Republic of the Philippines battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the antecedents of each case will require
antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR.,
BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T.
GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA
J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO
M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON
S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS
JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and
PLANTERS COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME
ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and
challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing
his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his
adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even
stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to
Hercules increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it
dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never
die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus
forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach
of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil.The giver of life, without whose
invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also
tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who,
like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay
alive.
Land for the Landless is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance
in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is
more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people, 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution
affirmed this goal adding specifically that the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private
property and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits. 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to
formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil. 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these
sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social
Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere
provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this
end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect
the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles.
This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27,
which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even
energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for
the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the
Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its
own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the
improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year
of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President
Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing
the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve
common legal questions, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be
the subject of one common discussion and resolution. The different
will first be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-
hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
AugustinHermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these
lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection
and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken
for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she
promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for
retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to
Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the
petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice
and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases
of EPZA v. Dulay 5 and Manotokv. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover,
the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in
money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive
order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected
by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the
order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners
only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners
of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under
P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228
ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the
measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small
farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed
by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has
already been upheld in the earlier cases of Chavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v.
Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines,
Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of just
compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula
prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary
only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or
warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because
no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department
of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because
the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of
7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No.
27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any
event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with
landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of
just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final
ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while
what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of
martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that
P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should
itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from
substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988
by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the
DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228
despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the
payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he
adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above-
mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias
Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters
Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members.
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to
Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President
could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she
could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition
period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the
President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would
still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be
known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION
PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall
be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset
Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such
other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts
collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered
automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this
Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The
money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has
yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with
money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of
the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the
Land Bank of the Philippines shall compensate the landowner in an
amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on
the owners declaration of current fair market value as provided in
Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and
promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. This
compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes
that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing
periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually
agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be
prescribed or approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no
effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters situation.
There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the
application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters
have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although
they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right
to equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of
at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On
September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time
by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners.
Both motions were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian
Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid
because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc.
No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial
appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather
than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore,
the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National
Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise
of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental
right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands,
which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the
government assessors valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the
other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly
required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in
violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the
presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in
the whereas clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to
the petitioners contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of
CARP and a general survey on the peoples opinion thereon are not
indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters
have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of
Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the
expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the
petition for prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition
is against the payment of public money without the corresponding
appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can
be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty
billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial
amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word initial
simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when
necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition
on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In
addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the
measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed
in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2,
1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National
Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian
Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just
compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to
the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to
him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion
of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the
recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of
the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his
petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a
motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot
and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to
the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the
Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision
that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for
under the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides
violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power
granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to
emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of
the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property
without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of
riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution.
He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his
land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after
October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his
contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the program
along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or
more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is
premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister
of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to
Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers
until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27
was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural
land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold
rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization
payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the
motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the
Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
respondents acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D.
No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as
long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their
respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by
tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of
P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn
shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the
respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have
been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform
has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-
quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been
amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who
own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or
lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from
which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming
that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the
Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by
Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table),
Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation
Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated
December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27
and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for
Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the
corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the
petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have
prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their
appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the
implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the
exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ
of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this
case, to a separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are
not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven
hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the
rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are
nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as
required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for
LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere
letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the
weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary is
nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the
legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the
fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the
doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed
or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon
the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of
their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the
legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a
blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that
before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were
made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the
Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a
declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a
majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the
deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And
as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus,
there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question
must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in
the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners
and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by
the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive
the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied this exception in
many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present
petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court
when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it
will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that
this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its
meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political
considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision.
Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court
will not hesitate to make the hammer fall, and heavily, to use Justice
Laurels pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any
public official, betray the peoples will as expressed in the Constitution.
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed judicial supremacy which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this
Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before
resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of the
several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of
his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v.
Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for
the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos.
228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987,
when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took
over legislative power from her. They are not midnight enactments
intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that
these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power
for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or
repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute
does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution
of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquinos
loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the
measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not
rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and
has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657
whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions
of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2
of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been
incorporated by reference in the CARP Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that
it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as
specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an
appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said
fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the
primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public
funds from the treasury.19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to
the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit,
Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With
particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been
complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives,
which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures,
had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The
legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the
Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention
limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer
tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of
the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This
section declares:
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person
may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural
land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure,
and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded
to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1)
that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further,
That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still
own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement
that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves
only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to
be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in
the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every
presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and
effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways
of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No.
79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the
former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was
issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President
Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this
Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official
Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not
have any force and effect if they were among those enactments
successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in
the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742
that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a
discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government.
That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important
qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that
mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself
but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words,
mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary
and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear
duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal
remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial,
the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary,
the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an
inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length
of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all
parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause
when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first
case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction
be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as
there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from the
administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if
the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the
power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both
powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of
Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of
all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its
assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised
was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and
intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the
verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public
morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the
taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid
down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: The general
rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. The regulation
that went too far was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the
subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land
surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a
deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder,
with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The
Court held the law could not be sustained without compensating the
grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that
there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the
police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and
is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without
making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public
health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The
restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use.
The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The
state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely
prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious
as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions the
restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to
enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling
of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter
being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The
employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long
been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J.
Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the
earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a
zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant
remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police
and eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking,
they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of
private property for improvements that would be available for public
use, literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they
assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point
reflected in the Euclid opinions reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to
bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately
authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate public
purpose, the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation
whatever. With the progressive growth of governments involvement in
land use, the distance between the two powers has contracted
considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power a
trend expressly approved in the Supreme Courts 1954 decision in
Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domains
public use test to match that of the police powers standard of public
purpose. 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the
improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper
exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the
attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nations
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3
vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the respondents
Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand
Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office
building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic
landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective
of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the
Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it
although other landowners in the area could do so over their respective
properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court
nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand
Central Terminal which it said would undoubtedly mitigate the loss
caused by the regulation. This fair compensation, as he called it, was
explained by Prof.Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status,
Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the
authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminals
designation as a landmark the rights which would have been
exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance
atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were
proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its
losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to
construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee
sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry
out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is
not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-
beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent
domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground
that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and
dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges
during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits
finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these
petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to
the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our
examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the
power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal
protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have
not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that
they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an
objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong
to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no
evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other
in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members
of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by
the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that
not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made
to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.
There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained
under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful
subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public
generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the
interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject
and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution
itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What
remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to
achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the
rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary
that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will
excuse the bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say
that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation
who would deny him that right.
