Espionage and Intelligence

Wars are not won and lost only on the battlefield. Information and secrecy are also vital as rival
states angle for military and geopolitical advantage. This is why governments throughout history
have used espionagecovert techniques to acquire, withhold, or use sensitive information. The
collection and assessment of strategic information, and that information itself, are also known
as intelligence. Today, all the worlds major governments employ spies in times of peace as well
as war, and their mysterious, dangerous work is integral to state power.
Espionage has been going on for just about as long as war itself, and references to spies in the
historical record date back to the ancient empires. One fundamental function of wartime espionage
is to monitor the location and movements of enemy troops, then secretly report this intelligence to
ones own military leadership. In the American Revolutionary War, for example, this was the mission
of such famous spies as Paul Revere and Nathan Hale, as well as Benedict Arnold, who did the
same for the British side as a double agent. Both Britain and the United States established
permanent intelligence agencies as part of their army and navy in the late nineteenth century. All
sides in World War I made extensive use of spies, sometimes gaining advance knowledge of enemy
battle plans. In early 1917, British agents intercepted and decoded the Zimmerman Telegram. This
secret message from the German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman outlined a plot to entice
Mexico into declaring war on the United States. The public exposure of the telegrams contents
helped influence the American public in favor of joining the war against Germany.

Espionage in World War II and the Cold War

Espionage and intelligence work proved crucial to the outcome of World War II. Nazi German
institutions such as the Gestapo were oriented chiefly toward maintaining the Third Reichs domestic
control through terror, one reason why German intelligence was of limited value once war broke out.
Shortly before the Nazi invasion of Poland, Polish agents shared with the British the progress they
had made on signals intelligence. Through a project called Ultra, Allied intelligence was able
to crack Germanys communications codes early in the war. Some historians believe this advantage
shortened the wars duration by as much as two years. The Allies also had tremendous success in
counterintelligence. The British were extremely effective at identifying and apprehending German
spies and, through the double-cross system, even turned many of them into double agents who
fed disinformation (false information) back to German authorities. In 1944, their bogus reports were
part of a major espionage campaign to mislead the Germans about where and when a massive
imminent Allied invasion of France would take place. The D-Day landing that took place at
Normandy on 6 June 1944 was a success; many German troops had been diverted to Pas de Calais
because of false information.
After the war ended, intelligence work grew from a wartime specialty to a permanent fixture of states.
For President Harry S. Truman and other American leaders, the Pearl Harbor attack had made clear
the need for effective, ongoing warning mechanisms, especially in the context of the emerging
conflict with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the super-secret Manhattan Project and the advent
of atomic weapons vastly increased the level of secrecy in government. The Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), Americas wartime intelligence body, became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
after the National Security Act of 1947. Today, the CIA is at the hub of a wider intelligence
community comprising more than a dozen separate agencies including the National SecurityAgency,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
Meanwhile, Soviet Russia had its own formidable intelligence capability, which its leaders used both
to protect their communist government and to promote communism in foreign lands. Joseph Stalin
turned the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) into his apparatus of internal
repression. After Stalins death, the USSR established the KGB. Intelligence bodies served as secret
police in many autocratic societies, typified during the Cold War by East Germanys Stasi. Among
the worlds most well-known espionage agencies are Israels Mossad, Pakistans Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), and Britains MI5.

Covert Action from Mosaddegh to the Mujahideen

The functions of the CIA fall into three major categories. The agencys primary job is to collect and
analyze information about a vast array of places, events, and issues related to the national security
of the United States. Among the products of this brainwork are the Presidents Daily Briefing and the
authoritative, classified reports known as National Intelligence Estimates. A second task is
counterintelligence, the protection of government secrets, including its secret worldwide network of
informants and other assets. The third category, covert action, encompasses all sorts of espionage
activity meant to influence events overseas.

Starting in the 1950s, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and CIA Director Allen Dulles, covert
action began to play a more prominent role in U.S. foreign policy. In 1953, the CIA was clandestinely
involved in the overthrow of Irans democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh,
and his replacement by the autocratic, but pro-Western, Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
The following year, a CIA coup ousted Guatemalas reformist president, Jacobo Arbenz, leading to
decades of repressive military rule in that country. U.S. operatives tried in a variety of ways to get rid
of Cubas communist revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro, includingassassination attempts and a
bungled invasion. Over the years the CIA has been implicated in numerous other efforts to subvert
or overthrow governments perceived as hostile to U.S. interests.
Some of these covert actions had unforeseen and devastating consequences. During the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the CIA funneled billions of dollars in aid, through Pakistans
ISI, to Muslim resistance fighters known collectively as the mujahideen. This operation helped set
the stage for the eventual Soviet withdrawal, and indirectly contributed to the demise of the Soviet
Union. It also led directly to the rise of Islamic terrorist groups that later threatened the West. For
example, a wealthy young Saudi man named Osama bin Laden went to Pakistan to join the Afghan
conflict before founding the al-Qaeda terrorist network. The ISI has continued to play a shadowy role
in support of diverse militant groups in the region such as the Afghan Taliban. A mysterious money
transfer, sent days before th September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington
from Mahmud Ahmed, head of the ISI, to Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 ringleaders, has not yet
been fully explained. The emergence of al-Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks could be considered
examples of blowbackan intelligence term for unintended negative consequences of espionage
tactics.
Faulty Intelligence
In addition to those around the world who object to the CIAs geopolitical meddling, some critics
believe the agencys priorities should return to traditional intelligence gathering. The CIAs analysts,
supposedly among the best-informed people in the world, were apparently caught by surprise when
their main adversary, the Soviet Union, disintegrated. Intelligence work is also vulnerable to being
ignored, distorted, or misused by political leaders. In the lead-up to the March 2003 U.S. invasion
of Iraq, President George W. Bush and his administration insisted that Iraq was hiding weapons of
mass destruction. When the coalition forces found no such weapons, the administration declared an
intelligence failure. In December 2007, the findings of a National Intelligence Estimate were leaked
to the press, revealing the intelligence communitys judgment that Iran had shut down its efforts to
develop a nuclear weapons capability. This conclusion contradicted the assertions of Bush and Vice
President Richard Cheney, who had been considering a military strike against Iran.
Despite the end of the Cold War, undercover espionage work goes on. Ten people arrested in the
United States on 27 June 2010 were accused of being sleeper spies for Russian intelligence. The
members of the spy ring had lived in the United States for more than a decade under assumed
identities, but none had apparently managed to obtain any meaningful policy secrets. On 8 July, the
ten were deported to an airport tarmac in Vienna, Austria, in exchange for four prisoners released
from Russian jails.
Espionage is not restricted exclusively to government and the national security arena. Corporations
also spy on one another routinely to gain industrial advantage, steal trade secrets and proprietary
information, or engage in sabotage. In July 2011, escalating espionage accusations rocked Rupert
Murdochs News Corporation, one of the worlds largest media companies. Journalists and private
investigators at Murdochs British newspapers were accused of hacking into the voice mail accounts
of numerous public figures. Two top officials at Scotland Yard resigned as evidence gathered of
police collusion with News Corporation executives.

