan City issued and her husband acquired a
on February 20, residential condominium with parking
2006, consisting slot in San Juan City, which they used
I of 4 pages as a family residence until the
"12" CCT No. 11986-R completion of their intended
covermg the permanent family home at Corinthian
parking slot for Hills, Quezon City; and
Unit 7F of One I 3. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be a
Wilson Place, resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
which the Registry years and eleven (11) months
of Deeds for San
Juan City issued
on February 20,
2006, consisting
of 2 2ages
"13" I Declaration of
Real Property No.
96-39721 covering
Unit 7F of One
Wjlson Place,
issued by the
Office of the City
so
Assessor of San
Juan City on April
25, 2006,
consisting of 1
ae:e
"14" I Declaration of
Real Property No.
96-39722 covering
the parking slot
for Unit 7F of One
Wilson Place,
issued by the
Office of the City
Assessor of San
Juan City on April
25, 2006
consisting of 1
ae:e
"15" I Receipt No. To prove that:
8217172 issued 1. In February 2006, Sen. Poe briefly
by the Salvation travelled to the U.S.A. for the sole
Army on February purpose of supervising the packing
23, 2006, and/ or disposal of some of the family's
consisting of 1 remaining household belongings;
12age , 2. Sen. Poe had definitely abandoned her
"15-A" Receipt No. residence in the U.S.A. and did not
8220421 issued intend to return there anymore;
by the Salvation I 3. Since May 2005, Sen. Poe intended to
Army on February reside, and actually resided
23, 2006, permanently in the Philippines; and
consisting of 1 14. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will b<: ..Jl
i.i, ; I
resident of the Philippines for ten r:k:Q).
1
page
years and eleven ( 11) months "' : ~;;.
~f
"16" E-mail from the \ 1. Sen. Poe and her family definitely ~.,
U.S.A. Postal abandoned their former residence 1n .-;,>.,
Service, sent on the U.S.A. and did not intend to

March 28, 2006 to return there anymore; ,/!
..:~-
Sen. Poe's 12. No later than May 2005, Sen. Poe l:;l;~tj ~11:
husband, abandoned her residence in the
confirming the U.S.A., and, from then on, st,ie
latter's intended to reside permanently in the
submission of a Philippines; and
request for change I 3. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be a
of address to the resident of the Philippines for ten ( lQ) 1"
U.S.A. Postal years and eleven (11) months 1,c
Service, consisting ,;;;
I of 1 2age I
"17" Final Statement 1. On April 27, 2006, Sen. Poe an.d,.~r{
issued by First husband sold their family home irY~e
American Title U.S.A.; .... _7;,; ..
Insurance 2. Sen. Poe and her family deflrt~fy ~"
,, Company which abandoned their former residence ' 11.
indicates as the U.S.A. and did not intend to 1:~$c I
1. 1\ Settlement Date: return there anymore; .::~

"04-27I 2006," 3. No later than Mav 2005, Sen. Poe Had
.~:.
51
consisting of 2 I abandoned her residence in the

pages U.S.A., and, from then on, she
Philippines; and
4. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be a
resident of the Philippines for ten ( 10)
years and eleven (11) months
"18" I Transfer 1. No later than May 2005, Sen. Poe had

Certificate of Title abandoned her residence in the
No. 290260 U.S.A., and, from then on, she
covering a 509- intended to reside permanently in the
square meter lot Philippines;
at No. 106, Rodeo 2. In early 2006, shortly after selling
Drive, Corinthian their house in the U.S.A., Sen. Poe
Hills, Barangay and her husband acquired a vacant lot
Ugong Norte, in Quezon City, where they built their
Quezon City, new home; and
issued by the 3. By May 9, 2016, Sen. Poe will be a
Registry of Deeds resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
for Quezon City on years and eleven (11) months.
June 1, 2006,
consisting of 4
pages
"30-A" I The Questionnaire 1. As stated on page 1 of the

- Information for Questionnaire, even before she ran for
Determining an elective office, and long before the
Possible Loss of question of her residence in the
U.S. Citizenship Philippines became an issue, Sen. Poe
(issued by the considered herself a resident of the
U.S. Department Philippines since "05 2005" or May
of State - Bureau 2005;
of Consular 2. As stated on page 4 of the
Affairs), which Questionnaire, Sen. Poe maintained
Sen. Poe her ties in the Philippines, re-
accomplished on established her residence in the
12 July 2011, Philippines since May 2005, and
consisting of 5 exercised her civil and political rights
pages as a Filipino citizen;
3. No later than May 2005, Sen. Poe had
abandoned her residence in the
U.S.A., and, from then on, she
Philippines; and
4. By 9 May 2016, Sen. Poe will be a
resident of the Philippines for ten ( 10)
years and eleven ( 11) months
"41" I Affidavit of Jesusa 1. Shortly after the death of Sen. Poe's
Sonora Poe dated father, i.e., in early 2005, Sen. Poe
8 November 2015 and her family decided to move back
consisting of 3 and come home to the Philippines for
pages good to be with Sen. Poe's mother;
2. Sen. Poe arrived in the Philippines in
May 2005 and her children also
arrived at or around that time;
52
3. Sen. Poe enrolled Brian and Hanna in

schools in the Philippines for the
school year 2005-2006;
4. Upon their return to the Philippines
in 2005, Sen. Poe and her children
initially lived with Sen. Poe's mother
at her residence in San Juan City
until they could find their own place
to stay;
5. Sen. Poe's mother reassigned their
long-time family driver to work as
Sen. Poe's driver since 2005 precisely
because Sen. Poe would and her
children would henceforth be based
in the Philippines;
6. In the first quarter of 2005 and no
later than May 2005, Sen. Poe had
Philippines; and
years and eleven ( 11) months
"42" Affidavit of 1. Shortly after the death of Sen. Poe's
Teodoro Misael father, i.e., in the first quarter of
Daniel v. 2005, Sen. Poe and her husband
Llamanzares decided to return to and permanently
dated 8 November reside in the Philippines;
2015 consisting of 2. As early as March 2005, Sen. Poe and
3 pages her husband started making
arrangements to tran sfer her family's
personal belongings and household
goods from the U.S.A. to the
Philippines;
3. In the first quarter of 2005 and no
later than May 2005, Sen. Poe had
Philippines;
years and eleven (11) months;
5. The documents marked as Exhibits
"6-series" are authentic print-outs
accurately reflecting digitally stored
electronic data messages or electronic
documents pertaining to the
conversations between Sen. Poe
and/ or her husband and
representatives of (a) Victory Van
International; and (b) National
Veterinary Quarantine Service of the
Bureau of Animal Industry of the
Philippines; and
53
6. The document marked as Exhibit

"16" is an authentic print-out
accurately reflecting digitally stored
electronic data message or electronic
document from the United States
Postal Service.
Additionally, Exhibit "42" is being offered
to:
Authenticate Exhibit "6-series" and
Exhibit "16" in accordance with Rules
5 and 9 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC16o,
promulgated by the Supreme Court on
17 Julv 2001.
73.1. As held in Sabili vs. COMELEC161 and Mitra

vs. COMELEC, 16 2 the various pieces of evidence showing
that Sen. Poe established her domicile of choice in the
Philippines starting on 24 May 2005, must be viewed
"collectively" and not "separately" or in isolation.
74. Treating the issue of Sen. Poe's residence as a

question of fact, it is evident that when she returned to the
Philippines on 24 May 2005, she satisfied the three (3) requisites
for reestablishing her domicile of choice in the country. If the
COMELEC had carefully examined and weighed her evidence, it
would have arrived at the inevitable conclusion that Sen. Poe's
animus manendi (in the Philippines) and animus non revertendi
(to the U.S.A.) concurred with her physicar presence in the
country on 24 May 2005.
t, 74.1. Sen. Poe returned to the Philippines.on ;2f

May 2005,163 and, except for brief trips abroad, 164 has beep'
' continuously residing in the Philippines since that periodt.~,.
Notably, in 2011 or two (2) years prior to her ever runnfr'.ig:
for an elective office, Sen. Poe already stated in a sworn
document that she "became a resident of the Philippines \
160 The Rules on Electronic Evidence

161 G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012, citing Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 34z7,
Phil. 510 ( 1997)
, /62 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010 ::~}
163 See An~exes "~" a.nd "1-ser.i~s";. Exhibit "I" (Sen. Poe's travel records) and Exhil:>it ~::i
' p.10, showmg arrival m the Ph1hppmes on May 24, 2005. :r<
16 4 Sen. Poe's trips abroad during the contested period from May 2005 to July 2Q06 ~'i;l,re::.t~~~
1
. 1) Hong Kong - Philippin~ departure: September 11, 2005, Philippin"~Jfiirriv;~

September 14, 2005, lastmg only four (4) days;
f 2) USA - Philippine departure: December 16, 2005, Philippine arrival: ...~a~y . -..., .,. .
.; r . 2006, lasting only twenty two (221 days; ,.~" 11* "';,~ ... ~.
rt 3} US~ - Philippine def:larture: February 14, 2006, Philippine arrival: March 111:'2~~; ." "
lastmg only twenty five (251 days; _,, ;;
.v 4) Thailand - Philippine departure: July 2, 2006, Philippine arrival: July -~. 2006,
lasting only four (4) days. (See Exhibits "I" for the Petitioner and "5" for ~he Sen.
Poe)
~
54
once again since 2005", 165 specifically from "05 2005" (May
2005) to "present" .166
74.2. Sen. Poe's animus manendi, or intent to

stay permanently in the Philippines, is evidenced by,
among others:
a) Sen. Poe's travel records, which show that whenever

absent for a trip abroad, she would consistently
return to the Philippines; 167
b) Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe,16s attesting to, inter
alia, the fact that after their arrival in the Philippines
in early 2005, Sen. Poe and her children first lived
with her at 23 Lincoln St., Greenhills West, San Juan
City, which even necessitated a modification of the
living arrangements at her house to accommodate
Sen. Poe's family; 169
c) School records of Sen. Poe's children,170 which show
that they had been attending Philippine schools
continuously since June 2005;
d) Sen. Poe's TIN I.D.,171 which shows that shortly after
her return in May 2005, she considered herself a
taxable resident and submitted herself to the
Philipp in es' tax jurisdiction;
e) Condominium Certificates of Title for Unit 7F and a
parking slot at One Wilson Place<1 72 purchased in
early 2005, and its corresponding Declarations of Real
Property I 73 for real property tax purposes, which
clearly establish intent to reside permanently in the
Philippines; 174
165 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "30-A'', p. 4, in response to item no. 7
appearing on the same page.
166 Id. p.1.
167 Supra note 164 and infra note 185.
168 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "41"
169 See Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012 [citing Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03, July 30,
1991, 199 SCRA 692, 715, citing Delos Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893, 899 (1935)], where
the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that "a candidate is not required to have a
house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a
friend or relative."
17 0 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibits "7" to "7-F" for Sen. Poe
171 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "8" for Sen. Poe
172 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibits "11" and "12" for Sen. Poe
173 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibits "13" and "14" for Sen. Poe
17 4 The candidate's purchase of real property in a locality is a strong evidence of his intent
to reside or live therein. In Jalosjos v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012, citing
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-
03, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692, 715), the candidate's purchase of a residential lot and a
fish pond in the locality were considered evidence of his establishment of domicile there.
In Mitra vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010), the following were considered
as proof of establishment of residence: (a) "the purchase of a lot for (the candidate's)
permanent home;" and (b) the construction of a house on the said lot." In Gallego vs. Vera
~
55
f) Sen. Poe's reacquisition of her natural-born Filipino

citizenship, 17 5 and applications for derivative
citizenship for her minor children; 176
g) Sen. Poe's registration as a voter on August 31,
2006;177
h) Sen. Poe's renunciation of her U.S.A. citizenship on
October 20, 2010;178
i) Sen. Poe's acceptance of her appointment as MTRCB
Chairperson on October 21, 2010;179
j) Questionnaire - Information for Determining Possible
Loss of U.S. Citizenship, 180 wherein Sen. Poe, long
before the commencement of any controversy with
respect to her residency, indicated that she
considered herself a resident of the Philippines
starting in May 2005.
74.3. On the other hand, Sen. Poe's animus non-

revertendi, or definite intent to abandon her U.S.A. domicile
as early as first quarter of 2005, is evidenced by, among
others:
a) Affidavit of Jesusa Sonora Poe, 18 1 attesting to, among

others, the reasons which prompted Sen. Poe to leave
the United States and return permanently to the
Philippines;
b) Affidavit of Sen. Poe's husband, Teodoro Misael Daniel
V. Llamanzares, 18 2 corroborating Mrs. Poe's statement
and explaining how he and Sen. Poe had been actively
attending to the logistics of their permanent relocation
to the Philippines since March 2005;
c) Sen. Poe and her husband's documented
conversations with property movers regarding the
relocation of their household goods, furniture, and
cars, then in Virginia, US.A., to the Philippines, which
show that they intended to leave the United States for
good as early as March 2005;183
(73 Phil. 453 [ 1941]), the fact that the candidate had "bought a piece of land" in Abuyog
was deemed evidence of his animus manendi therein.
175 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibits "19" (Sen. Poe's Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines), "20" (Sen. Poe's Petitiop filed with the Bureau of Immigration J"B.I."]),
and "22" (Order of B.I. granting Sen. Poe's Petition)
176 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibits "21", "21-A", and "21-B"
180 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "30-A"
181 Annexes."H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "40"
183 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibits "6-series" and "42" for Sen. Poe. These e-mail
conversations (Exhibit "6-series"), authenticated by Sen. Poe's husband (Exhibit "42")
show, among others, that as early as March 18, 2005, she was already in touch with
56
d) Relocation of their household goods, furniture, cars,

and other personal property then in Virginia, US.A., to
the Philippines, which were packed and collected for
storage and transport to the Philippines on February
and April 2006;
e) Sen. Poe's husband's act of informing the United
States Postal Service of their abandonment of their
former U.S.A. address on March 2006;
f) Sen. Poe and her husband's act of selling their family
home in the U.S.A. on April 27, 2006;
g) Sen. Poe's husband's resignation from his work in the
U.S.A. in April 2006 and return to the Philippines on
May 4, 2006;
h) Questionnaire - Information for Determining Possible
Loss of U.S. Citizenship, 18 4 wherein Sen. Poe, long
before the commencement of any controversy with
respect to her residency in the Philippines, indicated
that she considered herself no longer a resident of the
United States since May 2005 until present.
74.4. If the COMELEC considered these pieces of

evidence, it would have found that Sen. Poe's statement
that she will be a resident of the Philippines for 10 years
and 11 months by May 2016 is not false. The COMELEC
would have correctly appreciated the fact that she had been
a resident of the Philippines continuously starting May
2005. 185 This is why her children had been contin~usly
.. 4'itli
., . ~,proper~y i:i~vers asking for an. estim~~e o.f the total cost.of relocating their househ'61a g9o\is
;;!, ~from Virginia, U.S.A., to Manila, Phihppmes (see e-mail dated March 18, 2005). Sen. Pae
and her husband eventually obtained the services of Victory Van International,,: wrh~ll
packed, collected, and stored their household goods and other moveable properties fQr.
transport to the Philippines in two (2) batches: one in February 2006 (supervised by Sen/
Poe, who was then in the United States), and another in April 2006 (supervised by Sen .
.Poe's husband, who was still at the United States at that time) shortly before Sen. Poe's
'husband returned to the Philippines in May 2006. (See e-mails dated February' a; 2006,
February 10, 2006, and April 7, 2006). . ,,
184 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "30-A", p.1
185 Sen. Poe's travel records (Exhibit "I" for the private respondent Elamparo) and U.S.A.
Passport (Exhibit "5" for Sen. Poe) show that she was physically present in the Philippines
continuously from May 24, 2005 to December 16, 2005, except for a brief four {4l dav
travel to Hong Kong from September 11 to 14, 2005, after which she returned to 'the
Philippines. On December 16, 2005, Sen. Poe briefly travelled to the U.S.A. to attend toher 't;>
zJamily's ongoing relocation, staying there for only twenty two (22) days. She return~ to.~
''Philippines on January 7, 2006. Sen. Poe's last lengthy stay in the U.S.A. W;aS' {:Jtpi
February 14, 2006 to March 11, 2006, or twenty five (25) days (less than one m6nthJ/fo
supervise the packing and collection of her family's household goods, and wrai'PUP'i'
,, :
'
~
~~):-
fapiily's affairs in the United States. (See Exhibits "6-series" [e-mail correspo11~~
Victo~ .van Interna.tional] and "15" to "!~-~'.' [rece~pts f~r do~ated goods""'troi:n)tt.
} Salvation Army], which show Sen. Poe's activities durmg this penod.) Sen. ~Qi~ic:hd~;~
i~
~. leave the country again until July 2, 2006, for a brief four (4) day visit to Thai1fpd, ~t~t
w~i~h she returned to the ~hilippines on J~l~ 5, 2~06. On November. 1, 2096, 51',n.;~,9~
agam went overseas for a bnef four (4) day V!Slt to Singapore, after which she rewrned):o
., ,,,the Philippines on November 4, 2006. These uncontroverted pieces of evidenc.~cl~rly
. "show that Sen. Poe had been continuously staying in the Philippines since May 2Q05, only
. leaving for brief periods of overseas business, but always returning to the Philippines.
~.
57
attending Philippine schools since June 2005; this is why

she and her husband purchased a condominium unit in
San Juan in late 2005; this is why they purchased a vacant
lot to build a family home in Quezon City in early 2006;
this is why they had their household belongings in the
U.S.A. packed and collected for storage and eventual
transport to the Philippines as early as February and no
later than April 2006; 186 this is why they sold their house in
the U.S.A. in April 2006, 18 7 the same month that Sen. Poe's
husband resigned from work and eventually returned to the
Philippines to join his family.
75. In Varias vs. COMELEC, 18 8 the High Court ruled that

ignoring evidence constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Indeed,
when the question brought before a tribunal is one of fact (which
the issue on residence undoubtedly is), there is really nothing
more whimsical, capricious and arbitrary than disregarding
evidence. Such utter disregard of evidence constitutes grave
abuse of discretion because it amounts to an evasion of a
positive duty enjoined by law, that is, the duty of the COMELEC
to treat the issue of residence as a question of fact and to
carefully weigh the evidence presented by the parties.
76. It is noteworthy that this Honorable Court has ruled

that several candidates established their respective domiciles of
choice in their respective localities based oIY significantly less
evidence than that presented by Sen. Poe in the proceeding a
quo.
76.1. In Perez vs. COMELEC,189 this Honorable

Court upheld the COMELEC's ruling that private
respondent therein had "changed his residence from
Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July
1990 on the basis of only the fallowing (five [5] pieces/ types
of evidence):" (a) "the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza,
186 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "6-series" for Sen. Poe, which show that as
early as March 2005, Sen. Poe and her husband had been in touch with property movers
and obtaining estimates regarding the total cost of relocating their household goods,
furniture, and other movable properties to the Philippines. The spouses eventually
obtained the services of Victory Van International, which scheduled the collection and
storage (for eventual transport to the Philippines) of the Llamanzares family's household
goods in two (2) batches: the first in February 2006 (see e-mail dated February 10 and 15,
2006), and the second in April 2006 (see e-mail dated April 7 and 27, 2006). This timeline
is consistent with the fact that Sen. Poe's house in the U.S.A. was sold on April 27, 2006.
These pieces of evidence indubitably show that Sen. Poe and her family abandoned their
U.S.A. domicile and could no longer have been living in the United States during this
period. This logical conclusion is consistent with the fact that Sen. Poe and her children
returned to the country with the intention to reside here permanently starting May 2005.
188 G.R. No. 189078, 30 March 2010
189 G.R. No. 133944, 28 October 1999
58
the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes

St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private respondent had
lived in 1990;" (b) "the contract of lease between private
respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a
residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996;" (c)
"the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between
private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit;" (d) "the
certificate of live birth of private respondents second
daughter;" and (5) "various letters addressed to private
respondent and his family."
76.2. In Japzon, this Honorable Court held that

Mr. Ty had established a new domicile of choice in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines based on only four (4) pieces of evidence,
namely: (a) his application for a Philippine passport
"indicating in his application that his residence in
the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur,Eastern Samar;" (b)
community tax certificates for the years 2006 and 2007
"stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar," and
showing that "Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local
tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar;" and (c) Ty's registratic5h as a voter on 17
July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
76.3. It is notable that Ty did not even present

independent evidence that he had abandoned his domicile
in the U.S.A. (i.e., proof of animus non-revertendi).
Nevertheless, this Honorable Court sided with him. Why
should the outcome be different in Sen. Poe's case when,
on top of her proof on animus manendi, she proved her
animus non-revertendi separately and through distinct
pieces of evidence, such as her and her husband's
resignation from work, the donation of some of the family's
household goods, collection and transport of the family's
household belongings, and the sale of the family home in
the U.S.A.? -
76.4. Similarly, in Jalover vs. Osmena and

COMELEC, 190 this Honorable Court affirmed the
COMELEC's finding that "Osmeiia had sufficiently
established by substantial evidence his residence in Toledo
190 G.R No. 209286, 23 September 2014

59
City, Cebu." The COMELEC relied on only six (6) acts: (a)
"Osmefla applied for the transfer of his voter's registration
record to Toledo City;" (b) "Osmefla likewise purchased a
parcel of land in Ibo, Toledo City in 1995;" (c) he
"commenced the construction of an improvement, which
would eventually serve as his residence since 2004;" (d)
"Osmefla even acguired another parcel of land in Das,
Toledo City in December 2011; (e) he "transferred his
headquarters to Poblacion and Bato, Toledo City as early as
2011; and (f) "Osmefla has always maintained profound
political and socio-civic linkages in Toledo City."
76.5. It bears stressing that the petitioner against

Osmefla presented his own evidence to controvert the
latter's evidence. Yet, Osmefla still prevailed on the issue
of residence. In contrast, in this case, private respondent
presented nothing (save for Sen. Poe's COC for Senator
which is neither binding nor decisive on the issue of her
residency) to refute Sen. Poe's evidence. Applying Jalover,
wasn't there even more reason for Sen. Poe to prevail in the
proceeding a quo?
77. Despite Sen. Poe's overwh.elming and unrefuted

evidence, the COMELEC still insisted that she failed to comply
with the 10-year residence requirement for Presidential
candidates. In arriving at that decision, the COMELEC focused
on Sen. Poe's apparent statement in her COC for Senator that
she had resided in the Philippines for only "6" years and "6"
months on 13 May 2013. According to the COMELEC, this was
proof that Sen. Poe had resided in the Philippines only since
November 2006 and, therefore, for just 9 years and 6 months by
9 May 2016. This singular fact does not constitute "substantial
evidence," and thus cannot negate Sen. Poe's other evidence
(discussed in pars. 73 to 74) clearly and overwhelmingly showing
that the fact of her residence is that she had reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines as early as 24 May 2005.
A.1.a. The COMELEC

disregarded the settled
.. principle e1191ciated in ti ;;. .......
Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, reiterated in
Perez vs. COMELEC, that a
candidate's statement in
her certificate of
candidacy is not decisive
of the issue of residence.
60
-
The fact of residence
always prevails over a
candidate's statement
about residence.
78. On pages 18 to 19 of the 1 December 2015 Resolution,

the COMELEC Second Division pointed out that Sen. Poe cannot
comply with the 10-year residence requirement under Section 2,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, because by her own
admission in her COC for Senator, Sen. Poe was a resident of the
Philippines "since November 2006" only. The COMELEC En
Banc upheld this finding in its 23 December 2015 Resolution.
Therefore, (for the COMELEC) by 9 May 2016, she will be
resident of the Philippines for only 9 years and 6 months. The
COMELEC's sole basis for this conclusion is Item No. 7 of Sen.
Poe's COC as Senator, wherein she indicated that her "period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" is "6" years
and "6" months.
79. The Second Division initially characterized this

statement as supposedly "binding" on petitioner. It also held
that Sen. Poe is "estopped" from "declaring an earlier period of
residence."
80. However, the COMELEC En Banc/ in ruling on Sen.

Poe's Motion for Reconsideration, clearly softened its position.
In its 23 December 2015 Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc
effectively acknowledged that Sen. Poe's statement on her
residence in her 2012 COC is not "binding" and may be
overcome by contrary evidence. Thus, it simply stated that Sen.
Poe's statement in her 2012 COC is an "admission against
interest," which is the "best evidence" "afford(ing) greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute." It is "fair to presume" that the
2012 COC "corresponds with the truth, and it is (her) fault if it
does not." The COMELEC En Banc also pointed out that a COC,
"being a notarial document, has in its favor the presumption of
regularity," and to "contradict the fact stated therein, there must
be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
I a.
Ii 8 "
preponderant." However, despite Sen. Poe's overwhelming and
. - :91'
uncontroverted evidence showing that she started residing in the

country on 24 May 2005, the COMELEC En Banc still found that
Sen. Poe started residing in the Philippines only "in November
2006."
--
61
81. The COMELEC clearly ignored this Honorable Court's

landmark ruling in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC.191 In that
case, this Honorable Court categorically held that "(i)t is the fact
of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual
has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement." In the same case, the Supreme Court ruled that
an "honest mistake" in a certificate of candidacy "should not ...
be allowed to negate the fact of residence . . . if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a
piece of paper." Romualdez applies squarely to Sen. Poe's case
because:
(a) Like Mrs. Marcos in Romualdez (who stated that her

period of residence in the locality was 7 months,
instead of "since childhood"), Sen. Poe stated a period
of residence in her COC for Senator ("6" years and "6"
months) which is shorter than the period she should
have stated therein ("7" years and "11" months);
(b) Like Mrs. Marcos in Romualdez, Sen. Poe's error in

her COC for Senator was the result of an honest
mistake rooted in the confusing entries and questions
in the certificate of candidacy itself; and
(c) Like Mrs. Marcos in Romualdez, Sen. Poe was honest

and open about her mistake, and she corrected it the
first chance she had, and with every succeeding
opportunity thereafter.
82. Sen. Poe committed an honest mistake when she

stated in her COC for Senator that her "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE
BEFORE MAY 13, 2013" is "6" years and "6" months.
82.1. Only a two-year period of residence in the

Philippines is required to qualify as a member of the Senate
of the Republic of the Philippines. Sen. Poe sincerely had
no doubt that she had satisfied this residence requirement.
She even accomplished her COC for Senator without the
assistance of a lawyer. Indeed, even Chairman Andres
Bautista of the COMELEC, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion promulgated on 23 December 2015,
noted that the "residency requirement for Senator is two (2)
years. Hence, when [Sen. Poe] stated in her 2013 COC that
she was a resident ... for [6 years and 6 months], it would
seem that she did so without really considering the legal or
191 G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995

62
constitutional requirement as contemplated by law. After

all, she had already fully complied with the two-year
residence requirement." 192 (Because of this, Chairman
Bautista ruled that the supposed "admission" in the 2013
COC was not.knowingly made.)
82.2. It is no wonder that Sen. Poe did not know

that the use of the phrase "Period of Residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013" in her COC for Senator,
actually referred to the period immediately preceding 13
May 2013, or to her period of residence on the day right
before the 13 May 2013 elections. Sen. Poe therefore
interpreted this phrase to mean her period of residence in
the Philippines as of the submission of COCs in October
2012 (which is technically also a period "before May 13,
2013").
82. 3. In terms of abandoning her domicile in the

U.S.A. and permanently relocating to the Philippines,
nothing significant happened in "November 2006."
Moreover, private respondent was not able to present any
evidence which would show that Sen. Poe returned to the
Philippines with the intention to reside here permanently
only in November 2006. Thus, there would have been no
logical reason for Sen. Poe to reckon the start of her
residence in the Philippines in "November 2006." This
bolsters the fact that Sen. Poe's representation in her COC
for Senator regarding her period of residence was ba~ed on
j,
her honest misunderstanding of what was asked d(b~;r;n ~
Item No. 7 of her COC for Senator, and that she indeed
counted backward from October 2012 (instead of frqmfJ3
May2013). t~
82.4. The COMELEC apparently realized tkat Ule

phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines before --~fhe
date of the election)" (which appears in Sen. Poe's COC for
Senator) might cause some confusion or misunderstanding
....~
among prospective candidates in the 9 May 2016 electi0p.s .
Thus, Item No. 7 of the latest COC forms which the ;;-
COMELEC prepared for the 9 May 2016. e~ctwns

(including Sen. Poe's COC for President 193) was significcfhtly
amended and revised. It now states: ., :~~~:,:
~~l
.,.~
-
it'::: ,,. '(
~~ ~
'1i9/ Chairman Bautista, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in SPA No. 15-001 (pci.'i5:t19
, 1. (Annex "B-2" hereof) , '-" .1'!11.
193 See Annex "C" hereof, and Exhibit "B" for the private respondent, which is a,ttach,ed to
Anqexes "E" and "F" "

I:,;
63
PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016:194
The COMELEC's recent insertion of the phrase "UP TO THE

DAY" in the entry above is significant because it bolsters
Sen. Poe's claim that she was misled by the earlier version
of that question in her COC for Senator.
82.5. If a question is, in the COMELEC's mind,

confusing, shouldn't the COMELEC expect that a candidate
would give a wrong answer to that question, and that the
candidate who gave such wrong answer did not lie but was
simply confused? If a question is concededly imprecise,
shouldn't the COMELEC excuse a candidate's honest
imprecise answer to that imprecise question?
82.6. It must also be noted that when Sen. Poe

accomplished her COC for Senator, she reckoned her
residence in the Philippines from March-April 2006, which
is when (to her recollection at the time she signed this
COC) she and her family had substantially wound up their
affairs in the U.S.A. in connection with their relocation to
the Philippines. Specifically, March 2006 was when Sen.
Poe arrived in the Philippines after her last lengthy stay in
the U.S.A., and April 2006 was when she and her husband
were finally able to sell their house irf the U.S.A. The
month of April 2006 is also when her husband had
resigned from his job in the U.S.A. The period between
March-April 2006 to September 2012 is around six (6)
years and six (6) months.
82. 7. This erroneous understanding of the

commencement of her residence in the Philippines, together
with the confusing question in Item No. 7 of her COC for
Senator, explains why Sen. Poe mistakenly indicated in
that COC that her "Period of Residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013" would be "6" years and "6" months.
82.8. Sen. Poe was later advised (only this year)

by legal counsel that the concept of "residence," for
purposes of election law, takes into account the period
when she was physically present in the Philippines starting
from 24 May 2005, (after having already abandoned her
residence in the U.S.A., coupled with the intent to reside in
the Philippines) and not just the period after her U.S.A.
residence was sold and when her family was already

64
complete in the country, after her husband's return. Sen.

Poe's period of residence in her COC for Senator should,
therefore, have been counted frqm 24 May 20Q5, and
extended all the way "up to the day before" the 13 May
2013 elections. Sen. Poe realized o~ly this year that she
should have stated "7" y~ars ~~d "11" 1nonths (instead of
"6" years and "6" months) as her period of residence in her
COC for Senator. Significantly, the issue regarding Sen.
Poe's correct period of residence in the Philippines was
raised for the first time only this year.
83. Nonetheless, the COMELEC did not believe that Sen.

Poe had committed an "honest mistake" in her COC for Senator.
According to the COMELEC Second Division, "no evidence ha(d)
been shown that there was an attempt to rectify the so-called
mistake."195 The COMELEC further pointed out that "the
attempt to correct it in her present COC filed only on October
15, 2015 cannot serve to outweigh the probative weight that has
to be accorded to the admission against interest in her 2013
COC for Senator." Bbased on this Honorable Court's ruling in
Romualdez, a candidate's "attempt" to correct her "honest
mistake" and the timing of that attempt are both immaterial in
determining whether the mistake was, indeed, "honest."
83.1. Mrs. Marcos's "honest mistake" 1n

Romualdez was rooted in the misleading questions and '
entries in the COC, and not in her attempt to rectify that
mistake or the timing of that attempt. In the words of ~is
: ~. ,
Honorable Court, the "source(s) of confusion" of Mr$,. ,
Marcos were the items in the COC itself (i.e., "the entry ,:foi:
*.~
residence [Item No. 7]") which was "followed immediately:;by'r
the entry for residence in the constituency wher~ a- ~.
i ;eandidate seeks election." In the same vein, as discusstd
in par. 82, the "source of confusion" in Sen. Poe's COC '{or
Senator was also in Item No. 7 thereof, specifically the use
of the phrase "Period of Residence in the Philippines beffjre ~,
May 13, 2013."196 As discussed, the COMELEC<
acknowledged the possibility for such confusion when it~t
substantially amended Item No. 7 of the COC to t\9W,
..I
' specifically state in the revised forms, that the informa'f#2.l'
'
~
sought is residence "up to the day" before the 9 May ZOl
elections.
.. rr ' 83.2. It would be absurd to suggest tg~t:

,,
mistaken statement in Mrs. Marcos's COC would suO:tli
t "'
:~ 1 L
1
;!,?S See Annex "A" hereof, 1December2015 Resolution, p. 19

.1ti6 Italics supplied.
~
~
.!
,:r
~::,
-
65
have become "decisive" on the issue of her residence if she

had failed to seek the correction of that mistake. This
Honorable Court would definitely still have ruled that
residence is ultimately an "issue of fact" even if Mrs.
Marcos had failed to seek such amendment. At any rate,
Mrs. Marcos was not able to successfully amend her COC.
Her amended COC was no longer accepted by the Provincial
' ' '
Election Supervisor because the period to file COCs had

already lapsed at the time. And when she filed her
amended COC with the head office of the COMELEC, its
Second Division even "struck" the same from the records.
83.3. Sen. Poe, on the other hand, could not have

sought to "amend" her COC for Senator immediately after
she had filed the same, because Sen. Poe discovered her
honest mistake only this year (2015), or two years after her
election and proclamation as Senator in May 2013. Soon
after she discovered her mistake, Sen. Poe corrected it
publicly in media interviews, and officially before the SET
and in her COC for President in the 2016 elections. This is
discussed in detail in Argument A.6.
83 .4. Sen. Poe's conduct after she discovered her

honest error is comparable and analogous to that of Mrs.
Marcos. Like Mrs. Marcos, Sen. Poe was honest and open
about her mistake, and she corrected it the first chance she
had, and in every succeeding opportunity thereafter.
84. What if a candidate's statement on her residence in a

previous certificate of candidacy was not the result of an "honest
mistake," would that statement be considered "decisive" or
"binding" with respect to her future COCs? Would the candidate
in that scenario be "estopped," as the COMELEC held, from
claiming a different period of residence in a subsequent COC?
Perez vs. COMELEC19 7 tells us that both questions must be
answered in the negative.
85. In Perez, the Supreme Court reiterated the

undisturbed principle previously enunciated in Romualdez that
an erroneous statement in a COC is not decisive of the issue of
residence. However, the High Court did not make any
determination, and therefore did not consider as material,
whether the candidate had committed "honest mistakes" in his
previous COCs (and even in his prior affidavits), when he had
stated therein that he was a resident of a locality other than the
197 G.R. No. 133944, 28 October 1999

66
locality in which he sought to run for office. The High Court

stressed that residence is an issue of fact, thus:
In support of her claim, petitioner presented private

respondent's certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in
the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections his voter's affidavit which he
used in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1997 elections; and his
voter registration record dated June 22, 1997, in all of which it is
stated that he is a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel,
Municipality of Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of
Cagayan.
x x x
In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private

respondent changed his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao,
the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the
following: ( 1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner
of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the
contract of lease between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas
T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at Kamias St.,
Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June
30, 1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998,
between private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the
certificate of live birth of private respondents se,cond
I'
daughter;
and (5) various letters addressed to private respondent and his
family, which all show that private respondent was a resident of
.if( c .~
Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one ( 1) year immediately ,r
;;. preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.
There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding .f
that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of

Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the ,i,
merit of this factual finding.