That right covers the persons life, his liberty and his property under
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the
owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the
familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of
just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may
be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling
to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the
vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert
the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property
owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the
public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the
police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no
means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found
in the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1)
public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No.
79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the
pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property
rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is
not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by
the CARP as the Constitution calls for the just distribution of all
agricultural lands. In any event, the decision to redistribute private
agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the
legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion.
We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear
showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the
political departments when they decide what is known as the political
question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Taada
v. Cuenco: 36
The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted
with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the authority
of the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. 37 Even so, this should not
be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply
because their views may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to
include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as
the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also
continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The
Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert
only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We
do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that
the entire St. Marys river between the American bank and the
international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship
canal, throughout its entire length, was necessary for the purpose of
navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith, that
determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by
the United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review
of the judgment of Congress .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been
settled for us by the Constitution itself. No less than the 1987 Charter
calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural
lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed
maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc.
No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional
injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures to encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable
farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they
till. That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must
be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a
longer and more thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the takers gain
but the owners loss.40 The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full,
ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions
contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands
under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and
deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to
the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable
taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must
enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of
the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these
requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to
make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as
the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is
pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be
employed in raising the amount. 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the
CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case
of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with
an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or
in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to
issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution
of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just
compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative
authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made
to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard
by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-
the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the
LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within
thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other
branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a
challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing
that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be
either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn
valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these
decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.
It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the
property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to
simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the
owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless
for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking
of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a
judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the
strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing
short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose
between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its
choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot
exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the
determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
x xx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same
question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the
same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still
have the power and authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
x xx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove
that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over
the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners
have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and
con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations
essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not
suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees
constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as
summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless
allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the
property. But more importantly, the determination of the just
compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon
the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly
provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the
court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted
by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the
right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what
is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just
compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by
the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria
provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof,
or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation
for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the
option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares
Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below Thirty-five percent
(35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in
accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten
percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year
from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That
should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full
or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of
their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government,
including assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets
foreclosed by government financial institutions in the same province or
region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled
corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided
the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or
region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the
use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments;
Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder
in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above
provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the
expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than
money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this
contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment,
than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the
loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of
the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the
value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is
more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of
the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating
entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to
which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value
being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to
buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has
been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect that just
compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and
not otherwise. Thus
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The
condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor
can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other
basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in the
manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power
of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of
payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard
as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of
things, be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of
compensation. 48
Just compensation for property taken by condemnation means a fair
equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable
time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to
substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable
advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the
payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that
medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of
the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be
taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands
whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the
maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of
expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire
Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished
farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the
whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the
foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and
the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to
come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully
only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee
to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it
not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has
ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for a just distribution
among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their
dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be
tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation
under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos
will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present
standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this
difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of
the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned
the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less
conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they
were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no
illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may
therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of
payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the
payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money),
or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other
things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a
similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was
the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with
which they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission
any categorical agreement among the members regarding the meaning
to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the
comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was
the suggestion to fine tune the requirement to suit the demands of the
project even as it was also felt that they should leave it to Congress to
determine how payment should be made to the landowner and
reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations
as progressive compensation and State-subsidized compensation
were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just
compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates
against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and
intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to
be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and
manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore- quoted
Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not
mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our
decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution
removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the
need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of
our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section
will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmers
hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view
the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree
today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not
always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the
proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the
total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands
expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted
that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily
because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of
value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making
up the balance of the payment are negotiable at any time. The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are
also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP
bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value
equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the
landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already
remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that
these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for
their forbearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their
indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform.
Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the
Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under
E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that
Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the
CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the
earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of
failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that
given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary,
the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the
basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner
provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his
property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation,
in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of
the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does
not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is
entered and paid, but the condemnors title relates back to the date on
which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioners
report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is
complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the
owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases
holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just
compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be
uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was
held that actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was
a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the
State albeit not to the appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v.
Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction
upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the
payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and
appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy
further said that both on principle and authority the rule is that the
right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the
property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public
use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent,
until just compensation has been made to him.
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and
Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion
are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of
expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute
reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken
from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid . (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-
farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the
owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that
no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless
and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized
farmers cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of
the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of
October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said
decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers
cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also
perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the
lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after
October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of
just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the
land.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of
the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then,
title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership
is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by
arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be
rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-
farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained
by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the
express provision in Section 6 of the said law that the landowners whose
lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed
to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No.
78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the
President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude
immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet
to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the
petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other
agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming
that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any,
under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new
retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the
whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V By Decision[1] of September 16, 1997, the Regional Adjudicator of DARAB
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases
have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to the
shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely.
To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should
be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper
instruments for the better protection of the farmers rights. But we have
to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on
familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested
project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmess words, it is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment, and so we learn as we venture
forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect
perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we
struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that
have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the
comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way
for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will
be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and
disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and
helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm
on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother
Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living.
And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it
the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he
banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments
and rebuild in it the music and the dream.
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the
herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State
only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27
are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention
under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No.
6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions
are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
it was docketed as DARAB Case No. 7315.
FIRST DIVISION
SUSAN G. PO and LILIA G. MUTIA,
Petitioners,
- versus -
OMERO DAMPAL,*
Respondent.
G.R. No. 173329
Promulgated:
December 21, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in ManoloFortich,
Bukidnon which were covered by OCT No. P-4146 and OCT No. 4147, with
an approximate area of 2.5773 and 2.0651 hectares, respectively, were
mortgaged for P33,000.00 by the spouses Florencio and Ester Causin,
through their attorney-in-fact Manuel Causin, to the now-defunct Rural
Bank of Tagoloan, Inc.
For failure to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and
sold the lots at public auction on July 8, 1992 to petitioner Susan G. Po
(Susan) who was the highest bidder. OCT No. P-4146 and OCT No. 4147
were subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-39280 and TCT No. 39281
were, in their stead, issued in Susansfavor, following the spouses Causins
failure to redeem the property.
On September 13, 1993, Susan sold the lot covered by TCT No. 39281 to
her herein co-petitioner Lilia G. Mutia (Lilia) who was issued TCT No. T-
40193.
On September 29, 1994, the spouses Causin and their tenant-herein
respondent OmeroDampal (Dampal) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
ManoloFortich a complaint against the bank for Annulment of the Real
Estate Mortgage and Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-280 (the civil
case).
