LEGAL

ETHICS
FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
FOR SY 2013-2104
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and
the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7

COMPILED BY PABALAN, C.B.D. and PURAY, J.S.


CANON 11: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.01. A lawyer shall appear in
court properly attired.
Rule 11.02. A lawyer shall punctually
appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the courts.
Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not
attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05. A lawyer shall submit
grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 11:
o Proper Attire (Rule 11.01)
o Punctuality (Rule 11.02)
o Proper Language and Behavior (Rule 11.03)
o Not to Attribute Motives to Judge (Rule 11.04)
o Grievance Against Judge (Rule 11.05)
KNOW MORE:
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness
or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of
the decision of the court in a pending case
made in good faith may be tolerated; because
if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and
obviously erroneous, it should not influence the
court in reversing or modifying its decision. (In
re: Sotto, 82 Phil 595 (1949))17
Lawyers should bear in mind their basic duty
to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers and to
insist on similar conduct by others (Canon 11
CPR). This attitude is best shown through
17
FACTS: Atty. Vicente Sotto, then a Senator of the Republic,
wrote his opinion in the Manila Times regarding the SCs
decision, In re Angel Parazo which was then pending
reconsideration. There the SC cited in contempt a reporter for
his refusal to divulge his source of news published in the paper.
Sotto claims that majority of the members of the Supreme
Court are incompetent and narrow-minded. He also said that
the members of the Court have deliberately committed blunders
and injustices during the past years. The SC cited Sotto in
contempt and required him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
scrupulous preference for respectful language,
is to be observed not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance.
(Guerrero v. Villamor, 179 SCRA 355
(1989))
I. Rule 11.01. A lawyer shall appear in court
properly attired.
Courts have ordered a male attorney to wear a
necktie and have prohibited a female attorney
from wearing a hat. However, the prohibition
of a dress whose hemline was five inches above
the knee was held to be acceptable as such
had become an accepted mode of dress even
in places of worship. (Aguirre)
Respect begins with the lawyers outward
physical appearance in court. Sloppy or
informal attire adversely reflects on the lawyer
and demeans the dignity and solemnity of court
proceedings. (Agpalo)
II. Rule 11.02. A lawyer shall punctually appear
at court hearings.
A lawyer owes the court and his client the duty
to punctually appear at court proceedings.
(Agpalo)
Inexcusable absence from, or repeated
tardiness in, attending a pre-trial or hearing
may subject the lawyer to disciplinary action as
his actions showing disrespect to the court
make him guilty of contemptuous behavior.
(Agpalo)
III. Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.
Notes from Agpalo:
Lawyers Courtesy
It must never be forgotten that a
lawyer pleads; he does not dictate. He
should be courageous, fair, and
circumspect, not petulant, combative,
or bellicose in his dealings with the
court
While criticism of judicial conduct is not
forbidden and zeal in advocacy is
encouraged, the lawyer must always
act within the limits of propriety and
good taste and with deference for the
judges before whom he pleads his
clients cause
A lawyer should not assail, without
basis, the personal integrity of a judge
and accuse him of misfeasance in an
attempt to hide his own inadequacies
and omissions to escape criticism of his
client
The discharge of the lawyers duty to
his client does not justify or require the
use of defamatory or threatening
words. Neither does the mistake of a
 LEGAL ETHICS

judge in some of his rulings warrant the not spill over the wall of decency and propriety.
use of offensive language (Agpalo)

There is no defense against the use in a The cardinal condition of all such criticism is
pleading by a lawyer of disrespectful, that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
threatening, abusive, and abrasive over the wall of decency and propriety.
language. It cannot be justified by the (Agpalo)
constitutional right of free speech for
such right is not absolute and its
exercise must be within the context of V. Rule 11.05. A lawyer shall submit grievances
a functioning and orderly system of against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
dispensing justice
Const art. VIII, sec. 6. The Supreme Court
Where words are abrasive or insulting, shall have administrative supervision over all
evidence that the language employed is courts and the personnel thereof. [the SC is the
justified by the facts is not admissible proper authority
as a defense
The duty to respect does not preclude a lawyer
Judges Courtesy from filing administrative complaints against
The duty to observe and maintain erring judges, or from acting as counsel for
respect is not a one-way duty from a clients who have legitimate grievances against
layer to a judge. A judge should show them. (Agpalo)
no shortness of temper which merely
detracts from the equanimity and The lawyer shall not file an administrative case
judiciousness that should be the until he has exhausted judicial remedies which
constant marks of a dispenser of justice result in a finding that the judge has gravely
erred. (Agpalo)
A judge may utilize his opportunities to
criticize and correct unprofessional Where a criminal complaint against a judge or
conduct of attorneys but he may not do other court employees arises from their
so in an insulting manner administrative duties, the Ombudsman must
defer action on said complaint and refer the
While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause same to the SC for determination whether said
in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill judges or court employees acted within the
he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to scope of their administrative duties.
arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo. Otherwise, in the absence of any administrative
(Sangalang v. IAC (1989)) action, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts
Every citizen has the right to comment upon power of administrative supervision over all
and criticize the actuations of public officers. courts and its personnel, in violation of the
The Court also treats with forbearance and doctrine of separation of powers. (Maceda v.
restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993))18
actuations, provided it is done in respectful
terms and through legitimate channels. For
courageous and fearless advocates are the
strands that weave durability into the tapestry
of justice. The reason is that an attorney does
not surrender his right as a citizen to criticize
the decisions of the court in fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the Bar, as
well as the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. Criticism has been
an important part of the traditional work of a
lawyer. As a citizen and as officer of the court,
a lawyer is expected not only to exercise his
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of
such right. But the cardinal condition of all such
criticism is that is shall be bona fide and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. (In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA
(1970))

IV. Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute

to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.

The rule allows such criticism so long as it is

supported by the record or it is material to the
case. A lawyers right to criticize the acts of
courts and judges in a proper and respectful
way and through legitimate channels is well
recognized. The cardinal condition of all such
criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall
18
This prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction is with regard
to whether the office of the ombudsman could entertain a
criminal complaint for the alleged falsification by Judge Maceda
of his certificate of service submitted to the SC, and assuming
that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the SC.

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE

CANON 12: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 12. A lawyer shall exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
Rule 12.01. A lawyer shall not appear
for trial unless he has adequately
prepared himself on the law and the facts
of his case, the evidence he will adduce
and the order of its proferrence. He
should also be ready with the original
documents for comparison with the
copies.
Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file
multiple actions arising from the same
cause.
Rule 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting to the
same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
Rule 12.05 A lawyer shall refrain
from talking to his witness during the
break or recess in the trial, while the
witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06
A lawyer shall not
knowingly assist a witness to
misrepresent himself or to impersonate
another.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 12:
o Adequate Preparation (Rule 12.01)
o Forum Shopping (Rule 12.02)
o Not to Delay Case (Rule 12.03)
o Court Process (Rule 12.04)
o Proper Behavior (Rule 12.05-12.07)
o Not to Testify on Behalf of Client (Rule 12.08)
KNOW MORE:
CONST. art III, sec 6. All persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Rule 138 Sec 20(g). Duties of attorneys. It is
the duty of an attorney: (g) Not to encourage
either the commencement or the continuance
of an action or proceeding, or delay any mans
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest.
Notes from Agpalo:
o The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client
but the administration of justice. As an
officer of the Court, it is the duty of the
lawyer to advance the Courts objective of
having a speedy, efficient, impartial,
correct, and inexpensive adjudication of
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
case and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments.
o The duty to assist in the administration of
justice may be performed by doing no act
that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the
administration of justice and by faithfully
complying with all his duties to the court
and to his client. Examples of the former
would include the duty to inform the court
of any change of his address or of the
death of his client.
o Acts that amount to obstruction of the
administration of justice may take many
forms. They include such acts as instructing
a complaining witness in a criminal case
not to appear at the scheduled hearing so
that the case against his client, the
accused, would be dismissed
o Ordinarily, obstruction of justice constitutes
contempt of court, and citing the
misbehaving lawyer for contempt and
punishing him for such misbehavior may be
sufficient to accomplish the end desired.
However, the misbehavior may be of such
character as to effect the offenders
qualifications as a lawyer for the practice of
law. In such case, he may be disciplined as
a lawyer for such misconduct.
I. Rule 12.01. A lawyer shall not appear for trial
unless he has adequately prepared himself on the
law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will
adduce
A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter
without adequate preparation. (Rule 18.02)
Without adequate preparation, the lawyer may
not be able to effectively assist the court in the
efficient administration of justice. Non-
observance of this rule might result in:
1) The postponement of the pre-trial or
hearing, which would thus entail delay in
the early disposition of the case,
2) The judge may consider the client non-
suited or in default or
3) The judge may consider the case deemed
submitted for decision without clients
evidence, to his prejudice. (Agpalo)
II. Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple
actions arising from the same cause
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaining or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief,
or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith:
a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein;
b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and
c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report

that fact within 5 days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion
after hearing. The submission of false
certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertaking therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the
acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions. (ROC,
Rule 7, Sec. 5)
Rule 12.02 stresses the affirmative duty of a
lawyer to check against useless litigations. His
signature in every pleading constitutes a
certificate by him that to the best of his
knowledge there is a good ground to support it
and that it is not to interpose for delay. The
willful violation of this rule may subject him to
(1) appropriate disciplinary action or (2) render
him liable for the costs of litigation. (Agpalo)
Forum shopping is prohibited by Supreme
Court Circular No. 28-91 --ANNEXED, which
is now integrated in the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
III. Rule 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting to
the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so.
Where a lawyers motion for extension of time
to file a pleading, memorandum or brief has
remained unacted by the court, the least that is
expected of him is to file it within the period
asked for (Agpalo)
IV. Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
Notes from Agpalo
o While a client may withhold from his
counsel certain facts or give him false
information to attain his unlawful ends, a
lawyer can easily see through the clients
action either before or at the early stage of
the litigation
o If after his appearance a lawyer discovers
that his client has no case, he may not
unceremoniously abandon the action. He
should advise his client to discontinue the
action or to confess judgment, and if the
client is determined to pursue it he should
ask that he be relieved from professional
responsibility
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
o If a lawyer is honestly convinced of the
futility of an appeal in a civil suit he should
not hesitate to temper his clients desire to
seek appellate review of such decision for
unless, he could show sufficient cause for
reversal, he would only succeed in planting
false hope in his clients mind, increasing
the burden on appellate tribunals,
prolonging litigation unnecessarily and
exposing his client to useless expenses.
o Nonetheless a lawyer should not, solely on
his own judgment, let the decision become
final by letting the period to appeal lapse,
without informing his client of the adverse
decision and of his candid advice in taking
appellate review thereof, well within the
period to appeal, so that the client may
decide whether to pursue appellate review.
In expropriation proceedings by the NAPOCOR
against several lot owners in Bulacan, the
president of an organization of the lot owners
entered into a contract for legal services with
Atty. Principe. The complainant Malonso, a
member of the same organization, appointed
on the other hand a certain Elfa as his
attorney-in-fact on the matter of negotiation
with NPC. Eventually, an amicable settlement
was had between NAPOCOR and the lot
owners. More than two years after the
expropriation cases were instituted, Atty.
Principe filed his motion to separate legal fees
and filed his Notice of Entry of Appearance
claiming that he is the legal counsel of the lot
owners. The other lot owners including Malonso
wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that
they have never authorized Sandamas
President to hire the services of Atty. Principes
law firm to represent them. Atty. Principe filed
several motions to ensure his claim to the 40%
of the selling price of the properties being
expropriated. An investigation conducted by
the IBP recommended Atty. Principes
suspension from the practice of law for two
years on the ground that Atty. Principe had
violated among others Rule 12.04 which says
that a lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes. In its Resolution, the IBP
Board ordained his suspension from the
practice of law for 2 years. The SC however
found that formal requisites of the investigation
and resolution had not been complied with and
dismissed the case requiring the IBP to comply
with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all
cases involving disbarment and discipline of
attorneys. (Malonzo v. Prinsipe, 447 SCRA 1
(2004))
V VII.
Rule 12.05 A lawyer shall refrain from talking
to his witness during the break or recess in the
trial, while the witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 A lawyer shall not knowingly assist
a witness to misrepresent himself or to
impersonate another.
Rule 12.07 A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat
or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience
him.

Rule 132, sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a
witness. A witness must answer questions,
although his answer may tend to establish a
claim against him. However, it is the right of a
witness:
o To be protected from irrelevant, improper,
or insulting questions, and from harsh or
insulting demeanor;
o Not to be detained longer than the interests
of justice require;
o Not to be examined except only as to
matters pertinent to the issue;
o Not to give an answer which will tend to
subject him to a penalty for an offense
unless otherwise provided by law; or
o Not to give an answer which will tend to
degrade his reputation, unless it be to the
very fact at issue or to a fact from which
the fact in issue would be presumed. But a
witness must answer to the fact of his
previous conviction for an offense.
P.D. No. 1829 Penalizing the obstruction
of apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenders (1981)ANNEXED
Notes from Agpalo:
Rule 12.05. The purpose of this rule is to
avoid any suspicion that he is coaching the
witness what to say during the resumption
of the examination
Rule 12.06. A lawyer may interview
witnesses in advance of trial or attend to
their needs if they are poor but he should
avoid any such action as may be
misinterpreted as an attempt to influence
the witness what to say in court. Court will
not give weight on a testimony of a witness
who admits having been instructed. A
lawyer who presents a witness whom he
knows will give a false testimony or is an
impersonator may be subjected to
disciplinary action.
Rule 12.07. The lawyer has a duty to
always treat adverse witnesses and suitors
with fairness and due consideration
Rule 12.07. The client cannot be made the
keeper of the lawyers conscience in
professional matters. He has no right to
demand that his counsel abuse the
opposite party and the latters witnesses or
indulge in offensive personalities. Improper
speech is not excusable on the ground that
it is what the client would say if speaking in
his own behalf
Rule 12.07. If it is the judge who subjects
the witness to harsh treatment, the lawyer
has the right to protest in a respectful and
dignified manner the action of the judge
and to make the incident of record without
being held liable administratively or for
contempt of court
VIII. RULE 12.08 A LAWYER SHALL AVOID
TESTIFYING IN BEHALF OF HIS
CLIENT; EXCEPT:
a. on formal matters, such as mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument, and
the like; or
b. on substantial matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
which event he must, during his testimony,
entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
The underlying reason for the impropriety of a
lawyer acting in such dual capacity lies in the
difference between the function of a witness
and that of an advocate. The function of a
witness is to tell the facts as he recalls then in
answer to questions. The function of an
advocate is that of a partisan. It is difficult to
distinguish between the zeal of an advocate
and the fairness and impartiality of a
disinterested witness (Agpalo)
Although the law does not forbid an attorney to
be a witness and at the same time an attorney
in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel
should not testify as witness unless it is
necessary and that they should withdraw from
the active management of the case. Canon 19
of the Code of Legal Ethics provides that when
a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to
merely formal matters. Such as the attestation
or custody of an instrument and the like, he
should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of
justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court
in behalf of his client. (PNB v. Uy Teng Piao,
57 PHIL 337 (1932))
CANON 13: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the
merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives
the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01. A lawyer shall not
extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02. A lawyer shall not make
public statements in media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03. A lawyer shall not
brook or invite interference by another
branch or agency of the government by
another branch or agency of the
government in normal course of
judicial proceedings.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 13:
o No Extraordinary Attention (Rule 13.01)
o No Public Statements to Media (Rule 13.02)
o Not to Invite Outside Interference (Rule
13.03)
KNOW MORE:
Grievances must be ventilated through proper
channels (appropriate petitions, motions or
other pleadings) in keeping with the respect
due to the Courts as impartial administrators of
justice entitled to proceed to the disposition of
its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions
and tending to embarrass the administration of

justice. For though the rights of free speech
and of assembly are constitutionally protected,
an attempt to pressure or influence courts of
justice is no longer within the ambit of
constitutional protection. (Nestle Phil. v.
Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987))19
Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
be balanced with the requirements of equally
important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and
orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of
the courts cannot be disguised as free speech,
for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of
courts or public respect and confidence thereof.
His statements are not fair criticisms of any
decision of the Court, but are threats made
against it to force the Court to decide the issue
in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of
the public. It tends to promote distrust an
undermines public confidence in the judiciary,
by creating the impression that the Court
cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially,
uninfluenced by public clamor and other
extraneous influences. (In Re: De Vera, 385
SCRA 285 (2003))20
I. Rule 13.01. A lawyer shall not extend
extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Notes from Agpalo
o The common practice of some lawyers
making judges and prosecutors godfathers
of their children to enhance their influence
and their law practice should be avoided by
judges and lawyers alike
o A lawyer should not see a judge in chamber
and talk to him about a case he is handling
and pending in the judges court
o A lawyer should not communicate to the
judge the merits of a pending case
II. Rule 13.02. A lawyer shall not make public
statements in media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
Notes from Agpalo:
19
FACTS: Two unions with pending cases before the SC had
intermittent pickets in front of the Padre Faura gate of the SC
building, obstructing access to and egress from the Courts
premises. They also constructed provisional shelters, set up a
kitchen, littered the area causing it to be unhygienic and
unsanitized, waved their red streamers and placards with
slogans, and harangued the court with the use of loudspeakers.
Two justices called the leaders of the unions and their counsel
to inform them that the pickets constitute direct contempt of
court, and that their petitions could not be heard until the
pickets stop. Arty Espinas, the counsel for the unions,
apologized and assured that the acts would not be repeated.
The SC dismissed the contempt charges against Atty. Espinas.
20
FACTS: Atty. De Vera made some remarks to the Philippine
Daily Inquirer regarding a pending case involving the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law. In one statement, he
asked the SC to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law
unconstitutional and that his group was greatly disturbed by
the rumors. In another statement, he said that a decision in
favor of the laws unconstitutionality would trigger mass actions
and the people would not just swallow any SC decision that is
basically wrong. Atty. De Vera admitted to making the
statements but that these were factually accurate and that
these are within his right to freedom of speech.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
o Purpose: Newspaper publications regarding
a pending or anticipated litigation may
interfere with a fair trial, prejudice the
administration of justice, or subject a
respondent or a accused to a trial by
publicity and create a public inference of
guilt against him
o The court, in a pending litigation, must be
shielded from embarrassment or influence in
its all important duty of deciding the case.
Thus, what a lawyer can ordinarily say against
a concluded litigation and the manner the
judge handed down the decision may not
generally be said to a pending action.
o Once a litigation is concluded, the judge who
decided it is subject to the same criticism as
any other public official because then, his
ruling becomes public property and is thrown
open to public consumption.
o A newspaper publication tending to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending case
constitutes criminal contempt, but the rule is
otherwise after the litigation is ended.
Televising a court trial would amount to a violation
of due process. A carnival atmosphere would be
created.
Jurisprudence also states that there is nothing
that proscribes the press from reporting events
that transpire in the courtroom. But there is a
reasonable likelihood that the prejudicial news
prior to trial will prevent a fair trial. If publicity
during the proceeding threatens the fairness of
the trial, a new trial shall be ordered.
HOWEVER, THE CASE AT BAR IS DIFFERENT. The
publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of
the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of
the government for what was claimed to be a
massacre of Muslim trainees. If there was a
trial by newspaper it was not of the petitioner
but of the government. There is no showing that
the courts martial failed to protect the accused
from massive publicity. Protection would include:
controlling the release of information; change the
venue or postpone trial until the deluge of
prejudicial publicity has subsided. Even granting
that there is massive and prejudicial publicity, the
petitioners do not contend that the respondents
have been unduly influenced but simply that they
might be. (Martelino v. Alejandro (1989))
III. Rule 13.03. A lawyer shall not brook or
invite interference by another branch or agency of
the government by another branch or agency of
the government in normal course of judicial
proceedings
Rule 11.05. A lawyer shall submit
grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
The basis for this rule is the principle of
separation of powers (Aguirre)

D. The Lawyer and the Client
MEMORY AID FOR CANONS UNDER THIS
SECTION:
1. Service to the Needy (Canon 14)
2. Observe Candor, Fairness, Loyalty (Canon 15)
3. Hold in Trust Clients Moneys and Properties
(Canon 16)
4. Trust and Confidence (Canon 17)
5. Competence and Diligence (Canon 18)
6. Representation with Zeal (Canon 19)
7. Attorneys Fees (Canon 20)
8. Preserve Clients Confidence (Canon 21)
9. Withdrawal of Services for Good Cause (Canon
22)
KNOW MORE:
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is
premised on the Roman Law concepts of
1. location conduction operarum (contract of
lease and services) where one person lends
his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the
services are to be performed, wherein
lawyers services may be compensated by
honorarium
2. mandato (contract of agency) wherein a
friend on whom reliance could be placed
makes a contract in his name, but gives up
all that he gained by the contract to the
person who requested him. (Regala v.
Sandiganbayan)
Notes from Agpalo:
o The relationship is strictly personal and
highly confidential and fiduciary (something
in trust for another). Thus, delegation is
prohibited absent the clients consent. It
likewise terminates at death of either the
client or the attorney.
o A client can terminate it any time with or
without the consent of the lawyer.
However, an attorney enjoys no similar
right as he is an officer of the court and he
may be permitted to withdraw only with the
consent of his client or with the approval of
the court. The essential feature of the
relation of attorney and client is the fact of
employment. While a written agreement for
professional services is the best evidence to
show the relation, formality is not an
essential element of the employment of a
lawyer
o It is sufficient, to establish the professional
relation, that the advice and assistance of
an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession
o There is an implied contract of professional
employment where an attorney appears on
behalf of a party without the latter
interposing any objection thereto
o To employ an attorney one has to have
legal capacity to do so. Minors/
incompetents must have a general
guardian/ guardian ad litem has to employ
an attorney.
o A lawyer has no power to act as counsel or
legal representative for a person without
being retained nor may he appear for a
party in a case without being employed
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
unless by leave of court
Retainer, defined:
(1) an act of client by which he engages
services of an attorney to render legal advice,
defend or prosecute his cause in court;
(2) fee which a client pays to an attorney when
latter is retained (retaining fee)
o General retainer, defined: secure
beforehand services of attorney for any
legal problem that may afterward arise
o Special retainer, defined: particular case or
service
o Retaining fee, defined: preliminary fee paid
to insure and secure future services, to
remunerate him for being deprived, by
being retained by one party. It prevents
undue hardship resulting from the rigid
observance of the rule forbidding him from
acting as counsel for other party (Agpalo)
Employment of a law firm:
The employment of a law firm is
equivalent to the retainer of a member
thereof even though only one of them
is consulted
CANON 14: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 14. A lawyer shall not refuse his
services to the needy.
Rule 14.01. A lawyer shall not
decline to represent a person solely on
account of the latters race, sex, creed
or status of life, or because of his own
opinion regarding the guilt of said
person.
Rule 14.02. A lawyer shall not
decline, except for serious and sufficient
cause, an appointment as counsel de
oficio or as amici curiae, or a request
from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any of its chapters for
rendition of free legal aid.
Rule 14.03. A lawyer may refuse to accept
representation of an indigent client if:
a. he is not in a position to carry out the
work effectively or competently;
b. he labors under a conflict of interests
between him and the prospective client or
between a present client and the
prospective client.
Rule 14.04. A lawyer who accepts the cause
of a person unable to pay his professional
fees shall observe the same standard of
conduct governing his relations with paying
clients.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 14:
o Availability of Services Regardless of Status
(Rule 14.01)
o Providing Counsel de Oficio (Rule 14.02)

o Valid Ground for Refusal (Rule 14.03)
o Same Standard of Conduct for All Clients (Rule
14.04)
KNOW MORE:
General rule: A private practitioner is not obliged
to act as counsel for a person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline
employment.
Exceptions: Canon 14 provide the exceptions to
the general rule and emphasize the lawyers
public responsibility of rendering legal services to
the needy and the oppressed who are unable to
pay attorneys fees. In such cases, refusal is the
exception rather than the rule.
R.A. 6033. An act requiring courts to give
preference to criminal cases where the
party or parties involved are indigents
(1969)ANNEXED
R.A. 6034. An act providing transportation
and other allowances for indigent
litigants. (1969) ANNEXED
RA 6035. An act requiring stenographers
to give free transcript of notes to indigent
and low income litigants and providing a
penalty for the violation thereof. (1969)
ANNEXED
I. Rule 14.01. A lawyer shall not decline to
represent a person solely on account of the latters
race, sex, creed or status of life, or because of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
Rule 138, sec. 20 (h-i). Duties of attorneys.It
is the duty of an attorney: (h) Never to reject,
for any consideration personal to himself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed. (i) In
the defense of a person accused of crime, by all
fair and honorable means, regardless of his
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused,
to present every defense that the law permits,
to the end that no person may be deprived of
life or liberty, but by due process of law
Rule 14.01 makes it his duty not to decline to
represent the accused regardless of his opinion
as to his guilt. Note that in criminal cases, it
is easy to take accused because of presumption
of innocence and proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
It is the lawyers duty to counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under law.
He is not to encourage the commencement or
the continuance of an action or delay any
mans cause, for any corrupt motive or
interest. He must decline to conduct a civil
case or to make a defense when convinced
that it is intended merely to harass or injure
the opposite party or to work oppression or
wrong. If he were to take a bad civil case for a
plaintiff, it will only be to advise him not to file
the action or to settle it with the claimant. If
he were to accept the defense of a bad civil
case against a defendant, it will either be to
exert his best effort toward a compromise or,
to tell his client to confess judgment. In
criminal cases: easy to take accused because
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
of presumption of innocence and proof beyond
reasonable doubt. (Agpalo)
Rule 2.01. A lawyer shall not reject, except for
valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed.
II. Rule 14.02. A lawyer shall not decline,
except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de oficio or as amici curiae,
or a request from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of
free legal aid.
Rule 138 sec. 20 (h), Duties of attorneys. It
is the duty of an attorney: (h) Never to reject,
for any consideration personal to himself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
Rule 138, sec. 31 Attorneys for destitute
litigants.A court may assign an attorney to
render professional aid free of charge to any
party in a case, if upon investigation it appears
that the party is destitute and unable to employ
an attorney, and that the services of counsel
are necessary to secure the ends of justice and
to protect the rights of the party. It shall be
the duty of the attorney so assigned to render
the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause
shown.
Rule 116, sec. 6. Duty of court to inform
accused of his right to counsel.Before
arraignment, the court shall inform the accused
of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires
to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to
defend himself in person or has employed
counsel of his choice, the court must assign a
counsel de oficio to defend him.
Rule 116, sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de
oficioThe court shall appoint a counsel de
oficio to defend a client, considering [1] the
gravity of the offense, [2] the difficulty of the
questions that may arise, [3] and the
experience and ability of the appointee. The
counsel must be [1] a member of the bar in
good standing [2] or, in localities without
lawyers, any person of good repute for probity
and ability
Rule 116, sec. 8. Time for counsel de oficio to
prepare for arraignment. Whenever a
counsel de oficio is appointed by the court to
defend the accused at the arraignment, he
shall be given a reasonable time to consult with
the accused as to his plea before proceeding
with the arraignment.
Rule 124 (Case on Appeal in the CA), sec. 2.
Appointment of counsel de oficio for the
accused.If it appears from the record of the
case transmitted that [1] the accused is
confined in prison, [2] is without counsel de
parte on appeal, or [3] has signed the notice
of appeal himself, the clerk of court of the CA
shall designate a counsel de oficio.
An appellant who is not confined in prison may,
upon request, be assigned a counsel de oficio
within the 10 days from receipt of the notice to
file brief and he establishes his right thereto by
affidavit
 P.D. 543. Authorizing the designation of
municipal judges and lawyers in any
branch of the government service to act as
counsel de oficio for the accused who are
indigent in places where there are no
available practicing lawyers. (1974)
ANNEXED
Counsel de Oficio, defined: a counsel,
appointed or assigned by the court, from
among such members of the bar in good
standing who by reason of their experience and
ability, may adequately defend the accused.
(Agpalo)
Rule 138, sec. 36. Amicus curiae.
Experienced and impartial attorneys may be
invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae
to help in the disposition of issues submitted to
it.
Amicus curiae, defined: A friend of the court;
a bystander (usually a counselor) who
interposes or volunteers information upon
some matter of law in regard to which the
judge is doubtful or mistaken. (Agpalo)
III. Rule 14.03. A lawyer may refuse to accept
representation of an indigent client if:
a. he is not in a position to carry out the work
effectively or competently;
b. he labors under a conflict of interests
between him and the prospective client or
between a present client and the prospective
client.
IV. Rule 14.04. A lawyer who accepts the
cause of a person unable to pay his professional
fees shall observe the same standard of conduct
governing his relations with paying clients.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
CANON 15: QUICK REFERENCE
. A lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
Rule 15.01. A lawyer, in conferring
with a prospective client, shall ascertain
as soon as practicable whether the
matter would involve a conflict with
another client or his own interest, and if
so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.
Rule 15.02. A lawyer shall be bound
by the rule on privileged communication
in respect of matters disclosed to him by
a prospective client.
Rule 15.03. A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule 15.04. A lawyer may, with the
written consent of all concerned, act as
mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in
settling disputes.
Rule 15.05. A lawyer when advising
his client shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable
results of the clients case, neither
overstating nor understanding the
prospects of the case.
Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state
or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative
body.
Rule 15.07. A lawyer shall impress
upon his client compliance with the laws
and the principles of fairness.
Rule 15.08. A lawyer who is engaged
in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law
shall make clear to his client whether he
is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 15:
o Conflict of Interest (Rule 15.01 and 15.03)
o Privileged Communication (Rule 15.02)
o Mediator, Conciliator or Arbiter (Rule 15.04)
o Candid, Honest Advice (Rule 15.05)
o Not to Claim Influence (Rule 15.06)
o Impress Compliance with Laws (Rule 15.07)
o Dual Profession (Rule 15.08)
KNOW MORE:
This canon is based on the character of the
attorney-client relationship which is strictly
personal and highly confidential and