~-~-
Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was

a resident of Gattaran, at least until June 22, 1997, is shown by the
following documentary evidence in the record, to wit: ( 1) his
certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988,
1992 and 1995 elections; (2) his voters registration records, the .
!1,"
latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3) the fact that
private respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of
1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.
x x x
Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of

candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992,
' :-~-
:,
67
and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of

Gattaran. Under the law, what is required for the election of
governor is residency in the province, not in any district or
municipality, one year before the election.
Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v.

COMELEC:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material
only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
In this case, although private respondent declared in his

certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that
he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was
actually a resident of the Third District not just for one ( 1) year
prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7)
years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a resident of
Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was
governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be
convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao,
which is the capital of the province of Cagayan. 1:s
86. Applying Perez, in relation to Romualdez, whether the

erroneous statement on residence in an earlier COC was made
intentionally or mistakenly, the fact of residence will always
control. This is but logical, for while a candidate is required to
state in his or her COC certain information pertaining to his or
her eligibility for office, the law itself does not discount the
possibility of error or mistake, as it only requires the candidate
to certify under oath that such information in his or her COC are
"true to the best of his knowledge."19 9 Certainly, a candidate's
"knowledge" could turn out to be wrong, without bad faith on the
part of such candidate.
87. Consistent with what is apparently stated in her COC

for Senator, does the "fact" of Sen. Poe's residence show that the
earliest she started residing in the Philippines was in November
2006? The answer is "NO." This explains why neither the
COMELEC nor private respondent could (or bothered to) identify
any fact or piece of evidence which would explain why Sen. Poe's
residence should be reckoned from November 2006. On the

1g9 Sec. 74, Omnibus Election Code
68
contrary, the "fact" of Sen. Poe's residence, as discussed in detail

above, is that she reestablished her domicile of choice in the
Philippines as early as 24 May 2005.
88. Still, in its 23 December 2015 Resolution, instead of

simply admitting there is absolutely no evidence of anything
significant in November 2006 to which Sen. Poe may have
pegged the beginning of her residence, the COMELEC curiously
held that there could possibly be such an event but that Sen.
Poe may be concealing evidence thereof:
That there does not appear on record "any significant event

in Respondent's life which would lead to her reckoning her
residency in the Philippines as of November 2006 is not a
definitive badge of good faith by respondent. That a thing does
not appear on record does not translate to it being inexistent. In
other words, it is still very much possible that such "significant
event" happened in November 2006, just that it was not now
brought to the attention of this Commission by respondent (who
could not be expected to present such incriminating information)
or petitioner (who, possibly, has not discovered the same).
The foregoing passage is disturbing. Is the COMELEC En

Banc suggesting that it has the power to assume a fact, even
without evidence? Does it have the power, in the absence of an
applicable presumption, independent of Seq,, Poe's 2012 COC
and despite all of the other evidence on record, to simply assume
that Sen. Poe started residing in the country only in November
2006? The answer is obviously in the negative because in any
adversarial proceeding, a "fact" must be proven before the
tribunal can find that it exists (unless, of course, there is an
applicable presumption of fact or law which may be invoked to
replace proof). Indeed, why should the COMELEC even suggest
that there is such evidence, and that Sen. Poe is concealing it?
For the COMELEC to, in effect, accuse Sen. Poe of suppression
of evidence shows not just grave abuse of discretion, but
outright bias and hostility.
88.1. The COMELEC's decision to rely on mere

conjectures, in place of evidence presented by Petitioner
proving facts consistent with her good faith, is a blatant
display of its arbitrary resort to "subjective non-legal
standards"2oo in its analysis of whether herein Petitioner
met the ten-year period of residence required by law.
200 See Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010

.....
69
89. As for the COMELEC's supplied excuse for herein

private respondent failure to provide evidence "(who, possibly,
has not discovered the same)", it should be reminded of the
passage in Tongko vs. The Manufacturers Life Insurance
Company (Phils.}, Inc.20 1 : "This Court (and all adjudicators for that
matter) cannot and should not fill in the evidentiary gaps in a
party's case that the party failed to support; we cannot and
should not take the cudgels for any party. Tongko failed to
support his cause and we should simply view him and his case
as they are; our duty is to sit as a judge in the case that he and
the respondent presented."
90. Since Sen. Poe's COC for Senator does not coincide
with the fact of her residence, this document should have been
disregarded by the COMELEC, and not declared to be "binding"
or decisive on the issue of Sen. Poe's compliance with the 10-
year residence requirement. The COMELEC should disregard
what is stated in a COC when it does not jive with the rest of the
evidence. Conversely, it should not throw away or, worse, ignore
the rest of the evidence when these do jive with what is stated in
the COC.
A.1.b. The COMELEC acted

whimsically and
capriciously in 1,
automatically concluding
that Sen. Poe's statement
.....
~
in her COC for President
concerning her period of
residence is false, simply
because her earlier COC
...~
for Senator contradicts
that statement. The
,~
COMELEC should have

determined, independent
of Sen. Poe's COC for
<I,:;
i
Senator, whether the
period of residence stated
in her COC for President ,li
is false.
t
.,, In its 23 December 2015 Resoluti?n, the CO~~~L;~~ ,~

..
91.
. ./ ""
En qnc ruled that Sen. Poe's 2012 COC which shows thfit' ~~ii ,\
r 'Ji.ef~ (:
1~'..-~~J' J,c.
'l'.. F
201 G.R. No. 167622, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 58
4 .~j,.. '
70
-
started residing in the Philippines only "on November 2006," is
"entirely inconsistent with her declaration" in her present 2015
COC that she "was a resident since May 2005." According to the
COMELEC En Banc, Sen. Poe's arguments were correctly struck
down "on the basis of this contradiction." This ruling is illogicstl
and arbitrary.
92. The fact that a person's prior sworn statement

contradicts her current sworn statement does not automatically
render the current statement false. The inconsistency between
two assertions simply means that one assertion is false.
Whoever asserts that the current claim is false, must prove its
falsity independent of the prior inconsistent claim.
92.1. Grounded, as it is, in basic logic and

common sense, this principle has been applied consistently
in the law on perjury. In Masangkay vs. People,202 this
Honorable Court held as follows:
We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot

be obtained by the prosecution by merely showing the
inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if
both statements are sworn. The prosecution must additionally
prove which of the two statements is false and must show the
statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory
statement. The rationale for requiring evidence other than a
contradictory statement is explained thus:
x x x Proof that accused has given contradictory

testimony under oath at a different time will not be
sufficient to establish the falsity of his testimony
charged as perjury, for this would leave simply
one oath of the defendant as against another, and it
would not appear that the testimony charged was
false rather than the testimony contradictory
thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize
each other; there must be some corroboration of
the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration,
however, may be furnished by evidence
aliunde tending to show perjury independently of
203
the declarations of testimony of the accused.
92.2. The felony of perjury, like an action under

Section 78 of the OEC, includes "deliberate falsehood" as a
necessary element. The principle enunciated above may
therefore apply by analogy in Sen. Poe's case.
202 G.R. No. 164443, 18 June 2010

203 Underscoring supp lied
71
93. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in

concluding that Sen. Poe's claim about her period of residence in
her COC for President is "false," based solely and exclusively on
her apparently inconsistent statement in her COC for Senator.
The COMELEC ought to have looked for evidence, other than
Sen. Poe's COC for Senator, which would show that her claim
about her period of residence in her COC for President is "false."
The COMELEC did not cite any such evidence aliunde, and
understandably so, because all of the evidence in the proceeding
a quo proves that what Sen. Poe stated in her COC for Preside11t
is "true." All the evidence shows that Sen. Poe started residing
in the Philippines on 24 May 2005 (See pars. 73 to 74 above). In
contrast, none of the evidence proves that Sen. Poe started
residing in the Philippines only in "November 2006." Therefore,
Sen. Poe was being truthful when she stated in her COC for
President that her "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016" would be
" 1O" years and " 11" months.
93.1. From a mathematical standpoint,

Petitioner's 7-year and 11-month period of residence in the
Philippines (as of 13 May 2013, reckoned from 24 May
2005) necessarily includes a 6-year and 6-month period.
Therefore, Sen. Poe's statement on her residence in Item
No. 7 of her COC for Senator was not aMsolutely false, but
simply incomplete. (What would have been outright false is
a representation in her COC for Senator that, by 13 May
2013, she would have resided in the Philippines for any
period longer than 7 years and 11 months, but Sen. Poe
made no such claim in her COC).
93.2. Sen. Poe's COC for Senator was incomplete

only insofar as it was short of a 1 year and 5-month period.
However, this period was immaterial insofar as Sen. Poe's
COC for Senator was concerned, because adding that
missing period would not have made Sen. Poe any more or
less qualified for a seat in the Senate. Stated differently,
when she mistakenly omitted this 1 year and 5-month
period, Sen. Poe did not conceal or hide a "lack" of
_ iA+roa e If ~nmttr11tion as 11~~n.at6rial candidate. She also had '&fl'!:'.~~
nothing to gain as a Senatorial candidate by intentionally

omitting this period from her COC for Senator, because she
undoubtedly possessed more than 2 years of residence in
the Philippines immediately preceding the 13 May 2013
elections.
72
94. Like the High Court's rulings in Romualdez vs.

COMELEC and Perez vs. COMELEC, and the basic concepts of
"admission against interest," the foregoing discussion explains
why Sen. Poe's COC for Senator cannot, in and of itself (divorced
from the rest of the evidence in this case), constitute factual or
legal basis for the falsity of Sen. Poe's representation in her COC
for President that by 9 May 2016, she would have resided in the
Philippines for "10" years and "11" months.
A.2. The COMELEC disregarded the

basic principle that residence
is principally an issue of fact
and intention, and cited
inapplicable jurisprudence,
when it ruled that the
commencement of Sen. Poe's
domicile in the Philippines
should start, at the earliest,
when she reacquired her
natural-born Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No.
9225.
95. The COMELEC disregarded Sen. ,1Poe's evidence of

,1, residence before July 2006, because it found that "the earliest
starting point from which (it) should reckon [Sen. Po,~'s
r~sidency is July 18, 2006 204 when [she] was grahted
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225." This
ruling',is purportedly based on three decisions of this Honorable ., ,,
Court, i.e., Coquilla vs. COMELEc,2os Japzon vs. COMELEC206 ~
and Caballero vs. COMELEc.2o 7 The COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it misapplied these three decisions~iQ
decidirtg when to count the commencement of Sen. Poe's
residence in the Philippines .
., 96. The facts in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero have two

'{2) things in common: (a) the candidates presented negligible or
n@ evidence of reestablishment of domicile of choice .in 'tij~.
~ Philippines before they were repatriated; and/ or (b) the evidehe~
:~;;~~-~[~''
~-' :,~~ ~~
20 4 Sen., Poe submits that she reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship ~~n' -q,-..,
tO,bk her oath of allegiance on 7 July 2006, for that is what Section 3 of R.A. ~ ..~
provides. Be that as it may, the difference between dates is immaterial bec'ci'Ufj~~
comq;}eqcement of Sen. Poe's domicile in the Philippines should be counted before~,
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225. :''}
;0:;1p.R. No. 151914, 31July2002, 385 SCRA 607 ":~;: v
20 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009 ,'
207 G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015
. ,t
J
~.
73
(other than the candidates' previous COCs) showed that they

had not reestablished residence in the Philippines before they
were repatriated.
96. 1. In Coquilla, the only pieces of evidence

showing that he might have had the intent to reside in the
Philippines were: (a) his Community Tax Certificate; and (b)
his verbal declarations that he intended to run for office.
The candidate's balikbayan stamps in his U.S. passport, by
themselves, showed that the candidate's intention was only
to vacation temporarily in the Philippines.
96.2. In Japzon, there was absolutely no evidence

of the candidate's residence before he reacquired his
natural born citizenship. In fact, all of his evidence
pertained to events after repatriation.
96. 3. Finally, in Caballero, the candidate clearly

failed to prove that he had reestablished his domicile of
choice in Uyugan, Batanes, at least one year before the May
13, 2013 elections. On the contrary, he admitted that his
place of work was abroad, his visits to the_Philippines were
"vacations" from work, and he had only 9 months "actual
stay" in Uyugan, Batanes.
97. In other words, in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero, this

Honorable Court was left with no choice but to reckon the start
of the candidate's domicile, at the earliest, on the day he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship, because there was simply
insufficient proof that the candidates in question had resided in
the Philippines before repatriation. Accordingly, in these three
decisions, the High Court did not lay down (and could not have
laid down) an absolute rule that residence may start only from
the date of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or when the
candidate secures a permanent resident visa. There was also no
pronouncement in these three cases that evidence of residence
before reacquisition (or before securing a permanent resident
visa) must be ignored or set aside. The High Court had no
opportunity to tackle this specific issue because there was no
proof of residence before repatriation or while the candidate did
not possess a permanent resident visa.
97.1. Indeed, even Commissioner Louie Guia, in

his Separate Opinion, reconsidered his previous position
and held that, based on a proper appreciation of Coquilla,
Japzon, Caballero, and Caasi vs. COMELEC, and the
undisputed evidence on record, Sen. Poe "effectively
transferred her domicile from the US to the Philippines as
74
of May 2005", as "[r]e-acquisition of former citizenship is

not a condition for one to be deemed to have re-established
his or her domicile in the country."208 After taking a second
look at Sen. Poe's unrebutted evidence, Comm. Guia
correctly concluded that while "[t]he circumstance of ...
being solely a US citizen before July 2006 should of course
be considered in evaluating [Sen. Poe's] intent to stay in the
Philippines and abandon her US domicile permanently,"
"[e]vidence abound" to show that the intention to change
their domicile from the US to the Philippines "have already
been present as of May 2005." "Entertaining the probability
of [Sen. Poe] still intending to maintain US as her domicile
[simply] because she was still a US citizen at that time,
despite proof to the contrary, can be considered as
employing a 'subjective non-legal standard' which the
Supreme Court rejected in the case of [Mitra vs.
COMELECJ. "209
98. The facts which Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero share

in common are the very same facts which distinguish these
decisions from Sen. Poe's case. As explained in pars. 73 to 74
above, unlike these three cases, Sen. Poe was able to present
overwhelming and unrefuted evidence that she had
reestablished her domicile of choice in the Philippines before her
repatriation on 7 July 2006, or as early as 24 May 2005. Unlike
th~se three cases, not a single piece of"' evidence in the
, 4u:>roceeding a quo (other than Sen. Poe's non-binding COC ,f,er
'Senator) proved that Sen. Poe had resided elsewhere before'~'.{
'.~lll~( 2~06 or th~t. sh~ had failed t~ reestablish her domicilej~{~"'i
''';.;:C!lb1ce 1n the Ph1hpp1nes before this date. The stark contra.st~;'"'
, o~tween the factual milieu in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero:oii
the one hand, and Sen. Poe's case, on the other, is illustrated in :.'
the t~I,le below: >' .~ t
;}' ' .~ .
Coquilla Japzon Caballero Sen. Poe's case (SPA)..

001 [DC]) (See Argument ,
A.5. 210 .i'.fi. 'ft
Evidence of the The None None 1. Entry in U.S.A. .
candidate's candidate's Passport showing that ,
~~stablishment Balikbayan .. Sen. Poe returned,Jo ,
""' Pf donilcize In visas, his the Philippines on\~:'
i','#~l Ph;lippines community May 2.005 ~e
oefore tax Exhibit "5") .,;; ~
' . tt:../ ~
~repatriation certificate 2. E-mail excha
~: and his between Sen.:' ,
,_. :- '"*
-; declarations and/ or her hq1i
;', that he and reoreserita
~:~- \
1 1 2:~ Co:p,~ Guia, Separate Opinion dated 23 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-001 (qC),
,.(Anne;t'"~-1" hereof)
29,11 1Id., at p. 7
:tfo. See Annexes "H" and "I-series" hereof
~ . ""11. '
..;'"
;;t
~ ,::.;
75
-
intends to of: (1) Victory Van
run for office Corporation, and (2)
National Veterinary
Quarantine Service of
the Bureau of Animal
Industry of the
Philippines, showing
that, as early as
March 2005, the
family started
planning their move
back to the
Philippines (Exhibits
"6-series");
3. School records of Sen.
Poe's two older
children showing that
they were enrolled in
Philippines schools
for the Academic Year
2005 to 2006
(Exhibits "7-series");
4. Identification Card
bearing Sen. Poe's
TIN which the BIR
issued on 22 July
2005 (Exhibit "8");
5. Condominium
Certificates of Title
Nos. 11985-R and
11986-R showing that
Sen. Poe and her
husband had
acquired a
condominium unit
/
(and parking slot) in
'\!; San Juan. City no"
later tf1art w. 20
February
. ~) 1 '2006
" '
(Exhibits "11" . ''i""~nd.-

!);.
"12");
6. Declarations of, Real
Property Nos. J '96".~.
39721 and 96-39722.
covering the ~me :
condominium unit
(and parking'. stotl, in
San Juan . City
showing that these
real properties were
declared for tax
purposes in S~n .
Poe's and ))er
husband's name 'on
25 April: . , ~06
(Exhibits ".13" 1 ed
" ~.. )J,
J "14"); ,,, '.
7. Receipts .i~;;t":bj~i
the Salva~ ~ri::nt- ~
both dated }.~g
February
. "li~'
- ,. ~~-0
. -~'4
showmg tha ,
,'f r had denate~;~ ~.a l,J;
number of '''')'her
t.,- household goods Pin
the U.S.A. fExbibits
~~'
'
-------------------------------..-...... 76
.~
"15" and "15-A");

8. E-mail from the
U.S.A. Postal Service,
sent on 28 March
2006 to Sen. Poe's
husband, confirming
the latter's
submission of a
request for change of
address to the U.S.A.
Postal Service
(Exhibit "16");
9. Final Statem"nt
issued by First
American Title
Insurance Company
which indicates as
Settlement Date: "04-
27 /2006," which
shows that Sen. Poe
and her husband sold
their family home in
the U.S.A. on 27 April
2006 (Exhibit "1 7");
10. Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 290260
covering a 509-
square meter lot at
No. 106, Rodeo
Drive, Corinthian
Hills, Baran gay
Ugong Norte, Quezon
City, issued by the
Registry of Deeds for
,. Quezon City on 1
June 2006 (Exhibit
"18");
11. The Questionnaire -
Information for
Determining Possible
Loss of U.S.
Citizenship (issued
by the U.S.
Department of State
- Bureau of Consular
Affairs), which Sen.
Poe accomplished on
12 July 2011
(Exhibit "30-A")
12. Affidavit Affidavit of
Jesusa Sonora Poe
dated 8 November
2015 (Exhibit "41");
13. Affidavit of Teodoro
Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares dated 8
November 2015
(Exhibit "42");
14. Sen. Poe's verified
statements in her
Answer and other
pleadings
Coquilla Japzon Caballero Sen. Poe's case (SPA 15-
001 [DC]) (See Argument
A.5.)
Evidence cited I Balikbauan Candidate Candidate None
77
or offered to visas which, admittedly admitted

prove that the Qy started that his
candidate had themselves, residing in place of
not established showed that the work was
residence in the the Philippines abroad, his
Philippines candidate only after visits to the
before intended to repatriation. Philippines
repatriation stay only were
(other than the temporarily "vacations"
candidate's in the from work,
non-binding Philippines and he had
COC) only 9
months
"actual
stay" in
Uyugan,
Batanes.
99. Obviously, in Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero, the

evidence of establishment of domicile in the Philippines before
repatriation was nothing compared to Sen. Poe's evidence in the
proceeding a quo. So, why should Sen. Poe's residence be
decided in the same way that the issue was decided in Coquilla,
Japzon and Caballero? Why should these three cases be
controlling in Sen. Poe's case? Only similar cases should be
decided similarly, and, as clearly demonstrated above, Coquilla,
Japzon and Caballero are anything but "similar" to Sen. Poe's
case.
100. It bears stressing that Coquilla nowhere stated an

absolute rule that a foreigner's residence in the Philippines may
commence only upon repatriation. As a matter of fact, as the
COMELEC itself pointed out, Coquilla is authority for the
proposition that a foreigner can establish residence in the
Philippines "as a visitor" allowed by immigration laws to stay as
such. In other words, what Coquilla prohibits, for purposes of
determining compliance with statutory or constitutional
residence requirement for elective offices, is not residence in the
Philippines while being an alien, but residence obtained through
unlawful entry in the Philippines. Sen. Poe's cancelled U.S.A.
Passport (Exhibit "5" 1) shows that her presence in the
21
Philippines from 24 May 2005 onwards was always legal.

Therefore, under the terms of Coquilla, Sen. Poe could
reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before
her repatriation on 7 July 2006.
100.1. Indeed, to qualify a balikbayan as a mere

visitor, as if he or she is not inclined nor permitted to stay
even without a resident visa, is inconsistent with the law
itself. To start, the term balikbayan is defined by law to
include "a former Filipino citizen and his or her family, as
211 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"

78
this term is defined hereunder, who had been naturalized

in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines."212 Under the law, the visa-free entry period of
one year afforded by a balikbayan stamp is of a length
indicative of something more than just transient stay. The
law also envisions a balikbayan program instituted by the
Department of Tourism which "shall include a kabuhayan
shopping privilege allowing tax-exempt purchase of
livelihood tools and providing the opportunity to avail of the
necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their
return to the country."213
100.2. That "balikbayans" can avail themselves of

livelihood programs designed to make them "become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their
return to the country," and are allowed to bring in personal
effects, vehicles, motorcycles and household goods,214 show
that the law does not treat them as transients with no
intent to stay. The obvious intent of the law is to help
balikbayans reestablish residence here.
101. Not only did the COMELEC apply inapplicable

jurisprudence, it also failed to apply applicable jurisprudence.
Jalosjos vs. COMELEC2 15 is the case which the COMELEC should
have applied in deciding the length of Sen. Poe's residence in the
Philippines. In Jalosjos, the Supreme Court started counting the
candidate's residence in the Philippines even befor~~i, he .
\reacquired his natural born Filipino citizenship under R:f. l\{iP,c
:<, 9225 (and without mentioning the need for a "permaneJ:),t .
resident visa," as the High Court did in Coquilla). This i~(.
~."
~-.
212 Sedtion 2, RA No. 6768 as amended by RA No. 9174 (underscoring supplied)
213 Section 1, RA No. 6768 as amended by RA No. 9174. The law also provides for training
programs thus: ' "' '
'i
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through the OWWA, in

coordination with the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), livelihood corporation and
.,, other concerned government agencies, shall provide the necessary entrepreneurial
training and livelihood skills programs and marketing assistance to a balikbayan, ," ,:,,,
.... including
;~ .
'-_--
his or her immediate family members, who shall avail of the kabuhay~n'
. ;.
....,,,.,.. ~:.': ~
program in accordance with the existing rules on the government's reinteg~atjoa'}t ..,;
program. ~ F
.. '.~~'1. . :;
In the case of non-OFW balikbayan, the Department of Tourism shall m~~:rp~, ~,~ . ~
necessary
~
arrangements with the TLRC and other training institutions for pol$~!~ -. -(~
.. .~A:'. :.'
' -
r~ ~~'.""'~'
4
.: livelihood training.
" '',214 Wh.ile the Bureau o.f Customs requires registr~tion of importers, such requit~.:
. .,~.# ~-t~..;;.~~.~.'.;u. ~.' . :
no\,al}ply to "Importation of personal effects, vehicles, motorcycles and househoJd ~,$ii~~. .
a balikbayan and his/her family under R.A. No. 6768, as amended, Overseas Cpn~1 ., .
, )Yorkers and other returning resident". (See Bureau of Customs Memorandum Orcftx .N'9,9.
011-14, dated 22 May 2014) "'1'
215 G.R, No. 191970, 24 April 2012 '
~-
79
because the candidate was able to prove that he started living

with his brother prior to his repatriation, thus:
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate's

compliance with residency requirement since the question of
residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid
down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile
remains until. he acquires a- new one; and (c) a person can have but
. . . " . .
one domicile at a time.
x x x
But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos'
domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for
granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City
to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired
Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
On the other hand, when he came .to the Philippines in

November
.
2008 to live with his brother in
' . Zamboanga Sibugay, it
'; .
is evident that Jalosi,os did so with intent t<;> change his domicile
for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath,.of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal
right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establ.ished a new domicile in

Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile
. of choice and by operation of law
. .
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have
a domicile or residence somewhere.216
101. 1. Jalosjos teaches us that evidence of

reestablishment of domicile of choice before repatriation or
in the absence of a permanent resident visa cannot be
ignored (as the COMELEC did in its assailed Resolutions).
This ruling makes perfect sense in light of the basic and
fundamental principle that residence is an issue of fact, as
discussed extensively in Argument A. l.

80
101.2. Even if Sen. Poe had not yet been

repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 and even if she did not
possess a permanent resident visa2 11, the COMELEC
should have at least examined, weighed and given
probative value to Sen. Poe's overwhelming and unrefuted
evidence showing that she resided in the Philippines as
early as 24 May 2005 (See pars.73 to 74 above).
102. On page 41 of the 11 December 2015 Resolution, the

COMELEC implied that "getting a permanent resident visa" is
supposedly the only way to "waive" one's "non-resident status."
In its 23 December 2015 Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc
held that according to Coquilla, it is the act of "obtain(ing) an
immigrant visa .... and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR)" that "effectively waives an alien's status as a non-
resident." This is a misreading of Coquilla and other applicable
jurisprudence.
102. 1. As shown in the excerpt of Coquilla quoted

on page 40 of the 11 December 2015 Resolution, this
Honorable Court did not say that the procurement of an
"immigrant visa" and an "immigrant Certificate of
Residence" are the only ways for a foreigner "waive" her
non-resident status.
102.2. On the contrary, jurisprudence shows that

there are other acts, especially per~anent relocation to the
Philippines, which would indubitably show an alien's a
"waiver" or "forfeiture" of her non-resident status.
102.3. In Caasi vs. Court of Appeals (which was

cited in Coquilla and in U.qdoracion vs. COMELECJ2IB), this
Honorable Court held that the waiver of one's non-resident
status (in that case, the possession of a green card) "should
be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country,"
. which are shown by . "clear" and "indubitable"
. . . .
evidence. A candidate's unequivocal acts may be indicative

of her waiver of her non-resident status. This is consistent
with jurisprudence holding that residence is ultimately a
"question of presenceana: imen'i:ion.
211 It must be emphasized that Sen. Poe did not have to secure a permanent resident visa
at that time, for her residence in the country was at any rate lawful and allowed under the
balikbayan program.
21sa.R. No. 179851, 18Apri12008
~
81
102.4. In Jalosjos,2 19 the candidate returned to the

Philippines to live with his brother even before he
reacquired his natural born Filipino citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225. This Honorable Court held that his act of
residing (as an Australian) with his brother was among the
acts by which he "forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia."
102.5. In the same vein, in Gayo vs. Verceles, 22 0

the High Court considered the act of "relocating" to the
Philippines "for good," as a "waiver" of ones "permanent
residency status" in a foreign country, and the
commencement of one's legal residence, thus:
Applying case law to the present case, it can be said

that the respondent effectively abandoned her residency in
the Philippines by her acquisition of the status of a
permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, we find that the
respondent reacquired her residency in the Philippines even
before the holding of the May 2001 elections. The records
show that she surrendered her green card to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way
back in 1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S.
residency could not have been made clearer. Moreover,
when she decided to relocate to the Philippines for good in
1993, she continued living here and only wrnt to the U.S.A.
~\
on periodic visits to her children who were residing there,.,
Moreover, she was elected Mayor in the 1998 elections anij,.
served as such for the duration of her term. We find slich
i acts sufficient to establish that the respondent intended .to .,. ;,
stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she y',
l ,_
has once again made the Philippines her permanent
residence. 221
,:\
102.6. In Sen. Poe's case, on 24 May 20U5, sfie .r..._'J'.:
clearly and undoubtedly waived and forfeited her status a,s

a non-resident alien when she relocated to the Philippines
"for good." Therefore, even under the terms of Coqui.l~a,
starting on 24 May 2005, Sen. Poe could reestablish per
f domicile in the Philippines.
;t . ,~
., 219 G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012

220 G.R. No. 150477, 28 February 2005 ~;
...
:.ff'';.
~ L"'~
::+. _!if';
82
103. As discussed in pars. 71 to 72 above, it is well-settled

that there are only three (3) requisites for establishing a new
domicile of choice, to wit:222
(a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(b) an intention to remain there (animus manendz); and
(c) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non

revertendz)
103.1. Upholding the COMELEC's ruling would be

tantamount to adding a fourth requisite, i.e., the
possession of: (a) "permanent resident visa;" and/ or (b)
Philippine
. citizenship,
. throughout the period of
establishment of domicile of choice in the Philippines.
103.2. If the COMELEC is correct, then despite

established jurisprudence on the subject, "residence" would
!!Q longer be an issue solely of "physical presence" and
"intention," but of alien documentation and/ or Filipino
citizenship as well.
104. The ruling of the COMELEC that the possession or

reacquisition of Philippine citizenship is a condition sine qua non
for establishing domicile in the Philippines, n1ns contrary to the
4d:}asic principle that residence is independent of citizenship. '!"":
. . \~.
t . .,J:_,-
',j,
104. l. In Cordora vs. and Frivaldo ~"''"
COMELEC2 23
<:;,OMELEC, 224 this Honorable Court ruled that residence As
.;,\
.
"~eparate," "distinct" and not ciependent upon citizenship.. ,~
104.2. Similarly, in Japzon,22s this Honorable '. ' :.