Robotic weapons: researchers call for new

regulations for 21st century warfare | Oxford
Martin School
Robotic weapons, whether autonomous or remote controlled, have generated
widespread controversy in recent years. A new policy paper from the Oxford
Martin School, University of Oxford, urges governments to recognise the
increasing prominence of these weapons in contemporary and future forms of
warfare and proposes steps towards suitable regulation.
Robotic weapons currently in use range from RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Systems), commonly referred to as drones, which are controlled by a human
operator, to robots used to monitor border posts in the Korean Demilitarized
Zone, which can potentially be programmed to identify and target individuals
without direct human supervision. The debate on these types of weapons has
become more confused as their use has increased; varying degrees of machine
autonomy, and the differing contexts in which robotic weapons can potentially
be deployed, mean a legal and ethical consensus has so far proved impossible.
With more funding being channeled into the development of the next
generation of military robots, confusion and controversy are likely to grow.

It is clear that robotic weapons are here to stay, and that they will play a
growing role in future armed conflicts, says Dr Alex Leveringhaus, the papers
lead author. Their use is increasing in militaries around the world, as is
research into new systems. A recent example is the announcement of co-
operation between the UK and France on a new drone, known at the moment
as the Future Combat Air System. But their use raises a multitude of legal and
ethical questions. Many people are uncomfortable with the concept of an
autonomous robotic weapon, or even with the idea that military personnel can
kill by remote control.

New military technologies and their deployment are in danger of outpacing

the development of an appropriate regulatory framework. There is now an
urgent need for states, the military and manufacturers to work together to
respond to justified legal and moral concerns.

The new Oxford Martin School policy paper, Robo-Wars: The Regulation of
Robotic Weapons, gives a clear and concise overview of the technological
dimensions of robotic weapons as well as their treatment under existing
international legal and ethical frameworks. It assesses the regulatory options
currently under discussion, and recommends ways for states, manufacturers
and the military to develop a suitable regulatory framework.

Its authors, Dr Leveringhaus and Dr Gilles Giacca state that, given the
complexity of the issue, neither a blanket endorsement nor condemnation of
robotic weapons is feasible. Instead, regulation should be conducted on a case-
by-case basis.

Their recommendations include:

Prioritising human oversight and control over weapons at all stages of

deployment, and ensuring human operators can override the robot at
any stage;
Implementing mechanisms to ensure human operators can be held
responsible for deployment and supervision of weapons;
For states and the military to work together to define the contexts in
which robotic weapons can be used, and prevent illegal use;
Ensuring new weapons comply with existing legal and ethical
restrictions.

Emerging military weapons

The roles played by autonomous weapons will be discussed at a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, this
week which could have far reaching ramifications for the future of war.

The second Expert Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) will discuss issues
surrounding what have been dubbed by some as "killer robots", and whether they ought to be
permitted in some capacity or perhaps banned altogether.

The discussion falls under the purview of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),
which has five protocols already covering non-detectable fragments, mines and booby traps, incendiary
weapons, blinding lasers and the explosive remnants of war.

Australia and other parties to the CCW will consider policy questions about LAWS and whether there
should be a sixth protocol added to the CCW that would regulate or ban LAWS.

There are generally two broad views on the matter:

LAWS should be put in the same category as biological and chemical weapons and comprehensively and
pre-emptively banned.

LAWS should put in the same category as precision-guided weapons and regulated.
The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (CSKR) argues for a ban on LAWS similar to the ban on blinding lasers
in Protocol IV of the CCW and the ban on anti-personnel landmines in the Ottawa Treaty. They argue
that killer robots must be stopped before they proliferate and that tasking robots with human
destruction is fundamentally immoral.

Others disagree, such as Professor Ron Arkin of Georgia Tech in the US, who argues that robots should
be regarded more as the next generation of "smart" bombs.

They are potentially more accurate, more precise, completely focused on the strictures of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and thus, in theory, preferable even to human war fighters who may panic, seek
revenge or just plain stuff up. Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, after all, appears to have been shot down
by "meaningful human control".

Only five nations currently support a ban on LAWS: Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Pakistan and the Holy See.
None are known for their cutting edge robotics. Japan and South Korea, by contrast, have big robotics
industries. South Korea has already fielded the Samsung SGR-A1 "sentry robots" on its border with
North Korea.

Definitions

At the end of last year's meeting, most nations were non-committal. There were repeated calls for
better definitions and more discussions, such as from Sweden, Germany, Russia and China.

Few nations have signed up to the CSKR's view that "the problem" has to be solved quickly before it is
too late. Most diplomats are asking what exactly would they like to ban and why?

The UK government has suggested that existing international humanitarian law provides sufficient
regulation. The British interest is that BAE Systems is working on a combat drone called Taranis, which
might be equipped with lethal autonomy and replace the Tornado.

LAWS are already regulated by existing International Humanitarian Law. According to the Red Cross, no
expert disputes this. LAWS that cannot comply with IHL principles, such as distinction and
proportionality are already illegal. LAWS are already required to go through Article 36 review before
being fielded, just like any other new weapon.

As a result, the suggestion by the CSKR that swift action is required is not, as yet, gaining diplomatic
traction. As their own compilation report shows, most nations have yet to grasp the issue, let alone
commit to policy.

The real problem for the CSKR is that a LAWS is a combination of three hard to ban components:

Sensors (such as radars) which have legitimate civilian uses

"Lethal" cognition (i.e. computer software that targets humans), which is not much different from "non-
lethal" cognition (i.e. computer software that targets "virtual" humans in a video game)

"Lethal" actuators (i.e. weapons such as Hellfire missiles), which can also be directly controlled by a
human "finger on the button" and are not banned per se.

Japan has already indicated it will oppose any ban on "dual-use" components of a LAWS. The problem is
that everything in a LAWS is dual-use the "autonomy" can be civilian, the lethal weapons can be
human operated, for example. What has to be regulated or banned is a combination of components, not
any one core component.

Out of the loop?

The phrase "meaningful human control" has been articulated by numerous diplomats as a desired goal
of regulation. There is much talk of humans and "loops" in the LAWS debate:

Human "in the loop": the robot makes decisions according to human-programmed rules, a human hits a
confirm button and the robot strikes. Examples are the Patriot missile system and Samsung's SGR-A1 in
"normal" mode.

Human "on the loop": the robot decides according to human-programmed rules, a human has time to
hit an abort button, and if the abort button is not hit, then robot strikes. Examples would be the Phalanx
Close-In Weapon System or the Samsung SGR-A1 in "invasion" mode, where the sentry gun can operate
autonomously.