While the civil case was pending or on June 16, 1997, Dampal filed a
complaint against Susan and Lilia before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region X, for Legal Redemption with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as DARAB Case No. X-05-
361.
Region X disallowed the redemption prayed for on the ground of
prescription, albeit he declared that Dampal is entitled to security of
tenure as a tenant; and that although Dampal was not given notice in
writing of the public auction sale, he was deemed to have knowledge
thereof because of the civil case for annulment, hence, there was
substantial compliance with the rules.
Dampals motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order[2]
dated October 28, 1997, he appealed to the DARAB Central Office where
By Decision[3] of October 19, 2004, the DARAB Central Office reversed
the Adjudicators ruling. It held that Dampal, as a tenant, had the right to
redeem the mortgage in the amount of P40,000.00 plus interest; and that
the right had not prescribed, owing to the lack of written notice to him
and to the DAR of the sale. It accordingly ordered the cancellation of the
title issued in favor of Susan and that of Lilia and the issuance of new
ones in Dampalsfavor, upon his payment of the redemption amount.
Susan and Lilias motion for reconsideration of the said Decision was
denied by Resolution[4] of July 7, 2005, hence, they appealed via
certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
By Resolution[5] of October 19, 2005, the appellate court, holding that
petitioners should have appealed the DARAB Decision via Rule 43, instead
of Rule 65, dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari.
Petitioners thereupon filed before the appellate court a Motion for Leave
to Amend Petition and for Admission of Amended Petition, which motion
was denied by Resolution[6] of March 28, 2006. In denying the motion,
the appellate court held that dismissal due to error in the mode of appeal
cannot be reconsidered by the mere expediency of filing an amended
petition. Moreover, it noted that it was filed out of time.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts March 28,
2006 Resolution, alleging that their error in the choice of remedy was
excusable as they relied on Sec. 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure, reading:
Sec. 1. Appeal to the Board. An appeal may be taken to the Board from a
resolution, decision or final order of the Adjudicator that completely
disposes of the case by either or both of the parties within a period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution/decision/final order
appealed from or of the denial of the movants motion for
reconsideration in accordance with section 12, Rule X by:
1.1 filing a Notice of Appeal with the Adjudicator who rendered the
decision or final order appealed from;
1.2 furnishing copies of said Notice of Appeal to all parties and the Board;
and
1.3 paying an appeal fee of Seven Hundred Pesos (Php700.00) to the DAR
Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated or through postal
money order, payable to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the
Adjudicator is situated, at the option of the appellant.
A pauper litigant shall be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee.
Proof of service of Notice of Appeal to the affected parties and to the
Board and payment of appeal fee shall be filed, within the reglementary
period, with the Adjudicator a quo and shall form part of the records of
the case.
Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal. (underscoring supplied)
By Resolution[7] of May 22, 2006, the appellate court denied the motion
for reconsideration, holding that nothing in the above-quoted Sec. 1 of
Rule XIV states that the remedy of an aggrieved party from an adverse
decision of the DARAB is by certiorari, and that the applicable rule is Sec.
1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
On petitioners attribution of the faux pas to their counsel, the appellate
court held that they are bound thereby. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assert that the appellate court, in dismissing their petition
due to technicality, denied them the opportunity to establish the merits
of their case. They maintain that Dampals right of redemption has
prescribed, he having admitted Susans acquisition of title to the property
as early as 1993 but that it was only in 1997 that he filed the action for
redemption before the DARAB. They thus conclude that the need for
sending him notice in writing could be dispensed with; and that Dampals
inaction estopped him from asserting his right as a tenant.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The earlier-quoted Sec. 1 of Rule XIV of the DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure dwells on how appeals to the DARAB Board from the
decisions, resolutions or final orders of the Adjudicator are to be taken.
How petitioners could have been misled to file their appeal from the
DARABs Decision to the Court of Appeals via certiorari escapes
comprehension.
Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the
DARAB should be filed with the Court of Appeals by verified petition for
review. Thus, Sec. 1 of Rule 43 provides:
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or
final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
SECTION 2. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to
the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.
SECTION 3. How appeal taken. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified
petition for review x xx (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sec. 1, Rule XV of the 2003 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure provides:
Section 1. Appeal to the Court of Appeals. - Any decision, order,
resolution, award or ruling of the Board on any agrarian dispute or any
matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement,
interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, may be brought on appeal within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Rules of Court. (underscoring supplied)
While a petition for certiorari, when availed of as a wrong remedy, is
dismissible, there are exceptions thereto, viz: (a) when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest
of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.[8] None of these circumstances is present in the case at bar,
however.
The denial[9] by the appellate court of petitioners MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO AMEND PETITION AND FOR ADMISSION OF AMENDED PETITION filed
on October 28, 2005 is thus in order. For the records show that
petitioners filed the petition for certiorari on the last day of the 15-day
period to appeal or on October 5, 2005.
The belated filing of the Amended Petition is inexcusable.
Time and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble
purpose, and to disregard such rules, in the guise of liberal construction,
would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be
disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement
of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of
justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors may be
heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order
and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance
by the parties of the procedural rules.[10] (emphasis supplied)
Technicality aside, on the merits, petitioners failed to establish that in
deciding the case, the DARAB committed grave abuse of discretion.
In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of written notice to the
tenant of the sale, as well as to the DAR, is indispensable, particularly in
view of Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No.
6389, which mandates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from
the notice in writing upon registration of the sale.
Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code of
1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, otherwise known as the
Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, provides:
Sec. 12. Lessees right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a
third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter
shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural
lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the
extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption
under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from
notice in writing which shall
be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of
Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority
over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be
the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.
The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR thus tolled
the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioners contention that
Dampal must be considered to have had constructive knowledge thereof
fails in light of the express requirement for notice to be in writing.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
OTILIA STA. ANA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SPOUSES LEON G. CARPO and AURORA CARPO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 164340
Promulgated:
November 28, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision[2] dated March 5, 2004 which reversed and set aside the
Decision[3] of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) dated June 24, 1998 and reinstated the Decision[4] of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Laguna dated October
12, 1993.
The Facts
Respondent Leon Carpo[5] (Leon) and his brother Francisco G. Carpo are
the registered co-owners of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2175
of the Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision, situated at Sta. Rosa, Laguna,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17272[6] of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna, with an area of 91,337 square meters, more
or less. A portion thereof, consisting of 3.5 hectares, pertained to Leon
and his wife, respondent Aurora Carpo. It was devoted to rice and corn
production (subject land) and was tenanted by one Domingo Pastolero
(Domingo), husband of AdoracionPastolero (Adoracion).[7] When
Domingo passed away, Adoracion together with her son ElpidioPastolero,
assumed the tenancy rights of Domingo over the subject land.