Court held that R.A. No. 9225 treats citizens)iip. ~~1
independently of residence, thus: .;" :'~
,."'t ',!.,
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225

governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or- retain his .. Philippine citizenship despite -
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights
t and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of
.. ~ . \
.f,: said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on th$.\~~
matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking~ir'
'i/;~'S'> - '
~jti2~ Mitra vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010; Japzon v. CommisS.loq
'i, ,E!ectio;u~.1 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, citing Papandayan, Jr. v. Commissioii"
, ; Electi6ns, 430 Phil. 754 (2002)
2~9.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009 -~,\'.'.~;
:22t,G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996

. 22,5 O.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009 ~~ ~-
., .
~t ~
"' \ :~: ...
83
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes

no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on
the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for
dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at
the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he
may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the
foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
x x x
As has already been previously discussed by this

Court herein, Ty's reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or
effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his
domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his
domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming
his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence
therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice, and it shall not retroa'ct to the time of
his birth. 226
104.3. If R.A. No. 9225 is supposed to have "no

effect" on residence, then one's repatriation thereunder
should not (in all instances) be the starting point of one's
residence in the Philippines.
104.4. It bears stressing that the Constitution

simply requires that a Presidential candidate be a natural-
born Filipino. There is no added condition in the
fundamental law that she be a natural-born Filipino for ten
years immediately preceding the election.
105. To reiterate, in Japzon, 227 this Honorable Court

stressed that the issue of whether a candidate complied with the
residence requirement is ultimately a question of fact, requiring
a careful examination of the evidence presented by the parties.
As held in Sabili vs. COMELEC22 8 and Mitra vs. COMELEC,2 29 the
221 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009
22s G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012, citing Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 347
Phil. 510 (1997)
~
84
pieces of evidence showing the establishment of domicile of

choice must be viewed "collectively" and not "separately" or in
iso~ation. Thus, as discussed at the outset, in Romualdez,230 the
High Court stressed that even the statement of a candidate in
her COC regarding her period of residence is not "decisiv~,"
because the "residence requirement" is ultimately a question of
fact. A single statement "should not ... be allowed to negate the
fact of residence . . . if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper."231
105.1. Applied to Sen. Poe's case, one cannot

ignore
. the numerous
. pieces of evidence showing that she
reestablished her domicile of choice in the Philippines as
early as 24 May 2005, simply because she did not possess
a: (a) "permanent resident visa", or (b) Philippine
citizenship, at the time.
105.2. The absence of a single document (like an

"permanent resident visa," or an Oath of Allegiance under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225) should not be viewed in
"isolation," or considered (in itself) "decisive" of the issue of
residence, especially in the face of voluminous unrefuted
evidence proving Sen. Poe's reestablishment of her domicile
in the Philippines as early as 24 May 2005. A contrary
ruling would violate the basic principle that compliance
with the "residence requirement" is ultimately a question of
fact.
106. When the COMELEC placed undue stress and

emphasis on Sen. Poe's COC for Senator and the date of her
repatriation, the COMELEC "used Wr<?ng. and irrelevant
considerations" and "clearly g(ave) t<?O much weight to one
factor" in deciding the issue of Sen. Poe's residence. In Varias
vs. COMELEC, 232 this Honorable Court ruled that these acts
amount to grave abuse of discretion. As discussed, the "relevant
considerations" in reckoning the commencement of Sen. Poe's
residence are the overwhelming and unrefuted evidence
discussed in pars. 73 to 74 above, which collectively show that
Sen. Poe had reestablished her domicile of choice in the
Philippines starting on 24 May 2005.
A.5. In placing undue weight on

Sen. Poe's statement on
residence in her COC for
229 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010

230 G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
231 Id.
232 G.R. No. 189078, 11 February 2010
85
-
Senator, and in ruling further
that a person's domicile of
choice may commence only
upon repatriation and/ or the
possession of a permanent
resident visa, the COMELEC
applied a "very legalistic,
academic and technical
approach to the residence
requirement" which "does not
satisfy" and is completely
divorced from the "simple,
practical and common-sense
rationale for the residence
requirement."
107. In Torayno vs. COMELEC,233 the Supreme Court

warned against applying a "very legalistic, academic and
technical approach to the residence requirement" which "does
not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for
the residence requirement." On page 17 of the assailed 1
December 2015 Resolution, the COMELEC (citing Limbona vs.
COMELEC23 4 ) noted that "(t)he manifest intent of the law in fixing
a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and neecfs of a community
and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve
that community."
108. The COMELEC's ruling giving undue weight to Sen.

Poe's statement on residence in her COC for Senator, and its
ruling that Sen. Poe's residence should be reckoned, at the
earliest, from the moment she secures a permanent resident visa
and/ or reacquires her natural-born Philippine citizenship are
also "very legalistic, academic and technical approach(es) to the
residence requirement" which are totally oblivious to the
rationale behind the residence requirement.
108.1. Familiarity with a locality is a function of

physical presence and time, not a single statement in a
persons' previous COC, her alien documentation or her
citizenship.
108.2. Thus, one who has spent at least 10 years

1n the country, without securing a "permanent resident
233 G.R. No. 137329, 9 August 2000

234 G.R. No. 181097, 25 June 2008
~
86
visa" or before reacquiring her natural-born citizenship, is

not necessarily less acquainted with the problems that
beset the Filipino people, than one who secured
"permanent resident visa" or reacquired her natural-born
citizenship before the start of her 10-year period of
residence in the country, but leaves the country for long
periods of time. By the same token, one who has 10 years
of familiarity with the problems and issues of the
Philippines does not become any less familiar simply
be<?ause her earlier statement seems to indicate a period or
residence in the country shorter than 10 years.
108.3. Therefore, binding a person to a statement

on residence in her earlier COC, or reckoning a candidate's
period of domicile in the Philippines only from the moment
she secures "permanent resident visa" or reacquires her
natural-born citizenship, "does not satisfy th(e) simple,
practical and common-sense rationale for the residence
requirement."
109. As discussed, Sen. Poe reestablished her domicile and

has been physically present in the Philippines as early as 24
May 2005. Thus, by 9 May 2016, Sen. Poe would be far from a
"stranger or newcomer" to the country. On the contrary, Qy_2.
May 2016, she would have been well "acquainted with the
needs" of her countrymen and women for at if east 10 years and
11 months.
110. Considering that Sen. Poe's statement in her COC for

President regarding her period of residence in the Philippines
satisfies the "simple, practical and common sense" rationale for
the residence requirement, the same cannot be considered false.
In the absence of a "false" representation in Sen. Poe's COC for
President, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the same.
A.6. The COMELEC ignored

evidence of Sen. Poe's honesty
and good faith when it ruled
that she had concealed her
supposed "ineligibility" for the
Presidency, and that she
supposedly intended to
mislead or deceive the
that her "PERIOD OF
-
87
RESIDENCE UP TO THE DAY

BEFORE MAY 09, 2016" would
be "10" years and "11"
months.
------------------------------------------
111. The COMELEC held that "the declaration of '10 years
and 11 months' in (Sen. Poe's) present COC for President" was
simply "intended to hide the fact earlier stated under oath in her
2013 COC for Senator that she had actually resided in the
Philippines only since November 2006."235 Sen. Poe's
"contradiction", according to the COMELEC, "betrays an
indubitable attempt to mislead or misinform the electorate and
hide from them the fact that she is actually not compliant with
the [residence] requirement prescribed in the Constitution".236
112. In the first place, Sen. Poe does not lack the residence
qualification for the Presidency, as discussed extensively in
Argument A. l. Second, she never "hid" from the public the fact
that she mistakenly indicated in her COC for Senator her period
of residence to be "6 years and 6 months", in order to "mislead"
them into thinking that she is compliant with the residence
requirement prescribed in the Constitution. As shown by her
evidence submitted to the COMELEC (in pars. 73 to 74 above),
Sen. Poe's alleged failure to meet the ten-year residence
requirement on the basis of her COC for Senator was already
known by the public as early as June 2015, and she, reacting to
this issue the first opportunity that she had, already publicly
acknowledged and went on record that she committed an honest
mistake in accomplishing her COC for the Senator with respect
to her correct period of residence in the Philippines. Under these
circumstances, the intention to deceive the public (or to conceal
anything from them) is clearly negated by Sen. Poe's public
explanations made long before she ever announced her
candidacy for President and filed her now assailed COC.
113. To Sen. Poe's knowledge, the statement in her COC for

Senator that she had been a resident of the Philippines for "6
years and 6 months" "before" May 2013 was first reported in the
media on 2 June 2015, when it was raised by Navotas City
'*" -.~.
- -....R--epresentative and tnenunited Nationalist Alliance ("UNA")
Secretary General Tobias "Toby" M. Tiangco during a press
conference held at the House of Representatives. 237 During this
23 5 1December2015 Resolution, pp. 31-32. (Underscoring in the original)

0
236 1 December 2015 Resolution, p. 32.

2 3 7 A video clip of this press conference was uploaded on video-sharing site Youtube by
SunStar Philippines on 2 June 2015, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OrIG5ns2yE.

A compact disk containing a copy of this video clip is attached as Annex "A" of herein
88
press conference, Representative Tiangco, using the same theory

propounded by those seeking to obstruct Sen. Poe's run for the
Presidency, raised doubts regarding her compliance with the
residence requirement for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency
(i.e., that following her COC for Senator, Sen. Poe would be a
resident of the Philippines for only 9 years and 6 months by May
2016). 238 The press conference called by Rep. Tiangco was held
late in the afternoon. Sen. Poe could simply have kept her
silence and said nothing in response to Rep. Tiangco's
allegations. Instead, the very next day, she chose to publicly
admit the truth-that she had committed an honest mistake in
her COC for Senator, 23 9 explaining that her period of residence
indicated therein was only "6 years, 6 months" because at the
time she executed said document, she "thought to err on the
side of prudence" by counting her residence in the Philippines
only from April 2006, when she and her husband sold their
family home in the U.S.A., until October 2012, when she filed
her COC for Senator. 240
Petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "M" hereof), and re-attached as
Annex "Q" hereof.
238 Several media outfits, reporting on the press conference held by Rep. Tiangco, ran
front-page stories regarding Sen. Poe's alleged failure to meet the ten-year residence
requirement on the basis of her COC for Senator. A sampling of these articles which
indubitably show that the public was aware of this issue as early as June 2, 2015, are
attached as Annex "B-series" of Sen. Poe's Verified Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "M"
hereof). ,
23 9 Again, Sen. Poe's statements during this ambush intervieW: i.e., that she mistakenly
reckoned her period of residence in her 2013 COC only from April 2006 (when she and her
husband sold their house in the U.S.A.) despite living in the country with her children
since early 2005_,, were reported by several media outfits via print and broadcast media.
Sen. Poe's alleged failure to meet the ten-year residence requirement, and her assertion
that she was able to comply with the same-were on the news for several days. A sampling
of these news reports are attached as Annex "C-series" of Sen. Poe's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration (Annex "M" hereof). A compact disc containing video clips of news reports
broadcasted during this relevant period was also attached as Annex "D" of the Motion for
Reconsideration, and re-attached hereto as Annex "R".
2 40 Excerpts of her answers to the ambush interview by media reporters on June 3, 2015
are quoted below:
REPORTER: [Ano ang masasabi nyo] on the residency issue na ni-raise po ni Rep.
Tiangco?
SEN. POE: Naaawa ako sa kanila na pinagdidiskitahan nila ang isyu na iyan na
parang ganoon na rin ang ginawa ng mga nawawalan ng pag-asa noong tumatakbo
si FPJ. Gayun pa man, tama rin naman na malaman ng ating mga kababayan ang
aking tunay na pagkatao, sapagkat ako ay kanilang inihalal at wala naman po
akong itinatago. Isang public document po ang COC na iyan. Ngayon, sasagutin ko
ito.
Unang-una, bakit nakalagay, six years and six months. Nakalagay po doon
sa COC, "resident in the Philippines before May 2013." Hindi po sinasabi by May
2013 or on May 2013. Alam mo, sa experience ko sa COMELEC, dapat nag-iingat
kang mabuti. Ang ginawa ko, it was my actual residence on the day of my filing,
which is in October 2012.
Bakit ko napili ang 6 years and 6 months? Simple Jang po. Kasi kung
presence in the Philippines, I was here 2005 pa Jang. Yung mga anak ko, naka-
enroll na sa paaralan, ready po ang transcripts diyan, ready din po ang titulo ng
89
113.1. The pieces of evidence that Sen. Poe

mentioned during her June 2015 interview-i.e., her actual
physical presence in the Philippines since May 2005; her
children's attendance in Philippine schools since June
2005; her family's purchase of a condominium unit for use
as a temporary residence while they are looking for a new
family home-were all presented in evidence by Sen. Poe in
the proceedings a quo.
aming kinuhang lugar para matirahan. Pero nilagay ko iyon sapagkat noong 2006
lang naibenta yung bahay namin sa America--April 2006, which can be proven.
So sabi ko, at that time, baka iyon ang ibig nilang sabihin. Di ako abogado,
pero ako po ay tapat at truthful at kung bibilangin mo talaga ang oras na nadito
ako sa Pilipinas, lagpas pa nga po sa requirement. Kaya para po sabihin nila na
kulang, marami po kaming mapapatunay na sobra pa nga at maraming
magpapatunay diyan.
Pero, ito rin po ang gusto kong sabihin. Ang pinaka-nakakainsulto sa akin
ay ginamit pa nila na hindi daw ako tapat dahil di naman daw ako kwalipikado.
Bakit hindi ko daw sinabi iyon. Unang-una, hindi po totoo na ako ay hindi
kwalipikado. Kwalipikado po ako pero hindi pa po ako kandidato. Ang iba may mga
commercial na. Ako naman po ay nag-iisip at nagninilay-nilay pa. Sasagutin ko
naman iyan kung ako ay nag-file, at iyan nga po ang kasagutan. xx x
x x x
REPORTER: Ano dapat ang nilagay na taon at buwan sa residency? Ano dapat ang
correct year? ,,.
SEN. POE: Ang correct is, actually early 2005. 1 think if I am not mistaken mga ...
[pauses to think]. Alam mo kasi yung tatay ko namatay nung 2004 eh, so bandang
huli na po iyon ng December 14 [2014] na po iyon. So January pa lang alam ko, or
mga February 2005 nandito na po ako. Mapapatunayan po iyan, yung mga anak
ko naka-enroll na po dito ng June 2005, bumili na po kami ng matitirhan namin
ng pansamantala noong 2005, hanggang pinapatayo pa namin yung aming
lilipatan. Ang bahay po ng aking nanay sa San Juan ay naiwan na po sa aming
mag-ina ng aking namayapang tatay. Ang korporasyon po ng aking pamilya ay
tinulungan kong maipagpatuloy noong 2005 pa. In fact, pwede na naman ninyong
hindi sabihin ito, yung isang network nag-release ng pelikula ni FPJ, patuloy po
ang paguusap namin sa kanilang mga liderato as early as of that that time kaya
sila can provide that witness.
REPORTER: Ma'am June 2015 na po ngayon, so as of today you already met the
residency ... ?
SEN. POE: As of today po, lagpas lagpas na. In fact nga kung sasabihin nila na
nagsinungaling ako doon, kulang nga ang nilagay ko eh. Kung saka-sakali nga
dapat pa mas makatulong sa akin iyon, pero hindi nga po ako abogado at
teknikalidad po. Parang sinasabi nila, before May, so that's any month, so !
thought to err on the side of prudence na it's the day of my actual filing to show
that I was eligible first for Senate, and if ever, sa mga darating po na panahon kung
matutuloy man, ay talagang lagpas pa sa kinakailangan. xx x
A video clip of this ambush interview was uploaded on video-sharing site Youtube by
GMA News and Public Affr1irs on June 3, 2015, at
https: I /www.youtube.com/watch?v=6VOXlJXr},J_J_cg. A compact disk containing a copy
of this vid~o clip was attached as Annex "E" of Sen. Poe's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, and re-attached hereto as Annex "S". The transcript of Sen. Poe's
statements during this June 3, 2015 interview is also publicly available at the Senate
website, at https://www.senate.gov.ph/press release/2015/0603 poel.asp.
90
114. Consistent with Sen. Poe's public admission that she

committed an honest mistake in accomplishing her COC for
Senator, Sen. Poe, as early as September 1, 2015, in her Verified
Answer filed before the SET in SET Case No. 001-15 (a petition
for quo warranto filed by Rizalito David), already made it of
record that as of May 13, 2013, she had been residing in the
Philippines "for more than six (6) years and six (6) months"
already. 241
114.1. The SET Answer was the first opportunity

that Sen. Poe had to go on record in any formal proceeding
to explain the erroneous entry in her COC for Senator.
Prior to this, her residence in the Philippines was never
assailed in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
proceeding.
114.2. Sen. Poe also could not have withdrawn her

COC for Senator nor corrected the same earlier, as she
learned of her honest mistake in her COC for Senator only
early this year (2015), or around 2 years after she had
already been elected and proclaimed Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines in May 2013. Her first chance
to correct her mistake in the records of the COMELEC was
when she filed her COC for President on 15 October 2015.
114.3. Sen. Poe's Verified Answer in SET Case No.

001-15 is a later document made under oath. It is a1"public
record, made widely accessible when it was uploade~iI1 full
' ~:. 1 ''-
i $; ,,
{l:
Pars. 2.6.1 to 2.6.3 of Sen. Poe's SET Answer, attached as Annex "F" of'Sen. pJe's
24 1
Verified Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "M" hereof), state: -~;r.
f 1:,(
, ~' i
2.6.l. The truth is that, as of 13 May 2013, [Sen. Poe] had been.
residing in the Philippines for more than six (6) years and six (6) months. [Seli:1.'
Poe]'s statement in her COC that she had been residing in the Philippineis.,~for a .
period of six (6) years and six (6) months before the May 13, 2013 electiorts" wa~1
therefore technically wrong. However, this mistake was an excusable error 'aAsing .
from complex legal principles that a layman is not expected to fully know, much,;
less understand. It was an honest mistake made in good faith. In fact, [Sen. Po~J
was not assisted by counsel when she accomplished her COC. .
), , .. ,;
;\>' .
2.6.2. [Sen. Poe]'s good faith is made more manifest by the fact tltat .
~
she had nothing to gain by indicating a period shorter than her actual resid~C):'.;lif: '~;'@'. ..
the Philippines. On the contrary, it would have been to her advantage to incpcat~""
longer period. The fact that she did not so indicate, clearly shows that she hcme~~
misunderstood what was being asked of her in her COC, and that s}1e ~1d ftc!t\-,:
'-:'. ..~.'
' . '.,
!".
.~'~ ~
(
intend to mislead or deceive anyone. '_;;~jl ft~ '.

_;_.u;
'i 2.6.3. This is not the first time a candidate committed l
mistake in stating her period---;;-f residency in her COC. The Suprem~';~llit ~\~..
' :~
.> .-''"
faced with precisely this problem in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC. 24__1 tttlf:e~r~\. i~
;t /1:,,
instead of making the candidate pay for her mistake by disqualifying ~~' ;,tl'ff -~
Supreme Court stressed that the "residency requirement" is ultimately a ~stjsm
' 1.
of fact. The statement in the COC is not "decisive." ~
- - - !~
,; ta,
~
-
91
in the online news website Rappler.242 Thus, apart from the

news reports in June 2015, 24 3 her explanation, this time
under oath, regarding her "honest mistake" in her 2013
COC was already communicated to the public244 as early as
September 2015, or before Sen. Poe filed her COC now in
question.
115. The foregoing clearly shows that, in indicating her

period of residence in the Philippines in Item No. 7 of her COC
for President to be " 10 years, 11 months", she could not have
intended to mislead or misinform the public as to the actual
period of her residence in the Philippines. She did not indicate
such period simply to "create the impression on the part of the
unsuspecting electorate that she is compliant with the residence
requirement, hence eligible to run."245 To the contrary, Sen. Poe
indicated such period in order to correct a previous error
committed in her COC for Senator, which error she already
publicly recognized long before filing her now assailed COC for
President.
116. Still, in its 23 December 2015 Resolution, the

COMELEC En Banc held that although Sen. Poe acknowledged
and explained her honest mistake in her 2012 COC, in a public
interview in June 2015 and in her SET Answer, these were
"nonetheless delivered at a time when, at the very least, the
possibility of (Sen. Poe) running for President of the country in
2016, was already a matter of public knowledge." "By then, the
(Sen. Poe) could have already been aware that she cannot
maintain her declaration in the 201 (2) COC as it would be
insufficient to meet the 10-year residence requirement for
President." This is another conjectural reasoning which evinces
the COMELEC's arbitrariness in appreciating the import of the
evidence before it, ignoring established facts in favor of an
unwarranted conjecture that Sen. Poe's explanations may have
been made in bad faith.
242 See "FULL TEXT: Grace Poe's response to disqualification case before the SET",
published on September 1, 2015, available at
http: //www.rappler.com I nation I politics/ elections/ 2016 / l 04418-full-text-grace-poe-
response-disqualification-case. (date of last access: December 2, 2015) A computer print-
out of this news article was attached as Annex "G" of Sen. Poe's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration (Annex "M" hereof)
243 See Annex "C-series" of Annex "M" hereof
2 4 4 See Annexes "B-series", "C-series", and "D" of Annex "M" hereof. See also news article
written by Camille Elemia for online news site Rappler, published on September 4, 2015,
reporting on the "honest mistake" committed by Sen. Poe in her 2013 COC, available at
http: //www.rappler.com/ nation I politics/ elections/ 20 l 6 / 104 731-grace-poe-citizenship-
residency-timeline-arguments. = A computer print-out of this news article is attached as
Annex "H" of Annex "M" hereof.
245 1 December 2015 Resolution, p. 31
92
-
116.1. That Sen. Poe publicly admitted and
explained her honest mistake in her COC for Senator,
months before she filed her COC for President, wholly
negates the COMELEC's claim that Sen. Poe supposedly
"hid" this fact from the Philippine electorate or anyone else.
116.2. That Sen. Poe "rectified" her honest mistake

only in June of this year, when the "possibility" of her
running for President was "already a matter of public
knowledge" does not make her explanations incredible.
Sen. Poe's explanations are consistent with news reports
regarding her return to the country, all published long
before her residence in the Philippines was put into
question. Insofar as the COMELEC En Banc insinuates that
Sen. Poe's public statements were driven by some personal
motive to mislead or to show that she would qualify for the
Presidency, there is simply no factual basis therefor. Bad
faith or ill motive is never presumed. On the contrary, good
faith is presumed. These are basic principles and there is
no excuse for the COMELEC's refusal to adhere to them.
117. Moreover, since a Petition to Deny Course to or Cancel

a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is
concerned not with the qualification of a candidate per se, but
whether a candidate committed any deliberate misrepresentation
in relation to those qualifications, 246 the Petitioner in such action
is duty-bound to establish bad faith on the part of the candidate
as an indispensable element. Good faith is an available defense;
thus, an allegedly ineligible candidate (and Sen. Poe is not
ineligible) who made an erroneous declaration in an honest belief
that he possesses such qualification cannot come under the
prov1s1on.
118. Indeed, Sen. Poe cited in support of her position the

ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Commission on Elections, i.e., that the statement of a candidate
in her COC regarding the period of her residence is not "decisive"
and cannot prevent the candidate from proving her actual period
of residence as a "question of fact"; Jalosjos vs. Commission on
Elections,2 48 that a candidate may reestablish her
residence before reacquiring her citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225; and even Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections, 249
where it was ruled that a foreigner can reestablish residence in
the Philippines "as a visitor" allowed by immigration laws to stay
as such. Sen. Poe also cited the ruling in Cordora vs.
246 See Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179695, 18 December 2008
248 G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012
249 G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002
93
Commission on Elections25 and Frivaldo vs. Commission on

Elections25l that residence is "separate", "distinct" and not
dependent upon citizenship; and the ruling in Japzon vs.
Commission on Elections, 252 reiterated in Caballero vs.
Commission on Elections, 253 that R.A. No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence.
119. In other words, there were ample legal bases for Sen.
Poe to state in her COC for President a period of residence that
was reckoned from a date prior to April 2006 (November 2006 as
the Second Division erroneously concludes), and prior to her
reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. That the
COMELEC does not agree with Sen. Poe's position based on
these legal authorities only highlights that the reckoning of her
period of residence is a matter of legal dispute; and given that
this Honorable Court has not itself definitively ruled on it, that
legal dispute (on a difficult legal issue) is itself a basis for good
faith negating any supposed intention to deceive on the part of
Sen. Poe.
120. Sen. Poe's good faith in indicating her period of

residence to be "10 years, 11 months" is bolstered by the opinion
of respected legal figures, such as Former Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban (who in one column 254 expressed his opinion that
Petitioner complied with the constitutional residence
requirement for President), election law exyJert Atty. Romulo
Macalintal, 255 Atty. Oscar Franklin Tan,256 and even .Se,nate,
President Franklin Drilon, among others, who, citing sOitled
:.:. Jurisprudence on residence, are also of the opinion that.), ~"
}, statement in a COC is not binding and would not prevent Sep:. ,+.,
Poe from proving her compliance with the ten-year residence " II.
requirement. At the very least, these published opinions ar.et
evidence of Sen. Poe's good faith in reckoning her period: Pf
residence from May 2005, which is when she returned to the ~\:
Philippines with a definite intention to reside here permanentlY:

Surely, if these legal personalities say that Sen. Poe is not bbun(b
by an honest mistake in her COC for Senator, and can prove
. through evidence a longer period of residence in the Philippines;
'"Jt
';~
,;;;;,,
,1250 G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009 ..
251 G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996 ;;
' 4.
252 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009 .s:'";'~'!,v..
253 G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015 ' .. ""~L
25 4 . See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "36-A" for Sen. Poe. . .Jf;
/ 25 5 See report by Tetch Torres-Tupas, "l~esidency issue even helps Grace P<;ie~ec~'Jt
.,; ;, ' expert", available online at http:// ne\\'sinfo. inc uirer. net 695806 residenc '- "~e~ih-
he,ws,-grace-poe-election-expert. A print-out of this article is attached as Anne*'f.Jji f.
Annex "M" hereof. , ,'!It,
, }56 See article published on June 3, 2015 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 4y~if~le
1
online at http: I I opinion.inquirer.net/ 85455 /instantly-debunking-toby-tiangco. A print-
out of,this article is attached as Annex "K" of Annex "M" hereof. :if , . '
~
,~~
....
94
Sen. Poe's assertion in her COC for President that by May 9,

2016, she will be a resident of the Philippines for "10" years and
"11" months," especially in light of uncontroverted evidence she
presented, cannot be said to be baseless, much less intentionally
deceptive.
B. THE COMELEC ACTED

WHIMSICALLY AND CAPRICIOUSLY,
IGNORED SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND
DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD IN RULING THAT SEN.
POE MADE A FALSE MATERIAL
REPRESENTATION IN HER COC
FOR PRESIDENT WHEN SHE
STATED THEREIN THAT SHE IS A
"NATURAL BORN FILIPINO
CITIZEN."
B.1. The COMELEC disregarded the

legal impact of the 17
November 2015 Decision of the
SET in SET Case No. 001-15
which became final and ,.
executory on 3 December
2015, or after the petition a
quo was deemed submitted for
resolution. The SET Decision
negates the falsity of
Petitioner's representation in
her COC for President that she
is a natural-born Filipino. Sen.
Poe cannot be a natural-born
Filipino as a Senator, but not a
natural-born Filipino as a
candidate for the Presidency.
-----------------------------------------
121. On 17 November 2015, the SET, in SET Case 001-15
entitled David vs. Poe-Llamanzares, declared Sen. Poe (and, by
inference, other foundlings), as natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, to wit:2s1
2s1 SET Decision, Exhibit "43", p. 26

95
We rule that [Sen. Poe] is a natural-born citizen under the

1935 Constitution and cgntinue (sic) to be a natural-born citizen as
'' ' f '
defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a "citizen of the

Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship."
122. The SET has sole jurisdiction to rule directly on the

qualifications of an incumbent Senator. In the words of the
I ; ~ ; .
Constitution, 2 58 the SET is the "sole judge of all contests relating

to the ... gua,J.ific;:ations" of members of the Senate of the Republic
of the Pnilippines. In contrast, under the present state of the
law, the COMELEC may touch upon the qualifications of
candidates of specific public posts, but only for the narrow and
liiited purpose of determining whether the candidate committed
a false material representation in his or her COC.
123. The SET's 17 November 2015 Decision2s9 ("SET

Decision") is therefore the first and only ruling rendered to date,
'
which passed squarely upon the issue of whether Sen. Poe, as a
foundling 1 is a natural-born Filipino. This Decision is the first
' I ~
and only ruling per se on Sen. Poe's citizenship qualification,

which just so happens to be exactly the same citizenship
qualification for the Presidency.
124. On 3 December 2015, or after the petition a quo was

deemed submitted for resolution but before ,.the COMELEC En
Banc issued its assailed 23 December 2015 Resolution, the SET
Decision became final apd executory. Under Rule 80 of the 2013
Rules of the SET, a decision becomes final and executory upon
receipt by the parties of a copy of the resolution denying a
motion for reconsideration of the decision. On 3 December
2015, the parties to SET Case No. 001-15 received the SET's
Resolution denying petitioner Rizalito David's motion for
'
reconsideration. Therefore, the 17 November 2015 Decision
became "final and executory" on that date. The fact that Mr.
David elevated the SET Decision to this Honorable Court does
not change the final and executory nature of the Decision,
unless the High Court issues a temporary restraining order
enjoining the implementation of the SET Decision. To Sen. Poe's
knowledge, no such TRO has been issued by the Supreme Court.
The SET Decision was the:refme -"final and executory" as early as
3 December 2015.
125. In sum, even if the COMELEC disagreed with the SET,

it could not have ruled that it was false for Sen. Poe (or that it
was an -intentional misrepresentation for her) to assert in her
258 Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution
259 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "43" for Sen. Poe
-
96
COC for President that she is a "NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO

CITIZEN," because the first st?llding, fi9al and executory ruling
on this issue is that Sen. Poe is a natural-born Filipino. A
person can only assume on~ status. Sen. Poe cannot be a
natural-born citizen as a Senator
. . and at the same time, - lack
-
such citizenship as a Presidential candidate, or commit
deliberate misrepresentation by stating that she is a natural-
born Filipino as found by the SET.
126. The COMELEC's disregard of the SET Decision in

exercising its own limited jurisdiction to determine whether Sen.
Poe made a material misrepresentation in her COC, highlights
the grave abuse of discretion committed by the Commission. It
cannot be overemphasized that the COMELEC is not a court or a
tribunal which possesses an original power to interpret the law,
such that it can freely ignore a Decision rendered by a co-equal
constitutional body on the same issue, and conclude with
certainty that the representation on Sen. Poe's COC was false.
127. Notably, at the time the COMELEC En Banc issued its

23 December 2015 Resolution, it was already of public
knowledge and widely reported in the media that the SET's
Decision had been elevated to this Honorable Court. In view of
that development, and in the spirit of showing due deference and
respect to this Honorable Court, the COMELEC En Banc should
have avoided making any categorical ruliRg on Sen. Poe's
"'' citizenship.
..
'S,
128. Assuming arguendo that ,
the , COMELEC has, the. cJ1: "'
power to render a separate ruhng specifically, squarel~ aqd
finally on the issue of the citizenship of a foundling (as the SET. ;,~
undoubtedly had the power to do), but which is in conflict witp;; . . l
that of the SET, the COMELEC's ruling would create, at the v.ezy.
least, equipoise on the issue. Moreover, the two conflicting
rulings would show that the issue of Sen. Poe's citizensl)ip~'is !
,_);
really an unsettled legal issue, of first impression, which only the
Supreme Court can decide with finality.
A'
11 129. Since the issue of Sen. Poe's citizenship is of first

,impression and that this Honorable Court has yet to defi~itely l':.*'
-:>
resolve the same, it follows that there was a distinct possihilik '}'~
that Sen. Poe might be found to be a natural-born Filigitt'4!>. ;,~ . .~.~$:
,,.,,,
light of that possibility, it would also follow that Sen. Poe~. .'.(~'~'. -.'
. {very least, might ?ave been tellii;g the truth when she ~t.~: ;. e~c;b.,~. ~
her COC for President that she is a "NATURAL BORN Pllil?INd
. CITIZEN." This is significant because someone who migKt::~
; ,telling the truth cannot be categorically found to be asser;tjn~a
, falsehood (or, worse, telling a lie).
., ~

, 7 '~. .
'' ' ;; + .
}
%::.:.'
~
97
130. Considering that the issue of Sen. Poe's citizenship is

still unsettled, the COMELEC acted il~ogically, whimsically and
capriciously when it considered as definitely false, Sen. Poe's
assertion in her COC for President that she is a "NATURAL
BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
B.2. The COMELEC disregarded

settled and long-standing
jurisprudence that the burden
of proof in proceedings under
Section 78 of the OEC, in
relation to Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules, is on the
petitioner, when it ruled that
Sen. Poe had the burden of
proving her natural-born
citizenship.
131. The COMELEC's ruling on citizenship is based on its

finding that Sen. Poe had the burden of proving that she is a
natural-born Filipino; that she has a "bloodline" to a Filipino
parent. In its 23 December 2015 Resolution, the COMELEC En
Banc reiterated that "[t]he burden of proving that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen is upon respondent [Sen. Poe]."260
This ruling was rendered in utter disregard of prevailing law and
jurisprudence, and thus with grave abuse of discretion. The
decisions of this Honorable Court uniformly show that the
petitioner (Elam.para) (not the respondent) has the burden of
proof, at the first instance, in a petition filed under Section 78 of
the OEC.
131.1. In Aznar vs. COMELEC,261 this Honorable

Court held that it was "incumbent" upon the petitioner to
"positively establish," "by substantial and convincing
evidence," that the candidate "had lost his Philippine
citizenship." In other words, it was the burden of the
petitioner to prove that the candidate was an alien.
131.2. In Salcedo II vs. COMELEC,262 the High

Court found that "petitioner has failed to discharge the
burden of proving that the misrepresentation allegedly
260 COMELEC En Banc Resolution, p. 26

261 G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990
262 G.R. No. 135886, 16 August 1999
------------------------------------------ --
98
made by private respondent in her certificate of candidacy

pertains to a material matter."
131.3. The concluding paragraph of the majority

decision in Tecson vs. COMELEC shows that it was the
petitioner who had the burden of proving that the late
'
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (Sen. Poe's late father) made a false
material representation in his COC for President in the May
2004 elections. The same paragraph found in the opinion
of the majority in Tecson (which the COMELEC quoted on
the fast page of the 1 December 2015 Resolution) also
shows that, contrary to the COMELEC's ruling, it is not
necessm for a candidate to prove with certainty that he or
she is a natural-born Filipino or that he or she has a
"bloodline" to a Philippine citizen, thus:
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish

conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of
'
candidacy
.. in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and eyidence, and to
prove whether 0! J!Ot there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos
vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful. 263
131. 4. In Fermin, 26 4 this Honorable Court ordered

the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
petitioner had not made out a "prima facie case."
According to the High Court, the petitioner had not
presented "(c)onvincing evidence" to "substantiate every
allegation," "sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called
on to answer it."
131.5. In Japzon vs. COMELEC,26s the High Court

held that "Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is
ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines." This Honorable

264 G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, 18 December 2008
265 G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, cited in Sabili vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, 24
April 2012) .
99
Court upheld the En Banc resolution of the COMELEC

which had ruled:
Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus

presumed that every person is a citizen of the country in
which he resides; that citizenship once granted is
presumably retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and
that the burden rests upon who alleges a change in
citizenship an4 allegian.ce ~o establish the fact. 266
131.6. In Mitra vs. COMELEC,267 this Honorable