Human "off the loop": the robot makes decisions according to human-programmed rules, the robot
strikes, and a human reads a report a few seconds or minutes later. An example would be any "on the
loop" LAWS with a broken or damaged network connection.

It could be that a Protocol VI added to the CCW bans "off the loop" LAWS, for example. Although the
most widely fielded extant LAWS are "off the loop" weapons such as anti-tank and anti-ship mines that
have been legal for decades.

As such, diplomats might need a fourth category:

Robot "beyond the loop" the robot decides according to rules it learns or creates itself, the robot strikes,
and the robot may or may not bother to let humans know.

The meeting taking place this week will likely wrestle with these definitions, and it will be interesting to
see if any resolution or consensus emerges, and what implications that might have on the future of war.

The history of warfare and international security is the history of technological

innovation, and the modern era is no exception. The advent of nuclear
technology, for example, led to the doctrine of deterrence through mutually
assured destruction. More recent advances such as unmanned vehicles and
precision mortars and missiles have increasingly minimized both own-side
causalities and collateral damage, and with them the risk of unwanted shifts in
public opinion, while placing ever more of a premium on accurate intelligence.

However, the pace of technological change is accelerating all the time. Can
our ability to respond even to understand keep up?

The fear of what both friends and foes are developing, and willing to use,
could overwhelm existing processes of oversight, dialogue, diplomacy and
control, disrupting our ability to make informed and politically sound decisions.
Rapid advances in any of the following technologies could potentially
destabilize fragile balances of power and permanently alter the international
security landscape, entrenching disparities between countries or heralding
chaos.

Here are eight technologies that are changing the international security
landscape:

1. Drones. Essentially, drones are flying robots. The US appears to be

leading the way with over 11,000 such vehicles, but the technology is
spreading widely as it becomes more affordable: even North Korea
reportedly possesses advanced drone technology, while off-the-shelf
quadcopter drones are already being used by narcotics gangs to spy on
and eliminate rivals. Last year saw the first instance of a US civilian
shooting down a drone when a neighbour flew it over his property.
2. Autonomous weapons. When drone technology is combined with
artificial intelligence, the result is so-called autonomous weapons
which can select and engage targets based on pre-defined criteria and
without human intervention. These have been called potentially the third
revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear. We might still be a
long way from Hollywoods humanoid-looking robots, coldly deciding
who lives and dies; but current technology is advanced enough for, say,
an armed quadcopter using facial recognition software to identify targets
from a database and open fire. The risks of automated weapons are
clear: for example, facial recognition is still far from reliable; while
human override mechanisms can theoretically be built in, they can
malfunction; and automated weapons could be hacked by malicious
parties.
3. Wearable devices. Possible military uses here include sensing moods
to avoid poor decision making; tracking bodily functions to optimize
health and performance; exo-skeletons to enhance soldiers
 performance, with current technology already allowing a human to carry
loads of around 90kg without difficulty; and spying. In a real-life story
reminiscent of an Ian Fleming novel, a lady styling herself as
SexyCyborg has posted online about how she 3D-printed shoes with a
hidden drawer where she installed devices for gathering information,
then used her seductive appearance to gain entrance to organizations,
evading the traditional detection mechanisms such as being asked to
leave mobile equipment at the door.
4. Additive manufacturing. 3D printing has already been tested by both
the US and Chinese armies in war games, and could revolutionize
supply chains by enabling replacement parts to be manufactured in the
field from digitally transmitted designs and locally available materials.
Militaries are even aiming to be able to print food, and skin and
prosthetics for those injured in service. Questions remain to be solved,
however, around intellectual property, quality control and liability. As
printers become more precise and able to use more materials, there is
also a risk of proliferation of certain types of weapon systems as it
becomes easier to copy critical technologies and bypass normal
restrictions such as export controls. Additive manufacturing techniques
could enable the development of new kinds of warhead, with greater
control of particle size and direction on detonation.
5. Renewable energy. The capacity to generate power locally could
revolutionize supply chains as much as the capacity to print parts
locally. Militaries are already at the forefront of developing solar
technologies, including dye-sensitized light harvesting materials which
can harness light energy outside the visible spectrum. Nanomaterials
embedded in clothes could potentially also turn them into a significant
method of energy generation.
6. Nanotechnology. Our ability to manipulate particles at the nano scale
has progressed significantly in the last decade, and we are rapidly
developing technology to make metamaterials which have properties
that do not occur naturally. Some conceivable applications still remain in
the realm of science fiction, such as Star Trek-type cloaking devices,
and systems which can self-replicate and self-assemble. We have also
barely scratched the surface of possible ways to exploit quantum effects
of matter at supercooled temperatures. Still, in the short term, related
innovations promise to make weaponry better, lighter, more mobile,
smarter, and more precise. One challenge is that nano electronics need
vast amounts of power; another is that it will be significantly harder to
monitor the proliferation of nano weapons than, say, nuclear weapons.
 7. Biological weapons. While the history of biological warfare is nearly as
old as the history of warfare itself, rapid developments in biotechnology,
genetics and genomics are opening up new and highly lethal avenues
for the creation of new biological weapons. We are already capable of
altering cells and creating killer viruses. Airborne designer viruses,
engineered superbugs and genetically modified plagues all seem like
potential doomsday scenarios. The global norms against biological
weapons, laid down in the 1925 Geneva Convention and the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, are coming under pressure
as the capacity to create lethal biological weapons becomes more
widespread.
8. Bio-chemical weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits
any use of chemicals, including non-lethal chemicals, in warfare
situations but here, too, technological advances are making such
weapons almost a do-it-yourself project and increasingly hard to
regulate. Unmanned vehicles also offer new and effective ways of
delivering chemical agents in the battlefield. Advances in neurobiology
and pharmaceuticals will offer increasing possibilities to alter
behavioural patterns and emotions perhaps including cocktails of
chemical drugs which change neurological signals to create warrior
behaviour reminiscent of zombie movies.

What is the best response to such evolving threats? Given the destabilizing
nature of some of these innovations, there might be strong arguments for
establishing legal prohibitions on and, just as importantly, strong norms
against the use of certain new weapon types. With other new weapons,
such as more intelligent systems and equipment, there will be the potential to
reduce casualties overall if used in the right way, so we will want to try to
regulate rather than prevent their use altogether.

However, it makes little sense to try to ban the development of all

technologies with the potential to create weapons of a kind which we would
not want to see used. Many of the above technologies have obvious civilian
applications from delivery drones to the genetic engineering of viruses to
treat diseases and indeed are largely being developed by civilian
entrepreneurs.