However, on December 29, 1983, Adoracion, by executing a notarized
PinanumpaangSalaysay[8] with the conformity of Leon, and for a
consideration of P72,500.00, transferred her rights in favor of petitioner
Otilia Sta. Ana[9] (petitioner) who, together with her husband, Marciano
de la Cruz (Marciano), became the new tenants of the subject land.
At the outset, the parties had a harmonious tenancy relationship.[10]
Unfortunately, circumstances transpired which abraded the relationship.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) mediated in order to amicably
settle the controversy, but no settlement was reached by the parties.
Thus, the instant case.
In their Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment of Lease
Rentals[11] dated December 1, 1989, respondents alleged that it was
their agreement with petitioner and Marciano to increase the existing
rentals from 36 cavans to 45 cavans, and that, if respondents wanted to
repossess the property, they only had to pay the petitioner the amount
of P72,500.00, the same amount paid by the latter to Adoracion.
Respondents further averred that despite repeated demands, petitioner
refused to pay the actual rentals from July 1985 to September 1989, in
violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817; and that the subject land
had been declared, upon the recommendation of the Human Settlements
Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning
Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondents
prayed that petitioner be ejected from the subject land and be directed
to pay P75,016.00 as unpaid rentals.
In their Answer[12] dated January 26, 1990, petitioner and Marciano
denied that there was an agreement to increase the existing rental which
was already fixed at 36 cavans of palay, once or twice a year depending
on the availability of irrigation water; that neither was there an
agreement as to the future surrender of the land in favor of the
respondents; that they did not refuse to pay the rentals because they
even sent verbal and written notices to the respondents, advising them
to accept the same; and that in view of the latters failure to respond,
petitioner and Marciano were compelled to sell the harvest and to
deposit the proceeds thereof in Savings Account No. 9166 with the
Universal Savings Bank at Sta. Rosa, Laguna under the names of Leon and
Marciano. As their special affirmative defense, petitioner and Marciano
claimed that Marciano is a farmer-beneficiary of the subject land
pursuant to P.D. 27. Petitioner and Marciano prayed for the outright
dismissal of the complaint and for the declaration of Marciano as full
owner of the subject land.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The PARADs Ruling
On October 12, 1993, the PARAD ruled that petitioner and Marciano
deliberately defaulted in the payment of the rentals due the respondents.
The PARAD found that the deposit made with Republic Planters Bank was
actually in the names of petitioner and Marciano, hence, personal to
them. The PARAD also found that it was only during the hearing that
petitioner and Marciano deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the
Universal Savings Bank for the unpaid rentals. As such the PARAD
considered the deposits as late payments and as implied admission that
indeed petitioner and Marciano did not pay the past rentals when they
fell due. The PARAD further held and disposed thus:
The intent of the defendant to subject the said area under PD 27 should
pass the criteria set. Foremost is the determination of the aggregate
riceland of plaintiff. He must have more than seven (7) hectares of land
principally devoted to the planting of palay. Area over seven (7) hectares
shall be the one to be covered by PD 27 on Operation Land Transfer
(OLT). In the case at bar, defendants failed to prove that plaintiff has
more than the required riceland. In fact the subject 3.5 hectares are
jointly owned by two. Hence, coverage for OLT is remote.
Defendant claimed that plaintiff is covered by LOI 474, and therefore, he
is zero retention of area. In reference to said law, wherein it provides
landowner with other agricultural land of more than 7 hectares, or have
other industrial lands from where he and his family derived resources,
then, the owner cannot retain any riceland. However, this is not
applicable in the instant case, as the defendant failed to prove that
plaintiff has other source of income from where they will derive their
sustenance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Ordering the ejectment of defendant from the subject landholding
for non-payment of lease rentals;
b) Ordering the defendant Marciano de la Cruz to surrender the
possession and cultivation of the subject land to herein plaintiffs;
c) Ordering the defendant to pay as actual damage the amount of
P75,016.00 corresponding to the unpaid rentals from July 18, 1985 up to
September 16, 1989[; and]
d) [D]eclaring the subject land not covered by Presidential Decree No.
27, Republic Act [No.] 6657, and Executive Order No. 228.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner and Marciano sought relief from the DARAB.[13]
The DARABs Ruling
On June 24, 1998, the DARAB held:
It is a fundamental rule in this jurisdiction that for non-payment of lease
rentals to warrant the dispossession and ejectment of a tenant, the same
must be made in a willful and deliberate manner (Cabero v. Caturna, et
al., CA-G.R. 05886-R, March 10, 1977). For a valid ouster or ejectment of
a farmer-tenant, the willful and deliberate intent not to pay lease rentals
and/or share can be ascertained when there is a determination of will not
to do a certain act.
Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be
concluded that the defendants-appellants deliberately failed or refused
to pay their lease rentals. It was not the fault of defendants-appellants
herein that the rentals did not reach the plaintiffs-appellees because the
latter choose to lend a deaf ear to the notices sent to them. Clearly,
therefore plaintiffs-appellees failed to show by substantial evidence that
the defendants-appellants deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease
rentals. It has been held that the mere failure of a tenant to pay the
landowners share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject
the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the
tenant to pay (Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, 1 SCRA 1106).
Thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal interposed by the defendants-appellants
to be meritorious, the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and
another judgment issued as follows:
1. Enjoining plaintiffs-appellees to respect the peaceful possession and
cultivation of the land in suit by the defendants-appellants; and
2. Directing the MARO of Sta. Rosa, Laguna to assist the parties in the
proper accounting of lease rentals to be paid by the defendants-
appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. On April 16, 2003, Marciano
passed away.[14]
The CAs Ruling
On March 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the PARAD that
petitioner and Marciano failed to pay the rentals and that there was no
valid tender of payment. The CA added that this failure to pay was
tainted with bad faith and deliberate intent. Thus, petitioner and
Marciano did not legally comply with their duties as tenants. Moreover,
the CA held that the subject land was not covered by P.D. 27, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228, since the same
had become a residential, commercial and industrial land, to wit:
In the case at bar, We opted to give more weight to the petitioners
contention that the subject landholding is for residential, commercial,
and industrial purposes as declared by zoning ordinance of 1981 of the
town of Sta. Rosa, Laguna upon recommendation of the Human
Settlement Committee xxx. The vicinity map of the subject landholding
shows that it is almost beside Nissan Motors Technopa[r]k and
surrounded by the South Expressway and several companies such as the
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and Toyota Motors Philippines along
the Pulong Santa Cruz, National Road. The vicinity map shows therefore
that the subject landholding is a residential, commercial, and industrial
area exempted from the coverage of P.D. No. 27, Republic Act. No. 6657
and Executive Order No. 228.