fiduciary. Only in such a relationship can a
person be encouraged to repose confidence in
an attorney. The canon therefore is required by
necessity and public interest and is based on
the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking
legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is
fatal to the administration of justice. (Agpalo)
I II.
Rule 15.01. A lawyer, in conferring with a
prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a
conflict with another client or his own interest, and
if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Art. 209 Revised Penal Code. Betrayal of trust
by an attorney. or solicitor.Revelation of
Secrets.In addition to the proper
administrative action, shall be imposed upon
an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador
judicial) who, by any malicious breach of
professional duty or of inexcusable negligence
or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned
by him in his professional capacity
Tests of Conflict of Interest:
1. when, on behalf of one client, it is the
attorneys duty to contest for that which his
duty to another client requires him to
oppose or when the possibility of such
situation will develop;
2. whether the acceptance of the new relation
will prevent a lawyer from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or will invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness in the
performance thereof; and
3. whether a lawyer will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired in the previous
employment.
The proscription against representation of
conflicting interests finds application where the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the
same general matter and is applicable however
slight such adverse interest may be. It applies
although the attorneys intentions and motives
were honest and he acted in good faith.
Rule against representing conflicting interests
applies even if the conflict pertains to the
lawyers private activity or in the performance
in a non-professional capacity, and his
presentation as a lawyer regarding the same
subject matter.
Effect of termination of attorney-client relation
o Termination of relation of attorney and
client provides no justification for a lawyer
to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client.
Neither may he do anything injurious to his
former client nor use against former client
any knowledge or information gained.
o Reason: clients confidence, once reposed,
cannot be divested by the expiration of
professional employment
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
Opposing clients in same or related suits
An attorney who appears for opposing
clients in the same or related actions puts
himself in that awkward position where he
will have to contend on behalf of one client
that which he will have to oppose on behalf
of the other client. He cannot give
disinterested advice to both clients but will
instead be called on to use confidential
information against one client in favor of
the other in view of the identicalness or
relatedness of the subject.
Even though the opposing clients, after full
disclosure of the fact, consent to the
attorneys dual representation, the lawyer
should, when his clients cannot see their
way clear to settling the controversy
amicably, retire from the case.
Opposing clients in unrelated actions
o A lawyer owes loyalty to his client not only
in the case in which he has represented
him but also after the relation of attorney
and client has terminated because it is not
good practice to permit him afterwards to
defend in another case another person
against his former client under the pretext
that the case is distinct from, and
independent of, the former case.
o It is improper for a lawyer to appear as
counsel for one party against the adverse
party who is his client in another totally
unrelated action. The attorney in that
situation will not be able to pursue, with
vigor and zeal, the clients claim against
the other and to properly represent the
latter in the unrelated action; or, if he can
do so, he cannot avoid being suspected by
the defeated client of disloyalty of partiality
in favor of the successful client
New client against former client
o A lawyer cannot represent a new client
against a former client only when the
subject matter of the present controversy
is related, directly of indirectly, to the
subject matter of the previous litigation in
which he appeared for the former client. He
may properly act as counsel for a new
client, with full disclosure to the latter,
against a former client in a matter wholly
unrelated to that of the previous
employment, there being no conflict of
interests.
o Reason: what a lawyer owes to former
client is to maintain inviolate the clients
confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in
any matter which he previously
represented him; in this case, duty does
not arise
o Where subject matter of present suit
between the lawyers new client and his
former client is in some way connected,
prohibition applies even if no confidential
information was acquired
Conflicting duties
o A lawyer may not, as an employee of a
corporation whose duty is to attend to its
legal affairs, join a labor union of
employees in that corporation because the
exercise of the unions rights is

incompatible with his duty as a lawyer for
his corporate client
o A lawyer may not, as counsel for a client,
attack the validity of the instrument
prepared by him
Attorneys interest vs. Clients interest
o An attorney should not put himself in a
position where self-interest tempts him to
do less than his best for his client. (e.g., it
is improper to have financial stakes in
subject matter of suit brought on behalf of
his client)
Rule applicable to law firm
o Where a lawyer is disqualified or forbidden
from appearing as counsel in a case
because of conflict of interests, the law firm
of which he is a member as well as any
member, associate or assistant is similarly
disqualified or prohibited from so acting.
o This rule is a corollary of the rule that the
employment of one member of a law firm is
considered as an employment of the law
firm and that the employment of a law firm
is equivalent to a retainer of the members
thereof.
Notes from Agpalo:
o The canon therefore is required by
necessity and public interest and is based
on the hypothesis that abstinence from
seeking legal advice in a good cause is an
evil which is fatal to the administration of
justice.
o The disclosure is more for the protection of
the lawyer than that of the client, so that
the client may not lose confidence in him,
which may even affect his fee. If the lawyer
does not disclose anything, a client may
assume the lawyer has no interest which
will interfere with his devotion to the cause
confided to him or betray his judgment.
For attorney-client privilege to apply, however,
the period to be considered is the date when
the privileged communication was made by the
client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to
a crime intended to be committed in the future.
(if past, privilege applies; if future, does not
apply) In order that a communication between
a lawyer and his client be privileged, it must be
for a lawful purpose or in the furtherance of a
lawful end. (People v. Sandiganbayan, 275
SCRA 505 (1996))
The general rule is that a lawyer may not
invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of his client. The reasons for
this are that:
o The Court has a right to know that the
client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
o The privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been
established. The privilege does not attach
until there is a client.
o The privilege pertains to the subject matter
of the relationship.
o Due process considerations require that the
opposing party should know his adversary.
(Metaphor: He cannot be obliged to grope
in the dark against unknown forces.)
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
The general rule is however qualified by some
exceptions. Client identity is privileged
o Where a strong probability exists that
revealing the clients name would implicate
the client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyers advice.
o Where disclosure would open the client to
civil liability.
o Where the governments lawyers have no
case against an attorneys client unless by
revealing the clients name, the said name
would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime.
Information relating to the identity of the
client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the clients name itself has
an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client
confidences. (Regala v. Sandiganbayan,
262 SCRA 122 (1996))
Limitations to general rule
The prohibition against representing
conflicting interests does not apply:
1. where no conflict of interests exists (e.g. a
lawyer may represent new client against
former client where both actions are
unrelated and where lawyer will not be
called to oppose what he had espoused on
behalf of former client not use confidential
info against former client.)
2. where the clients knowingly consent to dual
representation in writing
Lawyer may represent conflicting
interests before it reaches the court but
only after full disclosure of the facts
and express written consent of all
parties.
Where representation by a lawyer is for
both opposing parties, their written
consent may enable the lawyer to
represent them before but not after
their controversy has reached the
court. After the controversy has
reached the court, the lawyer cannot,
even with the parties written consent,
represent both of them without being
held administratively liable as an officer
of the court.
Disclosure should include thorough
explanation of nature and extent of
conflict and possible adverse effects of
dual representation. This should
include disclosure of the lawyers
present and/or former clients who have
conflicting interests.
Advantage: a mutual lawyer, impartial
and with honest motivations, may be
better situated to work out an
acceptable settlement since he has
confidence of both parties
A lawyer may represent new client
against former client only after full
disclosure and written consent. Former
clients written consent constitutes a
release from obligation to keep
inviolate the clients confidences or to
desist from injuriously affecting him in
any matter which he previously
represented.

Where circumstances show parties
require independent counsel, or where
lawyer may be suspected of disloyalty,
he should immediately withdraw from
the case.
General rule that a lawyer may be
allowed to represent conflicting
interests, where parties consent,
applies only where one is a former
client and the other is a new one, not
where both are current clients.
Lawyer may not represent conflicting
interests, even with consent, where the
conflict is between the attorneys
interest and that of a client (self-
interest should yield to clients interest)
or between a private clients interest
and that of the govt or any of its
instrumentalities (public policy and
public interest forbid dual
representation).
3. where no true attorney-client relationship is
attendant
Absence of true attorney-client
relationship either with the attorney or
with the law firm of which he is a
member makes the prohibition
inapplicable.
Exception: attorneys secretary,
stenographer or clerk who, in such
capacity, has acquired confidential
information from attorneys client, may
not accept employment or, after
admission to the bar, represent an
interest adverse to that of attys client.
Effects of representation of conflicting interests
o Representation of conflicting interests
subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.
The reason is that the representation of
conflicting interests not only constitutes
malpractice but also a violation of the
confidence which results from the attorney-
client relationship, of the oath of a lawyer
(in that he did not serve his clients interest
well) and of his duty to both the client and
the court.
o If representation of conflicting interests is
unknown and works prejudice against new
client, judgment against the latter may be
set aside. Basis: a lawyer disqualified from
appearing on account of inconsistency of
duties is presumed to have improperly and
prejudicially advised and represented the
party from beginning to end of litigation.
Two questions to be asked:
(1) Did the attorney discharge or have
opportunity to discharge conflicting
interests?
(2) Did the new client suffer prejudice? If
yes to both, adverse judgment against new
client may be justified.
o Attorneys right to be paid for his services
to former client may be affected by
representation of conflicting interests, only
if 2 matters are related and the former
client objected to such representation. But
new client may not defeat attorneys right
to fees in the absence of concealment and
prejudice by reason of attorneys previous
professional relationship with opposing
party.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer
represents inconsistent interest of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. Also, if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance thereof. (Hornilla
v. Salunat (2003))
III. Rule 15.02. A lawyer shall be bound by the
rule on privileged communication in respect of
matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Art. 209 Revised Penal Code. Betrayal of
trust by an attorney. or solicitor.Revelation of
Secrets.In addition to the proper
administrative action, shall be imposed upon
an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador
judicial) who, by any malicious breach of
professional duty or of inexcusable negligence
or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned
by him in his professional capacity.
Exceptions to privilege (Aguirre):
1. When a lawyer is accused by the client and
he needs to reveal information to defend
himself
2. When the client discloses the intention to
commit a crime or unlawful act. (Future
crime)
For attorney-client privilege to apply, however,
the period to be considered is the date when
the privileged communication was made by the
client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to
a crime intended to be committed in the future.
(if past, privilege applies; if future, does not
apply) In the present case, testimony sought
to be elicited from Sansaet are communications
made to him by physical acts and/or
accompanying words of Paredes at the time he
and Honrada, either with active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify,
or in the process of falsifying, the documents
which were later filed by Sansaet in the
Tanodbayan. Crime of falsification had not yet
been committed, hence, they are not covered
by the privilege. It could also not have been
covered by the privilege because Sansaet was
himself a conspirator in the commission of the
crime of falsification. In order that a
communication between a lawyer and his client
be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or
in the furtherance of a lawful end. On the
contrary, Sansaet, as lawyer, may be bound to
disclose the info at once in the interest of
justice. (People v. Sandiganbayan (1997))

IV. Rule 15.04. A lawyer may, with the written
consent of all concerned, act as mediator,
conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
An attorneys knowledge of the law and his
reputation for fidelity may make it easy for the
disputants to settle their differences amicably.
However, he shall not act as counsel for any of
them. (Agpalo)
V. Rule 15.05. A lawyer when advising his client
shall give a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of the clients case,
neither overstating nor understanding the
prospects of the case.
A lawyer is bound to give candid and honest
opinion on the merit or lack of merit of clients
case, neither overstating nor understating the
prospect of the case. He should also give an
honest opinion as to the probable results of the
case, with the end in view of promoting respect
for the law and the legal processes. (Agpalo)
VI. Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply
that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.
This rule protects against influence peddling.
Some prospective clients secure the services of
a particular lawyer or law firm precisely
because he can exert a lot of influence on a
judge and some lawyers exact big fees for such
influence (Agpalo)
VII. Rule 15.07. A lawyer shall impress upon his
client compliance with the laws and the principles
of fairness.
Art. 19 Civil Code. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith.
Notes from Agpalo:
o A lawyer is required to represent his client
within the bounds of the law. The CPR
enjoins him to employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and warns him not to allow his client
to dictate procedure in handling the case.
He may use arguable construction of the
law or rules which are favorable to his
client. But he is not allowed to knowingly
advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing law.
o A lawyer should comply with the clients
lawful requests. But he should resist and
should never follow any unlawful
instructions. In matters of law, it is the
client who should yield to the lawyer and
not the other way around.
o A lawyer must also observe and advice his
client to observe the statute law, thought
until a statute shall have been construed
and interpreted by competent jurisdiction,
he is free and is entitled to advice as to its
validity and as to what he conscientiously
believes to be its just meaning and extent
VIII. Rule 15.08. A lawyer who is engaged in
another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
Exercise of dual profession is not prohibited but
a lawyer must make it clear when he is acting
as a lawyer and when he is otherwise,
especially in occupations related to the practice
of law. Reason: certain ethical considerations
may be operative in one profession and not in
the other. (Agpalo)
A lawyer is not barred from dealing with his
client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good
faith. Business transactions between an
attorney and his client are disfavored and
discouraged by policy of law because by virtue
of a lawyers office, he is an easy position to
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance
of his client. Thus, there is no presumption of
innocence or improbability of wrongdoing in
favor of lawyers. MOREOVER, the proscription
against representation of conflicting interests
finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter
and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be. It applies although the
attorneys intentions and motives were honest
and he acted in good faith. Representation of
conflicting interests may be allowed where the
parties give an informed consent to the
representation after full disclosure of facts. The
lawyer must explain to his clients the nature
and extent of the conflict and the possible
adverse effects must be thoroughly understood
by his clients. The test to determine whether
there is conflict of interest in the representation
is the probability, not the certainty of conflict.
(Nakpil v. Valdez, 286 SCRA 758 (1998))21
21
FACTS: Atty. Carlos Valdes was the lawyer and accountant of
the Nakpils. In 1965, Jose Nakpil wanted to buy a summer
residence in Baguio City but because of lack of funds, he agreed
that Valdes would keep the property in trust until the Nakpils
could buy it back. Valdes took out two loans to purchase the
property. In 1973, Jose Nakpil died. The ownership of the
Baguio property became an issue in the intestate proceedings as
Valdes excluded it from the inventory of Joses estate. In 1978,
Valdes transferred his title to the property to his company. The
estate filed an action for reconveyance and the adminstratix
filed an administrative case to disbar Valdes for (1) maliciously
appropriating the property in trust to his family corporation (2)
including in the claims against the estate the amounts of the two
loans which he claimed were Joses loans probably for the
purchase of a house and lot in Moran St., Baguio City and (3) for
conflict of interest, since his auditing firm prepared the list of
claims of creditors who were also represented by his law firm.
The SC suspended Valdes from the practice of law for one year

CANON 16: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 16. A Lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account
for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the
funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept
by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver
the funds and property to his client
when due or upon demand. However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and
may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in
the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04. A lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except
when, in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 16:
o Account (Rule 16.01)
o Keep Clients Fund Separate (Rule 16.02)
o Lawyers Lien (Rule 16.03)
o No Borrowing, Lending (Rule 16.04)
KNOW MORE:
Art. 1491(5) Civil Code. The following persons
cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public
auction, wither in person or through the
mediation of another: (5) Justices, judges,
prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and tights which may
be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.
Elements of Art. 1491 (Aguirre)
o Property or interest is in litigation
o Attorney takes part as counsel in the case
involving said property
o Purchase, acquisition by attorney, by
himself or through another of the property
in litigation, during the pendency of the
case.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
(purchase includes mortgage of property in
litigation to lawyer. In this case, acquisition is
merely postponed until foreclosure but the
effect is the same)
Application of the Rule
When all the following four elements are present
there is a violation of law and ethically improper
conduct:
1. there must be attorney-client relationship
2. the property or interest of the client must
be in litigation
3. the attorney takes part as counsel in the
case
4. the attorney himself or through another
purchases such property or interest during
the pendency of the litigation
When the rule inapplicable
The absence of one element renders prohibition
inapplicable (e.g. an attorney may bid on behalf of
his client at the auction sale of the clients property
in litigation since it is not for his own benefit)
contingent fee contract: allowed since it
neither gives nor purports to give to the
attorney an absolute right, personal or real, in
the subject matter during the pendency of the
litigation; the measure of compensation
provided is a mere basis for the computation of
fees and the payment made from the proceeds
of the litigation is effected only after its
successful termination. A distinction must be
made between purchasing an interest in the
litigation to enable a lawyer to litigate on his
own account or to abuse the clients confidence
(prohibited) and accepting compensation
contingent upon the result of the litigation
(allowed). Note, however, that a contingent
fee contract which is unreasonable ceases to be
a measure of due compensation for services
rendered.
Effects of Prohibited Purchase
o A prohibited purchase is null and void ab
initio; public interest and public policy
dictate that its nullity is definite and
permanent and cannot be cured by
ratification. The lawyer will be deemed to
hold the property in trust for the client.
o The client is therefore entitled to recover
property and interest from his attorney
with the fruits. The client should, however,
return the purchase price and the legal
interests.
I. Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Notes from Agpalo:
o A lawyer holds money or property, which he
received from or for his client, in trust and
should promptly make an accounting thereof.
o If money or property entrusted was not used
for its purpose, it should be returned
immediately to the client. Failure to return
would raise presumption that he
misappropriated the money/property
o Money received by a lawyer from a person
who is not his client is also held by him in

trust and he is under obligation to account for
it.
o The circumstance that a lawyer has a lien for
his attorneys fees over the clients money in
his possession does not relieve him from the
obligation to make a prompt accounting and
his failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct
In the present case, respondent collected
money from the complainant and the nephew
of the detained person in the total amount of
P64,000 for the immediate release of the
detainee through his alleged connection with a
Justice of the Supreme Court. Not only that,
respondent even had the audacity to tell
complainant that the Justices of the Supreme
Court do not accept checks.
As with other cases against him, respondent
has demonstrated a penchant for
misrepresenting to clients that he has the
proper connections to secure the relief they
seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will
allegedly be given to such connections. In so
doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor
and public contempt. He deserves to be
disbarred from the practice of law. (Berbano
v. Barcelona, 410 SCRA 258 (2003))
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not
to delay any man for money or malice and is
bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity
to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly
the money of his clients that has come into his
possession (otherwise a violation of Sec. 25,
Rule 138 of ROC). He should not commingle it
without his clients consent. He should maintain
a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private
trust. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees
on money in his hands would not relieve him
from the duty of promptly accounting for the
funds received. (Daroy v. Legaspi (1975))22
II. Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the
funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
A lawyer should keep funds of each client
separate and apart from his own. He should not
use clients money for personal purposes
without clients consent. He should report
promptly the money of his client in his
possession. (Agpalo)
III. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the
funds and property to his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the
funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
22
FACTS: The SC disbarred Atty. Legaspi who, without his
clients knowledge, received from the deputy provincial sheriff
P4, 000 as their share in the intestate proceeding of their
maternal grandparents. He misled his clients by informing them
that they could withdraw the money but later admitted that he
had withdrawn the money and spent it. The SC disbarred Atty.
Legaspi.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
Rule 138, sec. 37. Attorneys liens.An
attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have
lawfully come into his possession and may
retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply
such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments, which he has secured in a litigation
of his client, from and after the time when he
shall have caused a statement of his claim of
such lien to be entered upon the record of the
court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice
thereof to be delivered to his client and power
over such judgments and executions as his
client would have to enforce his lien and secure
the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
If client agrees with lawyer as to the amount of
attorneys fees and as to the application of the
clients fund to pay his lawful fees and
disbursement, a lawyer may deduct what is due
him and remit the balance to his client. If no
such agreement or consent or if there is
dispute or disagreement as to the fees, he
should return everything to client without
prejudice to his filing a case to recover his
unsatisfied fees. (Agpalo)
This rule grants the lawyer a lien over the
clients funds in his possession as well as on all
judgments and executions he has secured for
his client, to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements. (Agpalo)
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a
judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust
and must be immediately turned over to them.
(Businos v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 40
(1997))23
After a decision favorable to Atty. Robinols
clients and he had received the latter's funds,
suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided
to convert the payment of his fees from a
portion of land equivalent to that of each of the
plaintiffs to P 50,000, which he alleges to be
the monetary value of that area. Certainly,
Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally
appropriate his clients' money not only because
he is bound by a written agreement but also
because, under the circumstances, it was
highly unjust for him to have done so. His
clients were mere squatters who could barely
eke out an existence
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since
he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had
the legal right to retain the money in his
possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground
23
FACTS: Atty. Ricafort, as counsel of Busios in a case Busios
won, received from the Clerk of Court of RTC Ligao, Albay, P25,
000 and from OAS Standard High School P5, 000. Busios waited
for the amounts to be deposited in her account. Atty. Ricafort
later informed her that he had spent the money but he
promised to pay her. Only after an estafa case was filed did
Atty. Ricafort pay P60,000 as settlement. Busios dropped the
estafa case but not the disbarment case.

for his discharge as counsel- his clients had lost
confidence in him. Secondly, even if there were
no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right
to retain his clients' funds intended for a
specific purpose the purchase of land. He
stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if
a lawyer is employed without a price
agreed upon for his services in which case
he would be entitled to receive what he
merits for his services, as much as he has
earned. In this case, however, there was an
express contract and a stipulated mode of
compensation. The implied assumption on
quantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
(Quilban v. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768
(1989))
IV. Rule 16.04. A lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the clients interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except when, in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.
Champertya bargain by a stranger (the
lawyer) with a party to a suit (the client) by
which such third person undertakes to carry on
the litigation at his own expense and risk, in
consideration of receiving, if successful, a part
of the proceeds or subject sought to be
recovered.
Champertous Contractwhere the lawyer
assumes all expenses of litigation and
reimbursement is contingent on outcome of
case is PROHIBITED! Champertous contracts
are like wagersthe lawyer gets paid and
reimbursed if he wins the case and loses even
what he had spent on the case if he loses.
Contingent Fee Contractin this, the lawyer
gets reimbursed for any advances made for the
client in the course of the representation,
whether he wins the suit or not; only the
amount of attorneys fees is contingent upon
winning.
The relation of attorney and client is highly
fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is
duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients. The profession, therefore, demands
of an attorney an absolute abdication of every
personal advantage conflicting in any way,
directly or indirectly, with the interest of his
client. (Barnachea v. Quicho, 399 SCRA 1
(2003))
CANON 17: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. [no implementing rules]
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
KNOW MORE:
When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he
thereby covenants that he will exert all effort
for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The
failure to exercise due diligence or the
abandonment of a client's cause makes such
lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client
had reposed on him.
A lawyer has a duty to protect with utmost
dedication the interest of his client and of the
fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his
client. More so where by reason of his gross
negligence his client thereby suffered by losing
all her cases.
Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable,
above suspicion and beyond reproach in
dealing with their clients. The profession is not
synonymous with an ordinary business
proposition. It is a matter of public interest.
(Cantiller v. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246
(1968))
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer
to disclose to the client all the circumstances of
his relations to the parties, and any interest in
or connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of
counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose.
A lawyer should champion his cause with that
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that
he is obligated to give to every case that he
accepts from a client. (Alisbo v. Jalandoon,
199 SCRA 321 (1991))
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e): To maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client's
business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (f): To abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witnesses, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged.
Furnishing the adverse parties with evidence
against the client constitutes betrayal of trust
and confidence of his former clients in violation
of Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e). (Ngayan v. Tugade,
193 SCRA 779 (1991))
A lawyer has a sworn duty to act with fidelity
toward his clients. Canon 17, Code of
Professional Responsibility states that [a]
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and shall be mindful the trust and confidence
reposed in him; and Rule 1.01 which prohibits
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement
of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar
but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain ones goods standing in the legal
profession. (In Re: Suspension from the
Practice of law (435 SCRA 417 (2004))

The present case focuses on a critical aspect of
the lawyer-client relationship: the duty of
loyalty. The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is
traditionally characterized as undivided. This
means that lawyers must represent their clients
and serve their needs without interference or
impairment from any conflicting interest.
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, deals with conflicts in the
interests of an attorneys actual clients among
themselves, of existing and prospective clients,
and of the attorney and his clients. It states
that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
The relation of attorney and client begins from
the time an attorney is retained. An attorney
has no power to act as counsel or legal
representative for a person without being
retained. To establish the professional relation,
it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of
an attorney are sought and received in any
manner pertinent to his profession.
Inapplicable to the case, is Canon 15 of the
same Code which encompasses the
aforementioned rule. In general terms, Canon
15 requires lawyers to observe loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with their clients.
Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice
to a party with an interest conflicting with that
of his client resulting in detriment to the latter
may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far
be it that every utterance of an attorney which
may have afforded an individual some relief
adverse to the formers client may be labeled
as a culpable act of disloyalty. As in every
case, the acts alleged to be culpable must be
assessed in light of the surrounding
circumstances.
We are not unaware of the custom of
practitioners in a law firm of assigning cases
and even entire client accounts to associates or
other partners with limited supervision, if at all.
However, let it not be said that law firm
practitioners are given a free hand to assign
cases to seasoned attorneys and thereafter
conveniently forget about the case. To do so
would be a disservice to the profession, the
integrity and advancement of which this Court
must jealously protect.
Law practitioners are acutely aware of the
responsibilities that are naturally taken on by
partners and supervisory lawyers over the
lawyers and non-lawyers of the law office.
Lawyers are administratively liable for the
conduct of their employees in failing to timely
file pleadings.
We now hold further that partners and
practitioners who hold supervisory capacities
are legally responsible to exert ordinary
diligence in apprising themselves of the
comings and goings of the cases handled by
the persons over which they are exercising
supervisory authority and in exerting necessary
efforts to foreclose the occurrence of violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
persons under their charge. Nonetheless, the
liability of the supervising lawyer in this regard
is by no means equivalent to that of the
recalcitrant lawyer. The actual degree of
control and supervision exercised by said
supervising lawyer varies, inter alia, according
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
to office practice, or the length of experience
and competence of the lawyer supervised.
Such factors can be taken into account in
ascertaining the proper penalty. Certainly, a
lawyer charged with the supervision of a
fledgling attorney prone to rookie mistakes
should bear greater responsibility for the
culpable acts of the underling than one satisfied
enough with the work and professional ethic of
the associate so as to leave the latter mostly to
his/her own devises. (Solatan v. Inocentes,
466 SCRA 1 (2005))
CANON 18: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 18. A lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer shall not
undertake a legal service which he
knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However he may
render such service if, with the consent
of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02. A lawyer shall not
handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable
period of time to the clients request
for information.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 18:
o Client Consent with Collaborating Counsel
(Rule 18.01)
o Adequate Preparation (Rule 18.02)
o Not to neglect Legal Matters (Rule 18.03)
o Inform Client of Case Statue (Rule 18.04)
KNOW MORE:
Competence sufficiency of lawyers
qualifications to deal with the matter in
question and includes knowledge and skill and
the ability to use them effectively in the
interest of the client
Diligence is the attention and care required
of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence. It is axiomatic in the
practice of law that the price of success is
eternal diligence to the cause of the client.
(Edquibal v. Ferrer, 450 SCRA 406)
Lawyer impliedly represents that: he possesses
requisite degree of learning, skill, ability which
is necessary to the practice of his profession
and which other similarly situated possess; he
will exert his best judgment in the prosecution

or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; he
will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence in the use of his skill and in the
application of his knowledge to his clients
cause; he will take such steps as will
adequately safeguards his clients interest. A
client may reasonably expect that counsel will
make good his representations. (Agpalo)
I. Rule 18.01. A lawyer shall not undertake a legal
service which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he
can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
However well meaning he may be, a lawyer
cannot ask another lawyer to collaborate with
him in a particular case without the consent of
the client. The fiduciary nature of attorney-
client relationship prohibits this. (Aguirre)
Some cases involve specialized fields of law
and require special training. A lawyer should
not accept an undertaking in specific area of
law which he knows or should know he is not
qualified to enter. (Agpalo)
II. Rule 18.02.A lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation.
Lawyer should safeguard his clients rights and
interests by thorough study and preparation;
mastering applicable law and facts involved in a
case, regardless of the nature of the
assignment; and keeping constantly abreast of
the latest jurisprudence and developments in
all branches of the law (Agpalo)
III. Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
The standard of diligence required of a lawyer
is that of a good father of a family. He is not
bound to exercise extraordinary diligence
There is want of required diligence when a
lawyer fails without sufficient justification to
bring an action immediately, to answer a
complaint within the reglementary period, to
notify his client of the date of the date of
hearing, to attend the scheduled pre-trial
conference, to inform the client of an adverse
judgment within the reglementary period to
appeal, to take steps to have the adverse
decision reconsidered or appealed, to ascertain
the correct date of receipt of decision, to
acquaint himself with what has happened to
the litigation, to pay docket fee on appeal, to
claim judicial notice sent to him by mail or to
file the appellants brief
It should be remembered that the moment the
lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that
he will exert all effort for its prosecution until
its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to
exercise due diligence or abandons his clients
cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
on him by the latter. (Legarda v. CA, 209
SCRA 722 (1992))24
IV. Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable period of time to the
clients request for information.
It was unnecessary to have complainants wait,
and hope, for six long years on their pension
claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate,
respondent should have forthwith terminated
their professional relationship instead of
keeping them hanging indefinitely. (Blanza v.
Arcangel (1967))
CANON 19: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 19. A lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal within the bounds of law.
Rule 19.01. A lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case
or proceeding.
Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has
received information that his client
has, in the course of the
representation, perpetuated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to
rectify the same, and failing which he
shall terminate the relationship with
such client in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03. A lawyer shall not
allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 19:
o Fair and Honest (Rule 19.01)
o Rectify Clients Fraud (Rule 19.02)
o Control Proceedings (Rule 19.03)
KNOW MORE:
I. Rule 19.01. A lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.
Rule 138, Sec. 20(d). Duties of attorneys.It
is the duty of an attorney: (d) To employ, for
the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
24
FACTS: Legarda was defendant in a complaint for specific
performance. Atty. Coronel, her counsel, failed to file an
answer within the period and Legarda was thus declared in
default. The lower court rendered a decision against Legarda.
Coronel failed to pose an appeal within the period. Thus, the
decision became final. The SC suspended Atty. Coronel for six
months.
 LEGAL ETHICS

to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law.
Rule: In espousing his clients cause, a lawyer
should not state his personal belief as to the
soundness or justice of his case. Reasons: the
lawyers personal belief has no real bearing on
the case; if expression of belief were permitted,
it would give improper advantage to the older
and better known lawyer whose opinion would
carry more weight; If such were permitted,
omission to make such assertion might be
taken as an admission of the lack or belief in
the soundness of his clients cause. (Agpalo)
II. Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received
information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetuated a fraud upon a person
or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to
rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
Mistakes or Negligence of Lawyer Binding
Upon Client (1998, 200, 2002 BAR EXAMS)
General Rule: Client is bound by attorneys
conduct, negligence and mistake in handling case
or in management of litigation and in procedural
technique, and he cannot be heard to complain that
result might have been different had his lawyer
proceeded differently.
Exceptions:
1) Where adherence thereto results in outright
deprivation of clients liberty or property or
where interest of justice so requires.
2) Where error by counsel is purely technical
which does not affect substantially clients
cause.
3) Ignorance, incompetence or inexperience of
lawyer is so great and error so serious that
client, who has good cause is prejudiced
and denied a day in court.
4) Gross negligence of lawyer.
5) Lack of acquaintance with technical part of
procedure.