History is replete with technologies which are initially developed with the aim
of winning a conflict and later bring a peace dividend, such as improvements
in aviation spurred by the First World War. History also shows it can be
difficult to foretell what technologies may become most militarily impactful: just
as those innovated in a military context can turn out to have life-enhancing
civilian applications, so ostensibly benign technologies can be unexpectedly
tweaked into killing machines.

Leaving aside the desirability of bans on the development of technologies,

there is the question of feasibility. In a growing number of fields, the capacity
to innovate potentially weaponizable technologies is no longer the preserve of
militaries with large budgets, and can increasingly be done by small groups or
individuals with off-the-shelf equipment. While technology is also improving
our capacity for surveillance, it will be difficult to be confident that no group is
working undetected.

Instead, the way forward lies in finding ways to incentivize technological

innovation that avoid the rush into a technological arms race. This will require
collaboration to understand how technologies are evolving and likely to
evolve, to enable the discussion of new ethical guidelines before such
technologies are widely weaponized, fall in the wrong hands or are utilized for
malign purposes. Everyone stands to benefit from greater insight, more
qualified oversight, better preparedness and collaborative thought leadership.

Counter-Terrorism

As radical Islamist groups become more and more effective at recruiting ordinary
Russian citizens to their cause, the state is increasing efforts at identifying those at risk
of falling under the influence of recruiters.

A court in Yekaterinburg (around 1,100 miles east of Moscow) has determined that city
resident Mohammad Gireyev used social networks to recruit potential supporters for the
Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar group.

Earlier the organization had been linked to the Islamic State jihadist organization and
now it is affiliated with another terrorist group, the al-Nusra Front.

Russia actively began looking for terrorist recruiters and recruits after the widely-
publicized incident involving Varvara Karaulova, a Moscow student who traveled to
Turkey in order to enter Syria and join ISIS after being contacted by recruiters. She was
detained near the Syrian border and returned to Russia.

The mass media later started reporting with increasing frequency on children from well-
to-do families and regions with no Islamic underground who had set off for the newly-
proclaimed caliphate after meeting recruiters on the internet. As ISIS grew it became
apparent that recruiters are ready to work not only with Muslims but will target any
vulnerable citizens.

Hotline set up
Yelena Sutormina, a member of the Civic Chamber of Russia, has established a hotline
for those whose relatives are either planning to go to Syria or are already there.
Sutormina said that she has been contacted more than 50 times since the summer.

"The people who call or write are those who suspect their relatives of sympathizing with
ISIS and ask to have them returned from Syria," she said.

Having received and verified information on a person who has gone to Syria,
Sutormina's colleagues then write to the Interior Ministry and Russias Federal Security
Service (FSB) asking that an international search warrant be put out for the individual.
They also ask the government authorities to help look for the relative if he or she has
still not left Russian territory.

A recent case involved a car dealership in a Moscow suburb, said Sutormina.

"We were told that one of the employees was becoming more and more aggressive,
that he was expressing his support for the extremists, criticizing the Russian bombings.
His colleagues were afraid and wrote us and we gave the information to the FSB. Now
the man is being questioned," she said.

Sutormina adds that volunteers are trying to fight these recruiters unofficially, since
thanks to the internet the geography of alarming signals has expanded.

"I have this feeling that the recruiters are ready to offer the recruits anything they lack.
For some it's faith, for some love, for others violence. This is very difficult to detect,"
said Varvara Karaulova's lawyer Sergei Badamshin.

According to Sutormina, the Russian Security Council has received a petition from
several Civic Chamber members suggesting that Roskomnadzor (The Federal Service
for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media) be given
more authority in matters of internet resources, since it is there that ISIS carries out its
recruitment.

Currently, the service can block sites only if the General Prosecutor's Office orders
it. Meanwhile, Russias parliament, the State Duma, is trying to toughen its anti-
terrorism legislation, including reviewing proposals to harshen punishment for
recruitment.

Caucasian sources
Russias North Caucasus region is reportedly now the main supplier of ISIS recruits.
The figures constantly differ but the FSB and the National Anti-terrorist Committee say
that there are at least 4,000 Russian citizens on the territory controlled by ISIS, who are
mostly of North Caucasus origin.

In comparison with previous years, security forces in the North Caucasus republic of
Dagestan are seeing a relative lull. Agents admit that this calm is due to the purges of
underground groups before the Olympics in Sochi and then to the mass departure of
radicalized youths from the republic for Syria.

"Of course, many prefer just to take their family and go to Turkey for starters. From
there you can get over the border to Syria. The difference is that you can't take your
family into a forest, while ISIS needs not only soldiers but also people with other
professions. You can actually live there," said a Moscow-based Salafi preacher, who
spoke to RBTH on condition of anonymity.

The law-enforcement agencies are attentively watching the local Muslim population and
are taking preventive measures with suspicious citizens.

Russias Counterterrorism Policy: Variations on an

Imperial Theme
By Mariya Y. Omelicheva

For over a decade, Russia has struggled with persistent domestic insurgency and terrorism.
The country has experienced a multitude of terrorist and militant attacks, and the turn of
the century was marked by a series of high-profile terrorist incidents involving a large
number of civilian casualties. In response to this threat, Russian authorities adopted
extensive counterterrorism legislation, established and modified institutions responsible for
combating terrorism, and streamlined the leadership and conduct of counterterrorist
operations. According to recent statements by the present Kremlin administration, the
terrorist problem in Russia has finally receded, and the war on separatism had been
definitively won. Yet, the daily reports on the shoot-outs and clashes between insurgents
and Russia's security forces cast serious doubts on these official claims. Despite the signs of
a slow normalization of life in Chechnya, the security situation remains tense there, and
terrorist incidents and guerilla attacks have spread into the broader Southern region
previously unaffected by terrorism.
Much ink has been spilled criticizing deficiencies of Russia's forceful, excessive, and poorly-
coordinated responses. The state has been blamed for the lack of a comprehensive
counterterrorism strategy encompassing socio-economic approaches and an effective
system of prevention and protection from terrorism. Yet, judging the Russian campaign's
excesses and failures does not improve our general understanding of why it has always
favored the tactic of force and suppression as the most appropriate methods of fighting
terrorism. Stressing the futility of a short-term reactive approach does not explain Russia's
choice of the military approach over the long-term socio-economic solutions for resolving
complex security concerns.

It is my conviction that many aspects of Russia's counterterrorism policy can be explained

from the position of Russia's imperial tradition. The latter had considerable impact on the
policies and security measures adopted by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. Rekindled
recently by the fear of disintegration and reduced international standing, it has been
shaping security policies and perceptions of the modern Russian state. In the essay that
follows, I briefly delineate the contours of Russia's contemporary counterterrorism policy
and demonstrate the continuity of Russian counterterrorism from pre-Soviet and Soviet, to
post-Soviet regimes. Next, I define and demonstrate the endurance of the imperial tradition
throughout the Tsarist, Soviet, and modern epochs, and apply the "imperial lens" for the
analysis and interpretation of Russia's measures aimed at combating terrorism.