The CA ruled in favor of the respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board-Central Office, Elliptical Road, Diliman, Quezon City
(promulgated on June 24, 1998) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one entered-REINSTATING the decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board-Region IV, Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (dated October 12, 1993). No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] assailing the
aforementioned Decision which the CA, however, denied in its
Resolution[16] dated June 28, 2004.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARROGATING
UPON ITSELF WHAT IS OTHERWISE DARS POWER TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE SUBJECT AGRICULTURAL LAND HAS BECOME
RESIDENTIAL/INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
EQUATED LAND RECLASSIFICATION WITH LAND CONVERSION FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE PROPRIETY OF EJECTMENT OF AN
AGRICULTURAL LESSEE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED
TO NOTE THAT AN EJECTMENT SUIT BASED ON A CLAIM OF NON-
PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTAL IS DIAMETRICALLY ANTITHETICAL TO THE
CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS NO LONGER AGRICULTURAL BUT A
RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL AREA EXEMPTED FROM
THE COVERAGE OF P.D. NO. 27, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 AND EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 228.
THE DECISION DATED MARCH 5, 2004--INSOFAR AS IT ADOPTED THE
FINDING OF DARAB-REGION IV, OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL
ADJUDICATOR, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA INSTEAD OF THAT OF THE DARAB-
CENTRAL--IS VIOLATIVE OF SEC. 14, ART. VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
FOR HAVING DECIDED WITHOUT EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH SAID DECISION IS
BASED.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RESORTING
TO SURMISES AND CONJECTURES WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE OF
THE HEREIN PETITIONER AND HER DECEASED HUSBAND TO DELIVER THE
LEASE RENTALS TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS, WAS DONE SO IN BAD FAITH
AND WITH DELIBERATE INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE LAND OWNERS
THEREOF.
Petitioner asseverates that there is no evidence to support respondents'
claim that the failure to pay the lease rentals was tainted with
malevolence, as the records are replete with acts indicative of good faith
on the part of the petitioner and Marciano and bad faith on the part of
respondents.
Moreover, petitioner claimed that the power to determine whether or
not the subject land is non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), lies with the DAR,
and not with the courts; that mere reclassification by way of a zoning
ordinance does not warrant the dispossession of a tenant but conversion
does, and entitles the tenant to payment of disturbance compensation;
the legal concepts of reclassification and conversion are separate and
distinct from each other; that respondents' complaint before the PARAD
alleged and established the fact that the subject land is a riceland,
therefore, agricultural; that the CA failed to explain why it upheld the
findings of the PARAD on the issue of non-payment of lease rentals; and
that though the issue of non-payment of lease rentals is a question of
fact, due to the conflict of the factual findings of the PARAD and CA with
those of the DARAB, petitioner asks that this Court review the evidence
on record, and pursuant to the CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna, et
al.,[17] rule on whether petitioner willfully and deliberately refused to
pay lease rentals as to warrant her dispossession from the subject
land.[18]
On the other hand, respondents aver that petitioner and her family are
wealthy, as they own numerous properties in Sta. Rosa, Laguna including
a luxurious house;[19] that, as such, petitioner cannot be considered as a
landless tenant deserving the protection of agrarian reform laws; that the
DARAB negated the highest degree of respect the factual findings of the
PARAD deserved; that petitioner's claims that Marciano repeatedly made
verbal and written notices[20] for Leon to accept their lease rentals were
fraudulent designs to disguise the deliberate intent of petitioner not to
pay the lease rentals; that when Leon went to petitioner's residence,
petitioner did not pay the P10,000.00 due as lease rentals; that during
the hearing before the PARAD, when respondents' counsel requested
that they be furnished a bank certificate as to the existence of said bank
deposits in Republic Planters Bank as of April 20, 1987 and October 1,
1987, petitioner herself commented, Nagdepositohotalaga kami
sapangalannamin;[21] that the statement of petitioner is an admission
that bank deposits, if any, were made, not in the name of Leon as
contained in the written notices, but rather in the names of petitioner
and Marciano; that such certificate was not introduced in evidence and
that upon inquiry, said deposits do not actually exist; that per recent
inquiry, the bank deposit in Universal Savings Bank only contains
P1,020.19 due to previous withdrawals made by Marciano; that the
foregoing circumstances indicate a pattern of fraudulent
misrepresentations by the petitioner to mislead the DARAB into believing
that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately refuse to pay the lease
rentals; that from July 18, 1985 up to the present, petitioner failed to pay
the lease rentals showing again, the deliberate refusal to pay; that this
default on the part of the petitioner has been recurring for several years
already, thus depriving the respondents as landowners of their share of
the subject land in violation of the principle of social justice; that as
raised in respondents Omnibus Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration[22] before the DARAB and as found by the CA based on
its vicinity map,[23] the subject land is of a residential, commercial and
industrial character, exempted from agrarian reform coverage; and that
the DARAB erred in not finding the sale of the tenancy rights of
Adoracion to petitioner and Marciano for P72,500.00 violative of P.D. 27
even if the same was with Leon's consent. The sale, respondents contend
was therefore, null and void ab initio, not susceptible of any
ratification.[24]
Our Ruling
Before we resolve this case on the merits, a procedural issue must be
disposed of.
Respondents strongly argue that the instant Petition was filed out of time
because, while petitioner originally claimed to have received her copy of
the CA Resolution[25]dated June 28, 2004, denying her Motion for
Reconsideration,[26] on July 12, 2004, petitioner eventually admitted,
after respondents showed proof to the contrary, that she actually
received the said Resolution on July 7, 2004.[27] Thus, petitioner had
only up to July 22, 2004 to appeal the CA's ruling to this Court. In this
case, petitioner filed her Motion[28] for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review on Certiorari (Motion) on July 23, 2004. As such, there was no
more period to extend. Further, the instant Petition was filed on August
27, 2004, or three (3) days beyond the thirty-day extended period.
Hence, respondents submit that the CA decision had already become
final and executory.[29]
Petitioner alleges that on July 15, 2004, she met with her counsel to
engage the latter's legal services. During said meeting, counsel asked
petitioner about the date of receipt of the assailed CA Resolution.
Petitioner replied that she received her copy on July 12, 2004. On July 20,
2004, counsel filed an Entry of Appearance with the CA.[30] On July 23,
2004, petitioner through counsel filed the Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review. On August 11, 2004, petitioner received a
copy of respondents' Opposition to the Motion. Thereafter, upon
verification, petitioner admitted that she received the copy of the CA
Resolution on July 7, 2004. Thus, her Motion was admittedly filed one day
late. Petitioner begs the indulgence of this Court for her oversight and
mistake, attributing the same to her lack of education and old age.
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather
than to promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the
rules or except a particular case from their operation. Law and
jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with
the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of
the duty to reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the
parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.[31]
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo[32] is instructive:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary
situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us,
depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and
give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the
technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of
the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently
apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent
the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts
have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be
given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
In this case, petitioner was one day late in filing her Motion for Extension.
