G.R. No.
L-19190 November 29, 1922 Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-
appellant.
Recaredo Ma. Calvo for appellant. Attorney-General
Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of
the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank, Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank,
between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an
extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C."
in the amount of P300,000. This special authorization was
essential in view of the memorandum order of President
Concepcion dated May 17, 1918, limiting the discretional
power of the local manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant
loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which,
in certain cases, could be increased to P10,000. Pursuant to
this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000, was
granted the firm of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.," the only
security required consisting of six demand notes. The notes,
together with the interest, were taken up and paid by July
17, 1919.
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership
capitalized at P100,000. Anacleto Concepcion contributed
P5,000; Clara Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000; Miguel S.
Concepcion, P20,000; Clemente Puno, P20,000; and Rosario
San Agustin, "casada con Gral. Venancio Concepcion,"
P50,000. Member Miguel S. Concepcion was the
administrator of the company.
On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President
of the Philippine National Bank and as member of the board
of directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan with a violation of section 35 of Act No.
2747. He was found guilty by the Honorable Enrique V.
Filamor, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to
imprisonment for one year and six months, to pay a fine of
P3,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and the costs.
Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918,
just mentioned, to which reference must hereafter
repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank
shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents
of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides:
"Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this
Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment." These two sections were
in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts took place,
but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January
30, 1921.
committed by the trial court. These errors they have argued
adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief, and again in
oral argument. Attorney-General Villa-Real, in an
exceptionally accurate and comprehensive brief, answers
the proposition of appellant one by one.
The question presented are reduced to their simplest
elements in the opinion which follows:
I. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the
copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a
"loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?
Counsel argue that the documents of record do not prove
that authority to make a loan was given, but only show the
concession of a credit. In this statement of fact, counsel is
correct, for the exhibits in question speak of a "credito"
(credit) and not of a " prestamo" (loan).
The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow
money by virtue of the confidence or trust reposed by a
lender that he will pay what he may promise.
(Donnell vs. Jones [1848], 13 Ala., 490; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary.) A "loan" means the delivery by one party and
the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money,
upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum
loaned, with or without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner
[1864], 29 N. Y., 146, 167.) The concession of a "credit"
necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit
of the amount fixed in the "credit,"
II. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the
copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.," by Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a
"loan" or a "discount"?
Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. 2747
prohibits the granting of a "loan," it does not prohibit what
is commonly known as a "discount."
In a letter dated August 7, 1916, H. Parker Willis, then
President of the National Bank, inquired of the Insular
Auditor whether section 37 of Act No. 2612 was intended
to apply to discounts as well as to loans. The ruling of the
Acting Insular Auditor, dated August 11, 1916, was to the
effect that said section referred to loans alone, and placed
no restriction upon discount transactions. It becomes
material, therefore, to discover the distinction between a
"loan" and a "discount," and to ascertain if the instant
transaction comes under the first or the latter
denomination.
Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid
nature, growing, as they do, out of an actual, live,
transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is
only a mode of loaning money, with, however, these
distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in
advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the expiration
of a credit; (2) a discount is always on double-name paper;
a loan is generally on single-name paper.
Conceding, without deciding, that, as ruled by the Insular
Auditor, the law covers loans and not discounts, yet the
conclusion is inevitable that the demand notes signed by
the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount
paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness, because
(1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes,
but was paid when the notes fell due; and (2) they were
single-name and not double-name paper.
The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of
the argument are not essentially different from the facts in
the Binalbagan Estate case. Just as there it was declared
that the operations constituted a loan and not a discount,
so should we here lay down the same ruling.
III. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the
copartnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an
"indirect loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No.
2747?
Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." was not an "indirect loan." In this
connection, it should be recalled that the wife of the
defendant held one-half of the capital of this partnership.
In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the
primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention
of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the
Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against
temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition
against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim
that no man may serve two masters that where personal
interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost
always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is
financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's
business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of
a director is a member, falls within the prohibition.
Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar
relationship called a conjugal partnership. (Articles 1315,
1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially noted.)
A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a
director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such
director.
That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit
exactly such an occurrence is shown by the acknowledged
fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to
mingle his personal and family affairs with his official duties,
and to permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of no
established reputation and without asking for collateral
security.
In the case of Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank ([1870], 33
Md., 558; 3 Am. Rep., 211), the Supreme Court of Maryland
said:
What then was the purpose of the law when it declared
that no director or officer should borrow of the
bank, and "if any director," etc., "shall be
convicted," etc., "of directly or indirectly violating
this section he shall be punished by fine and
imprisonment?" We say to protect the
stockholders, depositors and creditors of the
bank, against the temptation to which the
directors and officers might be exposed, and the
power which as such they must necessarily
possess in the control and management of the
bank, and the legislature unwilling to rely upon
the implied understanding that in assuming this
relation they would not acquire any interest
hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful
discharge of duty, declared in express terms that
they should not borrow, etc., of the bank.
In the case of People vs. Knapp ([1912], 206 N. Y., 373),
relied upon in the Binalbagan Estate decision, it was said:
We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his
copartnership firm as well as to himself directly.
The loan was made indirectly to him through his
firm.
IV. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, be convicted of a violation of section 35 of
Act No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act,
when these portions of Act No. 2747 were repealed by Act
No. 2938, prior to the finding of the information and the
rendition of the judgment?
As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion,
section 49 of Act No. 2747, in relation to section 35 of the
same Act, provides a punishment for any person who shall
violate any of the provisions of the Act. It is contended,
however, by the appellant, that the repeal of these sections
of Act No. 2747 by Act No. 2938 has served to take away the
basis for criminal prosecution.
This same question has been previously submitted and has
received an answer adverse to such contention in the cases
of United Stated vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil., 241); People vs.
Concepcion ([1922], 43 Phil., 653); and Ong Chang Wing and
Kwong Fok vs. United States ([1910], 218 U. S., 272; 40 Phil.,
1046). In other words, it has been the holding, and it must
again be the holding, that where an Act of the Legislature
which penalizes an offense, such repeals a former Act which
penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the
effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to
try, convict, and sentenced offenders charged with
violations of the old law.
V. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the
copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio
Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in
violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747, penalized by this
law?
Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in
section 35 of Act No. 2747 is on the bank, and since section
49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the bank when
it violates any provisions of the law, but on
a person violating any provisions of the same, and imposing
imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the prohibition
contained in said section 35 is without penal
sanction.lawph!l.net
The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden
to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board of
directors, and to each director separately and individually.
(People vs. Concepcion, supra.)
VI. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion,
President of the Philippine National Bank, in extending the
credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." constitute a legal defense?
Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of
which he was convicted, it was because he was misled by
rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. It is furthermore
stated that since the loans made to the copartnership
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." have been paid, no loss has
been suffered by the Philippine National Bank.
Neither argument, even if conceded to be true, is
conclusive. Under the statute which the defendant has
violated, criminal intent is not necessarily material. The
doing of the inhibited act, inhibited on account of public
policy and public interest, constitutes the crime. And, in this
instance, as previously demonstrated, the acts of the
President of the Philippine National Bank do not fall within
the purview of the rulings of the Insular Auditor, even
conceding that such rulings have controlling effect.
Morse, in his work, Banks and Banking, section 125, says:
It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust,
and advantage not common to the other
stockholders. The law will not allow private profit
from a trust, and will not listen to any proof of
honest intent.
JUDGMENT
On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the
decision of the trial court, and the errors assigned by the
appellant, and with reference to previous decisions of this
court on the same subject, we are irresistibly led to the
conclusion that no reversible error was committed in the
trial of this case, and that the defendant has been proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
the information. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls
within the limits of the punitive provisions of the law.
Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand,
Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-
appellee.
Ramirez & Ortigas for appellant.
Taada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellee.
SANTOS, J.:
An appeal interposed on June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-
appellant, Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership, from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at
Pasig, Hon. Andres Reyes presiding, which dismissed its
complaint in Civil Case No. 7706, entitled, "Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, plaintiff, v. Feati Bank and
Trust Company, defendant," for lack of merit.
The following facts a reproduction of the lower court's
findings, which, in turn, are based on a stipulation of facts
entered into by the parties are not disputed. Plaintiff
(formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") is a limited
partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a
corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate
business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla
y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into
separate agreements of sale on installments over two
parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the
Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal.
On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights
and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma
Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price,
the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in
favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on
installment) and the deeds of sale contained the
stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of
sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively
for residential purposes, and she shall
not be entitled to take or remove soil,
stones or gravel from it or any other lots
belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements
(except the fence) which may be
constructed at any time in said lot must
be, (a) of strong materials and properly
painted, (b) provided with modern
sanitary installations connected either
to the public sewer or to an approved
septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a
distance of less than two (2) meters
from its boundary lines. 2
The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos.
101509 and 101511 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma
Chavez. 3
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092 issued in its name,
respectively and the building restrictions were also
annotated therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5
directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and
encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D', 5 while Lot No. 6 was
acquired from Republic Flour Mills through a "Deed of
Exchange," Annex "E". 6 TCT No. 101719 in the name of
Republic Flour Mills likewise contained the same
restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that
Republic Flour Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good
faith. free from all liens and encumbrances," as stated in the
Deed of Sale, Annex "F" 7 between it and Emma Chavez.
Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on
TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719, 101613, and 106092
were imposed as part of its general building scheme
designed for the beautification and development of the
Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big
landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and
industrial sites are also designated or established. 8
Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that
the area along the western part of Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has
been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per
Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 9 It alleges that plaintiff-
appellant 'completely sold and transferred to third persons
all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue" 10 and the subject lots thereunder were acquired
by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after
the area ... had been declared a commercial and industrial
zone ... 11
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying
the foundation and commenced the construction of a
building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking
purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims could also
be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential
purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded
in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of
the commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused
to comply with the demand, contending that the building
was being constructed in accordance with the zoning
regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and
planning permit applications with the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building and
planning permits to proceed with the construction.12
On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No.
7706, supra, was submitted in the lower court for decision.
The complaint sought, among other things, the issuance of
"a writ of preliminary injunction ... restraining and enjoining
defendant, its agents, assigns, and those acting on its or
their behalf from continuing or completing the construction
of a commercial bank building in the premises ... involved,
with the view to commanding the defendant to observe and
comply with the building restrictions annotated in the
defendant's transfer certificate of title."
In deciding the said case, the trial court considered, as the
fundamental issue, whether or not the resolution of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5
and 6, among others, as part of the commercial and
industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the
building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the
lots in question. 13 The records do not show that a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued.
The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and
dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject
restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No.
27, supra. It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of
police power of the said municipality, and stressed that
private interest should "bow down to general interest and
welfare. " In short, it upheld the classification by the
Municipal Council of the area along Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that
the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the
restrictions in question as against defendant-
appellee. 14 The trial court decision further emphasized
that it "assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that
there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to
whether the same is null and void. 15
On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above decision, 16 which motion
was opposed by defendant-appellee on March 17,
1965. 17 It averred, among others, in the motion for
reconsideration that defendant- appellee "was duty bound
to comply with the conditions of the contract of sale in its
favor, which conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer
Certificates of Title issued in her (Emma Chavez) favor." It
also invited the trial court's attention to its claim that the
Municipal Council had (no) power to nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant corporation." 18
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its
order of March 26, 1965. 19
On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal
from the decision dismissing the complaint and from the
order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for
reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal
bond." 20 On April 14, the appeal was given due
course 21 and the records of the case were elevated
directly to this Court, since only questions of law are
raised. 22
Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court
erred
I. When it sustained the view that Resolution
No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring
Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part
of the commercial and industrial zone,
is valid because it did so in the exercise
of its police power; and
II. When it failed to consider whether or not
the Municipal Council had the power to
 nullify the contractual obligations
assumed by defendant-appellee and
when it did not make a finding that the
building was erected along the property
line, when it should have been erected
two meters away from said property
line. 23
The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment
of errors. In this connection, We already had occasion to
hold in Relativo v. Castro 24 that "(I)t is not incumbent on
the appellee, who occupies a purely defensive position, and
is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of
error, "
The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power;
and (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede
the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-
appellee.
1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the
validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of police power
is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said
resolution was never questioned before it. The rule is that
the question of law or of fact which may be included in the
appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have
been raised in the court below, and are within the issues
framed by the parties. 25 The object of requiring the parties
to present all questions and issues to the lower court before
they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable
the lower court to pass thereon, so that the appellate court
upon appeal may determine whether or not such ruling was
erroneous. The requirement is in furtherance of justice in
that the other party may not be taken by surprise. 26 The
rule against the practice of blowing "hot and cold" by
assuming one position in the trial court and another on
appeal will, in the words of Elliot, prevent deception. 27 For
it is well-settled that issues or defenses not raised 28 or
properly litigated 29 or pleaded 30 in the Court below
cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.
In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was
admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below.
when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only
controversy then as stated by the trial court was whether
or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong ... which declared lots Nos. 4 and 5 among
others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of
the municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting
as encumbrances on the lots in question. 31 Having
admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even
if impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its
position on appeal.
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day
for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of
the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion
that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264,
otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act," 32 empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; 33 for the
municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise
of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting
that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the
word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact
the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... "
An examination of Section 12 of the same law 34 which
prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise reveals
that the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally
construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power should be
interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be
presumed to exist." The same section further mandates
that the general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in
case of doubt, so as to give more power to local
governments in promoting the economic conditions, social
welfare and material progress of the people in the
community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are
existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a
province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party
on the other," in which case the original terms and
provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions,
clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot
nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the
defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions
incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to
defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. 35 Invariably described as "the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers" 36 and "in a sense, the
greatest and most powerful attribute of
government, 37 the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious,
'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a
denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. 38 As this Court held through
Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance
Company vs. City of Davao, et al. 39 police power "is elastic
and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is
not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents
resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress
of a democratic way of life." We were even more emphatic
in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et
al., 40 when We declared: "We do not see why public
welfare when clashing with the individual right to property
should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise
of its police power.
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of
highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short)
from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and
commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace,
good order and general welfare of the people in the locality,
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in
the area, especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The
lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place.
EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities
and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an
endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise
and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly
granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations, the municipality of
Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was
reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the
circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization
advances, stressed this Court, speaking thru Justice Laurel
in the leading case of Calalang v. Williams et al., 41 Thus-
As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los
Angeles (195 US 223, 238 49 L. ed.
169), 'the right to exercise the police
power is a continuing one, and a
business lawful today may in the future,
because of changed situation, the
growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health
and welfare, and be required to yield to
the public good.' And in People v.
Pomar (46 Phil. 440), it was observed
that 'advancing civilization is bringing
within the scope of police power of the
state today things which were not
thought of as being with in such power
yesterday. The development of
civilization), the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public
opinion, with an increasing desire on
the part of the masses and of the
government to look after and care for
the interests of the individuals of the
state, have brought within the police
power many questions for regulation
which formerly were not so
considered. 42 (Emphasis, supplied.)
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort health and prosperity of the state 43 and
to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of
the individual are subordinated. 44
The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution and the valid exercise of police power may also
be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis 45 wherein Mr. Justice
Cardozo, speaking for the Court, resolved the conflict
"between one welfare and another, between particular and
general, thus
Nor is the concept of the general welfare
static. Needs that were narrow or
parochial a century ago may be
interwoven in our day with the well-
being of the nation What is critical or
urgent changes with the times. 46
The motives behind the passage of the questioned
resolution being reasonable, and it being a " legitimate
response to a felt public need," 47 not whimsical or
oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the
Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise
of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it aptly when
he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to
succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights
are rendered nugatory." 48
Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins.
Co. v. Auditor General 49 that laws and reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power are read into
contracts agreed upon by the parties. Thus
Not only are existing laws read into contracts
in order to fix obligations as between
the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power
is also read into contracts as a postulate
of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against
impairments presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue
of which contractual relations are
worthwhile a government which
retains adequate authority to secure
the peace and good order of society.
Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 50 through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that ...
the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract,
unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where
such exclusion is allowed." The decision in Maritime
Company of the Philippines v. Reparations
Commission, 51 written for the Court by Justice Fernando,
now Chief Justice, restates the rule.
One last observation. Appellant has placed unqualified
reliance on American jurisprudence and authorities 52 to
bolster its theory that the municipal resolution in question
cannot nullify or supersede the agreement of the parties
embodied in the sales contract, as that, it claims, would
impair the obligation of contracts in violation of the
Constitution. Such reliance is misplaced.