Canon 19.02 merely requires the lawyer to

terminate his relationship with the client in the
event the latter fails or refuses to rectify the
fraud. (Agpalo)

On the other hand, Canon 41 of the Canons of

Professional Ethics permits the lawyer to inform
the person injured by the fraudulent acts of his
client or the injured partys counsel. Canon 41
may collide with the lawyers duty to keep the
clients confidence inviolate which may be the
reason for the revision.

Rule: A lawyer may not volunteer the

information concerning the clients commission
of fraud to anybody, as it will violate his
obligation to maintain his clients secrets
undisclosed.

III. Rule 19.03. A lawyer shall not allow his

client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.

Rule 138, sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to

bind clients.Attorneys have authority to bind
their clients in any case by any agreement in
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their client's litigation,
or receive anything in discharge of a client's
claim but the full amount in cash.

A lawyer should seek instruction from his client

on any substantial matter concerning the
litigation, which requires decision on the part of
the client (i.e. whether to compromise the
case, or to appeal an unfavorable judgment.)
In procedural matters, the client must yield to
the lawyer. (Agpalo)

o Rule: In matters of law, it is the client who

should yield to the lawyer and not the other
way around. Reasons: Lawyers duty to the
court is foremost. The dignity of the legal
profession may be compromised.

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
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 LEGAL ETHICS

CANON 20: QUICK REFERENCE matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair standing of the attorney. No court shall be
and reasonable fees. bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but
Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided may disregard such testimony and base its
by the following factors in determining his conclusion on its own professional knowledge.
fees: A written contract for services shall control the
a. The time spent and the extent of the amount to be paid therefore unless found by
services rendered or required; the court to be unconscionable or
b. The novelty and difficulty of the unreasonable.
questions involved;
c. The importance of the subject Rule 138, sec. 32. Compensation for
matter; attorneys de oficio.Subject to availability of
d. The skill demanded; funds as may be provided by law the court
e. The probability of losing other may, in its discretion, order an attorney
employment as a result of employed as counsel de oficio to be
acceptance of the professed case; compensated in such sum as the court may fix
f. The customary charges for similar in accordance with section 24 of this rule.
services and the schedule of fees of Whenever such compensation is allowed, it
the IBP Charter to which he shall not be less than P30 in any case, nor
belongs; more than the following amounts:
g. The amount involved in the o P50 in light felonies;
controversy and the benefits o P100 in less grave felonies;
resulting to the client from the o P200 in grave felonies other than capital
service; offenses;
h. The contingency or certainty of o P500 in capital offenses.
compensation;
i. The character of the employment, RA 5185, sec. 6 (An act granting further
whether occasional or established; autonomous powers to local governments)
and Prohibition Against Practice. - A member of the
j. The professional standing of the Provincial Board or City or Municipal Council
lawyer. shall not appear as counsel before any court in
any civil case wherein the province, city or
Rule 20.02. A lawyer shall, in cases of municipality, as the case may be, is the
referral, with the consent of the client, be adverse party: Provided, however, That no
entitled to a division of fees in proportion member of the Provincial Board shall so appear
to the work performed and responsibility except in behalf of his province in any civil case
assumed. wherein any city in the province is the adverse
party whose voters are en-franchised to vote
Rule 20.03. A lawyer shall not, for provincial officials, nor shall such member
without the full knowledge and consent of of the Provincial Board or City or Municipal
the client, accept any fee, reward, costs, Council appear as counsel for the accused in
commission, interest, rebate or any criminal case wherein an officer or
forwarding allowances or other employee of said province, city or municipality
compensation whatsoever related to his is accused of an offense committed in relation
professional employment from any one to the latter's office, nor shall he collect any fee
other than the client. for his appearance in any administrative
proceedings before provincial, city or municipal
Rule 20.04. A lawyer shall avoid agencies of the province, city or municipality,
controversies with clients concerning his as the case may be, of which he is an elected
compensation and shall resort to judicial official.
action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud. The provisions of this Section shall likewise
apply to provincial governors and city and
municipal mayors.
Notes from Agpalo: Right to Attorneys
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 20: Fees
o Fee Guide (Rule 20.01) o That the practice of law is a profession and
o Clients Consent of Fees for Referral (Rule not a money-making trade does not
20.02) operate to deny a lawyer the right to
o Clients Consent of Acceptance fee (Rule attorneys fees for his professional services.
20.03) He has the right to have and recover from
o Avoid Compensation Controversy with Client his client a fair and reasonable
(Rule 20.04) compensation for his services, except in
cases where he has agreed to render
service gratuitously or has been appointed
KNOW MORE: counsel de oficio.

Rule 138, sec. 24. Compensation of o Lawyers should avoid controversies

attorneys.An attorney shall be entitled to concerning compensation so far as shall be
have and recover from his client no more than compatible with self-respect and with right
a reasonable compensation for his services, to receive a reasonable recompense for
with a view to the importance of the subject services. Resort to law suits with clients

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE

should only be done to prevent injustice,
imposition or fraud. The impression is that
those instituting suits are mercenaries.
o GENERALLY: right of lawyer to reasonable
compensation for services requires the
following:
1. that attorney-client relationship exists;
and
2. that he rendered services to the client.
o A written agreement is not necessary to
establish a clients obligation to pay
attorneys fees. As long as the lawyer is
honestly and in good faith trying to serve
and represent the interest of his client, an
absence of express undertaking does not
defeat recovery of fees.
o Clients obligation to pay attorneys fees
arises from the inanimate contract of facis
ut des (I do and you give) which is based
on the principle that no one shall unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.
o General rule: a person who had no
knowledge of, or objected to, the lawyers
representation may not be held liable for
attorneys fees even though such
representation redounded to his benefit..
The objection should be raised before and
not after beneficial services shall have been
rendered by the lawyer; otherwise, the
party who benefited may be required to
pay counsel fees. For it is neither just that
client who retained lawyer should alone pay
nor is it fair that those who, investing
nothing and assuming no risk, received
benefits should not contribute their
proportionate share to counsel fees (based
on equity).
o Non-lawyer cannot recover attorneys fees
even if there is a law authorizing him to
represent a litigant in court because basis
of reasonable compensation is the
existence of attorney-client relationship and
the rendition of services.
o Lawyer who is absolutely disqualified from
engaging in private practice of law by
reason of his government position may
neither practice law nor, should he do so
illegally, charge attorneys fees for such
services. Exception: fees for services
already performed before lawyer qualified
for public office even though payment is
made thereafter.
o Lawyer designated by court to render
professional services, in the absence of law
allowing compensation, cannot charge
government nor the indigent litigant for his
professional services. Appointment neither
violates constitutional restriction against
taking of property without just
compensation or the due process of law nor
imposes upon the government the oblig to
pay him his fees because one of the obligs
of an attorney willingly assumed when he
took his oath as lawyer is to render free
legal services whenever required by the
court to do so.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
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Rules of Court: Court, in its discretion,
may grant (token) compensation
subject to availability of funds: P30-P50
in light felonies; P100 in less grave
felonies; P200 in grave felonies other
than capital offenses; P500 in capital
offenses. This is not intended as a
source of regular income
o Misconduct on part of lawyer may affect or
negate his right to recover from client a
reasonable compensation for services
already performed. (examples: negligence,
carelessness, misrepresentation,
unfaithfulness or abuse of clients
confidence). Basis: good morals and public
policy
o Although a client has right to discharge
lawyer anytime, dismiss or settle action or
even waive the whole of his interest in
favor of adverse party, he cannot, in the
absence of lawyers fault, consent or
waiver, deprive the lawyer of his just fees
already earned.
Quantum meruit
When no price is stipulated for lawyers
service, courts will fix amount on quantum
meruit basis, or such amount which his
service merits.
Requisite for principle: that there is an
acceptance of the benefits by one sought to
be charged for the services rendered under
circumstances as reasonably to notify him
that the lawyer performing the task is
expecting to be paid compensation.
Doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on the
equitable postulate that it is unjust for a
person to retain benefit without paying for
it.
Other times when doctrine applicable:
where amount stipulated in written
agreement is found to be unconscionable or
where client dismissed counsel before
termination of case or where the lawyer
withdrew therefrom for valid reasons.
A charging lien, to be enforceable as security
for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as
a condition sine qua non a judgment for money
and execution in pursuance of such judgment
secured in the main action by the attorney in
favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his
right to fees by filing the necessary petition as
an incident in the main action in which his
services were rendered when something is due
his client in the action from which the fee is to
be paid. An enforceable charging lien, duly
recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court
trying the main case and this jurisdiction
subsists until the lien is settled. (Metrobank v.
CA, 181 SCRA 367 (1981))25
25
FACTS: Lawyers filed verified motion to enter in the records
their charging lien. Attorneys liens were annotated on the
certificate of land titles. Consequently, the other partys
petition against sale of land was granted with prejudice and a
new certificate of title with his name was made wherein
attorneys liens were annotated. The Court held that the
lawyers were not entitled to the enforcement of charging lien
for payment of its attorney's fees and also held that a separate
civil suit is not necessary for the enforcement of such lien.

Since the main case from which the petitioner's
claims for their fees may arise has not yet
become final, the determination of the
propriety of said fees and the amount thereof
should be held in abeyance. This procedure
gains added validity in the light of the rule that
the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an
incident of the main action may be availed of
only when something is due to the client.
(Quirante v. IAC, 169 SCRA 769 (1989))26
The mere fact that an agreement had been
reached between attorney and client fixing the
amount of the attorney's fees, does not
insulate such agreement from review and
modification by the Court where the fees
clearly appear to be excessive or unreasonable.
(Tanhueco v. De Dumo, 172 SCRA 760
(1989))
The Counsel if worthy of his hire, is entitled to
be fully recompensed for his services. With his
capital consisting solely of his brains and his
skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in
money but in the expenditure of time and
energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the
part of a client to escape payment of his fees.
(Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411 (1967))27
I. Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the
following factors in determining his fees:
a. The time spent and the extent of the services
rendered or required;
b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
c. The importance of the subject matter;
d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment as a
result of acceptance of the professed case;
f. The customary charges for similar services and
the schedule of fees of the IBP Charter to which
he belongs;
g. The amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;
h. The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i. The character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
j. The professional standing of the lawyer.
A valid written contract is conclusive as to
amount of compensation. Unless both parties
set aside contract and submit question of
reasonableness of amount of fees for court to
resolve on quantum meruit basis, neither client
nor lawyer may disregard amount fixed
(Agpalo)
None of the factors is controlling but are guides
only. Other factors (Agpalo):
a) actual purchasing power of Philippine peso
b) omission or fault of lawyer
26
FACTS: Atty Quirante filed a motion for confirmation of
attorneys fees in the trial court, presenting alleged agreement
between him and Casasola about said fee while the main case is
still pending. The case is being heard on appeal. The Court held
that Atty. Quirante cannot have a confirmation of attorneys
fees.
27
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
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c) loss of opportunity on part of lawyer for
other employment
d) financial capacity of client
Amount based on Quantum Meruit: Quantum
Meruit means as much as a lawyer deserves.
Its essential requisite is acceptance of the
benefits by one sought to be charged for
services rendered under circumstances as
reasonably to notify him that lawyer expects
compensation. (Agpalo)
Instances when Court will fix Amount of
Attorneys Fees based on Quantum Meruit:
1. agreement is invalid for some reason other
than illegality of object of performance
2. amount stipulated is unconscionable
3. no agreement as to fees existed between
parties
4. client rejects amount fixed in contract as
unconscionable and is found to be so
5. lawyer, without fault, was unable to conclude
litigation
Agpalo adds (1) the results secured and (2)
whether of not the fee is contingent, it being
recognized as a rule that an attorney may
properly charge a higher fee when it is
contingent that when it is absolute. Even other
consideration may be the actual purchasing
power of the Philippine Peso, the omission of
fault of the lawyer in the discharge of his
duties, the loss of opportunity on the part of a
lawyer for other employment of the financial
capacity of the client.
II. Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral,
with the consent of the client, be entitled to a
division of fees in proportion to the work performed
and responsibility assumed.
Lawyers sometimes use the lawyer-referral
system. It is an aid to selection of qualified
lawyers. This system helps individuals in
locating lawyers competent to handle their
particular problem. It enables laymen to have
informed selection of competent lawyers who
have experience in the subject matter involved
in a particular case. It is however stressed that
it is improper for a lawyer to receive
compensation for merely recommending
another lawyer to his client for if such practice
is permitted, it would tend to germinate evils of
commercialism and to destroy proper
appreciation of professional responsibility. It is
only when, in addition to referral, he performs
legal service or assumes responsibility in case
that he will be entitled to a fee. (Agpalo)
Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said provision enumerates the grounds
for the suspension and disbarment of lawyers,
namely:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court, on what grounds, - A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath of which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for willful
 LEGAL ETHICS

disobedience of any lawful order of a superior CANON 21: QUICK REFERENCE

court or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without any
Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting
and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
relationship is terminated.
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Urban Bank v. Pena Rule 21.01. A lawyer shall not reveal the
(2001)) confidence or secrets of his client except:
o When authorized by the client after
acquainting him of the consequences of
III. Rule 20.03. A lawyer shall not, without the disclosure;
the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept o When required by law;
o When necessary to collect his fees or to
any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, defend himself, his employees or
rebate or forwarding allowances or other associates or by judicial action.
compensation whatsoever related to his
professional employment from any one other than Rule 21.02. A lawyer shall not, to the
the client. disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor
Rule 138, sec. 20(e). Duties of attorneys.It shall he use the same to his advantage or that
is the duty of an attorney: (e) to accept no of a third person, unless the client with full
knowledge of the circumstances consents
compensation in connection with his client's
thereto.
business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval. Rule 21.03. A lawyer shall not, without
the written consent of his client, give
Reason: to ensure protection of lawyers in information from his files to an outside agency
collection of fees. Moreover, it is designed to seeking such information for auditing,
secure the lawyers wholehearted fidelity to the statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data
processing, or any similar purpose.
clients cause and to prevent that situation in
which the receipt by him of a rebate or Rule 21.04. A lawyer may disclose the
commission from another in connection with affairs of a client of the firm to partners or
the clients cause may interfere with the full associates thereof unless prohibited by the
discharge of his duty to the client. The amount client.
received by lawyer from opposite party or third
persons in the service of his client belongs to Rule 21.05. A lawyer shall adopt such
the client except when the latter has full measures as may be required to prevent those
knowledge and approval of lawyers taking whose services are utilized by him, from
disclosing or using confidences or secrets of
(Agpalo)
the client.

Rule 21.06. A lawyer shall avoid

IV. Rule 20.04. A lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Suits to collect fees should be avoided and only
when the circumstances imperatively require
should a lawyer resort to lawsuit to enforce
payment of fees. This is but a logical
consequence of the legal profession not
primarily being for economic compensation.
(Agpalo)
An attorney-client relationship can be created
by implied agreement, as when the attorney
actually rendered legal services for a person
who is a close friend. The obligation of such a
person to pay attorneys fees is based on the
law of contracts concept of facio ut des (no
one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of others.) (Corpuz v. CA, 98 SCRA 424
(1980))28
28
FACTS: Atty David and Corpuz were good friends. In Corpuzs
civil case, David became his counsel. Prior to rendering of final
judgment, Corpuz gave the lawyer a check which the latter
returned. After favorable decision was rendered, Atty. David
demanded attorneys fee which Corpuz refused to deliver
alleging that Davids services were offered gratuitously. The
Court decided that Atty. David should be paid attorneys fees.
indiscreet conversation about a clients affairs
even with members of his family.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 21:
o Revelations of Confidence and Secrets Allowed
(Rule 21.01)
o Use of Information Received in Course of
Employment Allowed (Rule 21.02)
o Prohibition to Giving of Information Outside
Agency (Rule 21.03)
o Protection from Disclosure (Rule 21.04
21.05)
o Prohibition of Indiscreet Conversation (Rule
21.06)
o Not to Reveal that Lawyer was Consulted (Rule
21.07)
KNOW MORE:
Rule 138, 20(e). Duties of attorneys.It is
the duty of an attorney: (e) To maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client,
and to accept no compensation in connection
with his client's business except from him or
with his knowledge and approval;
Rule 130, sec. 21(b). Privileged
communication. An attorney cannot, without
the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment; nor can an attorney's

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
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secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity.
A confidential communication refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means which so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no
third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given. Covers all
actions, signs, means of communication
There is a difference between confidences and
secrets of clients. While confidences refer to
information protected by attorney-client
privilege under the Revised Rules of Court
(information pertinent to the case being
handled), secrets are those other information
gained in the professional relationship that the
client has requested to be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would likely be detrimental to client
(information not exactly pertinent to case).
To constitute professional employment it is not
essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. If a person, in respect to his business
affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits
or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as
established. Information so received is sacred
to the employment to which it pertains, and to
permit to be used in the interest of another, or,
worse still, in the interest of the adverse party,
is to strike at the element of confidence which
lies at the basis of, and affords the essential
security in, the relation of attorney and client.
Rationale behind this prohibition: not only to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but also to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. The
question is not necessarily one of the rights of
the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard.
(Hilado v. David, 83 Phil 569 (1949))
I. Rule 21.01. A lawyer shall not reveal the
confidence or secrets of his client except:
a. When authorized by the client after acquainting
him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b. When required by law;
c. When necessary to collect his fees or to defend
himself, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.
Exceptions to the General Rule (Agpalo):
o In cases of contemplated crimes or
perpetuation of fraud (reason: lawyer-client
relationship should only be for lawful
purposes)
o in case client files complaint against his
lawyer or unreasonably refuses to pay his
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
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LEGAL ETHICS
fees: lawyer may disclose so much of
clients confidences as may be necessary to
protect himself or to collect fees
II. Rule 21.02. A lawyer shall not, to the
disadvantage of his client, use information acquired
in the course of employment, nor shall he use the
same to his advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
III. Rule 21.03. A lawyer shall not, without
the written consent of his client, give information
from his files to an outside agency seeking such
information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, or any similar
purpose.
The reason for the rule is that the work and
product of a lawyer, such as his effort,
research, and thought, and the records of his
client, contained in his files are privileged
matters. (Agpalo)
IV-V.
Rule 21.04. A lawyer may disclose the affairs of
a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof
unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05. A lawyer shall adopt such measures
as may be required to prevent those whose
services are utilized by him, from disclosing or
using confidences or secrets of the client.
Professional employment of a law firm is
equivalent to retainer of the members thereof
even though only one partner is consulted.
When one partner tells another about the
details of the case, it is not considered as
disclosure to third persons because members of
a law firm are considered as one entity.
(Agpalo)
VI. Rule 21.06. A lawyer shall avoid
indiscreet conversation about a clients affairs even
with members of his family.
A lawyer must not only preserve the
confidences and secrets of his clients in his law
office but also outside including his home. He
should avoid committing calculated
indiscretion, that is, accidental revelation of
secrets obtained in his professional
employment. Reckless or imprudent disclosure
of the affairs of his clients may jeopardize
them. Not every member of the lawyers family
has the proper orientation and training for
keeping clients confidences and secrets.
(Agpalo)
VII. Rule 21.07. A lawyer shall not reveal
that he has been consulted about a particular case
except to avoid possible conflict of interests.
This rule clarifies that privilege communication
applies even to prospective clients. Moreover,
the prohibition applies even if the prospective
client did not thereafter actually engage the
lawyer. (Agpalo)
CF: Rule 14.03. A lawyer may refuse to
accept representation of an indigent client if:

a) he is not in a position to carry out the
work effectively or competently;
b) he labors under a conflict of interests
between him and the prospective client
or between a present client and the
prospective client.
CF: Rule 15.01. A lawyer, in conferring with
a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a
conflict with another client or his own interest,
and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective
client.
This rule clarifies that privilege communication
applies even to prospective clients. Moreover,
the prohibition applies even if the prospective
client did not thereafter actually engage the
lawyer. By the consultation, the lawyer already
learned of the secrets of prospective client. It is
not fair if he will not be bound by the rule on
privileged communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client. This
rule, of course, is subject to exception of
representation of conflicting interests (Agpalo)
CANON 22: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 22. A lawyer may withdraw his
services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.
Rule 22.01. A lawyer may withdraw
his services in any of the following case:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or
immoral course of conduct in
connection with the matter he is
handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of these
canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-
counsel will not promote the best
interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition
of the lawyer renders it difficult for him
to carry out the employment
effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay
the fees for the services or fails to
comply with the retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed
to public office; and
g) Other similar cases.
Rule 22.02. A lawyer who withdraws
or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer
lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and
shall cooperate with his successor in the
orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.
MEMORY AID FOR RULES UNDER CANON 22:
o Good Causes for Withdrawal of Services
(Rule 22.01)
o Duties of Lawyer who Withdraws (Rule
22.02)
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
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KNOW MORE:
Causes of Termination of Attorney-Client
Relation (Agpalo)
o Withdrawal of the lawyer under Rule 22.01
o Death of the lawyer
o Death of client
o Discharge or dismissal of the lawyer by the
client
o Appointment or election of a lawyer to a
government position which prohibits private
practice of law
o Full termination of the case
o Disbarment or suspension of the lawyer
from the practice of law
o Intervening incapacity or incompetence of
the client during pendency of case
o Declaration of presumptive death of lawyer
o Conviction of a crime and imprisonment of
lawyer
Note: Except for items 2 and 6, the lawyer has
duty to notify the court in case of termination
of attorney-client relationship.
A contract for legal services being personal, it
terminates upon death of the lawyer. However,
if the lawyer is a member of a law firm, which
firm appears as counsel for the client, the
death of the attending lawyer will not terminate
the relation. The firm will continue to appear as
counsel for client unless there has been
agreement that services were to be rendered
only by the said attorney.
Who may Terminate Attorney-Client Relation
1. Client
Client has absolute right to discharge his
attorney with or without just cause or even
against lawyers consent. Existence or non-
existence of a just cause is important only
in determining right of an attorney to
compensation for services rendered.
Discharge of an attorney or his substitution
by another without justifiable cause will not
operate to extinguish the lawyers right to
full payment of compensation as agreed
upon in writing.
2. Attorney
3. Court
4. Circumstances beyond control of parties
Discharge of attorney must be made known to
the court and adverse party through a formal
notice. This is unnecessary between the lawyer
and client, himself. But insofar as the court and
other party are concerned, the severance of the
relation of attorney and client is not effective
until a notice of discharge by the client or a
manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is
filed with the court and a copy thereof served
upon the adverse party.
Before discharge is recorded in the court, the
lawyers power is limited to (1) making that
fact known to court and to adverse party, and
to (2) preserving and protecting clients
interest until final discharge or new counsel
enters appearance. He cannot pretend to
continue representing client.
Representation continues until the court
dispenses with the services of counsel in
accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Counsel may be validly

substituted only if the following requisites are
complied with: (1) New counsel files a written
application for substitution; (2) The clients
written consent is obtained; (3) The written
consent of the lawyer to be substituted is
secured, if it can still be; if the written consent
can no longer be obtained, the application for
substitution must carry proof that notice of the
motion has been served on the attorney to be
substituted in the manner required by the
Rules. (Obando v. Figueras (2000))
I. Rule 22.01. A lawyer may withdraw his services
in any of the following case:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral
course of conduct in connection with the matter
he is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of these canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will
not promote the best interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the
lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out
the employment effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the
fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to
public office; and
g) Other similar cases.
A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for
good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances; a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
(Montano v. IBP, 358 SCRA 1 (2001))29
Procedure for Withdrawal: If without written
consent from client, lawyer should file petition
for withdrawal in court and he must serve copy
of his petition upon his client and the adverse
party at least 3 days before date set for
hearing. He should also give time to client to
secure services from another lawyer in the case
from which he is withdrawing.
Change or Substitution of Counsel
Change of counsel
1) client discharges attorney with or without
cause: no consent or notice to lawyer needed,
nor court approval
2) attorney may initiate move by withdrawing his
appearance with written consent of client or
with leave of court on some justifiable ground
3) substitution of counsel in the form of
application for that purpose: constitutes an
appearance of the substituting counsel and is a
polite way of effecting change; compliance with
formalities is necessary since it involves ethical
considerations
Requirements for substitution
1) written application for substitution
2) written consent of client
3) written consent of attorney to be substituted
29
FACTS: Atty. Dealca and Montano agreed that 50% attorneys
fees shall be paid upon case acceptance and the other half upon
its termination. Despite agreement, Atty. Dealca asked for
payment of balance during the course of case. Upon failure to
give balance of P3, 500, Dealca withdrew appearance as counsel.
The Court found that Dealca had not withdrawn for good cause.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
* in case written consent of attorney cannot be
secured, proof of service of notice of application
upon attorney to be substituted.
** in case of death of original attorney, additional
requirement of verified proof of death necessary
usually initiated by substituting counsel hence
the need to obtain conformity of original lawyer
or at least notice to original lawyer of
substitution
consent of original lawyer or notice
requirement is designed to afford the lawyer
the opportunity to protect his right to
attorneys fees. If he gives consent, it is
presumed he has settled that question. If not,
he can ask in same action that his chance to
have his right to attorneys fees be preserved
and protected.
Effects of Defective Substitution
A defective substitution is one which lacks any
of the requisites for a valid substitution.
It does not effect a change of counsel; nor
constitute an appearance of new lawyer, both
of whom shall be deemed counsel of record;
pleadings filed by the new lawyer deemed
effective.
Employment of additional counsel
Client has right to as many lawyers as he can
afford. Clients proffer of assistance of
additional counsel should not be regarded as
evidence of want of confidence.
Professional courtesy requires that a lawyer
retained as collaborating counsel should at
least communicate with counsel of record
before entering his appearance and should
decline association if objectionable to original
counsel.
But if first lawyer is relieved by client, another
lawyer may come into the case.
II. Rule 22.02.A lawyer who withdraws or is
discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to
which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate
with his successor in the orderly transfer of the
matter, including all information necessary for the
proper handling of the matter.
A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to
his client when due or upon demand. However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has secured
for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court. (Rule 16.03)
Lawyers withdrawal or discharge shall be
without prejudice to his attorneys lien:
o Purpose of Rule 22.02 (lawyer entitled
to retaining lien) and Rule 16.03
(lawyer entitled to retaining and
charging lien): to insure payment of
lawyers professional fees and the
reimbursement of his lawful
 LEGAL ETHICS

disbursements in keeping with his It cannot be can be

dignity as an officer of the court. actively enforced by
(Agpalo) enforced. It is execution. It
a general lien. is a special
Kinds of Liens lien.
1. Retaining Lien (general lien) Basis Lawful Securing of a
o the right of an attorney to retain the possession of favorable
funds, documents and papers of his funds, money
client which have lawfully come into papers, judgment for
his possession until his lawful fees and documents, client
disbursements have been paid and to property
apply such funds to the satisfaction belonging to
thereof. client
o Reason and essence of lien: Coverage Covers only Covers all
inconvenience or disadvantage caused funds, judgments for
to the client because of exercise of papers, the payment
such lien may induce client to pay the documents, of money and
lawyer his fees and disbursements. and property executions
o It is a general lien for the balance of in the lawful issued in
the account due to the attorney from possession of pursuance of
client for services rendered in all the attorney such
matters he may have handled for the by reason of judgment
client, regardless of outcome. his
o It is dependent upon and takes effect professional
from time of lawful possession and employment
does not require notice thereof upon Effectivity As soon as As soon as
client and the adverse party to be the lawyer the claim for
effective. gets attorneys
o Passive right and cannot be actively possession of fees had been
enforced; amounts to a mere right to the funds, entered into
retain funds, documents and papers papers, the records of
as against the client until the attorney documents, the case
is fully paid his fees. However, lawyer property
may apply so much of clients funds in Notice Client need Client and
his possession to satisfy his lawful not be adverse party
fees and disbursements, giving notice notified to need to
promptly thereafter to his client. make it notified to
effective make it
* Requisites for validity (of retaining lien) effective
1. attorney-client relationship Applicability May be Generally, it
2. lawful possession by lawyer of the exercised is exercisable
clients funds, documents and papers in before only when the
his professional capacity judgment or attorney had
3. unsatisfied claim for attorneys fees or execution, or already
disbursements regardless secured a
thereof favorable
2. Charging Lien (special lien) judgment for
o A charging lien is a right which the his client
attorney has upon all judgments for the
payment of money and executions
issued in pursuance thereof, secured in
favor of his client. Covers only services
rendered by attorney in the action in ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
which the judgment was obtained and
takes effect only after a statement of I. LIABILITIES OF LAWYERS
claim has been entered upon record of
the particular action with written notice CIVIL LIABILITY
to his client and adverse party. 1) Client is prejudiced by lawyers negligence
and misconduct.
* Requisites for validity of charging lien 2) Breach of fiduciary obligation
1. attorney-client relationship 3) Civil liability to third persons
2. attorney has rendered services 4) Libelous words in pleadings; violation of
3. money judgment favorable to the client has communication privilege
been secured in the action 5) Liability for costs of suit (treble costs)
4. attorney has a claim for attorneys fees or when lawyer is made liable for insisting on
advances clients patently unmeritorious case or
5. statement of his claim has been duly interposing appeal merely to delay litigation
recorded in the case with notice thereof
served upon the client and adverse party CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1) Prejudicing client through malicious breach
of professional duty
*From Pinedas Annotations 2) Revealing client secrets
Retaining Charging 3) Representing adverse interests
Nature Passive lien. Active lien. It 4) Introducing false evidence