Court placed the burden of evidence on the elected member
of the House of Representatives only after the private
respondents had "successfully established," and the elected
official had "admitted," that his domicile of origin was in a
city other than where he was elected to office. The burden
of proof was, initially, on the parties who asserted that the
official lacked the residence qualification.
131.7. In Reyes vs. COMELEC,268 the majority held

that the petitioner before the COMELEC (Joseph Tan)
initially had the burden of proof to show that the candidate
(Regina Reyes) was not a Filipino. The High Court held
that the "burden" shifted to Reyes only after Tan had
proven that Reyes was a U.S. Passport holder and a
"balikbayan." However, Reyes was not,.,required to prove
that she was a natural-born Filipino to begin with,,_ .She~
only had to prove that she had complied witfl: #.the
requirements under R.A. No. 9225 to qualify for fJublic
ii. ',1A"' :
office. ' ~... ~,
-!
~''.4_
131.8. At least two (2) settled principles involvin,i~J
, the concept of "burden of proof' support the abqve- ,
mentioned jurisprudence. Under Section 1, Rule 13 t~of the
. Rules of Court, burden of proof is the duty "of a pa}q,7to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law." Thus, this Honorable Court has
consistently held that "(t)he burden of proof is, in the Jitst
instance, with the plaintiff who initiated the action,"26.9 ap;d
it becomes incumbent on the defendant to prove ~r
defense only after plaintiff has proven his claim. I!, foH~.I
.. . . .' . ...;~~.:.,'ft:
. /266 Underscoring supplied , ,.'t1 1i,:{f~*'
, '267 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010 ~'4'1 i,';i:' '~;.
268 G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013 . )"i":~~ "
269*R~public vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203 & 180702, 12 Apr:il '~"i'l';
Republic vs. Vda. De Neri, G.R. No. 139588, 4 March 2004; See separate copclJ,it;ipg
1 1bpinion of Justice Callejo in Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 & lql8~4, 3
March2004 ;;
I..
100
that private respondent has the burden of proof (in the first
instance) to prove her claim. It is private respondent's duty
to initially prove that Sen. Poe's representations in her COC
concerning her citizenship and residence are "false."
Another oft-cited principle is that "(t)he burden of proof is
on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given
on either side."270 Thus, a party would !!Q! have the burden
of proof if she would prevail in the absence of evidence from
both parties. The burden of proof could not rest on Sen.
Poe, for she stands to prevail in the event that neither party
presents evidence in this case. In contrast, since private
responde~t stood to be "defeated" if neither party presented
evidence, upon her rested the "burden of proof."
132. To reiterate, the "exclusive" ground that may be raised

in a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC under
Section 78 of the OEC is that the "representation(s) contained as
required by law (are) false." Therefore, if the purported falsehood
in the COC involves the candidate's citizenship, the petitioner
-
must prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino. While this
'
statement is negative in form, it constitutes the very basis of
private respondent's claim that Sen. Poe is disqualified.
Whenever the petitioner's right depends upon the truth of a
negative statement, upon him is the onus probandi. 271 To repeat
this fundamental rule, Section 1 of Rule 131 imposes on the
claimant the "duty" to prove his claim, regarcUess of the form in
which his claim is cast.
133. Thus, a candidate should not be compelled to prove

the truth of the representation in her COC that she is a
"NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN." The law assumes that a
perso~ is honest and truthful. A person is presumed innocent of
any wrong doing (including lying or deceiving). 272 It is no wonder
that in proceedings under Section 78 of the OEC, jurisprudence
places the burden of proof squarely on the petitioner (the one
accusing the respondent of lying), and not on the respondent
(the one accused of lying). There are more reasons why private
respondent had the burden of proving that Sen. Poe is not a
natural-born Filipino.
134. Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,

"(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the
210 Spouses Hanopol vs. Shoemar. Inc., G.R. Nos. 137774 & 148185, 4 October 2002,
citing Borlongan vs. Madrideo, G.R. No. 120267, 25 January 2000, which in turn, cited
Summa Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175 ( 1996)
211 Venzon v. Spouses Santos et al., G.R. No. 128328, 14 April 2004
212 Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
--------------~--------------------~..,,~-.~------... ~ ....
101
performance of a duty by a public officer" "are prima facie

eviQ.ence of the facts stated therein ... "213
134.1.Thus, in Board of Commissioners, et al.

vs. Hon. Dela Rosa, 21 4 this Honorable Court applied a
"presumption of citizenship" in favour of a certain Mr.
< ' ; '
William Gatchalian because the last official act of then

Acting Commissioner of Immigration was the issuance of
an order "admitting" Mr. Gatchalian as a "Filipino
citizen" and "revalidating" his Identification Certificate.
Conversely, in Aznar vs. COMELEc,2 7 s the Supreme
Court held that "lqss of citizenship" could not be
presumed for a "holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippif1-e pas~port" who "ha(d) continuously
participated in the electoral process in this country since
1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate."
134.2. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of

Court, the following "presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted":
(I) That a person acting in a public office was regularly

a1mointed or elected to it;
I .
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

x x x /
276
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
135. The Philippine Government has, through official acts,

repeatedly and consistently recognized Sen. Poe as a natural-
born Filipino, or a Filipin,o. Taken together, these acts give rise
to a presumption that Sen. Poe is certainly a Filipino, and in
fact, a natuq:tl-born Filipino. The COMELEC should have placed
the burden on private respondent to overcome this presumption.
27 3In Gonzles vs'. Pennisi, G.R. No. 169958, 5 March 2010, this section was applied to a
certificate of live birth which the Supreme Court held to be "valid unless declared invalid
by competent authority." See also Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123361, 3 March
1997, where the Supreme Court held that: "The execution of public documents, as in the
case of the Affidavit of Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is
required to assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who
alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by merely
casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting preponderant
evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall the same rule apply in
the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn before the Philippine Consulate
General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering oath
being of itself a performance of duty by a public official."
214 G.R. Nos. 95122-23, 31May1991
21s G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990
102
i. Official acts in recognition of

Sen. Poe's natural-born
Philippine citizenship
135.1. On 18 July 2006, the B.I. issued an Order

granting Sen. Poe's petition for reacquisition of natural
born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, which states that
Sen. Poe is "presumed to be a natural born Philippine
citizen." R.A. No. 9225 applies only to natural-born
Filipinos.
135.2. On 31 July 2006, the B.I. issued

Identification Certificate No. 06-10918 277 which certifies
that Sen. Poe was "recognized as a citizen of the
Philippines as per (sic) pursuant to the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225) xx x."
135.3. On 6 October 2010, the President of the

Philippines appointed Sen. Poe the Chairperson of the
MTRCB; 278 a position which can only be occupied by a
"natural-born" Philippine citizen.279
135.4. Sen. Poe's coc2so for the 2013 Senatorial

elections was accepted by the CO MELEC and no
disqualification case was filed against her. She stated in
her COC that she is a natural-born Fil.ipino. Thereafter,
''
.,M, she was overwhelmingly elected by the Filipino people.. "' '""' ' <~I
;,.
'~,,:.
135.5. On 17 November 2015, the SET, in ,SET

Case 001-15 entitled David vs. Poe-Llamanzares, render'~
1/ a Decision2s1 of even date which declared Sen. Poe;~~a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 2s2 As discussed. t.
~
. arlier, the SET Decision became final and executory on"i. 3. '?~
;i
December 2015. .. ',It ,:'"P
~;
......
{
.}~ ~ ~J.:
u. Official acts in recognition of 'l,P'.\,
,.
Sen. Poe's Philippine -~
citizenship
~i
135.6. On 13 May 1974, the San Juan C~\it:
issued a Decision283 granting the Spouses Poe's peti'" '' I
' ?71 See xhibit "23"

h4/~}1f, See ~xhibit "2~" .
'. .... 279 Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1986 .
'250 ~e Exhibit "32"
-~
. 281 See Exhibit "43"

4 ;?s!i
Id., at p. 26
.283 See ~xhibit "2"
.\,;
103
adopt Sen. Poe. Sen. Poe does not argue that her
citizenship is derived from her Filipino adoptive parents;
rather it is her position that the adoption affirms that she
was a Filipino in the first place. The San Juan Court could
not have applied Philippine adoption law (which relates to
"family rights and duties" and to "status" of persons), if it
did not in the first place, consider Sen. Poe to be a Filipino
who would be "bound" by such laws.
135.7. On 13 December 1986, the COMELEC

issued to Sen. Poe a Voter's Identification Card 284 for
Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. On
31 August 2006, the COMELEC registered Sen. Poe as
voter. Under the 1973285 and 1987286 Constitutions, the
right of suffrage may be exercised only by those who are
"citizens ~f the Philippines."
135.8. The Ministry /Department of Foreign Affairs

of the Philippines issued passports to Sen. Poe on 4 April
1988, 5 April 1993, 19 May 1998, 13 October 2009, and 18
March 2014.287 A diplomatic passport288 was even issued in
her favor on 19 December 2013. Passports typically state
that the bearer is "a c;it~zen <?f ~he Philippines." Under R.A.
No. 8239, the Philippine government issues a passport only
if it is "satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen."289
A passport is a document certifying the> citizenship of the
holder,290 and under R.A. No. 8293, is not issued in cases
of a doubtful claim to Philippine citizenship.291
135.9. The presumption that the San Juan Court,

the D.F.A., the B.I., the President, and the COMELEC
"regularly performed" their respective "official" duties in
issuing the above-mentioned documents in Sen. Poe's
favor, logically carries with it the presumption that she
qualified for their issuance. In other words, the application
of the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the
aforementioned documents, and the regularity in Sen. Poe's
election (as Senator) and appointment (as MTRCB
28 4 See Exhibit "3"

285 Section 1, Article VI of the 19 7 3 Cons ti tu ti on
286 Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution
28 7 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibits "4", "4-A", "4-B", "25" and"34"
288 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "33"
289 See Sections 3(d) in relation to Section 5 of R.A No. 8293 and Maquiling vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, 2 July 2013
290 RONALDO P. LEDESMA, PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT (COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 613)
COMMENTS AND CASES p. 17 (1994), citing sec. 136 if the 1983 Foreign Service Code
291 See Sec. 3 (e), R.A. 8293. Under Sec. 13 (e) of the same law, a "travel document", in lieu
of a passport, may be issued to a stateless person who is likewise a permanent resident, or
a refugee granted such status or asylum in the Philippines.
104
Chairperson) necessarily entails the presumption that she

is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Therefore, it
was private respondent's burden to prove that Sen. Poe is
not a natural-born Filipino.
135.10. Lastly, the cases of Tecson vs. COMELEC

and Japzon vs. COMELEC, among others, show that a
presumption may be the basis of a claim of citizenship. In
Tecson vs. COMELEC, the late Fernando Poe, Jr.'s Filipino
citizenship was ultimately upheld based on the
pre~umption that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, who died
at San Carlos, Pangasinan, was a resident thereof even
before his death, and "in the absence of any other evidence
. . . would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902." The
COMELEC itself, in its Resolution (upheld by this
Honorable Court) denying the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner Manuel B. Japzon in Japzon vs.
COMELEC, even summarized certain presumptions which
may be indulged in even if the issue involved is citizenship,
viz:
It must be noted that absent any showing of

irregularitY. that overturns the prevailing status of a citizen,
the presumption of regular\ty remains. Citizenship is an
important aspect of every individual's,, constitutionally
granted rights and privileges. This is essential in
determining whether one has the right to exercise pre-
determined political rights such as the right to vote or the
right to be elected to office and as such rights spring from
citizenship.
Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus

presumed tha~ every person i~ a ci~izen of the country in
.
which he resides; that. citizenship once granted is
.
presumably retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and

'
that the burden r~sts upon who alleges a change in
citizenship and allegiance
' ' . to establish the fact.292
136. Common sense tells us that Sen. Poe was born of

Filipinos and is therefore nati.:iral-born. Given this strong
probability, her statement in her COC for President that she is a
natural born citizen of the Philippines cannot automatically be
considered "false." The presumption that she is born of Filipino
parents is supported not only by international law principles,
but presumptions found in the Rules of Court, as well as

105
ordinary deductive reasoning applied to unrebutted

circumstantial evidence.
136.1. Section 3 (y), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court

states:
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following

presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary

course of.. nature and ordinary
. . . nature habits of life; 293
The "ordinary course of nature" and the "ordinary habits of

life," taken together with the admitte<.l facts, which also
constitute unrebutted circumstantial evidence in Sen.
Poe's favor, lead to the conclusion that Sen. Poe's
biological parents were m~st likely Filipinos, and not
foreign~rs.
136.2. Sen. Poe is only 5 ft. 2 inches tall.294 She

has brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge,
straight black hair and an oval-shaped face.295 Her height ..
and facial features are consistent with physical traits . "'
ordinarily associated with Filipinos. ., ;.
'!\1 r">!{fi.
:~
136.3. Sen. Poe was found, as a new-born ba~
J,'.
ip Iloilo City which is located in the Philippines.296 .~r
"'biological parents were therefore likely to have been
,residents of Iloilo City. In 1968, as at any time, 1
overwhelming majority of the population of Iloilo City w.<:(te
,,. . Filipinos. .,
136.4. Sen. Poe was abandoned in a Romdn .;;

Catholic Church.297 A great majority of Filipinos ~e
Roman Catholics, and only a Roman Catholic would ~
.j'
,;f expected to entrust his/her new-born child to a chur:f:~. ,;..[:'
' ~ Even in 1968,. the Philipi;>ines .was the only .predomina~~~~''.;
> ~ Roman Catholic country in Asia. In the ordinary cou:r- ~
., ithings, only Filipinos with Roman Catholic faith/~'
I,_-./ ~leave Petitioner in a church in Iloilo City.
Jr-
' <'J.>~::'~, . ~~-------------
. ) .' , 293. ~nqerscoring
supplied
,. :see Exhibit "4'', p. 1
294
. ;.;:n~ Id.
tJ6 Elamparo Petition, p. 6, first paragraphs under "Relevant Facts"
.. 291 Id.
.,., .
.' - ~;~:
4-
106
136.5. Sen. Poe's abandonment as a new-born

child is also far more consistent with her biological parents
being Filipinos. New-born children are abandoned usually
because their parents are poor and cannot afford to take
care of them. On the other hand, foreigners impoverished
in their own country would not likely have the means to
travel and find themselves impoverished in the Philippines.
Therefore, abandoned children found in the Philippines are
more likely to have been born of poor Filipino parents, as
opposed to foreigners.
136.6. In the absence of evidence, the law does not

require the COMELEC to accept the improbable, the
unlikely and the absurd. As discussed, "unless overcome
by evidence," the "ordinary" must be presumed. In this
case, the "ordinary course of nature" and the "ordinary
habits of life" tell us that a new-born baby with brown eyes,
black hair and an oval-shaped face, found in a Parish
Church in Iloilo City hours after her birth, was born of
Filipinos. Occam's Razor teaches us that the simplest
answer is often correct.
136.7. Would the presumption of natural born

citizenship be rendered absurd if the foundling had blond
curly hair, blue eyes and freckles? What if the foundling
had ebony skin and dark curly hair? The answer is "NO."
136.8. A natural-born Filipino does not have to

look like a typical Filipino. He or she may be of Caucasian,
Indian, African or other foreign descent, but still be a
natural-born Filipino citizen. The Constitution simply
provides that a person be born of parents who are citizens
of the Philippines. This means that a foundling's parents
may be naturalized Filipinos, but with Caucasian, Indian,
African or other foreign descent. It is wrong to presume
that natural-born Filipinos must always be of the Malay
race, as there are many Filipinos who are mestizos,
Chinoys and others of mixed stock. Therefore, a found[ng
may look like a foreigner, but still be a natural-born
I ;
Filipino. That said, this discourse is more academic than

decisive, because, as discussed, Sen. Poe looks entirely
Filipina. This obvious fact only strengthens the
presumption that she was born of Filipinos.
137. The above-mentioned circumstances of Sen. Poe's

discovery as an abandoned new-born baby in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo in 1968, and her physical features which
llm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1111111111. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._ _. . . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .~
107
resemble a typical Filipina, must also be considered as

circumstantial evidence that she was indeed born of Filipino
parents. Circumstantial evidence, which may suffice for
conviction even in criminal proceedings requiring the highest
degree of proof, is certainly admissible in an administrative
12roceeding requiring only S\,lbs~ant~al evidence to prove that Sen.
Poe is most likely born of Filipino parents, and did not "lie" when
she stated in her COC that, "to the best of [her] knowledge", she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
137.1. Substantial evidence is defined as "that

amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. "298 Thus,
the COMELEC should have considered the uncontroverted
circumstances of Petitioner's birth, discovery as a new-born
infant, and physical features, as sufficient relevant
evidence adequately justifying a conclusion that she was
most likely born of Filipino parents. A rule requiring
conclusive identification of blood ties to a Filipino parent is
neither supported by law (as the definition of natural-bo.,..n
citizenship under the Constitution does not even require
actual proof of blood relationship) nor by jurisprudence (as
the cases of Board of Commissioners vs. Dela Rosa and
Tecson show, wherein a claim of citizenship was upheld
based on a presumption).
t
137.2. Section 4 of Rule 133, on the sufficiency of

circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction in a
criminal case, may be applied by analogy. Under said rule,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, there are several
circumstances which lead to the inference that Sen. Poe is
likely born of Filipino parents, to wit: ( 1) she was found as
a new-born baby in Iloilo City in 1968; (2) Iloilo is, then as
now, predominantly populated by Filipino citizens; (3) there
is no international airport or seaport in Iloilo City in 1968,
and no evidence to show that it is considered a main port of
_L.- r ~-entry ior aliens; ~~ en. ~was reportedly abandoned in a
Roman Catholic Church, which is the religion practiced by
a majority of the Filipino population in 1968, as in present
times; and (5) Sen. Poe's physical features are consistent
with those normally associated with Filipino citizens. These
"circttmstances" are not disputed by private respondent.
298 Sec. 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court

108
The combination of these circumstances is sufficient to

produce a "moral certainty" "or conviction in an
unnrejudiced mind" that Sen. Poe is indeed born of Filipino
; ';
parents who abandoned her as a new-born infant in a

Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City in 1968.
137.3. It is grave abuse of discretion for the

COMELEC to insist on nothing less than direct proof from
Petitioner that she was born of Filipino parents. To repeat,
the proceeding a quo was administrative in nature,
requiring only substantial evidence-the lowest quantum of
evidence in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Even
criminal proceedings, which require proof beyond
reasonable doubt, do not require direct proof, much less
proof producing "absolute certainty" of guilt. The highest
quantum of proof under the rules on evidence require
merely "moral certainty" that a person has more likely than
not committed the crime he is charged with. To require
Sen. Poe to prove with "absolute certainty" her "blood tie" to
a Filipino parent is to require her to meet a quantum of
evidence even. greater than that required in criminal
~;
proceedings. This is certainly unjust, arbitrary, whimsical,

and despotic.
138. All told, there was no legal basis for the COMELEC to
p~ace the burden of proof on Sen. Poe to prove her natural born '
~qitizenship or to prove her bloodline to a Filipino parent. Private ""
' respondent ought to have proven that Sen. Poe was not te1Iitlg _
-J}le truth when she claimed in her COC for President that she)~, ,~'"
:: '~'NATURAL-BORN
" ,..
FILIPINO CITIZEN." The COMELEC should'.'\, :~.,., ~ .,(''
-have demanded proof from the private respondent that Sen. P,pe --
is not a natural born Filipino. ~~-- :~:
-~~~
't k
139. Was private respondent able to discharge her burden? ,<'.

-The answer is NO. The only way to prove that Sen. Poe is not,. a .,. .
_natural-born Filipino is to prove that both of her parents qre -~
foreigners. No such proof was presented. The only fact
. ,established in the proceeding a quo is that Sen. Poe's parents 0,.te
Junknown. But this fact can!l.Q! discharge private responden,~;s t
~~th;trden. How can private respondent's failure to present evidet:i&~,&.,j,
~-that Sen. Poe's parents were foreigners discharge their burde:fl',~&~t;
prove that Sen. Poe is a foreigner or stateless and not a nat- .;tt ....:" . ,_
"' -~qrn Filipino? A burden of proof is not and cannot be disc:f _

.;-bf th~- abs~nce of evide~ce; to hold ot~er'"'.'ise is to supp~ft\;}d
:;;t<!'t~absur,~ lo.gic that th~ exi~tence of a thing is proved by t~~~~
, lack-di' evidence that it exists. . ~~
t~,1:'.\
:)}''
.;.;(
't,'
109
139.1. Nqt kriowing ~s different from not being. A

person who is not sure that she is a natural-born Filipino
may in fact be a natural-born Filipino. "Unknown" parents
may in fact be Filipino parents. Thus, Sen. Poe may in fact
be a natural-barf} Fi_lipino. If it is entirely possible that Sen.
Poe was telling the truth when she stated in her COC that
she is a "NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN," then the
COMELEC cannot --.- conclude that what she said was false.
The mere fact that Petitioner's parents are unknown does
not render false her claim in her COC that she is a
"NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN."
139.2. Ignoring for the time being that

presumptions of law apply in favor of her natural-born
citizenship which have not been disproven, and that the
burden of proof is not hers but private respondent's, Sen.
Poe's statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino cannot be false, but at most only not proven. The
mere fact that a statement is not proven does not mean
that it is false.
140. At the end of the day, the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it declared "false" Sen. Poe's assertion
in her COC for President regarding her citizenship, despite
private respondent's complete and utter failure to prove such
falsity. In the absence of proof, presumptions stand, and the
'
presumption in this case is that Sen. Poe was telling the truth in
her COC when she stated therein that she is a "NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN."
B.3. The COMELEC acted

whimsically, capriciously,
contrary to common sense and
logic, and in contravention of
the letter and spirit of the
fundamental law, in concluding
that a foundling like Sen. Poe
is "excluded" from the
enumeration of Philippine
citizens under Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935
Constitution.
-------------------------------------------
141. Section l, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution
enumerates those who are considered Philippine citizens:
.~
110
( 1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time

of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fa~hers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 300
142. On page 24 of the 1 December 2015 Resolution,

applying the Latin maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"
the COMELEC concluded that a foundling is supposedly "not in
the enumerations (sic)" of Philippine citizens above. This
position was adopted in the 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc. This conclusion is whimsical and
capricious because it is illogical.
143. Sen. Poe concededly does not fall under sub-

paragraphs (1), (2) and (5). Therefore, she does not need to be
"excluded" from these three (3) categories. However, the mere
fact that she is a foundling does not, by any stretch of logic,
categorically "exclude" Sen. Poe from sub-paragraphs (3) and (4).
144. Philippine citizens under paragraphs (3) and (4) are

simply those whose parents are Filipinos. There is nothing in
the provision which requires that the identity of such parents be
proven with absolute certainty, or even that such identity be
proven as a fact.301
145. The biological parents of a foundling are simply

unknown, and therefore they may in fact be Filipinos. Thus, as
discussed in paragraph 136 (and sub-paragraphs), Sen. Poe will
most probably fall under any of these two (2) types of Filipinos.
Thus, a foundling is NOT necessarily EXCLUDED from these
two categories of citizens. Therefore, the COMELEC should not
have applied the latin maxim "exclusio unius est exclusio
300Underscoring supplied
301 This is true not only with respect to foundlings, but even with respect to legitimate
children, whose filiation (or biological tie) to their father is merely presumed by law. In
other words, a legitimate child may in fact be not biologically related to his or her Filipino
father, but the law will still consider him or her a Filipino citizen, because of the quasi-
conclusive presumption that he or she is born of the husband of his or her mother. There
are therefore situations wherein a person is presumed by law to be a Filipino citizen,
notwithstandirtg the absence of any actual "blood tie" to a Filipino parent, as in the case of
a child conceived or born within a valid marriage between a Filipino father and an alien
mother, but is actually the product of artificial insemination with a donor, or of adulterous
relations.
111
alterius." Simple logic and common sense (neither of which the

COMELEC wanted to use) are enough arrive at this conclusion.
146. Considering that foundlings are not categorically

excluded from the letter of pars. (3) and (4) of Section 1, Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, and there is am:IJiguity in the
application of this Article to foundlings, the issue becomes, in
essence, one of constitutional construction. Contrary to the
COMELEC's Resolution,302 a verba legis approach will not solve
the problem, as the "express terms" of the Constitution, when
"applied", will not lead to the conclusion that foundlings are not
Filipino citizens.
14 7. Since the issue is fundamentally one of construction,

it is proper to apply acceptable methods of constitutional
construction, among them, ascertainment of intent behind a
particular provision. In this regard, the deliberations of the
framers of the organic law must be consulted in order to discern
their intent with respect to the citizenship of foundlings.
147.1. In Nitafan vs. Commissioner, 303 this

Honorable Court ruled:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
~~ ~ f adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in'-"':'' ~,,.
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter'
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the'~ ''~ :;'.' _:A"
~ people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be.. ~~~. f\

safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the expl.anation offered by the
framers. 304 ~ ~'
< ~ ~;,
' J t
1
147.2. In In re Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile,3os the High" ''
Court stated that "it is generally held that, in construipg
constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or 'of.'
doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates ;iu;;:;.'.
'""'ii-
~ 1 December 2015 Resolution, p. 25

302
, 303 G.R. No. 7870, 23 July 1980
.:. '304 Un4erscoring supplied
.~os G.l\. No. L-35536, 17 September 1974, citing Pollock vs. Farmer's Loan & T .
.J,p7 U.S. 429, 39 L. ed. 759; See also Legal Tender cases (1884) 110 U.S. 421, ~S'.~
1;\,~04, 70 A.L.R. 30). The Supreme Court also examined the deliberation~,Jbf
~ . . ConstiWtional Commission/ Convention in construing applicable provisions . of
' ''Constitution in the following cases: Feliciano vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 14 .
. ~~4 January 2004; Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic oft
(pf'filippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. Nos. 183591, etc., 14 October~'.;W08;
1
,Gamb~ vs. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 2011. ('

112
the C<?n~titutiqnal convention as throwing light on the

intent of the framers of the Constitution."
148. The COMELEC ought to have examined the

deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention306 in the
hope of discovering why foundlings were not categorically
excluded from the enumeration of citizens under Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. If the COMELEC had done
so, it would have learned that there is a perfectly good
expl?-Pation for the silence in the text of the Constitution, and
the explanation was not that foundlings should be considered
stateless or !!Q!!-Filipinos under Philippine law. On the contrary,
the Constitution was silent, only because foundlings are already
included in the concept of }us sanguinis Filipinos.
149. The pertinent deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional

Convention, on what eventually became Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, show that the intent of the framers was not to
exclude foundlings from the term "citizens of the Philippines."
According to them, "(b)y international law the principle that
children or people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it was not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively." There was
certainly !!Q intent to consider foundlings as "stateless" persons
or foreigners. Thus:
/
Spanish English Translation

SR. RAFOLS: Para una enmienda. For an amendment. I propose that
Propongo que despues del inciso 2 after subsection 2, the following is
se inserte lo siguiente: "Los hijos inserted: "The natural children of a
naturales de un padre extranjero y foreign father and a Filipino mother
de una madre filipina no reconocidos not recognized by the father.
por aquel.
xxx
xxx
El Presidente. La Mesa desea pedire [We] would like to request a

una aclaracion del proponente de la clarification from the proponent of
enmienda. Se refiere Su Senoria a the amendment. The gentleman
hijos naturales or a toda clase de refers to natural children or to any
hijos ilegitimos? kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols. A toda clase de hijos To all kinds of illegitimate children.

ilegitimos. Tambien se incluye a los It also includes natural children of
hijos naturales de padres unknown parentage, natural or
desconocidos, los hijos naturales or illegitimate children of unknown
ilegitimos, de padres desconocidos. parents.
Sr. Montinola. Para una aclaracion. I For clarification. The gentleman said

113
-
Alli se dice "de padres "of unknown 12arents." Current
l ' iF I .
desconocidos." Los Codigos actuales codes consider them Filipino, that is,
consideran como filipino, es decir, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein
me refiero al codigo espanol quien all children of unknown parentage
considera como espanoles a todos born in Spanish territory are
los hijos de padres desconocidos considered Spaniards, because the
nacidos en territorio espanol, porque presumptio,n is tha} a child of
la presuncion es que el hijo de unknown parentage is the son of a
padres desconocidos es hijo de un S12aniard. This may be applied in the
espanol, y de esa manera se podra Philippines in that a child of
aplicar en Filipinas de que un hijo unknown parentage born in the
desconocido aqui y nacido en Philippines is deemed to be Filipino,
Filipinas se considerara que es hijo and there is no need. ..
filipino y no hay necesidad ...
Sr. Rafols. Hay necesidad, porque There is a need, because we are

estamos relatando las condiciones relating the conditions that are
de los que van a ser filipinos. [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola. Pero esa es la But that is the interpretation of the

interpretacion de la ley, ahora, de law, therefore, there is no [more]
manera que no hay necesidad de la need for the amendment.
enmienda.
Sr. Rafols. La enmienda debe leerse The amendment should read thus:
de esta manera: "Los hijos naturales "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign
o ilegitimos de un padre extranjero y father and a Filipino mother
de una madre filipina reconocidos recognized by one, or the childreri of
por aquel o los hijos de padres unknown parentage."
desconocidos. /
Sr. Briones. Para una enmienda con The amendment [should] mean
el fin de significar los hijos nacidos children born in the Philippines of
en Filipinas de padres desconocidos. unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols. Es que el hijo de una The son of a Filipina to a foreigner,

filipina con un extranjero, aunque although this [person] does not
este no reconozca al hijo, no es recognize the child, is not unknown.
desconocido.
El Presidente. Acepta Su Senoria o I Does the gentleman accept the

no la enmienda? amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols. No acepto la enmienda, I do not accept the amendment

porque la enmienda excluiria a los because the amendment would
hijos de una filipina con un exclude the children of a Filipina
extranjero que este no reconoce. No with a foreigner who does not
son desconocidos y yo creo que esos recognize the child. Their parentage
hijos de madre filipina con is not unknown and I think those
extranjero y el padre no reconoce, children of overseas Filipino mother
deben ser tambien considerados and father [whom the latter] does
como filipinos. not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.
El President. La cuestion en orden The question in order is the

es la enmienda a la enmienda del amendment to the amendment from
.--
114
Delegado por Cebu, Sr. Briones. the Gentlemen from Cebu, Mr.
Briones.
Mr. Bulson. Mr. President, don't
you think it would be better to leave Mr. President, don't you think it
this matter in the hands of the would be better to leave this matter
Legislature? in the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas. Senor Presidente, mi Mr. President, my humble opinion is

opinion humilde es que estos son that these cases are few and far in
cases muy pequenos y contados, between, that the constitution need
para que la constitucion necesite [not] refer to them. By international
referirse a ellos. Por leyes law the principle th.at children or
in ternacionales se reconoce el people born in a country of
principio de que los hijos o las unknm.yn parents are citizens in this
personas nacidas en un pais de nation i~ reco,gnized, and it is not
padres desconocidos son ciudadanos neces~ary to include a provision on
de esa nacion , y no es necesario the subject exhaustively.308
incluir una disposicion taxativa
sobre el particular. 307
150. Under which of the five (5) categories of Philippine

citizens enumerated in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution does a foundling belong? The exchanges between
the delegates of the 1934 Constitutional Convention quoted
above show that foundlings were intended to be jus sanquinis
Philippine citizens, that is - those born of "a father or mother
who is a citizen of the Philippines."
,.
.-~~ 150.1. The citizenship of a "foundling" ":was "'
discussed specifically in the course of the debates Of~tl;le,
framers on )us sanguinis Philippine citizens who, ~t t~.~,
, time, fell under paragraph (2) of the then proposed draft ~t't.
the Article on Citizenship, thus:309 ,, "'.~(
t
(2) All persons born in the Philippines or in foreign * ~'
territory of a father or mother who is a citizen of the'' ~ . .v
Philippines;
" ~
The framers of the 1935 Constitution did not discuss the .

citizenship of a foundling in the context of the other typ'i=fs.
of Filipinos under Section 1, Article IV of the '1935 si
y
Constitution, much less considered them in the contex(:;wJ.:.
"naturalized" Filipinos. . ~: " ""~,~:)'
150.2. Specifically, Delegate Rafols wanted to it

in the enumeration of Philippine citize.ns, immediay,;~~~~~h~"
,,paragraph (2) quoted above, the following sub-sect10?~ft~~~;~\~:""
1
.~ ??1 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "37", pp. 186 to 187 ' 4~ .:.t'.'