To deny the Petition on this ground alone is too harsh a penalty for a days
delay, taking into consideration the time, resources and effort spent by
petitioner and even by the respondents, in order to pursue this case all
the way to this Court. Thus, we dispense with the apparent procedural
defect and resolve this case on the merits. The ends of justice are better
served when cases are determined on the merits with all parties given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections.[33]
The Petition is impressed with merit.
In sum, there are two (2) ultimate issues that require resolution in this
case:
1) Whether the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had already
become residential, commercial and/or industrial, thus, excluded from
the coverage of our laws on agrarian reform; and
2) Whether the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant, failed to pay her
lease rentals when the same fell due as to warrant her dispossession of
the subject land.
On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative.
To recapitulate, the instant case sprang from a Complaint for Ejectment
based on Non-Payment of lease rentals. Though an allegation was made
by the respondents that the land had been declared, upon the
recommendation of the Human Settlements Committee, suitable for
commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the
Municipality of Sta. Rosa, no argument was advanced by respondents to
support such allegation, in the same way that no prayer for the
ejectment of the tenants was raised based on that allegation. The PARAD
held that petitioner should be ejected for non-payment of lease rentals.
It also ruled that the subject land is not covered by P.D. No. 27, R.A. No.
6657, and E.O. No. 228, not on the basis of the allegation in the
complaint, but on the respondents' right of retention.
On appeal, the DARAB concentrated on the issue of petitioners failure to
pay lease rentals. When the DARAB ruled that petitioner and Marciano
did not deliberately fail to pay said rentals, respondents raised a new
issue in their Omnibus Motion that the transaction between Adoracion
and petitioner was void in violation of P.D. No. 27, despite the conformity
of Leon. This issue was not resolved by the DARAB.
Finally, when the case reached the CA, the appellate court affirmed the
findings of the PARAD that petitioner and Marciano deliberately and in
bad faith did not pay the lease rentals. The CA, however, also held that
the subject land had already become a residential, commercial and
industrial area based on the vicinity map showing that the land was
surrounded by commercial and industrial establishments.
Without doubt, the PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that
the subject land was no longer covered by our agrarian laws because of
the retention rights of the respondents. The CA likewise acted without
jurisdiction when it ruled that the land had become non-agricultural
based on a zoning ordinance of 1981 on the strength of a mere vicinity
map. These rulings violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial
powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2)
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.[34]
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid,[35] we held:
As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno [343 SCRA 153], "the DAR is
vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program." The
DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program under R.A. No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A.
No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations."
Under Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agrarian dispute" is
defined to include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
Simply put, agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in
jurisprudence, are within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of
the PARAD and the DARAB, while issues of retention and non-coverage of
a land under agrarian reform, among others, are within the domain of
the DAR Secretary.
Thus, Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or the
Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative
implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as
enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be
under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the
Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:
3.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under
the agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of CLOAs and EPs,
including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of such
coverage;
3.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or
disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries;
3.3 Subdivision surveys of land under CARP;
3.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates of Land
Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside
the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance,
recall, or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with the Register
of Deeds;
3.5 Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;
3.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA
6657;
3.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ)
Opinion No. 44 (1990);
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock,
swine, and poultry raising;
3.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fish pond and prawn farms from the
coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
3.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found unsuitable for
agricultural purposes;
3.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses and purposes
including protests or oppositions thereto;
3.12 Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to
homelots;
3.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenants/farmer-beneficiary's
landholdings;
3.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
3.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and its
predecessors; or
3.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to
it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner
and respondents in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of
lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage
by
the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB.[36] But issues with respect to
the retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the
exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian
reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the DARAB, but by
the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are Agrarian
Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
It has not escaped our notice that, as this case progressed and reached a
higher level in the hierarchy of tribunals, the respondents would,
invariably, proffer an additional theory or defense, in order to effect
petitioners eviction from the land. As a consequence, the simple issue of
ejectment based on non-payment of rentals has been muddled.
Proof necessary for the resolution of the issue of the land being covered
by, or excluded/exempted from, P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and other
pertinent agrarian laws, as well as of the issue of the right of retention of
the respondents, was not offered in evidence. Worse, the PARAD
resolved the issue of retention even if it was not raised by the
respondents at that level, and even if the PARAD had no jurisdiction over
the same.
Likewise, the CA ruled that the land had ceased being agricultural on the
basis of a mere vicinity map, in open disregard of the Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction, since the issue was within the province of the Secretary of
DAR.
We take this opportunity to remind the PARAD and the CA that courts of
justice have no power to decide a question not in issue. A judgment that
goes beyond the issues, and purports to adjudicate something on which
the parties were not heard, is extra-judicial, irregular and invalid. This
norm applies not only to courts of justice, but also to quasi-judicial
bodies such as the PARAD. Accordingly, premature and irregular were the
PARAD ruling on the retention rights of the respondents, and the CA
decision on the non-agricultural character of the land subject of this
controversy -- these issues not having passed the scrutiny of the DAR
Secretary -- are premature and irregular.[37]
Thus, we cannot allow ourselves to fall into the same error as that
committed by the PARAD and the CA, and resolve the issue of the non-
agricultural nature of the subject land by receiving, at this stage, pieces of
evidence and evaluating the same, without the respondents having first
introduced them in the proper forum. The Office of the DAR Secretary is
in a better position to resolve the issues on retention and
exclusion/exemption from agrarian reform coverage, being the agency
lodged with such authority inasmuch it possesses the necessary expertise
on the matter.[38]
Likewise, we refrain from entertaining the issue raised by respondents
that petitioner and her family are not landless tenants and are therefore
not deserving of any protection under our laws on agrarian reform,
because fairness and due process dictate that issues not raised in the
proceedings below should not be raised for the first time on appeal.[39]
On the second issue, we rule in the negative.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844,[40] as amended, coupled
with the fact that the respondents are the complainants themselves, the
burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment
of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee rests upon the respondents as
agricultural lessors.[41] This proceeds from the principle that a tenancy went to the point of seeking government intervention in order to address
relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to security of tenure. their problems with respondents. Absent such deliberate and willful
Petitioner can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on refusal to pay lease rentals, petitioner's ejectment from the subject land
grounds provided by law.[42] Section 36 of the same law pertinently is not justified.
provides:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
Sec. 36.Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60640 is hereby REVERSED and
agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated June 24, 1998 in DARAB Case No.
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the 2203 is REINSTATED without prejudice to the rights of respondent-
Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is spouses Leon and Aurora Carpo to seek recourse from the Office of the
shown that: Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary on the other issues they
raised. No costs.
x xxx
SO ORDERED.