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
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5) Misappropriating clients funds (Estafa)
II. CONTEMPT OF COURT (1998 BAR EXAM)
A. Nature
o It is exercised on preservative and not on
vindictive principles and on corrective rather
than the retaliatory idea of punishment. It is
criminal in nature.
o The power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts. It is essential in the observance of
order in judicial proceedings and to
enforcement of judgment, orders and writs.
B. Kinds of Contempt
1) Direct Contempt
- Consists of misbehavior in the presence of or near
a court or judge as to interrupt or obstruct the
proceedings before the court or the administration
of justice.
2) Indirect or Constructive Contempt
- One committed away from the court involving
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment or command of the court,
tending to belittle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or
embarrass the court.
a) Civil contempt failure to do
something ordered by the court which is for
the benefit of the party.
b) Criminal contempt consists of
any conduct directed against the authority
or dignity of the court.
C. Acts of a Lawyer Constituting Contempt
1) Misbehavior as officer of court
2) Disobedience or resistance to court order
3) Abuse or interference with judicial
proceedings
4) Obstruction in administration of justice
5) Misleading courts
6) Making false allegations, criticisms, insults,
veiled threats against the courts
7) Aiding in unauthorized practice of law
(suspended or disbarred)
8) Unlawful retention of clients funds
9) Advise client to commit contemptuous acts
III. DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
A. Power to Discipline Errant Lawyers
1) The Supreme Court has the full authority
and power to
-WARN
-ADMONISH
-REPRIMAND
-SUSPEND and
-DISBAR a lawyer
(Rule 138, Sec. 27, ROC)
2) The Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts are also empowered to
-WARN
-ADMONISH
-REPRIMAND and
-SUSPEND an attorney who appears before
them from the practice of law for any of the
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
causes mentioned in Rule 138, Sec. 27.
(Rule 139-B, Sec. 16, ROC)
*NOTE: But they cannot disbar a lawyer.
B. Forms of Disciplinary Measures
1) WARNING an act or fact of putting one
on his guard against an impending danger, evil
consequences or penalties.
2) ADMONITION a gentle or friendly
reproof, mild rebuke, warning or reminder,
counseling, on a fault, error or oversight; an
expression of authoritative advice.
3) REPRIMAND a public and formal censure
or severe reproof, administered to a person in
fault by his superior officer or a body to which
he belongs.
4) SUSPENSION a temporary withholding of
a lawyers right to practice his profession as a
lawyer for a certain period or for an indefinite
period of time.
a. Definite
b. Indefinite qualified disbarment; lawyer
determines for himself for how long or how
short his suspension shall last by proving to
court that he is once again fit to resume
practice of law.
5) CENSURE Official reprimand
6) DISBARMENT It is the act of the
Philippine Supreme Court in withdrawing from
an attorney the right to practice law. The name
of the lawyer is stricken out from the roll of
attorneys.
KNOW MORE:
SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT (1990, 1992,
1993, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2005 BAR EXAMS)
Nature of Proceedings:
1. Neither a civil action nor a criminal
proceeding;
2. SUI GENERIS, it is a class of its own
since it is neither civil nor criminal
(2002 BAR EXAMS)
3. Confidential in nature
4. Defense of double jeopardy is not
available
5. Can be initiated by the SC, motu
proprio, or by the IBP. It can be
initiated without a complaint.
6. Can proceed regardless of interest of
the complainants
7. Imprescriptible
8. It is itself due process of law
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis: neither purely civil nor purely criminal.
It is notand does not involvea trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation
by the Court in the conduct of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor.xxxxx
Public interest is its primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be

allowed the privileges as such. (In Re:
Almacen)
Grounds for Disbarment:
1. Deceit
2. Malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in office any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer
3. Grossly immoral conduct
4. Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude (e.g. estafa, bribery, murder,
bigamy, seduction, abduction,
concubinage, smuggling, falsification of
public document, violation of BP 22)
5. Violation of oath of office
6. Willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court
7. Corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to case without an
authority to do so.
Objectives of Suspension and
Disbarment:
1. To compel the attorney to deal fairly and
honestly with his clients;
2. To remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proved him unfit to
be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney;
3. To punish the lawyer;
4. To set an example or warning for the other
members of the bar;
5. To safeguard the administration of justice
from dishonest and incompetent lawyers;
6. To protect the public;
The statutory enumeration of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as
a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power
of the court over its officers cannot be
restricted. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Admin. Case
No. 398, Feb. 28, 1967)
Disbarment should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe such as reprimand,
suspension or fine would accomplish the end
desired. (Amaya vs. Tecson, 450 SCRA 510)
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
is upon the complainant and this court will
exercise its disciplinary power only if the
complainant establishes his case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. (Aquino
vs. Mangaoang, 425 SCRA 572)
Officers Authorized to Investigate
Disbarment Cases:
1. Supreme Court
2. IBP through its Commission on Bar
Discipline or authorized investigators
3. Office of the Solicitor General
Grievance Procedure: Disbarment,
Suspension and Discipline of Attorneys
(Rule 139-B):
A. Proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension and discipline of attorneys may
be taken:
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
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LEGAL ETHICS
1. by the Supreme Court motu proprio
or,
2. by the IBP upon the verified complaint
of any person.
B. The IBP Board of Governors may initiate
and prosecute proper charges against
erring attorneys including those in the
govt:
1. motu proprio or
2. upon referral by the SC or
3. by a Chapter Board of Officers or at
the instance of any person.
C. The complaint must be:
1. verified;
2. state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of;
3. supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the
facts therein alleged, or by such
documents as may substantiate it;
4. six copies shall be filed with the
Secretary of the IBP or any of the
Chapters.
D. Investigation by the National Grievance
Investigators.
E. Submission of the investigative report to
the IBP Board of Governors.
F. Board of Governors decides within 30
days.
G. Investigation by the Solicitor General.
H. SC renders final decision on
disbarment/suspension/dismissal.
C. Modifying Circumstances
Extent of disciplinary action depends on attendance
of mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
Mitigating Circumstances
1. Good Faith in the acquisition of a
property of the client subject of the
litigation (In Re: Ruste, 70 Phil
243)
2. Inexperience of a lawyer (Munoz vs.
People, 53 SCRA 190)
3. Age (Lantos vs. Gan, 196 SCRA 16)
4. Apology (Munoz vs. People, 53
SCRA 190)
5. Lack of Intention to slight or offend
the court (Rheem of the Phil., Inc.
vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441)
Aggravating Circumstances
1. Abuse of authority or of attorney-
client relationship
2. sexual intercourse with a relative
3. charge of gross immorality
4. Previous dismissal as member of the
bar
EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE PARDON
(1994, 1998 BAR EXAMS)
If during the pendency of the disbarment
proceeding the respondent was granted
executive pardon, the dismissal of the case
on that sole basis will depend on whether
the executive pardon is absolute or
 LEGAL ETHICS

conditional. If the pardon is absolute, the Condition for Reinstatement:

disbarment case will be dismissed. A lawyer who has been suspended or
However, if the executive pardon is disbarred may be reinstated when the SC is
conditional, the disbarment case will not be convinced that he has already possessed the
dismissed on the basis thereof. requisites of probity and integrity necessary
Absolute pardon by the President may wipe to guarantee his worth to practice his
out conviction as well as offense itself and possession.
the grant thereof in favor of a lawyer is a
bar to a proceeding for disbarment against Effects of Reinstatement:
him based solely on commission of such 1. Recognition of moral rehabilitation and
offense. mental fitness to practice law;
The reason is that the respondent lawyer, 2. Lawyer shall be subject to same law,
after the absolute pardon, is as guiltless rules and regulations as those
and innocent as if he never committed the applicable to any other lawyer;
offense at all. 3. Lawyer must comply with the
If absolute pardon is given to lawyer after conditions imposed on his readmission.
being disbarred for conviction of a crime, it
does not automatically entitle him to
reinstatement to the bar. It must be shown
by evidence aside from absolute pardon
that he is now a person of good moral
character and fit and proper person to
practice law. In case of a conditional
pardon, there will be a remission of
unexpired period of sentence.

Reinstatement
- It is the restoration in disbarment
proceedings to a disbarred lawyer the
privilege to practice law.

Const art. VIII, sec. 5(5).

The power of the Supreme Court to
reinstate is based on its constitutional
prerogative to promulgate rules on the
admission of applicants to the practice of
law.

In order that there is reinstatement, the

following must be taken into consideration:

1. the applicants character and standing prior

to disbarment;
2. the nature or character of the misconduct
for which he is disbarred;
3. his conduct subsequent to disbarment (Cui
vs. Cui, 11 SCRA 755)
4. including his efficient government service
(In Re: Adriatico, 17 Phil 324)
5. the time that has elapsed between
disbarment and the application for
reinstatement and the circumstances that
he has been sufficiently punished and
disciplined (Prudential Bank vs.
Benjamin Grecia, 192 SCRA 381)
6. applicants appreciation of significance of
his dereliction and his assurance that he
now possesses the requisite probity and
integrity;
7. favorable endorsement of the IBP, pleas of
his loved ones (Yap Tan vs. Sabandal,
170 SCRA 207)

The court may require applicant for

reinstatement to enroll in and pass the
required fourth year review classes in a
recognized law school. (Cui vs. Cui, 11
SCRA 755; In Re: Rusiana, 56 SCRA 240

A previously disbarred lawyer who is given

absolute pardon by the President is not
automatically reinstated, he must still file a
petition for reinstatement with the SC.

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 1 Independence
Canon 2 Integrity
Canon 3 Impartiality
Canon 4 Propriety
Canon 5 Equality
Canon 6 Competence and Diligence
CANON 1: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 1. Judicial independence is a pre-
requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental
guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore
uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both
its individual and institutional aspects.
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial
function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance
with a conscientious understanding of the
law, free of any extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason.
Sec. 2. In performing judicial duties,
Judges shall be independent from judicial
colleagues in respect of decisions which the
judge is obliged to make independently.
Sec. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social,
or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from
inappropriate connections with, and
influence by, the executive and legislative
branches of government, but must also
appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable
observer.
Sec. 6. Judges shall be independent in
relation to society in general and in relation
to the particular parties to a dispute which
he or she has to adjudicate.
Sec. 7 Judges shall encourage and uphold
safeguards for the discharge of judicial
duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence
of the judiciary.
Sec. 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote
high standards of judicial conduct in order
to reinforce public confidence in the
judiciary which is fundamental to the
maintenance of judicial independence.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
MEMORY AID FOR SECTIONS UNDER CANON
1:
Independent judicial function (Sec. 1)
Outside pressure (Sec. 2)
Influencing outcome of litigation (Sec. 3)
Influence on judicial conduct (Sec. 4)
Independence from executive and legislative
(Sec. 5)
Independence from society and particular
parties (Sec. 6)
Safeguards for judicial independence (Sec. 7)
Promote Public confidence (Sec. 8)
KNOW MORE:
Re: Sec. 1 Independent judicial function
A judge found defendants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. However, he sentenced the
accused with reclusion perpetua instead of
the death, as unequivocally required by RA
7659. A court of law is no place for a
protracted debate on the morality or
propriety of the sentence, where the law
itself provides for the sentence of death as
a penalty in specific and well-defined
instances. (People v. Veneracion, 249
SCRA 244 (1995))
Re: Sec. 2 Outside Pressure
The discretion of the Court to grant bail
must be based on the Courts
determination as to WON the evidence of
guilt is strong. This discretion may be
exercised only after the evidence has been
submitted at the summary hearing
conducted pursuant to Sec. 7 of Rule 114
of the Rules. Respondents admission that
he granted bail to an accused upon the
request of a Congressman, despite his
belief that the evidence of guilt against said
is strong, is indeed reprehensible. (Tahil
v. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378 (1975))
Re: Sec. 4 Influence on Judicial Conduct
Constant company with a lawyer tends to
breed intimacy and camaraderie to the
point that favors in the future may be
asked from respondent judge which he may
find hard to resist. The actuation of
respondent Judge of eating and drinking in
public places with a lawyer who has
pending cases in his sala may well arouse
suspicion in the public mind, thus tending
to erode the trust of the litigants in the
impartiality of the judge. (Padilla v.
Zantua, 237 SCRA 670 (1994))
Re: Sec. 5 Independence from Executive
and Legislative
RA 972 (the Bar Flunkers Act) aims to
admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation. By
its declared objective, the law is contrary to
public interest because it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of
the profession, as was exactly found by this
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the
vital requisites for the practice of law that

should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life,
honor and civil liberties. It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license. Laws are
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because
their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law
suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and
hereby declare that RA. 972
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and
without any force or effect for the following
reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to
admit 810 candidates who failed in the
bar examinations of 1946-1952, and
who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law,
as was exactly found by this Court in
the aforesaid years.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment
revoking the resolution of this Court on
the petitions of these 810 candidates,
without having examined their
respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution
at any time for justifiable reasons, only
this Court and no other may revise and
alter them. In attempting to do it
directly RA 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has
exceeded its legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules
on admission to the Bar.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the
law makes, is contrary to facts which
are of general knowledge and does not
justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The
pretended classification is arbitrary. It
is undoubtedly a class legislation. (IN
RE: CUNANAN, 94 PHIL 534
(1954))
Re: Sec. 8 Promote Public Confidence
The active participation of a judge, being
merely a nominal or formal party in
certiorari proceedings is not called for. xxx
Under Sec 5 of Rule 65 of the ROC, a judge
whose order is challenged in an appellate
court does not have to file any answer or
take active part in the proceeding unless
expressly directed by order of this court. It
is the duty of respondent to appeal and
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
defend, both in his/her behalf and in behalf
of the Court or judge whose order or
decision is at issue. xxx Respondents folly
did not stop there. When complainant filed
for respondents inhibition, he hired his own
lawyer. Respondent judge should be
reminded that decisions of courts need not
only be just but must be perceived to be
just and completely free from suspicion or
doubt both in its fairness and integrity.
(Macalintal v. Teh, 280 SCRA 623
(1997)30)
CANON 2: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 2. Integrity is essential not only to the
proper discharge of the judicial office but also
to the personal demeanor of judges.
Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not
only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the
is
view of a reasonable observer.
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of
judges must reaffirm the people's faith
in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice
must not merely be done but must also
be seen to be done.
Sec. 3. Judges should take or initiate
appropriate disciplinary measures
against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may have become aware.
MEMORY AID FOR SECTIONS UNDER CANON
2:
Conduct above reproach (Sec. 1)
Reaffirm peoples faith (Sec. 2)
Disciplinary action (Sec. 3)
KNOW MORE:
Re: Sec. 1 Conduct above reproach
The imputation of illicit sexual acts upon
the incumbent judge must be proven by
substantial evidence, which is the quantum
of proof required in administrative cases.
(Alfonso v. Juanson)
Respondent judge was also at fault for his
shortness of temper and impatience,
contrary to the duties and restriction
imposed upon him by reason of his office.
He failed to observe the proper decorum
expected of judicial officers. Judicial officers
are given contempt powers so that they
can remind counsels of their duties in court
30
Facts: Atty. Macalintal related to the Court in a letter the
actuations of Judge Teh, relative to Election Case No. R-95-001.
Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the client of
complainant. He questioned the resolution via certiorari with
the COMELEC. While case was pending in the COMELEC, Teh
actively participated in the proceedings by filing his comment
on the petition, as well as an urgent manifestation.
Complainant filed a motion for inhibition but instead, Teh hired
his own lawyer and filed answer before the court with prayer.
The SC found that Judge Tehs actuations eroded public
confidence in the administration of justice.

without being arbitrary, unreasonable or
unjust. Respondent should have cited the
complainant in contempt of court instead of
throwing tantrums by banging his gavel
loudly and unceremoniously walking out of
the courtroom. Although respondent had a
valid explanation for carrying a gun, his act
of carrying it in plain view of the lawyers
(including the complainant) and considering
what just happened, cannot be taken as an
innocent gesture. It was calculated to instill
fear and intimidate the complainant.
Respondent's behavior constitutes grave
misconduct. A judge's conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety
not only in his official duties but in his
everyday life. One who lives by the precept
that might is right is unworthy to be a
judicial officer. (Romero v. Valle (1987))
Re: Sec. 2 Reaffirm peoples faith
A judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also
to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality: a public official is also judged by
his private morals. (Castillo v. Calanog
(1991))
CANON 3: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 3. Impartiality is essential to the
proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies
not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made.
Sec. 1. Judges shall perform their
judicial duties without favor, bias or
prejudice.
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or
her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence
of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is
reasonable, so conduct themselves as to
minimize the occasions on which it will
be necessary for them to be disqualified
from hearing or deciding cases.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not knowingly,
while a proceeding is before, or could
come before, them make any comment
that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome of such proceeding
or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any
comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person
or issue.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves
from participating in any proceedings in
which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to
decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to,
instances where
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice
concerning a party or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or
was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her
family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer
in the case or matter in controversy, or a
former associate of the judge served as
counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness
therein;
(e) The judge's ruling in a lower court is the
subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or
affinity to a party litigant within the sixth
civil degree or to counsel within the fourth
civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or
child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in
the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome of the proceedings;
Sec. 6. A judge disqualified as stated
above may, instead of withdrawing from
the proceeding, disclose on the records the
basis of disqualification. If, based on such
disclosure, the parties and lawyers
independently of the judge's participation,
all agree in writing that the reason for the
inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the
judge may then participate in the
proceeding. The agreement, signed by all
parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated
in the record of the proceedings.
MEMORY AID FOR SECTIONS UNDER CANON
3:
Judicial duties free from bias (Sec. 1)
Promote confidence, impartiality (Sec. 2)
Minimize instances of disqualification (Sec. 3)
Public comments pending and impending
case (Sec. 4)
Disqualifications (Sec. 5)
Remittal of disqualifications (Sec. 6)
KNOW MORE:
Re: Sec. 2 Promote confidence,
impartiality
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only
upon the fact that it is able to administer
justice but also upon the perception and
confidence of the community that the
people who run the system have done
 LEGAL ETHICS

justice. Hence, in order to create such Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of
confidence, the people who run the Judges Under the Rules of Court
judiciary, particularly judges and justices,
must not only be proficient in both the I. Mandatory or Compulsory Disqualification
substantive and procedural aspects of the (Rule 131, ROC)
law, but more importantly, they must a. when he or his wife or his child is
possess the highest integrity, probity, and pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in creditor or otherwise;
their public and private lives. Only then can b. when he is related to either party
the people be reassured that the wheels of within the sixth degree of consanguinity
justice in this country run with fairness and or affinity or to counsel within the 4th
equity, thus creating confidence in the civil degree;
judicial system. (Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, c. when he has been an executor,
259 SCRA 354 (1996)) guardian, administrator, trustee or
counsel;
Re: Sec. 5 Disqualifications d. when he has presided in an inferior
It is clear from the reading of the law that court where his ruling or decision is
intimacy or friendship between a judge and subject to review.
an attorney of record of one of the parties
to a suit is no ground for disqualification. II. Voluntary Inhibition (1991, 199, 2005
To allow it would unnecessarily burden BAR EXAMS)
other trial judges to whom the cases would A judge may, in the exercise of his
be transferred. In fact, this is one rare sound discretion disqualify himself, for just
opportunity for Masadao to show that JBL and valid reasons other than those
Reyes did not err in recommending him for mentioned above. (Rule 137, Section 1)
his competence and known probity; that he This leaves the discretion to the
has conducted himself with the cold judge to decide for himself questions as to
impartiality of an impartial judge; that no whether he will desist from sitting in case
one can sway his judgment whoever he for other just and valid reasons with only
may be. his conscience to guide him, unless he
However, men of the Bench are not without cannot discern for himself his inability to
imperfections. A judge experiences the tug meet the test of the cold neutrality required
and pull of purely personal preferences and of him, in which event the appellate court
prejudices which he shares with the rest of will see to it that he disqualifies himself.
his fellow mortals. Especially for Filipinos A decision to disqualify himself is
whose sense of gratitude is one trait which not conclusive and his competency may be
invariably reigns supreme over any and all determined on application for mandamus to
considerations in matters upon which such compel him to act. Judges decision to
tender sentiment may somehow inexorably continue hearing a case in which he is not
impinge. The circumstances before Judge legally prohibited from trying
Masadao are not ordinary ones. Thus, this notwithstanding challenge to his objectivity
is one certain circumstance where a case may not constitute reversible error.
could well be heard by another judge and The filing of an administrative case
where a voluntary inhibition may prove to against a judge does not disqualify him
be the better course of action. Judge from hearing a case. The court has to be
Masadaos actuations are within par 2 sec 1 shown other than the filing of
rule 137. (Masado v. Elizaga, 155 SCRA administrative complaint, act or conduct of
72 (1987)31) judge indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter being branded
A judge cannot sit in any case in which he as the stigma of being biased or partial.
was a counsel without the written consent (Lorenzo v. Marquez (1988))
of all parties. The rule is explicit that he
must secure the written consent of all DISQUALIFICATION INHIBITION
parties, not a mere verbal consent much Grounds Specific and exclusive No specific
less a tacit acquiescence. The written grounds BUT
consent must be signed by them and there is a
entered upon the record. (Lorenzo v. broad basis for
Marquez (1988)) such, i.e.,
good, sound
ethical
grounds
Role of Judicial officer has no The matter is
the discretion to sit or try left to the
judicial the case sound
officer discretion of
31
FACTS: On May 4, 1987, Judge Masadao rendered a decision the judge
finding the accused, Jaime Tadeo, guilty of estafa. Justice JBL
Reyes entered his appearance for the accused. Judge Masadao
issued an order inhibiting himself from further sitting in the
case on the ground that retired Justice Reyes has been among
those who had recommended him to the bench. A raffle was
conducted and the case was assigned to Judge Elizaga. Judge
Elizaga returned the records with a letter stating his refusal to
act and assailing the re-raffling of the case as uncalled for and
impractical.

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE

CANON 4: QUICK REFERENCE
Sec. 9. Confidential information acquired
by judges in their judicial capacity shall
not be used or disclosed by for any other
purpose related to their judicial duties.
Sec. 10. Subject to the proper
performance of judicial duties, judges
may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in
activities concerning the law, the legal
system, the administration of justice or
related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official
body concerned with matters relating to the
(c) law, the legal system, the administration of
justice or related matters;
(d) Engage in other activities if such activities do
not detract from the dignity of the judicial
office or otherwise interfere with the
performance of judicial duties.
Sec. 11. Judges shall not practice
law whilst the holder of judicial office.
Sec. 12. Judges may form or join
associations of judges or participate in
other organizations representing the
interests of judges.
Sec. 13. Judges and members of
their families shall neither ask for, nor
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done
or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of
judicial duties.
Sec. 14. Judges shall not
knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to their influence, direction or
authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted
to be done in connection with their duties
or functions.
Sec. 15. Subject to law and to any
legal requirements of public disclosure,
judges may receive a token gift, award or
benefit as appropriate to the occasion on
which it is made provided that such gift,
award or benefit might not reasonably be
perceived as intended to influence the
judge in the performance of judicial
duties or otherwise give rise to an
appearance of partiality.
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
Canon 4. Propriety and the appearance
of propriety are essential to the performance
of all the activities of a. judge.
Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
Sec. 2. As a subject of constant
public scrutiny, judges must accept
personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a
way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
Sec. 3. Judges shall, in their personal
relations with individual members of
the legal profession who practice
regularly in their court, avoid
situations which might reasonably
give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not participate in
the determination of a case in which
any member of their family
represents a litigant or is associated
in any manner with the case.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not allow the use
of their residence by a member of the
legal profession to receive clients of
the latter or of other members of the
legal profession.
Sec. 6. Judges, like any other citizen,
are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but
in exercising such rights, they shall
always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary.
Sec. 7. Judges shall inform
themselves about their personal
fiduciary financial interests and shall
make reasonable efforts to be
informed about the financial interests
of members of their family.
Sec. 8. Judges shall not use or lend
the prestige of the judicial office to
advance their private interests, or
those of a member of their family or
of anyone else, nor shall they convey
or permit others to convey the
impression that anyone is in a special
position improperly to influence them
in the performance of judicial duties.

MEMORY AID FOR SECTIONS UNDER CANON
4:
Avoidance of Impropriety (Sec. 1)
Acceptance of Personal Restrictions (Sec.
2)
Avoidance of Controversy (Sec. 3)
Not participate in cases where he may be
impartial (Sec. 4)
Not allow the use of his residence by other
lawyers (Sec. 5)
Freedom of Expression (Sec. 6)
Be informed of his financial interests (Sec.
7)
Influence of Judicial Conduct (Sec. 8)
Confidential Information (Sec. 9)
Engage in other activities (Sec. 10)
Practice of Profession (Sec. 11)
Form associations (Sec. 12)
Gifts, Requests, Loans (Sec. 13)
Gifts, Requests, Loans by staff (Sec. 14)
Permissible tokens and awards (Sec. 15)
KNOW MORE:
Re: Sec. 1 Avoidance of impropriety
Whatever the motive may have been, the
violent action of the respondent in a public
place constitutes serious misconduct and
the resultant outrage of the community
(Arban v. Borja (1989))
It was highly improper for a judge to have
wielded a high-powered firearm in public
and besieged the house of a perceived
defamer of character and honor in warlike
fashion and berated the object of his ire,
with his firearm aimed at the victim
(Saburnido v. Madrono (A.C. No. 4497.
September 26, 2001)
Re: Sec. 9 Confidential information
Personal knowledge of the case pending
before him is not one of the causes for the
disqualification of a judge under the first
paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 137 of the
Revised Rules of Court (took effect Jan. 1,
1964). But paragraph 2 of said section
authorizes the judge, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, to disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reason
other than those mentioned in par. 1.
Before 1964, a judge could not just
voluntarily inhibit himself from a case. But
in cases decided in 1961 and 1962, a judge
was allowed to inhibit for fear that an
opinion expressed by him in a letter as
counsel might influence his decision and for
being related to a counsel within the 4th
civil degree. In 1967, a judge was allowed
to voluntarily disqualify himself on grounds
other than those mentioned in par. 1 of
cited section. Pimentel v. Salanga: Judge
should make a careful self-examination
whether to disqualify himself or not in a
case before him. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that peoples faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflects on the probability
that a losing party might nurture at the
back of his mind the thought that the judge
had unmeritoriously titled the scales of
justice against him. Judge should be
commended for heeding SC ruling in
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
Geotina v. Gonzales: A judge, sitting on a
case must at all times be fully free,
disinterested, impartial and independent.
Elementary due process requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal. A judge has both the duties of
rendering a just decision and of doing it in
a manner completely free from suspicion as
to his fairness and as to his integrity.
Mater, Jr. v. Hon. Onofre Villaluz: Outside
of pecuniary interest, relationship or
previous participation in the matter that
calls for adjudication, there may be other
causes that could conceivably erode trait of
objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. If
such causes appear and prove difficult to
resist, it is better for judge to disqualify
himself. That way, his reputation for
probity and objectivity is preserved; even
more important, ideal of an administration
of justice is lived up to. (Umale v. Villaluz
(1973))
Re: Sec. 11 Practice of Profession
The Court has reminded judges of the
lower courts that a judge whose order is
challenged in an appellate court need not
file any answer, or take an active part in
the proceedings unless expressly directed
by order of the Court. A judge must
maintain a detached attitude from the case
and shall not waste his time by taking an
active part in a proceeding that relates to
official actuations in a case. He is merely a
nominal party and has no personal interest
or personality therein. Further, respondent
judge, in signing and filing a comment with
the court on behalf of one of the parties,
engaged in the private practice of law. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases in court or participation in court
proceedings but includes preparation of
pleadings or papers in anticipation of
litigation. Under Section 35, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule 5.07
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are
prohibited from engaging in the private
practice of law. This is based on public
policy because the rights, duties, privileges
and functions of the office of an attorney-
at-law are inherently incompatible with the
high official functions, duties, powers,
discretion and privileges of a judge.
(Tuazon v. Cloribel (2001))
Re: Sec. 13 Gifts, requests and loans
Receiving money from a party litigant is the
kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on
the part of the judge, who is charged with
the responsibility of administering the law
and rendering justice. Members of the
judiciary should display not only the
highest integrity but must, at all times,
conduct themselves in such manner as to
be beyond reproach and suspicion.
(Ompoc v. Torre (1989))

CANON 5: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon 5. Ensuring equality of
treatment to all before the courts is essential
to the due performance of the judicial office.
Sec. 1. Judges shall be aware of, and
understand, diversity in society and
differences arising from various
sources, including but not limited to
race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, caste, disability, age, marital
status, sexual orientation, social and
economic status and other like
causes.
Sec. 2. Judges shall not, in the
performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct, manifest bias or
prejudice towards any person or
group on irrelevant grounds.
Sec. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial
duties with appropriate consideration
for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and
judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties.
Sec. 4. Judges shall not knowingly
permit court staff or others subject to
his or her influence, direction or
control to differentiate between
persons concerned, in a matter
before the judge, on any irrelevant
ground.
Sec. 5. Judges shall require lawyers
in proceedings before the court to
refrain from manifesting, by words or
conduct, bias or prejudice based on
irrelevant grounds, except such as
are legally relevant to an issue in
proceedings and may be the subject
of legitimate advocacy.
MEMORY AID FOR SECTIONS UNDER CANON 5
Understand the diversity in society (Sec. 1)
Not to manifest bias or prejudice (Sec. 2)
Not to differentiate (Sec. 3)
Not to influence staff (Sec. 4)
Attitude to parties appearing in court (Sec.
5)
KNOW MORE:
Re: Sec. 2Bias or Prejudice
Rule 137 1 of the Rules of Court
expressly states that no judge shall sit in
any case which he has been counsel (for a
party) without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record. The prohibition is
not limited to cases in which a judge hears
the evidence but includes as well cases
where he acts by resolving motions, issuing
orders and the like. (In Re Judge Rojas
(1998))
"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
LEGAL ETHICS
Re: Sec. 5 Attitude to Parties Appearing in
Court
The action of the judge in seizing the
witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulder and
turning him about was unwarranted and an
interference with that freedom from
unlawful personal violence to which every
witness is entitled while giving testimony in
a court of justice. Against such conduct the
appellant had the right to protest and to
demand that the incident be made a matter
of record. That he did so was not contempt,
providing protest and demand were
respectfully made and with due regard for
the dignity of the court. (In Re: Aguas
(1901))
CANON 6: QUICK REFERENCE
Canon. 6. Competence and diligence are
prerequisites to the due performance of judicial
office.
Sec. 1. The judicial duties of a judge
take precedence over all other
activities.
Sec. 2. Judges shall devote their
professional activity to judicial duties,
which include not only the performance
of judicial functions and responsibilities
in court and the making of decisions,
but also other tasks relevant to the
judicial office or the court's operations.
Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable
steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge, skills and personal qualities
necessary for the proper performance
of judicial duties, taking advantage for
this purpose of the training and other
facilities which should be made
available, under judicial control, to
judges.
Sec. 4. Judges shall keep themselves
informed about relevant developments
of international law, including
international conventions and other
instruments establishing human rights
norms.
Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness.
Sec. 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.
Sec. 7. Judges shall not engage in
conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties.
 LEGAL ETHICS

MEMORY AID FOR SECTIONS UNDER CANON 6

Duties take precedence (Sec. 1)
Perform administrative duties (Sec. 2)
Maintain professional competence (Sec. 3)
Be informed about the law (Sec. 4)
Prompt decision making (Sec. 5)
Maintain order in proceedings (Sec. 6)
Not to engage in conduct contrary to duties
(Sec. 7)

KNOW MORE:

Re: Sec. 2 Administrative duties

In the instant case, respondent judge
impeded the speedy disposition of cases by
his successor on account of missing records
of cases. This fact reflects an inefficient and
disorderly system in the recording of cases
assigned to his sala. Proper and efficient
court management is as much the judge's
responsibility for the Court personnel are
not the guardians of a Judge's
responsibilities. A judge is expected to
ensure that the records of cases assigned
to his sala are intact. There is no
justification for missing records save
fortuitous events. The loss of not one but
eight records is indicative of gross
misconduct and inexcusable negligence
unbecoming of a judge. (Longboan v.
Polig (1990))

Re: Sec. 3 Maintain professional competence

While the court does not require perfection

and infallibility, it reasonably expects a
faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by
those who are selected to fill the positions
of administrators of justice. (In Re Judge
Baltazar Dizon (1989))32

As a matter of public policy, in the absence

of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts
of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts are erroneous. Yet it is highly
imperative that they should be
controverted with basic legal principles.
They are called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and to keep themselves abreast of the
latest laws, rulings, jurisprudence affecting
their jurisdiction. Even in the remaining
years of his stay in the judiciary, he should
keep abreast with the changes in the law
and with the latest decisions and
precedents. Although a judge is nearing
retirement, he should not relax in his study
of the law and court decisions. (Abad v.
Bleza (1986))

32
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent Judge Dizon praying that the resolution, finding him
guilty of rendering an erroneous decision, be reconsidered.
Dizon ruled that the state must first prove criminal intent to
find the accused, Lo Chi Fai, guilty of a violation of a Central
Bank Circular. He also ordered the return of the seized foreign
currency from the accused. This Court pointed out that in
offenses punished by special laws, proof of malice or deliberate
intent is not necessary. Respondent manifestly disregarded and
failed to apply this plain and fundamental basic principle.
Respondent admits that his decision is erroneous but pleads that
his mistaken judgment proceeded from good faith and not from
deliberate desire to pervert his position.