A Brief on Russia's Counterterrorism Policy

In the context of Russia, terrorism has been tightly associated with activities of Islamic
militants in Chechnya and the broader North Caucasus region. The latter has been an area
with the highest concentration of terrorist attacks, and Chechen guerilla fighters have been
implicated in the vast majority of hostage-taking incidents and terrorist crimes in Russia.
The development of Russia's counterterrorism legislation and institutional framework has
trailed the government's experiences with fighting the Chechen resistance and coping with
the threat of terrorism in the North Caucasus.

As a result of the developments in Chechnya, the Russian government adopted the Federal
Law "On Combating Terrorism" in 1998, which became the main legal pillar of Russian anti-
terrorist efforts. The law attempted to define terrorist activity omitting political motivation
as one of the defining characteristics of the crime. It also sketched out the legal regime of
the counterterrorist operation, and defined organizational basis of counterterrorism placing
Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Ministry of Interior (MVD) at the top of the
list of agencies responsible for combating terrorism.

The troops of the FSB, MVD, and military units from other "power" ministries - the Defense
Ministry, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Border Service were used in
counterterrorism and "mop-up" operations in Chechnya as part of the Combined Group of
Forces. To assist the military battalions in carrying out counterterrorism tasks, the FSB, the
Interior Ministry, and the Main Intelligence Service of Russia created special task teams for
the liquidation of terrorists and militants without trial.[1] With a lack of oversight and the
virtual impunity of the military and special task forces, the counterterrorism operation in
Chechnya has degenerated into the indiscriminate use of overwhelming military force,
characterized by deplorable patterns of brutalizing the local population. Frequent
abductions, summary executions, and torture have had a radicalizing effect on the
population.

In 1999, Russia entered the second Chechen military campaign, and a new wave of terrorist
violence and insurgency engulfed the country in the early 2000s. The government's reaction
to a new wave of terrorism was similar to earlier policy responses. President Putin pledged
to overhaul the system of Russia's security services and develop procedures for coordinating
the activities of counterterrorism agencies. The Russian government vowed to re-assert its
influence in the North Caucasus and restore order in the volatile Southern region. The
military strategies were expanded outside of the Chechen republic, and the presence of
military troops in the rest of the North Caucasus was substantially increased.[2] Under the
pretext of combating terrorism, the Kremlin increased the powers of its security services,
strengthened the "power vertical," and expanded controls over mass media and political
life.[3] To streamline the changes in the leadership and conduct of counterterrorist
operations, the Russian government adopted a new Federal Law "On Counteraction to
Terrorism", which replaced the earlier version. Entered into force in 2006, the law legalizes
the application of armed forces for counterterrorism operations inside and outside of the
country, but provides only scant description of prophylactic measures aimed at defending
the Russian people and infrastructure against the threat of terrorism. As the 1998 act "On
Combating Terrorism," the 2006 counterterrorism law allows for suspension of certain
individual liberties and media freedoms in the zone of counterterrorist operations, and
authorizes counterterrorism units to carry out searches and demolition of suspicious
airplanes and ships.

Extensive legislative measures and institutional reforms all point to the Russian desire to
learn from its experiences of managing horrific acts of terrorism. Notwithstanding the
changes at the tactical level of counterterrorist operations and development of new means
for combating terrorism, the basic principles of tackling security threats in Russia have
remained essentially the same. The striking similarities of the current views on the most
effective and appropriate ways of combating terrorism to those of the Soviet and Tsarist
regimes suggest the palpable continuity of Russian counterterrorism. The resemblance of
contemporary measures to Soviet and pre-Soviet responses is indicative of an age-old
understanding of the terrorist threat that Russia inherited from the previous regimes.

The Continuity of Russia's Counterterrorism

Since the first terrorist campaign set up by the Russian revolutionaries in the late 19th
century, terrorism in Russia has been regarded as an assault against the state personified
by the Tsar, the communist party, or the central government and leadership of the modern
state, respectively. In the epoch of Tsars, terrorism was coterminous with the revolutionary
movement against absolutism.[4] During the early years of the Bolshevik rule, it was
tantamount to counter-revolutionary anti-Communist actions. Two decades later, terrorism
was viewed as subversive activities of foreign intelligence services, or acts of resistance to
the Soviet government orchestrated by secret services from Western states. Neither the
Soviet Union nor contemporary Russia has clearly defined terrorism or distinguished it from
other crimes of a violent or political nature.[5] This ill-defined legal construct allowed the
government full discretion to bring forth charges of alleged terrorist crimes. The vague
definitions created uncertainty in the application of law, which allowed for politically
motivated enforcement of the criminal legislative provisions.

The scope of Russia's counterterrorism measures has been traditionally confined to military
operations and security services' efforts. This follows from Russia's understanding of
terrorism as an attack on the state rather than an assault on individual rights.
Subsequently, in Russia, concerns over human rights have always receded to the
background of counterterrorism planning and operations. The very first counterterrorist
campaign launched by the Tsarist regime was exemplar in this regard. The extent of
oppression and violations of individual freedoms was incommensurable to the
revolutionaries' attacks that the Tsarist government sought to deter and combat. Hundreds
of "politically untrustworthy" people were sent to exile, placed under strict surveillance, or
kept in the long-term pre-trial detention for having "intent" to commit terrorist crimes. The
secret police monitored societal "moods," and exercised control over the theater, literature,
and print media. It was also responsible for surveillance of intelligentsia in Tsarist Russia.[6]

The Bolsheviks, who replaced Tsarist agents, employed terror tactics to counter bourgeois
terrorism. Since the latter was viewed as a bi-product of class struggle, the annihilation of
the bourgeoisie was deemed essential for eradicating terrorism.[7] For the Soviet
government, terrorism became a continuation of struggle launched by the capitalist
governments against the communist regime. Subsequently, neutralization of "enemies"
suspected in collaboration with the Western nations was considered a necessary dimension
of counteraction to terrorism. In modern Russia, the ruthlessness of the Russian security
forces and impunity with which its troops committed their crimes against ethnic Chechens
were tantamount to the brutal practices employed against the peoples of the Russian
Empire, whether under Tsarist or Soviet rule.