\~Underscoring supplied
, '309 See f>nnexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "37", p. 135
115
The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino

mother not recognized by the father. 310
150. 3. Delegate Rafols explained that the phrase

"natural children" was meant to include "natural children
of unknown parentage." 31 1 Delegate Montinola objected to
the amendment,' citing Spanish Law which applies a
"presumption" that "a child of unknown parentage is the
son of a Spaniard." He then suggested that this apply to
the Philippines. In other words, Delegate Montinola
suggested that a foundling be presumed born of F,ilipinos.
As discussed, Delegate Roxas essentially agreed with
Delegate Montinola when the former expressed the view
that "(b)y international law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens
in this nation."312 However, Delegate Roxas added that
since the cases of foundlings are "few and far in between",
and international law already recognizes a rule with respect
to their citizenship, there is no more need to include a
provision on the subject exhaustively. No one expressed
any disagreement, and this was the fina~ statement on the
matter of "foundlings" before Delegate Rafols' amendment
was put to a vote.3 13 This explains why foundlings were not
mentioned in Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
/'
150 .4. Paragraph (4), Section 1, Article IV of the

1935 Constitution considers as Philippine citizens "those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship."
Mr. Aruego's contemporary account of the debates on this
sub-paragraph confirms that the citizenship of foundlings
was discussed in the context of jus sanginis Philippine
citizens, thus:
310 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "37" hereof, p. 186 (English translation);
Underscoring supplied
313 It must be noted that the membership of the 1934 Constitutional Convention was
dominated by lawyers. Seventy percent (70%), or one hundred forty two (142) out of two
hundred two (202) members of the Constitutional Convention, were lawyers, so that it is
not unreasonable to conclude that when Delegate Roxas expressed the opinion that an
express provision on children of unknown parentage in the Philippines is not necessary,
for "international law" already recognizes them as citizens of the Philippines anyway, they
understood this to be the case, as the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws was already existing at that time. This is also
supported by Delegate Aruego's contemporary account of the proceedings of the
Convention, as cited in par. 150.4 above. (For the composition of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention, see, I JOSE M. ARUEGO, THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 23-46
(1949).
116
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols

presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who
w~s a ~itizen of th,e Philipp_ines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was 4efeated primarily because the Convention
believed that the cases, being too. few to warrant. the
inclusion of a provis~on in the Constitution to apply to them,
should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it
was believed that the rules of international law were already
clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that founqlings followed the
nationality of the place where they were found, thereby
making unnecessary
'
the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment. 314
150.5. In its 17 November 2015 final and

executory Decision, the SET ruled that "(i)t was never the
intention of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to exclude
foundlings from natural-born Philippine citizenship," and
"(t)here was a recognition that 'children or people born in a
country of unknown parents are citizens of this nation."315
150.6. Based on the foregoing, when the framers of

the 1935 Constitution declared that "by international law,"
a foundling is a "citizen of this nation," the type of
Philippine citizenship they had in mind.;was citizenship :Qy
blood. Under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
}us sanguinis Philippine citizens fall under paragraphs (3)
and (4) thereof. Accordingly, the intent of the framers was
to consider a foundling a Philippine citizen whose "father"
and/ or "mother" is a citizen of the Philippines."
151. The fore going discussion illustrates why the

COMELEC acted whimsically and capriciously when it applied
the Latin maxim "expresio unius est exclusio alterius" in
characterizing the enumeration of citizens under Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
152. Another reason why said maxim cannot be applied is

this Honorable Court's pronouncement in People vs.
Manantan,316 where it discussed an exception to the application
of this Latin maxim, viz:
31 4I JOSE M:ARUEGO, THE FRAMING OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 209 (1949)

315 Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "43", p. 24
316 G.R. No. L-14129, 31 July 1962, citing Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App.
519)
117
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of

its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them,
but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice
will follow by not so including them, the maxim expresio unius
est exclusio alterius, should not be invoked. 317
The exception applies here.
152.1. As discussed, it was precisely the intent of the

framers of the 1935 Constitution to include foundlings in
the definition of Filipino citizens (specifically, pars. (3)
and/or (4), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution),
even though they were not sp~cifically mentioned in the
enumeration of "citizens of the Philippines." In other
words, "no reason exists" to exclude foundlings from that
enumeration.
152.2. Moreover, it would be the height of injustice

to deprive a foundling of Philippine citizenship, or to
punish her with statelessness, for a status and condition
that is not of her own doing. It is not her fault that she
was abandoned at birth. Worse, she can do little or nothing
to change her status as a foundling.
152. 3. Based on the fore going, in determining the

) ,:. citizenship of a foundling under the 1935 Constitutiou, one'"
may not invoke the Latin maxim, "expresio uni1.ls11,, est'
exclusio alterius." i:.
~.'"". ':.
'!,~,~
.- .ii ~. ..ti.;.
,, 153. The intent to include foundlings in the classes of ju~-,,
$anguinis citizens under the 1 935 Constitution was undisturbed;J1
an,d repeatedly carried over in succeeding Philippi!}e .~
.~ Constitutions. Thus, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions also qp,
not contain any specific provision on the citizenshi,p "'ot
foundlings. The framers of later organic laws obviouslY" ~
shared the view that no express provision on foundlings needs to '
be included in the text of the Constitutions, as they, a.re
'adequately protected under international law and consid~r~Cl~'
filipino citizens. ;): <>'o&.:
.r :t:l"
. . 154. T~e framers ?f the 1935 ~?nstitution .r~lied P,~~~~l'i,
; ~. 9n 1nternat10nal law 1n charactenz1ng the c1tlzensh1~f''. fti
,, ..;foundling, because international law is particularly autho~ ., .. 1

' Jpi7:t;i;on the subject of citizenship. Indeed, the legal found~ d

111
.,. ' Al1tiele IV of the 1935 Constitution on "Citizenship"

'.
;,,,,,
, 311 Unperscoring supplied
.1~
~
118
"municipal law and in~ernational law." Delegate Aruego of the

1934 Constitutional Convention expressed this view as
follows:3 18
MR. ARUEGO. Mr. President, and gentlemen of the Convention:

If I take this stand this afternoon, it is because I realize and I know
that you realize with me the importance of this section of the
Constitution. In defining citizenship in the Constitution, we are at
the same time defining the persons to whom should be extended
the rights and duties of citizenship. Our definition of citizenship
in the Philippines involves both municipal law and international
law. It involves the obligations of Filipinos both under municipal
law and those obligations under international law.319
154.1. Thus, in proposing, defending and objecting

to, amendments to Article IV on "Citizenship," various
members of the 1934 Constitutional Convention repeatedly
cited rules and principles of international law to support
their respective arguments.320
154. 2. These repeated reference and desire to

conform with international law is but logical, as Article 1 of
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (" 1930 Hague
1'
318 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "37", at p. 139
320 Id., at pp. 178 to 180; Underscoring supplied. The excerpts below briefly illustrate this
point:
MR. CINCO. But suppose a child is born to a Filipino mother; the child has got a
father we cannot tell who he is, but it came out that the child appears to be very
white, it does not seem to be born of a Filipino father, what kind of citizenship has
the child?
MR. SANCHEZ. The general rule in international law will apply that (sic) child
follows the citizenship of his mother.
MR. CINCO. So that he is a Filipino citizen?
MR. SANCHEZ. I think so because that is the rule of international law. 320
x x x
MR. PAREDES. Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention: I have asked for
a chance to talk against all these five amendments, because I find them destructive
of the rules of International Law, converting the Filipino unnecessarily into a
treacherous and enabling every foreigner to be a Filipino just because he is
susceptible of naturalization.
x x x. With regard to No. 2., "All persons born in the Philippines or any foreign
country of a mother who is a citizen of the Philippines." I believe that is the point of
discussion, because as to the first point, if he is born of a Filipino father in or
outside the Philippines, he is a Filipino. We know that according to the rules of
International Law the nationality of a son follows the nationality of the father. x x
x.
x x x
The third reason is that in International Law, as I have stated, we have already
adopted this theory, and if we are going to alter the rules of International Law
which in the body of the article or chapter on principles we have declared to follow,
we will be contradicting the well-settled rules of International Law from time
immemorial, that the children will follow the nationality of the father.
(Underscoring supplied)
119
Convention"), which private respondent Elamparo

mistakenly cite as support in her Petition, in fact provides
that while it is for the State to "determine under its own
law who are its nationals," this will be recognized only "in
so far as it is consistent with international conventions,
international custom, and the principles of l~w generally
recognised with regard to nationality."
154.3. Indeed the principle that foundlings are

citizens of the country in which they are found, is an
ancient one predating even the earliest of the international
conventions cited in the following paragraphs. In the 1881
work of publicist3 21 Francis Wharton entitled "A Treatise on
the Conflicts of Law or Private International Law", he
already noted that "[t]he nationality of a foundling is that of
the place where he was born."322
155. In its 1 December 2015 Resolution, the COMELEC

Second Division also ruled against the natural-born Filipino
citizenship of foundlings, supposedly because automatically
considering them to be natural-born Filipinos (despite the
absence of proof of blood line to a Filipino parent), would be
unfair to those born of "mothers who are citizens of the
Philippines" (whose citizenship is, initially, inchoate until they
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority).3 23
This was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, which held that
"[t]he doctrine that persons falling under [Section 1 (4) of the
1935 Constitution] are not considered natural-born citizens is
already cemented in the case of Bengzon (sic) III vs. HRE .."',"
hence, to consider a foundling "natural-born" is to place her "at
a better position than persons falling under Section 1 (4) [of the
1935 Constitution] ."324
155. l. Sen. Poe submits that there is nothing

unfair about this distinction. A foundling does not know
who her parents are. Therefore, she cannot know for
certain that only her mother is a Filipino and that,
therefore, she must elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. She could very well be born of
a Filipino father; in which case, the rule on election of
321 A publicist is an expert in international law. (Webster's Third new International

Dictionary, 1993 ed., p.1836)
322 Sec. 10, p.37. While at first blush, this principle appears to be }us soli in nature, it can
nevertheless be applied in countries which follow the jus sanguinis doctrine, based on the
common sensical presumption that a child found in a particular country is likely to have
been born 'bf residents therein, such residents in all likelihood being citizens of said
country.
323 1 December 2015 Resolution, pp. 23-24.
-------------------------------........ 120
~
Philippine citizenship would not apply to her. On the other

hand, a person who is fully aware that he is born only of a
Filipino mother has no excuse or justification for not
electing Philippine citizenship when she turns 18 years old.
Upon such election, that person would, in fact, be a
natural-born
; '
Filipino, whereas a foundling would only be
presumed to be a natural-born Philippine citizen.
155.2. According to Bengson III vs. HRET,325 the

1987 Constitution expressly "considers those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the majority age as natural-born." This is
reiterated in Ma vs. Fernandez, 326 where the Supreme
Court clarified that under the 1987 Constitution, children of
Filipino mothers and alien fathers born during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution are considered "natural-
born citizens upon election of their citizenship."
155. 3. Moreover, the conclusion that a foundling is

placed in a better position than the child of a Filipina
mother is skewed, as it rests on a presumption of loss of
Philippine citizenship on the part of the Filipino mother. In
other words, this position has to first presume: (1) that the
Filipino mother is married to a foreigner (when he could
very well be unwed); and (2) the alien husband's national ~~'
law gives his nationality to the Filipino mother. w;ithout
these presumptions, the child will be illegitimate, ahtl will
simply follow the Filipino nationality of the mother; N ~:
't,'1''
~, ~
"'
156. All told, since the text of Section 1, Article IV of t1;ie
fundamental law does not categorically exclud~ foundlings, ruia
t,he intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution was to incl]!de
r ' foundlings in the concept of jus sanguinis Filipinos,,,.t :was
indeed illogical, whimsical and capricious for the COMeLEC~'to
conclude that foundlings are "excluded" from Philjppie
citizenship.
,
-..~, .:':'
l B.4. The COMELEC disregarded

applicable international human
rights instruments ratified by
the Philippines which create
an affirmative obligation to
consider foundlings as natural-
'' born citizens of the country.
';' 32s G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001
i' i-
326 q.R. No. 183133, 26 July 2010
:;...,.
121

Second Division recognized the binding effect of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights ("UDHR"), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), and the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child ("UNCRC"), all of which
the Philippines signed and/ or ratified. Yet, it refused to give
effect to a child's right to a nationality from birth in the case of
foundlings, on the tenuous supposition that it will "override the
Constitution which requires a bloodline to a Filipino parent to
confer the status of being a natural-born citizen."32 7 This is
baseless and illogical. The definition of natural-born citizenship
under the Constitution is not restricted to a "bloodline to a
Filipino parent"; it merely requires that a person be a citizen by
operation of law, without having to perform an act to acquire or
perfect such citizenship. Even if it did, the application of the
presumption of law as to the citizenship of the parents of the
foundling as provided in "generally accepted principles of
international law would place the foundling's right to a
nationality within the bloodline requirement of natural-born
citizenship. Moreover, it simply does not follow that since Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution is silent with respect to foundlings,
any other article or provision of law which may suggest that they
are or may be deemed natural-born citizens is automatically
violative of the Constitution. ,,,
158. To the contrary, the silence of the 1935 Constitution

allows for an interpretation that can harmonize the provisions of
said Constitution with other applicable provisions of law, such
as provisions of an international convention transformed into
municipal law through the process of ratification. Thus, the
COMELEC should have considered the implications of the
Philippines' treaty obligations under international human rights
instruments, instead of simplistically ruling against the Filipino
citizenship of foundlings on the erroneous understanding that
upon them rests the burden to prove their citizenship. It must be
emphasized that Filipino citizenship is a privilege that foundlings
in the country presently enjoy.3 28 If the COMELEC considered
the rights guaranteed by the treaties invoked by herein
Petitioner, it would have found that since foundlings are not
definitely excluded among the category of Filipino citizens, an
327 1 December 2015 Resolution, p. 30.

328 Under our present system of law, foundlings are recognized by the Philippine
government as citizens, if not natural-born citizens, of the Philippines. To repeat, the DFA
has been issuing Philippine passports-certainly a durable proof of Filipino citizenship-to
foundlings, requiring only a copy of their foundling certificates, and without requiring
them to first "prove" their "bloodline" to a Filipino parent before they can be considered
citizens entitled to the protection of the state.
122
interpretation upholding their citizenship will be more consistent

with the Philippines' positive obligations under the UDHR, the
UNCRC, and the ICCPR to "implement" a child's "right to acquire
a nationality" or the "right to a nationality" "from the moment of
birth" and to ensure that no new-born child is left stateless.
159. On 21 August 1990, the Philippines ratified the UN

Convention on the Rights of the Child. Accordingly, it is legally
binding on the Philippines. Under Article 7 of the UNCRC, the
Philippines undertook to protect the right of a new-born to a
nationa:Iity, and to ensure that every child is protected against
statelessness "from birth." The provision reads:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and

shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall en.sure the implementation of these

rights in accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless. 329
,...
160. A similar Article is found in the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Philippines
also ratified on 23 October 1986. Article 24 of the ICCPR
recognizes the right of every child "to acquire a nationality,"
thus:
Article 24. 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination

as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
original, property or birth, the right, to such measure of protection
as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family,
society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall

have a name.
330
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
160.1. The UNCRC was adopted, among other

reasons, precisely because of the "need to extend particular

123
care to the child,"331 as provided in Articles 23 and 24 of

the 19CPR.
160. 2. Article 2. 1, Part II of the ICCPR states that

"(e)ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
pre~ent Covenant, witliout distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."
161. As mentioned, the ICCPR and the UNCRC create an

ol?ligation on the part of the Philippines to ensure that, "from
birth," every child, "without discrimination," "acquires" a
"nationality." Conversely, the Philippines has a duty not to leave
any new-born stateless.
162. The only way the Philippines can perform its treaty
obligations under the UNCRC and the ICCPR in the case of a
foundling is to recognize him or her as its own citizen, that is-a
Philippine citizen. The Philippines has no authority to consider a
foundling a citizen of another county. In the words of the Hon.
Justice Carpio in his separate opinion in Maquiling vs.
COMELEC, "Philippine courts have no power to declare whether
a person possesses citizenship other than that of the
"
Philippines."33 2
::;~., :
162.1. The Philippines has the obligati6,ii,. ;pft

.,t: simply to recognize a foundling as its citizen, but to. d~.So
'~C
f
{
'f.
!'1
from the time of the foundling's birth. To reiterate;'1JQ<f~t
the UNCRC, a child is guaranteed not only the d.ght: tO'
acquire a nationality, but the right to acquire. suqh
nationality from birth, especially "where the child>_~~()..~!d
otherwise be stateless." ...
/t r~l
162.2. Domestic laws on naturalization333 are not

sufficient to make the Philippines compliant with its tre~ty
obligations to ensure that a foundling be consideted
J:
Filipino from birth. Under Philippine law, an applic~li
naturalization33 4 must be not less than eighteen {18!"-V(
~ 331 ' preamble of the UNCRC

$ee
ft.,.
r . VI
332 G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, 696 SCRA 420 ,,,. --~
333 Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and Republic Act No. 9139 ~ 1,~.. ;. ~'1
334 Naturalization can either be judicial (governed by Commonwealth Act.No.~!i--5lt>.
.~~
aihended), or administrative (governed by Republic Act No. 9139). Both laws cleady rbJe~t6.
aliens and not to stateless persons. C.A. No. 4 73 prescribes, inter alia, a minimQ.,Qt a~ of
~wenty o~~ (2.1) years on the day of the heari~g o~ the petition, and a minimum {~si?e.ncy
m the Ph1hppmes of five (5) years, under special circumstances, and ten (10) ye~i-s, ~11 the
-
124
of age at the time she petitions for naturalization.

Moreover, she must have "a known trade, business,
profession or lawful occupation to qualify for
naturalization. Thus, if the COMELEC's disregard of the
UDHR, UN CRC, and ICCPR is accepted, a foundling would
be left stateless from .birth and
' ' . for
.
,,
at least
.
eighteen
. '
years
until she can qualify (by having a trade, business,
profession or lawful occupation) for naturalization, in
violation of the Philippines' obligations under the UNCRC
and the ICCPR. This is another reason why a foundling
must be recognized as citizen of the Philippines "from
birth."
163. Although neither the ICCPR nor the UNCRC was in

force when Sen. Poe was born in 1968, each may apply
retroactively to the date of her birth in determining her
citizenship. The reasons are as follows:
164. First, the refusal to give retroactive application to the

ICCPR and the UNCRC will discriminate against foundlings born
before the Philippines' ratification335 of these treaties. This
would violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 336
164.1. Differential treatment in law is justified only

when it is based on a reasonable classification. To be
reasonable, a classification: (a) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (b) must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(d) must apply equally to all members of the same class.33 7
164.2. There is no valid and substantial

distinction between foundlings who were born before the
ICCPR and the UNCRC came into force, and foundlings
who were born after this date. For as long as the identities
of their birth parents are not established, they share the
same status-that of a foundling. A law made applicable to
foundlings born after ratification should apply equally to
foundlings born before, as they are all members of the
same class.
absence of special qualifications. On the other hand, R.A. 9139, which applies to "aliens
born and residing in the Philippines", requires that an applicant be at least eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of filing of the petition and be a resident of the Philippines since
birth.
335 The Philippines ratified the ICCPR and the UNCRC on 23 October 1986 and on 21
August 1990 respectively.
336 Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Underscoring supplied)
337 People v. Cayat, G .R. No. L-45987, 5 May 1939
125
165. Second, the UNCRC and the ICCPR are "curative"

statutes which may apply retroactively.
165.1. To reiterate, as treaties which the

Philippines ratified, the UNCRC and the ICCPR form part of
the law of the land.
'\ t
These treaties are, therefore,
I
considered domestic statutes.
165.2. It is basic that "curative" laws apply

retroactively. 338 Curative laws "are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils." 339 A
law may be applied retroactively "when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIGHTS."340
165.3. Insofar as the ICCPR and UNCRC supply

deficiencies in Philippine law on the rights of a new-born to
a nationality and to be protected against statelessness,
they are curative in nature. Thus, they apply
retrospectively to Sen. Poe'~ b~rth in 1968.
166. Third, under Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties, there is !!Q prohibition against the
retroactive application of treaties (unless a different intention
appears). What is prohibited is the application of a treaty to a
fact or status which ceased to exist before the-treaty entered into
force.
166.1. In the first place, neither the ICCPR nor the

UNCRC expressly or impliedly prohibits their retroactive
application. There is likewise no indication in these
treaties that their respective provisions should be applied
only prospectively.
166.2. Secondly, foundlings in the Philippines who

were born before the ICCPR and the UNCRC entered into
force did not cease to be such after the treaties entered into
force. They continue to be foundlings and foundlings
continue to be "born" until today. Therefore, these two
treaties bind the Philippines "in relation" to determining
Sen. Poe's rights at the time of her birth in 1968.
338 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996; Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No.
114222, 6 April 1995; Briad Agro Development Corp. vs. Dela Serna, G.R. Nos. 82805 &
83225, 29 June 1989
339 Narzoles vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 141959, 29 September 2000
340 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
126
167. Fourth, considering that the Philippines was already a

signatory to the ICCPR as early as 19 December 1966 (or almost
2 years before Sen. P<?e's ~irth), the Philippines was "obliged (as
of that date) to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose" of the ICCPR.3 41 Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties states:
Article 18. OBLIGATION NOT TO DEFEAT THE OBJECT

AND PURPOSE OF A TREATY PRIOR TO ITS ENTRY INTO
FORCE
A State is obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat

the obiect and purpose of a treaty when:
o? '
(a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments

constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear
not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty,

pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided
that such entry into force is not unduly delayed. 342
167.1. To deny Sen. Poe Philippine citizenship, or

to leave her stateless at the time of her birth in 1968, as
Petitioner argues, would have "defeated the obje~t and
purpose" of the ICCPR, among which is to affou::d its
""
subjects (like Sen. Poe) a "right to a nationality."
t~,
;~, : 168. Finally, a refusal (at present) to recognize Sen.~ P~"'~

;~ ,'right to have "acquired a nationality" "from birth" and "to ensf~
the implementation of this right" where she "would otherwise. Pf
stateless," would be a violation of the obligations ~f ,~ tp~
?Philippines under the UNCRC and the ICCPR. . .
B.5. The COMELEC also disregarded

the basic constitutional law
concept of "incorporation" and
ignored applicable settled ~~
it jurisprudence on the matter,
~~
when it ruled that the

,...,
Philippines is supposedly "not
bound" by the 1930 Hague
.~:'..
Convention and the Convention
~''l ;!
See Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in

34 1 relation.~ .B.~n
..~, 'Muna ..
vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, 1 February 2011 .
ij
i . 3 42 Ut}derscoring supplied
..
,I
~
127
on Statelessness, simply
because the Philippines "is not
a signatory" to these two
treaties.
-------------------------------------------
169. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that
the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole. Ut magis valeat
quam pereat. Thus, in Francisco vs. House of Representatives, 34 3
citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 44 this
Honorable Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction

that n.o ~ne provision of the Constitution is to be separated from
all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and
to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must h.armonize them, if

practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory. (Emphasis supplied) 344
170. Thus, it was gross error for the COMELEC to consider

Article IV of the 1935 Constitution in isolation and give it an
interpretation that is patently antagonistic to other provisions of
the same Constitution, such as Section 3, Article II (on the
applicability of generally accepted principles of international law)
of the same Constitution. This error is exacerbated by the fact
that another interpretation that harmonizes the different parts of
the Constitution is actually applicable, yet ignored, by the
COMELEC.
171. The COMELEC held that since the Philippines "is not
a signatory" to the 1930 Hague Convention and the Convention
on Statelessness, it is supposedly "not bound" thereby. The
ruling ignores the basic Constitutional precept that international
law principles may form part of the law of the land through
incorporation, and not simply by transformation {i.e., ratification
of treaties).
343 G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003

344 Boldfaced in the original
128
172. It is elementary that international law may form part

of Philippine law either through transformation or
incoreoration. 3 45
172.1. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC,

being a "signatory" to a treaty or convention (coupled with
ratification) would make the same "binding" on the
Philippines. A treaty ratified by the Philippines is
"transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
dom~stic conflicts;"3 46 a treaty "forms part of the law of the
land."347
172.2. However, a principle in a treaty (and not

necessarily the entire treaty which the Philippines has
neither signed nor ratified) may still be binding on the
Philippines under Section 3, Article II of the 1935
Constitution, which embodies the incorporation clause,348
thus:
SECTION 3. The Philippines renounces war as

an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles <?f international law as part of the law of
the Nation. 3 4 9
172.3. This point has been settled as early as the

1949 landmark case of Kuroda v. Jalarrdoni, 350 where this
Honorable Court laid down the principle that the
Philippines need not be a formal party to an international
convention before its courts can give effect to its provisions,
for as long as the norm in question is a generally accepted
principle of international law, viz:
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has

no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva
345 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Phil. vs. Dugue III, G.R. No.
173034, 9 October 2007
3 46 Id., citing JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., AN INTRODUCTION TO PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2002
ed., p. 57
347 See Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, referred to as the transformation
.. c,L~';ls~ (i:s it 'transforms' treaties into municiJi>a! o.r domestic law), which states that "(n)o
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." See Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association vs. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007; Puma Sportschuhfabriken
Rudolf Dassler, K.G. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75067, 26 February 1988;
dictum in Abbas vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 89651 & 89965, 10 November 1989.
3 4 8 Pharmaceutical
.
and Health Care
. Association
.. vs. Dugue III, G.R. No. 173034, 9 October
2007
349 The underscored phrase, otherwise known as the "incorporation" clause, was
substantially reproduced in Sections 3 and 2, respectively, of Article II of the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions.
350 G.R. No. L-2662, 26 March 1949
129
Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the

first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principles of international law. In fact
these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations: the United States and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention. Such rules and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even
if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rule and principle of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have
been or shall be a signatory. (emphases supplied)
The case served as precedent in subsequent cases

such as Mijares vs. Ranada3sl and Razon vs. Tagitis, which
were resolved using principles embodied in international
agreements to which the Philippines is not a party.
173. The Constitution itself does not define what is meant

by the phrase "generally accepted principles of international
law." And while "generally accepted principles of international
law" is often associated with "customary international law" as
defined under the ICJ Statute, it does ~appear that this "
.....Jfonorable Court has laid down a consistent set of rul~~ ..in.+
\;;J' ~valuating precepts that would qualify as "generally acce.g,ted
,pri,nciples of international law." Jurisprudence applying{ t1lis'
.:'k~rase employ varied levels and types of analyses.
':f =~ ~
"
,- .. ''
173.1. First, the phrase "generally acceptep ._t

,Principles of international law" is commonly associat;4 .\ ,ff
:;.
i '}~ with "customary international law," as the phra~~ 'is
nderstood in Article 38 (l)(b) of the Statute of trre '
International Court of Justice ("ICJ Statute"), in which c~se
two (2) elements must concur:
.' .;
'i,.,c
(a) Established, widespread, and consistent practic~ .~~<;,

,' the part of States; and ;,;,,, ~"' f l:S:
A psychological element known as opinio juris .>s'~

ii
L
(b) ~. .
' ' '
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). .

;,,~
'~" ;;,'
~
!(F
~<'
_,-\.
~
:~ ~
.,\~~-' G.R,No. 139325, 12 April 2005
~\,
1 ,.
..$
....
130
38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute. This was the Supreme Court's
ruling in International School Alliance of Educators vs.
Quisumbing3s 2 and in Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Phil. vs. Duque JJJ.353 This principle is
discussed in more detail in pars. 187 to 190 hereof.
173.3. Finally, the Supreme Court may simply

declar~ a principle, a convention or a set of rules as
"generally accepted principles of international law," without
any detailed explanation, and without applying the
definitions and elements of "customary international law"
or "general principles of law recognized by civilized
354
nations." The UDHR is one such set of rules which the
352 G.R. No. 128845, 1 June 2000

353 G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007
35 4 These principles include, among others:
Pacta Sunt Servanda La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Hon. Fernandez, G.R. No.
L-63796-97, 2 May 1984; Sujanani vs. Hon. Ongpin,
G.R. No. L-65659, 21 May 1984; Tanada vs. Angara,
G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997; Secretary of Justice vs.
Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000; Bayan vs.
Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680 &
138698, 10 October 2000; See La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 27 January
2004; Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Atlanta
Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 193796, 2 July 2014
A State may not be sued Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014;
without its consent (State's Baer vs. Tizon, G.R. No. L-24294, 3 May 1974; Sanders
Immunity from Suit) vs. Hon. Verdiano, G.R. No. L-46930, 10 June 1988;
U.S.A. vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 (1990); Shauf vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90314, 27 November 1990;
Wylie vs. Rarang, G.R. No. 74135, 28 May 1992; U.S.A.
vs. Hon. Reyes, G.R. No. 79253, 1 March 1993; Parreno
vs. Mcgranery, G.R. No. L-4263, 12 March 1953 (which
also cited Syquia vs. Lopez, et al., 84 Phil. 312, G.R. No.
L-1648; Marvel Building Corp. vs. Philippine War
Damage Commission, 85 Phil. 27, G.R. No. L-1822;
Marquez Lim vs. Nelson, et al., 87 Phil. 328, G.R. No. L-
2412.); The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949,
1 December 1994; Jusmag Philippines vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 108813, 15 December 1994; The Department of
Health vs. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. G.R. No. 169304, 13
March 2007 (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 90314,
November 27, 1990, 191 SCRA 713 cited in United
States of America v. Reyes, G.R. No. 79253, March 1,
1993, 219 SCRA 192.)
Vienna Convention on Reyes vs. Bagatsing, G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014
Diplomatic Relations
adopted in 1961.
Diplomatic immunity Lasco vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration, G.R. Nos. 109095 - 109107, 23
February 1995; and Sombilon vs. Romulo, G.R. No.
175888, 11 February 2009
~
131
"(A) belligerent occupant Vda. De Villarual vs. Manila Motor Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-
(like the Japanese in 1942- 10394, 13 December 1958
1945) may legitimately
billet or quarter its troops
in privately owned land
and buildings for the
duration of its military
operations, or as military
necessity should demand."
"(A) foreig11 army allowed Tubb vs. Griess, G.R. No. L-1325, 7 April 194 7; and
to march through a Dizon vs. The Commanding General of the Philippine
friendly country or to be Ryukus Command, G.R. No. L-2110, 22 July 1948
stationed in it, by (citing Tubb vs. Griess)
permission of its
government or sovereign,
is exempt from the civil
and criminal jurisdiction of
the place."
"(A") state has the right to Illuh Asaali vs. Commission of Customs, G.R. No. L-
protect itself and its 24170, 28 February 1969
revenues, a right not
limited to its own territory
but extending to the high
seas."
"(J)udicial acts which are I Etorma vs. Ravelo, G.R. No. L-718, 24 March 1947
not of political complexion
of de facto governments
established by the military
occupant in an enemy
territory" (a principle 1 ,.
based on the Regulations

of the Hague Convention),
are valid
"The Hague Convention, I Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, 26 March 1949
the Geneva Convention
and significant precedents I Liban vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, 18 January 2011
of international (Geneva Convention only)
jurisprudence established
by the United Nations" and
the "rules and regulations"
of the Hague and Geneva
conventions
"(S)equestration of cash, I Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. L-554, 9
funds, and realizable April 1948
securities in occupied
territory (as) proscribed by
article 53 of the Hague
Regulations"
United Nations Convention I People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, 21April2014
on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (UN-
CEDAW) "and its allied
issuances" (In 1981, 180
countries, including the
Philippines, ratified this
Convention.)
~
132
Supreme Court has consistently declared, in its entirety, as

containing "generally accepted principles of international
law" without going into detail as to how it has become
"customary international law" or why it is a "general
principle of law recognized by civilized nations." (See
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, Domingo vs. Scheer, and
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs.
Hon. Olalia, Jr.)
174. In the proceeding a quo, Sen. Poe did not argue that
the 1930 Hague Convention, in its entirety, or the Convention on
Statelessness, as a whole, should be considered "generally
accepted principles of international law." Sen. Poe focused on
two specific principles or presuiptions in these two
conventions, to wit:
174. 1. The first sentence of the first paragraph of

Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention which provides
that a child of unknown parents, or a foundling, is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth,"
to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have

the nationality of the country of birth. / If the child's
":
d1f.
,J
parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined,, ,~
by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is "' .

known. ;,
,~~
I '~,.J.
"~\
'i-
,
'f:.
. A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed
to have been born on the territory of the State in which it
was found' 355 -.-
and
The 1968 Vienna I Agustin vs. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112, 2 February 1979 :'if
Convention on Road Signs ~ ~ '1;

and Signals
"The Paris Convention and I Sehwani, Inc. vs. In-N-Out Burger, Inc., G.R. No:
th:e -- WIPO Joint 171053, 15 October 2007
i!'. ~commendation"
-:>'> !)'
~(, There is no "duty on the BPI vs. De Reny Fabric Industries, Inc., G.R. - ' "
part of a bank to verify 24821, 16 October 1970
whether what has been
' . . described in letters of
., ~'f::redit's or drafts or
~:shipping documents
i-f ac~ll.apy tallies with .what
wa; loaded aboard ship"
355 Und~rscoring supplied
1\1;'
;~:t ;fl
133
174.2. Article 2 of the Convention on Statelessness

which states that foundling is presumed born of citizens of
the county in which she is found, thus:
Article 2
A foundliti,g found in the territory of a Contracting State

shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered
to have been born within that territory of parents 12ossessing
the nat~onality of that State. 356
175. Sen. Poe's position in the proceeding a quo was that

these two presumptions are "generally accepted principles of
international law." The COMELEC appears to have missed this
point entirely when it kept on harping on the admitted fact that
the Philippines is "not a signatory" to the 1930 Hague
Convention and the Convention on Statelessness (a stance which
might have assumed some relevance if Sen. Poe had argued that
the two aforementioned presumptions are binding as
international "conventional" or "treaty" law). What the
COMELEC should have focused on is whether the two
presumptions may be considered "generally accepted principles
of international law" under the incorporation clause.
176. As discussed below, had the QOMELEC applied

settled law and jurisprudence on international law, it would have
realized that the two presumptions may be considered either
"customary international law'' under Article 38 (l)(b) of the ICJ
Statute, or "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations" under Article 38 (l)(c) of the ICJ Statute.
i. Customary International law
177. As discussed, a principle may be considered

"customary international law'' if two (2) elements concur: (a)
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and (b) a psychological element known as opinio juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Both elements
concur as regards: (a) the presumption that a foundling is a
citizen of the state in which she is found; and (b) the
presumption that a foundling is born of citizens of that state.
i.1. "Widespread and consistent practice"

134
178. In Razon vs. Tagitis,357 this Honorable Court had to

resolve issues on the use and application of the Rule on the \Vrit
of Amparo in an enfarced disappearance case. Since the concept
of an "enforced disappearance" was neither defined nor
penalized under Philippine law, the High Court sought guidance
from international law. The Court noted that under the
"International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance," there is a "right not to be suqiect to
enforced disappearance." However, the Court also pointed out
that the Philippines had n~ither signed nor ratified said
Convention. Still, this Honorable Court held that the ban on
~ ,
enforcetj. disappearances is binding on the Philippines as a