In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions
and authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines,
the laws of which must necessarily be construed in
accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and
such intent may be deduced from the language of each law
and the context of other local legislation related
thereto. 53 and Burgess, et al v. Magarian, et al., 55 two Of
the cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the
conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e. that the municipal
resolution supersedes/supervenes over the contractual
undertaking between the parties. Dolan v. Brown, states
that "Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon
the use of property by injunction where the property has so
changed in character and environment as to make it unfit or
unprofitable for use should the restriction be enforced, but
will, in such a case, leave the complainant to whatever
remedy he may have at law. 56 (Emphasis supplied.) Hence,
the remedy of injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied on
the specific holding that "A grantor may lawfully insert in his
deed conditions or restrictions which are not against public
policy and do not materially impair the beneficial
enjoyment of the estate. 57 Applying the principle just
stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it
is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort,
to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes,
defendants- appellees should be permitted, on the strength
of the resolution promulgated under the police power of
the municipality, to use the same for commercial purposes.
In Burgess v. Magarian et al. it was, held that "restrictive
covenants running with the land are binding on all
subsequent purchasers ... " However, Section 23 of the
zoning ordinance involved therein contained
a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not
intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any
easements, covenants or other agreement between
parties." 58 In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in
the subject resolution.
It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building
restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee as
vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of
sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613
and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot
prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power
through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building
restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential,
cannot be enforced.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from,
dismissing the complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED. "without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero,
De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee * and Aquino,JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I hold it is a matter of public knowledge that the place in
question is commercial. It would be worse if the same were
to be left as residential and all around are already
commercial.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The exhaustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by
Justice Guillermo S. Santos commends itself for approval. I
feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yielding concurrence, The
observation, however, in the dissent of Justice Vicente
Abad Santos relative to restrictive covenants calls, to my
mind, for further reflection as to the respect to which they
are entitled whenever police power legislation, whether on
the national or local level, is assailed. Before doing so,
however, it may not be amiss to consider further the effect
of such all-embracing attribute on existing contracts.
1. Reference was made in the opinion of the Court
to Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. Auditor
General. 1 The ponente in that case was Justice Sanchez. A
concurrence came from me. It contained this qualification:
"It cannot be said, without rendering nugatory the
constitutional guarantee of non-impairment, and for that
matter both the equal protection and due process clauses
which equally serve to protect property rights, that at the
mere invocation of the police power, the objection on non-
impairment grounds automatically loses force. Here, as in
other cases where governmental authority may trench
upon property rights, the process of balancing, adjustment
or harmonization is called for. 2 After referring to three
leading United States Supreme Court decisions, Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 3Nebbia v. New
York, 4 and Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 5 I
stated: "All of the above decisions reflect the view that an
enactment of a police power measure does not per se call
for the overruling of objections based on either due process
or non-impairment based on either due process or non-
impairment grounds. There must be that balancing, or
adjustment, or harmonization of the conflicting claims
posed by an exercise of state regulatory power on the one
hand and assertion of rights to property, whether of natural
or of juridical persons, on the other. 'That is the only way by
which the constitutional guarantees may serve the high
ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus
effectively preclude ally abusive exercise of governmental
authority." 6 Nor did my concurrence stop there: "In the
opinion of the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief
Justice Hughes, there was this understandable stress on
balancing or harmonizing, which is called for in litigations of
this character: 'The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government
by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society. This principle of
harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the
necessary residuum of state power has had progressive
recognition in the decisions of this Court.' Also to the same
effect: 'Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power
must be consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional
limitation of that power. The reserve power cannot be
construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the
limitation to be construed to destroy the reserved power in
its essential aspects. 'They must be construed in harmony
with each other. This principle precludes a construction
which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the
repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the
denial of means to enforce them. But it does not follow that
conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of
enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose
of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be
within the range of the reserved power of the State to
protect the vital interests of the community.' Further on,
Chief Justice Hughes likewise stated: 'It is manifest from this
review of our decisions that there has been a growing
appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding
ground for a rational compromise between individual rights
and public welfare. " 7 This is the concluding paragraph of
my concurrence in the Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. case: "If emphasis be therefore laid, as this concurring
opinion does, on the pressing and inescapable need for
such an approach whenever a possible collision between
state authority and an assertion of constitutional right to
property may exist, it is not to depart from what sound
constitutional orthodoxy dictates. It is rather to abide by
what is compels. In litigations of this character then,
perhaps much more so than in other disputes, where there
is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the judiciary
cannot escape what Holmes fitly referred to as the
sovereign prerogative of choice, the exercise of which might
possibly be impugned if there be no attempt, however
slight, at such an effort of adjusting or reconciling the
respective claims of state regulatory power and
constitutionally protected rights." 8
I adhere to such a view. This is not to say that there is a
departure therefrom in the able and scholarly opinion of
Justice Santos. It is merely to stress what to my mind is a
fundamental postulate of our Constitution. The only point I
would wish to add is that in the process of such balancing
and adjustment, the present Constitution, the Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. decision having been
promulgated under the 1935 Charter, leaves no doubt that
the claim to property rights based on the non-impairment
clause has a lesser weight. For as explicitly provided by our
present fundamental law: "The State shall promote social
Justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people. Towards this end, the
State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. 9
2. Now as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by
Hart and Sacks under the category of "private directive
arrangements. " 10 Through them people are enable to
agree on how to order their affairs. They could be utilized
to govern their affairs. They could be utilized to govern their
future conduct. It is a well-known fact that the common law
relies to a great extent on such private directive
arrangements to attain a desirable social condition. More
specifically, such covenants are an important means of
ordering one aspect of property relationships. Through
them, there could be delimitation of land use rights. It is
quite understandable why the law should ordinarily accord
them deference, It does so, it has been said, both on
grounds of morality and utility. Nonetheless, there are
limits to the literal enforcement of their terms. To the
extent that they ignore technological or economic progress,
they are not automatically entitled to judicial protection.
Clearly, they must "speak from one point of time to
another." 11 The parties, like all mortal, do not have the
power of predicting the future with unfailing certainty. In
cases therefore where societal welfare calls for police
power legislation, the parties adversely affected should
realize that arrangements dealing with property rights are
not impressed with sanctity. That approach, in my view, was
the guiding principle of the opinion of the Court. f fence my
full and entire concurrence.
ABAD SANTOS, J:, dissenting:
Although Resolution No. 27, series of 1960, of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal, is valid until otherwise
declared, I do not believe that its enactment was by virtue
of the police power of that municipality. I do not here
dispute the concept of police power as stated in Primicias
vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 77 (1948) for as a matter of fact I accept
it. And I agree also that it is elastic and must be responsive
to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in PLDT vs. City of
Davao, L-23080, Oct. 26, 1965, 15 SCRA 244. But Resolution
No. 27, cannot be described as promotive of the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people of Mandaluyong. On the contrary, its
effect is the opposite. For the serenity, peace and quite of a
residential section would by the resolution be replaced by
the chaos, turmoil and frenzy of commerce and industry.
Where there would be no industrial and noise pollution
these bane of so-called progress would now pervade and
suffocate the environment to the detriment of the ecology.
To characterize the ordinance as an exercise of police
power would be retrogressive. It will set back all the efforts
of the Ministry of Human Settlements to improve the
quality of life especially in Metro Manila. It will make Metro
Manila, not the city of man as envisioned by its Governor
but a city of commerce and industry.
Considering, therefore, that Resolution No, 2-1 was not
enacted in the legitimate exercise of police power, it cannot
impair the restrictive covenants which go with the lands
that were sold by the plaintiff-appellant. I vote for the
reversal of the appealed decision.
# Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I hold it is a matter of public knowledge that the place in
question is commercial. It would be worse if the same were
to be left as residential and all around are already
commercial.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The exhaustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by
Justice Guillermo S. Santos commends itself for approval. I
feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yielding concurrence, The
observation, however, in the dissent of Justice Vicente
Abad Santos relative to restrictive covenants calls, to my
mind, for further reflection as to the respect to which they
are entitled whenever police power legislation, whether on
the national or local level, is assailed. Before doing so,
however, it may not be amiss to consider further the effect
of such all-embracing attribute on existing contracts.
1. Reference was made in the opinion of the Court
to Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. Auditor
General. 1 The ponente in that case was Justice Sanchez. A
concurrence came from me. It contained this qualification:
"It cannot be said, without rendering nugatory the
constitutional guarantee of non-impairment, and for that
matter both the equal protection and due process clauses
which equally serve to protect property rights, that at the
mere invocation of the police power, the objection on non-
impairment grounds automatically loses force. Here, as in
other cases where governmental authority may trench
upon property rights, the process of balancing, adjustment
or harmonization is called for. 2 After referring to three
leading United States Supreme Court decisions, Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 3Nebbia v. New
York, 4 and Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 5 I
stated: "All of the above decisions reflect the view that an
enactment of a police power measure does not per se call
for the overruling of objections based on either due process
or non-impairment based on either due process or non-
impairment grounds. There must be that balancing, or
adjustment, or harmonization of the conflicting claims
posed by an exercise of state regulatory power on the one
hand and assertion of rights to property, whether of natural
or of juridical persons, on the other. 'That is the only way by
which the constitutional guarantees may serve the high
ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus
effectively preclude ally abusive exercise of governmental
authority." 6 Nor did my concurrence stop there: "In the
opinion of the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief
Justice Hughes, there was this understandable stress on
balancing or harmonizing, which is called for in litigations of
this character: 'The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government
by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the
peace and good order of society. This principle of
harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the
necessary residuum of state power has had progressive
recognition in the decisions of this Court.' Also to the same
effect: 'Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power
must be consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional
limitation of that power. The reserve power cannot be
construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the
limitation to be construed to destroy the reserved power in
its essential aspects. 'They must be construed in harmony
with each other. This principle precludes a construction
which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the
repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the
denial of means to enforce them. But it does not follow that
conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of
enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose
of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be
within the range of the reserved power of the State to
protect the vital interests of the community.' Further on,
Chief Justice Hughes likewise stated: 'It is manifest from this
review of our decisions that there has been a growing
appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding
ground for a rational compromise between individual rights
and public welfare. " 7 This is the concluding paragraph of
my concurrence in the Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. case: "If emphasis be therefore laid, as this concurring
opinion does, on the pressing and inescapable need for
such an approach whenever a possible collision between
state authority and an assertion of constitutional right to
property may exist, it is not to depart from what sound
constitutional orthodoxy dictates. It is rather to abide by
what is compels. In litigations of this character then,
perhaps much more so than in other disputes, where there
is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the judiciary
cannot escape what Holmes fitly referred to as the
sovereign prerogative of choice, the exercise of which might
possibly be impugned if there be no attempt, however
slight, at such an effort of adjusting or reconciling the
respective claims of state regulatory power and
constitutionally protected rights." 8
I adhere to such a view. This is not to say that there is a
departure therefrom in the able and scholarly opinion of
Justice Santos. It is merely to stress what to my mind is a
fundamental postulate of our Constitution. The only point I
would wish to add is that in the process of such balancing
and adjustment, the present Constitution, the Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. decision having been
promulgated under the 1935 Charter, leaves no doubt that
the claim to property rights based on the non-impairment
clause has a lesser weight. For as explicitly provided by our
present fundamental law: "The State shall promote social
Justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people. Towards this end, the
State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. 9
2. Now as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by
Hart and Sacks under the category of "private directive
arrangements. " 10 Through them people are enable to
agree on how to order their affairs. They could be utilized
to govern their affairs. They could be utilized to govern their
future conduct. It is a well-known fact that the common law
relies to a great extent on such private directive
arrangements to attain a desirable social condition. More
specifically, such covenants are an important means of
ordering one aspect of property relationships. Through
them, there could be delimitation of land use rights. It is
quite understandable why the law should ordinarily accord
them deference, It does so, it has been said, both on
grounds of morality and utility. Nonetheless, there are
limits to the literal enforcement of their terms. To the
extent that they ignore technological or economic progress,
they are not automatically entitled to judicial protection.
Clearly, they must "speak from one point of time to
another." 11 The parties, like all mortal, do not have the
power of predicting the future with unfailing certainty. In
cases therefore where societal welfare calls for police
power legislation, the parties adversely affected should
realize that arrangements dealing with property rights are
not impressed with sanctity. That approach, in my view, was
the guiding principle of the opinion of the Court. f fence my
full and entire concurrence.
ABAD SANTOS, J:, dissenting:
Although Resolution No. 27, series of 1960, of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal, is valid until otherwise
declared, I do not believe that its enactment was by virtue
of the police power of that municipality. I do not here
dispute the concept of police power as stated in Primicias
vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 77 (1948) for as a matter of fact I accept
it. And I agree also that it is elastic and must be responsive
to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in PLDT vs. City of
Davao, L-23080, Oct. 26, 1965, 15 SCRA 244. But Resolution
No. 27, cannot be described as promotive of the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people of Mandaluyong. On the contrary, its
effect is the opposite. For the serenity, peace and quite of a
residential section would by the resolution be replaced by
the chaos, turmoil and frenzy of commerce and industry.
Where there would be no industrial and noise pollution
these bane of so-called progress would now pervade and
suffocate the environment to the detriment of the ecology.
To characterize the ordinance as an exercise of police
power would be retrogressive. It will set back all the efforts
of the Ministry of Human Settlements to improve the
quality of life especially in Metro Manila. It will make Metro
Manila, not the city of man as envisioned by its Governor
but a city of commerce and industry.
Considering, therefore, that Resolution No, 2-1 was not
enacted in the legitimate exercise of police power, it cannot
impair the restrictive covenants which go with the lands
that were sold by the plaintiff-appellant. I vote for the
reversal of the appealed decision.
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA
ALONZO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in
curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court
of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we
administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we
do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither
because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply
the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in
the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro
indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of
their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry
of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua,
transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for
the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year
later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her
own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P
440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied,
after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of
the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In
1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his
wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed
area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five
coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses
Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared
that he was an American citizen . 5 On May 27, 1977,
however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed
by her brother. 6
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised
within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964.
Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied
the requirement of the law. 7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs
cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including
Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only
604 square meters, including the portions sold to the
petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion,
was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who
later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the
petitioners and the private respondents were close friends unless accompanied by an affidavit of
and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10 the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware
redemptioners.
of the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the
area occupied by the petitioners had merely been The right of redemption of co-owners excludes
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the that of the adjoining owners.
circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in
to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of
purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially
giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive,"
significant was the erection thereon of the permanent
the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not
semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was
the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.
done without objection on her part or of any of the other
co-heirs. The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the
Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that
interpretation and application of the pertinent law as
there was really no written notice given by the vendors to
invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and
their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088
the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil
can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such
Code, providing as follows:
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his to run, much less expired in 1977.
hereditary rights to a stranger before
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
may be subrogated to the rights of the
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
price of the sale, provided they do so
provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
within the period of one month from
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
the time they were notified in writing of
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
the sale by the vendor.
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume
In reversing the trial court, the respondent the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
court ** declared that the notice required by the said
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of
article was written notice and that actual notice would not
but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
although no particular form was required.
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a What we do instead is find a balance between the word and
copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
redemption would satisfy the requirement for written
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots
redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the
to the literal command without regard to its cause and
particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely
redemption start running. "
to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we
the written notice should be given by the vendor and not nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a
the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may
Article 1623, reading as follows: not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that
redemption shall not be exercised
killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the
except within thirty days from the
law maker's will.
notice in writing by the prospective
vendor, or by the vendors, as the case The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute
may be. The deed of sale shall not be determines its construction, hence, a
recorded in the Registry of Property, statute must be read according to its
 spirit or intent. For what is within the
spirit is within the letter but although it
is not within the letter thereof, and that
which is within the letter but not within
the spirit is not within the statute.
Stated differently, a thing which is
within the intent of the lawmaker is as
much within the statute as if within the
letter; and a thing which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers. 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks
to ensure that the redemptioner is
properly notified of the sale and to
indicate the date of such notice as the
starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. Considering the shortness
of the period, it is really necessary, as a
general rule, to pinpoint the precise
date it is supposed to begin, to obviate
any problem of alleged delays,
sometimes consisting of only a day or
two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the
right of redemption was invoked not days but years after
the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was
filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first
sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay
invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade,
assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the
notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this
case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not
in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day
period for redemption had expired long before the
complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the
private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of
the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964.
By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be
closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their
palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of
the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to
make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters
were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales
made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from
the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that
sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were
actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day
period started running and ultimately expired. This could
have happened any time during the interval of thirteen
years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem
the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla
Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had
already been extinguished because the period for its
exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party
with laches in the assertion of an
alleged right it is essential that he
should have knowledge of the facts
upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should
have induced inquiry, and the means of
ascertaining the truth were readily
available upon inquiry, but the party
neglects to make it, he will be
chargeable with laches, the same as if
he had known the facts. 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder
why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them,
should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build
thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not
the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This
certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this
unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or
at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily
available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them
chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was
already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are
deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the
respondent court understandably applied pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it
had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by
this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should
be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De
Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is
adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the
sales although no notice in writing was given them. And
there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question
and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977,
without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.
These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice
"as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law
be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is
reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes,
JJ., concur.
Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.
[G.R. No. 99425. March 3, 1997]
ANTONIO C. RAMOS, ROSALINDA M. PEREZ, NORMA C.