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
 When a defendant appears in court solely
for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. The
aim is simply the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. If the
defendant seeks other reliefs, the
appearance, even if qualified by the word
special, is equivalent to a general
appearance.

ATTORNEY AD HOC
TERMS A person named appointed by the court to
defend an absentee defendant in the suit in which
the appointment is made.

ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
That class of persons who are licensed
officers of the courts empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed
 by law as a consequence.
ADMONITION 
A form of disciplinary measure which ATTORNEY IN FACT
consists of a gentle or friendly reproof, mild He is simply an agent whose authority is
rebuke, warning or reminder, counseling, on a strictly limited by the instrument appointing him.
fault, error or oversight; an expression of His authority is provided in a special power of
authoritative advice. attorney or general power of attorney or letter of
 attorney. He is not necessarily a lawyer.
 
AMBULANCE CHASER ATTORNEY OF RECORD
A lawyer who haunts hospitals and visits The attorney whose name is entered in the
the homes of the afflicted, officiously intruding their records of an action or suit as the lawyer of a
presence and persistently offering his service on designated party thereto. (1999 BAR EXAMS)
the basis of a contingent. 
 ATTORNEYS FEES
AMBULANCE CHASING a) Ordinary: an attorneys fee is the
A lawyers act of chasing the victims of an reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer
accident for the purpose of talking to the same for the legal services he has rendered to
victim or the latters relatives and offering his legal client. Basis is employment by client
services for the filing of the case against the person 
who caused the accident. (1993 BAR EXAMS) b) Extraordinary: an attorneys fee is an
 indemnity for damages ordered by court to
AMICUS CURIAE be paid by losing party to the prevailing
(Plural: Amici Curiae) party in litigation; payable not to lawyer
An experienced and impartial attorney but to the client, unless otherwise agreed
invited by the court to appear and help in the upon; also known as attorneys fee as
disposition of the issues submitted to it. It implies damages
friendly intervention of counsel to call the attention 
of the court to some matters of law or fact which BAR AND BENCH
might otherwise escape its notice and in regard to Bar refers to the whole body of attorneys
which it might go wrong. and counselors collectively, the members of the
An amicus curiae appears in court not to legal profession.
represent any particular party but only to assist the Bench denotes the whole body of judges.
court. (1993, 1996, 1998 BAR EXAMS) 
 BAR ASSOCIATION
AMICUS CURIAE PAR EXCELLENCE An association of members of the legal
Bar associations who appear in court as profession like the IBP where membership is
amici curiae or friends of the court. Acts merely as integrated or compulsory.
a consultant to guide the court in a doubtful 
question or issue pending before it. BARRATRY
 Offense of frequently inciting and stirring
APPEARANCE up quarrels and suits. The lawyers acts of
The coming into court as a party either as a fomenting suits among individuals and offering
plaintiff or as a defendant and asking relief legal services to one of them. (1993 BAR EXAMS)
therefrom. 
 CENSURE
a) GENERAL APPEARANCE Official reprimand
When the party comes to court either as a 
plaintiff or as a defendant and seeks general CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT
reliefs from the court for satisfaction of his One where the lawyer agrees to conduct
claims or counterclaims respectively. the litigation on his own account and to pay the
 expenses thereof, and to receive as his fee a
b) SPECIAL APPEARANCE portion of the proceeds of the judgment. It is
contrary to public policy and invalid because it

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
 LEGAL ETHICS

violates the fiduciary relationship between the shown by the certificate of the clerk of court of the
lawyer and his client. (Bautista vs. Gonzales, 182 trial court, a defendant is
SCRA 151, 1990) (1990, 2000 BAR EXAMS) (a) confined in prison
(b) without means to employ an attorney
CHAMPERTY (c) desires to be defended de oficio
A bargain by a stranger (the lawyer) with
a party to a suit (the client) by which such third COURT
person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his A board or other tribunal which decides a
own expense and risk, in consideration of receiving, litigation or contest
if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject
sought to be recovered. DE FACTO JUDGE
An officer who is not fully invested with all
CHARGING LIEN the powers and duties conceded to judges, but
It is an equitable right to have the fees and exercising the office of a judge under some color of
lawful disbursements due a lawyer for his services right
in a suit secured to him out of the judgment for the
payment of money and execution issued in DE JURE JUDGE
pursuance thereof in the particular suit. (1994 One who is exercising the office of a judge
BAR EXAMS) as a matter of right; an officer of a court who has
been duly and legally appointed
CLIENT
One who engages the services of a lawyer DILIGENCE
for legal advice or for purposes of prosecuting or It is the attention and care required of a
defending a suit in his behalf and usually for a fee. person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence (Edquibal vs. Ferrer, 450 SCRA
COMPETENCE 406)
Sufficiency of lawyers qualifications to deal
with the matter in question and includes knowledge DIRECT CONTEMPT
and skill and the ability to use them effectively in Consists of misbehavior in the presence of
the interest of the client. or near a court or judge as to interrupt or obstruct
the proceedings before the court or the
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION administration of justice.
Refers to information transmitted by
voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and DISBARMENT
client in confidence and by means which so far as It is the act of the Philippine Supreme
the client is aware, discloses the information to no Court in withdrawing from an attorney the right to
third person other than one reasonably necessary practice law. The name of the lawyer is stricken out
for the transmission of the information or the from the roll of attorneys.
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was
given. DISHONEST ACT
It is an act of lying or cheating (Agpalo)
CONTINGENT FEE
Fee that is conditioned on the securing of a EXECUTIVE JUDGE
favorable judgment and recovery of money or Refers to the Executive Judge of the
property and the amount of which may be on a Regional Trial Court of a city or province who issues
percentage basis a notarial commission. (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice)
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT
It is an agreement in which the lawyers FIDUCIARY DUTY
fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be The principle that an attorney derives no
recovered in the action, is made to depend upon undue advantage that may operate to the prejudice
the success in the effort to enforce or defend the or cause an occasion for loss of a client.
clients right. It is a valid agreement. It is different
from a champertous contract in that the lawyer FIXED OR ABSOLUTE FEE
does not undertake to shoulder the expenses of the Payable regardless of the result of the case.
litigation. (1990, 2000, 2002 BAR EXAMS)
FORUM SHOPPING
COUNSEL/ATTORNEY DE OFICIO The act of filing repetitious suits in different
An attorney appointed by the court to courts. It is committed through the following:
defend an indigent defendant in a criminal action. 1) Going from one court to another in the
hope of securing a favorable relief in one
In a criminal action, if the defendant court, which another court has denied.
appears without an attorney, he must be informed 2) Filing repetitious suits or proceedings in
by the court that it is his right to have an attorney different courts concerning the same
before being arraigned and must be asked if he subject matter after one court has decided
desires the aid of an attorney. If he desires and is the suit with finality.
unable to employ an attorney, the court must 3) Filing a similar case in a judicial court after
assign a counsel de oficio to defend him. He is also receiving an unfavorable judgment from an
designated as counsel of indigent litigants. The administrative tribunal.
appointment of a counsel de oficio in that instance (1991, 1997, 1998, 2002 BAR EXAMS)
is a matter of right on the part of the defendant.
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
On appeal in a criminal case, the appellate It is the absence of a proven conduct or act
court must also appoint a counsel de oficio if, as which has been historically and traditionally

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
 LEGAL ETHICS

considered as a manifestation of moral turpitude. management and direction of a partys case as

The act or conduct showing moral turpitude need distinguished from his juniors or subordinates.
not amount to a crime; and even if it does
constitute an offense, a conviction upon a criminal LEGAL ETHICS
charge is not necessary to demonstrate bad moral
character although it may show moral depravity. Legal Ethics denotes that body of principles
by which the conduct of members of the legal
GOOD REPUTATION profession is controlled.
It is the opinion generally entertained of a It is that branch of moral science which
person, the estimate in which he is held by the treats of the duties which an attorney at law owes
public in the place where he is known (subjective). to his clients, to the courts, to the bar and to the
public. [G.A. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial
GROSS IMMORALITY Ethics 8 (1949)].
A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or MAINTENANCE
so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be Consists in maintaining, supporting or
reprehensible to a high degree. promoting the litigation of another.

HOUSE COUNSEL (or IN-HOUSE COUNSEL) MORAL CHARACTER

One who acts as attorney for business It is what a person really is (corresponds to
though carried as an employee of that business and objective reality). It exhibits qualities of truth-
not as an independent lawyer speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of
IMMORAL OR DECEITFUL CONDUCT fiduciary responsibility (Justice Felix Frankfurter)
That which is willful, flagrant or shameless
and which shows a moral indifference to the MORAL TURPITUDE
opinion of the good and respectable members of It means anything which is done contrary
the community. to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals, or to
any act of vileness, baseness or depravity in the
INDIRECT OR CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT private and social duties that a man owes his
One committed away from the court fellowmen or to society, contrary to the accepted
involving disobedience of or resistance to a lawful rule of right and duty between man and man.
writ, process, order, judgment or command of the
court, tending to belittle, degrade, obstruct, NOTARY and NOTARY PUBLIC
interrupt or embarrass the court. Refer to any person commissioned to
perform official acts under these Rules. (2004
c) CIVIL CONTEMPT Rules on Notarial Practice)
Failure to do something ordered by
the court which is for the benefit of the OF COUNSEL
party. An experienced lawyer, usually a retired
member of the judiciary, employed by law firms as
d) CRIMINAL CONTEMPT consultants. (supplemented by San Beda Reviewer
Consists of any conduct directed 2006)
against the authority or dignity of the
court. PLEA OF GUILTY
An admission by the accused of his guilt of
JUDGE a crime as charged in the information and of the
A public officer who, by virtue of his office, truth of the facts alleged, including the qualifying
is clothed with judicial authority and aggravating circumstances.

JUDICIAL ETHICS PRACTICE OF LAW

It is the branch of moral science which Any activity, in or out of court, which
treats of the right and proper conduct to be requires the application of law, legal procedures,
observed by all judges and magistrates in trying knowledge, training and experience. (Ulep v
and deciding controversies brought to them by Legal Clinic, Inc (1993)
adjudication which conduct must be demonstrative
of impartiality, integrity, competence,
independence, and freedom from improprieties. PRACTICING LAWYER
One engaged in the practice of law who by
LAWYER license are officers of the court and who are
The general term for a person trained in empowered to appear, prosecute and defend a
the law and authorized to advice and represent clients cause.
others in legal matters.
One who: PRO SE
a) passed the bar exams An appearance by a lawyer in his own
b) registered in the roll of attorneys behalf. (1995 BAR EXAMS)
c) received a certificate of license to practice
law from the Clerk of Court of the QUANTUM MERUIT (as much as he deserves)
Supreme Court Its essential requisite is acceptance of the benefits
d) taken an oath. by one sought to be charged for services rendered
under circumstances as reasonably to notify him
LEAD COUNSEL that lawyer expects compensation.
The counsel on either side of a litigated
action who is charged with the principal

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
 LEGAL ETHICS

Doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to TRIAL LAWYER

prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain
benefit without paying for it.
REINSTATEMENT
It is the restoration in disbarment
proceedings to a disbarred lawyer the privilege to
practice law.
REPRIMAND
A form of disciplinary measure which
consists of a public and formal censure or severe
reproof, administered to a person in fault by his
superior officer or a body to which he belongs.
One who personally handles cases in courts
and administrative agencies of boards which means
engaging in actual trial work, either for the
prosecution or for the defense of cases of clients.
(supplemented by San Beda Reviewer 2006)
WARNING
A form of disciplinary measure which
consists of an act or fact of putting one on his
guard against an impending danger, evil
consequences or penalties.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself)

This principle or doctrine applies to both
judges and lawyers. Judges had been dismissed
from the service without the need for a formal
investigation because based on the records, the
gross misconduct or inefficiency of the judges
clearly appears. (Uy vs. Mercado, 154 SCRA
567)

RETAINER (embraces two concepts)

(1) an act of client by which he engages services of
an attorney to render legal advice, defend or
prosecute his cause in court;
(2) fee which a client pays to an attorney when
latter is retained (retaining fee)

a) GENERAL RETAINER
Fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future
services as general counsel for any ordinary
legal problem that may arise in the routinary
business of the client and referred to him for
legal action. This could be paid monthly or
annually, depending on lawyer-client
arrangement. This is considered as
compensation for lost opportunity.
b)SPECIAL RETAINER
Fee which client will pay to his lawyer for a
specific matter (case/service), possibly in
addition to a general retainer.

RETAINING FEE (same as retainer)

Preliminary fee paid to insure and secure
future services, to remunerate him for being
deprived, by being retained by one party. It
prevents undue hardship resulting from the rigid
observance of the rule forbidding him from acting
as counsel for other party

RETAINING LIEN
A right merely to retain the funds,
documents, and papers as against the client until
the attorney is fully paid his fees and to apply such
funds to the satisfaction. (1995, 2000 BAR
EXAMS)

SUSPENSION
A form of disciplinary measure which
consists of a temporary withholding of a lawyers
right to practice his profession as a lawyer for a
certain period or for an indefinite period of time.
a) DEFINITE

B) INDEFINITE -qualified disbarment;

lawyer determines for himself for how long or
how short his suspension shall last by proving
to court that he is once again fit to resume
practice of law.

"Ask and it will be given to you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you." Matthew 7:7
PABALAN, C.B.D. 1-ESTRELLADO S.Y. 2013-2014 2nd Semester| FINAL EXAM COVERAGE
ZALDIVAR v. GONZALES
Legal Ethics Contemptuous Language Duty of a
Lawyer
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then
Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar
then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the
authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting
on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from
investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and
he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez
even had a newspaper interview where he proudly
claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the
Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation
theta the rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for
an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due
course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against
Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to
explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in
the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising
his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the
rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court
may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching
notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court
have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar
and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the
court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme
Court as the embodiment and the repository of the
judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and
authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than
that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the
court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at
bar, his statements, particularly the one where he
alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached
him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely
from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent

Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices
of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such
statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for
the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase
and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court,
the entire system of administration of justice in the
country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of

free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that
PARAGAS v. CRUZ
In asking for reconsideration of this Court's dismissal of
his petition for certiorari in the above-entitled case, Atty.
Jeremias T. Sebastian, acting as counsel de parte for
petitioner Rosauro Paragas, stated the following in his
written motion, filed on May 22, 1965:
"The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration
of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated April 20,
1965 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of
Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules, of Court promulgated
by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further
ground that it is likewise a violation of the most
important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of
the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment."
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the
cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the
fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not,
and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
require.
A mere disclaimer of any intentional disrespect by
appellant is no ground for exoneration. His intent must
be determined by a fair interpretation of the languages
by him employed. He cannot escape responsibility by
claiming that his words did not mean what any reader
must have understood them as meaning.

... . The rule of law in a democracy should always be

upheld and protected by all means, because the rule of
law creates and preserves peace and order and gives
satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. Butwhen
the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort,
sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cave-
men! We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again
and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court
and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people
should keep their temper under control at all times! But
justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the
very life of Democracy on the face of the earth."

Considering the foregoing expressions to be derogatory

to its dignity, this Court, by Resolution of June 2, 1965,
after quoting said statements required Atty. Sebastian to
show cause why administrative action should not be
taken against him.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Sebastian is administratively liable
for his actions/language.

Held:
The expressions contained in the motion for
reconsideration penned by the counsel of the petitioner
are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful and he is
hereby guilty of direct contempt of court.

As remarked in People vs. Carillo: Counsel should

conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases
with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer
of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
PEOPLE v. ESTEBIA
Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of
First Instance of Samar and was sentenced to suffer the
capital punishment. On December, Lope Adriano was
appointed as Estebias counsel de oficio when his case
came up before the Supreme Court on review. Adriano
was required to prepare and file his brief within 30 days
from notice.
On January 19,1967, Adriano sought a 30-day extention
to file appellants brief in mimeograph form. On February
18,Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension. A third
extension was filed on March 8 for 15 days.
his brief de oficio. In the face of the fact that no brief
has ever been filed, counsel's statements in his motions
for extension have gone down to the level of empty and
meaningless words; at best, have dubious claim to
veracity. Adrianos pattern of conduct reveals a
propensity to benumb appreciation of his obligation as
counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that
should be accorded this Court. For the reasons given
Attorney Lope E. Adriano was suspended from the
practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of
one (1) year.

On March 27 Adriano filed for another 15-day extension

and on April 11 he moved for a last extension of ten
days. However, on April 21 he sought a special extension
of five days. All of these motions for extension were
granted by the Court and the brief was due on April 26,
1967. However, no brief was filed. For failing to comply,
the Supreme Court resolved to impose upon Adriano a
fine of P500 with a warning that a more drastic
disciplinary action will be taken against him upon further
non-compliance.

On December 5,1968, Adriano was ordered to

show cause why he should not be suspended from
the practice of law for gross misconduct and violation of
his oath of office as attorney. A resolution was personally
served upon him on December 18, 1968 however
Adriano ignored the said resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not the conduct of Atty Lope E. Adriano
as member of the bar deserve disciplinary action.

Held:
Yes, by specific authority, this Court may assign an
attorney to render professional aid to a destitute
appellant in a criminal case who is unable to employ an
attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the
lawyer so assigned "to render the required service."

A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent

prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand,
"should always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's
behalf. No excuse at all has been offered for non-
presentation of appellant's brief. And yet, between
December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his
appointment, and December 5, 1968, when the last show
cause order was issued by this Court, more than
sufficient time was afforded counsel to prepare and file
TOLENTINO v. CABRAL
Prosecutor Tolentino files a petition for certiorari
assailing the order of RTC Judge Cabral granting bail to a
rape suspect. Tolentino also files an administrative
complaint against Cabral for the loss of pertinent records
on the case and for showing partiality for the accused.
Cabral brings counter charges against Tolentino when
the latter questioned certain orders of the court by
distorting and misrepresenting the actual contents of
such orders; and for threatening Cabral that if the
prosecutions motions are not granted, an administrative
complaint would be brought against him.
HELD:
Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court
found that Cabral knowingly issued a manifestly unjust
order granting bail despite strong evidence of guilt.
Acting on the administrative complaint, the Supreme
Court finds Cabral guilty of gross negligence and
inefficiency for the loss of important records on the case.
He is also guilty of partiality in denying the prosecution
the chance to file an opposition when Cabral fixed the
date of a hearing close to the date of its service to the
prosecution. Tolentino is also found guilty of the
countercharges.
For grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law,
gross negligence and inefficiency, rendering unjust
judgment and for violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Judge Cabral is suspended for 6 months
without pay. Tolentino is reprimanded for breach of
Canon 10,Rules 10.01 and 10.02 as well as Canon 11, Rule
11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
MAGLUCOT-AW v. MAGLUCOT
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11
November 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816
which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994,
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental in an action for recovery of possession and damages.
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had
been effected in 1952. Petitioners contend that there was already a
partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to exclusive possession
and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D, which originally formed part of Lot
No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other hand,
claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot
No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation where
there is an order for partition but there is no showing that the
sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First
Instance for its approval or that a decree or order was registered in
the Register of Deeds.
Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made
reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to
the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the
law "by the researcher." Second, he cited the researcher
of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference
to the record"that "[w]e have scanned the records on
hand and found no evidence of any partition." Finally,
counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating
that "this will only show that there was no proper study
of the case by the researcher."
ISSUE:
WON the acts of the counsel in criticizing the court
researcher warrant a reprimand
HELD:
YES.
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm
of the justice system and as an institution apart from the
persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the
courts and not the persons or personnel that may
participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly
improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to
berate the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for
petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of
the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by
the use of proper language in its pleadings and
admonished for his improper references to the
researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or
behavior before the courts
VILLAFLOR v. SARITA HELD:

Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the counsel of Biyaya
Corporation, the plaintiff in the ejectment case filed
against complainant Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 53, of Kalookan
City. Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Romanito A.
Amatong decided the ejectment case in favor of Biyaya
Corporation. Complainant appealed this decision to the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 131,which
affirmed the decision of the MTC.
YES. Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is DISBARRED from
the practice of law.
Atty, Sarita is liable not only for deliberately misleading if not
deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC Judge into violating the
appellate courts restraining order, but also for making false
allegations that led his clients to commit a contemptuous act;
As a member of the Bar, Atty. Sarita is mandated by his oath to obey
the laws as well as the duly constituted authorities therein and not to
do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court;

Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, complainant

We desire to call attention to the fact that courts orders,
brought the case on appeal before the Court of Appeals
however erroneous they may be, must be respected,
which was docketed as CA G.R No. 50623.Losing no time,
especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves
complainant also filed with the Court of Appeals an
officers of the courts. Court orders are to be respected
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
not because the judges who issue them should be
Restraining Order to prevent the impending demolition
respected, but because of the respect and consideration
of his family home.
that should be extended to the judicial branch of the
Government. This is absolutely essential if our
In a Resolution dated 27 December 1996, the Court of
Government is to be a government of laws and not of
Appeals granted the prayer for a TRO.
men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the
On 9 January 1997, Judge Amatong granted the motion
authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial
of respondent and issued an order for the
incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the
implementation of the writ of demolition. The
Government to which they belong, as well as to the State
demolition order was actually carried out the next day,
which has instituted the judicial system.
or on 10 January 1997, by the deputy sheriff of the lower
court.
Not only did respondent disobey the order of the Court
of Appeals, he also misled the trial court judge into
In response to the situation, complainant filed before the
issuing the order to implement the writ of demolition
Court of Appeals an action for Indirect Contempt against
which led to the destruction of the family home of
respondent, Biyaya Corporation, Judge Amatong, And
complainant. In doing so, respondent violated his oath
the Register of Deeds of Kalookan City.
of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 February
shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of
1997, found respondent and his co-defendants, Judge
any in court. Surely, such conduct of respondent is
Amatong and Biyaya Corporation, guilty of indirect
starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court.
contempt.
Respondents behavior also exhibited his reckless and
unfeeling attitude towards the complainant. By
Thereafter, complainant filed a case for disbarment
disobeying the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, he
against respondent before the IBP Commission on Bar
inflicted deep physical and moral injury upon
Discipline.
complainant and his family by making them
homeless. Obviously, it did not matter to him whether
After giving respondent enough opportunity to face the
complainant and his family would still have a place to
charges against him, which the latter did not avail, the
stay as long as he won the case for his client. We would
case was submitted for resolution.
like to emphasize that a lawyers responsibility to protect
and advance the interests of his client does not warrant
ISSUE:
a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party.Respondent failed to
WON Atty. Saritas acts warrant a disbarment.
live up to this expectation.
CITY SHERRIF, Iligan City v. FORTUNADO
Respondents Alfaro, Editha and Nestor, all surnamed
Fortunado, are the registered owners of two parcels
of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-
3041 and T-1929, both registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City. Said properties were mortgaged by
Arsenio Lopez, Jr. on July 24, 1968 to the Traders
Commercial Bank (now Traders Royal Bank) to secure a
loan obligation in the amount of P 370,000.00.
On January 6, 1971, respondents Fortunado instituted an
action before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVIII, against Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Traders Royal
Bank, among others, for annulment of mortgage. In said
complaint, Traders Royal Bank interposed a counterclaim
for foreclosure of the mortgage.
The trial court decided in favor of the Fortunados.
On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned its
rights to the mortgage to petitioner Angel L. Bautista. By
virtue of the said assignment, petitioner on March
19,1984 wrote the City Sheriff of Iligan City requesting
that the mortgaged properties be foreclosed for non-
payment of the loan obligation. To thwart the pending
foreclosure, the Fortunados filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, a complaint for
cancellation of lien with preliminary injunction against
petitioners.
After petitioner filed his answer, respondents moved for
a summary judgment which was granted by the court.
Consequently, on July 31,1985, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint. In its decision, the
trial court delved on the issue of prescription of a
mortgage action.
Respondents moved for reconsideration arguing that
since the principal loan has already been paid, the
mortgage, which is an accessory contract, should
likewise be extinguished.
In effect, the City Sheriff of Iligan City, Mr. Angel L.
Bautista and Mrs. Angelica M. Bautista were
permanently restrained from conducting a public auction
sale of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-3041 (a.f.). The Register of Deeds of Iligan City
was further ordered to cancel Entry No. 451 on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.) on file with his office.
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The case was given due course in the Supreme Court.
Both parties were ordered to submit their memoranda.
Eventually, on January 30, 1995, respondents, through
counsel Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a verified
Manifestation informing the Court that the subject real
estate mortgage has already been released by the
Traders Royal Bank on December 22, 1983 as shown in
the certified true copy of the Release of Real Estate
Mortgage, and that the petitioner was killed in a robbery
in his house. Respondents therefore pray for the
dismissal of the petition.
The petitioners counsel, Atty. Abrogena was asked to
respond. However, the copy of the resolution of the
Court addressed to Atty. Abrogena was returned
unclaimed after three notices, with the postmaster's
remark "moved." In view of this development, the Court
considered the resolution as served.
ISSUE:
WON the failure of the petitioners counsel to inform the
court of the death of his client warrants a sanction
RULING:
Atty. Emilio Abrogena, counsel for petitioner, was
REPRIMANDED for his failure to inform this Court of the
death of petitioner and to perform his duty under
Section 16, Rule 3* of the Revised Rules of Court. He is
further warned that a repetition of such omission in the
future will be dealt with severely.
Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first
and foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the
court are more significant than those which he owes to
his client. His first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success
is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics
of the profession.
*SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.- Whenever a
party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel
to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of the counsel to comply with this duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.
AGUINALDO v. AGUINALDO
Defendant Segundo Aguinaldo, was ordered to reconvey
one-fourth () pro-indiviso of the property in litigation to
appellees, and to pay the latter the amount of P300.00
yearly beginning with the year 1955.
is no reason to refuse affirmance to the order of the
lower court complained of, appointing appellants as legal
representatives of the deceased defendant and
substituted in his place pursuant to the Rules of Court in
order that the execution that ought that have taken
place long since could at long last be effected.

There was an appeal.

The appeal was denied, a writ of execution was issued.

On February 13 of the same year, one Cecilio Aguinaldo

filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to
quash such writ of execution based primarily on the
allegation that defendant Segundo Aguinaldo died on
August 7, 1959 during the pendency of such appeal.

There was an opposition to such motion on February 25,

1965, inviting attention to Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court to the effect that in the event of the death of a
party to a pending case, it is the duty of his attorney to
give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian, or their legal representative and
alleging that there was a failure on the part of the
counsel to comply with the above provision.

In response, the defendants counsel in turn merely

manifested on March 23, 1965 that he had ceased to be
such as of May 31, 1956, and that such a pleading be
considered sufficient compliance with the aforesaid
order

ISSUE:

WON the motion to quash the writ of execution is proper

despite the fact that the death of Segundo was not
reported during the pendency of the appeal.

RULING:

No. Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat,

the enforcement of a final judgment, executory in
character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises
to the level of a technicality is not likely to elicit the
sympathy of this Court or any court for that matter. Yet,
in effect, that is what the move taken by the defendants
in his case amounted to. The lower court as was but
proper did not lend its approval. Still undeterred, they
would appeal. They ought to have known better. There

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GABRIEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or
REGINO GABRIEL and JAIME TAPEL were convicted of the
repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the
crime of theft. The trial courts decision was affirmed by
execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects
the CA.
himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not
A petition for review lodged by Atty. Rodolfo D. Mapile knowing any better or for willful violation of his duties as
in the SC however it was denied for lack of merit. A final an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and
judgement was entered. to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just
and are consistent with truth and honor.
Another petition was filed by Atty. Cornelio M. Orteza
despite the above decision of the court. This second
petition was also denied. Atty Orteza was ordered to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

As a response Atty. Orteza filed a motion for

reconsideration regarding the denial of the second
petition and contended that the burden of both
pleadings is that the first petition to set aside the Court
of Appeals affirmance of petitioners conviction was a
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, while the
second petition was one for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Ortalezas act warrants a sanction

RULING:

Yes. Respondent Atty. Orteza is therefore adjudged

guilty of contempt of court and is ordered to pay a fine
of Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos with ten (10) days from
notice hereof failing which, he shall be imprisoned for a
period of (50) days. While further administrative action
against him is herewith forborne, he is hereby warned
that a future repetition or the same or similar incident
will be dealt with more severely.

However zealous may be counsel's concern and belief in

the alleged innocence of the petitioners, it is elementary
that counsel may not split their appeal into one to set
aside the appellate court's denial of petitioners
appellants' motion for reconsideration of its decision
affirming the trial court's judgment of conviction and/or
for new trial (the first petition) and into another to set
aside the appellate court's decision itself, which affirmed
the trial court's conviction of the petitioners-appellants
(the second petition).

Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the

Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede obstruct and degrade the administration of
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COBB-PEREZ v. LANTIN position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel
to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of
Perez for the latters failure to pay a debt of P17k.
his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless,
Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
favor. The sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
opposed by Damaso as he claimed the amount of said
caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity
property was more than the amount of the debt. Judge
to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice
Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he
is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
amended his earlier decision and so he issued a second
indisputable.
writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public
sale on Damasos 210 shares of stock approximately
worth P17k.