"generally ac~epted principle of internatio~al law."
179. In Razon, this Honorable Court considered the

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances, as part of the "generally accepted
principles of international law," even if it had been ratified by
only sixteen (16) States (excluding the Philippines), and even if it
had not yet entered into force, because the entry into force was
conditioned on its ratification by at least 20 States. 358
Specifically, the High Court in Razon considered the ban on
enforced disappearances as a "generally accepted principle of
international law'' and, thus, part of the law of the land, based
on the following "material sources of custom:"
.d''
(a) An international treaty (i.e., the 1998 Rome Statute

establishing the International Criminal Court [ICC]);
(b) A regional treaty (i.e., Inter-American Convention on

Enforced Disappearance of Persons);
(c) The practice of international and regional organs (i.e.,

the declarations of the UN and the UN Human Rights
Committee, and the European Court of Human Rights
[in its application of the European Convention on
Human Rights]);
(d) Regional State Practice (i.e., legislation of Colombia,

Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, which
implement the Inter-American Convention on
Enforced Disappearance of Persons); and
357 G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009

358 See footnote No. 106, 606 SCRA 598 at 669
135
(e) State Practice of the U.S.A. (i.e., the Third

Restatement of Laws and a decision of the U.S. Court
of Appeals).
180. Applying the analysis in Razon, the presumption that

a foundling is a citizen of the State in which she is found, and
I c I 5 . ,
the presumption that a foundling is born of citizens of the

country in which she is found, were "generally accepted . '
principles
. of international law" at the time of Sen. Poe's
.
birth in . .
1968, and the refore ,formeq part of the law of the land at that
time. As discussed, this is essentially the position that the
framers of the 1935 Constitution took in their deliberations on
Article IV thereof. 359
181. On the international plane, as of 1966 (or two years

before Sen. Poe's birth), no less than nine (9) international
instruments (which pursuant to Razon, may be considered
"material sources of custom") had already addressed the twin
issues of nationality and statelessness, to wit:
(a) the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions

Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (" 1930
Hague Convention");
(b) the 1930 Hague Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of

,. Statelessness; ,,
%. ~
' ~~ .
,.
(c) the 1930 Hague Special Protocol Concetq#ig

. .. ;__ , ,..J:J ~,
Statelessness; f .
'i~
I y ~
J.,5( '",(
'(d) the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; '"'
~';',,"'
, (e) the 1957 United Nations Convention on the Status~o(

.. .~
:'~
Married Women; , ,
-~
(f) the 1959 United Nations Declaration on the Rights, oC ;,>'$- ~ -~

;,
di!
the Child; " '.;:'
--~ ~
(g) the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction:;/

., , ... .fil
_,;:;
of Statelessness; '
,. 'Ii - >1
., (h) t~e 1966 International Covenant on Civil and \~~~~~~ .
~. :111 Rights and
'
'"' '
.r".. f;
if
,} ~: .
...
:~ I,
., 359 See par.-.- hereof. 1 "

136
--
(i) the 1966 International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 360
181.1. The 1930 Hague Convention is significant,

because it is the result of the first attempt to codify
international law principles on certain subjects, among
them, nationality laws. The 1930 Hague Convention is the
product of the First Conference for the Codification of
International Law, organized under the auspices of the
League of Nations and attended by delegates from farty
seven (4 7) governments (or over half of the existing states
in 1930)361 and by observers appointed by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic. This Conference for the
Codification of International Law, and the 1930 Hague
Convention it produced, is an important development in
international law, as it represented the first concrete action
by the League of Nations to "assist in the fixing and
codifying of international law" on various questions "the
regulation of which, by international agreement, would
seem desirable and realizable."362
181.2. Considering its history, the 1930 Hague

Convention is considered confirmatory of certain general
principles of nationality law. 363 Several of its provisions deal
with the acquisition of nationality of several groups who
traditionally face statelessness as a result of conflict of
laws: married women, children, foundlings, and adopted
persons. In 1968, when Sen. Poe was born, the 1930 Hague
Convention already had thirty-seven (37) State signatories
(or fifty percent [50/o] of existing states in 1930) and fifteen
(15) State parties. The 1930 Hague Convention now has
twenty-one (21) State parties. As discussed, Article 14
thereof states that "(a) ch~ld whose parents are both
unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth."
181.3. In 1947, the UN Human Rights

Commission urged consideration of nationality questions, a
proposal which received concrete expression in Article 15 of
360 This list excludes regional and bilateral agreements.
36! There were only seventy four (74) widely recognized sovereign states, including some
historical states, in 1930. The forty seven (4 7) delegates to the first League of Nations
Conference for the Codification of International Law represented some of the largest and
more established states existing in 1930.
36 2 United Nations Documents concerning the Development and Codification of
International Law, published as supplement to the American Journal of International Law,
Volume 41, No. 4, October, 1947. Available online at
http: //legal.un.org/ilc/ documentation/ english/ASIL 194 7 study.pdf.
363 Kay Hailbronner, NATIONALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW, IN
ACQUISITION AND Loss OF NATIONALITY: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES - POLICIES AND TRENDS JN 15
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, Rainer Baubock, Eva Ersb0ll, Kees Groenendijk, Harald Waldrauch,
eds., Amsterdam University Press (2006)
,.......
137
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights ("UDHR")

(to which the Philippines is a signatory and which the
United Nations General Assembly adopted on 10 December
1948).364 Article 15(1) of the UDHR which the Supreme
Court has specifically declared to be binding on the
Philippines and part of the law of the land, states that all
people have a "right to a nationality", and that no one may
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.
181.4. In 1959, the U.N. General Assembly,

through Resolution No. 1386 (XIV) and by a vote of 70 to O
(with 2 abstentions), proclaimed the "Declaration of the
Rights of the Child" ("UNDRC"). The third "whereas" clause
of the UNDRC states that "the child, by reason of his
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards
and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as
well as after birth."365 In the UNDRC, the U.N. General
Assembly called upon the "national Governmen~s" (among
others) "to recogp.i~e (the rights under the UNDRC) and
strive for their observance by legislative and other
measures progressively taken in accordance with (the
principles set forth therein)." Consistent with UDHR,
Principle 3 of the UNDRC contains a more empathic
provision on the right to nationality as applied to children,
making it an entitlement of a child from birth:
;''
The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a

nationality. 366
181.5. The Convention on Statelessness is the

culmination of more than a decade of international
negotiations, 36 7 and over thirty (30) years of international
364 See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-chu Chen, Nationality and
Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual and External Arenas, 83 Yale L.J. 900, 965
(1974)
365 Underscoring supp lied
367 The Convention on Statelessness is the result of over a decade of international
negotiations on how to avoid the incidence of statelessness. In 1949, the Secretary
General, at the request of the Economic and Social Council, commissioned a study on
statelessness which called for the universal acceptance of the following two principles: (1)
nationality is to be conferred on every child at birth; (2) no person should lose his/her
nationality during his lifetime unless and until he has acquired a new one. In August
1950, the Economic and Social Council urged the International Law Commission ("IL~"),
the UN body tasked with definitively codifying international legal norms, to prepare at the
earliest possible time the necessary draft international convention or conventions for the
minimization of statelessness. The ILC responded by adopting the draft Conventions on the
Elimination and Reduction of Future Statelessness. This provided the impetus for the
convening of an international conference of plenipotentiaries in Geneva in 1959, which
later reconvened in 1961. Significantly, since its inception in 1949, the ILC has included
"nationality, including statelessness" in its list of topics to be considered for codification.
Draft conventions by the ILC are often considered to be good evidence of the existence of
customary international law on certain subjects.
138
-
covenants on the right to a nationality and the avoidance of
statelessness. The Convention on Statelessness provides
for rules on the acquisition of nationality by stateless
individuals. Under the Convention on Statelessness, States
must ensure access to nationality for a person who would
otherwise be stateless if the person is born in the State's
territory or born abroad to a national of the State. It also
protects individuals against the loss or deprivation of
nationality if he or she will become stateless as a result. By
setting out rules to limit the occurrence of statelessnessJ.
the Convention gives effect to Article 15 of the UDHR. It is
a matter of record that the UDHR (mentioned in the
aforequoted note of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees) was unanimously adopted by the members of the
U.N. General Assembly in 1948, including the Philippines.
To stress, the High Court has also repeatedly declared that
the UDHR embodies "generally accepted principles of
international law." Thus, even if the Philippines has not
yet signed or ratified the Convention on Statelessness, it is
still binding, being merely an implementation of the UDHR
signed by the Philippines in 1948. Hence, it cannot 1 e
seriously disputed that the presumptions provided by the
Convention constitute generally accepted principles of
international law.
181.6. At the time of Sen. Poe's.1birth in 1968, the

United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Israel an:a. t1J..e ..-
, .'rl
\if.,;,
Dominican Republic had already signed the Conventicfrtt1qn .
Statelessness. There are Sixty-Four (64) State parties:it'~ i,
!~
the Convention on Statelessness. 368 Unlike the internation8.1
.., \ ,..ii
donvention which this Honorable Court applied in Ra~on
(which had not entered into force, as it had only 16 state.
parties), the Convention on Statelessness entered into .forte
~
in 1975. Although the Philippines remains neither:. -~ :iii:
Signatory, nor a party to the Convention on Statelessnessr it
is reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for '
Refugees to have already "initiated the process for ,.,
accession" to the Convention on Statelessness. 36 9 As .
discussed, on the nationality of foundlings, Article 2 ther~pf
.If states that "(a) foundling found in the territory cff''~"ii
368 Data provided by the United Nations, availabl~:

, ';(
"https: Ntreaties.un.org/doc/Treaties{2007/11 L29 /V-4.en.pdf ,,
369 See "Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for t
, o;t the Bigh Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report;" "Universe,~ re~i
;~:t~lJ&view: The Philippines" available .at http://www.refworld.o~g/pdfid/~~e0_7aa22:'p~
; ~: ~f~~~lso t~e 21 J~ne 2015 ".With Due .Respect". column m the Ph~hppme J?aily ln.1
of former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban which reported the mformat10n from ,
B~rnard Kerblat, country representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for
~efugees that at a ministerial meeting on 7 December 2011, the Philippine panel pledged
"tQ.initiate accession to the Convention on Statelessness. ,;,
'
~;.::,'
139
Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to tl-:e

contrary, be considered to have been born wi~hin tJ::iat
territory of parents possessing the nationality of that
State." 37 0 Article 2 of the Convention on Statelessness
provides for a rebuttable presumption of descent from a
citizen (praesumption iuris sanguinis) in favor of a
foundling. This is consistent with the doctrine of jus
sanguinis under paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 1, Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution.
181. 7. According to this Honorable Court 1n

Razon, the "material sources of custom" include "recitals in
treaties and other international instruments" and
"resolutions relating to legal questions in the U.N. General
Assembly." The "Introductory Note" to the Convention on
Statelessness written by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner on Refugees establishes beyond doubt
the status of "generally accepted principles of international
law" accorded to the Convention. The U.N. Commission for
Refugees stated thus:
x x x . Together, these two treaties 371 form the foundation

of the international legal framework to address
statelessness, a phenomenon which continues to adversely
affect the lives of millions of people around the world. The
1961 Convention is the leading intemationw instrument that
sets rules for the conferral and non-withdrawal of
citizenship to prevent cases of statelessness from arising.
By setting out rules to limit the occurrence of statelessness,
the Convention gives effect to article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which recognizes that
"everyone has the right to a nationality."372
181.8. Following the spirit of the UDHR and the

Convention on Statelessness, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") (which has one hundred
sixty-eight [ 168] State parties and to which the Philippines
is a signatory3 73) and the 1966 International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
contain provisions recognizing the fundamental right to a
nationality of defined minority groups. The ICCPR applies
the right specifically to children, thereby stressing that
protection against statelessness should start from birth.

371 The other one being the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
37 3 As of 1966.
140
Article 24 of the ICCPR states that "(e)very child has the

right to acquire a nationality. "374
' '
182. Similar to the adoption of international instruments

and conventions, State practice in the domestic sphere in foreign
jurisdictions is also widespread and consistent, insofar as Stat~~
I
presume that foundlings are citizens of the State in which they

are found or presume that they are born of citizens of that State.
182. 1. In the proceedings a quo, Petitioner was

able to show evidence375 that at least sixty (60) countries,
spread throughout Asia, North and South America, and
Europe, have enacted statutes which prescribe that a
person found within
. ; .
its
'
territory of unknown parentage
; . .
would be considered its citizen. At least forty two (42) of

these countries, or more' than two-thirds (2/3) are }us
sanguinis countries which grant citizenship on the basis of
descent (either through paternal or maternal lines). These
countries include, per region:
a) Europe: Forty one (41) countries376, with at least

thirty four (34) countries which apply jus sanguinis
principle (Albania, Austria, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, enmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, K0sovo, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Serbia,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine);
b) North and South America: At least thirteen (13)

countries, with at least three (3) countries which
apply )us sanguinis (Belize, Costa Rica, Suriname);
c) East and Southeast Asia: At least six (6) countries,

five (5) of which apply )us sanguinis (Japan, China,
South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam).
182.2. Notably, all sixty (60) countries recognize

the presumption that a foundling is a citizen of the country
where he or she was found, despite only thirty three (33) of
them being parties to the Convention on Statelessness.
Twenty six (26) of these countries are non-signatories to the
Convention on Statelessness, while one country (France) is
375 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibits "38" and "39-series"
376 Russia was counted as part of the European region and not Asia.
141
a signatory but has not yet ratified said treaty. This

strongly suggests that states, irrespective of being a party
to the Convention on Statelessness, recognize as obligatory
the principle that a foundling is presumed to be a citizen of
the country where he or she was found.
183. On the regional level, there are several regional

conventions on human rights which uniformly affirm the right of
persons, particularly children, to a nationality, and the right of
every person not to be arbitrarily deprived of such nationality,
viz:
(a) The European Convention on Nationality,377 signed

and/ or ratified by twenty nine (29)378 out of forty
seven (47) members states of the Council of Europe;
(b) The Arab Charter on Human Rights,379 signed and/ or
ratified by seventeen (17)380 out of twenty two (22)
members of the League of Arab States;
(c) ASEAN Human Rights Declaration,381 adopted
unanimously by the ten (10) member states of the
ASEAN, including the Philippines;
(d) American Convention on Human Rights,382 ratified by
twenty five (25)383 out of thirty five (35) member states
of the Organization of American States ("OAS"); and
3.~1 Article 4 - Principles ,.. .

The rules on nationality of each State Party shall be based on the following"
principles:
,,
,~,:
l. everyone has the right to a nationality;

v 4. statelessness shall be avoided;
If)$ ' no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality;
.' /4~ . ,?either marri.age nor the dissolution of a.mar~iage between a national of a St:=i-t~
Party and an ahen, nor the change of nat10nahty by one of the spouses dunqg .
marriage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the other spouse. .
378 Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmar~',
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, No~ay, ,. ''
~Pertugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Macedonia, Ukraine have ratified the Convention. ; "~i.
The COlJ.:ptries which signed the Convention, but have not yet ratified, are: Croatia, Fran; i.<
Greece,'Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Russia, '
379 Article 29 "' t
1. Everyone has the right to nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily or unlawfully
deprived of his nationality.
2. States parties shall take such measures as they deem appropriate, in accordance "
'with their domestic laws on nationality, to allow a child to acquire the mother~~~ ~'
I m1.ticmality, having due regard, in all cases, to the best interests of the child. , ,;: r~;. J';
,:;, , 3. Non one shall be. denied the right ~o a?quire another nationality, hayin~ 'fl~:lff~:.;i
F regard for the domestic legal procedures m his country. .~, "'' . f'L"
3so Algeria (2006), Bahrain (2006), Egypt (signed 2004, not yet ratified), Iraq (2012),,',~lj
. , (2004), Kuwait (2006), Lebanon (2011), Libya (2006), Morocco (signed 200.f;'~tj/?.
ra'tifiep), Palestine (2007), Qatar (2009), Saudi Arabia (2009), Sudan (signed 200'~0~
... ,J ~tified), Syria (2007), Tunisia (signed 2004, not yet ratified), the United Ara~ ~~
,,,~:t,b.'f2008), and Yemen (2008). lftr;~:>~

ii'< , :' ,381 Article 18. Every person has the right to a nationality as prescribed by law., No.
1 , "sJ;ia11 be arbitrarily deprived of such nationality nor denied the right to cli.ange ,.
,,.; nationality.
:~q~ Article 20. Right to Nationality
:; 1. ~very person has the right to a nationality.
'
""
~
142
(e) 1995 Commonwealth of Independent States

Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 3s4
183.1. The European Convention on Nationality, in

particular guarantees the right of a foundling to acquire a
nationality ex lege when he would otherwise be stateless.
Although only twenty seven (27) countries are signatories,
forty-one (41) member states385 of the Council of Europe,
with thirty four (34) of them following the jus sanguinis
doctrine, already provide for automatic acquisition of
citizenship by.~
foundlings
. found within their respective.
territories. The wording of the European Convention on
Nationality is in turn drawn from the Convention on
Statelessness.
184. Clearly, there is a uniform practice of recognizing the

right to nationality of foundlings, spread over different
geographic areas, and observed even among jus sanguinis
countries, supporting a finding that it is a "generally accepted
principle of international law'' that foundlings are presumed
born of parent~ who are citizens of the country in which they are
found.
i.2. Opinio Juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or

necessity).
185. Implicit in this element is a belief that the practice in

question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it." As discussed, the State practice alluded to in the
case of the presumption that foundlings are citizens of the State
in which they are found and the presumption that foundlings
are born of citizens of that State, refers to legislation. This
indicates that the adoption and application of these
2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he
was born if he does not have the right to any other nationality.
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it.
38 3 Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. However, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela denounced the convention on 26
May 1998 and 10 September 2012 respectively.
384 Article 24
1. Everyone shall have the right to citizenship.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his citizenship or of the right to change it.
385 These countries are: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,
Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom.
143
presumptions arises from a belief on the part of the States

involved that they are under a legal obligation to follow these
' ' '
presumptions. Moreover, the legislation is also related to, and in

line with, a State's ratification of the pertinent International
Convention involved.
186. Opinio Juris being a subjective element, it is

important to take into consideration the particular state's
interpretation of whether a practice alleged as international
custom is considered by it to be obligatory. In
Nicaragua vs. United States of America,387 which was cited in
Mijares vs. Ranada, the International Court of Justice placed
particular emphasis on the practice of the U.S.A. (a party to the
case) in determining the existence of the element of opinio Juris.
This is significant because the Philippines itself, even in the
absence of domestic legislation, has performed acts which
indicate that it acknowledges the binding effect of the
presumption that a foundling is a citizen of the ' country in which
she is found, or is born of citizens of that country.
186.1. As discussed, based on the deliberations of

the 1934 Constitutional Convention, foundlings were
always meant to be included in the concept of Philippine
citizens, even though they were not specifically mentioned
in Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. The basis
for that intent is precisely the presumption under
international law that a foundling is a citizen of the country
in which she is found. Again, this principle was already
concretely expressed in the 1930 Hague Convention (which
codified existing principles of nationality law), and the
members of the Constitutional Convention, who are
predominantly lawyers, are presumed knowledgeable of
this existing principle.
186.2. Another concrete manifestation that the

Philippines has long recognized the generally accepted
principle of international law that foundlings are citizens of
the country in which they are found is DOJ Opinion No.
189, series of 1951. In this opinion, the Secretary of Justice
recognized that foundlings are citizens of the country in
which they are found in the context of an application for a
passport for that foundling.
186.3. Another instance showing the recognition of

the said generally accepted principle of international law is
the fact that the DFA specifically allows passports to be
387 Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 186.

144
issued to foundlings. This means that the DFA recognizes

foundlings as Philippine citizens, as passports can be
issued only to citizens of this country. If the State, acting
through the DFA, did not find that according foundlings
citizenship is a "conduct of a civilized nation" (as discussed
below), then the Philippines would not be issuing passports
to them.
ii. "General Principles of Law Recognized by

Civilized Nations"
187. Even if the presumptions favoring a foundling's

citizenship cannot be deemed "customary international law,"
they could still be considered "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." Indeed, as earlier stated, the
term "generally accepted principles of international law" has
been associated with "the generally accepted principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." It is not required that they are
accepted by all nations or by the majority of nations. It is
enough that they are accepted by "civilized nations."
'
188. In fact, in several cases interpreting or applying the

incorporation clause, the court's focus of inquiry is not the
number of states who accept the legal principle, but whether
such a principle can be "established by a process of reasonin~,
based on the common identity of all legal isystems".388 For'
' '"'
~&-example, the principle against non-discrimination is a geneyally Ii''
,accepted principle of international law because it earl: be

r:"cl~duced by the test of reasonableness from basic principles :of ~c-\-.
'\~guity, fairness and justice, which are valid throughout all kin8,s1'\
.,./of human societies. In International School Alliance of Educa.tor;,
vs. Quisumbing389 the Supreme Court held:
<,.\,' ;)
.j;l
11
International law, which springs from general principles of'"
faw, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law'. .,.
include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness: ~\I'
and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on ...,,. ,
'\.:...._ -~---Ecenomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International.

l Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
:~ "
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in~.
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discriminatio; '"
.:r
~;-,
in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody t
, general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis
,, .t ,. ;~,~~~.i
;~~/;t6harmaceutical and Health Care Association vs. Dugue III, G.R. No. 173034, .9 .~~to~r
~
7 ~"
.: ~~9 G.R. No. 128845, 1 June 2000

l :~ ....
(4'
'' .. "'l'' ;j,

;;~ ~
~ '
'~~-
,,.
145
fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has

incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. 390
Hence, any discriminatory act sanctioned by the state against a

foundling would violate a generally accepted principle of
international law. Denying to foundlings the rules on burden of
proof, and presumptions of innocence and regularity which are
ordinarily accorded to all persons, including even persons
accused of crimes or charged with civil claims, would be
discriminatory against foundlings, and would violate their rights
under both municipal and international law.
188.1. Similarly, in Pharmaceutical and Health

Care Association of the Phil. vs. Duque III, 391 this Honorable
Court held:
The concept of g~nerally accepted principles of law

has also been depicted in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain
general principles of law as a primary source of
international law because they have the character of
jus rationale and are valid through all kinds of
human societies. (Judge Tanaka in his dissenting
opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966
I.CJ. 296). O'Connell holds that certain principles are
part of international law because theyrare basic to
legal systems generally and hence part of
the jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are
established by a process of reasoning based on the
common identity of all legal systems. If there should
be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state
practice and determine whether the municipal law
principle provides a just and acceptable
solution.x x x392
189. The principle that a foundling should be deemed, at

least presumptively, a citizen of the State in which she is found
or born of citizens of that State, is founded on equity, fairness
and justice. As discussed, it would be the height of injustice to
penalize a foundling with statelessness (and all the limitations
that being stateless entails) for a status and condition that is not
of her own doing. It is not her fault that she was abandoned at
birth. Worse, she can do little or nothing to change her status as
a foundling. Therefore, it is but fair and just that a State initially
embrace a foundling as its own citizen, pending proof that she

391 G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007
392 Emphasis in the original
146
would otherwise not qualify for citizenship. Leaving a foundling

out in the cold, so to speak, and depriving him or her of parens
patriae, is anything but civilized.
190. Given the widespread and uniform enactment and

application of the presumption of citizenship of foundlings in
various "civilized nations" across continents,393 it is reasonable
to conclude that these rules have become "basic to legal
systems" and "valid through all kinds of human societies."
191. In sum, the presumption that a foundling is a citizen

of the country in which she is found and the presumption that a
foundling is born of citizens of that country may also be
considered "general principles of l,aw recognized by civilized
nations" as defined in Article 38.1 (c) of the !CJ Statute and,
therefore, "generally accept~d principles of international law"
which form part of the law of the land under the incorporation
clause.
192. The assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC did not

adopt an analysis as extensive as the one detailed above because
the COMELEC appeared to have inexplicably forgotten that
international law may form part of the law of land through
"incorporation," and not simply through "transformation." Such
basic ignorance of the Constitution and applicable settled
jurisprudence constitutes grave abuse of discr.etion.
B.6. The COMELEC gravely abused

its discretion when it chose to
interpret the provisions on
citizenship in a manner that
runs contrary to the
fundamental principles
animating the 1987
Constitution.
---------------------------------------------
193. All told, the COMELEC's wholesale rejection of the
numerous legal bases supporting the proposition that a
foundling found in the Philippines is presumed born of Filipino
citizens, and, since he or she did not have to perform an act to
acquire or perfect such citizenship, is deemed a natural-born
Filipino, if upheld by this Honorable Court, is tantamount to the
disenfranchisement and statelessness by judicial fiat (by the
COMELEC, which is not even a judicial body) of thousands of
393 See Exhibit "39-series"

147
foundlings who have heretofore enjoyed the benefits of

citizenship, and were actually recognized by the State as Filipino
citizens. This is a matter of transcendental importance that goes
beyond herein Petitioner's candidacy, or indeed, the political
aspirations of any person.
194. To uphold the COMELEC's inexplicable disregard of

elementary principles pertaining to presumptions of law, burden
of proof, the applicability of treaties and generally accepted
principles of international law, and blind adherence to a
supposed "requirement" of Filipino parentage proven as a fact
under the Constitution, is to negate the very citizenship-the
right to enjoy rights-being enjoyed by thousands of foundlings
heretofore considered by the state as Filipino citizens. This is not
only in blatant disregard of the Philippines' obligations under the
UDHR, the UNCRC, and the ICCPR, among others, but it is also
an interpretation that runs counter to the very spirit animating
our Constitution.
194.1. The foremost principle animating the

Constitution is the sovereign people's desire to build a "just
and humane society". 39 4 While "independence",
"democracy", and "rule of law" are treasured ideals of the
sovereign, it is trumped by the primordial principle of
justice and primacy of human rights. Indeed, full respect
,,'.:-
for human rights is guaranteed in Section 11, Article II of
~r,
the 1987 Constitution. The fact that it is exp.r~ssly,
mentioned in the declaration of state principles anc:Fi.state
,;.-
,!,
policies, before the article on citizenship, underscores ;jt~
importance in construing other provisions oC t:i~
. Constitution, to the end that the entire document may ,b~.
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the stated_:~
, objectives of the sovereign. , , 1
~ } ~"!:~--,;-,,'
~;
,If.
B. 7. The COMELEC ignored the
Constitutional and settled
jurisprudential definition of a
"natural born Philippine
-~
-
'
*''~
. ,.
'jj. ,
-~ '_.
~-
citizen" when it ruled that: (a)
although every child has a
:_,,- right to acquire a nationality,
Sen. Poe cannot be considered
*' .
a "natural-born" Filipino; and ..
(b) a foundling cannot be
i
r
',;~(
1
~:1 4 Preamble, 1987 Constitution ,,
,
.
.'
'
" ~~
'';'-
-
148
considered a "natural-born"
Filipino under international
law because applicable
international conventions and
instruments do not use the
phrase "natural-born" in
referring to citizenship or
nationality.

Second Division conceded that under the UN CRC and the
ICCPR, a "child has a right to acquire a nationality." As
discussed, the right "to acquire a nationality" under these
treaties must be construed with the UDHR which recognizes in
favor of everyone a "right tq ~ nationality". Such nationality,
which starts "from birth" (under the UNCRC and UNDRC), could
only be the nationality of a Filipino for the Philippines would not
have the power to recognize Sen. Poe, or any other person for
that matter, as a citizen of any other country. However, the
COMELEC insisted that a foundling is not natural-born.
196. The COMELEC acted illogically, incongruously, and

therefore with grave abuse of discretion, when it effectively
conceded that Sen. Poe is Filipino under the UNCRC, ICCPR and
UDHR, but at the same time denied that she isnatural born.
197. It is well-settled, not only in the Constitution, but in

applicable jurisprudence, that there are two approaches to
determining whether a person who is admittedly a Filipino, is
also "natural-born."
197. 1. The first approach is by applying the

definition in Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
which states that natural-born citizens of the Philippines
are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."
197.2. The second approach is by showing that the

foundling is not a naturalized Filipino because, if she is not
naturalized, she is perforce, natural-born,3 9 5 pursuant to
Bengson III vs. HRET, 396 thus:
39 5 JOSE M. ARUEGO, THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED 68 (1975).

396 G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001
149
The present Constitution, however, now considers

those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article
IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natura.1-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and
(2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
cit~zen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. 397
197 .3. It is of no moment, as the COMELEC

repeatedly pointed out in its assailed Resolutions, that the
applicable international law principles, laws and
conventions (i.e., the pertinent provisions in the 1930
Hague Convention, the Convention on Statelessness, the
UNCRC, the ICCP and the UDHR) do not expressly state
that a foundling is a "natural-born" citizen. In the first
place, citizens under paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 1,
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution are ~lso not "expressly"
referred to therein as "natural-born" citizens. Yet, they are
considered as such because they satisfy the definition of
natural-born citizens of the Philippines in the Constitution.
197 .4. What matters is that a foundling's

citizenship falls under any of the two ways of defining a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. As explained
below, a foundling is a natural-born Filipino under both
definitions.
198. Under treaty and conventional international law

(which the COMELEC accepted as binding on the Philippines)
and "generally accepted principles of international law," a
foundling is a Filipino from birth. In fact, the U.N. Declaration
on the Rights of the Child (adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly in 1959) and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child (ratified by the Philippines in 1990) both expressly state
that a child's right to a nationality must be recognized "from
birth." There is also nothing under international law which
requir~s a foundling to "perform an act to acquire or perfect" her

150
citizenship. Having satisfied the two (2) elements of the

Constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino under Section
2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC ought to
have concluded that Sen. Poe is natural-born.
198.1. The second sentence of Section 2, Article IV

(in relation to Section 1 [3], Article IV) of the 1987
Constitution also considers as "natural-born" Filipinos,
those "born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who "elect Philippine citizenship."
198.2. Assuming for the sake of argument that

Sen. Poe should be considered born of a Filipino mother
only (and nQ! of a Filipino father), Sen. Poe was deemed to
have "elected" Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the age
of majority" (under par. (4), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
Constitution) when she decided to live a Filipino life and,
thereafter, secured: (a) her Voter's Identification Card398 in
1986 (which is the year she turned 18); (b) her first
Philippine Passport two years later, or in 1988;399 and (c)
her second Philippine Passport, five years later, or in
1993. 40 0
198.3. In Co vs. HRET,401 this Honorable Court

reiterated that the "election" of citizenship may be "both a
-, t formal and an informal process." The High Court cited In
Re: Florencio Mallare, 402 which held that "the exercis.e-.of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election ej{rcises
~ c?i:istitut~ a po~i~ive act of elec~ion of Phifipfi.'Pe
citizenship." According to Co, Mallare applies to those "-~o
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship." Indeed,
Sen. Poe could not have been expected to formally' "ele~f'
Philippine citizenship because, when she reached the age. of
majority in 1986, she did not know the identity . of her
biological father. (Today, she still does not know who heis).
Thus, she had !ill way of finding out whether her biplpgical
father was, indeed, a foreigner and that, therefore, she had
to formally elect Philippine citizenship by the time she .;~as
18. Informal "election" of Philippine citizenship.}'Tq\ild,
--
l' therefore, apply to her (as~uming arg_uendo that s~~f:laj,ls
only under par. (4), Section 1, Article IV of th,,~. !~5
Constitution, in relation to Section 1 (3) and ~~!i~t'~f'
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution). j~l""" - '!~-
39& See Exhibit "3"

it '
1 399 See Annexes "H" and "I-series"; Exhibit "4"
,
'tt 1
400 See Annexes "H" and "I-series" Exhibit "4-A"
,
j~';'
401 G.R. Nos. 92191-92 & 92202-03, 30 July 1991

402 p9 SCRA 45 (1974])
';:.
,. ~~
t-
. ~ii,
151
199. Sen. Poe is also a natural-born Filipino, because she

cannot be considered a F~lipino "naturalized in accordance with
law," under paragraph (5), Section 1, Article IV of the 1 935
Constitution. 4 03 Notably, the COMELEC did not rule that a
foundling is a naturalized Filipino. On the basis of the
COMELEC 's ruling, it would follow that Sen. Poe must be
considered a natural-born Filipino. That said, there is no legal
basis to consider a "foundling" as a "naturalized" Filipino.
199.1. The phrase "in accordance with law" in par.

5, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution must be
construed in relation to the verb "naturalized" which has a
well-settled meaning in Philippine law.
(a) In Republic vs. Karbasi, 4 0 4 Go vs. Republic, 4 0s and So

vs. Republic, 4 06 the Supreme Court defined
"naturalization" as the legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the privilege of a native-born
citizen. Under the present laws, the process of
naturalization can be judicial or administrative.
(b) In Republic vs. Batugas, 4 0 7 the Supreme Court held

that "(u)nder existing laws, an alien may acquire
Philippine citizenship ... "
,,.
(c) In Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. the Commissioner of
Immigration, 408 the Supreme Court adopted the
following discussion by counsel on paragraph (5),
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution: "Citizens
by naturalization, under this provision, include not
only those who are naturalized in accordance with
legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but
also those who acquire citizenship by 'derivative
naturalization' or by operation of law, as for example,
the 'naturalization' of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an
alien woman to a citizen."
.. -~ .......
(d) Mr. Aruego defined a "naturalized" citizen as one
"who, at the moment of birth, is an alien but who, by
an intervening act, is made a citizen."409
403 Id., at pp. 98 to 104 (Underscoring supplied)
404 G.R. No. 210412, 29 July 2015
40s G.R. No. 202809, 2 July 2013
406 G.R. No. 170603, 29 January 2007
407 G.R. No. 183110, 7 October 2013
408 G.R. No. L-21289, 4 October 1971
409JOSE M. ARUEGO, THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED 67 (1975).
152
199.2. In sum, the subject of "naturalization" is

always an alien who becomes, through an intervening act,
a Filipino citizen.
199.3. The "intervening act/ s" vary depending on

the law governing his naturalization and this is how the
phrase "in accordance with law" should be construed.
(a) Under R.A. No. 9139, otherwise known as the

"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000," and
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
"Revised Naturalization Law," the alien (who must not
be less than 18 years old) must file a
petition/application with the Special Committee on
Naturalization (under R.A. No. 9139) or with the court
(under C.A. No. 473). If the petition is granted, a
"decree" or "certificate" of naturalization" is issued
and the alien must take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Under Section 15 of C.A.
no. 473, an alien woman married to a Filipino, who
might herself be naturalized, will be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines.
(c) Aside from the usual process that the passing of a law
entails and the lobbying that precedes such
enactment, naturalization of an alien by direct act of
Congress usually requires the taking of an oath of
allegiance and its registration with the Bureau of
Immigration. 4lo
199.4. It is noteworthy that when the 1935

Constitution was adopted, the only law in force which
granted "naturalization," was Act No. 2927 or the
"Naturalization Law." Like the naturalization statutes
which succeeded it, this law also applied only to
foreigners41 1 and provided for the filing of the necessary
petition with the Court of First Instance. Based on
available resources, in 1935, there had been no grant of
citizenship by direct act of Congress to specific individuals.
It follows that when the members of the 1934
Constitutional Convention used the phrase "naturalized in
accordance with law," they specifically had the
See Footnote 321 of Sen. Poe's Memorandum on SPA 15-002 (DC)
4 10
411SEC. 1. Who mau become Philippine citizens. - Philippine citizenship may be acquired
by: (a) Nfi.tives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b)
natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said
country if residing therein.
~
153
"Naturalization Law" in mind and not any municipal law or

act of Congress, much less internati~nal law.
199.5. On the other hand, when the members of

the 1934 Constitutional Convention discussed the
citizenship of foundlings, they did not say (or otherwise
express their intention) that a foundling could be
considered as a Filipino "naturalized in accordance with
law." The sub-paragraph on Filipinos "naturalized in
accordance with law" was passed without even mentioning
"foundlings." 41 2 On the contrary, as discussed, when the
framers declared that "by international law," a foundling is
a "citizen of this nation," they had a jus sanguinis
Philippine citizen in mind. A foundling would fall under
either paragraph (3) or (4), Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, but certainly not paragraph (5) thereof.
200. In sum, the person subject of "naturalization" is, .Qy

definition, an alien who, through the performance of an act (i.e.,
the filing of the appropriate petition/ application/ request, by
marriage, and/ or the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines), becomes a Filipino. Sen. Poe was
definitely not an alien at birth, and never had to undergo any
naturalization process.
201. "Naturalization" is clearly not whatttakes place when a

foundling is recognized as a Filipino from birth under applicable
international law. As explained, a foundling is a Filipino ~(!!ot an
. ;fl.lien) from birth who does not have to do anything to perfec;;~w}:ier
! Filipino citizenship. A foundling, therefore, falls squarely,wrnh\n
/.
1
the definition of a natural-born Filipino, and totally outside t'J;t~
definition of a "naturalized" Filipino. ' f T_
'); :. : :, ;~ :~
~ ,~
202. Since Sen. Poe is not a Filipino "natura1ized ln
accordance with law," she must perforce be considered "natural-
born." I
203. In issuing its assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC;.did

tJ~dno 1 twnti<in aa7M.t9c asettled definitions of a "-nfltiiral . f
't;,t'l. born" Filipino. Had the COMELEC bothered to applY::; ~b:,~ . . e
/, definitions, it would have found that Sen. Poe is, irl;qped)iidf
.natural-born Philippine citizen. Therefore, it was not :fl
Sen. Poe to state in her COC for President that
~
'"t~
;;
412 See Exhibit "37", p. 203
~
154
B.8. The COMELEC acted with

grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that the recognition of
foundlings as natural-born
Filipinos would contravene the
1935 Constitution and the
principle of jus sanguinis.
204. In its assailed Resolutions, the COMELEC repeatedly

held that international law could not be the basis for natural-
born citizenship, because international law cannot "override" or
"prevail" over the principle of }us sanguinis under the
Constitution. This ruling is premised on the COMELEC's
assumption that there is a conflict between the principle of }us
sanguinis on the one hand, and the recognition or presumption
of a foundling's natural-born citizenship under international law,
on the other. As discussed below, the supposed conflict alluded
to by the COMELEC is more imagined than real.
204.1. First, as discussed, even under the 1935

Constitution, international law which is either
"transformed" (under the treaty clause) or "incorporated"
(under the incorporation clause) forms part of the law of
the land.
/.
204.2. Second, Article IV on Citizenship in the

1935 Constitution was based significantly on international
law principles. In fact, the presumption of the citizenship
of a foundling under international law is the basis for the
intent of the framers to include foundlings in the concept of
jus sanguinis Philippine citizens. To repeat, they were
deliberating what eventually became paragraphs (3) and (4)
of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution (children of
Filipino fathers and mothers) when they discussed the
citizenship of foundlings.
204.3. Third, under international law (specifically,

the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and
applicable State legislation), a foundling is presumed born
of citizens of the Philippines. This is consistent with the
principle of }us sanguinis, as enshrined in paragraphs (3)
and (4) of Section l, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution
which considers as Filipinos those whose fathers or
mothers are "citizens of the Philippines." The situation
would, of course, be different if the presumption of natural-
born citizenship were applied despite. an admitted
. or proven
fact that the foundling was born to foreigners. Such
.....
155
application of international law would, indeed, contravene

the Constitution. But that is not the case here, because it
was neither alleged nor proved that Sen. Poe's biological
parents are aliens.
204.4. Fourth, presumptions are generally founded

upon basic principles of justice, laws of nature, the
experienced course of human conduct and affairs or the
connection usually found to exist between specific
agencies. 41 3 Presumptions arise from motives of public
policy and for the sake of greater certainty. They owe their
existence to necessity and are based on general experience.
The necessity which brings them into existence is the fact
that in their absence many meritorious causes would fail
through inability to produce affirmative evidence of
essential facts, concerning the existence of which the
general experience of men leaves but slight doubt. 4 14
Since presumptions take the place of facts in the absence
of evidence, 41 5 there is no valid basis to distinguish between
persons who can establish their bloodline by proof and
those who can do so by presumption.
204.5. Fifth, the natural-born citizenship of a

person may be established using presumptions. This is
precisely what the Supreme Court did in Tecson vs.
COMELEC. 41 6 In Tecson, the Court found that Sen. Poe's
father, the late Fernando Poe, Jr., is a natural-born
Filipino, based ultimately on a presumption that his
grandfather had resided in the Philippines in 1899, and
therefore benefitted from the mass Filipinization that took
place in 1902, thus:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether

grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether
or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in
turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino , citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
413 Padill~, Evidence, Vol. 2, 1994 ed. P.62, citing 20 Am. Jur Sec. 158, p.162
414 Id., citing 31 CJS, Sec.114, pp. 723-724
415 See Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
416 G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004
156
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under

>: ' ; '
Spanish rul~, and ~hat San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of

residence upon his death in 1954, ip. the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his pl.ace of residence
before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
11 . .
i eg1tlmate.
417
204.6. Sixth, Sen. Poe is more likely to have been

born to Filipir~o parents, than aliens. The possibility that
she was actually born to foreigners is very slim. Therefore,
there is essentially no risk that a foundling (who is, in
reality, a foreigner) would enjoy presumptive natural-born
Filipino status.
204.7. Seventh, a ruling on citizenship is never

final. If someone is later able to specify two foreigners and
is able to conclusively show them to be Sen. Poe's parents,
then that would be sufficient to overcome the presumption
of her natural-born citizenship. ,,
-f
~;,.
204.8. Eighth, under the 1935 Corl;gtutio:r,

,!
natural-born Filipino citizenship is not always p~s~cl on
" blood relationship. Thus, according to Aruego, a !!lenl~r
of the 1934 Constitutional Convention and noted a~,itholjfy
on the 1935 Constitution, the "understanding by t}jj
National Assembly under the original 1935 Philipahle
Constitution that for the purpose of election .Jd' lh~
bicameral Congress which was instituted with the 1':::139-
1940 amendments requiring the fact of being natural-born
for election thereto, the term natural-born citizen meant
anybody who was not so by naturalization." 418 In. o~her
words, even some of those who were not Philippine cit~ens
} by blood, i.e., those citizens "at the time of the ado : "'dx,1i~. 76f
the 1935 Constitution" or those "born in the PhJlip ~ ~
~-
$, :-
Islands of foreign parents who, before adopt~?P,;:9!~~

Constitution, had been elected to public off1c
Philippine Islands," were still considered "natural-59.trii
ff> . ('
,'~

418J,OSE M. ARUEGO, THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED 68 (1975). ~
~
....
157
204.9. Finally, by defining natural-born citizens as

those who are citizens "from birth," as opposed to "Qy:
birth," the intent of the Constitution was -not to - limit
.-
natural-born citizens to those who are related, by blood, to
Filipino parents. Moreover, there is nothing in the
Constitutional definition of natural-born Filipino
citizenship419 which confines such status "solely and
exclusively" to actual proof of blood relationship to a
Filipino father or mother.420 The definition of natural-born
citizenship does not say "those born of a Filipino father or
mother proven as a fact", or even "those born of a Filipino
father or mother", but rather, "those who do not have to
perform any act to acguire or perfect their Filipino
citizenship."421 Clearly, the definition of natural-b,rn
citizenship is broad enough to contemplate citizenship ex
lege or by operation of law, apart from naturalization,
which always involves a positive act on the part of an alien
who wishes to acguire Philippine citizenship.
205. Based on the foregoing, there is nothing

unconstitutional about presuming that Sen. Poe was born of
Filipinos or that she is a natural-born Filipino, even though she
;
cannot, as yet, prove that she is related by blood to citizens of

the Philippines. The following pronouncement in Co vs. HRET is
highly instructive on the issue of Sen. Poe's citizenship:
,...
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest
wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever
cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of

citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation,
have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its
richness. 4 22
206. Finally, as a natural-born Filipino, Sen. Poe

reacquired that status when she was repatriated under R.A. No.
9225. She was, therefore, telling the truth when she stated in
419 Sec. 2, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution.

420 Indeed, considering that the filiation of children is sometimes also a presumption
created by law (e.g., children conceived or born during the marriage of their parents are
presumed to be the child of the husband, and their legitimate filiation cannot be impugned
but by the husband himself or his heirs and only on limited grounds during a limited
period), the Constitution cannot provide for such definition. In other words, tying natural-
born Filipino status to actual proof of the existence of a blood tie between a child and a
Filipino parent would be tantamount to requiring each Filipino citizen to prove, through
scientific evidence such as DNA, that they are beyond the shadow of doubt the biological
child of a parent who is Filipino.
158
her COC for President that she is a "NATURAL BORN FILIPINO

CITIZEN."
B.9. The DOJ, and not the

COMELEC, has the primary
jurisdiction to revoke the B.I. 's
18 July 2006 Order which: (a)
found Sen. Poe to be
presumptively a former
natural-born Filipino; and (b)
approved her petition for
reacquisition of natural-born
Filipino citizenship. Insofar as
the COMELEC held that Sen.
Poe was not qualified for the
B.I.'s Order, the same is a
prohibited collateral attack on
Sen Poe's natural-born Filipino
citizenship.
207. When the COMELEC held that Sen. Poe was not
qualified to apply for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225, it
effectively set aside the 18 July 2006 Order issued by the
Bureau of Immigration ("B.I.") which: (a)"' found Sen. Poe
presumptively a former natural-born Filipino; and (b) approved
her petition for reacquisition of natural-born Filipino citizenship.
208. The COMELEC failed to pass upon Sen. Poe's

argument, repeatedly stressed in the proceeding a quo, that the
DOJ has the "primary jurisdiction" to decide whether said order
was legally issued, which necessarily includes the initial inquiry
as to whether Sen. Poe was a "former natural-born Filipino"
qualified for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225.
209. In Quintas, Jr. vs. National Stud Farm, 42 3 the Supreme

Court held:
It is true that the doctrine of primai:y jurisdiction or prior resort

goes no further than to determine whether it is the court or the
agency that should make the initial decision. Parker, in his text,
would put the matter thus: "The fact that a governmental authority
is empowered to deal with a given type of matter gives rise to a
presumption that it has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. If
the Jaw delegates A to make decisions this means that in dubio B
423 G.R. No. L-37052, 29 November 1973

~
159
is not so delegated." Davis clarifies the point in this wise: "The

precise function of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide
a court in determining whether the court should refrain from
exercising ~ts j~risdiction untq after, aq administrative agency has
c;letermined som.e question or some aspec_t of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court." The important thing is
that the dispute be determined according to the judgment, in the
language of an American Supreme Court decision, "of a tribunal
appointed by law and informed by experience." x x x. When,
therefore, as was likewise adverted to by the Solicitor General, the
judicial forum was sought by plaintiff, there was in effect fill
unwarranted di.sr~gard of the concept of primary jurisdiction. 4 2 4
209.1. Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs. Tantuico,

Jr.425 is also apropos:
In cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has

been to refer the same to an administrative agency of
special competence. As early as 1954, the Court in
Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co.,
Inc. (94 Phil. 932, 941 ), held that under the sense-making
and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction' .. the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question
by the administrative tribunal, where the question
I'
demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
it
special knowledge, experience, and services of t~! .
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intri".aW "' :. .,,_
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential tQ
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
' ~ ~;~~
administered. '4 26 1~
~ * ' 210. The DOJ has the primary jurisdiction or the powet t~~
t'm~e the initial decision" to rule on whether reacquisiqomoif
natural-born Filipino citizenship evidenced by the 18 July ~006.
Order, was valid. Under Section 18 of B.I. Memorandurrt :~
!'
Circular No. AFF. 05-002, the 18 July 2006 Order can _be
revoked only by the DOJ, thus:
' .. -'J
I However, the Order of Approval issued under these Ruf,e~- -~?~
':.~
may be revoked by the Department of Justice upon a substantive Q
finding of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment on the pa~& .;.,

;:,
'~~
.. , . 424 U9derscoring supplied .

' "' 42 ~G:R. No. L-47051, 29 July 1988; see Ros vs. DAR, G.R. No. 132477, 31 Aug~t
,,~avedra vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 80879, 21 March 19,~8~Bfftt
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 74222 & 77098, 27 November 1990
' '
-.,
-~1~,r ..
.~
160
the applicant and after an administrative hearing

; . initiated by an
'
aggrieved party or by the Bureau of Immigration. 427
211. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, until the

DOJ has been given the chance (in the appropriate
administrative proceeding) to decide the issue, the COMELEC
should have "refrained" from deciding whether Sen. Poe could
validly avail herself of the benefits of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., whether
she was, indeed, a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines
gualified under the terms of that statute. In the meantime, the
18 July 2006 Order which: (a) found that Sen. Poe was born to
Filipino parents and presumptively a former natural-born
\ I ' .
Filipino; and (b) approved her petition for reacquisition of

natural-born Filipino citizenship, cannot
.
be impugned .
in this
case. It must be presumed . valid and regular.
' (
212. A corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is

the prohibition against collateral attacks against citizenship
(which the COMELEC did not discuss in its assailed
Resolutions). It is well-settled that "[i]n our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity." 42 8 Before the 18 July 2006 Order
, I
can be assailed, the jurisdiction of the appropriate

adri:inistrativy agency (i.e., the DOJ) must first be properly
invoked. As a final note, the COMELEC is not a court of general
jurisdiction which can pass upon the validity of an
administrative proceeding that has long ago been terminated,
and the decision in which has long ago attained finality. The
COMELEC is of limited jurisdiction and it would have been
becoming modesty on its part to respect the determination of the
agency specifically tasked with the implementation of Rep. Act
No. 9225.
B.10. The COMELEC ignored

evidence of Sen. Poe's honesty
and good faith when it ruled
that she supposedly intended
to mislead or deceive the
that she is a "NATURAL BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN."
4 21
Underscoring supplied
428Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149,
23 August 2011; Co vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 92191-92,
30 July 1991, citing Queto vs. Catolico,G.R. Nos. L-25204 & L-25219, 23 January 1970.
161

En Banc partially reversed the Second Division's 1 December
2015 Resolution, and ruled that Sen. Poe deliberately attempted
to deceive and mislead the electorate with respect to her
citizenship. In so ruling, the COMELEC accepted hook-line-and-
sinker, private respondent's theory that Sen. Poe was guilty of a
supposed "pattern of misrepresentation"429 "to falsely represent
her status as a Filipino citizen."430 The COMELEC En Banc,
adopting private respondent's position, relied on Sen. Poe's
alleged ''false" statement in her Petition for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, filed with the B.I. on
10 July 2006, and the Condominium Certificates of Title ("CCT")
and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") in Sen. Poe and her
husband's name, for properties they purchased after their
family's permanent return to the Philippines in May 2005.
214. COMELEC En Bane's ruling cannot hold water,

because it was based on a misappreciation, if not an utter
disregard, of the evidence on record. What made the ruling of
COMELEC En Banc, even more capricious is that it did not even
care to mention, and certainly did not address, Sen. Poe's
arguments in her Omnibus Comment/ Opposition to private
respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration (filed on 14
December 2015, or more than a week before the 23 December
2015 Resolution was promulgated), wherein Sen. Poe
painstakingly addressed Private respondent's erroneous and
baseless position that Sen. Poe deliberately intended to mislead
when she stated in her 2015 COC that she is a "NATURAL-
215. Sen. Poe's actions, viewed fairly and objectively, are

actually compatible with the good faith availment of rights and
privileges available to former natural-born Filipino citizens
(which Sen. Poe was at the time the acts in question were
committed). The COMELEC En Banc itself made room for this
explanation when it stated on page 30 of the 23 December 2015
Resolution that "this pattern of behavior may be considered as
proof of consistency in believing, perhaps in good faith 1 that she
is a Filipino ... "
216. The COMELEC En Banc harped on Sen. Poe's alleged

false declaration to the B.I. that she was born to Ronald Allan
Kelly Poe, and Jesusa Sonora Poe in her Petition for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
4 29 Par. 9, Motion for Partial Reconsideration

430 Id.
162
("R.A. 9225 Petition"), executed on July 7, 2006 and filed with

the B.I. on July 10, 2006. The COMELEC En Banc noted that
Sen. Poe declared in the R.A. 9225 Petition that she was BORN
TO Filipino parents when in fact, she was not. The COMELEC En
Banc implies that Sen. Poe intentionally indkated t1:1-e n8.1Tle of
her adoptive parents in her R.A. 9225 Petition in order to deceive
the B.I. into thinking that she was a former natural-born Filipino
citizen. This allegation is not only false.1 but also downright
uninformed.
216.1. Firstly, Sen. Poe had no intention to

mislead or deceive the B.I. when she stated in her "Petition
for Re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship" that she was
"born ... to" her adoptive parents, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe
and Jesusa Sonora Poe. The law itself recognizes them as
her legal parents, 431 and Sen. Poe's act of indicating their
names in the blank spaces provided for "Father's name"
and "Mother's name" was not intended to mislead or to gain
favor with the B.I.
216.2. An examination of Sen. Poe's R.A. 9225

4 2
Petition 3 will readily reveal that it was a standard boiler
plate form from the B.I., with several blanks that an
applicant for re-acquisition under R.A. No. 9225 simply
had to fill in. Sen. Poe had no hand in preparing the form,
and she did not think that she could modify its structure .
..J
' . ~
.
216.3. By writing the names of her adopMye

parents in the blanks in the form reserved for the names'of
.the applicant's parents, Sen. Poe was guided by the p:Qr~~ ~~
~Father's name" and "Mother's name" appearing noticeably~''
underneath these blanks. When she wrote the names'' of~'~
her adoptive parents, she acted legally, because they W~fe ;,
her legal parents. However, she definitely never intended.to
convey that she was, in fact, "born ... to" her adopt,iv<e#
par~nts. More importantly, Sen. Poe acted instinctiv~J~, ~
as 1n fact she has known no other parents but them .. , 0
Sen. Poe simply indicated who she recognized as (and knew

to be) her father and mother; a recognition that is.
,."'' supported by law,433 and indeed reflected in her Certif~$. .
i ~ :Jt,~;~. i'i
431 Sec. 16, R.A. No. 8552 ("Domestic Adoption Act of 1998") . ~
Ex h'b't >f:~,
/. 43'2 1 1 "20" ., " : ..,
}i~~i . .,Jt:
: ;43~ Under the law, among the effects of adoption are: (a) to sever all legal ties be~:N~g~:.:;
. ,-gtological parent(s) and the adoptee; and (b) to deem the adoptee as a legitimate ~1.?il'!.!'~~~::
,
1 iihe adopters. (See In re Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, 21 May 2009). Even the law:aj ri<ijt-'s~~
1\~\
l : that tl::i,e adoptive parents, for all intents and purposes, be recognized as the birth' ms t ,1
a:n
:pf !doptee, as it requires the local civil registrar to "issue a certificate of birth . . . . .~i~'1.:'
~~hall not bear any notation that it is a new or amended certificate and which sha\hi~ow,~ ..
~afuong others, the following: registry number, date of registration, name of child, sex, liaqe
,'of birth! place of birth, name and citizenship of adoptive mother and father, and)he date;
':..
163
of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office ("NSO", now

"Philippine Statistics Authority or "PSA") itself, which
reflects Ronald Allan Kelly Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as
her "father" and "mother". Although Sen. Poe did not
submit her NSO-authenticated birth certificate in support
of her R.A. 9225 Petition, 4 3 4 such birth certificate, regularly
issued to her by a government agency in May 2006 or prior
to executing and filing her R.A. 9225 Petition, nevertheless
strongly
.
supports Sen. Poe's good faith, and strongly .
militates against the insinuation that Sen. Poe intentionally
misrepresented the identity of her known parents.
216.4. As importantly, in the R.A. 9225 Petition,

the word "to" does not immediately follow after the word
"born" so as to leave no doubt in the mind of the applicant
(Sen. Poe) that she must indicate the names of her
biological parents (and no other). The word "born" is
followed by a space for the "date of birth," then by a space
for the "place of birth," and then by the word "to" (which
happens to appear on the next line immediately before the
names of the applicant's parents), such that the whole
sentence reads "I am a former natural-born Philippine
citizen, born on (date of birth) Sep. 3, 1968 at (place of
birth) Iloilo City to (Father's name) Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
a (Father's citizenship) Filipino citizen and (Mother's name)
Jesusa Sonora Poe, a (Mother's citizenship) Filipino
citizen[.]"
216.5. Secondly, Sen. Poe's declaration as to the

identity of her parents did not deceive or mislead the B.I.
Under R.A. No. 9225 and B.I. Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-05-002, Sen. Poe was not required to prove that she
was in fact born to Filipino parents, or even that she used
to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Sen. Poe's
natural-born Filipino citizenship was presumed from her
"proof' of Philippine citizenship, i.e., her "Old Philippine
and place of their marriage, when applicable." Section 16, A.M. No. 02-06-02-SC, or the
New Rule on Adoption, in relation to Section 14 of R.A. No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998. Section 14 of R.A. No. 8552, which was already in force when Sen. Poe's new
birth certificate was issued on 4 May 2006, provides:
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. - An amended certificate of birth shall be
issued by the Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact
that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her
surname. The original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled" with the
annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place and shall be
sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the
adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue. (underscoring
supplied)
434 Sen. Poe opted to submit, instead, her old Philippine passport, as allowed by B.I.
Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-02. (See Par. 1.32.1, Sen. Poe's Verified Answer.)
164
-
Passport." On this point, Section 6 of B.I. Memorandum
Circular No. AFF-05-002 provides:
Section 6. Proof as natural-born citizen of the Philippines.-
A former natural-born citizen of the Philippines shall

enjoy the presumption that he/she was a natural-born
Filipino, Provided, that proof of Philippine citizenship i.s
submitted. In determining Philippine citizenship, a copy of
at least one of the following shall be submitted, the original
of which shall be presented and appropriately marked by
the evaluating officer "original seen and verified".
1. Philippine Birth Certificate;

2. Old Philippine Passport;
3. Voter's affidavit or voter's identification card;
4. Marriage contract indicating the Philippine
citizenship of the applicant; and
5. Such other document that would show that the
applicant is a former natural-born citizen of the
Philippines as may be acceptable to the evaluating
officer.
In all cases, the evaluating officer may require the

submission of additional documents if there is reasonable
ground to believe that the applicant is not a former natural-
born Filipino. 435 "
216.6. The B.I. stated correctly that Sen. Poe was

born of Filipino parents because she was a holder of a
Philippine passport and there was no evidence whatsoever
that she was born of foreigners. She was therefore
presumed to be natural born. Tellingly, the Memorandum
recommending approval of Sen. Poe's R.A. 9225 Petition,
prepared by Mr. Manuel Ferdinand C. Arbas for then B.I.
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., found that she "was
a former Philippine citizen, who is presumed to be a
natural born PhilipJ?ine citizen ... and has taken her oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines" on the basis of
the following documents only:
a. Petitioner's old Philippine passport (No. DD 156616),

showing that she was born on 03 September 1968 at
Iloilo City, Philippines;
b. Petitioner's certificate of naturalization issued by the
United States of America and issued [sic] American
435 Underscoring and emphasis supplied

...
165
Passport No. 017037793 issued on 19 December

2001 at USA; and
c. Petitioner's oath of allegiance, pursuant to R.A. No.
9225, dated 07 July 2006, thereby deemed [sic] to
have re-acquired his [sic] Philippine citizenship. 436
216.7. Sen. Poe stresses, as she did earlier, that

this is not the proper venue to assail the grant by the B.I.
of her Petition for re-acquisition of natural-born citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225, or to determine whether the B.I. was
indeed misled by the contents of Sen. Poe's R.A. 9225
Petition. Nevertheless, Sen. Poe maintains the validity of
her re-acquisition of citizenship under R.A. 9225, for at the
end of the day, what was material to her application under
R.A. No. 9225 and B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-
002 was that she was, in fact, a former natural-born
Filipino. As discussed in earlier arguments, she was.
21 7. The COMELEC En Banc also ascribes to Sen. Poe a

deliberate intention to misrepresent her Filipino citizenship on
the basis of CCT Nos. 11985-R (for Unit 7F in One Wilson Place,
San Juan City) and 11986-R (for a corresponding parking slot in
the same condominium project) and TCT No. N-290260 (for a
parcel of land in Brgy. Murphy, Ugong Norte, Quezon City),
which were in the name of "Spouses Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares and Mary Grace P. Llamanzare~ both of legal age,
,' . Filipinos", entered on February 9, 2006 and June 1, 2006, p1j_or .,.;.
to Sen. Poe's reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship upon
,t~ing the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic 4 3 7 in July. 2006.
t !fr ~ '' ' . .; . . 1'.
~e COMELEC En Banc accepted private respondent's claim tl}ar:t ~

::th:ese~',documents show a "pattern of misrepresentation indicaf;,\Te,.;-'7
,, ,ific
of a dehberate intent to falsely represent [Sen. Poe's] status as. a' 'tit~~
"1
Filipi.no citizen." 439 ~~ tt
; :"i'
, '
21 7 .1. Firstly, these three certificates of title w~fe 4 : _w'
obviously issued by the Registrars of Deeds of San J4an i ..,

'
City and Quezon City and, therefore, clearly do no't ~~~
constitute Sen. Poe's personal representations about her,
citizenship. They were not documents which Sen. Pqe~.~ ''\."'if"~-. ~
f
..t prepared, such that the COMELEC En Banc may now.J~.~~f
~) them as evidence of a supposed act which proves a ~sp~9~~':t
1
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,,i:ht
'~~
*
i ,436 A cbpy of this Memorandum dated July 17, 2006 is attached as Annex "A" orseo:.
q"~lfiJ:mibus Comment/Opp?sition filed. in this ca~e on .14 December 2015 (Annex "P",.h,~:~~i'
\; Pars. 6 (b) to (d), Motion for Partial Reconsideration '
. '439 Par',9, Motion for Partial Reconsideration
.
~
'',.)r
1111-.
166
custom or usage, and the like" on the part of the

Respondent. 440
217.2. Secondly, the supposed "misrepresentation"

in the titles (and there is none, because the CCTs and TCTs
do not constitute Sen. Poe's personal representations about
her citizenship) is irrelevant in this proceeding and
incompetent
. '
for the purpose that the COMELEC En Banc
now suggests, as what is in question here is a supposed
misrepresentation committed by Sen. Poe in accomplishing
her 2015 COC. Section 34 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which private respondent cites, actually teaches the
reverse: evidence that tends to show that what a person
has done at one time is not probative of the contention that
he has done a similar act at another time. In other words,
proof of a past "misrepresentation" (assuming there was,
and there is none here proven) is not admissible to prove
that a person committed another "misrepresentation" at
present. This is especially true in Sen. Poe's case. If
documents executed before she reacquired her Philippine
citizenship on 7 July 2006 were false for that reason, how
can they show a pattern of falsity of a COC which
concededly was executed after she reacquired her
citizenship (or when she was already unquestionably a
Filipino)? In the proceeding a quo, private respondent did
not even offer these pieces of evidence fOF the purpose of an
alleged pattern drawn from previous conduct. She cannot
now unfairly be allowed to use Sen. Poe's own evidence-
offered for the purpose of proving her actual residence in
the Philippines since May 2005-to violate the rule on res
inter alias acta and force Sen. Poe to meet allegations that
are not even mentioned in the petition a quo.
217 .3. It must be emphasized that a former

natural born Filipino like Sen. Poe is allowed to own land
pursuant to Section 8, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, 44 1 in relation to the Foreign Investments Act
of 1991 (R.A. 7042)442 and Batas Pambansa Blg. No. 185. 443
440 Par. 9, Motion for Partial Reconsideration. See also, sec. 34, Rule 130, Rules of Court
441 Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
442 SEC. 10. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII,
Section 8 of the Constitution. - Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws
may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000)
square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be
used by him for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them
may avail of the privilege herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the
total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
167
As for condominium units, aliens are allowed to purchase

the same under the provisions of the Condominium Act. 44 4
Sen. Poe was, at the time the titles were entered, a former
natural-born Filipino qualified to purchase said properties.
Indeed, she re-acquired her natural-born Filipino
citizenship soon thereafter. It must also be mentioned that
Sen. Poe's husband (under whose name the properties were
jointly registered) is also a Filipino citizen. Hence, it cannot
even be said that the alleged "misrepresentations" in these
documents were material, in the sense that they allowed
respondent to acquire real property which she was
prohibited from doing.
217.4. Lastly, the proceeding a quo was not the

proper suit to examine the validity of the purchases. The
TCTs were issued to prove residence. That was the issue
before the COMELEC En Banc. In Mitra vs. Commission on
Elections, 4 45 the validity of the lease contract presented by
In the case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other
purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land for
business or other purposes which when added to those already owned by him shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two (2) lots which should be
situated in different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines: Provided, That the
total land area thereof shall not exceed five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of
urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land for use by him for business or
other purposes. A transferee who has already acquired urban 1and shall be disqualified
from acquiring rural land and vice versa". (underscoring supplied)
443 Section 1. In implementation of Section fifteen of Article XIV of the Constitution, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, subject to the provisions of this
Act.
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the
case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his
residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not
exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall
still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural lands for residential
purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the
maximum areas herein authorized.
444 See Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4726 ("The Condominium Act"), which provides:
Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or
other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided
interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or
shareholdings in the condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where the
common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of separate
units as co-owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or
transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens, or corporations at least sixty
percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases of
hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium project are held
by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the
concomiilint transfer of the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the
corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits
imposed by existing laws.
445 G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744
168
Mitra to prove residence was attacked because the property

was on public land which cannot be leased. Dismissing the
attack as irrelevant, this Honorable Court said: "The
validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue
before us; what concerns us is the question of whether
Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or
strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his
residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under
construction) and whether he indeed resided there."
218. The foregoing show that instead of showing a "pattern

of misrepresentation," the acts imputed against Sen. Poe are
instead compatible with good faith exercise of rights and
privileges available to former natural-born Filipino citizens
(which Sen. Poe was at the time in question).
219. The COMELEC En Banc also held that "jurisprudence"

on the issue of a foundling's citizenship is unnecessary, because
the language of the 1935 Constitution is "clear" and
"unmistakable." As discussed earlier, that stance that
foundlings are "clearly" excluded from the article on citizenship
in the fundamental law, is simply illogical and contrary to
jurisprudence.
220. In the first place, if the nature of citizenship of

foundlings is so clear as the COMELEC Ent' Banc posits, why'
, rwould such issue engender the present situation where tw~,;(2)~,
independent constitutional bodies made drastically diffat~nt iJ~ ~
'!-Qi\
- -,
., ,",~rulings as to the .citizenship o.f Sen. Poe? In ~act, why wo:ikl