CASTILLO and BALIUAG MARKET VENDORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan, Branch 19, and MUNICIPALITY
OF BALIUAG, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Who has the legal authority to represent a
municipality in lawsuits? If an unauthorized lawyer
represents a municipality, what is the effect of his
participation in the proceedings? Parenthetically, does a
motion to withdraw the appearance of the unauthorized
counsel have to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
regarding notice and hearing of motions?
These questions are answered by this Court in
resolving this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court of the Decision[1]of public respondent[2] in CA-
G.R. SP No. 23594 promulgated on March 15, 1991, which
denied due course to and dismissed the petition therein.
Also assailed is the Resolution[3] of public respondent
promulgated on May 9, 1991, which denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The facts as found by public respondent are
undisputed, to wit:[4]
"On April 18, 1990, petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda
M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo, and the Baliuag Market
Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition before the court a
quo docketed as Civil Case No. 264-M-9 for the Declaration
of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7
(1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade
to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan.
On April 27, 1980, during the hearing on the petitioners'
motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction, the
Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for respondent
Municipality of Baliuag, which opposed the petition.
Whereupon, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by
the court a quo on May 9, 1990.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the Provincial Fiscal and the
Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an Answer
in (sic) behalf of respondent municipality.
At the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 1990,
Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he
was counsel for respondent municipality. On the same date,
and on June 15, 1990, respectively, Atty. Romanillos filed a
motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an
Amended Answer with motion to dismiss.
On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado
appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. The
Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who
submitted the Reply to- petitioners' Opposition to
respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. It was also Atty.
Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of
evidence on July 17, 1990 for respondent municipality.
During the hearing on August 10, 1990, petitioners
questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as
counsel of (sic) the respondent municipality, which
opposition was reiterated on August 15, 1990, and was put
in writing in petitioners' motion of August 20, 1990 to
disqualify Atty. Romanillos from appearing as counsel for
respondent municipality and to declare null and void the
proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty.
Romanillos.
Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint
motion dated August 22, 1990 stating, among others, that
Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for
respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his
collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is
adopting the entire proceedings participated
in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.
On September 19, 1990 respondent Judge issued the Order
now being assailed which, as already stated, denied
petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel
for respondent municipality and to declare null and void the
proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on the
other hand, granted Atty. Regalado's motion 'to formally
adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of
evidence'. In support of his foregoing action, respondent
Judge reasoned:
'Petitioners' motion for the disqualification of Atty.
Romanillos as respondent municipality's counsel is deemed
moot and academic in view of his withdrawal as counsel of
said municipality pursuant to a joint motion dated August
22, 1990, although he shall remain as counsel on record of
private respondent Kristi Corporation. Atty. Oliviano
Regalado under the same joint motion moved for the
adoption of the entire proceedings conducted by
collaborating counsel, Atty. Romanillos.
It is noted that Atty. Romanillos initially entered his
appearance as collaborating counsel of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Provincial Attorney when he filed a
motion to dissolve injunction under motion dated May 30,
1990 and since then despite his active participation in the
proceedings, the opposing counsel has never questioned
his appearance until after he made a formal offer of
evidence for the respondents. The acquiescence of
petitioners,' counsel of (sic) his appearance is tantamount
to a waiver and petitioners are, therefore, estopped to
question the same. In all the pleadings made by Atty.
Romanillos, it was clearly indicated that he was appearing
as the collaborating counsel of the Provincial Attorney.
Besides, petitioners' counsel failed to submit their
comment and/or objection to the said joint motion of
respondents' counsel as directed by the Court within the
reglementary period. By virtue of these circumstances, all
the proceedings attended to and participated in by said
collaborating counsel is a fait accompli and the Court finds
no cogent justification to nullify the same.'
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
Order was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated
October 19, 1990, the second Order now being assailed.
Respondent Judge reiterated the observations which he
made in the Order of September 19, 1990 that Atty.
Romanillos, while actively handling the said case was
merely appearing as the collaborating counsel of both the
Provincial Prosecutor and the Provincial Attorney of
Bulacan; that Atty. Romanillos' appearance was 'never
impugned by petitioners' and was only questioned after his
(Atty. Romanillos') submission of the formal offer of
evidence for respondent; and that therefore, said court
proceedings 'is (sic) a fait accompli'. Respondent Judge
went on to say that the declaration of nullity of said
proceedings and the re-taking of the same evidence by the
same parties is (sic) apparently an exercise in futility'. He
added that in the absence of untimely objection by
petitioners to Atty. Romanillos' appearance as the
collaborating counsel, petitioners are guilty of laches for
having slept on (sic) their rights and are estopped as their
acquiescence may be considered as waiver of such right.
Furthermore, according to respondent Judge, assuming
that the proceedings had been 'tainted with frailness to
render the same legally objectionable', the same has been
'legally remedied' by its formal adoption upon motion of
the Provincial Accorney (sic), Atty. Regalado, who is not
disqualified to appear as counsel for the municipality of
Baliuag, for the reason that by virtue of Section 19 of R.A.
No. 5185 (The Decentralization Act of 1967), the authority
to act as legal officer/adviser for (sic) civil cases of the
province of Bulacan, of which the municipality of Baliuag is
a political subdivision, has been transferred from the
Provincial Fiscal (now Provincial Prosecutor) of Bulacan to
the Provincial Attorney thereof."
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence
this recourse.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum
are:[5]
"1) Under present laws and jurisprudence, can a
municipality be represented in a suit against it
by a private counsel?
2) If not, what is the status of the proceedings undertaken
by an unauthorized private counsel;
3) Can the provincial attorney of a province act as counsel
of a municipality in a suit;
4) Can the provincial attorney adopt with legal effect
the proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized
private counselof (sic) a municipality;
5) May a court act on an alleged motion which
violates Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section
26, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court."
Petitioners contend that the assailed Decision which
affirmed the Orders of the trial court is void for being
violative of the following laws:[6]
"VI-1 The respondent court violated Section 1683 of
the Revised Administrative Code;
Section 3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic
Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act; and Section 35;
Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12,
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292) when it authorized Atty.
Oliviano D. Regalado, the Provincial
Attorney of Bulacan, to appear as
counsel for respondent Municipality of
Baliuag.
VI-2 The respondent court violated Section 1683 of
the Revised Administrative Code;
Section 3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic
Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act; Section 35, Book
IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987; and
Article 1352 of the New Civil Code,
when it denied the petitioners' motion
to declare the proceedings undertaken
or participated in by said Atty. Roberto
B. Romanillos, as private counsel of
 respondent Municipality, null and void.
VI-3 The respondent court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and in grave abuse of
discretion when it acted and granted
the respondent's JOINT MOTION dated
August 22, 1990 (Annex 'H') which, as a
rule, is a mere worthless piece of paper
which the respondent judge/court has
no authority to act upon, considering
that said motion was filed in court in
patent violation of or without
complying with the mandatory
requirements provided for by Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 26 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court."
Public respondent did not give due course to the
petition "because it does not prima facie show justifiable
grounds for the issuance of certiorari."[7] Public
respondent adds that:[8]
"Considering the foregoing jurisprudence, the logical
conclusion is that the Provincial Attorney of Bulacan has
now the authority to represent the municipality of Baliuag
in its law suits.
It follows that respondent Judge was correct in ruling in the
assailed Order of October 19, 1990 that even
assuming, arguendo, that the proceedings by the court
a quo which had been participated in by Atty. Romanillos
are legally objectionable, this was legally remedied by the
formal adoption by the provincial Attorney, Atty. Regalado,
of the said proceedings, considering that the provincial
attorney is not disqualified from representing the
municipality of Baliuag in civil cases.
In the second place, the record discloses that Atty.
Romanillos had appeared as counsel for respondent
municipality of Baliuag in collaboration with the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Provincial Attorney, as shown in the
motion to dissolve injunction dated May 28, 1990 which
Atty. Romanillos had filed for respondent municipality.
Accordingly and pursuant to the aforecited provisions of
law, it cannot correctly be said that respondent Judge had
acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed Atty.
Romanillos to act as private counsel and Atty. Regalado,
Provincial Attorney of Bulacan, to appear as counsel for
respondent Municipality of Baliuag. Perforce, it also cannot
be correctly said that respondent Judge violated the
aforecited provisions when he denied petitioners' motion
to declare null and void the proceedings undertaken by and
participated in by Atty. Romanillos as private counsel of the
municipality of Baliuag.
At any rate, even granting, only for the sake
of argument, that Atty. Romanillos' appearance
as counsel for the municipality could not be
legally authorized under the aforesaid provisions
of law, the fact that Atty. Regalado as Provincial
Attorney of Baliuag had formally adopted the
proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos as
counsel for the municipality of Baliuag had
served, as already stated, to cure such a defect.
Thirdly, We are likewise unable to see grave
abuse of discretion in respondent Judge's actuation
in granting the joint motion filed by Atty. Romanillos
and Atty. Regalado for the withdrawal of the former
as private counsel of respondent municipality, and
the adoption by the latter of the proceedings
participated in/undertaken by the former, including
the formal offer of evidence submitted by the
former."
Public respondent likewise found that the "joint
motion does not partake of the nature of an adversarial
motion which would have rendered non-compliance with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court fatal to the
motion."[9] It is to be emphasized that petitioners "sought
the disqualification of Atty. Romanillos x x x (Thus,) what
petitioners had sought to (be) achieve(d) in their said
motion was in fact what Atty. Romanillos had sought x x x
in the joint motion dated August 22, 1990."[10]
Respondent municipality submits that Section 19 of
RA 5185:
"is not meant to prohibit or prevent the Provincial Attorney
to act as legal adviser and legal officer for municipalities and
municipal districts because such interpretations would be
to say the least, absurb (sic). In this jurisdiction, a province
is composed of municipalities and municipal districts, and
therefore they are deemed included in the provisions of
Section 19 of Republic Act 5185. It is also impractical and
contrary to the spirit of the law to limit the sphere of
authority of the Provincial Attorney to the province
only."[11]
The different allegations boil down to three main
issues: (1) Who is authorized to represent a municipality in
a civil suit against it? (2) What is the effect on the
proceedings when a private counsel represents a
municipality? Elsewise stated, may the proceedings be
validated by a provincial attorney's adoption of the actions
made by a private counsel? (3) Does a motion of withdrawal
of such unauthorized appearance, and adoption of
proceedings participated in by such counsel have to comply
with Sections 4 and 5[12] of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court?
The Court's Ruling
We affirm the Decision and Resolution of public
respondent.
First Issue: Who Is Authorized to Represent a
Municipality in Its Lawsuits?
In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs.
Court of Appeals,[13] this Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the
question of who may legally represent a municipality in a
suit for or against it, thus:[14]
"x x x The matter of representation of a municipality by a
private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,[15] and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,[16] where we ruled
that private attorneys cannot represent a province or
municipality in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
'Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal
shall represent the province and any municipality or
municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases
whereof (sic) original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme
Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal
district in question is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality or municipal
district in the same province. When the interests of a
provincial government and of any political division thereof
are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the
province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a
special attorney may be employed by its council.'[17]
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3,
Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law,[18] only
the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can
represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The
provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to
employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it.[19]
For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that
the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the
municipality's case must appear on record.[20] In the
instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the
Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of
herein private counsel is without authority of law."
The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and
adviser for the civil cases of a province and corollarily, of the
municipalities thereof, were subsequently transferred to
the provincial attorney.[21]
The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence
show that only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and
municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its
lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances may a private
attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in
lawsuits. These exceptions are enumerated in the case
of Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental,[22] to wit:[23]
"Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to
be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an
adverse party in a case involving the provincial government
or another municipality or city within the province. This
provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v.
The Auditor General (44 SCRA 169, March 29, 1979) where
the Court held that the municipality's authority to employ a
private attorney is expressly limited only to situations
where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve
and represent it. With Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative
Code as legal basis, the Court therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v.
Gimenez [107 Phil. 932 (1960)] which enumerated
instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent in court a particular municipality; if and when
original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is
vested in the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality in the same province, and when, in a
case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is
pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.
Thereafter, in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 728,
October 30, 1981), the Court ruled that a municipality may
not be represented by a private law firm which had
volunteered its services gratis, in collaboration with the
municipal attorney and the fiscal, as such representation
was violative of Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative
Code. This strict coherence to the letter of the law appears
to have been dictated by the fact that 'the municipality
should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private
lawyer' and that the interests of the municipality would be
best protected if a government lawyer handles its
litigations."' (Underscoring supplied.)
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this
case. It may be said that Atty. Romanillos appeared for
respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already
counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with
respondent municipality in this same case. The order of the
trial court dated September 19, 1990, stated that Atty.
Romanillos "entered his appearance as collaborating
counsel of the provincial prosecutor and the provincial
attorney."[24] This collaboration is contrary to law and
hence should not have been recognized as legal. It has
already been ruled in this wise:
"The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are
supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does not
legalize the latter's representation of the municipality of
Hagonoy in Civil Case No. 5095-M. While a private
prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous
arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a
municipality is the plaintiff."[25]
As already stated, private lawyers may not represent
municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even in
collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is
anchored on the principle that only accountable public
officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that
public funds should not be expended to hire private
lawyers.
Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning
the legality of the appearance of Atty. Romanillos,
notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of
respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to
dissolve the preliminary injunction. Municipality of Pililla,
Rizal vs. Court of Appeals[26] held that the legality of the
representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. This Court stated that:[27]
"The contention of Atty. Mendiola that
private respondent cannot raise for the first time
on appeal his lack of authority to represent the
municipality is untenable. The legality of his
representation can be questioned at any stage of
the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited,
the issue of lack of authority of private counsel to
represent a municipality was only raised for the
first time in the proceedings for the collection of
attorney's fees for services rendered in the
particular case, after the decision in that case had
become final and executory and/or had been duly
executed."
Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of
the unauthorized representation should not be held in
estoppel just because they did not question on the spot the
authority of the counsel for the municipality. The rule on
appearances of a lawyer is that
"(u)ntil the contrary is clearly shown, an attorney is
presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom
he purports to represent. (Azotes v.Blanco, 78 Phil. 739) His
authority to appear for and represent petitioner in
litigation, not having been questioned in the lower court, it
will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly
authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client.
(Republic v. Philippine Resources Development
Corporation, 102 Phil. 960)"[28]
Second Issue: Effect on Proceedings by Adoption
of Unauthorized Representation
Would the adoption by Atty. Regalado of the
proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos validate
such proceedings? We agree with public respondent that
such adoption produces validity. Public respondent stated
the reasons [29] to which we agree:
"Moreover, it does not appear that the
adoption of proceedings participated in or
undertaken by Atty. Romanillos when he was
private counsel for the respondent municipality
of Baliuag such as the proceedings on the
motion to dissolve the injunction, wherein
petitioners had even cross-examined the
witnesses presented by Atty. Romanillos in
support of said motion and had even started to
present their witnesses to sustain their
objection to the motion would have resulted in
any substantial prejudice to petitioners'
interest. As We see it, to declare the said
proceedings null and void notwithstanding the
formal adoption thereof by Atty. Regalado as
Provincial Attorney of Bulacan who is authorized
to represent respondent municipality of Baliuag
in court and to require trial anew to cover the
same subject matter, to hear the same
witnesses and to admit the same evidence
adduced by the same parties cannot enhance
the promotion of justice."
This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the
appearance of Atty. Romanillos would not cause substantial
prejudice on petitioners. Requiring new trial on the mere
legal technicality that the municipality was not represented
by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest
of justice. After all, this Court does not see any injustice
committed against petitioners by the adoption of the work
of private counsel nor any interest of justice being served
by requiring retrial of the case by the duly authorized legal
representative of the town.
In sum, although a municipality may not hire a private
lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of
substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality
may adopt the work already performed in good faith by
such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1)
provided that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse
party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any
guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private
lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyer's
work cannot bind the municipality.
Third Issue: "Joint Motion" Need Not Comply with Rule 15
We also agree with the justification of public
respondent that a motion to withdraw the appearance of
an unauthorized lawyer is a non-adversarial motion that
need not comply with Section 4 of Rule 15 as to notice to
the adverse party. The disqualification of Atty. Romanillos
was what petitioners were really praying for when they
questioned his authority to appear for the municipality. The
disqualification was granted, thereby serving the relief
prayed for by petitioners. Such being the case, no "notice
directed to the parties concerned and served at least 3 days
before the hearing thereof"[30] need be given petitioners,
the questioned motion not being contentious. Besides,
what petitioners were questioning as to lack of authority
was remedied by the adoption of proceedings by an
authorized counsel, Atty. Regalado. The action of the trial
court allowing the motion of respondent municipality
effectively granted petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty.
Romanillos. In People vs. Leviste,[31] we ruled that:
"While it is true that any motion that does not
comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not
be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to
judicial cognizance, this Court has likewise held that
where a rigid application of the rule will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve
the case. Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits and not on technicalities. As
this Court held in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, an
order of the court granting the motion to dismiss
despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof
of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings x x x (which) cannot deprive a competent
court of jurisdiction over the Case."'(Citations
omitted).