Subsequently, With the help of the spouses counsels

Attys. Baizas and Bolinas, they resorted to a series of
actions and petitions for the sole purpose of delaying
theexecution of the simple money judgment which has
long been final and executory.

What they did was attack the execution in a piecemeal

fashion, causing the postponement of the execution sale
six times. More than eight years after the finality of
the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be
satisfied.

.The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where

the SC ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are
without merit; that their numerous petitions for
injunction are contemplated for delay. In said decision,
the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of
the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels.
The counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme
Court as they claimed that such decision reflected
adversely against their professionalism; that If there
was delay, it was because petitioners counsel happened
to be more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers (which)
is not to be condemned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are

excused.

RULING

No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor

and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is
to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers
insistence despite the patent futility of his clients
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KENNETH ROY SAVAGE et. al. v. TAYPIN

Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant

issued by respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in
the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture
from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong,
Talisay, Cebu.

The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng

Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco
Development Corporation (MENDCO), alleging that
Savages products are the object of unfair competition
involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended. Savage contends
however, that there was no existence of offense leading
to the issuance of a search warrant and eventual seizure
of its products.

Petitioners next allege that the application for a search

warrant should have been dismissed outright since it was
not accompanied by a certification of non-forum
shopping, citing as authority therefor Washington
Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

In that case, we sustained the quashal of the search

warrant because the applicant had been guilty of forum
shopping as private respondent sought a search warrant
from the Manila Regional Trial Court only after he was
denied by the courts of Pampanga. The instant case
differs significantly, for here there is no allegation of
forum-shopping, only failure to acquire a certification
against forum-shopping. The Rules of Court as amended
requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings,
omitting any mention of "applications."

In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on

the matter, required such certification even from
"applications." Our ruling in Washington
Distillers required no such certification from applications
for search warrants. Hence, the absence of such
certification will not result in the dismissal of an
application for search warrant.

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JP Juan and Sons Inc v. Llana Inducstries, Inc. Cases such as this contribute to the needless clogging of
the court dockets. The Rules of Court were devised to
In a complaint originally filed with the City Court of
limit the issues and avoid unnecessary delays and
Manila on October 30, 1963, plaintiff sought recovery
surprises. Hence, the mandatory provisions of Rule 20 of
from defendant of the sum of P900.00, representing the
the Revised Rules of Court for a pre-trial conference for
unpaid balance of office equipment amounting to
the simplification of the issues and the consideration of
P1,890.00 sold and delivered on October 15, 1962 by
all matters which may aid in the prompt disposition of an
plaintiff to defendant under a purchase order, copy of
action. The Rules further require in Rule 7 section 5 that
which was duly annexed to the complaint. Plaintiff also
"every pleading of a party represented by an attorney
asked for the payment of legal interests and costs and
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
P200.00 for attorney's fees. Judgment was rendered on
individual name" and that "the signature of an attorney
December 9, 1963 by the City Court in favor of plaintiff
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
and defendant appealed the same to the Court of First
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
Instance of Manila.
information and belief, there is good ground to support
Defendant filed its Answer on January 27, 1964, where it it; and that it is not interposed for delay" with the express
"denied specifically all the allegations of paragraphs 2 admonition that "for a willful violation of this rule, an
and 3 of the complaint", which are the material attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action." The
allegations referring to its purchase of the office cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so
equipment, its partial payment and refusal and failure to that the salutary objectives of these Rules may be
pay the unpaid balance of P900.00 despite repeated attained.
demands of plaintiff and alleged as a "special and
affirmative defense" that "defendant has no obligation
to pay to the plaintiff the amount or sum of money
claimed in the complaint."

Defendant did not deny under oath the authenticity of

the purchase order annexed to the complaint, as
required by Rule 8, section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:

WON the act of the defendants through their counsel

were dilatory tactics

RULING:

Yes. The specific denials of the defendants were

unexplained. An unexplained denial of information and
belief of a matter of records, the means of information
concerning which are within the control of the pleader,
or are readily accessible to him, is evasive and is
insufficient to constitute an effective denial.

Although allowed by the Rules of Court (referring to lack

of sufficient knowledge or information) must be availed
of with sincerity and in good faith, - certainly neither for
the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what
allegations of the complaint are really put in issue nor for
the purpose of delay.
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ACHACOSO v. COURT OF APPEALS
Upon the filing on December 15, 1972 of the petition at
bar for review of the Court of Appeals' decision
dismissing petitioner's petition for mandamus filed with
said court to compel the Manila court of first instance to
allow petitioner's proposed appeal from its adverse
judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the Court per
its resolution of December 22, 1972 required
respondents to comment thereon.
Respondents filed on February 8, 1973 an extensive
eighteen page comment and petitioner's counsel,
Rodrigo M. Nera, filed on February 12, 1973 a motion for
leave to file reply within 15 days from notice alleging that
there was need for such reply "in order that this
Honorable Court may be fully and completely informed
of the nature of the controversy which gave rise to the
instant petition." The Court granted such leave per its
resolution of February 23, 1973 and notice of such leave
was served on counsel on February 27, 1973.
Atty. Niera further requested for two more extensions,
yet he failed in submitting a reply.
His ultimate contention was that he was not in a financial
position to advance the necessary expenses for
preparing and submitting the reply.
ISSUE:
manifestation that he was foregoing the filing of such
reply on petitioner's behalf. His inaction unduly delayed
the Court's prompt disposition of the case after the filing
by respondents on February 8, 1973 of their comments
on the petition showing its lack of merit.
The Court would have then so disposed of the petition
had it not been for petitioner's plea to be given time and
opportunity to file a reply to the comments in order to
fully apprise the Court of the nature of the controversy,
which plea the Court granted in reliance on his good
faith. Yet after having obtained three extensions of time
for the filing of the reply, counsel simply failed to file any
reply nor to give the Court the courtesy of any
explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so.
Counsel readily perceived in his explanation that his
conduct comes close to delaying the administration of
justice and trifling with the Court's processes. It does not
reflect well on counsel's conduct as an officer of the
Court that after assuring the Court that the third
extension requested by him "in view of his crowded
schedule" and "of urgent professional work and daily
trial engagements" would be the last within which period
he would at last file the awaited reply, for him thereafter
to let the period simply lapse without any explanation
whatsoever, and worse, to wait to be found out, and
have the Court require him to explain.

WON Atty. Nieras act warrants a sanction

RULING:

Yes. Considering, however, that counsel's record shows

no previous infractions on his part since his admission to
the Philippine Bar in 1953, the Court is disposed to be
lenient in this instance.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court administered a reprimand on

Atty. Rodrigo M. Nera, with the warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this resolution be filed in his
personal record.

RATIO:

Counsel's explanation is far from satisfactory. If indeed

he was not in a financial position to advance the
necessary expenses for preparing and submitting the
reply, then he could have filed timely the necessary

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REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint
before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the Presidential
Commission on Good Govt (PCGG) against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares of stocks in the named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33
(CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
Among the defendants named in the case are herein
petitioners and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco,
who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law
Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its
clients and in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings.
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the
members of the law firm acquire information relative to
the assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm,
petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that
they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint"
& "3rd Amended Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the
complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as partydefendant, Roco
having promised hell reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder
in the companies involved in PCGG Case # 33.
Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for
having plotted, devised, schemed, conspired &
confederated w/each other in setting up, through the
use of coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate
framework & structures that led to establishment of
UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more
than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including the
acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious means &
machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the
holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
stock of UCPB.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
petitioners alleged that their participation in the acts w/
w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance
of legitimate lawyering
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from
ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the
allegations in the complaint implicating him in the
alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition"
w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG exclude them as parties-
defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to
substantiate compliance by Roco of the same conditions
precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco
didnt refute petitioners' contention that he did actually
not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG
Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity
of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners,
for their refusal to comply w/ the conditions required by
PCGG. It held, ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves
from the consequences of their acts until they have
begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege;
the existence and identity of the client.
ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA
lawyers filed the petition for certiorari. Petitioner
Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also
denied thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari,
assailing SBs resolution on essentially same grounds
averred by petitioners, namely:
SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners
to the strict application of the law of agency.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not considering
petitioners & Roco similarly situated &, thus, deserving
equal treatment
SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that,
under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that
dropping of partydefendants be based on reasonable &
just grounds, w/ due consideration to constitutional rts
of petitioners
PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners'
contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of
the client is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it
required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they
are evidence of nominee status.
ISSUE:
WON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS
PETITIONERS FROM REVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR
CLIENT(S) & THE OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED BY
THE PCGG
RULING:
YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on
the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum
(contract of lease of services) where one person lets his
services and another hires them without reference to the
object of which the services are to be performed,
wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by
honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of
agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be
placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that
he gained by the contract to the person who requested
him. But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that
of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee
An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant,
because he possesses special powers of trust and
confidence reposed on him by his client. An attorney
occupies a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an
officer of the Court & exercises his judgment in the
choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his
client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there
are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into
it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is
of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,
that is required by reason of necessity and public interest
based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking
legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.
Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules of Court,
Rule 130:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as
to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client,
be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of,
or with a view to, professional employment, can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which
has been acquired in such capacity.
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 20. It
is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from him or
with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.)
Canon 15, CPE also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely
dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists
between lawyer and client which in turn requires a
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
exchange and flow of information. Thus, the Court held
that this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the
name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.
The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client.
Reasons advanced for the general rule:
 Court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected
is flesh and blood.
Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established.
Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of
relationship
Due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know
his adversary.
Exceptions to the gen. rule:
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer's advice.
Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject
matter of the relationship was so closely related to the
issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually
attached to both.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability,
his identity is privileged.
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldnt reveal name of
his client as this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: We feel sure that
under such conditions no case has ever gone to the
length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the
nature of the transactions to w/c it related, when such
information could be made the basis of a suit against his
client.
Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal
the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of
money to govt voluntarily in settlement of
undetermined income taxes, unsued on, & w/ no govt
audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability
pending
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other
situations which could qualify as exceptions to the
general rule:
if the content of any client communication to a
lawyer is relevant to the subject matter of the
legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance
where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed & it is
the identity w/c is intended to be confidential,
the identity of the client has been held to be
privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to
the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences.
Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the
general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the
very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier,
protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the
legal advice or legal service sought was duly established
in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself as can
be seen in the 3 specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-
prosecution should they accede thereto.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can
readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the
financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up
of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave
their professional advice in the form of, among others,
the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their
client's shareholdings.
Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their
clients would implicate them in the very activity for
which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on
corporations. them in exercise of their duties.

Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of

the client's name would obviously provide the necessary
link for the prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists.

While the privilege may not be invoked for illegal

purposes such as in a case where a client takes on the
services of an attorney, for illicit purposes, it may be
invoked in a case where a client thinks he might have
previously committed something illegal and consults his
attorney. Whether or not the act for which the client
sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be
used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not
yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to
possible action against him.

The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is

consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege,
i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of
compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated.
What is sought to be avoided then is the exploitation of
the general rule in what may amount to a fishing
expedition by the prosecution.

In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately

hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a
case against their clients, the latter's case should be built
upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from
their own sources and not from compelled testimony
requiring them to reveal the name of their clients,
information which unavoidably reveals much about the
nature of the transaction which may or may not be
illegal.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the

lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's
loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the
protection, which exists not only during the relationship,
but extends even after the termination of the
relationship.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to

reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the
facts of the instant case clearly fall w/in recognized
exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not
privileged information. Otherwise, it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients
DAROY v. LEGASPI
Fermina Legazpi-Daroy, Lydia Legaspi-Acha and Agripino
Legaspi of Iligan City, in a verified complaint dated March
10, 1970, charged Attorney Ramon Chaves Legaspi of
Cagayan de Oro City with malpractice for having
misappropriated the sum of four thousand pesos which
he had collected for them. They prayed that the
respondent be disbarred.
The complainants hired the respondent in May, 1962 to
represent them in the intestate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga
and Paz Velez-Gonzaga.
The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to know
of the sale only when the respondent wrote a note dated
November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo Legaspi,
wherein he stated "that the money we have deposited
may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock".
The respondent advised Teofilo Legaspito see him on
that date so that the money could be withdrawn.
The complainants were not able to get the money on
December 8 because the respondent on December 7
sent to Mrs. Daroy a telegram countermanding his prior
advice and directing here to go to Cagayan de Oro City
on December 10, a Wednesday, to receive the money.
On December 9, a certain Atty. Sugamo sent a
handwritten note to Mrs. Daroy advising her not to go to
Cagayan de Oro City on December 10 because according
to the respondent "his postdated checks can be paid
and/or collected either Thursday or Friday yet".
In the afternoon of that same day, December 9, Mrs.
Daroy received another note, this time from the
respondent himself, "Cousin Ramon". The note
contained the disturbing intelligence that Mrs. Daroy's
"Cousin Ramon" had withdrawn the money amounting
to P4,000 and had spent it.
*The respondent even claimed that he is one of the heirs.
This was not proven.
It turned out that on October 20, 1969 the respondent,
as to "counsel for Fermina Daroy et al.", received from
Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay the said sum of
P4,000 as "one (1) share in participation of my clients
Fermina Daroy et al. in connection with (the) order of
Judge B. K. Gorospe" in the aforementioned intestate
proceeding. The respondent signed a receipt for that
amount. The sheriff paid to Attorneys Angel Quimpo,
Leovigildo Tandog, Jr. and Teogenes Velez, Jr. the
respective shares of the other groups of heirs also in the
sum of P4,000 for each group. Those lawyers turned over
the amounts withdrawn to their respective clients.
It is evident that the respondent, in writing on November
28, 1969 to Teofilo Legaspi that the money deposited
could be withdrawn on December 8, 1969, acted in bad
faith. He had already withdrawn the money before that
date. He concealed that fact from the complainants.
Before the disbarment complaint was filed several
demands were made upon the respondent to pay to the
complainants the amount which he had
misappropriated. He repeatedly broke his promises to
make payment. As complainants' patience was already
exhausted, they filed their complaint for disbarment on
March 13, 1970.
ISSUE:
WON ATTORNEY RAMON CHAVES LEGASPIs acts
warrant a disbarment?
RULING:
Yes.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay
any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated
to report promptly the money of his clients that has
come into his possession. He should not commingle it
with his private property or use it for his personal
purposes without his client's consent. He should
maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private
trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment
in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be
immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57
Phil. 8, 11).
Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that
when an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of
his client after it has been demanded, he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to
a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for any
violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).
"The relation between an attorney and his client is
highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a high
degree of fidelity and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In
view of that special relationship, "lawyers are bound to
promptly account for money or property received by
them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a
lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands
collected for his clients does not relieve him from the
duty of promptly accounting for the funds received."
(Syllabus, In re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).

The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a

gross violation of general morality as well as professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession, "It deserves severe punishment" (Sturr vs.
State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 Pac. 2d
897).1wph1.t

A member of the bar who converts the money of his

client to his own benefit through false pretenses is guilty
of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in his office
of lawyer. The attorney, who violates his oath of office,
betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client and
practices deceit cannot be permitted to continue as a law
practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as
an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of
an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In
re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No.
503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131; See Cabigao and
Yzquierdo vs. Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).
HADJULA vs. MADIANDA
Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be
friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal
Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical,
Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that,
sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some
legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the
course of their conversation which was supposed to be
kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and
produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth
certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be
informed later by the respondent that she (respondent)
would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was
malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have
refused handling her case only after she had already
heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with
respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of
2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the
latter. What, per complainant's account, precipitated the
filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP
promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in
exchange for the complainant's promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to
the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER
COMPLAINT with the Ombudsman charging her
(complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic
Act No. 3019, falsification of public documents and
immorality, the last two charges being based on the
disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent.
And also on the basis of the same disclosures,
complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also
instituted against her before the Professional Regulation
Commission.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,
respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant
and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent
also stated the observation that the supposed
confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to
are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP.
The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline came out with a Report and
Recommendation, stating that the information related
by complainant to the respondent is "protected under
the attorney-client privilege communication."
Prescinding from this postulate, the Investigating
Commissioner found the respondent to have violated
legal ethics when she "[revealed] information given to
her during a legal consultation," and accordingly
recommended that respondent be reprimanded.
ISSUE:
WON the act of Atty. MADIANDAs acts warrant a
sanction
RULING:
Atty. Madianda was reprimanded.
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the
very first moment complainant asked respondent for
legal advise regarding the former's business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney professionally on
any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or
charged; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of
any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation,
then the professional employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship between
the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of
the former's fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the
existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
UY vs. GONZALES
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer
to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the
circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing
the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and
submitted to him a petition to be filed before the
Regional Trial Court.
When the petition was about to be filed, respondent
went to complainants office demanding a certain
amount other than what was previously agreed upon.
Respondent left his office after reasoning with him.
Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was
shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition
for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent
filed a letter-complaint against him with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public
Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and
circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of
title that was the subject matter of the petition which
respondent was supposed to have filed.
Respondent claims that he gave complainant a
handwritten letter telling complainant that he is
withdrawing the petition he prepared and that
complainant should get another lawyer to file the
petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client
relationship between him and complainant; that there
was no longer any professional relationship between the
two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for
falsification of public document; that the facts and
allegations contained in the letter-complaint for
falsification were culled from public documents procured
from the Office of the Register of Deeds.
The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon
21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and
recommended for his suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of
the CPR?
HELD:
No. As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to
exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces
with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a
business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is
not essential that the client should have employed the
attorney on any previous occasion or that any retainer
should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither
is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had, for as long as the advice and
assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in
matters pertinent to his profession.
Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa
Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by
respondent against complainant were obtained by
respondent due to his personal dealings with
complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to
hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land
he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there was
no attorney-client relationship between respondent and
complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of
the petition was only incidental to their personal
transaction.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against
complainant were not obtained by respondent in his
professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a
property originally owned by his deceased son and
therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for
estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily
involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa,
respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21.
There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-
complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct
that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity
and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise
would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case
against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary
interests.
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Case:
Petitioners: The Complainants, former clients of the
respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for
"malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be
discovered during the actual investigation of this
complaint." Attached in their Affidavit of Merit, they
allege that because of the respondents neglect and
malpractice of law that they lost their case to Judge
Capulong and their appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Respondent: The unfavorable judgment by the Regional
Trial Court in the case is not imputable to [his] mistake
but rather imputable to the merits of the case. He further
claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him
because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the
main labor case he had handled for them. The
respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint
for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer
was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument
that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice
of the law profession.
The Antecedent Facts:
Santiago, Hontiveros, Manas, and Nordista, members of
Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA), were
alleged to have illegally expelled Paulino Salvador from
the union. The latter filed a complaint with the Dept. of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) which ruled in favor of
Salvador. Subsequently, Salvador filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela a complaint against the
complainants for actual, moral, and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on
grounds of (1) res judicata and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. Judge
Capulong granted the motion but was later re-instated
upon Salvadors motion for reconsideration and required
the complainants herein to file their answer within a
nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice. Instead
of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion
having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court
a petition for certiorari. Both petition and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied,
respondent still did not file the complainants answer.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order
of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence
before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail. Thereafter, the
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Salvador.
Complainants, assisted by respondent, elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals but affirmed the decision
in toto by the RTC.
Issue: Whether the respondent committed culpable
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in
failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case
No. 3526-V-91.
Ruling:
He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby
REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth,
more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility1. Once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Else wise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer
who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal profession.
HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA

Facts:

Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her

friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed confidential
information during that period. However, after the
confidential information was given by Hadjula, Atty.
Madianda referred her to another lawyer.

Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda

because of this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to hear
her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda
filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification
of public documents and immorality using the
disclosures as basis for the charges.

Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?

Held:

Reprimanded.

The moment complainant approached the then

receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.
Atty. Madianda should have kept the information secret
and confidential, under the attorney-client privilege rule.

However, the seriousness of the respondents

offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is
room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that
she (Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that
she was actuated by the urge to retaliate without
perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a
negative sentiment, she was violating the rule of
confidentiality.
Santiago vs. Fojas Issue: Whether the respondent committed culpable
248 SCRA 69 (1995) negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to
file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-
The Case: 91.

Petitioners: The Complainants, former clients of the

respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice,
neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during
the actual investigation of this complaint." Attached in their
Affidavit of Merit, they allege that because of the respondents
neglect and malpractice of law that they lost their case to
Judge Capulong and their appeal in the Court of Appeals.
Respondent: The unfavorable judgment by the Regional Trial
Court in the case is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather
imputable to the merits of the case. He further claims that the
complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused
to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had
handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal
of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file
the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of
argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the
law profession.
Ruling:
He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED
and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser
or advocate for every person who may wish to become his
client. He has the right to decline employment, subject,
however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion
the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion.

Else wise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the

client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
The Antecedent Facts: rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the
Santiago, Hontiveros, Manas, and Nordista, members of Far end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by
Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA), were alleged the rules of law, legally applied.
to have illegally expelled Paulino Salvador from the union. The
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of
latter filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and
any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
Employment (DOLE) which ruled in favor of Salvador.
law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
Subsequently, Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
(RTC) of Valenzuela a complaint against the complainants for
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.
grounds of (1) res judicata and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Later, he
A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. Judge Capulong
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
granted the motion but was later re-instated upon Salvadors
of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
motion for reconsideration and required the complainants
respect of the community to the legal profession.
herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of
fifteen days from notice. Instead of filing an answer, the
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of
the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari. Both petition and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied,
respondent still did not file the complainants answer. The
respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of
default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before
the Clerk of Court, but to no avail. Thereafter, the RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Salvador. Complainants,
assisted by respondent, elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals but affirmed the decision in toto by the RTC.
A.C. No. 5739 September 12, 2007
PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE I (PANELCO I)
represented by its GM, ROLANDO O. REINOSO,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN AYAR GARCIA, MONTEMAYOR
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric
Cooperative I (PANELCO I) charging Atty. Juan Ayar
Montemayor with negligence in handling the cases assigned to
him which caused unwarranted financial losses to the
complainant, approximately in the total amount of sixteen
million pesos (PhP 16,000,000).
PANELCO I stated that while acting as counsel for the
cooperative, respondent was negligent in handling its cases. It
alleged:
4. One of the cases assigned to Atty. Montemayor was filed
with the RTC of Pangasinan. It was decided that the case be
appealed to the CA;
5. However, the CA ordered the Dismissal of the appeal for the
failure of Atty. Montemayor to serve and file the required
number of copies within the time provided by the Rules of
Court;
6. In view of the dismissal, the Decision of the TC became final
and executory, and the judgment award in the amount
(P2,179,209.18) was paid by the complainant;
7. Another case was yet assigned to Atty. Montemayor. Again,
the decision was appealed by PANELCO I to the CA, through
Atty. Montemayor;
8. In its resolution, the CA considered the appeal abandoned
due to the failure of Atty. Montemayor to serve and file the
required Appellant's Brief despite the lapse of the two
extensions of time granted.;
9. Thus, the funds of PANELCO I deposited in banks were
garnished until the judgment award was paid to the Plaintiff
ECCO-ASIA
10. Later, Atty. Montemayor informed the complainant of the
judgment RTC that he had filed his appeal;
11. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishments, complainant
confronted Atty. Montemayor on the matter, and he uttered
"napabayaan ko itong kaso...ano ang gagawin natin";
12. As a consequence of the negligence of Atty. Montemayor,
the complainant was forced to settle with the Plaintiffs
without the benefit of an approved time-table, and is presently
in a dire financial situation
Thus, the Court declared respondent to have WAIVED the
filing of Comment on the Complaint for failure to file his
comment despite an extension of 15 days.
Issue: WON respondent committed gross negligence or
misconduct in mishandling complainants cases on appeal.
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the IBP in its findings and conclusion
that respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities.
The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation
for his failure to do so.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
xxxx
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH
ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Manifestly, respondent has fallen short of the competence and
diligence required of every member of the Bar in relation to his
client. As counsel, respondent had the duty to present every
remedy or defense authorized by law to protect his client.
When he undertook his clients cause, he made a covenant
that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until its final
conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication and
care, and if he should do no less, then he is not true to his
lawyer's oath.
The respondent failed to live up to his duties and
responsibilities. The appeals of his client, the petitioner, were
dismissed due to his improper way of filing the appeal and his
non-filing of the appellants brief. Respondent did not offer a
plausible explanation for not doing his level best in
representing his clients cause on appeal; thus, making
complainant suffer serious losses.

There is no doubt that it was part of respondents obligation to

complainant, as the latters counsel of record in the civil cases,
to prosecute with assiduousness said cases on appeal in order
to safeguard complainant's rights, but it was respondents
negligence or omission which has caused damage to such
interests.

In the case of Jardin v. Villar, Jr., the Court cited several cases
where lawyers were suspended for a period of six (6) months
from the practice of law for their failure to file briefs or other
pleadings for their respective clients.

The case of Atty. Montemayor is however different. He is guilty

not only of his unjustified failure to file the appellants brief of
his client not only once but twice. Moreover the Court notes
with dismay the huge losses suffered by complainant PANELCO
I in the total amount of (PhP 16,000,000).

Lastly, Atty. Montemayor demonstrated an utter lack of regard

for the very serious charges against him and a gross disrespect
for the Court when he failed to file his comment after being
required to file his response to the said charges. Respondent
could have presented sufficient justification for his inability to
file the appellants briefs but failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from

the practice of law.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS,
Facts:
In 1955, Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago
and judgment was rendered in favor of them.
Consequently, Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the
writ of execution but his motions were denied.
In 1963, the sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and
Henson, which Ago failed to redeem.
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy
of truth and moral justice.
A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and
honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is
a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients
position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or
lack of his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless,
then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients
propensity to litigate.

Ago then filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered

against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal
obligation and that his wifes share in their conjugal house
could not legally be reached by the levy made. The CFI of QC
issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda, the
Register of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final
deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring
the restraining order continued

In 1966, Ago filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to

enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed
it; Ago filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed
the petition; Ago appealed to SC which dismissed the petition

Later, Ago filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition

with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE
WON the Agos lawyer, encouraged his clients to avoid
controversy

RULING

No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint

for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that
the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos
abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the
satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners.