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due:
Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop
failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although
the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished;
x xx
Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The agricultural tenant's
failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to
warrant his dispossession of the land that he tills.
Petitioner's counsel opines that there appears to be no decision by this
Court on the matter; he thus submits that we should use the CA decision
in Cabero v. Caturna. This is not correct. In an En Banc Decision by this
Court in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al.,[43] we held that under our law
and jurisprudence, mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder's share
does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when
there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay. This
ruling has not been overturned.
The term deliberate is characterized by or results from slow, careful,
thorough calculation and consideration of effects and consequences.[44]
The term willful, on the other hand, is defined as one governed by will
without yielding to reason or without regard to reason.[45]
We agree with the findings of the DARAB that it was not the fault of
petitioner that the lease rentals did not reach the respondents because
the latter chose to ignore the notices sent to them. To note, as early as
November 10, 1986, Marciano executed an Affidavit[46] stating that Leon
refused to receive the respective lease rentals consisting of 37 cavans for
November 1985 and July 1986. For 1987, Marciano wrote Leon two
letters[47] informing him of the availability of the lease rentals for April
and October of the same year. On April 27, 1988, Marciano sought DAR
intervention and mediation with respect to the execution of a leasehold
contract and the fixing of the leasehold rentals.[48]Meetings were set but
respondents failed to attend.[49] The dispute was referred to the
barangay but the parties failed to amicably settle.[50]
These factual circumstances negate the PARAD findings of Marcianos and
petitioner's deliberate and willful intent not to pay lease rentals. Good
faith was clearly demonstrated by Marciano and petitioner when,
because respondents refused to accept the proffered payment, they even
 FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 191479, September 21, 2015 ]
JESUS VELASQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES PATERNO C. CRUZ AND
ROSARIO CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review of the Decision[1] dated 12 August 2009
and Resolution[2] dated 24 February 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 105140 which ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos City, Branch 79 to assume jurisdiction over the complaint in Civil
Case No. 264-M-2007 for recovery of possession with damages.
The facts are as follows:
Respondents Spouses Paterno and Rosario Cruz are the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Sta. Monica in Hagonoy,
Bulacan with an area of four hectares, more or less, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 020-10-022-11-027. On 7 May 2007, respondents filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Accounting and Damages
against petitioner Jesus Velasquez. Respondents alleged in their
Complaint that petitioner's father-in-law, Bernabe Navarro (Navarro) was
a tenant in said lot until 6 April 1985 when the latter relinquished his
tenancy rights by virtue of a SinumpaangSalaysay; that no other person
was installed as tenant of the farmland; that they discovered that
petitioner entered the farmland without their knowledge and consent;
that from 1985 up to the time of the filing of the complaint, petitioner
never paid a single centavo as rent for the use of the land; and that they
leased the farmland to a certain Godofredo Tosco in 1995 but petitioner
refused to vacate the property. Respondents prayed for the surrender of
possession of the property to them and for accounting and damages.[3]
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,, petitioner contended that,
jurisdiction pertains to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) because in the instant controversy is an agrarian dispute.
Petitioner asserted that he was assisting Navarro in tilling the land since
1975. He claimed that he continued working on the land after the death
of Navarro. Petitioner defended his non-payment of rentals due to the
fact that the subject land has lost its suitability for agricultural
production, thus, his non-payment is not a ground for dispossession. As a
further justification to the non-payment of rentals, petitioner emphasized
that since the implementation of the Operation Land Transfer, he is
deemed to be the owner of the subject land and respondents had no
more right to demand rentals. Petitioner claimed that he was identified
as a farmer-beneficiary and has since been paying amortizations to Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP).[4]
On 15 April 2008, the RTC issued an Order[5] dismissing the case for want
of jurisdiction. On 27 June 2008, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by respondents for violation of the three-day notice
rule.[6]
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
arguing that the elements of tenancy, which would vest jurisdiction on
the DARAB, were not sufficiently established. Respondents also assailed
the denial of their motion for reconsideration for violation of the three-
day notice rule. Respondents explained that the motion for
reconsideration was served on 5 May 2008 and the hearing was set on 9
May 2008. Respondents averred that they had no intention to violate the
said rule because they were of the belief that the motion for
reconsideration would be received by respondents' counsel on the
following day, 6 May 2008.[7]
During the pendency of the petition before the appellate court,
petitioner became the registered owner of the subject land under
Original Certificate of Title No. EP-992-C.[8]
Before petitioner could inform the appellate court of this significant
development, the Court of Appeals, on 12 August 2009, found merit in
respondents' petition. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals'
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 15, 2008 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Branch 79, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is hereby ordered to assume
jurisdiction over the case and act on it with dispatch.[9]
The appellate court ruled that petitioner failed to establish tenancy
relationship between the parties. According to the appellate court, the
elements of consent and sharing of harvest are lacking. Moreover,
petitioner was held as unqualified to be a successor-tenant by virtue of
hereditary succession because he is not among those listed under Section
9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, he being only a relative by affinity.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner claimed absolute ownership
over the disputed land by virtue of the issuance of an emancipation
patent in his favor and the corresponding registration of the same With
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on 19 September 2008. Resultantly,
petitioner argued that the issue of tenancy is now immaterial and any
and all matters relating to the identification, qualification or
disqualification of petitioner as a farmer-beneficiary, as well as the
validity of his emancipation patent are in the nature of an agrarian
dispute, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court.
On 24 February 2010, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[10]
Aggrieved, petitioner file d the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
contending that the award of an emancipation patent in the name of
petitioner is the best proof that Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
has identified him as the bonafide successor of his deceased father-in-
law, Navarro. Petitioner adds that by becoming the farmer-beneficiary
and registered owner of the subject lot, the issue of the existence or non-
existence of tenancy relationship between the parties has become moot
and academic. Petitioner maintains that since Original Certificate of Title
No. EP-992-C was issued pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27
and Operation Land Transfer, any and all actions pertaining to the right
and obligation of petitioner in connection thereto is vested in DARAB
which has primary and exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction.
Similarly, any and all matters relating to the identification, qualification or
disqualification of petitioner as a farmer-beneficiary over the subject land
and the validity of his emancipation patent over the same land are in the
nature of an agrarian dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC. Lastly,
petitioner asserts that respondents had clearly recognized the authority
of the DAR to take cognizance of the dispute between the parties when
they had previously submitted the matter involved herein with the
various DAR offices.
Respondents counter that not all the elements of agricultural tenancy are
present in this case. Petitioner could not have succeeded Navarro as
tenant of respondents because he is not among those listed under
Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844. Respondents cite the Court of Appeals
observation that it has not come across any official document from the
DAR expressly identifying petitioner as Navarro's successor. Respondents
insist that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
The core of this dispute is the question of whom between the DARAB and
the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case.