The "security departments" ["okhrannye otdeleniya," known in the West as Okhrana) that
carried out counter-revolutionary and counterterrorism functions in the Tsarist
administration became a prototype for the Soviet-era secret police. The "All-Russian
Emergency Commission" ("Vserossiiskaya Chrezvychainaya Komissiya"), or VChK, became
the main tool of the Bolshevik terror and a precursor of the Committee of State Security
(KGB) created in 1954.[8] Modern Russia has largely inherited the Soviet-era structure of
counterterrorism institutions, and the FSB's anti-terrorism office was a direct successor of
the KGB's department for the fight against terrorism. Many officers of the contemporary
security organs continue to rely on Soviet-style work methods, and believe in the
effectiveness of a security model emphasizing short-term, reactive, and coercive responses
instead of exploring alternative long-term measures for preventing the threat of terrorism. A
long-term strategy integrating preventive, prophylactic and reactive measures had not been
developed in the Soviet Union and is in a rudimentary stage in Russia. In 2006, the FSB
chief, Nicholai Patrushev, evaluated Russia's system of terrorist attack prevention as very
poor, giving it a score of "2" on a 5-point scale, which is a failing grade in the Russian
educational system.

The reason for this lack of a comprehensive preventive strategy is that in each regime
neither the secret services nor the law-enforcement agencies of Russia have systematically
examined their counterterrorism experiences for preparing recommendations regarding
improvements of methods and tactics of combating terrorism.[9] The Russian security
agencies, like their Tsarist and Soviet counterparts, carry out little analytical work and have
a minimal understanding of complex scientific and methodological tools for the systematic
processing and evaluation of data with the purpose of assessing strategic situations in the
region, identifying patterns of crimes, as well as the causes and consequences of
criminalization.

Russia's Imperial Tradition and Its Impact on State's Responses to Terrorism

It is my conviction that the continuity of the Russian counterterrorism program can be

explained from the position of Russia's imperial tradition. The latter refers to a practice of
extension and retention of the state authority over culturally, linguistically, and ethnically
diverse populations by means of force and accompanying this practice with a set of beliefs
regarding the greatness and inviolability of the empire.

Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union were both imperial states formed by conquest and
military force, retained by power and centralized control, and ruled by a Moscow-based
bureaucracy. Geographical expansion was the essence of imperial existence in the epoch of
the Tsars. In the Soviet time, territorial aggrandizement became commensurate with the
extension of the Soviet Union's national power. [10] Both the USSR and its predecessor
were multi-national states in which ethnic cultures and indigenous traditions were
subordinated to "high" Russian culture and language. Although, neither entity had
succeeded in building a nation, both undertook measures to develop a sense of
"Russianness" in the diverse population. The Russian settlers colonized the vast territories
inhabited by the non-Slavs, and occupied the key military, security, political, and economic
posts in the non-Russian regions. Russian language and traditions were imposed on other
ethnic groups, and myths about Russia's leading role in their present and past were actively
disseminated.[11]

Contemporary Russia has all of the trappings of an imperial state. It encompasses most of
the territory of Soviet and Tsarist Russia, and many regions located on its territorial fringes
still bear the scars of the colonial past. In this multi-ethnic state, a predominantly Slavic
political elite rule over a multitude of disempowered ethnic cultures and groups.[12] The
Russian government, elite, and general public perceive their country as the successor of
both the USSR and the Russian empire. Vladimir Putin, upon assuming his post as a Russian
president, attempted to build a historical bridge from the present to the past including the
Soviet time. The ideas of Russia's greatness and its destined superpower status have been
used as a centerpiece of the seemingly continuous Russian identity.[13] The notions of
"gosudarstvennost'" and "derzhava," associated with strong statehood and great power,
have firmly entered public discourse and have become a staple of the ruling United Russia
party's platform.

Thus, the history of Russia has been that of an imperial state. Yet, it has also been an
empire with a different tradition. It has never evolved into a national empire with a strong
sense of national consciousness. On the contrary, Russia's nationhood has always been
bound with imperium, Tsarist or Soviet, and citizens -- regardless of their nationality --
owed allegiance to the Tsar, the Communist party, or the state.[14] Contemporary Russia
reveres this tradition. "For the Russian, a strong state is not an anomaly, not something
with which he has to struggle, but, on the contrary, a source and a guarantee of order, as
well as the initiator and main moving force of any change," declared Putin.[15] A strong
state with direct and decisive command over the people has been viewed as a key to
resolving Russia's mounting economic and political concerns. Strengthening the state
through centralization and the erection of the "power vertical" has become a marker of
Putin's eight-year rule.

The imperial tradition and myths about Russia's preordained status of super power have had
considerable impact on its perceptions of the threats to security and the ensuing security
policies. The decline and collapse of the USSR struck a severe blow to Russian status
internationally and its image as a super-power. The loss of the former Soviet Republics not
only reduced the size of Russian territory, but also significantly damaged its strategic
position with regard to access to the high seas and strategic resources. The deteriorating
military-industrial capabilities that could not compete with the military and economic
performance of the West were a source of significant unease. Like imperial Russia and the
Soviet Union before, contemporary Russia has been insecure about the openness and
indefensibility of its new borders as well as encirclement by what it perceives to be, at least
moderately hostile states. Internally, a wave of nationalist and separatist claims that
threaten a further disintegration of Russian territory have exacerbated this post-imperial
frustration.
Faced with imminent decay, Russia was in no position to perform its imperial function of
continual geopolitical expansion. It only sought to preserve its landmass and retain the
state on a vast area of land that was in danger of shrinking away.[16] Russia's handling of
the Chechen conflict has been a product of its imperial policy, a "test of Russia's imperial
will."[17] The Chechen war and concomitant counterterrorism operations have been used to
preserve the Russian "imperial body" against all odds of further degeneration. The policy
toward Chechnya has been invigorated by several elements: the archaic views on the
backwardness of the Chechen people; primordial beliefs in the historical enmity of the
Chechen toward Russians and their supposed propensity for violence; and Russia's "calling"
to protect the Slavs, Orthodoxy, and the West from the grip of Islamic radicalism.[18]
According to Putin, Chechnya was an "irresponsible quasi-state" that became a "gangster
enclave while the ideological vacuum was quickly filled by fundamentalist
organizations".[19] This kind of rationalization employed by Russian leadership is not unique
to the Chechen conflict. It is a frame commonly used by imperial incumbents to justify their
fight against anti-colonialism.[20]

It should be noted, however, that the Chechen resistance forces have always posed variable
levels of threat to security of the Russian state. The first Chechen President Dzhokhar
Dudaev let various armed groups to carry out attacks on the Russian security forces and
engage in a range of criminal activities under his watch. Aslan Maskhadov, elected as a
President of Chechnya in 1997, had limited success in curbing the growth of radical Islamic
groups, which continued insurgency campaign against Moscow. Yet, the first military
campaign in Chechnya was instigated by fear of the Chechen precedent for other discontent
republics, and the primary motive for the Chechen war was to prevent disintegration of
Russia. The second Chechen war was launched in response to insurgents' operations in
Dagestan and a series of bombings in the heartland of Russia. The latter attacks were
blamed on the Chechen resistance groups, a fact that has never been fully confirmed, and
many analysts pondered over the role of the second war in boosting legitimacy and support
for Putin. Furthermore, no level of threat can justify the extent of atrocities committed by
the Russian military against the Chechen, official tolerance, if not outright support for, their
discrimination, and demonization of the entire Chechen population in statements of some
politicians and Russian mass media. Not only did these practices expand the support base
for guerilla fighters and terrorists, they also prompted the change in the tactics of the
Chechen insurgents who resorted increasingly to terrorist attacks inside and outside of
Chechnya.