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his

exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
Caballero vs. Deiparine
G.R. No. L-39059 September 30, 1974
Facts:
This involves a dispute over a parcel of land and the acts
committed by the plaintiff-lawyer which were not intended by
his client, the plaintiff.
That during the lifetime of Bucao she with her second husband
acquired by joint purchase a parcel of land from the Talisay-
Minglanilla Estate.
That in 1932 Bucao and Tomas executed jointly a notarial
instrument wherein they acknowledged that Antonio
Caballero had contributed the amount therein stated for the
purchase of the property and they sold 1/4 of the lot to him;
when the title to said lot was issued, Vicenta Bucao and Tomas
Raga held it in trust for their co-owner.
That the portion mentioned as sold to plaintiff Antonio
Caballero remained unsegregated from Lot 2072 and the deed
of sale of the Complaint; nor had it been registered in the
Register of Deeds; but he had been in occupation of a portion
of this lot peacefully until the present.
Bucao sold her undivided 1/2 of the above parcel to her co-
owner, Tomas Raga.
Defendants Olimpio Raga, Adriano Raga, Magdalena Raga and
Tomas Raga executed an instrument known as "Declaration
and confirmation of sale" without the participation of plaintiffs
Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero, wherein they
stated that they are the heirs of Vicenta Bucao of the 1/2 of
the property to Tomas Raga.
Alma Deiparine acquired in good faith, with a just title and for
a valuable consideration, the whole of Lot 2072 from Tomas
Raga as per deed of absolute sale.
That defendant Alma Deiparine came to know only of the sale
when it was presented by plaintiff Antonio Caballero at the
trial of an ejectment case filed by the former in the Municipal
Court of Talisay.
This case was decided in favor of Antonio Caballero but the
decision was appealed by Alma Deiparine to the Court of First
Instance of Cebu which affirmed the decision for Caballero.
The case is now in the Court of Appeals on appeal by Alma
Deiparine.
Caballero and the defendant parties entered into a
compromise agreement, and the lawyer of Caballero admitted
to certain facts without the authority of his client, Caballero.
ISSUE: Is the compromise valid, considering that the lawyer
admitted to facts which were not authorized by his client to
make?
RULING:
NO.
1. A reading of the stipulation of facts convinced the court that
it is a compromise agreement of the parties. The stipulation
concludes with this prayer: "WHEREFORE, it is most
respectfully prayed that the foregoing Stipulation of Facts be
approved and that a decision be handed down on the legal
issues submitted on the basis of said Stipulation of Facts."
Apparently it is intended to terminate the case.
2. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in
taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash
3. It may be true that during the pre-trial hearing held on
February 3, 1968, the parties concerned agreed to execute a
stipulation of facts but it does not mean that the respective
counsels of the contending parties can prepare a stipulation of
facts the contents of which is prejudicial to the interest of their
clients and sign it themselves without the intervention of their
clients.
4. Counsel for plaintiffs-appellants, Atty. Melecio C. Guba,
agreed that defendant-appellee Alma Deiparine bought the
land in question in good faith and for a valuable consideration;
that during the lifetime of their mother Vicenta Bucao, she,
with the conformity of her husband, sold her undivided of
the land in question to her co-owner and son, Tomas Raga.
5. All these adverse facts were made the basis of the appealed
decision against the plaintiffs. No further evidence was
presented as there was no hearing.
6. The attorney for the plaintiffs in making such admission
went beyond the scope of his authority as counsel and
practically gave away the plaintiffs' case. The admission does
not refer to a matter of judicial procedure related to the
enforcement of the remedy. It related to the very subject
matter of the cause of action, or to a matter on which the client
alone can make the admission binding on him.
7. The broad implied or apparent powers of an attorney with
respect to the conduct or control of litigation are, however,
limited to matters which relate only to the procedure or
remedy.
8. The employment of itself confers upon the attorney no
implied or power or authority over the subject matter of the
cause of action or defense; and, unless the attorney has
expressly been granted authority with respect thereto, the
power to deal with or surrender these matters is regarded as
remaining exclusively in the client.
A.C. No. 5736 June 18, 2010
RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL
vs.
ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by RCBI against
respondent Atty. Florido for "acts constituting grave coercion
and threats when he, as counsel for the minority stockholders
of RBCI, led his clients in physically taking over the
management and operation of the bank through force,
violence and intimidation."
Facts:
In 2002, RBCI filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent. RBCI alleged that respondent violated his oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
According to RBCI, respondent and his clients, (Nazareno-
Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the
use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the
premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay, the
bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their
own staff to run the bank.
Respondent denied RBCIs allegations. Respondent explained
that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon
him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and
validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he
was merely effecting a lawful and valid change of
management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice
was sent to Garay but he refused to comply. To ensure a
smooth transition of managerial operations, respondent and
the Nazareno-Relampagos group went to the bank to ask
Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted violently and
grappled with the security guards long firearm. Respondent
then directed the security guards to prevent entry into the
bank premises of individuals who had no transaction with the
bank. Respondent, through the orders of the Nazareno-
Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banks vault.
Issue: WON Atty. Florido represented his clients with zeal
within the bounds of law.
The Ruling of the IBP
The IBP declared that respondent failed to live up to the
exacting standards expected of him as vanguard of law and
justice. It recommended the imposition on respondent of a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months
to one year with a warning that the repetition of similar
conduct in the future will warrant a more severe penalty.
Respondent knew or ought to have known that his clients
could not just forcibly take over the management and
premises of RBCI without a valid court order. Respondent had
no legal basis to implement the take over of RBCI and that it
was a "naked power grab without any semblance of legality
whatsoever."
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm IBPs resolution.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Likewise, it is the
lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal
processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of
the law or lessening confidence in the legal system.
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent
his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this
reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress
upon his client compliance with the law and principles of
fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client. It is his duty to counsel
his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their
adversaries.
Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace.
Upon taking their professional oath, they become guardians of
truth and the rule of law. Verily, when they appear before a
tribunal, they act not merely as representatives of a party but,
first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty to
protect their clients interests is secondary to their obligation
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
While they are obliged to present every available legal remedy
or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always be made
within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense
of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate.
His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable,
fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the
pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable
and unethical.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido
GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law for one year.
A.M. No. 1311 July 18, 1991
RAMONA L. VDA. DE ALISBO and NORBERTO S. ALISBO,
vs.
ATTY. BENITO JALANDOON, SR.,
Facts:
Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as his
counsel in an action to recover his share of the estate of the
deceased sps. Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had
been adjudicated to because Alisbo failed to file a motion for
execution of judgment in his favor within the reglementary 5-
year period.
The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services
between Alisbo and Atty. Jalandoon were the following:
1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for
the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share
2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and
3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid 50% of the value
of the property recovered.
Respondent prepared a complaint with Ramon, Teotimo, and
Pacifico Alisbo as plaintiffs and Carlito Sales as defendant
signed by him alone. On the same day, he withdrew it and
replaced it with a complaint with Ramon as sole plaintiff and
Teotimo and Pacifico impleaded as defendants which
respondent and Atty. Pablo signed as counsel.
An amended complaint was filed with Ramon, his judicial
guardian Norberto, and eight others as plaintiffs, signed by
Atty. Pablo alone (10 years after final judgment).
Defendant Sales filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the action had prescribed. Consequently, the CFI of Negros
Occidental dismissed the case on the ground of prescription
(though Ramon filed the complaint w/in the ten-year
prescriptive period, it was null and void since Ramon was
insane and hence w/o capacity to sue).
In the main, complainants charged Jalandoon with having
deliberately caused the dismissal of the case and concealing
the fact that he had been the former legal counsel of Sales.
Jalandoon claims he only discovered his previous professional
relationship with Sales during the pre-trial on Oct. 6, 1972
ISSUE
WON Jalandoon is guilty of non-disclosure to client of adverse
or conflicting interest.
RULING
YES because:
1. Before filing the complaint, he had several interviews with
Ramon and Norberto re: CC No. 4963
2. He must have done research on the court records of CC No.
4963
3. For CC No. 9559, he had to inform himself of the personal
circumstances of defendant Sales.
With this knowledge, he should have declined employment by
Alisbo due to conflict of interest.
The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1
and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provide:
6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to
the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties,
and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which
might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
Jalandoon had delayed the filing of CC No. 9559, instead asking
the court to resolve the pending incidents in CC No. 4963. The
first complaint with Ramon and his brothers was only partially
defective due to Ramons insanity; by making Ramon the sole
plaintiff in the second complaint, it was rendered wholly
defective and ineffectual in stopping the prescriptive period.
While he allegedly found out about Ramon Alisbo's insanity on
July 17, 1971 only, he amended the complaint to implead
Alisbo's legal guardian as plaintiff almost 5 months later. By
that time the prescriptive period had run out.
Disposition: It was more than simple negligence; the Court
found respondent guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity
and was suspended for a period of 2 years.

G.R. No. L-27231 March 28, 1969
ALFONSO VISITACION
vs.
VICTOR MANIT, substituted by his widow LEONARDA MANIT
and daughters VIRGINIA DUNGOG, VICTORIA BATUCAN and
MERLINDA MANIT
Facts:
Alfonso Visitacion, filed a case against Victor Manit to hold him
liable subsidiarily as employer for the death of his son, Delano
Visitacion, as a result of injuries sustained in vehicular collision
involving Manits driver, Rudolfo Giron, who was found
insolvent after being convicted and sentenced.
The case was heard without defendant or his counsel being
present which resulted in plaintiff presenting evidence and the
case was submitted for decision. The defendant filed a motion
for new trial which was granted and the proceeding continued
with the defendants presenting their evidence.
On October 14, 1958, Atty. Garcia, defendants counsel,
manifested that Victor Manit had recently died and the
plaintiffs counsel amended the complaint by impleading the
widow and heirs of the deceased.
On January 27, 1960, Atty. Garcia filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel alleging that Manits heirs did not hire him to
represent them and both counsel and his client failed to
appear at the trial the next day. The Court considered them
having renounced their right to appear and present evidence
to contest plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiff. Atty. Garcias motion to withdraw was not passed
upon and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied. Thus, he filed this present appeal.
ISSUES:
WON the lower court erred in continuing with the case
without the new defendants brought to its jurisdiction.
WON the lower court erred in ignoring the motion to
withdraw by Atty. Garcia.
WON Atty. Garcia was able to safeguard his clients
interests.
RULING:
No error was committed, and Atty. Garcia was remiss in his
duties to safeguard the clients interests.
The record shows that Atty. Garcia had acknowledged the
receipt of the amended complaint substituting the defendant
heirs as counsel for defendants. They were impleaded and
submitted to the Courts jurisdiction through their counsels
acknowledgment of the amended complaint; the issuance of a
summons was unnecessary. The last-hour motion to withdraw
filed one day before the hearing came too late and was
properly ignored. The motion was not verified and also carried
no notice to his clients on record which was in violation of the
Rules of Court (Rule 15, Sec. 4 and Rule 138, Sec. 26,
respectively).
An attorney who could not get the written consent of his client
must make an application to the court, for the relation does
not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record.
The decision rendered by the lower court, upon failure of
defendants and counsel to appear, despite notification was in
effect a denial of counsels application for withdrawal. Atty.
Garcias failure to appear was inexcusable and he had no right
to assume that the Court would grant his application. Counsel
had no right to presume that the court would grant his
withdrawal and therefore must still appear on the date of
hearing.
The attorneys duty to safeguard the clients interests
commences from his retainer until his defective release from
the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of
the litigation.
The circumstances had lead the Court to believe that the last-
hour application to withdraw was merely a device to prolong
the case and delay execution of judgment. There was no
premature judgment rendered because the record shows that
the defendant heirs were shown to be aware of the existence
of the case.
Leonarda Manit was called upon as witness during the
deceaseds lifetime by Atty. Garcia and submitted herself to
the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither she nor her 3 children of
age can claim ignorance of the pendency of the case.
The circumstances of the case and the appeal taken all
together lead to the conclusion that the last-hour
withdrawal application of Atty. Garcia and his appeal
"as officer of the Court and then counsel of the
deceased" was but a device to prolong this case and
delay in the execution of the judgment, which should
have been carried out years ago. The imposition of
double costs is therefore in order.
G.R. Nos. 131384-87 February 2, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ELEGIO NADERA, JR. Y SADSAD
Facts:
Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his
wife Daisy, namely: Oleby, Maricris, March Anthony, and
Sherilyn.
In 1991, Daisy left for a job in Bahrain, and came home to the
Philippines for vacation only.
On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor,
Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by
their father, herein accused-appellant.
The trial court finds accused Elegio Nadera, Jr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Rape [4 counts]
with the qualifying circumstance that the victims are under 18
years of age and the offender is a parent.
The accused, however, alleged that the trial court erred in
accepting his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making
a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the
consequences of his plea.
In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which
the accused pleaded guilty, thus:
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty. Manolo Brotonel
of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. However, on August 5, 1997, when these cases were
called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the accused
manifested that the accused, realizing the futility of entering
into trial and considering that he actually committed the acts
complained of, intimated his intention to enter a plea of guilty
to the above-mentioned charges. The accused was then asked
by this Court if he was aware of the consequences of a plea of
guilty to a capital offense: that for the rape he committed on
May 17, 1992 against his daughter, Oleby Nadera, who was 9
years old at the time, he would be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and for the three other counts of rape committed on
April 17 and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby Nadera] and on
March 3, 1996 [against Maricris Nadera, 11 years old at the
time], he would be sentenced to death by lethal injection.
After having been informed of this, he insisted that he is willing
to enter a plea of guilty to the crimes charged and is ready to
face the consequences thereof.
ISSUES:
WON the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this case was
made improvidently.
WON Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, was remiss in
defending his client and protecting his clients rights.
RULING:
1] YES. Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this
case was made improvidently.
The Court finds merit in accused-appellant's allegations. Also,
it finds that there was inadequate representation of his case in
court, thus necessitating the remand of the case for further
proceedings.
Under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure ,
three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of
guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea
and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences
thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must ask the
accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.
In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly
transpired at the re-arraignment of accused-appellant, for
what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty,"
and whether he fully understood the consequences of his
guilty plea. On what exactly accused-appellant said in entering
his plea of guilty and what exactly he had been told by the trial
judge, the records' shed no light. There is thus no evidence to
show that accused-appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily
made or that he had fully understood the consequences of
such plea.
2] YES Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, was remiss in
defending his client and protecting his clients rights.
The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty.
Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, cannot go
unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine
Oleby Nadera; (b) the manner in which he conducted Maricris
Nadera's cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to
present evidence for the accused but also to inform the
accused of his right to do so, if he desires.
Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his
client can give meaning and substance to the accused's right
to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's duty, especially that of a defense
counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with
all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard
the accused's fundamental rights.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a

lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and
acts accordingly.

Lastly, not only did the defense counsel fail to object to the
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution,
according to the trial court's decision, he even expressed his
conformity to the admission of the same. Neither did he
present any evidence on behalf of accused-appellant. Worse,
nowhere in the records is it shown that accused-appellant was
informed, either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to
present evidence, if he so desires.

Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his

client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he
perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this
duty was all the more imperative because the life of accused-
appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because
he was counsel de oficio.

In view of the foregoing, we find it necessary to remand the

case for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused,
considering not only the accused's improvident plea of guilt
but also his lawyer's neglect in representing his cause.
Angeles vs. Uy, Jr.
Facts:
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC of
Caloocan City charged Atty. Thomas C. Uy with the
violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Atty. Thomas C. Uy is the lawyer of Primitiva
Malansing who was awarded a sum of money in a
civil case against Norma Trajano. In a hearing,
Norma Trajano manifested that she had already
settled in full the civil aspect in the criminal case
involving herself and Primitiva Malansing. She
alleged that she paid P20,000.00 directly to
Malansing, while the balance of P16,500 she
delivered to Atty. Uy. She even had a receipt
signed by Atty. Uy himself.
Malansing however manifested that she did not
receive the amount of P16,500.00. Atty. Uy argued
that Malansing did not want to accept the money,
but this was disputed by Malansing who manifested
her willingness to accept the money. The Court
thus directed Atty. Uy to produce the money, who
said it was in his office. The Court suspended the
proceedings to enable Atty. Uy to get the money
from his law office which is located only at the
second floor of the same building where this court
is located. Afterwards, he never returned.
For his part, Atty. Uy alleges that despite several
offers to Malansing to get the money, Malansing
declined and insisted that the money be kept in his
office; and that on the day of the trial when Judge
Angeles ordered for the money to be produced,
Jamisola, his staff who had the key, did not arrive
on time, thus his failure to produce the money.
Issue: WON Atty. Uys actions merit a sanction
Ruling:
The Bar Confidant recommended Atty. Uy be
suspended for a month. The Supreme Court upheld
this recommendation.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is
highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity
and good faith. It is designed "to remove all such
temptation and to prevent everything of that kind
from being done for the protection of the client."[5]
Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession." Furthermore, Rule
16.01 of the Code also states that "a lawyer shall
account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client." The Canons of
Professional Ethics is even more explicit:
"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby
for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
"Money of the client collected for the client or other
trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly and should not under any circumstances
be commingled with his own or be used by him."[6]
In the present case, it is clear that respondent failed
to promptly report and account for the P16,500 he
had received from Norma Trajano on behalf of his
client, Primitiva Del Rosario. Although the amount
had been entrusted to respondent on December
14, 1998, his client revealed during the February
10, 1999 hearing that she had not yet received it.
Worse, she did not even know where it was.
Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the
rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but
whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical
standards of the bar.[11] In this case, respondent
has not done so. Indeed, we agree with the
following observation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant:
"Keeping the money in his possession without his
client's knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the
tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the
money belonging to his client. This situation should,
at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like
judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must
also appear clean. This way, the people's faith in
the justice system would remain undisturbed."
Cruz vs. Jacinto
Facts:
Spouses Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Manimbo
Cruz seek the disbarment of Atty. Ernesto C.
Jacinto.
Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, lawyer of the couple in an
unrelated case, requested the Cruz spouses for a
loan in behalf of a certain Concepcion G. Padilla,
who he claimed to be an old friend as she was
allegedly in need of money. The loan requested
was for PhP 285,000.00 payable after 100 days for
PhP 360,000 to be secured by a real estate
mortgage on a parcel of land located at Quezon
City. The spouses, believing Atty. Jacinto was a
good risk, agreed to lend him money.
Upon maturity of the loan on 15 October 1990, the
spouses demanded payment from Concepcion G.
Padilla by going to the address given by the
respondent but there proved to be no person by
that name living therein. When the complainants
verified the genuineness of the land title with
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, it was certified
by the said office to be a fake and spurious title.
Further efforts to locate the debtor-mortgagor
likewise proved futile.
The complainants evidence included the sworn
statements of Estrella Ermino-Palipada, the
secretary of the Atty. Jacinto at the Neri Law Office,
and Avegail Payos, a housemaid of Atty. Jacinto.
Ms. Palipada stated that:
1. she was the one who prepared the Real Estate
Mortgage Contract and the Receipt of the loan
upon the instruction of the respondents;
2. she was a witness to the transaction and never
once saw the person of Concepcion G. Padilla, the
alleged mortgagor; and that
3. she was instructed by Atty. Jacinto to
notarize the said contract by signing the name
of one Atty. Ricardo Neri.
Avegail Payos, the housemaid of the respondent, in
turn stated that she was the one who simulated the
signature of one Emmanuel Gimarino, the Deputy
Register of Deeds of Quezon City upon the
instruction of Atty. Jacinto to make it appear that
the real estate mortgage was registered and the
annotation to appear at the back of the TCT as an
encumbrance.
In his version of the facts, Atty. Jacinto averred that
while he indeed facilitated the loan agreement
between the Cruz spouses and Concepcion G.
Padilla, he had no idea that the latter would give a
falsified Certificate of Title and use it to obtain a
loan. He claimed that he himself was a victim under
the circumstances.
Issue: WON Atty. Jacinto, as per the IBPs
recommendation, should be suspended for 6 mos.
Ruling:
The Court adopted the recommendation of the
Board of Governors of the IBP.
Undeniably, respondent represented complainants
in the loan transaction. By his own admission, he
was the one who negotiated with the borrower, his
long-time friend and a former client. He acted not
merely as an agent but as a lawyer of complaints,
thus, the execution of the real estate mortgage
contract, as well as its registration and annotation
on the title were entrusted to him. In fact,
respondent even received his share in the interest
earnings which complainants realized from the
transaction. His refusal to recognize any
wrongdoing or carelessness by claiming that he is
likewise a victim when it was shown that the title to
the property, the registration of the real estate
mortgage contract, and the annotation thereon
were all feigned, will not at all exonerate him.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with
his client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.
However, the measure of good faith which an
attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with
this client is a much higher standard than is
required in business dealings where the parties
trade at arms length. Business transactions
between an attorney and his client are disfavored
and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence,
courts carefully watch these transactions to be sure
that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by
virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position
to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of
his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or
improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an
attorneys favor. Further, his fidelity to the cause of
his client requires him to be ever mindful of the
responsibilities that should be expected of him.
Diaz vs. Kapunan
Facts:
In 1917, Vicente Diaz and Secundino de
Mendezona formed a partnership and entered into
extensive business transactions in the Province of
Leyte. The capital of the partnership was P380,000.
Unfortunately, however, the business failed to
prosper, with the result that on liquidation, it was
found to have suffered a loss of P67,000. When
Diaz and Mendezona came to settle up their affairs,
they eventually formulated a document of sale and
mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a debt in
favor of Diaz in the sum of P80,000 and an
additional sum of P10,000 owing to Diaz, laid upon
the hacienda "Mapuyo," and to be paid within the
term of one year. When the year had expired
Mendezona was not to be found and his family was
unable to meet the payment. There followed the
usual proceedings for foreclosure and sale, which,
after considerable delay, resulted in the hacienda's
being offered for sale at public auction.
At the time fixed for the sale, December 23, 1922,
there appeared Vicente Diaz, accompanied by his
lawyer Emilio Benitez, and Attorney Ruperto
Kapunan. Luis Velarde, the deputy sheriff of Leyte,
is authority for the statement that Kapunan told him
that he, Kapunan, was ready to bid on the property
up to P16,000 in order to assist the Mendezona
family which was in financial straits. At any rate, the
bidding was opened by Kapunan offering P12,000
for the property and with Diaz and Kapunan raising
the bids until finally Diaz offered P12,500. There
the bids stopped on account of Diaz and Kapunan
entering into the agreement, of decisive
importance, wherein Kapunan agreed to withdraw
his bid in consideration of P1,000.
Prior to the disbarment proceedings, Kapunan filed
a motion to the court to allow him to retain P500 as
his professional fees. Later on, after the filing of the
disbarment proceedings, Kapunan filed another
motion to return the money to Diaz. While the judge
refused the motion, Kapunan nevertheless returned
the money.
During much of the time here mentioned, Kapunan
was the attorney of Mendezona. Kapunan was
given extensive authority by the letter of
Mendezona of April 12, 1919. When Kapunan took
part in the sale, it must be assumed that he was
bidding in representation of his client and for the
benefit of the client.
Issue: WoN Atty. Kapunan is guilty of malpractice
Ruling:
Article 1459 of the Civil Code was held in force in
the case of Hernandez vs. Villanueva ([1920], 40
Phil., 775). It provides that the following persons,
naming them, "cannot take by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through
the mediation of another." The provision contained
in the last paragraph of said article is made to
include lawyers, with respect to any property or
rights involved in any litigation in which they may
take party by virtue of their profession and office.
This article has not been infringed by the
respondent because he has not purchased property
at a public or judicial auction and because his
participation in the auction was in representation of
his client. It has been held that an execution sale to
the attorney of the defendant is not unlawful if
made in good faith, with the consent of the client,
and without any purpose of defrauding the latter's
creditors.
Kapunan appears to have been acting in good faith
for his client, although adopting an irregular
procedure, and although attempting to make tardy
restitution of the money received by him.
Our judgment is that Attorney Ruperto Kapunan
shall stand reprimanded and that the complainant,
Vicente Diaz, shall immediately return to the clerk
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte the P500
received by Diaz from the clerk and receipted for by
Diaz, and the clerk of court shall transmit the P500
to Secundino de Mendezona or, in case of his
absence, to Miss Carmen de Mendezona.
Celaje vs. Soriano
Facts:
This is a disbarment case filed against Atty.
Santiago C. Soriano (respondent) for gross
misconduct.
Andrea Balce Celaje alleged that Atty. Soriano
asked for money to be put up as an injunction
bond, which she found out later, however, to be
unnecessary as the application for the writ was
denied by the trial court. Atty. Soriano also asked
for money on several occasions allegedly to be
given to the judge handling their case, Judge
Milagros Quijano, of the Regional Trial Court, Iriga
City, Branch 36. When complainant approached
Judge Quijano and asked whether what respondent
was saying was true, Judge Quijano outrightly
denied the allegations and advised her to file an
administrative case against respondent.
Atty. Soriano denied the charges against him and
averred that the same were merely concocted by
complainant to destroy his character. He also
contended that it was Celaje who boasted that she
is a professional fixer in administrative agencies as
well as in the judiciary; and that Celaje promised to
pay him large amounts of attorney's fees which
Celaje however did not keep.
The case was heard before the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline. During the hearing it was found that
Celaje alleged to have paid respondent amounts
totaling to P270,000. These amounts were
undocumented and not acknowledged in writing.
There were however some documents made in
writing for the P14,800 intended for the injunction.
Due credence must be given to Complainant's
allegations especially over the amount of
P14,800.00 intended for the injunction.
Unfortunately, none of the P270,000.00 given by
Complainant to Respondent was ever documented
and therefore accuracy of the amounts could not be
established and substantiated.
What has been documented only pertains to the
unpaid P5,800.00 intended for the injunction bond.
However, it has been established that indeed an
accumulated amount of P9,000.00 has been
remitted and only the unpaid P5,800.00 remains
unaccounted for.
Issue: WoN Atty. Soriano should be disbarred
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the IBP
recommendation that Atty. Soriano be suspended
for two years.
The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
particularly Canon 16 thereof, mandates that a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession. He
shall account for all money or property collected or
received from his client and shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon
demand.
Respondent's failure to return the money to
complainant upon demand gave rise to the
presumption that he misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. It is a gross violation of
general morality and of professional ethics and
impairs public confidence in the legal profession
which deserves punishment.
As the Court has pronounced, when a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does
not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.
The Court has been exacting in its demand for
integrity and good moral character of members of
the Bar who are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen
the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Indeed, membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. The attorney-client
relationship is highly fiduciary in nature. As such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and
disinterestedness on the part of the lawyer.
Penticostes vs. Ibanez
Facts:
Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-law of Atty.
Prudencio Penticostes was sued for non-remittance
of SSS payments. The complaint was assigned to
Prosecutor Dioasdado Ibanez.
During the investigation, Pascual gave P1,804.00
to Ibanez as payment of her SSS contribution.
Ibanez however did not remit the amount to the
system.
A year later, Penticostes filed a complaint against
Ibanez for failure to remit the contributions of his
sister-in-law. Seven days later, Ibanez paid P1,804
to SSS in behalf of Pascual.
In his defense, Ibanez claimed that his act of
accommodating Pascuals request to pay to the
SSS was not a professional misconduct but an act
of Christian charity. He claimed that the complaint
against him was moot and academic as he had
already paid the amount. He lastly disclaimed
liability, arguing that the acts were not done by him
in his capacity as a lawyer but as a prosecutor.
Issue: WoN Atty. Ibanez should be disciplined
Ruling:
The Supreme Court adopted the IBPs
recommendation that he be reprimanded.
that (t)he relation between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature...[thus] lawyers
are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients
and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. The failure of respondent to
immediately remit the amount to the SSS gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated it
for his own use. This is a gross violation of general
morality as well as professional ethics; it impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.
Respondents claim that he may not be held liable
because he committed such acts, not in his
capacity as a private lawyer, but as a prosecutor is
unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the
Code, a lawyer does not shed his professional
obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his
public office should make him more sensitive to his
professional obligations because a lawyers
disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified
in the publics eye. Want of moral integrity is to be
more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.

While it may be true that Atty. Ibanez remitted the

payment, it is clear that the same was made only
after a complaint had been filed against him.
Furthermore, the duties of prosecutor do not
include receiving money from persons with official
transactions with his office.
This Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers that
a high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is
expected and required of a member of the
bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
It is glaringly clear that respondents non-remittance
for over one year of the funds coming from
Encarnacion Pascual constitutes conduct in gross
violation of the above canon. The belated payment
of the same to the SSS does not excuse his
misconduct. While Pascual may not strictly be
considered a client of respondent, the rules relating
to a lawyers handling of funds of a client is
applicable. In Daroy v. Legaspi,[1] this court held
Rubias vs. Batiller
Facts:
This case concerns a land dispute between Atty.
Domingo Rubias and Isaias Batiller.
Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel
of land in General Luna, Iloilo, which he caused to
be surveyed. Before the war with Japan, Militante
filed with the Court of First Instance an application
for the registration of the title of the land. However,
during the war, the record of the case was lost, so
after the war Militante petitioned the court to
reconstitute the record of the case. His application
was dismissed. Pending his appeal, Militante sold
to Atty. Rubias the land, which sale was recorded in
the Register of Deeds in Iloilo.
Atty. Rubias declared the land for tax purposes. On
April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and
Detainer case against Isaias Batiller to which the
defendant Isaias Batiller filed his answer. The
Municipal Court of Barotac Viejo after trial, decided
the case on May 10, 1961 in favor of Batiller.
On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel
manifested in open court that before any trial on the
merit of the case could proceed he would file
a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he
did, alleging that plaintiff does not have cause of
action against him because the property in dispute
which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-
in-law, Francisco Militante was the subject matter of
LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case
was brought on appeal to this Court and docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid
case plaintiff was the counsel on record of
his father-in-law, Francisco Militante.
Issue: WoN the sale was valid
Ruling:
No. The sale is void from the beginning, thus the
appeal by Atty. Rubias is dismissed.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of
the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six
paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the
relation of trust or their peculiar control over the
property, from acquiring such property in their trust
or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a
public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians;
(2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers
and employees; judicial officers and employees,
prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others
especially disqualified by law.
The reason thus given by Manresa in considering
such prohibited acquisitions under Article 1459 of
the Spanish Civil Code as merely voidable at the
instance and option of the vendor and not void
"that the Code does not recognize such nullity de
pleno derecho" is no longer true and applicable
to our own Philippine Civil Code which does
recognize the absolute nullity of contracts "whose
cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy" or
which are "expressly prohibited or declared void by
law" and declares such contracts "inexistent and
void from the beginning."
Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is
definite and permanent and cannot be cured by
ratification. The public interest and public policy
remain paramount and do not permit of
compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the
permanent disqualification of public and judicial
officers and lawyers grounded on public policy
differs from the first three cases of guardians,
agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil
Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined
that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the
form of a new contact, in which cases its validity
shall be determined only by the circumstances at
the time the execution of such new contract. The
causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot
impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the
object which was illegal at the time of the first
contract, may have already become lawful at the
time of the ratification or second contract; or the
service which was impossible may have become
possible; or the intention which could not be
ascertained may have been clarified by the parties.
The ratification or second contract would then be
valid from its execution; however, it does not
retroact to the date of the first contract."
Laig vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Galero obtained from the Bureau of Lands
Homestead a parcel of land covering 219,949
square meters at Barrio Pinagtambangan, Labo,
Camarines Norte, for which Original Certificate of
Title No. 1097 was issued in Galero's name.
On June 25, 1940, Galero sold the land to a certain
Mario Escuta for P300.00. Escuta in turn, sold the
same land to Florencio Caramoan in December,
1942. Later, however, Petre Galero, through proper
court action, and with Atty. Benito K. Laig the
deceased husband of herein petitioner Rosario
Vda. de Laig as counsel recovered the land, the
court having been convinced that its alienation
violated Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
On June 1, 1948, a deed of sale was executed by
and between Petre Galero as vendor and Atty.
Benito K. Laig as vendee, whereby the former sold
to the latter the land in question with its
improvements, for P1,500.00 plus attorney's fees
due Atty. Laig for his legal services as counsel for
Galero in the successful reconveyance case.
Original Certificate of Title No. 1097 was delivered
by Galero to Atty. Laig. Unfortunately, vendee Atty.
Benito K. Laig failed to solicit the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as
required by Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as
amended. It was only after Atty. Laig's death in
1951 that his wife, herein petitioner Rosario,
noticed the deficiency.
On March 29, 1952,petitioner Vda. de Laig filed
with the Bureau of Lands an affidavit together with
copy of the deed of sale in her husband's favor.
Said affidavit stated that she wanted to have the
ownership over the land transferred to her
husband's name.
On August 14, 1952, the Bureau of Lands
forwarded the said affidavit of Vda. de Laig,
together with the deed of sale, to the Office of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
with a recommendation that the said deed of sale
be approved as the same does not violate any
pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act or the
corresponding rules and regulations thereunder
promulgated. On the same day, the Office of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
thru then Undersecretary Jose S. Camus, approved
the deed of sale.
Meanwhile however, Galero, after having acquired
a duplicate copy of the title, sold the same to
Carmen Verzo.
Issues: Who between petitioner Vda. de Laig and
respondent Carmen Verzo should be considered as
the rightful owner of the land in question?
Should the respondents register of deeds, Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, together with respondent
Carmen Verzo, be held liable for damages for
approving the sale of one and the same piece of
land in favor of two different persons?
Ruling:
The sale made between Atty. Laig and Galero was
held to be valid. Carmen Verzo was held to be a
buyer in bad faith.
Atty. Benito K. Laig, as Verzos boarder, must have
mentioned to Carmen Verzo, his landlady, the land
sold to him by Galero. By the same token, Carmen
Verzo must have known such sale; because
transactions of this sort in the rural areas do not
escape the knowledge of persons living under one
roof with a party to the document, more especially
when there exists between such persons and party
the peculiarly intimate relationship of landlady and
boarder in a small town. Furthermore, her sister-in-
law was witness to the sale.
Petre Galero was able to procure another copy of
the duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 1097
covering the disputed land through the aid of Atty.
Jose Lapak who is the son of the respondent
register of deeds, Baldomero Lapak, under clearly
dubious circumstances. For one, it was done
without observing the required formalities of notice
and hearing. Secondly, it was an over in a record-
setting period of ONLY four days.
Moreover, the expeditious disposal of the land in
litigation by Petre Galero to Carmen Verzo was
done immediately after the death of Atty. Benito
Laig, and during the time that his wife Rosario Vda.
de Laig, who was residing in faraway Manila, was
seeking all legal means to have the title over the
property transferred to her name.
Such bad faith on the part of respondent Carmen
Verzo and Baldomero Lapak is further underscored
by the fact that Atty. Jose Lapak himself (a) was the
notary public before whom the deed of sale
executed by and between Petre Galero and
Carmen Verzo was acknowledged, and (b) was the
same lawyer who assisted Carmen Verzo in writing
the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, enclosing
therewith an affidavit also sworn before said Atty.
Lapak, praying that the deed of sale be approved.