It should be remembered that rules of procedure are
but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
such that when rigid application of the rules tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court
is empowered to suspend their operation.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr.,
Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-26702. October 18, 1979.] JUAN AUGUSTO
B. PRIMICIAS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF
URDANETA, PANGASINAN, ET AL., Defendants-
Appellants. Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices
for Appellee. Primicias, Castillo & Macaraeg for
appellants.
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is the validity of Ordinance No.
3, Series of 1964, enacted on March 13, 1964 by the
Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which was
declared null and void by the Court of First Instance of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, in its decision dated June 29, 1966,
the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:cralawnad "WHEREFORE, this Court renders
decision declaring Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, to be
null and void; making the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the defendant, Felix D. Soriano,
definite and permanent; and further restraining the
defendants, Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., Lorenzo G. Suyat and
Estanislao Andrada, from enforcing the said ordinance all
throughout Urdaneta; and ordering the said defendants to
return to the plaintiff his drivers (sic) license CPN 017644, a
copy of which is Exhibit D-1, and to pay the costs of suit."
1 From the aforecited decision, defendants appealed
to this Court. The antecedent facts of this case are as
follows: 2 On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusto B.
Primicias, plaintiff-appellee, was during his car within the
jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdanetas
Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told, upon
stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3,
Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a
truck." The policeman then asked for plaintiffs license
which he surrendered, and a temporary operators permit
was issued to him. This incident took place about 200
meters away from a school building, at Barrio
Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal
complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta
against Primicias for violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of
1964. Due to the institution of the criminal case, plaintiff
Primicias initiated an action for the annulment of said
ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of restraining defendants
Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez, Police Chief Suyat,
Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the
ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was
enjoined from further proceeding in the criminal
case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary After trial, the Court
of First Instance rendered the questioned decision holding
that the ordinance was null and void and had been repealed
by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. Now, Defendants,
appellants herein, allege that the lower court erred in:
3 "1. declaring that Municipal Ordinance No. 3 (Series
of 1964) of Urdaneta is null and void; "2. requiring the
municipal council of Urdaneta in the enactment of said
ordinance to give maximum allowable speed and to make
classification of highways; "3. holding that said
ordinance is in conflict with section 35 par. b(4) of Republic
Act 4136; "4. requiring that said ordinance be approved
by the Land Transportation Commissioner; "5. holding
that said ordinance is not clear and definite in its
terms; "6. issuing ex-parte a writ of injunction to
restrain the proceedings in criminal case No. 3140. The
ordinance in question provides: 4 "SECTION 1 That
the following speed limits for vehicular traffic along the
National Highway and the Provincial Roads within the
territorial limits of Urdaneta shall be as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library a. Thru crowded streets approaching
intersections at blind corners, passing school zones or
thickly populated areas, duly marked with sign posts, the
maximum speed limit allowable shall be 20
kph. "SECTION 2 That any person or persons caught
driving any motor vehicle violating the provisions of this
ordinance shall be fined P10.00 for the first offense; P20.00
for the second offense; and P30.00 for the third and
succeeding offenses, the Municipal Judge shall recommend
the cancellation of the license of the offender to the Motor
Vehicles Office (MVO); or failure to pay the fine imposed,
he shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in accordance
with law."cralaw virtua1aw library Appellants contend
that the Ordinance is valid, being "patterned after and
based on Section 53, 5 par. 4 of Act No. 3992, as amended
(Revised Motor Vehicle Law). In so arguing, appellants fail
to note that Act No. 3992 has been superseded by Republic
Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three
months after the questioned ordinance was approved by
Urdanetas Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the
aforesaid Act is embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No.
4136, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Act Numbered
thirty-nine hundred ninety-two (3992) as amended, and all
laws, executive orders, ordinance, resolutions, regulations,
or parts thereof in conflict with the provisions of this Act are
repealed."cralaw virtua1aw library By this express
repeal, and the general rule that a later law prevails over an
earlier law, 6 appellants are in error in contending that "a
later enactment of the law relating to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause
an implied repeal of the original law." Pursuant to Section
63, Republic Act No. 4136, the ordinance at bar is thus
placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not
Act No. 3992. The validity of Ordinance No. 3, Series of
1964, must therefore be determined vis-a-vis Republic Act
No. 4136, the "mother statute" so to speak, which was in
force at the time the criminal case was brought against
Primicias for the violation of the said ordinance.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad An essential requisite for a valid
ordinance is, among others, that is "must not contravene . .
. the statute," 7 for it is a "fundamental principle that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate
to the laws of the state." 8 Following this general rule,
whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a
statute, the ordinance "must give way." 9 Since the
Ordinance is aimed at regulating traffic, Chapter IV Traffic
Rules), Article I (Speed Limits and Keeping to the Right),
consisting of sections 35, to 38 of Republic Act No. 4136,
particularly Sections 35, 36, 38 contain the provisions
material to its validity. Section 35 (b), Republic Act No.
4136, which took the place of Section 53, par. (4), Act No.
3992, provides restrictions as to speed thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE
SPEEDS Passenger cars and Motor
trucks motorcycles and buses 1. On open country
roads, with "blind corners" not closely bordered by
habitation. 80 km. 50 km. per hour per hour 2. On
through streets or boulevards, clear of traffic, with
"no blind corners" when so designated. 40 km. 30
km. per hour per hour 3. On city and
municipal streets, with light traffic, when
not designated "through streets." 30 km. 30
km. per hour per hour 4. Through crowded
streets approaching intersection at
"blind corners," passing school zones,
passing other vehicles which are stationary, or for
similar circumstances. 20 km. 20 km. per hour per
hour A look at the aforecited section and Section 1, par.
(a) of the Ordinance shows that the latter is more or less a
restatement only of number (4), par. (b), Section 35. As
observed by the trial court, the Ordinance "refers to only
one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b),
Section 35." 10 limiting the rates of speed for.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary "vehicular traffic along the national
highway and the provincial roads within the territorial limits
of Urdaneta to 20 kilometers per hour without regard to
whether the road is an open country roads (six), or through
streets or boulevards, or city or municipal streets with light
traffic. 11 As also found correctly by the lower court,
the Municipal Council of Urdaneta did not make any
classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit
requirement laid down by Section 38, Republic Act No.
4136, which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Classification of
highways. Public highways shall be properly classified for
traffic purposes by the provincial board or city council
having jurisdiction over them, and said provincial board,
municipal board or city council shall provide appropriate
signs therefor, subject to the approval of the Commissioner.
It shall be the duty of every provincial, city and municipal
secretary to certify to the Commissioner the names,
locations, and limits of all "through streets" designated as
such by the provincial board, municipal board or
council."cralaw virtua1aw library Under this section, a
local legislative body intending to control traffic in public
highways 12 is supposed to classify, first, and then mark
them with proper signs, all to be approved by the Land
Transportation Commissioner. To hold that the provisions
of Section 38 are mandatory is sanctioned by a ruling 13
that "statutes which confer upon a public body or
officer .. power to perform acts which concern the public
interests or rights of individuals, are generally regarded as
mandatory although the language is permissive only since
they are construed as imposing duties rather than
conferring privileges."cralaw virtua1aw library The
classifications which must be based on Section 35 are
necessary in view of Section 36 which states that "no
provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce
any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable
speeds other than those provided in this Act." In this case,
however, there is no showing that the marking of the
streets and areas falling under Section 1, par. (a), Ordinance
No. 3, Series of 1964, was done with the approval of the
Land Transportation Commissioner. Thus, on this very
ground alone, the Ordinance becomes invalid. Since it lacks
the requirement imposed by Section 38, the provincial, city,
or municipal board or council is enjoined under Section 62
of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code from "enacting
or enforcing any ordinance or resolution in conflict with the
provisions of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw
library Regarding the contention that the lower court
erred in holding that said "Ordinance is not clear and
definite in its terms," We agree with the Court a quo that
when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the phrase
"vehicular traffic" (Section 1, Ordinance) it "did not
distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and
motor trucks and buses. 14 This conclusion is bolstered by
the fact that nowhere in the Ordinance is "vehicular traffic"
defined. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its
clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the more
important so that "an average man should be able with due
care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether
he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of
conduct." 15 In comparison, Section 35(b), Republic Act No.
4136 on which Section 1 of the Ordinance must be based,
stated that the rates of speed enumerated therein refer to
motor vehicle, 16 specifying the speed for each kind of
vehicle. At the same time, to avoid vagueness, Art. II,
Section 3 defines what a motor vehicle is and passenger
automobiles are.cralawnad On the issue of whether a
writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 3140, the general rule is that "ordinarily, criminal
prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or
injunction." 17 Exceptions however are allowed in the
following instances:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "1. for the
orderly administration of justice; "2. to prevent the use
of the strong arm of the law in an appressive and vindictive
manner; "3. to avoid multiplicity of actions; "4. to vexing feature. Yet adjudication may not be declined,
afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; "5.
in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was held invalid." 18 The local
statute or ordinance at bar being invalid, the exception just
cited obtains in this case. Hence, the lower court did not err
in issuing the writ of injunction against defendants.
Moreover, considering that "our law on municipal
corporations is in principle patterned after that of the
United States," 19 it would not be amiss for us to adopt in
this instance the ruling that to enjoin the enforcement of a
void ordinance, "injunction has frequently been sustained
in order to prevent a multiplicity of prosecutions under it."
20 In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is
hereby affirmed.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary SO
ORDERED. Teehankee, (Acting C.J.,) Barredo, Makasiar,
Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur. Antonio, J., is on
leave. Aquino, J., did not take part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library I concur. The ordinance in question was in effect
a speed trap for unwary motorists for which Urdaneta had
become notorious.
G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950
GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIBIANO
MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and
Solicitor Francisco Carreon for oppositor and
appellant. Gregorio Perfecto in his own behalf.
BENGZON, J.:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required
Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his
salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After
paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the
Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the
reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in
violation of the Constitution.
The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the
refund of the amount collected. The defendant appealed.
The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the
embarrassment of passing upon the claim of a colleague.
Still, as the outcome indirectly affects all the members of
the Court, consideration of the matter is not without its
because (a) we are not legally disqualified; (b) jurisdiction
may not be renounced, ad it is the defendant who appeals
to this Court, and there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred; (c) supreme courts in the
United States have decided similar disputes relating to
themselves; (d) the question touches all the members of
the judiciary from top to bottom; and (e) the issue involves
the right of other constitutional officers whose
compensation is equally protected by the Constitution, for
instance, the President, the Auditor-General and the
members of the Commission on Elections. Anyway the
subject has been thoroughly discussed in many American
lawsuits and opinions, and we shall hardly do nothing more
than to borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions
to local conditions. There shall be little occasion to
formulate new propositions, for the situation is not
unprecedented.
Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that
the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office." It also provides that "until Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office,
Congress had not "provided otherwise", by fixing a different
salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate
provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a
year.
Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary
in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof?.
A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law
Reports answers the question in the affirmative. It says:
Where the Constitution of a state provides that the
salaries of its judicial officers shall not be
dismissed during their continuance in office, it
had been held that the state legislature cannot
impose a tax upon the compensation paid to the
judges of its court. New Orleans v. Lea (1859) 14
La. Ann. 194; Opinion of Attorney-General if N. C.
(1856) 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) Appx. 1; Re Taxation
of Salaries of Judges (1902) 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E.
970; Com. ex. rel. Hepburn v. Mann (1843) 5
Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the contrary the
earlier and much criticized case of
Northumberland county v. Chapman (1829) 2
Rawle (Pa.) 73]*
A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same
annotation. Another state holding the contrary view is
Missouri.
The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the
diminution of the compensation of Judges of the Supreme
Court and of inferior courts. The Federal Governments has
an income tax law. Does it embrace the salaries of federal
judges? In answering this question, we should consider four
periods:
First period. No attempts was made to tax the
compensation of Federal judges up to 1862 1.
Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was
passed subjecting the salaries of "civil officers of the United
States" to an income tax of three per cent. Revenue officers,
construed it as including the compensation of all judges; but
Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote to the
Secretary of the Treasury a letter of protest saying, among
other things:
The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the
compensation of every judge 3 per cent, and if it
can be diminished to that extent by the name of
a tax, it may, in the same way, be reduced from
time to time, at the pleasure of the legislature.
The judiciary is one of the three great departments of
the government, created and established by the
Constitution. Its duties and powers are
specifically set forth, and are of a character that
requires it to be perfectly independent of the two
other departments, and in order to place it
beyond the reach and above even the suspicion
of any such influence, the power to reduce their
compensation is expressly withheld from
Congress, and excepted from their powers of
legislation.
Language could not be more plain than that used in the
Constitution. It is, moreover, one of its most
important and essential provisions. For the
articles which limits the powers of the legislative
and executive branches of the government, and
those which provide safeguards for the
protection of the citizen in his person and
property, would be of little value without a
judiciary to uphold and maintain them, which was
free from every influence, direct and indirect, that
might by possibility in times of political
excitement warp their judgments.
Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining
in the Treasury a portion of the Compensation of
the judges, as unconstitutional and void2.
The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the
approval of the whole Supreme Court, that ordered it
printed among its records. But in 1869 Attorney-General
Hoar upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury
rendered an opinion agreeing with the Chief Justice. The
collection of the tax was consequently discontinued and the
amounts theretofore received were all refunded. For half a
century thereafter judges' salaries were not taxed as
income.3
Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of
February 24, 1919 expressly provided that taxable income
shall include "the compensation of the judges of the
Supreme Court and inferior courts of the United States".
Under such Act, Walter Evans, United States judge since
1899, paid income tax on his salary; and maintaining that
the impost reduced his compensation, he sued to recover
the money he had delivered under protest. He was upheld
in 1920 by the Supreme Court in an epoch-making
decision.*, explaining the purpose, history and meaning of
the Constitutional provision forbidding impairment of
judicial salaries and the effect of an income tax upon the
salary of a judge.
With what purpose does the Constitution provide that
the compensation of the judges "shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office"? Is
it primarily to benefit the judges, or rather to
promote the public weal by giving them that
independence which makes for an impartial and
courageous discharge of the judicial function?
Does the provision merely forbid direct
diminution, such as expressly reducing the
compensation from a greater to a less sum per
year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect,
yet effective, diminution, such as withholding or
calling back a part as tax on the whole? Or does it
mean that the judge shall have a sure and
continuing right to the compensation, whereon
he confidently may rely for his support during his
continuance in office, so that he need have no
apprehension lest his situation in this regard may
be changed to his disadvantage?
The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory
that a larger measure of liberty and justice would
be assured by vesting the three powers the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial in
separate departments, each relatively
independent of the others and it was recognized
that without this independence if it was not
made both real and enduring the separation
would fail of its purpose. all agreed that restraints
and checks must be imposed to secure the
requisite measure of independence; for
otherwise the legislative department, inherently
the strongest, might encroach on or even come to
dominate the others, and the judicial, naturally
the weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the
other two, especially by the legislative.
The particular need for making the judiciary
independent was elaborately pointed our by
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 78,
from which we excerpt the following:
xxx xxx xxx
At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience
as lawyer, legislator, and chief justice enable him
to speak as no one else could, tersely said
(debates Va. Gonv. 1829-1831, pp. 616, 619): . . .
Our courts are the balance wheel of our whole
constitutional system; and our is the only
constitutional system so balanced and controlled.
Other constitutional systems lacks complete
poise and certainly of operation because they lack
the support and interpretation of authoritative,
undisputable courts of law. It is clear beyond all
need of exposition that for the definite
maintenance of constitutional understandings it
is indispensable, alike for the preservation of the
liberty of the individual and for the preservation
of the integrity of the powers of the government,
that there should be some nonpolitical forum in
which those understandings can be impartially
debated and determined. That forum our courts
supply. There the individual may assert his rights;
there the government must accept definition of
its authority. There the individual may challenge
the legality of governmental action and have it
adjudged by the test of fundamental principles,
and that test the government must abide; there
the government can check the too aggressive self-
assertion of the individual and establish its power
upon lines which all can comprehend and heed.
The constitutional powers of the courts
constitute the ultimate safeguard alike of
individual privilege and of governmental
prerogative. It is in this sense that our judiciary is
the balance wheel of our entire system; it is
meant to maintain that nice adjustment between
individual rights and governmental powers which
constitutes political liberty. Constitutional
government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.
Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being
vested in the national courts, recognizing that
they would be charge with responsibilities more
delicate and important than any ever before
confide to judicial tribunals, and appreciating that
they were to be, in the words of George
Washington, "the keystone of our political
fabric", the convention with unusual accord
incorporated in the Constitution the provision
that the judges "shall hold their offices during
good behavior, and shall at stated times receive
for their services a compensation which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office."
Can there be any doubt that the two things thus
coupled in place the clause in respect of tenure
during good behaviour and that in respect of an
undiminishable compensation-were equally
coupled in purpose? And is it not plain that their
purposes was to invest the judges with an
independence in keeping with the delicacy and
importance of their task, and with the imperative
need for its impartial and fearless performance?