',~;tissue be the topic of content10us debates since early this ye~'ff'" :jc
with':legal pundits positing differing opinions on the issue? :eve~\

the' various petitioners in the four (4) cases filed against Seri. Poe~~~
befo,re the COMELEC En Banc are not in agreement with res~c\.;~
to her citizenship, with at least two of them 447 conceding that . ,,,,. ::XF
Sen.: Poe is presumed to be a natural-born citizen
notwithstanding her status as a foundling. Following . 1t!,l~
COMELEC En Bane's logic, they, as well as a host of other_~'
respected legal personalities like former Chief Justice Artemi9
Panganiban, Dean Antonio La Vina, Prof. Elizabeth Angui]jpg~;
,Pangalan, Prof. Katrina Legarda, Justice Mario Guarifia Hf;~;~:
#' .. ., ~ ,;; ~_j:f!;
Petitioners Antonio P. Conteras (in SPA No. 15-007 [DC]) and Amado D. Val~~-(j,~'-~ ' .
447
ii f':l'o. li,5-139 [DC]) made public statements as to their belief that Sen. Poe's -"~
foundling does not affect her natural-born Filipino citizenship, which is presum
,1 ,Proof'to the contrary is shown. Instead, Petitioner Contreras anchors his Petition
; ~Poe's alleged failure to meet the ten-year residence requirement under the C~ff .. ., ~~' ','
w.h.~l~:;Pet~t~oner Valdez is of the be.lief ~hat Sen. Poe lost her status as a natur~;~r~~;""
Fihpmo citizen after she was naturalized m the U.S.A. on October 2001. .;, ';: ~;'
.. , '.'148 In a column published on 10 December 2015 at the Philippine Daily Inquirer~}l:l.S\iG~
''f;,: tiuarifia joined a roster of prominent legal personalities who maintain that 1, pnqer
. ,, ~pplicable provisions of the Constitution, state obligations of the Philippiri,es ...
. ~ ; ';
tind~
' ~
- '. 't.l
_-'.
-;,..
"-'
'
169
among others, were all gr<?s~ly "ignorant" of "simple provisions of

the Constitution,'' 44 9 for they ought to "know[ ] what a natural-
born citizen means" and ought to be as convinced as her that
foundlings "do[] not qualify as such."450
221. The COMELEC En Banc clearly ignored the hornbook

doctrine that an error as to a difficult question of law may form
the basis of good faith. This was the pronouncement of this
Honorable Court as early as the 1939 case of Kasilag v.
Rodriguez, 4 51 where the Court, quoting Manresa, held:
We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases
of good faith founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition
appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has
already been passed upon by competent authority, and even
established by appeals taken from final judgments and
administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and
the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but,
unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far
exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be
ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon
to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, f!
clear, manifest, and .truly unexcusable ignorance
; . is one thing, to
which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing
is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal
principles and from the interpretation of conflictiqg doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error

of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the
capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons,
compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain
acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of
doubtful doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil
Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
221.1. As far as Sen. Poe is concerned, she is a

natural-born Filipino citizen, a legal position which was
upheld by the Senate Electoral Tribunal-the sole judge of
her qualifications, including her natural-born citizenship,
as a sitting Senator of the Republic. Moreover, Kasilag is
authority to the effect that even if this position later turns
out to be an "an error of law" based on the "interpretation
international law, and generally accepted principles of international law, a foundling has
the right to be deemed natural-born, a presumption which may be applied without
violating the principles of natural-born citizenship under the Constitution. A copy of
Justice Guarina's article is attached hereto as Annex "T".
449 Par. 21, Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Annex "M" hereof)
450 Id.
451 G.R. No. 46623, 7 December 1939
170
:-
of doubtful doctrines", still, such "error" is not incompatible
with good faith.
222. The COMELEC En Banc reversed the Seccnd

Division's ruling that Sen. Poe had "a well-founded belief that
she is a true Filipino" stemming from her being raised in a
Filipino household. 45 2 The COMELEC En Banc ruled that there
was no basis for the Second Division to take "judicial notice" of
the circumstances surrounding how Sen. Poe was adopted and
raised as. a Filipino. The COMELEC En Banc clearly ignored that
Sen. Poe's adoption is an admitted fact in the proceeding a quo.
It was also a matter of public knowledge since tl~e 1970s, when
they publicized their intention to formally adopt Sen. Poe. 453 Sen.
Poe's life is an open book, even featured in a primetime weekend
drama series,45 4 that it was whimsical for the COMELEC En
Banc to rule that her being raised in the Poe household "is not a
matter of public knowledge."
223. Under the circumstances, the Second Division

properly took judicial notice of the fact that Sen. Poe was raised
in a Filipino household, and indeed, for most of her life as a
child until her naturalization in the United States in October
2010, had known no other citizenship but that of the
Philippines. The purpose of adoption is precisely to give a chance
to a child to be raised in a family environment by the adoptive
parents. Since Sen. Poe's adoptive parents are concededly
Filipinos, it is logical to assume that Sen. Poe was also raised as
a Filipino. Indeed, Sen. Poe's citizenship was never challenged
at all until the middle of this year (2015), when she started
figuring prominently in pre-election surveys for the people's
choice for President.
224. In the final analysis, there is ample evidence on record

to show that Sen. Poe had always believed, in good faith, that
she is a natural-born Filipino. Therefore, even if she was wrong
(and she was not), Sen. Poe did not "deliberately" mislead
anyone when she stated in her COC for President that she is a
224. 1. From her personal knowledge of the

material circumstances of her discovery, coupled with her

4 53Attached as Annex "B-series" of Annex "P" hereof are computer print-out of news
articles or reports showing that it is publicly and widely known that Sen. Poe is the
daughter of the Spouses Poe, adopted by them from an early age and raised by them as
their legiti~ate daughter.
454 Sen. Poe's life story as a foundling adopted and raised by the Poe couple was
broadcasted by ABS-CBN Corporation on February 2, 2013 in Maalaala Mo Kaya, its long-
running primetime weekend drama program.
171
physical appearance, Sen. Poe has reasonable grounds to

form a well-founded belief that she was in all likelihood
born of Filipino parents who live in Jara, Iloilo, who later
abandoned her in a Roman Catholic Cathedral mere hours
after she was born. 455 As discussed, Sen. Poe is only 5 ft. 2
inches tall, with brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal
bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face-all
physical features ordinarily associated with Filipinos. She
was found, as a new-born baby, in Iloilo City, where in
1968, as at any time, an overwhelming majority of the
population were Filipinos. It is not reasonable for Sen.
Poe-or indeed, for anybody-to assume that in 1968, a
pregnant foreigner (together with her foreigner husband or
partner), who just so happened to have predominantly
Filipino-like physical features, left her motherland in order
to give birth in the Philippines, in an island very far from
where the international airport and main port of entry are
located, all to abandon such baby in a Roman Catholic
Church, presumably because of poverty.
224.2. The reported circumstances of Sen.

Poe's birth are consistent with her good faith belief that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen. To repeat, the mere fact
that Sen. Poe is a foundling, without more, is not sufficient
for a finding that Sen. Poe thereby had the intention of
deceiving or misleading the electorate 1nto thinking thae
v~. ' she is a natural-born citizen. ,.;.,
,.,,..,\017' ,,.
224.3. Moreover, as discussed in paragraph .i~t

~ hereof (and sub-paragraphs), the Government of . th~4.
' :,: Republic of the Philippines has, through the B.I. (wfii.c~''0.
granted Sen. Poe's petition for reacquisition of natural-born( ' "''
~ .citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and issued ~ M,11!

';!. "'-'{:"
Identification Certificate in her favour), the Office of the
President (which appointed Sen. Poe MTRCB Chairperson)
and the COMELEC En Banc (which accepted her COC~ lo\\
Senator), consistently recognized, and therefore repeatedly
led Sen. Poe to believe, that she is a natural-born Filipi~-.
These official government acts certainly did not alert hefl~~;
the prospect of being legally "stateless," as >pri'f~4J
"
~\'
respondent claims. : 'l ; ' -~~':';

~~\t-~,~~ :~:; ~r.~;~ .
224.4. When Sen. Poe prepared her\:
. Answer in SET Case No. 001-15 45 6 (which she fi1~<$.~i
September 2015 or more than a month before she'~,
~- ~~} ', -:,
1 !;;~55 See pars. 4.20 to 4.21, et seq., Sen. Poe's Memorandum with Fonnal Offer oFif,.rA"J~ce
~ (Annex "J" hereof) ,
.456 Se~ Annex "7" of Annex "M" hereof '
,,.
172
COC for President), she was provided with sound legal

bases (in a pleading prepared by her legal counsel) for the
proposition that she is a natural-born Filipino. Thereafter,
- . ''
on 17 November 2015, the SET agreed with Sen. Poe and
declared her to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
I
The SET Decision was affirmed in a Resolution dated 3

December 2015 and it became final and executory on the
same date.
225. Finally, the Second Division of the COMELEC initially

ruled that "the evidence is not conclusive that Sen. Poe
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact from
the electorate when she declared in her subject COC that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen." Although Commissioners Arthur
D. Lim and Sheriff M. Abas (members of the Second Division)
abandoned this position when the COMELEC En Banc issued its
23 December 2015 Resolution, Commissioner Al A. Parreno
(Chairman of the Second Division) maintained (as shown by his
hand-written note next to his signature on the last page of the
23 December 2015 Resolution) that "there is no material
misrepresentation as to citizenship." In his separate concurring
I
and dissenting opinion, the Chairman of COMELEC, the Hon.

Andres D. Bautista, also agreed that Sen. Poe simply had no
intent to deceive the Philippine electorate when she stated in her
2015 COC that she is a natural-born Filipino. Since
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim / abstained from
COMELEC En Banc ruling, there were only four Commissioners
(namely: Commissioners Arthur Lim, Sheriff Abas, Rowena
Guanzon and Lito Guia) out of the seven who categorically
found that Sen. Poe intended to mislead when she claimed in her
2015 COC that she is a natural-born Filipino. The fact that the
COMELEC En Banc was essentially divided on this issue further
bolsters Sen. Poe's position that she actually acted honestly in
accomplishing her 2015 COC.
226. The foregoing facts and circumstances, taken together

and viewed fairly and objectively and without whim and caprice,
wholly negate any intent on Sen. Poe's part to mislead or deceive
the Philippine electorate. They show that, when Sen. Poe
accomplisp.ed her COC for President, she had good faith and
legal basis for her representation therein that she is a "NATURAL
227. Therefore, assuming arguendo that the

representations in Sen. Poe's COC are "false" (and they are not),
they would, at most, be tantamount to honest mistakes on
difficult questions of law, but certainly not statements which
were meant to "deceive" or "mislead" the electorate. Accordingly,
173
the COMELEC En Banc should not have cancelled Sen. Poe's

COC on the ground that she had deliberately misrepresented
therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. There was
simply no evidence, much less substantial evidence, to support
that factual conclusion. A conclusion unsupported by proof is
an arbitrary conclusion, and therefore reversible by certiorari.
C. THE COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT

JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED
THE PETITION A QUO, DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF ANY FALSE
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION IN
SEN. POE'S COC FOR PRESIDENT.
C.1. In the absence of a false

material representation in Sen.
Poe's COC for President, the
petition a quo should have
been dismissed outright for
being a premature petition for
quo warranto which is within
the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the PET.
------------------------------------------ ,.
228. As discussed, the COMELEC lacked legal basis to
"deny due course to or cancel" Sen. Poe's COC for President. Yet,
it cancelled Sen. Poe's COC anyway, thereby sanctioning a
premature attack on her citizenship and residence qualifications
for the Presidency. By cancelling Sen. Poe's COC for President
(despite that absence of any "false material representation"
therein), and before the conduct of the May 9, 2016 elections,
the COMELEC effectively passed upon her eligibility for the
Presidency. This act constitutes grave abuse of discretion
because there is no proceeding to specifically declare the
"ineligibility" of a candidate before the election. Fermin vs.
COMELEQ45 7 is instructive in this regard.
228.1. In Fermin, the petitioner seeking the

disqualification of the candidate cited an earlier version of
Section 1 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules which stated
that "(a)ny candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law x x x may be disqualified
457 G.R. No. 179695, 18 December 2008

174
from continuing as a candidate." The petitioner in Fermin

also quoted COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 which stated
that a candidate could be "disqualified" under Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules, among other grounds, "(f)or not being
a citizen of the Philippines" or "(f)or lack of residence."
228.2. This Honorable Court ruled that the petitioner

could not rely on (the earlier version of) Section 1 of Rule
25 of the COMELEC Rules and on COMELEC Resolution
No. 7800, because "they cannot supersede the dissimilar
requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for
disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the
denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under
Section 78 of the OEC." The High Court cited the separate
opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez which
noted that the COMELEC could not, through the simple
passage of a rule of procedure, create a cause of action or
remedy to declare the "ineligibility" of a "candidate" which
does not exist in law, to wit:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding

for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule
25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any csmdidate who

''t, does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate ' -' .
as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be . M
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from '" :;.,
-~~'
'
",j'
continuing as a candidate. "'" <

'r,"
1 ~
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of ,i
" candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rul~1,:,.
Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action ~
which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the'...
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the; " -r,,.
Constitution, cannot do. 458 It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to. '
.it ' decide cases involving the right to vote, which essential.1.Y:., ' ,If,
)'
involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residern;e;.{
and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)] . o: ~;, "
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules

grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualificatioQc
''i contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only '1
h i'
their grounds but also in their consequences are proceediry~.:
!t7!' ,.
! {!;'
~J ' ..
.. ~ss Bold-face font in the original
~
'\.
,.
':,,.t
175
-
for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration
of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already
stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as
a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to
eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or
during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office. 459
229. In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "the

purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
remove the incumbent from office." A petition which seeks to
declare "ineligibility" or "lack of qualifications" should therefore
be filed against an "incumbent," by way of a petition for quo
warranto. In the case of the President, such a quo warranto
proceeding must be filed with the PET "within ten days after the
proclamation
, of the winner," pursuant to Rule 16 of A.M. No. 10-
4-29-SC, otherwise known as "The 2010 Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," which states:
Rule 16. Quo warranto. - A Vyrified for quo

warranto contesting the election of the President or Vice -
President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines may filed by any registered voter who
has voted in the election concerned within ten days after the
proclamation of the winner. 460
230. In the absence of a "false material representation" in

her COC for President, the petition a quo was reduced to nothing
but an assault on Sen. Poe's eligibility for the Presidency. The
petition a quo was in essence a petition for quo warranto. Since
the petition a quo is fundamentally one for quo warranto, it is
obviously premature, because no elections have been held yet
and Sen. Poe has not been elected or "proclaimed" "winner."
Moreover, in the event that Sen. Poe is elected and proclaimed
President, private respondent would have to file a petition with
the PET (which is the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
"qualifications of the President").461
459 Bold-face font in the original

461 Rule 13, A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC; Section 4, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
176
-
231. All told, in ruling on the petition a quo, despite the
absence of any "false material representation" in Sen. Poe's COC
for President, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or exsess of jurisdiction.
C.2. In the absence of a false

material representation in Sen.
Poe's COC for President, the
cancellation thereof effectively
deprives the Filipino people of
their sovereign prerogative to
decide a purely political
question, that is-who will be
the 16th President of the
Republic of the Philippines?
------------------------------------------
232. A political question is defined as a question "which
under the Constitution (is) to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity."462 The choice of elective public officials is
granted exclusively to the Filipino people through the right of
suffrage. 463 Under the Constitution, the President of the
Republic of the Philippines "shall be elected by a direct vote of
the People."46 4 Therefore, the issue of who should (as opposed to
who may) be elected President is a political 19uestion which is
clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
233. As discussed, the petition a quo lacks a cause of

action under Section 78 of the OEC. It was likewise a premature
petition for quo warranto which can be filed only with the PET,
and only if Sen. Poe is proclaimed President. Moreover, the DOJ,
and not the COMELEC, had primary jurisdiction to rule on the
legality of Sen. Poe's reacquisition of natural-born Philippine
citizenship. Nevertheless, by cancelling Sen. Poe's COC for
President, the COMELEC effectively declared that Sen. Poe
should not even be given a chance to secure the mandate of the
Filipino people.
234. If the assailed Resolutions are not annulled or set

aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the COMELEC
will be allowed to deprive the Filipino people of their sovereign
right to decide the most critical question in a democracy-Is Sen.
Poe the popular choice of the Philippine electorate? Should she
serve as the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines?
46 2 Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. L-36142, etc., 31 March 1973
463 Article V, 1987 Constiution
4 64 Section 4, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
-
177
This is obviously UQ1 a justiciable question, but a purely political

one, which is solely within the province of the Filipino people to
decide (and not the COMELEC). In the words of former Chief
Justice Reynato Puna in Tecson: 4 65
Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for

President involves a constitutional issue but its political tone is no
less dominant. The Court is split down the middle on the
citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made
more difficult by the interplay of national and international law.
Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this
Court, the better policy approach is to let the people decide who
will be the next President. F~r on political gue~tions, this
Court may err but the sovereign people will not. To be sure, the
Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court
0
the right to elect in behalf of the people. 466
VII.
URGENT APPLICATION FOR AN EX PARTE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER,
AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUCTION
235. Petitioner is entitled to the relief sought and the whole

or part of such relief is to enjoin the COME~,EC from enforcing
.'., and implementing its assailed Resolutions. The gross and..J>atent :ii'
errors, constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting"t~ lack

, 9f jurisdiction, if not outright absence of jurisdicti~n, : a:re
'>, ~. ' . t . : ~f
'~!~obvious. .. . . ,~~
/11,,, ' '\~: .
236. There is extreme urgency for the issuance of '!a:
terporary restraining order, status quo ante order, or writ ..of
r ii preliminary injunction in this case. In fact, not gr~tlng
immediate injunctive relief will render this Petition moot and
academic, and unjustly deprive over fifty (50) million Filipino
. voters a valid choice for the highest office of the land. Tb.is
violates not only Petitioner's right to run for public offic~, p:t;it
constitutes perhaps the gravest wrong to the sovereign pe()ple;r:-\~
/'violation of their basic and illimitable power as sovereign. /i~ , ,. ..
r
237. Under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constit:ui,
, Q.ecision of the COMELEC "may be brought to the ',
~ . Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty ~.~f
!!'~'''~
~,;
~
7-.Jf.
,.:.",
"~ :
' !1 ''!I(: ilfqr. .,!'

, ; . ~
-j_,);'.~ ~
1
k 465 G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004 {" -.
4 66 Upderscoring and emphasis supplied '~
,...,
~
178
receipt of a copy thereof. "4 67 This is the same period given by

Section 3, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
However, the COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure (as amended
by its Resolution No. 8523), particularly Section 8, Rule 23,
states in pertinent part that:
A Decision or Resolution is deemed final and executory if, in

case of a Division ruling, no motion for reconsideration is filed
within the reglamentary period, or in cases of rulings of the
Commission en bane, no restraining order is issued by the
Supreme Court within five days from the receipt of the decision or
resolution.
238. While it is obvious that the COMELEC should not be

allowed to adopt a rule inconsistent with the Constitution or the
law, 4 68 the fact remains that the COMELEC may under its own
Rules declare the assailed Resolution final and executory.
Indeed, the 23 December 2015 Resolution ominously cites Rule
37 that decisions in petitions to deny due course to or to cancel
certificates of candidacy "shall become final and executory after
the lapse of five days from their promulgation , unless restrained
by the Supreme Court." The effect of such precipitate
circumstance will be catastrophic.
239. The 2016 elections will be automated and governed by

Rep. Act No. 8436, as amended. The ballots to be used thereat
are required by law to carry the names of all official candidates.
Section 15 thereof states that the ballots must contain the
positions to be filled and that "(U)nder each position to be filled,
the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by
surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The
maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as
preferred by the female candidate. xx x"
240. In other words, because the name of candidate must

be on the ballot, the voter cannot vote for any person not on the
ballot. Conversely, a candidate whose name is not on the ballot
because his candidacy is initially invalidated, though
subsequently declared legal by the Supreme Court, cannot hope
46 7 See also Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code: "Decision in the Commission. -
The Commission shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from
the date of their submission for decision. The decision of the Commission shall become
final thirty days after receipt of judgment."
4 68 See for example, Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA
782: "A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments
that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the
appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for the filing
of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition for the denial of due
course to or cancellation of COC under Section 78 of the OEC."
179
to garner as single vote because his or her name is not printed

on the ballot, as what happened in Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC.469
241. The printing of the ballot is imminent and will

commence soon. In a document apparently coming from the
COMELEC entitled "2016 National and Local Elections
Automation Project OVM-VCM Terms of Reference" dated 14
October 2014 410, particularly the "2016 National and Local
Elections Implementation Calendar"471 attached thereto, printing
of ballots will start on "Mon 1 / 10 / 16" and will finish on "Mon
4/25/ 16". However, in some news media reports, the COMELEC
has been quoted as saying it will commence on 15 January
2015 47 2. And in some news reports, no definite day is given, only
that it will be in January 2016. 473 The COMELEC's Chairman
has been quoted confirming that printing of ballots will be
sometime in January 2016.47 4 Regardless of when the actual
date is, printing of ballots will start very soon making the need
for a temporary restraining order urgent.
242. Injunctive relief may be granted if a party, court,

agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably
in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject
of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. That is the case here. Unless a TRO or status quo
ante order is issued and petitioner's name allowed to remain on
the ballot, a final judgment in her favor will be empty and
469 G.R. No. 190529, 22 March 2011, 646 SCRA 63

470 Available at:
http: //www.comelec.gov.ph/uploads/AboutCOMELEC/BidsandAwards/ProcurementProje
cts I BACO 12014AESO MR I BA CO 12014AESO MRITB TermsOfReference. pdf
47 1 The entire document is 67 pages. Only the first page, and pp. 62 to 67 where the
Implementation Calendar is found, are attached hereto as Annex "U''.

472 See "Two crucial dates for the candidates in the coming elections" available at
http: I I www.tempo.com. ph I 2015 / 12 / 09 /two-crucial-dates-for-the-candidates-in -the-

coming-elections/ ("The second important Comelec date is January 15, 2016. The Comelec
will start printing the official ballots on this date.); also "Cha-cha referendum proposed"
available at http:/ /www.mb.com.ph/cha-cha-referendum-proposed/ ("The Comelec has
disclosed that it will start printing the ballots on January 15, 2016.")
4 7 3 See "Come lee concludes substitution of candidates for 2016 polls", available at
http: I / cnnphilippines.com I news/ 2015 I 12 I 10 I Comelec-concludes-deadline-su bstitution-
candidates-2016-elections. html ("According to the Comelec, setting a deadline for
substitution is imperative for ballot printing which will commence on January next year.
There are 1,953 versions of the ballot specific to each legislative district in the country.").
See also "Poe on disqualification case: Roxas, Binay behind Comelec ruling", available at
http://cebudailynews.inguirer.net/7668 7 I poe-on-disqualification-case-roxas-binay-
behind-comelec-ruling ("Comelec is set to finalize the list of candidates by Dec. 15 and is
expected to begin printing ballots in January.")
474 See "Comelec en bane tackles Grace, Diogong cases today", available at
http: //www~mb.com.ph/comelec-en-banc-tackles-grace-digong-cases-today/ ("We are also
studying that. Remember, the printing of the ballots will happen sometime in January,"
said Bautista.)
180
ineffectual because her name will not be on the ballot and the
electorate will not be allowed to vote for her. On the other hand,
if this petition is ultimately denied after her name is allowed to
remain on the ballots, then any votes cast for her will, by
express command of Section 9, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules
as amended, simply be treated as stray votes and not counted.
243. At this time, it should be pointed out that Petitioner

has been consistently ranked among the top, if not the top,
voters' choice for President in pre-election surveys. Her leads
over the perceived second and third placers in several surveys
were substantial. Even with the recent entry of a new candidate
(Mayor Rodrigo Duterte), Petitioner remains a major contender,
in a close second place. Petitioner's candidacy thus should not
be precipitately mooted and the millions of Filipino voters
disenfranchised by a non-issuance of a TRO or status quo ante
order.
244. It must also be pointed out that the respondent

Commission, in an aggravated display of its capriciousness
which characterized its entire handling of the cases against
Petitioner, issued the assailed 23 December 2015 Resolution two
(2) days before Christmas, at a time when it was already widely
announced that courts-including this Honorable Court-would
be closed and will not be able to grant immediate relief. Under
its own Rules (the validity of which Petitioner ,does not concede),
~ .
,1~. f. the Commission knows that Petitioner will only have five day;.s, or
o.until 28 December 2015, within which to secure an injunctive
,: ,i.T~lief, otherwise it may consider its own Resolution final' aI1~
t~trike out Petitioner's name in the list of candidates. If xtwa~
/ Irtinded at all to act with fairness towards Petitioner and respeet .
1
towards this Honorable Court, nothing prevented the respohdept:r:

C9mmission from releasing such Resolution on the fcill~wi~g:
>lWorking day (December 28), knowing full well that Petitionyr
would not be able to secure any kind of relief during four C:l') o1Jt
of five (5) limited days it prescribes under its Rules. Iqd~yd1
Petitioner could think of no reason behind the COMELEC en'
bane's decision to issue its assailed Resolution on December 43,,
but to ensure that Petitioner's time will run out before she cart
it>btain from this Honorable Court an injunctive remedy. l~;:n "
,; not be belabored that even the respondent Commissidn 'fHl
.closed,
.
and the all-important task of ballot-printing will~
'1 ...
-~'
;accomplished anyway, from December 23 to December 2.~
. 245. Petitioner is willing to post a bond in such ail:5~:!1, ...

. l: tltis Honorable Court may fix, conditioned upon pay~~~"'
1 ~.private respondent of all damages she may suffer, if it is,i{iP~ly
'(
.~
'"
,,~
,,..
M!!m
181
adjudged that petitioner was not entitled to injunctive relief in

the first place.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Immediately upon filing hereof, and before this Petition

can be heard on notice, a temporary restraining order/ status
quo ante order (followed by a writ of preliminary injunction, if
required by the Honorable Court) issue:
(a) restraining the public respondent COMELEC from:
(i) in any manner treating as final and/ or

executory, its Resolution dated 1 December
2015, rendered thru its Second Division, and its
Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the
Commission en bane, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC)
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe- Llamanzares,
respondent, as final and/ or executory; and
(ii) excluding the petitioner from the list of official

candidates for president in;- the May 2016
national elections and from the official ballots to
be printed and used in the same elections;
(b) Alternatively, directing the COMELEC to include

Petitioner in the ballot and official list of candidates if
the COMELEC has already ordered her exclusion; and
2. Judgment be ultimately rendered granting the instant

Petition, and nullifying the aforementioned 1 December 2015 and
23 December 2015 Resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC) .
. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are also prayed for.
Makati City for City of Manila, 24 December 2015.

182
POBLADOR BAUTISTA & REYES

Counsel for Petitioner
Senator Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares
5th Floor, SEDCCO I Building
120 Rada corner Legaspi Streets
Legaspi Village, Makati City
Tel No. 893-7623/Fax No. 893-7622
E-Mail: central@pbrlaw.com.ph
By:
~ ... J le.
ALEXANDER J. POBLADOR
PTR No. 4777501/Jan. 27, 2015/Makati City
Lifetime IBP No. 00066/Makati City
OR No. 345214/March 1, 1993
Roll of Attorneys No. 29440
MCLE Compliance No. V-0009389/July 22, 2015
PTR
S C RISTOPHER C. MENDOZA
. 4777518/Jan. 27, 2015/Makati City
o. 979194/Jan. 08, 2015/Makati City
CLE Compliance No. IV-0017855/ April 22, 2013
SA RA
PT No. 489641 /May , 201 ati City
IBP No. 1007077 /April 14, 2015/Zambales
Newly Admitted, M.C.L.E. Governing Board Order
l.S. 2008, July 4, 2008
... Verification and Certification follows

VERIFICATION
AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I, MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE

LLAMANZARES, of legal age, Filipino, and with address care
of Poblador Bautista & Reyes Law Offices, 5th Floor, SEDCCO I
Building, 120 Rada corner Legaspi Streets, Legaspi Village,
Makati City, under oath, hereby depose and state:
1. I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled case.
2. I caused the preparation of, and have read, the

foregoing Petition for Certiorari, and confirm that the factual
allegations therein are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge and/ or based on authentic records.
3. I hereby certify that, except for the Petition entitled

"Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares, petitioner, vs.
Commission on Elections, Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P.
Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez, respondents," which is a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court which I also intend to file with this
Honorable Court, I have not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues raised 1in this case in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any other court, tribunal
or agency. Should it come to my knowledge that another
similar action or proceeding initiated by or against me has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or any other court, tribunal or agency, I hereby
undertake to report said fact to thi~ Honorable Court within
five (5) days from knowledge thereof.
4. On 17 August 2015, Mr. Rizalito Y. David filed with

the Commission on Elections Law Department an Affidavit-
Complaint accusing me of having committed an election
offense under Section 262, in relation to Section 7 4 of the
Omnibus Election Code. On 8 December 2015, Mr. David also
filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Honorable Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 221538 and entitled "Rizalito Y. David,
petitioner, vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Mary Grace Poe
Llamnazares, respondents." The criminal complaint pending
before the COMELEC Law Department, and G.R. No. 221538
before this Honorable Court, also involve the issue of my
natural.born Filipino citizenship.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
this 24th day of December 2015 at Quezon City, Philippines.
IVIDAD SONORA POE LLAMANZARES

Af.fiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24th day of

December 2015 at Quezon City, affiant exhibiting to me her
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861, valid until 17 March 2019,
as competent evidence of her identity.
Doc. No. O~.c(. ;
Page No. ~ ;
Book No. I ;
~
Series of 2015.
'COR-AZON R7ROMANO
No. oqg~~qg, a /2./,5
.f11(_
{8 r No. q&1 G3J' 1[~ fr~ I
Ro fl 7'lo . 4-01r;J
N.~tf ~~-P!MU.. tk.~
~ C:O!l ~3~ ( 13 t,4/
TJN NO. 14-1 .. 3q4 -&42-0D'b'
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185
COPY FURNISHED:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Public Respondent
Palacio Del Gobernador
Gen. Luna St., Intramuros
Manila
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

134 Amorsolo Street
Legaspi Village, Makati City
ATTY. ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO

Private Respondent
8th Floor, Pacific Star Building
Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue cor. Makati Avenue
Makati City
EXPLANATION
Copies of the fore going Petition for Certiorari were by

registered mail instead of the preferred mode of personal service
due to distance, time and manpower constraints. Pursuant to
, ,$&ction 6 of A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC (Efficient Use of Paper RU18:h
copies of the Annexes to this Petition, except Annexes "T" arltii
"lf,1 were no longer served on the respondents, all of the~e bei~;.~,, '
,.
~ai-i o{ the records of the case that are already 1n their
' ';; '
'.
;['
''possession. A copy of the Petition with a full set of Annexes wa ,, ,

additionally served to the Office of the Solicitor General. ,
.J, ;!. '
<~.
. ~'~...; "
...
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tt,t.

Poe-Llamanzares V COMELEC

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....,4JJ;:'(:, ''~"~-~--. ~TV.,_,u " - "'" .J..

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEC 2 8 2015

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Extremely Urgent Application for

Petitioner Senator MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-

The will of the people. is paramount. Section 1, Article II of

Petitioner is before the Supreme Court-the court of last

oppression meted out by the COMELEC is the timing of the

The "maximum prejudice" was actually doubled, because

from subverting the very electoral process it is mandated to

Petitioner is a top choice for President-emerging as the

Even before she was elected a Senator of the Republic,

Private respondent accused Petitioner,., of committing a

In "excluding" Sen. Poe from the categories of Filipinos,

she cannot establish that her biological parents are Filipinos.

Private respondent's theory is based on her misconception

Sen. Poe is a natural-born citizen, and by 9 May 2016, she

It is settled that the burden in an action under Section 78

The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, instead

3 Sec. 3 (a), Rule 131, Rules of Court

As a final note, Petitioner submits that the core issue in

The reality that a foundling will be deprived of these simply

~' PARTIES . ij<.iltr

p\~adings, processes, orders and the decision in this, c~.~~'

2. Public respondent Commission on Elections

3. Private respondent Estrella C. Elamparo ("private

4. This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in

4.1. Certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions

5. On 1 December 2015, Petitioner, through her counsel

4 Hereinafter, "1 December 2015 Resolution" or "COMELEC Second Division Resolution"

the fifth day, 6 December 2015, was a Sunday, Petitioner filed

6. Petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration was

7.On 15 October 2015, Sen. Poe filed her Certificate of

10 Annex "C" hereof

8. Summons 13 was served on Sen. Poe on 4 November

THE PETITION A QUO FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF

A.1.1. The Petition does not contain allegations which, if

A.1.2. The Petition does not allege that Sen. Poe's

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS LACKS JURISDICTION

A.2.1. The DOJ, and not the Commission on Elections, has

A.2.2. The Petition is essentially a petition for quo warranto

SEN. POE DID NOT MAKE ANY MATERIAL

SEN. POE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE

B.1.1. Even though foundlings are not expressly mentioned

B.1.2. Under applicable treaties and "generally accepted

B.1.3. Sen. Poe re-acquired her natural-born Philippine

B.1.4. Sen. Poe executed a sworn renunciation of her U.S.A.

ON 9 MAY 2016, SEN. POE WILL BE A RESIDENT OF THE

B.2.1. It is well-settled that in order to re'establish one's

B.2.1.a. From 24 May 2005 up to today, Sen.

B.2.1.b. Animus Manendi

B.2.1.c. Animus Non Revertendi

2005, without the intention of returning

B.2.2. Sen. Poe could legally reestablish her domicile of

B.2.3. Sen. Poe committed an honest mistake, on a difficult

9. The Summons received by Sen. Poe contained a Noif!J;.

10. During the 10 November 2015 clarificatory hearing~,.

11. The fallowing facts are culled from the admissions of

13. On 6 September 1968, Mr. Emiliano Militar reported

14.1. In a Certificate of Finality dated 27 October

Resolution, p. 3, Fact No. 3.