As heretofore indicated, the malicious participation

of respondent register of deeds Baldomero Lapak
and his son Atty. Lapak is evident.

Knowing of the existence in his records of the

original of OCT No. 1097, Baldomero Lapak
effected the issuance of the second duplicate of
OCT No. 1097 to Petre Galero in just four (4) days,
dispensing with the requirements of notice and
hearing to interested parties.

For his malicious involvement, WE find Baldomero

Lapak liable under the following provision of the
Land Registration Act:

Whoever fraudulently procures, or assists in

fraudulently procuring or is privy to the fraudulent
procurement of any certificate of title or owner's
duplicate certificate, shall be fined not exceeding
five thousand dollars (ten thousand pesos) or
imprisoned not exceeding five years, or both, in the
discretion of the court.

WE also find Atty. Jose L. Lapak liable under the

abovequoted Section 117 of Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act), for which he should be, not only
prosecuted but also, disciplined as a member of the
Bar.
Mananquil vs. Villegas
Villegas was the counsel of record of Felix Leong,
the administrator for the testate estate of Felomina
Zerna.
In 1963, Leong, as administrator of Zernas estate,
entered into a lease contract with the partnership of
Hijos de Villegas over several lots included in
Zernas estate. The said lease contract was
renewed several times.
Villegas was both counsel of Leong and a partner
in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS.
After Leongs death, this disbarment suit was filed
by Mananquil, the appointed administrator for
Leongs estate. He alleged that the lease contracts
were made under iniquitous terms and conditions.
Also, Mananquil alleged that Villegas should have
first notified and secured the approval of the
probate court in Zernas estate before the contracts
were renewed, Villegas being counsel of that
estates administrator.
In his defense, respondent claims that he was
neither aware of, nor participated in, the execution
of the original lease contract entered into between
his client and his family partnership, which was
then represented by his brother-in-law Marcelo
Pastrano. And although he admits that he
participated in the execution of subsequent
renewals of the lease contract as managing partner
of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, he argues that he
acted in good faith considering that the heirs of
Filomena Zerna consented or acquiesced to the
terms and conditions stipulated in the original lease
contract.
Issues: Whether VILLEGAS should have first
secured the probate courts approval regarding the
lease
Whether VILLEGAS should be disbarred.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Villegas should be
suspended for four months for his participation in
the renewals of the lease agreement involving
properties of the estate in favor of the partnership
HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which respondent
is a member and in 1968 was appointed managing
partner.
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised
Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator
has the right to the possession and management of
the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of
administration without special authority from the
court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance,
it has long been settled that an administrator has
the power to enter into lease contracts involving the
properties of the estate even without prior judicial
authority and approval.
Thus, considering that administrator Leong was not
required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence
to seek prior authority from the probate court in
order to validly lease real properties of the estate,
Villegas, as counsel of Leong, cannot be taken to
task for failing to notify the probate court of the
various lease contracts involved herein and to
secure its judicial approval thereto.
There is no evidence as well to warrant disbarment,
although Villegas should be suspended from
practice of law because he participated in the
renewals of the lease contracts involving properties
of Zernas estate in favor of the partnership of Hijos
de Villegas. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code,
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession are
prohibited from leasing, either in person or through
the mediation of another, the properties or things
mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct,
hence, suspension for four months.
It cannot be denied that respondent himself had
knowledge of and allowed the subsequent renewals
of the lease contract. In fact, he actively
participated in the lease contracts dated January
13, 1975 and December 4, 1978 by signing on
behalf of the lessee HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS.
Moreover, the claim that the heirs of Filomena
Zerna have acquiesced and consented to the
assailed lease contracts does not militate against
respondent's liability under the rules of professional
ethics. The prohibition referred to in Articles 1491
and 1646 of the new Civil Code, as far as lawyers
are concerned, is intended to curtail any undue
influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of
his fiduciary and confidential association.
Ordonio vs. Eduarte
Facts:
This is a complaint for the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte.
Antonia Ulibari filed with the RTC, Branch 22,
Cabagan, Isabela, a case for annulment of a
document against her children. The case was
handled by Atty. Henedino Eduarte, herein
respondent's husband, until his appointment as
RTC judge on October 26, 1984. His wife, Atty.
Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August
22, 1985, decision was rendered in favor of Antonia
Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one
of the children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in
the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not
appeal. On June 13, 1987, while said case was
pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Ulibari conveyed some parcels of her land to her
children in the form of deeds of absolute sale,
prepared and notarized by herein respondent.
Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also
conveyed 20 hectares of land to herein respondent
and her husband as their Attorney's fees for legal
services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject
of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of
conveyance however remained in the name of
Antonia Ulibari.
On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed
this complaint for disbarment against herein
respondent on the basis of an affidavit executed by
her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating
that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of
land to respondent as her attorney's fees and that
the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her
children were not known to her (and that she
received no consideration therefor).
On August 10, 1989, the Investigation
Commissioner submitted a report finding the
charges to be true and recommending a one-year
suspension of the respondent from the practice of
law.
Issue: Whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into
signing the Deed of Conveyance transferring to her
lawyer (herein respondent) the subject parcel of
land containing 298,420 square meters as the
latter's attorney's fees
Whether respondent violated any law in preparing
and notarizing the deeds of absolute sale in making
it appear that there were considerations, when in
truth there were none
Ruling:
It is clear from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and
deposition that she never conveyed the said land to
her lawyer as attorney's fees.
Respondent is hereby ordered suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, and,
for having stated falsehoods in the four (4) deeds of
absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in
violation of the lawyer's oath and Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is
also ordered suspended from the practice or law for
a period of another six (6) months, resulting in a
total period on one year.
Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia
Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the
subject property in favor of the respondent and her
husband, the respondent, in causing the execution
of the Deed of Conveyance during the pendency of
the appeal of the case involving the said property,
has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which
prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment
property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession."
In the case at bar, the property was already in
actual litigation first in the lower court and then in
the Court of Appeals. Whether the deed of
conveyance was executed at the instance of the
client driven by financial necessity or of the lawyers
is of no moment. The act constitutes malpractice,
even if the lawyer had purchased the property in
litigation. The prohibition applies when the lawyer
has not paid money for it and the property was
merely assigned to him in consideration of legal
services rendered at a time when the property is
still the subject of a pending case.
Respondent has manifestly violated that part of her
oath as a lawyer that she shall not do any
falsehood. Not only that. In preparing the
documents which do not reflect the true transaction,
respondent has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
be mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any
artifice.
NOMBRADO v. HERNANDEZ
This is an administrative case for disbarment instituted by
Ernesto M. Nombrado against Juanito T. Hernandez, a
member of the Philippine Bar, charging the latter with
malpractice on two counts, namely:
(1) for having appeared as counsel for Crispin Nazareno
in a civil case for forcible entry against Arsenio Pansaon,
his former client, being the offended party and
complainant, in a criminal case for serious physical
injuries wherein Eufemio Velasco (Nazareno), a son of
Crispin, was the accused; Arsenio Pansaon alleged that
the reason why his case did not prosper was perhaps
because of the respondents knowledge of certain facts
about Pansaon, when he was still engaged as his
counsel.
Respondent denied this and in turn declared that the only
information he obtained from complainant Pansaon was
about the mauling incident itself how it happened and
why he sustained the injuries; that he did not ask Pansaon
for any papers or documents in connection with that
criminal case, except a medical certificate issued to him
by the attending physician; that in handling the forcible
entry case for Crispin Nazareno against his former client,
he did not use against the latter any fact or information he
acquired in the course of their attorney-and-client
relationship; and that if there was any document he
presented in the forcible entry case it came from Crispin
Nazareno and not from notary public Abellanosa
and
(2) for having appeared as counsel for the accused
and also for the complaining witness in Criminal Case
No. 329 of the Justice of the Peace Court (now
municipal court) of Baganga, Davao (now Davao
Oriental).
It appears that respondent was counsel for the
defendants Sotero Pontawe and Teofilo Aumada in
Criminal Case No. 329 for theft of large cattle before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Baganga.
Before the scheduled hearing on September 18, 1959,
upon request of complaining witness Ramon Morales,
respondent prepared a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the "real accused in this case are not the above-
named persons." Notwithstanding the motion to dismiss,
the complaining witness was cited to appear on
September 25, 1959 "to find out why Mr. Ramon Morales,
the complainant of Criminal Case No. 329, did not appear
on September 18, 1959, the date designated for
preliminary investigation proper of this case, and to find
out whether the manifestation of counsel of the defense
that there is such amicable settlement in this case,
Criminal Case No. 329, is true."
During the hearing on September 25, 1959, a heated
exchange of argument arose between respondent and the
private prosecutor, Atty. Danao because of the latter's
insistence on calling Morales to the witness stand despite
his expressed desistance to prosecute the criminal case.
Respondent manifested his intention to "intervene in
behalf of the complaining party in connection with the
action of Atty. Danao in this particular case."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Hernandez has shown a departure
from the strict norms of professional conduct laid down for
members of the bar on both counts.
RULING:
On Count (1), the respondent has shown a departure
from the strict norms of professional conduct laid down for
members of the bar.
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent
utilized against his former client information given to him
in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as
counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case
In the same case of Hilado vs. David, supra, the Court
said:
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare
relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice.... It is
founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one
of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in
mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to
keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of Justice.
On Count (2), the respondent's act of preparing the
motion to dismiss and stating in the course of the hearing
thereof that he was intervening "in behalf of the
complaining party", did not constitute simultaneous
appearance in behalf of the contending parties since there
was no longer any conflict to speak of, the complainant
having desisted from prosecuting the case against the
accused. Consequently, there was nothing improper in
respondent's conduct.
Upon the facts established in connection with the first
count the Court ruled that the penalty of reprimand and
warning be administered to the respondent.
ALCANTARA v. DE VERA
The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the
former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case filed
in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and
an administrative case filed before the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office.
Atty. Eduardo De Vera won a case for Rosario Mercado.
De Vera garnished the bank account of the opposing
party but he did not remit the same to Mercado, instead
he claimed that he used the same to pay off the judge and
whats left was for his attorneys fees. Mercado filed an
administrative complaint and eventually De Vera was
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In obvious retaliation, In summary, the respondent filed
against his former client, her family members, the family
corporation of his former client, the Chairman and
members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who
issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court
Judge in the case where his former client received a
favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former
client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora
which included the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum,
Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of
Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.
In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent
also re-filed cases which had previously been dismissed.
The respondent filed six criminal cases against members
of the Mercado family all the aforementioned cases are
re-filing of previously dismissed cases.
Complainants allege that the respondent committed
barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family
problems, and use of intemperate language when he
filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits
against the complainants and their family members,
their lawyers, and the family corporation. They
maintain that the primary purpose of the cases is to
harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension
from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the
respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be
disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under
Section 27,Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts of De Vera warrant a disbarment.
RULING:
Respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is DISBARRED
from the practice of law.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to
assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only
add to the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of
justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct
and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt
satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only
help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any
unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or
prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary
task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice.18 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very
explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider
it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and
unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an officer of
the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice,
but he did so against a former client to whom he owes
loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility19 provides:
CANON 21 A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation
is terminated.
Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his
client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
The cases filed by the respondent against his former
client involved matters and information acquired by
the respondent during the time when he was still
Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure
and operations of the family corporation, private
documents, and other pertinent facts and figures
used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the
respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were
all acquired through the attorney-client relationship
with herein complainants. Such act is in direct
violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by
the Court.
MERCADO v. VITRIOLO
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of
the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs
and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive
Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED).
Atty. Vitriolo was the counsel of Mercado in a case for
annulment of marriage filed by the latters husband which
was dismissed with finality.
Eventually, Vitriolo filed a criminal action for falsification
of public documents against Mercado alleging that the
latter made false entries in the certificates of live birth of
her children which were presented in the annulment case.
Mercado filed this complaint alleging that said criminal
complaint for falsification of public document disclosed
confidential facts and information relating to the civil case
for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her
counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring
this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing
the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
The respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents against
complainant does not violate the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client because the
bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live
birth which are public documents and in no way
connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel. According to
respondent, the complainant confided to him as then
counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment
case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of
the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters.
The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of
CHED and are accessible to anyone.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client when he filed
a criminal case for falsification of public document against
his former client.
RULING:
The complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In its ruling, the Court enunciated the following:
Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish
the existence of the privilege:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship,
or a prospective attorney-client relationship,
and it is by reason of this relationship that the
client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment.The reason for this is to make
the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with
the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be
divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally
free to obtain information from the prospective client.
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client
to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the
(prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
(2) The client made the communication in
confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted
by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or
the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent
ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer
pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the
opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional
capacity,are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be
intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking
legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal
assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to
a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the
evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants
allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent.
All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action
against her for falsification of public documents because the
criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however,
spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as
to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
PFLIEDER v. PALANCA
Palanca is the lawyer of Pfleider.
Pfleider leased to Palanca an agricultural land, Hacienda
Asia in Negros Occidental for a period of 10 years
It is stipulated in the lease agreement that a specified
portion of the lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider and
the remainder would be delivered by Palanca to the listed
creditors of Pfleider.
on account of the lease agreement records open to
the perusal of persons properly interested therein.
A violation of the confidence that accompanied the
delivery of that list would partake more of a private and
civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a
lawyer to his client.

Pfleider filed a suit for the rescission of the lease

agreement of the ground of alleged default in the payment
of rentals of Palanca.

Pfleider also filed for the disbarment of Palanca on the

following grounds:

Palanca did not follow the instructions of Pfleider

to settle his estafa case against Matiao in 1965
and the latter also failed to deposit the sum of
P5,000 with the court
Palanca has fraudulently charged the P5,000 as
part of the lease rental of the Hacienda Asia
Palanca also falsely represented having paid one
Guintos the sum of P866 for the account of
Pfleider when in truth and in fact, Guintos only
received P86
And ultimately,

Allegedly, the list of creditors which Pfleider has

confidentially supplied Palanca was disclosed by Palanca
in violation of their attorney-client relationship

It is charged that the list of creditors which Pfleider had

"confidentially" supplied Palanca for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease
contract was disclosed by Palanca, in violation of their
lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are
adverse to those of Pfleider.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent violated the rule on privileged

communication between attorney and

RULING:

Nothing in written complaint for disbarment against

Palanca and in his reply to Palanca's answer supports a
prima facie finding of such misconduct in office by
Palanca as would warrant further proceedings in this
case.

As Pfleider himself, in the execution of the terms of the

aforesaid lease contract between the parties, complainant
furnished respondent with a confidential list of his
creditors." This should indicate that Pfleider delivered
the list of his creditors to Palanca not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but
TIANA v. OCAMPO
First Case:
Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that
respondent Amado Ocampo who has been her "retaining
counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases as early
as 1966, has always had her unqualified faith and
confidence.
One Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for ejectment
from a parcel of land.
Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock.
Tiania confronted Ocampo about this but the latter
reassured Tiania that he will take care of everything and
that there was no need for Tiania to hire a new lawyer
since he is still Tiania's lawyer. Ocampo prepared the
answer in the said ejectment case, which Tiania signed.
Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a Compromise
Agreement which the latter signed without reading.
Tiania was shocked when she received an order to vacate
the property in question. To hold off her ejectment for
another two years, Ocampo advised Tiania to pay him a
certain amount for the sheriff
Ocampo denied the charges in detail. Although he
handled some legal problems and executed some notarial
deeds for Tiania from 1966-1971, Tiania had also
engaged the services of various counsel to represent her
in several criminal and civil cases, involving violations of
municipal ordinances and estafa. Thus, he could not be
the complainant's "retaining counsel" in all her legal
problems and court cases.
Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs.
Blaylock, and not as counsel of Tiania. He never saw or
talked to Tiania from the time the said civil case was filed
up to the pre-trial and as such could not have discussed
with her the complaint, the hiring of another lawyer, and
more so the preparation of the answer in the said case.
He admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case,
Tiania showed to him a document which supported her
claim, over the property in question. Ocampo, after going
over the document, expressed his doubts about it
authenticity.
This convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement
and to pay the acquisition cost to Blaylock over a period
of six (6) months. But Tiania never fulfilled any of her
obligations. She moreover made the situation worse by
selling the contested property to a third party even after
an alias writ of execution had ordered the transfer of the
possession of the disputed property to Blaylock.
Citing Arboleda v. Gatchalian, Ocampo said that the
overdue filing of a complaint
against a lawyer should already create a suspicion about
the motives of the complainant or the merit of the
complaint.
Second Case:
The Angel spouses, complainants in this case, allege that
sometime in 1972, they sold their house in favor of
Blaylock for the amount of seventy thousand pesos,
(P70,000.00). Ocampo (the same respondent Atty.
Amado Ocampo), acted as their counsel and prepared
the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of
Rights Over a Lot.
With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses
bought another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared
the Deed of Sale which was signed by the vendor, a
certain Laura Dalanan, and the Angel spouses, as the
vendees. In addition, Ocampo allegedly made the Angel
spouses sign two (2) more documents which, accordingly,
were made parts of the sale transaction.
Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real
Estate Mortgage of the same property purchased from
Laura Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in favor of
Blaylock.
The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said
documents until they received a complaint naming them
as defendants in a collection suit The Angel spouses
added that Ocampo reassured them that there was no
need for them to engage the services of a new lawyer
since he will take care of everything.
These acts, the complainants charge, violate the ethics of
the legal profession. They lost their property as a result of
the respondent's fraudulent manipulation, taking
advantage of his expertise in law against his own
unsuspecting and trusting clients.
As in the first case, Ocampo presented an elaborate
explanation. Ocampo alleged that it was his client, Mrs.
Concepcion Blaylock, who introduced to him the Angel
spouses in 1972. Blaylock wanted Ocampo to check the
background of the Angel spouses in connection with the
loan they were seeking from Blaylock.
The Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty.
Amado Ocampo with malpractice and gross misconduct
punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines and violation of his oath of office
as an attorney.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Atty. Ocampo is guilty of
representing conflicting interests.
RULING:
The respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo is guilty of
malpractice and gross misconduct in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, taking into
consideration the advanced age of the respondent, who
would have reached seventy three (73) years, the Court,
while uncompromisingly firm in its stand against erring
lawyers, nonetheless appreciates the advance years of
the respondent in his favor.
The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
We prohibit the representation of conflicting interests not
only because the relation of attorney and client is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also
because of the principles of public policy and good taste.
An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence
of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty.
Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession
suffers.
The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary
cases against a lawyer is whether or not the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof.
Considering this criterion and applying it to the present
administrative cases, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the Solicitor General upholding the
complaints against the respondent. Indeed, the
aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing
Blaylock, and at the same time advising Tiania, the
opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and
once again representing Blaylock and her interest while
handling the legal documents of another opposing party
as in the second case, whether the said actions were
related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct.
They are improper to the respondent's office as attorney.
PALM v. ILEDAN
The case is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J.
Palm (complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.
(respondent) for revealing information obtained in the
course of an attorney-client relationship and for
representing an interest which conflicted with that of his
former client, Comtech Worldwide Solutions Philippines,
Inc. (Comtech).
Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation
engaged in the business of computer software
development. From February 2003 to November 2003,
respondent served as Comtechs retained corporate
counsel for the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer
fee.
From September to October 2003, complainant
personally met with respondent to review corporate
matters, including potential amendments to the corporate
by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003, respondent
suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to
allow participation during board meetings, through
teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who
were outside the Philippines.
Prior to the completion of the amendments of the
corporate by-laws, complainant became uncomfortable
with the close relationship between respondent and Elda
Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director of
Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of
releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds.
Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer
agreement with respondent effective November 2003.
In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004,
respondent attended as proxy for Gary Harrison
(Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm,
members of the Board of Directors, were present through
teleconference. When the meeting was called to order,
respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum.
Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm
could not participate in the meeting because the corporate
by-laws had not yet been amended to allow
teleconferencing.
Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad
to return or account for the amount of P90,466.10
representing her unauthorized disbursements when she
was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April
2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by
respondent. In July 2004, due to Soledads failure to
comply with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a
complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati
Prosecutors Office. In the proceedings before the City
Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as
Soledads counsel.
ISSUE: confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent
during the stockholders meeting could not be considered
Whether or not respondent violated the Confidentiality of a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the
Lawyer-Client Relationship contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING:

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:

Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence

and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the IBP that in the course of

complainants consultations, respondent obtained the
information about the need to amend the corporate by-
laws to allow board members outside the Philippines to
participate in board meetings through teleconferencing.
Respondent himself admitted this in his Answer.

However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was

not a board meeting but a stockholders meeting.
Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for
Harrison. The physical presence of a stockholder is
not necessary in a stockholders meeting because a
member may vote by proxy unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws.
Hence, there was no need for Steven and Deanna
Palm to participate through teleconferencing as they
could just have sent their proxies to the meeting.

In addition, although the information about the

necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have
been given to respondent, it could not be considered
a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or
adoption of new by-laws may be effected by the board of
directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the
owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital
stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock
corporation. It means the stockholders are aware of the
proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power
may be delegated to the board of directors or trustees,
there is nothing in the records to show that a delegation
was made in the present case. Further, whenever any
amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies
of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-
laws.[10] The documents are public records and
could not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and
client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be
confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be
approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and
copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the
SEC, the information could not have been intended to be
ORCINO v. GASPAR
Orcino engaged the services of Atty. Gaspar to prosecute
a criminal case she intended to file against several
suspects in the slaying of her husband. Complainant paid
respondent his fees as stipulated. Forthwith, respondent
entered into his duties and performed them religiously
from the preliminary investigation with the office of the
prosecutor until the case was thereafter filed with the RTC
of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
Respondent however failed to attend the bail hearing
scheduled in August 1991. It was at this nearing that the
court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to all the
accused. After the hearing, complainant immediately
went to respondent's residence and confronted him with
his absence.
Respondent explained that he did not receive formal
notice of the hearing. Complainant became belligerent
and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his
absence. Respondent said that her suspicions were
based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives.
Complainant, however, continued accusing him
belligerently. She asked for the records of the case saying
that she could refer them to another lawyer. Stung by her
words, respondent gave her the records.
Subsequently, respondent filed before the trial court a
"Motion to Withdraw as Counsel" but it did not bear the
consent of complainant. The court issued an order
directing respondent to secure complainant's consent to
the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor
shall continue until he has secured this consent."
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to
respondent's withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearings in the
criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at
the hearings nor did he contact complainant. Complainant
was thus compelled to engage the services of another
lawyer. Hence, this complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a lawyer is excused from his duty to
represent his client if said client refuses to give his
consent to the lawyers motion to withdraw his
appearance.
RULING:
No. A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or
special proceeding with the written consent of his client
filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse
party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the
lawyer must file an application with the court. The court,
on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine
whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application
for withdrawal must be based on a good cause. In the
instant case, respondent did not file an application with
the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed
to withdraw.
Corollary issue:
Granting that the Motion to withdraw appearance filed by
respondent is sufficient as to form, is it based upon a good
cause?
No. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: A lawyer may withdraw his
services from his client only in the following instances:
(a) when a client insists upon an unjust or immoral
conduct of his case;
(b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and
the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the
case;
(d) when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer
makes him incapable of handling the case effectively;
(e) when the client deliberately fails to pay the attorney's
fees agreed upon;
(f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office;
(g) other similar cases
Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that
"there no longer exist[ed] the . . . confidence" between
them and that there had been "serious differences
between them relating to the manner of private
prosecution." This circumstance is neither one of the
foregoing instances nor can it be said that it is analogous
thereof.
This case arose from a simple misunderstanding between
complainant and respondent. Complainant was upset by
respondent's absence at the hearing where bail was
granted to the suspected killers of her husband. She
vehemently opposed the grant of bail. It was thus a
spontaneous and natural reaction for her to confront
respondent with his absence. Her belligerence arose
from her overzealousness, nothing more. Complainant's
words and actions may have hurt respondent's feelings
considering the work he had put into the case. But her
words were uttered in a burst of passion. And even at that
moment, complainant did not expressly terminate
respondent's services. She made this clear when she
refused to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel."
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in
terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so
and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The
lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for
withdrawal will be granted by the court.Until his
withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains
counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as
by the court to do what the interests of his client require.
He must still appear on the date of hearing for the
attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until
there is a withdrawal of record.
Respondent expressly bound himself under the contract
to bring the criminal case to its termination. He was in fact
paid in full for his services. Respondent failed to comply
with his undertaking, hence, it is but fair that he return to
complainant half of the amount paid him. The peculiar
circumstances of the case have rendered it impossible for
respondent and complainant to continue their relation
under the contract.
ARO vs. NAAWA
The services of herein petitioner, as practising attorney,
was engaged by respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo
Magtibay for the prosecution of their claim, as heirs, in the
estate of their deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay, consisting
of properties which were in the possession of the
respondents Aurelia Martinez,[[1]] spouses Gregorio
Lontok and Maria Mendoza and spouses Maximo Porto
and Rosario Andaya.
Being without means to prosecute their claim against the
persons concerned, respondents Luis Magtibay and
Pablo Magtibay agreed with herein petitioner to avail of
his services and entrust the prosecution of their claim on
a contingent basis.
By virtue of said agreement, herein petitioner took the
necessary steps to gather the needed papers and
documents for the filing of a petition to litigate as pauper
and a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
in which respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay
were the plaintiffs and the other respondents, excepting
the respondent Judge, were the defendants.
Eventually, there was an amicable settlement between
the parties, which the petitioners client entered into by
themselves, unknown at first to the petitioner, which as a
result, petitioner was deprived of his contingent fees,
agreed upon.
By entering into the compromise agreement in question
and even inserting therein a prayer to the court to dismiss
their case filed by petitioner, petitioner's clients impliedly
dismissed him. Such implied dismissal appears to Us to
have been made without justifiable cause.
A motion to dismiss the case was filed by the petitioners
client due to the settlement.
The petitioner thus filed a motion as an OPPOSITION TO
THE SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AND COUNTER-
MOTION OR PETITION TO SET ASIDE DEED OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND WAIVER DATED
OCTOBER 23, 1964 AND TO RECORD ATTORNEY'S
LIEN.
The respondent Judge, instead of denying the second
motion to dismiss and fixing his attorney's fees in the said
case and recording the same as lien, ... dismissed the
case and refused to give herein petitioner any kind of
immediate protection to safeguard his rights.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners dismissal as counsel was due to
justifiable cause
Whether the petitioner shall be compensated as
stipulated in their contract agreement
RULING:
While We here reaffirm the rule that "the client has an
undoubted right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer", We hold that when such
compromise is entered into in fraud of the lawyer, with
intent to deprive him of the fees justly due him, the
compromise must be subject to the said fees, and that
when it is evident that the said fraud is committed in
confabulation with the adverse party who had knowledge
of the lawyer's contingent interest or such interest
appears of record and who would benefit under such
compromise, the better practice is to settle the matter of
the attorney's fees in the same proceeding, after hearing
all the affected parties and without prejudice to the finality
of the compromise in so far as it does not adversely affect
the rights of the lawyer. Surely, "the client cannot, by
setting, compromising or dismissing his suit during its
pendency, deprive the attorney of his compensation for
the agreed amount, unless the lawyer consents to such
settlement, compromise or dismissal", (Legal and Judicial
Ethics by Martin, 1967 Rev. Ed p. 121) for the, attorney is
or "Shall be entitled to have and recover from his client -
a reasonable compensation (not more) for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney", (Sec. 24, Rule 138,
on Attorney and Admission to Bar) albeit, under Canon 12
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, "in fixing fees, it
should not be forgotten that the profession is a branch of
the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting
trade."
True it is also that "a client may, at anytime, dismiss his
attorney or substitute another in his place", (Sec. 26, Rule
138) but it must be emphasized that the same provision,
which is an incorporation of Republic Act 636 into the
Rules of Court, also provides that "if the contract between
client and attorney had been reduced to writing and the
dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he
shall be entitled to recover from the client full
compensation ..."
In the case at bar, by entering into the compromise
agreement in question and even inserting therein a
prayer to the court to dismiss their case filed by
petitioner, (see footnote 6, ante) petitioner's clients
impliedly dismissed him. (Rustia vs. the Court, etc.,
supra.) Such implied dismissal appears to Us to have
been made without justifiable cause, none is urged
anywhere in the record, and so, the above-quoted
provision of Section 26, Rule 138 applies here. The
terms of the compromise in question, as spelled out in
Annex A of Annex I of the petition, indicate clearly that
Aurelia Martinez, the defendant aunt in-law of petitioner's
clients, acknowledged that the rights of said clients were
practically as alleged by petitioner in the complaint he filed
for them. In other words, through the services of
petitioner, his clients secured, in effect, a recognition,
which had been previously denied by their aunt-in-law,
that they were entitled to a share in the estate left by
their uncle. We hold that under these circumstances, and
since it appears that said clients have no other means to
pay petitioner, since they instituted their case as paupers,
and that their aunt-in-law was aware of the terms of their
contract of professional services with petitioner', said
clients had no right to waive the portion of their such
acknowledged rights in favor of their opponent to the
extent that such waiver would prejudice the stipulated
contingent interest of their lawyer and their aunt-in-law
had no right to accept such waiver unqualified.
The Civil Code enjoins that:
ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Under the circumstance extant in the record, it is clear
that the compromise agreement in question falls
short of the moral requirements of this quoted article
of the Civil Code. If for this reason alone, it should not
be allowed to prejudice the rights of petitioner.
Accordingly, as all of these circumstances were
presented to respondent judge before he issued the
challenged order of dismissal and all the parties were
heard thereon, it was incumbent upon His Honor, in
equity and to avoid multiplicity of suits, particularly,
because the amount claimed by petitioner is only
P1,000.00, to have directly passed upon petitioner's
claim, and not having done so, it would appear that
the court a quo abused its discretion gravely enough
to warrant the writ of certiorari herein prayed for in so
far as the questioned orders prejudiced petitioner's
right to the fees for the professional services which
appear to have been creditably rendered by him.
Respondents allege that the judgment of dismissal in
question is already final because no appeal was taken
therefrom, but since We hold that the same was rendered
with enough grave abuse of discretion to warrant the
certiorari prayed for, such alleged finality could not have
materialized; obviously, petitioner could not have
appealed, not being a party in the case.