Mr. Hamilton said in explanation and support of
the provision (Federalist No. 79): "Next to
permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a
fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general
course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will.
xxx xxx xxx
These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that
the primary purpose of the prohibition against
diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like
the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good
and competent men to the bench, and to
 promote that independence of action and
judgment which is essential to the maintenance
of the guaranties, limitations, and pervading
principles of the constitution, and to the
admiration of justice without respect to persons,
and with equal concern for the poor and the rich.
xxx xxx xxx
But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back
was an income tax, and that a like tax was exacted
of others engaged in private employment.
If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited,
it can find no justification in the taxation of other
income as to which there is no prohibition, for, of
course, doing what the Constitution permits gives
no license to do what it prohibits.
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words,
and appears to be directed against all diminution,
whether for one purpose or another; and the
reason for its adoption, as publicly assigned at the
time and commonly accepted ever since, make
with impelling force for the conclusion that the
fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit
diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that
they regarded the independence of the judges as
of far greater importance than any revenue that
could come from taxing their salaries. (American
law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25;
Evans vs. Gore, supra.)
In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as
judge of the Unites States court of claims. His salary was
taxed by virtue of the same time income tax of February 24,
1919. At the time he qualified, a statute fixed his salary at
P7,500. He filed action for reimbursement, submitting the
same theory on which Evans v. Gore had been decided. The
Supreme Court of the United States in 1925 reaffirmed that
decision. It overruled the distinction offered by Solicitor-
General Beck that Judge Graham took office after the
income tax had been levied on judicial salaries, (Evans
qualified before), and that Congress had power "to impose
taxes which should apply to the salaries of Federal judges
appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute." (The
law had made no distinction as to judges appointed before
or after its passage)
Fourth period. 1939 Foiled in their previous attempts,
the Revenue men persisted, and succeeded in inserting in
the United States Revenue Act of June, 1932 the modified
proviso that "gross income" on which taxes were payable
included the compensation "of judges of courts of the
United States taking office after June 6, 1932". Joseph W.
Woodrough qualified as United States circuit judge on May
1, 1933. His salary as judge was taxed, and before the
Supreme Court of the United States the issue of decrease of
remuneration again came up. That court, however, ruled
against him, declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the
power to adopt the law. It said:
The question immediately before us is whether Congress
exceeded its constitutional power in providing
that United States judges appointed after the
Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity
from the incidence of taxation to which everyone
else within the defined classes of income is
subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has
committed itself to the position that a non-
discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is
not, when applied to the income of federal judge,
a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of
Article 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. To suggest
that it makes inroads upon the independence of
judges who took office after the Congress has
thus charged them with the common duties of
citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot
share of the cost of maintaining the Government,
is to trivialize the great historic experience on
which the framers based the safeguards of Article
3, Sec. 1. To subject them to a general tax is
merely to recognize that judges also are citizens,
and that their particular function in government
does not generate an immunity from sharing with
their fellow citizens the material burden of the
government whose Constitution and laws they
are charged with administering. (O'Malley vs.
Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, A. L. R. 1379.)
Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of
Internal Revenue is premised mainly on this decision (Note
A). He claims it holds "that federal judges are subject to the
payment of income taxes without violating the
constitutional prohibition against the reduction of their
salaries during their continuance in office", and that it "is a
complete repudiation of the ratio decidenci of Evans vs.
Gore". To grasp the full import of the O'Malley precedent,
we should bear in mind that:
1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the
extent that what the Court now says is inconsistent with
what said in Miles vs. Graham, the latter can not survive",
Justice Frankfurter announced.
2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine
in Evans vs, Gore, although it indicates that the
Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part the
consequences of that case.
Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and
O'Malley) and piecing them together, the logical conclusion
may be reached that although Congress may validly declare
by law that salaries of judges appointed thereafter shall be
taxed as income (O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax
the salaries of those judges already in office at the time of
such declaration because such taxation would diminish
their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this
manner the rationalizing principle that will harmonize the
allegedly discordant decision may be condensed.
By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley
decision, says the Evans precedent met with disfavor from
legal scholarship opinion. Examining the issues of Harvard
Law review at the time of Evans vs. Gore (Frankfurter is a
Harvard graduate and professor), we found that such
school publication criticized it. Believing this to be the
"inarticulate consideration that may have influenced the
grounds on which the case went off"4, we looked into the
criticism, and discovered that it was predicated on the
position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress
"to collect taxes on incomes from whatever source
derived" admitting of no exception. Said the Harvard Law
Journal:
In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court
of the United States decided that by taxing the
salary of a federal judge as a part of his income,
Congress was in effect reducing his salary and
thus violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the Constitution.
Admitting for the present purpose that such a tax
really is a reduction of salary, even so it would
seem that the words of the amendment giving
power to tax 'incomes, from whatever source
derived', are sufficiently strong to overrule pro
tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec. 1. But, two
years ago, the court had already suggested that
the amendment in no way extended the subjects
open to federal taxation. The decision in Evans vs.
Gore affirms that view, and virtually strikes from
the amendment the words "from whatever
source derived". (Harvard law Review, vol. 34, p.
70)
The Unites States Court's shift of position5 might be
attributed to the above detraction which, without
appearing on the surface, led to Frankfurter's sweeping
expression about judges being also citizens liable to income
tax. But it must be remembered that undisclosed factor
the 16th Amendment has no counterpart in the
Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat it.
Wherefore, as the underlying influence and the unuttered
reason has no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad
generality loses much of its force.
Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that
Congress may validly enact a law taxing the salaries of
judges appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines
no such law has been approved.
Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had
qualified after the express legislative declaration taxing
salaries, he could not very well complain. The United States
Supreme Court probably had in mind what in other cases
was maintained, namely, that the tax levied on the salary in
effect decreased the emoluments of the office and
therefore the judge qualified with such reduced
emoluments.6
The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which
judges already in office are made to pay tax by executive
interpretation, without express legislative declaration. That
state of affairs is controlled by the administrative and
judicial standards herein-before described in the "second
period" of the Federal Government, namely, the views of
Chief Justice Taney and of Attorney-General Hoar and the
constant practice from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income
Tax Law merely taxes "income" in general, it does not
include salaries of judges protected from diminution.
In this connection the respondent would make capital of
the circumstance that the Act of 1932, upheld in the
O'Malley case, has subsequently been amended by making
it applicable even to judges who took office before 1932.
This shows, the appellant argues, that Congress interprets
the O'Malley ruling to permit legislative taxation of the
salary of judges whether appointed before the tax or after.
The answer to this is that the Federal Supreme Court
expressly withheld opinion on that amendment in the
O'Malley case. Which is significant. Anyway, and again,
there is here no congressional directive taxing judges'
salaries.
Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an
amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that
salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case
is not relevant. As in the United States during the second
period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not
included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax
Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be
indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first
applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not
include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected
from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in
the United States, which must be deemed to have been
transplanted here;7 and second, when the Philippine
Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the
prohibition against diminution off the judges'
compensation, the Federal principle was known that
income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs.
Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding
doctrines; and the inference is not illogical that in
restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the
Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation of
the same.8
It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine
Government did not collect income tax on salaries of
judges. This may be gleaned from General Circular No. 449
of the Department of Finance dated March 4, 1940, which
says in part:
xxx xxx xxx
The question of whether or not the salaries of judges
should be taken into account in computing
additional residence taxes is closely linked with
the liability of judges to income tax on their
salaries, in fact, whatever resolution is adopted
with respect to either of said taxes be followed
with respect to the other. The opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, to which
the attention of this department has been drawn,
appears to have enunciated a new doctrine
 regarding the liability of judges to income tax
upon their salaries. In view of the fact that the
question is of great significance, the matter was
taken up in the Council of State, and the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice was
requested to give an opinion on whether or not,
having in mind the said decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of O'Malley
v. Woodrough, there is justification in reversing
our present ruling to the effect that judges are not
liable to tax on their salaries. After going over the
opinion of the court in the said case, the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, stated that
although the ruling of the Supreme Court of the
United States is not binding in the Philippines, the
doctrine therein enunciated has resolved the
issue of the taxability of judges' salaries into a
question of policy. Forthwith, His Excellency the
President decided that the best policy to adopt
would be to collect income and additional
residence taxes from the President of the
Philippines, the members of the Judiciary, and the
Auditor General, and the undersigned was
authorized to act accordingly.
In view of the foregoing, income and additional
residence taxes should be levied on the salaries
received by the President of the Philippines,
members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor
General during the calendar year 1939 and
thereafter. . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the
O'Malley decision "resolved the issue of taxability of judges'
salaries into a question of policy." But that policy must be
enunciated by Congressional enactment, as was done in the
O'Malley case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on
the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or other
commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning
real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes
other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is
only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the
effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that
the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the
fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the
Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form.
The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a
mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable
but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action
imposed in the public interest. (Evans vs. Gore)
Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction
by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. Let the
highest court of Maryland speak:
The exemption of the judicial compensation from
reduction is not in any true sense a gratuity,
privilege or exemption. It is essentially and
primarily compensation based upon valuable
consideration. The covenant on the part of the
government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as
much as part of the consideration agreed as is the
money salary. The undertaking has its own
particular value to the citizens in securing the
independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the
establishment of the compensation upon a
permanent foundation whereby judicial
preferment may be prudently accepted by those
who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity
and capacity, but are not possessed of such a
private fortune as to make an assured salary an
object of personal concern. On the other hand,
the members of the judiciary relinquish their
position at the bar, with all its professional
emoluments, sever their connection with their
clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to
the discharge of the onerous duties of their high
office. So, it is irrefutable that they guaranty
against a reduction of salary by the imposition of
a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the
sense of freedom from a burden or service to
which others are liable. The exemption for a
public purpose or a valid consideration is merely
a nominal exemption, since the valid and full
consideration or the public purpose promoted is
received in the place of the tax. Theory and
Practice of Taxation (1900), D. A. Wells, p. 541.
(Gordy vs. Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d
Series, p. 80)
It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of
the income tax may imperil the independence of the judicial
department. The danger may be demonstrated. Suppose
there is power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary
incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive.
In retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a
30 per cent on all salaries of government officials on the
level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the
judges by 30 per cent, but they may not grumble because
the tax is general on all receiving the same amount of
earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative
branches in equal measure. However, means are provided
thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of the
Executive and the Legislative branches, or their perquisites
such as allowances, per diems, quarters, etc. that actually
compensate for the 30 per cent reduction on their salaries.
Result: Judges compensation is thereby diminished during
their incumbency thanks to the income tax law.
Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second
consequence: Some few judges might falter; the great
majority will not. But knowing the frailty of human nature,
and this chink in the judicial armor, will the parties losing
their cases against the Executive or the Congress believe
that the judicature has not yielded to their pressure?
Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive
order the President has subjected his salary to the income
tax law. In our opinion this shows obviously that, without
such voluntary act of the President, his salary would not be
taxable, because of constitutional protection against
diminution. To argue from this executive gesture that the
judiciary could, and should act in like manner is to assume
that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of
security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such
assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.
The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and
Torres, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
OZAETA., J., dissenting:
It is indeed embarrassing that this case was initiated by a
member of this Court upon which devolves the duty to
decide it finally. The question of whether the salaries of the
judges, the members of the Commission on Elections, the
Auditor General, and the President of the Philippines are
immune from taxation, might have been raised by any
interested party other than a justice of the Supreme Court
with less embarrassment to the latter.
The question is simple and not difficult of solution. We shall
state our opinion as concisely as possible.
The first income tax law of the Philippines was Act No. 2833,
which was approved on March 7, 1919, to take effect on
January 1, 1920. Section 1 (a) of said Act provided:
There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid
annually upon the entire net income received in
the preceding calendar year from all sources
by every individual, a citizen or resident of the
Philippine Islands, a tax of two per centum upon
such income. . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Section 2 (a) of said Act provided:
Subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are
hereinafter allowed, the taxable net income of a
person shall include gains, profits, and income
derived from salaries, wages or compensation for
personal service of whatever kind and is whatever
form paid, or from professions, vocations,
businesses, trade, commerce, sales, or dealings in
property, whether real or personal, growing out
of the ownership or use of or interest in real or
personal property, also from interest, rent,
dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains,
profits, and income derived from any source
whatever.
That income tax law has been amended several times,
specially as to the rates of the tax, but the above-quoted
provisions (except as to the rate) have been preserved
intact in the subsequent Acts. The present income tax law
is Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466, sections 21, 28 and 29 of
which incorporate the texts of the above-quoted provisions
of the original Act in exactly the same language. There can
be no dispute whatsoever that judges (who are individuals)
and their salaries (which are income) are as clearly
comprehended within the above-quoted provisions of the
law as if they were specifically mentioned therein; and in
fact all judges had been and were paying income tax on
their salaries when the Constitution of the Philippines was
discussed and approved by the Constitutional Convention
and when it was submitted to the people for confirmation
in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935.
Now, the Constitution provides that the members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
(Section 9, Article VIII, emphasis ours.)a
The simple question is: In approving the provisions against
the diminution of the compensation of judges and other
specified officers during their continuance in office, did the
framers of the Constitution intend to nullify the then
existing income tax law insofar as it imposed a tax on the
salaries of said officers ? If they did not, then the income tax
law, which has been incorporated in the present National
Internal Revenue Code, remains in force in its entirety and
said officers cannot claim exemption therefrom on their
salaries.
Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution provides that all
laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered,
modified. or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines.
In resolving the question at bar, we must take into
consideration the following well-settled rules:
"A constitution shall be held to be prepared and adopted
in reference to existing statutory laws, upon the
provisions of which in detail it must depend to be
set in practical operation" (People vs. Potter, 47
N. Y. 375; People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y. 537; Cass vs.
Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; People vs. N. Y., 25 Wend.
(N. Y. 22). (Barry vs. Traux, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas 191,
193.).
Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
constitution are familiar with the previous and
existing laws upon the subjects to which its
provisions relate, and upon which they express
their judgment and opinion in its adoption
(Baltimore vs. State, 15 Md. 376, 480; 74 Am. Dec.
572; State vs. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Bandel vs. Isaac,
13 Md. 202; Manly vs. State, 7 Md. 135; Hamilton
vs. St. Louis County Ct., 15 Mo. 5; People vs. Gies,
25 Mich. 83; Servis vs. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; Pope
vs. Phifer, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 686; People vs.
 Harding, 53 Mich. 48, 51 Am. Rep. 95; Creve
Coeur Lake Ice Co. vs. Tamm, 138 Mo. 385, 39 S.
W. Rep. 791). (Idem.)
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have
been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with
reference to them. Constitutions, like statutes,
are properly to be expounded in the light of
conditions existing at the time of their adoption,
the general spirit of the times, and the prevailing
sentiments among the people. Reference may be
made to the historical facts relating to the original
or political institutions of the community or to
prior well-known practices and usages. (11 Am.
Ju., Constitutional Law, 676-678.)
The salaries provided in the Constitution for the Chief
Justice and each associate Justice, respectively, of the
Supreme Court were the same salaries ]which they were
receiving at the time the Constitution was framed and
adopted and on which they were paying income tax under
the existing income tax law. It seems clear to us that for
them to receive the same salaries, subject to the same tax,
after the adoption of the Constitution as before does not
involve any diminution at all. The fact that the plaintiff was
not a member of the Court when the Constitution took
effect, makes no difference. The salaries of justices and
judges were subject to income tax when he was appointed
in the early part of 1945. In fact he must have declared and
paid income tax on his salary for 19454 he claimed
exemption only beginning 1946. It seems likewise clear that
when the framers of the Constitution fixed those salaries,
they must have taken into consideration that the recipients
were paying income tax thereon. There was no necessity to
provide expressly that said salaries shall be subject to
income tax because they knew that already so provided. On
the other hand, if exemption from any tax on said salaries
had been intended, it would have been specifically to so
provide, instead of merely saying that the compensation as
fixed "shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office."
In the light of the antecedents, the prohibition against
diminution cannot be interpreted to include or refer to
general taxation but to a law by which said salaries may be
fixed. The sentence in question reads: "They shall receive
such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office." The next
sentence reads: "Until the Congress shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
receive an annual compensation of P16,000, and each
associate Justice, P15,000." It is plain that the Constitution
authorizes the Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation, but that such rate must be higher than that
which the justices receive at he time of its enactment or, if
lower, it must not affect those justice already in office. In
other words, Congress may approve a law increasing the
salaries of the justices at any time, but it cannot approve a
law decreasing their salaries unless such law is made
effective only as to justices appointed after its approval.
It would be a strained and unreasonable construction of the
prohibition against diminution to read into it an exemption
from taxation. There is no justification for the belief or
assumption that the framers of the Constitution intended
to exempt the salaries of said officers from taxes. They
knew that it was and is the unavoidable duty of every citizen
to bear his aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the
Government; that taxes are the very blood that sustains the
life of the Government. To make all citizens share the
burden of taxation equitably, the Constitution expressly
provides that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform."
(Section 22 [1], Article VI.) We think it would be a
contravention of this provision to read into the prohibition
against diminution of the salaries of the judges and other
specified officers an exemption from taxes on their salaries.
