Professional Documents
Culture Documents
RACHELLE
ANNE
D.
GUTIERREZ
TRANSPORTATION
LAW
DIGESTS
(2014
2015)
ATTY.
NORIANNE
TAN
o M/V
Cherokee
was
not
seaworthy
because
it
was
an
ancillary
activity
(in
local
idiom,
as
a
sideline).
undermanned
on
the
day
of
the
voyage.
Article
1732
also
carefully
avoids
making
any
distinction
between
a
person
or
enterprise
offering
transportation
ISSUES
TO
BE
RESOLVED
service
on
a
regular
or
scheduled
basis
and
one
offering
1. Whether
or
not
M/V
Cherokee
is
a
private
carrier.
such
service
on
an
occasional,
episodic
or
unscheduled
2. Whether
or
not
LOADSTAR
was
seaworthy
at
the
time
it
basis.
Neither
does
Article
1732
distinguish
between
a
undertook
the
voyage.
carrier
offering
its
services
to
the
general
public,
i.e.,
the
general
community
or
population,
and
one
who
RESOLUTIONS
AND
ARGUMENTS
offers
services
or
solicits
business
only
from
a
narrow
ISSUE
1:
Whether
or
not
M/V
Cherokee
is
a
private
carrier
NO.
segment
of
the
general
population.
We
think
that
Article
1733
deliberately
refrained
from
making
such
MAJOR
POINT
1:
LOADSTAR
is
a
common
carrier.
This
public
character
distinctions.
is
not
altered
by
the
fact
that
the
carriage
of
the
goods
in
question
was
o It
appears
to
the
Court
that
private
respondent
is
periodic,
occasional,
episodic
or
unscheduled.
properly
characterized
as
a
common
carrier
even
LOADSTAR
submits
that
the
vessel
was
a
private
carrier
because
though
he
merely
back-hauled
goods
for
other
it
was
not
issued
a
certificate
of
public
convenience,
it
did
not
merchants
from
Manila
to
Pangasinan,
although
such
have
a
regular
trip
or
schedule
nor
a
fixed
route,
and
there
was
backhauling
was
done
on
a
periodic
or
occasional
rather
only
one
shipper,
one
consignee
for
a
special
cargo.
than
regular
or
scheduled
manner,
and
even
though
The
records
do
not
disclose
that
the
M/V
Cherokee,
on
the
private
respondents
principal
occupation
was
not
the
date
in
question,
undertook
to
carry
a
special
cargo
or
was
carriage
of
goods
for
others.
There
is
no
dispute
that
chartered
to
a
special
person
only.
There
was
no
charter
party.
private
respondent
charged
his
customers
a
fee
for
The
bills
of
lading
failed
to
show
any
special
arrangement,
but
hauling
their
goods;
that
that
fee
frequently
fell
below
only
a
general
provision
to
the
effect
that
the
M/V
Cherokee
commercial
freight
rates
is
not
relevant
here.
was
a
general
cargo
carrier.
Further,
the
bare
fact
that
the
vessel
was
carrying
a
particular
type
of
cargo
for
one
shipper,
MAJOR
POINT
2:
It
is
not
necessary
that
the
carrier
be
issued
a
which
appears
to
be
purely
coincidental,
is
not
reason
enough
certificate
of
public
convenience
before
it
can
be
considered
a
to
convert
the
vessel
from
a
common
to
a
private
carrier,
common
carrier.
especially
where,
as
in
this
case,
it
was
shown
that
the
vessel
A
certificate
of
public
convenience
is
not
a
requisite
for
the
was
also
carrying
passengers.
incurring
of
liability
under
the
Civil
Code
provisions
governing
Under
the
facts
and
circumstances
obtaining
in
this
case,
common
carriers.
That
liability
arises
the
moment
a
person
or
LOADSTAR
fits
the
definition
of
a
common
carrier
under
Article
firm
acts
as
a
common
carrier,
without
regard
to
whether
or
not
1732
of
the
Civil
Code.
such
carrier
has
also
complied
with
the
requirements
of
the
o Article
1732
makes
no
distinction
between
one
whose
applicable
regulatory
statute
and
implementing
regulations
and
principal
business
activity
is
the
carrying
of
persons
or
has
been
granted
a
certificate
of
public
convenience
or
other
goods
or
both,
and
one
who
does
such
carrying
only
as
franchise.
RACHELLE
ANNE
D.
GUTIERREZ
TRANSPORTATION
LAW
DIGESTS
(2014
2015)
ATTY.
NORIANNE
TAN
policy.
Since
the
stipulation
in
question
is
null
and
void,
ISSUE
2
Whether
or
not
LOADSTAR
was
seaworthy
at
the
time
it
it
follows
that
when
MIC
paid
the
shipper,
it
was
undertook
the
voyage
NO.
The
vessel
was
not
even
sufficiently
subrogated
to
all
the
rights
which
the
latter
has
against
manned.
the
common
carrier,
LOADSTAR.
MAJOR
POINT
1:
The
doctrine
of
limited
liability
does
not
apply
where
NO
SEPARATE
OPINIONS
there
was
negligence
on
the
part
of
the
vessel
owner
or
agent.
LOADSTAR
was
at
fault
or
negligent
in
not
maintaining
a
seaworthy
vessel
and
in
having
allowed
its
vessel
to
sail
despite
knowledge
of
an
approaching
typhoon.
In
any
event,
it
did
not
sink
because
of
any
storm
that
may
be
deemed
as
force
majeure,
inasmuch
as
the
wind
condition
in
the
area
where
it
sank
was
determined
to
be
moderate.
Since
it
was
remiss
in
the
performance
of
its
duties,
LOADSTAR
cannot
hide
behind
the
limited
liability
doctrine
to
escape
responsibility
for
the
loss
of
the
vessel
and
its
cargo.
Under
the
rule
of
limited
liability,
the
insurer
is
subrogated
merely
to
the
rights
of
the
assured,
that
is,
it
can
recover
only
the
amount
that
may,
in
turn,
be
recovered
by
the
latter.
Since
the
right
of
the
assured
in
case
of
loss
or
damage
to
the
goods
is
limited
or
restricted
by
the
provisions
in
the
bills
of
lading,
a
suit
by
the
insurer
as
subrogee
is
necessarily
subject
to
the
same
limitations
and
restrictions.
o LOADSTAR
claims
that
its
liability
is
limited
to
what
is
dictated
in
the
bill
of
lading.
However,
limitation
on
the
carriers
liability
to
an
amount
fixed
in
the
bill
of
lading
which
the
parties
may
enter
into
is
allowable
only
when
the
same
was
freely
and
fairly
agreed
upon
(Articles
1749-1750).
On
the
other
hand,
the
stipulation
in
the
case
at
bar
effectively
reduces
the
common
carriers
liability
for
the
loss
or
destruction
of
the
goods
to
a
degree
less
than
extraordinary
(Articles
1744
and
1745),
that
is,
the
carrier
is
not
liable
for
any
loss
or
damage
to
shipments
made
at
owners
risk.
Such
stipulation
is
obviously
null
and
void
for
being
contrary
to
public
RACHELLE
ANNE
D.
GUTIERREZ