The Tsarist and Soviet empires were held together by strong authoritarian rule. The
preservation of Russia's territory by means of the war and counterterrorism also revived
authoritarianism. Against the backdrop of the military and counterterrorism operations in
the North Caucasus, the government launched extensive political and administrative
reforms carried out under the guise of restoring order, reducing lawlessness, and combating
terrorism.

The first in a series of the state-wide transformations was aimed at eliminating

dysfunctional features of Yeltsin-style federalism. Russia was divided into seven federal
districts likened to the six Governorate Generals established by Alexander II in the wake of
an assassination attempt in 1879.[21] The presidential envoys, heading each federal district
and accountable directly to president, have been tasked with the restoration of the
preeminence of federal law and order, and coordination of federal agencies' activities in the
districts they head. Yet, their unofficial assignment to monitor the threats to state security
and assist in the consolidation of Putin's regime was similar to the tasks of the
Governorate General formed in the epoch of the Tsars.[22]
The 1866 assassination attempt by a young Russian revolutionary, Karakozov, gave the
Tsar an excuse to take away certain municipal freedoms, and clamp down on the
democratic press.[23] The Dubrovka theater crisis of 2002 and the 2004 Beslan tragedy
supplied the Russian government with a pretext for abolishing direct popular elections of
regional leaders. The curtailment of media and political freedoms, and establishment of
barriers for electoral competition have further strengthened the powers of the ruling regime.

The reliance on repressive and simplistic military-bureaucratic solutions to complex security

problems falls in line with the imperial practices of coercion and the related belief regarding
the effectiveness of the use of force. The Russian government has traditionally had a low
threshold for the use of violence and few scruples about using coercion over negotiation as
a policy tool. The Russian security agencies have frequently been on par with the
"terrorists" in terms of their indifference for human lives and disdain for individual freedom.
The impunity with which crimes were committed by the Russian troops and security
services' units over the course of the war and counterterrorist operations resembled the
measures of the Soviet security forces and practices of the Tsarist secret police, which also
operated unchecked by any law.[24] In modern Russia, as in Soviet or Tsarist times,
Russian citizens have rarely had legal protection if pressure was exerted to force their
collaboration, confession was extracted under duress, or arrests were made on the basis of
false information.

To conclude, in the context of Russia's counterterrorism policy, the imperial tradition

manifested itself in the notion of terrorism as an attack on the state, its interests and
territory. Further, the protection of the state required the resurrection of sophisticated
forms of authoritarianism. The forceful means of control is the essence of authoritarian rule.
This explains the primacy of coercive, retaliatory, short-term counterterrorism responses
that have been adopted by the Russian regime. The unrestricted expansion of the state's
repressive powers for protection and preservation of state interests has rarely yielded good
results. Instead of resolving security problems, the imperial tradition calls for their
suppression. Inevitably, they re-emerge.

As of early 2014, the terrorist threats against Russia and its counterterrorism measures
will be in the spotlight, propelled by the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon bombings that
were perpetrated by two brothers of ethnic Chechen origin (one of whom was
reportedly monitored by Russias security services), as well as the preparations for the
February Sochi Winter Olympics. The primary terrorist threat is presented by the
Russian Federations Islamist insurgents, who are organized into several groups, loosely
allied with al Qaedas global jihad. In their most immediate threat, these Islamist
militants are intent on exploiting the worldwide media attention that will be associated
with the sporting events, which are located close to the North Caucasus, several
hundred miles from the Republic of Dagestan, where they are mounting an insurgency
to establish an Islamic state in that region. In response, Russia is boosting its
counterterrorism measures in the North Caucasus republics, as well as in other parts of
the country.
Terrorist Threats
Russias primary terrorist threats originate in the turbulent North Caucasus regions
republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkariya, where for the
past three decades extremist ethno-nationalist and Islamist militants have been waging
an insurgency against Russian rulewhich they regard as an occupying force and which
they seek to replace with a Taliban-style Islamist regime. One of the insurgents tactics,
for instance, is to assassinate moderate Islamist religious figures in an attempt to
replace them with those who adhere to a stricter form of Salafist Islam.

Russia has confronted several categories of terrorism since the times of the Russian
Empire, ranging from the 19th centurys revolutionary anarchists to todays secessionist
Islamic extremist ethno-nationalists, particularly those in the North Caucasus seeking to
liberate the North Caucasus from continued Russian presence. This represents a
reversal of terrorist threats for Russia because at the height of the Cold War the former
Soviet Union (and its Eastern European allies, such as East Germany, as well as Cuba)
was a major statesponsor of terrorism, with its security services providing active
support to Palestinian, Armenian, and South American terrorist groups.

In recent times, significant North Caucasus-originated terrorist incidents against Russia

have included the following:

In September 1999 Chechen insurgents attacked apartment buildings in

Moscow, killing some 200 people and injuring several hundred. In retaliation,
Russian troops invaded Chechnya.

On October 23, 2002, Chechen insurgents attacked the crowded Dubrovka

Theater in Moscow. An estimated 129 people were killed during the rescue
attempt by the Russian security forces.

On December 27, 2002, Chechen suicide bombers attacked the Chechen

administration complex in Groznyy, killing 78 people and injuring 150.

Between February and August 2004, a series of suicide bombings by North

Caucasus insurgents in the Moscow subway killed an estimated 80 people.
 On August 24, 2004, Chechen and Ingush insurgents attacked Russian
interior forces in Nazran, Ingushetia, killing 80 troops, while on the same day
two Russian passenger aircraft were blown up almost simultaneously, killing
90 people.

On September 1-3, 2004, Chechen and Ingush insurgents attacked a school

in Beslan, North Ossetia, holding more than 1,100 people hostage. Russias
rescue operation resulted in more than 300 deaths, including 186 children.

On November 27, 2009, Chechen insurgents bombed a high-speed Moscow-

to-St. Petersburg train, killing 26 people, with 100 injured.

On March 29, 2010, Chechen terrorists conducted a double suicide bombing of

the Moscow subway, killing 40 and injuring more than 100.

On Jan. 24, 2011, a Chechen terrorist conducted a suicide bombing at the

Domodedovo airport international arrivals hall, killing more than 36 people
and injuring around 180.

In mid-September 2013, three Russian police officers were killed and five
wounded by a suicide bomber who detonated a bomb in a car outside a police
station in Chechnya.