How could the rule of income taxation be uniform if it
should not be applied to a group of citizens in the same
situation as other income earners ? It is to us inconceivable
that the framers ever intended to relieve certain officers of
the Government from sharing with their fellows citizens the
material burden of the Government to exempt their
salaries from taxes. Moreover, the Constitution itself
specifies what properties are exempt from taxes, namely:
"Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes." (Sec. 22 [3], Article VI.) The omission
of the salaries in question from this enumeration is in itself
an eloquent manifestation of intention to continue the
imposition of taxes thereon as provided in the existing
law. Inclusio est exclusio alterius.
We have thus far read and construed the pertinent portions
of our own Constitution and income tax law in the light of
the antecedent circumstances and of the operative factors
which prevailed at the time our Constitution was framed,
independently of the construction now prevailing in the
United States of similar provisions of the federal
Constitution in relation to the present federal income tax
law, under which the justices of the Supreme Court, and the
federal judges are now, and since the case of O'Malley vs.
Woodrough was decided on May 22, 1939, have been,
paying income tax on their salaries. Were this a majority
opinion, we could end here with the consequent reversal of
the judgment appealed from. But ours is a voice in the
wilderness, and we may permit ourselves to utter it with
more vehemence and emphasis so that future players on
this stage perchance may hear and heed it. Who knows?
The Gospel itself was a voice in the wilderness at the time it
was uttered.
We have to comment on Anglo-American precedents since
the majority decision from which we dissent is based on
some of them. Indeed, the majority say they "hardly do
nothing more than to borrow therefrom and to compare
their conclusions to local conditions." which we shall
presently show did not obtain in the United States at the
time the federal and state Constitutions were adopted. We
shall further show that in any event what they now borrow
is not usable because it has long been withdrawn from
circulation.
When the American Constitution was framed and adopted,
there was no income tax law in the United States. To this
circumstance may be attributed the claim made by some
federal judges headed by Chief Justice Taney, when under
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1862, their salaries were
subjected to an income tax, that such tax was a diminution
of their salaries and therefore prohibited by the
Constitution. Chief Justice Taney's claim and his protest
against the tax were not heeded, but no federal judge
deemed it proper to sue the Collector of Internal Revenue
to recover the taxes they continued to pay under protest
for several years. In 1869, the Secretary of the Treasury
referred the question to Atty. General Hoar, and that officer
rendered an opinion in substantial accord with Chief Justice
Taney's protest, and also advised that the tax on the
President's compensation was likewise invalid. No judicial
pronouncement, however, was made of such invalidity until
June 1, 1920, when the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U.S. 245,
64 L. ed. 887) was decided upon the constitutionality of
section 213 of the Act of February 24, 1919, which required
the computation of incomes for the purpose of taxation to
embrace all gains, profits, income and the like, "including in
the case of the President of the United States, the judges of
the Supreme and inferior courts of the United States, [and
others] . . . the compensation received as such." The
Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.
Justice Van Devanter, sustained the suit with the dissent of
Justice Holmes and Brandeis. The doctrine of Evans vs.
Gore holding in effect that an income tax on a judge's salary
is a diminution thereof prohibited by the Constitution, was
reaffirmed in 1925 in Miles vs. Graham, 69 L. ed 1067.
In 1939, however, the case of O'Malley vs. Woodrough (59
S. Ct. 838, 122 A. L. R. 1379) was brought up to the test the
validity of section 22 of the Revenue Act of June 6, 1932,
which included in the "gross income," on the basis of which
taxes were to be paid, the compensation of "judges of
courts of the United States taking office after June 6, 1932."
And in that case the Supreme Court of the United States,
with only one dissent (that of Justice Butler), abandoned
the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham by
holding:
To subject them [the judges] to a general tax is merely to
recognize that judges are also citizens, and that
their particular function in government does not
generate an immunity from sharing with their
fellow citizens the material burden of the
government whose Constitution and laws they
are charged with administering.
The decision also says:
To suggest that it [the law in question] makes inroads
upon the independence of judges who took office
after Congress had thus charged them with the
common duties of citizenship, by making them
bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining
the Government, is to trivialize the great historic
experience on which the framers based the
safeguard of Article 3, section 1.
Commenting on the above-quoted portions of the latest
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the
subject, Prof. William Bennett, Munro, in his book, The
Government of the United States, which is used as a text in
various universities, says: ". . .
All of which seems to be common sense, for surely the
framers of the Constitution from ever cutting a
judge's salary, did not intend to relieve all federal
judges from the general obligations of citizenship.
As for the President, he has never raised the
issue; every occupant of the White House since
1913 has paid his income tax without protest.
(Pages 371-372.)
We emphasize that the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles
vs. Graham is no longer operative, and that all United States
judges, including those who took office before June 6, 1932,
are subject to and pay income tax on their salaries; for after
the submission of O'Malley vs. Woodrough for decision the
Congress of the United States, by section 3 of the Public
Salary Act of 1939, amended section 22 (a) of the Revenue
Act of June 6, 1932, so as to make it applicable to "judges of
courts of the United States who took office on or
before June 6, 1932." And the validity of that Act, in force
for more than a decade, has not been challenged.
Our colleagues import and transplant here the dead limbs
of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham and attempt to
revive and nurture them with painstaking analyses and
diagnoses that they had not suffered a fatal blow
from O'Malley vs. Woodrough. We refuse to join this heroic
attempt because we believe it is futile.
They disregard the actual damage and minimize it by trying
to discover the process by which it was inflicted and he
motivations that led to the infliction. They say that the chief
axe-wielder, Justice Frankfurter, was a Harvard graduate
and professor and that the Harvard Law Journal had
criticized Evans vs. Gore; that the dissenters in said case
(Holmes and Brandeis) were Harvard men like Frankfurter;
and that they believe this to be the "inarticulate
consideration that may have influenced the grounds on
which the case [O'Malley vs. Woodrough] went off." This
argument is not valid, in our humble belief. It was not only
the Harvard Law Journal that had criticized Evans vs. Gore.
Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues said that the decision
in that case "met with wide and steadily growing disfavor
from legal scholarship and professional opinion," and they
cited the following: Clark, Furthermore Limitations Upon
Federal Income Taxation, 30 Yale L. J. 75;
Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 15 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 635, 641-644; Fellman, Diminution of Judicial Salaries,
24 Iowa L. Rev. 89; Lowndes, Taxing Income of Federal
Judiciary, 19 Va. L. Rev. 153; Powell, Constitutional Law in
1919-1920, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 117, 118; Powell, The Sixteenth
Amendment and Income from State Securities, National
Income Tax Magazine (July, 1923), 5, 6; 20 Columbia L. Rev.
794; 43 Harvard L. Rev. 318; 20 Ill. L. Rev. 376; 45 Law
Quarterly Rev. 291; 7 Va. L. Rev. 69; 3 University of Chicago
L. Rev. 141. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues also said
that "Evans vs. Gore itself was rejected by most of the
courts before whom the matter came after that decision."
Is not the intention to throw Evans vs. Gore into the
graveyard of abandoned cases manifest from all this and
from the holding that judges are also citizens, liable to
income tax on their salaries?
The majority say that "unless and until our legislature
approves an amendment to the income tax law expressly
taxing 'the salaries of judges thereafter appointed,' the
O'Malley case is not relevant." We have shown that our
income tax law taxes the salaries of judges as clearly as if
they are specifically mentioned therein, and that said law
took effect long before the adoption of the Constitution and
long before the plaintiff was appointed.
We agree that the purpose of the constitutional provision
against diminution of the salaries of judges during their
continuance in office is to safeguard the independence of
the Judicial Department. But we disagree that to subject the
salaries of judges to a general income tax law applicable
to all income earners would in any way affect their
independence. Our own experience since the income tax
law went effect in 1920 is the best refutation of such
assumption.
The majority give an example by which the independence
of judges may be imperiled thru the imposition of a tax on
their salaries. They say: Suppose there is power to tax the
salaries of judges and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of
the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income
tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent tax on all
salaries of government officials on the level of judges, and
by means of another law the salaries of the executive and
the legislative branches are increased to compensate for
the 30 per cent reduction of their salaries. To this we reply
that if such a vindictive measure is ever resorted to (which
we cannot imagine), we shall be the first ones to vote to
strike it down as a palpable violation of the Constitution.
There is no parity between such hypothetical law and the
general income tax law invoked by the defendant in this
case. We believe that an income tax law applicable only
against the salaries of judges and not against those or all
other income earners may be successfully assailed as being
in contravention not only of the provision against
diminution of the salaries of judges but also of the
uniformity of the rule of taxation as well as of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. So the danger
apprehended by the majority is not real but surely
imaginary.
We vote for the reversal of the judgment appealed from the
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.
Paras J., concurs.
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-
appellees, vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of
Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor
Jose P. Alejandro for appellant. Manuel O. Chan for
appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No.
590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino
David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice
Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the
income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the
amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax
collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19,
1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from
October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they
do the same question of law, they were jointly submitted
for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B.
Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well
considered decision found and held that under the doctrine
laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries
of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of
their compensation and therefore was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund
of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and
considering the proposition and the arguments pro and
cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which
are raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we
have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United
States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs.
Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a
judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such
salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now
confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the
remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590,
particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection
of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of
appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably
by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his
point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers
the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill
No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9,
Article VIII of our Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all
judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy
years, or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in
office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice,
fifteen thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above
constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that
judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax
on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the
Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries
during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly
prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the
Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably
receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress
promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the
ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize
the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial
officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer
of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax,
payment of which is hereby declared not to be
dimunition of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision
interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article
VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment
of income tax on their salaries, because the collection
thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically
prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature
and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic
(naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that
payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his
compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the
Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not
a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found
and decided otherwise? To determine this question, we
shall have to go back to the fundamental principles
regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and
enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the
execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But
the interpretation and application of said laws belong
exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to
interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is
constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain
the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent
portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there
is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the
law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function
and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict
the power granted to the courts by the
Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W.,
2nd 341, 342.)
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority
vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is
the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from
it without violating their oaths of office. This duty
of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the state is imperative and
unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said,
whenever a statute is in violation of the
fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and
thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other
course would lead to the destruction of the
Constitution. Since the question as to the
constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter,
the courts will not decline the exercise of
jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might
be taken by political agencies in disregard of the
judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur.,
714-715.)
Under the American system of constitutional
government, among the most important
functions in trusted to the judiciary are the
interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely
connected power, the determination of whether
laws and acts of the legislature are or are not
contrary to the provisions of the Federal and
State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act
NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial
officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear
example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning
of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature
cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as
 used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a
term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates
a constitutional provision, validate it so as to
prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a
declaration that it shall be so construed as not to
violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur.,
919, emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of
government is assigned the task and the power to make and
enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with
regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the
Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the
Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what
a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution
means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a
decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability
in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a
system, a final court determination of a case based on a
judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be
undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and
different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by
the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor
desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of
government, particularly those governing the separation of
powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case.
Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the
collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident
diminution thereof. Under the old system where the in-
come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime
thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear.
All that the official who had previously received his full
salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and
to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his
salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the
amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income,
he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been
decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the
present system of withholding the income tax at the source,
where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to
his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal
portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during
the year and actually deducted from his salary
corresponding to each payday, said official actually does
not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is
deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a
month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed
at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a
month or P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of
month. In the present case, the amount collected by the
Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for
one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37
a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it
down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form
the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice
Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from
payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every
payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and
instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving
but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday,
his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is
decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection
with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No.
590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the
enactment of the law was the feeling among certain
legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not
enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism
and love for their country, they should pay income tax on
their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the
exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme
Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices
of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The
exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like
the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the
members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly
members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the
Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court of
Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these
officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively
insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers
enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court
of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal
Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason
behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is
to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of
this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present
membership number more than 990 judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit
judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said
by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court
in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against
diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like
the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good
and competent men to the bench and to promote
that independence of action and judgment which
is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties,
limitations and pervading principles of the
Constitution and to the administration of justice
without respect to person and with equal concern
for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose,
it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as
a limitation imposed in the public interest; in
other words, not restrictively, but in accord with
its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the
Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the
great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them
receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further
the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such
as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each
dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived
from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if
not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or
substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not
affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the
considerations that prompted the establishment of the
constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs.
Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they
(fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of
the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue
that could come from taxing their salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly
ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his
salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office,
provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily
for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.
When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this
excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because
of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and
due to the high standards of experience, practice and
training required, one generally enters its portals and
comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the aver-
age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at
seventy, assuming that he does not die or become
incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to
receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the
justices of the peace that the exemption can give more
benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of
the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay
the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of
the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and
onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing
unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public
policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject
to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime,
members of the Senate and House of Representatives
except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace
are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the
session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are
generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral
or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in
making such statements during their sessions are extended
immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who
enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are
exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and
improvements thereon when used exclusively for
educational purposes, even if they derive income
therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government
bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the
income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4],
National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any person
residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United
States administered by the United States Veterans
Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No.
360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the
Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the
United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services
corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive,
are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The
payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted
men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are
also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other
words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a
citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute
be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes
on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps
for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt
judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not
to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the
independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is
a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We
further hold that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province
and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands
of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
specially when the interpretation sought and provided in
said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement
as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down
by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G. R. No. L-
2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former
Solicitor General, I wish however to state that I concur in
the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of
the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be
a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution
or by law", constitutes an invasion of the province and
jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion
that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of
the fundamental principle underlying the separation of
powers.
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil.,
552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority
in ruling that no legislation may provide that it be held valid
although against a provision of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO
A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER,
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges
presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all
with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their
emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased,"
even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent
judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt
with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to
discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en
banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The
Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous
and standing directive to the Fiscal Management
and Budget Office of this Court to continue with
the deduction of the withholding taxes from the
salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as
well as from the salaries of all other members of
the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the
filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to settle
the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement.
As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the
Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed
express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to
members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to
equality among the three branches of Government" in the
words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the
deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially
with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted
amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos,
that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be
subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set
forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and
ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the
intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in
the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of
any public officer or employee, including constitutional
officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then
has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the
withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the
Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other
members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of
record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the
salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment
of the income tax and considered such payment as a
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in
office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of
Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general
income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not
fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of
their salaries during their continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is
called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts) shall receive such compensation
as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office
... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of
inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall
not be decreased during their continuance in
office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision
in the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated:
 No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer
or employee, including constitutional officers,
shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners
rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar
to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which
reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to
revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of
salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of
judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be diminished nor subjected to income
tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an
annual salary of _____________ and each
Associate Justice ______________
pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report
No. 18), two Commissioners presented their objections to
the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from
tax of the salary of justices, does this not violate
the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the
principle of equal protection of the law? After all,
tax is levied not on the salary but on the
combined income, such that when the judge
receives a salary and it is comingled with the
other income, we tax the income, not the salary.
Why do we have to give special privileges to the
salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the
judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of
their salary during their term. This is an indirect
way of decreasing their salary and affecting the
independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a
clause to respect tenure, but the special privilege
on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the
principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal
protection clause. 6
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the
sponsor, Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for
whom we have the highest respect, to surround
the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a
whole with the whole armor of defense against
the executive and legislative invasion of their
independence. But in so doing, some of the
citizens outside, especially the humble
government employees, might say that in trying
to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with
the fortress of privileges, an island of extra
territoriality under the Republic of the
Philippines, because a good number of powers
and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not
be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other
employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a
kind of economic immunity, which is, of course,
denied to the entire executive department and
the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article,
on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed
that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and
that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so
as to "give substance to equality among the three branches
in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the
Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original draft and
referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs.
Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then moved that
the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G.
Bernas stood up "in support of an amendment to the
amendment with the request for a modification of the
amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment
to the amendment saying that it is not enough to
drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income
tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will
do, then he will just fall back on the decision
in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs.
David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David,
etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from
income tax, but rather I would propose that the
statement will read: "During their continuance in
office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT
MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN
support of this position, I would say that the
argument seems to be that the justice and judges
should not be subjected to income tax because
they already gave up the income from their
practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and
 all other employees. And I know right now, for
instance, there are many people who have
accepted employment in the government
involving a reduction of income and yet are still
subject to income tax. So, they are not the only
citizens whose income is reduced by accepting
service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to
the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr.
then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon
resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding
with the original proponent, Commissioner Rigos,
that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read:
"During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be DECREASED."But this is on the
understanding that there will be a provision in the
Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the
General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any
public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be exempt
from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the
understanding that the salary of justices is subject
to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General
Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of public
officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be
found in the General Provisions. But at any rate,
when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is
on the understanding that the doctrine in
Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not
apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and
understood, was finally approved without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The
understanding, therefore, is that there will be a
provision under the Article on General Provisions.
Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take
note that the salaries of officials of the
government including constitutional officers shall
not be exempt from income tax? The amendment
proposed herein and accepted by the Committee
now reads as follows: "During their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED";
and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is
deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the
true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is
to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.121avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987
Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced
hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass
a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and
Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they
are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would
be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It
would be a strained construction to read into the provision
an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in
the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated
heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax
upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as
affirmed in Endencia vs. David 14 must be declared
discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter
ego of the people, have expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10,
Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of
the people, through the discussions and deliberations of
their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should
bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the
government and should share the burden of general
income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby
dismissed.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes,
JJ., concur. Yap, J., is on leave.
`[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes
the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the
individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads
of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line
demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the
State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity"
must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social
interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise
of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation,
which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against
those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he
says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and
illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the
end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the
body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of
laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom
and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to
unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social
order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental
rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of
contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the
web of rights and State impositions became tangled and
obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and
colors, the skein irregular and broken.Antagonism, often
outright collision, between the law as the expression of the
will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members
to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably
followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State
authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-
ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as
amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call
for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed
by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional
boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are
reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof,
acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates
by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with
any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.
- Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by
the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed
before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA
7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559
to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par.
(a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No.
26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183
of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565,
for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA
6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d"
of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558;
and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the
grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported
ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law
under which they are charged were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division,
issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On
25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1)
offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed
its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later
or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral
arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution
in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law
is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law
requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to
due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA
7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be
in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train
their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of
constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for
constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is
forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach
upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the
judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the
legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the
legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge
of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in
determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune
with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with
judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality,
invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing
therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first
ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we
held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, th
e constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched
and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet
the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of
constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and
palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic
law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive
commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption
weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the
statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt
that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no
finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-
founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has
miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden
and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the
Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of
his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct a
nd conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of the following
overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National Government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly
or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e)
by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible
guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the
judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty
that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public
officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of
acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks
the language of the law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which
petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-
Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined
and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12
of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his
co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS,
BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series
of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS
OR THEIR PERSONALgain and benefit, public funds in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES &
JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR
LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50)
AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY,
OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); ANDBY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT
OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS,
GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM
OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER
HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-
PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these
factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the
crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed
of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare
for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to
provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase"a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec.
4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence,
violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure
sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein, or because
of the employment of terms without defining
them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define
the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result
in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed.Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
contains the following commonly accepted definition of the
words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class
coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.
That Congress intended the
words "combination" and "series" to be understood in
their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the
legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually
became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON
JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of
plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF
OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean
to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that
number one and two or number one and something else are
included, how about a series of the same act? For example,
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be
included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that
two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but
combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say
combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so
there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination.
Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from
ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it
may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not
be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that
sometimes one or maybe even two acts may
already result in such
a big amount, on line 25, would theSponsor consi
der deleting the words a series of overt or, to read,
therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal
acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a
series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of
two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies
several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime. But when
we say acts of plunder there should be, at least,
two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already
covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks
of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided
in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets
belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must
be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation
and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of
the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined
in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at
least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal
acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is
to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said
common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall
unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and
others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid
common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall
scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a
conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law
does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's
reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various
ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a
statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant
to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as
against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify
a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types
of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as
against the second whenever directed against such
activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and
practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree
of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems
to suggest.Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the
observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the
Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law."[13] The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling
effect" upon protected speech.The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with
narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we
have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick
v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained
at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute.With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional."[20]As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis
for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-
Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they might
be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a
departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract
contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-
line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has
been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25] and is
generally disfavored.[26] In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that
the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously
claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more
imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot
be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to
furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific
precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be
construed in relation and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to
overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law.A fortiori,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law
is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its
passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was
extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its
legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v.
Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate
and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare
a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so
imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of
no reasonable construction that will support and give it
effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited,
among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly
imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or
settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates
due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further
argued that the Information charged them with three (3)
distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable
negligence while in the discharge of their official function
and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them was violated because they
were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all,
they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does
not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The
phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and
"gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the
different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all
these phrases in the same Information does not mean that
the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized
(Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or
without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F.
Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful
the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence,
x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the
aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public
officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits,
advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized
or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was
nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary
and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to
declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly
stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents
the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting
the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a
pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme
or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to
the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as
in all other crimes, the accusedalways has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating
by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of
the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in
the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty
of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder
of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable
doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process
Clause which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep.
Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during
the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON
RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in
our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right
of the accused especially so if the amount
committed, say, by falsification is less than P100
million, but the totality of the crime committed
is P100 million since there is malversation,
bribery, falsification of public document, coercion,
theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the
information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is
an enumeration of the things taken by the robber
in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of
jewelry. These need not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the
conviction of a crime for which he was charged
just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond
earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what
is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but
considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that
such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken
singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was
able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime
of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1
million. Now, when we add the totality of the
other acts as required under this bill through the
interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one
single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for
purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element
beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one
essential element of the crime is that the amount
involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of
 defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be P110
or P120 million, but there are certain acts that
could not be proved, so, we will sum up the
amounts involved in those transactions which
were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt,
is P100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature
did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of
proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with
the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every
fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each
and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information
to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate,
supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for
plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50
) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two
(2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that
they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings
us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating,
acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise,
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in
Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof
of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other
explanation for a combination orseries of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than
"a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill
gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required
to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern
as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series
or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported
defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very
important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4
is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused
be convicted under the Plunder Law without
applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of
individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal
Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements
of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt
without applying Section 4, can you not have a
conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your
Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the
application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place
Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the
law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail
of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged
constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is
two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it
contains a substantive element of the crime of
plunder.So, there is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go
that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section
4 contains a very important element of the crime
of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the
prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily,
all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec.
1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the
epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and
unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of
procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does
not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the
accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is
only a means to an end, an aid to substantive
law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction
for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender
that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that
Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by
petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the
law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant
Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080
provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this
Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance
is held invalid, the remainingprovisions of this Act and the
application of such provisions to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the
whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the
nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the
case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof
should accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can
best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice
Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires
proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring
Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in
se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims
the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of
Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.
733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required
to convict him would not be evidence for each and every
individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to
establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of
plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman
feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence,
which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a
speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of
cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every criminal act done to further the
scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As
far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned,
however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions
under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly
that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of
responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is
no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well
to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice
Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is
a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with
death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to
these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes
that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because
life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal
and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the
normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . .
. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death
of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected
to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death;
and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death
of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder,
rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, where the victim is detained for more than three
days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim
or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor,
robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped,
which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in
the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts
in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic
context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged
masses.Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply
entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche
of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people,
any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of
the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less
heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like
qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and
drug offenses involving government officials, employees or
officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to
cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when
the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in
se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations
of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance
against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA
7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in
the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same
having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential
history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659
is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State,
and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the
Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption
and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which
have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and
corruption has become more elaborate in
the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk
the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures
are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor
and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of
our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament
to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this
scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and
other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered
history of this nation, few issues of national importance can
equal the amount of interest and passion generated by
petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his
eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This
continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people
that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the
clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and
prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst
of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA
7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by
RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring
opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's
concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring
opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants
before Ombudsman.
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in
his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS
FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B.
FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
 ARROYO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the
President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he
is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring
personalities are important enough but more
transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on
the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many,
the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler
and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that
precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some
(10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he
would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and
the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing
on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner
was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but
surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power
started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords.[1]
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The
next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr,
then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and
delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He
accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November
1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner
took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on
cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was
referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the
Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino
Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by
Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.[2]
The House of Representatives did no less. The House
Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the
expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and
Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the
air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of
the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down
from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to
govern.[3]Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the
resignation of the petitioner.[4] Four days later, or on
October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also
demanded that the petitioner take the supreme self-
sacrifice of resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos
also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12,
respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Services[6] and later
asked for petitioners resignation.[7] However, petitioner
strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior
economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior
Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto
Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former
Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.[8] On
November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the
Department of Trade and Industry.[9] On November 3,
Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker
Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives
defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.[10]
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a
tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment[11] signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator
Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate
President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentabella.[12] On November 20, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-
one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.[13]
The political temperature rose despite the cold
December. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started.[14] the battle royale was fought by some of the
marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as
prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader
Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo,
Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar
Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez,
Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted
by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon
Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief
Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and
Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal
of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker of the
House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother,
Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by
live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing
rating. Its high and low points were the constant
conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic
point of the December hearings was the testimony of
Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI
Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from
petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature Jose
Velarde on documents involving a P500 million investment
agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.[15]
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment
trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it
resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were
exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo
Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took
the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly
owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who
was facing charges of insider trading.[16] Then came the
fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10[17] the
senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under
the name Jose Velarde. The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator
Pimentel resigned as Senate President.[18] The ruling made
at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger
that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches
full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the
eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a
letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the
indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings
until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the
issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice
Davide granted the motion.[20]
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the
call for petitioners resignation. A 10-kilometer line of
people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from
the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati
City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples solidarity
in demanding petitioners resignation. Students and
teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to
show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies
at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion,
attracted more and more people.[21]
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner
appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo
Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding
of a snap election for President where he would not be a
candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m.,
Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and
General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed
services went to the EDSA Shrine.[22] In the presence of
former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of
thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes
declared that on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000
strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce
that we are withdrawing our support to this
government.[23] A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a
similar stunning announcement.[24] Some Cabinet
secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and
bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.[25] Rallies
for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various
parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner
announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the
opening of the highly controversial second
envelop.[26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide
had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At
12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaangs Mabini
Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo
Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary
Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the
presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the
petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now
Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of
Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez.[27] Outside the palace, there was a brief
encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada
protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused
minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until
the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would
administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at
the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines.[28] At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.[29] He issued the
following press statement:[30]
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation
as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent
the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the
seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I
leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the
opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will
not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead
in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20,
2001, he signed the following letter:[31]
Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that
I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella
at 8:30 a.m., on January 20.[32] Another copy was
transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day
although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.[33]
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and
duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued
the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-
05-SC, to wit:
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President
of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice
Acting on the urgent request of Vice-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice
and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20,
2001, which request was treated as an administrative
matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to
administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon
of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any
justiciable case that maybe filed by a proper party.
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her
Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.[34] Recognition of respondent Arroyos
government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On
January 23, in a reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang,
led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio
Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats
recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.[35] US
President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone
call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
government.[36]
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte
was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.[37] The House then passed Resolution
No. 175 expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176
expressing the support of the House of Representatives to
the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its
support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution.[39]
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the
Solid Waste Management Act.[40] A few days later, she also
signed into law the Political Advertising Ban and Fair
Election Practices Act.[41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.[42] the next day, February 7, the Senate adopted
Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr.[43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan
Ponce Enrile, and John Osmea voted yes with reservations,
citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on the
legitimacy of respondent Arroyos presidency before the
Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert
Barbers were absent.[44] The House of Representatives
also approved Senator Guingonas nomination in Resolution
No. 178.[45] Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice
President two (2) days later.[46]
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83
declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and
has been terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago stated for the record that she voted against the
closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the
Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and
that the resolution left open the question of whether
Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective
post.[48]
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia,
President Arroyos public acceptance rating jacked up from
16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.[49] In
another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from
February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos
nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of
petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President
Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in
the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in
Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her
presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or
mass, and 54% among the Es or very poor class.[50]
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the
petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several
cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23,
2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No.
0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture,
graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for government
Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the
Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24,
2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756
filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed
by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD
1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758
filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for
plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created
by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges
against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor
Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel
Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing
the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits
of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in
answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On
February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-
15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and
1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in
his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is
over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel,
petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on
the same day, February 6, required the respondents to
comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring
on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the Court ordered
the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738
and the filing of the respondents comments on or before
8:00 a.m. of February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally
argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief
Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and Associate Justice Artemio
Panganiban[52] recused themselves on motion of
petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They
debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have
compromised themselves by indicating that they have
thrown their weight on one side but nonetheless inhibited
themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short
period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2)
days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the
urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement
for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel
for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the
President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue
a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are
officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt
to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public
the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending
decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately
enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or
deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his
office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of
the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the
respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the
cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days
after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action
will make the cases at bar moot and academic.[53]
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this
date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable
controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption
that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from
criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question
Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that
the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They
contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar
assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They
stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency
through people power; that she has already taken her oath
as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has
exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has
been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that
these realities on ground constitute the political thicket
which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents submission. To be
sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud
on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best
of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century,
the political question doctrine which rests on the principle
of separation of powers and on prudential considerations,
continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law.[55] In
the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out
by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v.
Carr,[56] viz:
x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a
courts undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on
question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable
from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political questions
presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political
questions, not of political cases.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been
continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political
question.[57] Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a great
degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of
the political question doctrine when it expanded the power
of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.[59] Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction.[60] With the new provision, however, courts
are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do
to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision
did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync
and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the
1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of
Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to
x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension
thereof x x x.
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for
a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61]and related cases[62] to
support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the
legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo,
they present a political question. A more cerebral reading
of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the
cited cases, we held that the government of former
President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution
by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than
the Freedom Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino
government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning
that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful
revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for
that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government
of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in
character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the
oath under the 1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath, she
categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is
discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People
Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves
the exercise of the people power of
revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA
II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy
of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the
subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President
that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented
political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief
discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People
Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are
treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the
reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national
hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition
of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as
among the reforms sine quibus non.[65] The Malolos
Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary
Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos
shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his
ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the
press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association
for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to
public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the
authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental
rights were preserved when the United States acquired
jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction to the
Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by
President McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble
and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The
guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935
Constitution,[67] and the 1973[68] Constitution. These
rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech
and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The
reasons are well put by Emerson:first, freedom of
expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to
provide for participation in decision-making by all members
of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more
adaptable and hence, a more stable community of
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus.[69] Inthis sense,
freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework
in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society
can take place without destroying the
society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization,[71] this function of free speech and assembly
was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of
Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which
emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the
substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk
rather than force; and this means talk for all and by
all.[72] In the relatively recent case of
Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly
stressed that "... it should be clear even to those with
intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people
assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should
listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count;
those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not
political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in
the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article
II,[74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section 11[76] of Article
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury
v. Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is . . . Thus, respondents
invocation of the doctrine of political is but a foray in the
dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties
considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed,
it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is
determinable from the records of the case and by resort to
judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or
that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he
submits that the office of the President was not vacant
when respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning
of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office or resignation of the President, the Vice President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as
President until President or Vice President shall have been
elected and qualified.
x x x.
 The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as
President or should be considered resigned as of January
20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the
14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high
level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble:there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.[78] The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given
legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did
not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January
20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned
has to be determined from his acts and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner
resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the
resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the
succession of events after the expos of Governor
Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners
alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation
spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment
filed in the House of Representatives which initially was
given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In
express speed, it gained the signatures of 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives. Soon, petitioners powerful political allies
began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary
of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and Former
Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in
tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned
together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened,
the peoples call for his resignation intensified. The call
reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of
the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second
envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of
outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA
Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their
grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and
demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a
brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an
authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the Final Days of
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive Secretary
Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The
Angara Diary reveals that in morning of January 19,
petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling
of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to crate an ad
hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At
1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small
office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed,
seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is
serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30,
p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The
proposal for a snap election for president in May where he
would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner
had intended to give up the presidency even at that
time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA
demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner
and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of
support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to
respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left
petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary
Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of dignified exit or
resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor disagree but listened
intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At
9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the
urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the
proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would
allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and
his family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no
objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit
but said he would never leave the country.[84] At 10:00
p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie
(Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in
the palace.[85] This is proof that petitioner had reconciled
himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was
already concerned with the five-day grace period he could
stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m.,
former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and
requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng
(lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer
of power.[86] There was no defiance to the
request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note
that at this stage, the problem was already about a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of
the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of
January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was
limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five
days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of
the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the
agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the
name of the petitioner.[87] Again, we note that the
resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to
Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on
the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary
shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
xxx
I explain what happened during the first round of
negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well
as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will
leave by Monday.
The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired.I dont want any more
of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the
bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has
resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x
x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.Ayoko na are words of
resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30
a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following
happened:
Oppositions deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms.
Macapagals spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I
am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It
reads:
1. The President shall sign a resignation document within
the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice
President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the
Philippines.
2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process
for the assumption of the new administration shall
commence, and persons designated by the Vice president
to various positions and offices of the government shall
start their orientation activities in coordination with the
incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police shall function under the Vice President as
national military and police effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of
Staff, shall guarantee the security of the president and his
family as approved by the national military and police
authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second
envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of
the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with
the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the
Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their
respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24
January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
2. In return, President Estrada and his families are
guaranteed security and safety of their person and property
throughout their natural lifetimes.Likewise, President
Estrada and his families are guaranteed freedom from
persecution or retaliation from government and the private
sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as
approved by the national military and police authorities
Vice President (Macapagal).
3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate
siting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening
of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof
that the subject savings account does not belong to
President Estrada.
4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January
2001 and 24 January 2001 (the Transition Period), the
incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate
briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the
orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) shall function under Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and
PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful
implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public
statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex A
heretofore attached to this agreement.[89]
The second round of negotiation cements the
reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted
that during this second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given
fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft
agreement which was premised on the resignation of the
petitioner was further refined. It was then signed by their
side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and
Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United
Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the
respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The
Angara Diary narrates the fateful events, viz:[90]
xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a
firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful
transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points
with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign
today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective
on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will
assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new
administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to
various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of
Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the
President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes
as approved by the national military and police authority
Vice President.
4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall
function under the Vice President as national military and
police authorities.
5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the
second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of
which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings
account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form
and tenor provided for in Annex B heretofore attached to
this agreement.
xxx
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene
Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting
the signature of the United Opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the
Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang
agreement (Why couldnt you wait? What about the
agreement)? I asked.
Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).
I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic
na?
And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir
(Yes, were deleting that part).
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that
there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first
provision on resignation since this matter is already moot
and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first
provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed
by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel and
General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to
General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is
important that the provision on security, at least, should
be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has
ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to
Gloria at 12 noon.
The president is too stunned for words.
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic
of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people
inside the compound.
The President is having his final meal at the Presidential
Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who
have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the
first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to
protect the Palace, since the police and military have
already withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as
many of the Estrada familys personal possessions as they
can.
During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President
needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along
with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong
and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality
of her proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor
that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our
civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the
seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I
leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the
opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will
not shrik from any future challenges that may come ahead
in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved
people.
MABUHAY!
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner
cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunitygiven him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given
up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not
resign but only took a temporary leave of absence due to
his inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter
dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again,
we refer to the said letter, viz:
Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that
I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in
mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the
cases at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the
circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these
circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was
never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long
crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its
existence when he issued his final press release. It was all
too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press
release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that
he was leaving the reins of government to respondent
Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance,
however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the
press release of the petitioner clearly showing his
resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must
prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the
press release, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency
cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a
whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of
his repudiation by the people. There is another reason why
this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioners
letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this
Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact
he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign
as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire
pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or
pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under
this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on bribery.
A reading of the legislative history of RA No.
3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA
No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill No. 293. The original
draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did
not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it
now stands.However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator
Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, reserved to propose
during the period of amendments the inclusion of a
provision to the effect that no public official who is under
prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily
resign or retire.[92] During the period of amendments, the
following provision was inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be
allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against
him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office
shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an
offense committed during his incumbency.[93]
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia
who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the
provision and insisted that the Presidents immunity should
extend even after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to
Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15
above became section 13 under the new bill, but the
deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on
the immunity of the President which was one of the reasons
for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate
on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of
a public official with pending criminal and administrative
cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law
ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation
or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending
criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent
his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution
for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no
person can be compelled to render service for that would
be a violation of his constitutional right.[94] A public official
has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or
resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a
public official is facing administrative or criminal
investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement
will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative
proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or
retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention
should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show
that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the
cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB
Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and
0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason
that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune
from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered
as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on
them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases
whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any
insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a
sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment
proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning.We hold
otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding
is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered
pending at the time petitioner resigned because the
process already broke down when a majority of the
senator-judges voted against the opening of the second
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out,
the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he
resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable
to act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner
that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers
and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on
leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the
January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day
to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice
President has no power to adjudge the inability of the
petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His significant submittal is that Congress has
the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article
VII.[95] This contention is the centerpiece of petitioners
stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in
order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of
the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve days
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office."
That is the law. Now the operative facts:
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above
letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker
of the House;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her
oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about
12:30 p.m.;
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of
Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;[96]
On the same date, the House of the Representatives
passed House Resolution No. 176[97]which states:
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY
VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE
ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of
confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority
of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the
Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January
2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the
international community had extended their recognition to
Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and
reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity
and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the
government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of
Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the
people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the
people a stable, continuing government and therefore must
remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of
Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to
eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political
wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation
and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various
segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital
for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of
Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to
the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in
nation-building, the national interest demanding no
less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its
support to the assumption into office by Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its
support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the Nations goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House
of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives
passed House Resolution No. 178[98] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice
President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T.
Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public
servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage;
who has served the Filipino people with dedicated
responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses
sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the
government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Justice, Senator of the Philippines - qualities which merit his
nomination to the position of Vice President of the
Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of
Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of
Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming
inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed
the following:
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the
nation an opportunity for meaningful change and
challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome
awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and
resolute cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum
for vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in
perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new
government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
resolve to discharge our duties to attain desired changes
and overcome the nations challenges.[99]
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate
Resolution No. 82[100] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the
Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the
Republic of the Phillippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant
endowed with integrity, competence, and courage; who
has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility
and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling
qualities of true statesmanship, having served the
government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Justice. Senator of the land - which qualities merit his
nomination to the position of Vice President of the
Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm
the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7,
2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise
passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which states:
RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT
COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize
that the Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been
terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment
Court of Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and
Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment
Court including the second envelope be transferred to the
Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and
preservation in accordance with the Rules of the
Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only
upon written approval of the Senate President.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished
copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7,
2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution
No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate
and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through
election to be held simultaneously with the regular election
on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to
be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any
functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without anysupport from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to
govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is
that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President.Implicitly clear in that recognition
is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioners claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to
review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses
of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold
that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is
an issue in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the
government. Or to use the language in Baker vs.
Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court
cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge
the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be
decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable
to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from
suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the
immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the
cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman
should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in
the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or
civil.
Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of
our legal history on executive immunity will be most
enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this
jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case
of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the
respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W.
Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and
Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila,
respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport
him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not
mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts
of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his
office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such
a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of
the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad,
destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free
from interference of courts or legislatures.This does not
mean, either, that a person injured by the executive
authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no
remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it
means, simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges
of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not
be personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will,
when the matter is properly presented to it and the
occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-
General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible
in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty
or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every
person, however humble or of whatever country, when his
personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the
judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General
personally in damages which result from the performance
of his official duty, any more that it can a member of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public
policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the
chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation
to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the
contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore
had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of
judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that
of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he
acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority
that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is
held here is that he will be protected from personal liability
for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but
also when he is without authority, provided he actually
used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in
determining whether he had authority to act or not. In
other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the
question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still
protected provided the question of his authority was one
over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position,
might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of
authority to act is so plain that two such men could not
honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he acts,
not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and, as
such, must answer for the consequences of his act.
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the
Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz: x x
x. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time
and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling
litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of
the highest officials of the State and for the office he
occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a
way, in a distrust as to the integrity of government
itself.[105]
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not
contain any specific provision on executive
immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years
under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of
the amendments involved executive immunity. Section
17, Article VII stated:
The President shall be immune from suit during his
tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official
acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders
during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the
incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture
entitled, Presidential Immunity And All The Kings Men: The
Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For
Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel, former Dean of
the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the
modifications effected by this constitutional amendment
on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his
disquisition:
In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans
one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute
immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the
President not only from civil claims but also from criminal
cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so
that it would cover even acts of the President outside the
scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its
coverage so as to include not only the President but also
other persons, be they government officials or private
individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can
be said that at that point most of us were suffering from
AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome).
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the
repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in
the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by then Member
of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo,
who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted
to President Marcos violated the principle that a public
office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a
return to the anachronism the king can do no
wrong.[107] The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President
Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power
revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was
crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity
provision of the 1973 Constitution. The
following explanation was given by delegate J.
Bernas, viz:[108]
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the committees
omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for
the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out this second
sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on
immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would
the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at
least the first sentence that the President shall be immune
from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending
all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in
Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider
it understood in present jurisprudence that during his
tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The
only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make
that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any
more query, Madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in
the light of this history. We reject his argument that he
cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that
the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable
for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea
if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend
itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-
sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a
criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him, viz:[110]
xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment
proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgment of
conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or
by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to
remove one from office, then his resignation would render
the case moot and academic.However, as the provision
says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the
ordinary courts.
This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino
Bermudez[111]that incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period
of their incumbency and tenure but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner
Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his
criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance in
the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan[112]and related
cases[113]are inapropos for they have a different factual
milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be
claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada
are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of
this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts
and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
other trespasser.[114] Indeed, a critical reading of current
literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of
a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President
Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to
produce certain recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of
President Nixons associates were facing charges of
conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National
Headquarters in Washingtons Watergate Hotel during the
1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon
moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among
others, that the President was not subject to judicial
process and that he should first be impeached and removed
from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme
Court. It concluded that when the ground for asserting
privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a
criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court further held that the
immunity of the President from civil damages covers only
official acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the
occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones[117] where it held that the US Presidents immunity
from suits for money damages arising out of their official
acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to
appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our
jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.[118] It
declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive
and effective measures against graft and
corruption."[119] It ordained that (p)ublic officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.[120] It set the rule that (t)he right of the State
to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel.[121] It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-
graft court.[122] It created the office of the Ombudsman
and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.[123] The Office of the
Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.[124] These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain
petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys
immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his
incumbency.
V system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada
should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent
Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the
barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that
the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all
set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due
process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical
schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of
high profile cases.[125] The British approach the problem
with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a
jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials
when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a
threat.[126] The American approach is different.US courts
assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of
pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair
trial. They have developed different strains of tests to
resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable
harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity
has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases.[127] In People vs.
Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the case
of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down
the doctrine that:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the
right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true
that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake
criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a
responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially
in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage
of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does
not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind
of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from
pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication
tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of
our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For
another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of
a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x
x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained
to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure
to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally
infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of
prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the
case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test
of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof
that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case
at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence
of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result
of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged
the burden.
We expounded further on this doctrine in the
subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon,
etc.[130] and its companion cases. viz.:
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on
their right to due process while undergoing preliminary
investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its
early invocation considering the substantial risk to their
liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of
sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For
sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity
of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of
the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the
case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which are
sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the
case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The
possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial
notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely
closed to the press and public. Inn the seminal case
of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal
trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively
that the time this Nations organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials both here and in England had long been
presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and
discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or
decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the
significant community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and
thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is
important that societys criminal process satisfy the
appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11,
14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by
allowing people to observe such process. From this
unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as
valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a
criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g.,
Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct
1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly
guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters
relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing
freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone
to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit
guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive
information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that
the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom
doors which had long been open to the public at the time
the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of
assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as
an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the
free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with
which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial
courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be present, and
where their presence historically has been thought to
enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision
which by its terms guarantees to the public the right to
attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as
indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The
right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important
aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be
eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and
prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial.
Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that
to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records
that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these
are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure,
the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider
in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the
klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution
carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear
that they considered any extra-record evidence except
evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of
time the investigation was conducted despite its summary
nature and the generosity with which they accommodated
the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their
fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the
ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough
evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile
headlines to discharge his burden of proof.[131] He needs
to show more weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to
render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against
the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation
by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has
been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members
of this special panel have already been infected by bias
because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against
him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged
respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote
petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has
been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports,
and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at
him by the mobs.[132] News reports have also been quoted
to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already
prejudged the cases of the petitioner[133]and it is
postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner
will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the
petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news
reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject
of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the
denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged
prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity
in the performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative
prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In
truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give
investigating prosecutors the independence to make their
own findings and recommendations albeit they are
reviewable by their superiors.[134] They can be reversed
but they can not be compelled to change their
recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute
cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words,
investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner
and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause
against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of
assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases
against the petitioner will now acquire a different
dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of
the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for
instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of
teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the
sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the
right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an
accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been
categorized as the most fundamental of all
freedoms.[135] To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more
to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to
insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner
shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the
restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient
vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy are not
decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and
not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the
power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the
majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule
of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of
government, it is because it has respected the right of the
minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance
of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may
be, is the key to mans progress from the cave to civilization.
Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some
peoples prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito
Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., no part in view of expression given in
the open court and in the extended explanation.
Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.
Kapunan, J., concur in the result and reserve the right
to write a separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., no part per letter of Inhibition dated
Feb. 15, 2000 mention in footnote 51 of ponencia.
Pardo, J., in the result; believes that petitioner was
constrained to resign and reserve his vote in immunity from
suit
Buena, J., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concur in the result and reserve
the filing of a separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concur in the result and
reserve the right to write a separate opinion.
Void for Vagueness Doctrine
A doctrine derived from the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the U.S.Constitution that r
equires criminal laws to be drafted in language that is clear
enough for theaverage person to comprehend.
If a person of ordinary intelligence cannot determine what
persons are regulated, what conduct isprohibited, or what
punishment may be imposed under a particular law, then t
he law will bedeemed unconstitutionally vague. The U.S. S
upreme Court has said that no one may be requiredat peril
of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning
of a penal law. Everyone isentitled to know what the gover
nment commands or forbids.
The void for vagueness doctrine advances four underlying
policies. First, the doctrineencourages the government to c
learly distinguish conduct that is lawful from that which isu
nlawful. Under the Due Process Clauses, individuals must b
e given adequate notice of theirlegal obligations so they ca
n govern their behavior accordingly. When individuals are l
eftuncertain by the wording of an imprecise statute, the la
w becomes a standardless trap for theunwary.
For example, Vagrancy is a crime that is frequently regulat
ed by lawmakers despite difficultiesthat have been encoun
tered in defining it. Vagrancy laws are often drafted in suc
h a way as toencompass ordinarily innocent activity. In one
case the Supreme Court struck down anordinance that pr
ohibited "loafing," "strolling," or "wandering around from
place to place" becausesuch activity comprises an innocuo
us part of nearly everyone's life (Papachristou v. City ofJac ng criminal sanctions.
ksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 [197
2]). The Court concluded thatthe ordinance did not provid
e society with adequate warning as to what type of conduc
t might besubject to prosecution.

Second, the void for vagueness doctrine curbs the Arbitrar

y and discriminatory enforcement ofcriminal statutes. Pen
al laws must be understood not only by those persons who
are required toobey them but by those persons who are c
harged with the duty of enforcing them. Statutes thatdo n
ot carefully outline detailed procedures by which police off
icers may perform aninvestigation, conduct a search, or m
ake an arrest confer wide discretion upon each officer toac
t as he or she sees fit. Precisely worded statutes are intend
ed to confine an officer's activitiesto the letter of the law.

Third, the void for vagueness doctrine discourages judges f

rom attempting to apply sloppilyworded laws. Like the rest
of society, judges often labor without success when interp
retingpoorly worded legislation. In particular cases, courts
may attempt to narrowly construe a vaguestatute so that i
t applies only to a finite set of circumstances. For example,
some courts willpermit prosecution under a vague law if t
he government can demonstrate that the defendantacted
with a Specific
Intent to commit an offense, which means that the defend
ant must haveacted wilfully, knowingly, or deliberately. By
reading a specific intent requirement into a vaguelyworde
d law, courts attempt to insulate innocent behavior from c
riminal sanction.

However, such judicial constructions are not always possib

le. Ultimately, a confusing law thatcannot be cured by a na
rrow judicial interpretation will not be submitted to a jury
for considerationbut will be struck down as an unconstituti
onal violation of the Due Process Clauses.

A fourth reason for the void for vagueness doctrine is to av

oid encroachment on First
Amendment freedoms, such as Freedom of
Speech and religion. Because vague laws causeuncertainty
in the minds of average citizens, some citizens will inevitab
ly decline to take riskybehavior that might land them in jail
. When the vague provisions of a state or federal statutede
ter citizens from engaging in certain political or religious di
scourse, courts will applyheightened scrutiny to ensure tha
t protected expression is not suppressed. For example, a la
wthat prohibits "sacrilegious" speech would simultaneousl
y chill the freedoms of expression andreligion in violation o
f the void for vagueness doctrine (Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. W
ilson, 343 U.S.495, 72 S. Ct. 777, 96 L. Ed. 1098 [1952]).

Although courts scrutinize a vague law that touches on a f

undamental freedom, in all othercases the void for vaguen
ess doctrine does not typically require mathematical precis
ion on thepart of legislators. Laws that regulate the econo
my are scrutinized less closely than laws thatregulate indivi
dual behavior, and laws that impose civil or administrative
penalties may bedrafted with less clarity than laws imposi