On October 21, 2013, 30-year-old Naida Asiyalova carried out a suicide

bombing of a bus near the southern city of Volgograd that killed six people
and injured 30. Asiyalova (also known as Amaturahman), a Dagestani
native, was the wife of Dmitry Sokolov, 21 years old, an ethnic Russian
(whom she was responsible for converting to radical Islam). Both were
members of a North Caucasus Islamist militant group, for whom Sokolov (also
known as Abdul Jabbar) had served as one of their explosives experts,
including building the suicide vest for his wife. Sokolov, who had gone into
hiding, was suspected by Russian security services of making explosives that
were used in several attacks in the Dagestani city of Makhachkala in early
2013.
Within the largely Muslim North Caucasus region, the Islamist insurgency has taken on
a global jihadist nature, with al Qeida-affiliated groups providing funding, fighters, and
materiel to the Chechen separatists. This explains how the Chechen-American Tsarnaev
brothers (and, reportedly, their mother as well) allegedly became adherents of global
Salafist militancy. Threats by these Islamist militants are expected to continue in early
2014, as demonstrated by a video message posted online in early July 2013 by Doku
Umarov, the Chechen-born leader (and Emir) of the Caucasus Emirate (also known as
the Caucasian Emirate), the self-proclaimed virtual state successor to the Chechen
Republic. The Caucasus Emirate has been waging the insurgency against the Russian
Federation, declaring that it is the duty of Muslims in the North Caucasus region to
attack the Winter Olympics in Sochi. In the video message, Umarov declared that They
[Russia] plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our ancestors, on the bones of
many, many dead Muslims, buried on the territory of our land on the Black Sea, and we
as Mujahideen are obliged to not permit that, using any methods allowed us by the
almighty Allah.

The Caucasus Emirates military branch, known as the Caucasian Front organization,
has been designated by the Russian and United States governments as a terrorist
organization.

Assessing Russias Counterterrorism Campaign

As demonstrated by the previous section, terrorist attacks by Islamist militants are
being waged on a frequent basis against Russian and locally-administered forces. In
response, the Russian government has responded with a spectrum of what are
considered harsh (but necessary) counterterrorism measures by its military,
intelligence, judicial, and law enforcement agencies.

Russias ineffectual response to the 2004 Beslan school siege, with its special forces
incurring heavy casualties, exposed significant deficiencies in its counterterrorism
capability at the time, especially in areas such as incident command, intelligence
management, and disseminating public information about such events. This led to an
overhaul of its counterterrorism-related security and law-enforcement agencies,
including establishing new counterterrorism coordinating bodies. These changes were
codified in March 2006 into The Law on Counteraction to Terrorism, which replaced
the previous 1998 version. In accordance with the law, the Federal Security Service
(FSB), Russias intelligence service (and successor to the KGB) serves as the chief
agency to combat terrorism, with a new National Antiterrorist Committee (NAK)
comparable to the American National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)established as
the top coordinating body. The NAK is tasked with coordinating the counterterrorism
policies and operations of 17 federal security agencies, with additional regional
counterterrorism committees carrying out its functions in the countrys administrative
regions.

Like other nations counterterrorism agencies, the NAK attributes success in countering
terrorism to three elements: preventing terrorist attacks, arresting suspected terrorists,
and minimizing the damage from terrorist incidentsall of which are driven by efficient
coordination between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. In 2013, Alexander
Bortnikov, the FSBs Director, served as the NAKs Chairman.

Complementing the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) also employs
counterterrorism units, as well as units tasked to counter extremism, a task previously
performed by the FSB.

As an example of how these counterterrorist forces operate to keep Islamist militants

on the defensive as Russia prepares to ensure safety for the Sochi Olympics, towns in
the Caucusus considered hotbeds of Islamist militancy have been placed under what is
termed a KTO regime (the Russian initials for a counterterrorism operation). This
permits security forces to set up checkpoints leading into a town, conduct random
searches, impose curfews and detain any foreigners who do not carry a special visitors
permit.

Like other governments that find themselves forced to engage in targeted killings of the
leaders of its terrorist adversaries, Russian counterterrorist forces also attempt to
target the leaders of the Islamist insurgency being waged against it in the volatile
Caucasus region. Although exact numbers are unavailable, several leaders of the
Islamist insurgency have been killed. This included the killing in early 2012 of 35-year-
old Dzhamaleil Mutaliyev, one of the leaders of the Caucasus Emirate, who was in
charge of organizing several suicide bombing attacks. Mutaliyev was reportedly a close
ally of Umarov, as well as of Shamil Basayev. In mid-2006, Russian forces also
reportedly killed Basayev, the Islamist terrorist leader responsible for organizing the
2004 Beslan school massacre. In March 2012, Russian security forces killed Alim
Zankishiyev (known as Ubaida), a leader of the Islamic insurgency in the Republic of
Kabardino-Balkaria, a region of the North Caucasus.

In another measure to prepare to safeguard the Sochi Olympics, the FSB conducted
several anti-terrorist exercises in the Krasnodar Territory area, including Sochi, to train
law-enforcement agencies and local governments in conducting joint responses to
potential terrorist incidents.

Like other counterterrorism organizations, Russian security agencies also monitor

extremist websites to investigate their agendas, key players, and possible targeting.
With some of these websites posting their material outside Russian borders, these are
monitored, as well.

In a move to bolster its anti-terrorism legal measures, in early November 2013, a

series of stricter anti-terrorism laws were implemented by the Russian government.
These would provide prison terms of up to 10 years for anyone undergoing training
aimed at carrying out terrorist activity, as well as compel the relatives of Islamist
militants who engage in terrorism to compensate the government for any damage they
cause. The law also permits the government to seize property of relatives as well as
close acquaintances of suspected militants if they refuse to provide documents
proving their legal ownership.

Conclusion
The bombing of the Boston Marathon by Chechen-American extremists demonstrated
that the terrorist threats against Russia also affect Western countries that have sizeable
Chechen and North Caucasus diasporas. To prevent such attacks from recurring, it is
likely that Russian-Western cooperation in counterterrorism will continue to expand,
with frequently held working group meetings and other forms of intelligence-related
exchanges, now that the involvement of global Salafist jihadism in the North Caucasuss
ethno-nationalist secessionist movements has become a major concern for Western
counterterrorism planners.
The North Caucasus-based terrorist threats against Russia are likely to intensify in
preparation for the Sochi Winter Olympics, scheduled for February 2014. These Islamist
terrorists will seek to exploit the extensive worldwide media attention associated with
such events, which are located close to the North Caucasus. In response, Russias
security services will be bolstering and tightening their counterterrorism measures in
the North Caucasus republics and the regions where the Winter Olympics will be played,
as well as in other parts of the country.