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
x xxx
Rule II, Section 1(1.1) of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure:
RULE II
Jurisdiction of the Board and its Adjudicators
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. The Adjudicator
shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate the following cases:
1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands
covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related agrarian
laws;
Based on the above-cited rules, only DARAB can adjudicate an agrarian
dispute.
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this wise:
x xxx
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under R.A. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be tenancy
relationship between the parties.
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner
and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly
the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which
relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and
cultivating the land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give
rise to security of tenure.[11]
In order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, viz.: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. All these requisites are
necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or
more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.[12]
The Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the absence of the consent
and sharing of harvests as indispensable elements of a tenancy
relationship. We agree with the appellate court's disquisition. The
appellate court held in this wise:
It appears that the element of consent and sharing of harvests are clearly
lacking. [Petitioner] merely alleged that he was verbally asked by all the
heirs of Guillerma Coronel to continue working on the land. The fact that
[petitioner] was allowed to stay on the property does not mean that
[respondents] impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation
with [petitioner]. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will
not ipso facto make one a dejure tenant.
x xxx
In this case, [petitioner]could not present any evidence showing that
[respondents] had recognized him as tenant. The other pieces of
evidence submitted by the [petitioner] do not prove the alleged tenancy
relationship as the certifications he presented could only show that he is
the actual occupant of the land, a fact recognized by the [respondents]
and the reason why they instituted an action for recovery of possession.
Being an actual occupant of the land is definitely different from being a
tenant thereof.
More importantly, [petitioner] was not able to show that he shared his
harvests, not even once, with the [respondents]. He just reasoned out
that he was not able to remit his dues because the land became
unproductive due to the intrusion of saline waters. No explanation was
offered to show that he exerted efforts to make the land productive for
agricultural production. Instead, he took the opportunity to release
bangus fingerlings but without giving any share of this income to the
[respondents].[13]
According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner's claim that he succeeded
Navarro as tenant is questionable. Section 9 of RA 3844 provides an
exclusive enumeration of those who are qualified to succeed to the
leasehold rights of a deceased or incapacitated tenant, to wit:
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or
Incapacity of the Parties. - In case of death or permanent incapacity of
the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall
continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can
cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor
within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among
the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant
by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the
order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or permanent
incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year,
such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year:
Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise
his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in
accordance with the order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the
leasehold shall bind his legal heirs.
Petitioner, a relative by affinity of Navarro, is, to the Court of Appeals,
not qualified to succeed as tenant.
The Court of Appeals cited additional reasons, based on standing rulings
and administrative issuances, which support petitioner's disqualification
as successor of the deceased tenant, thus:
Neither can this Court recognize him as the bona fide successor of
Navarro's Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) award under P.D. 27. The
ruling in the case of Tumol vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 150646, July 15, 2005, is
instructive:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Presidential Decree No. 27, and the
Policy of the Government laid down in the Code of Agrarian Reforms to
establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family size farm as the
basis of agricultural development of the country, the following rules and
regulations shall be observed in the event of death of a tenant-
beneficiary:
Succession to the farmholding covered by Operation Land Transfer, shall
be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines subject to the following limitations:
x xxx
2. For the purpose of determining who among the heirs shall be the sole
owner-cultivator, the following rules shall apply:
x xxx
b. Where there are several heirs, and in the absence of extra-judicial
settlement or waiver of rights in favor of one heir who shall be the sole
owner and cultivator, the heirs shall within one month from death of the
tenant-beneficiary be free to choose from among themselves one who
shall have sole ownership and cultivation of the land, subject to
Paragraph 1(b) and (c) hereof: Provided, however, That the surviving
spouse shall be given first preference; otherwise, in the absence or due
to the permanent incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority shall be
determined among the heirs according to age.
In fact, Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1978 also
provides:
Where there are several heirs, and in the absence of extra judicial
settlement or waiver of rights in favor of the one heir who shall be the
sole owner and cultivator, the heirs shall[,] within one month from the
death of the tenant-beneficiary[,] be free to choose from among
themselves one who shall have sole ownership and cultivation of the
land, xxx Provided, however, That [sic] the surviving spouse shall be given
first preference; otherwise, in the absence or due to the permanent
incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority shall be determined among
the heirs according to age (emphases and underlining omitted).
Moreover, the ministry memorandum circular specifically provides that:
1. Succession to the farmholding covered by Operation Land Transfer
shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines subject to the following limitations:
2.
a. The farmholding shall not be partitioned or fragmented.
b. The ownership and cultivation of the farmholding shall ultimately be
consolidated in one heir who possesses the following qualifications:
(1) being a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmer's
cooperative;
(2) capable of personally cultivating the farmholding; and
(3) willing to assume the obligations and responsibilities of a tenant-
beneficiary.
c. Such owner-cultivator shall compensate the other heirs to the extent
of their respective legal interest in the land, subject to the payment of
whatever outstanding obligations of the deceased tenant-beneficiary.
Again, being a relative only by affinity of the deceased Bernabe Navarro,
[petitioner]cannot lay claim as his successor. The (c)ourt cannot accept
his assertion that he was already identified by the DAR as the successor
on the basis of land amortization receipts. Said receipts merely show that
[petitioner] was the payor but these do not, in any way, recognize him as
the tenant-beneficiary of the land. It could be that it was in the account
of Bernabe Navarro. The [c]ourt has not come across any official
document from the DAR that expressly identified him as Bernabe
Navarro's successor.[14]
We also note the appellate court's reference to the well-entrenched
principle that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter on the
existence of the action is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.[15]
A court does not lose its jurisdiction over a case by the simple expedient
of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The court continues to have the
authority to hear and evaluate the evidence, precisely to determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing, tenancy is shown
to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.[16]
It was mentioned by the appellate court that the Complaint alleged the
following material facts:
x xxx
3. Plaintiffs are the registered owners of a parcel of farmland located at
Brgy. Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of four (4) hectares,
more or less, under Tax Declaration Property Index No. 020-10-022-11-
027, which they acquired from Guillerma Coronel Vda. de Cruz, plaintiff
Paterno's mother. x xx
4. For a long period of time, the said farmland was tenanted by Bernabe
Navarro;
5. On April 6, 1985, tenant Bernabe Navarro voluntarily surrendered his
tenancy rights over the aforesaid lot through a SinumpaangSalaysay. x xx
6. After Bernabe Navarro relinquished his tenancy rights in favor of
[respondents'] predecessor-in-interest, no other person was installed as
tenant of the farmland;
The averments of respondents' complaint, taken as true, establish the
nature of the action which the court has jurisdiction to determine,
precisely, whether or not tenancy exist between the parties. Thus did
respondents as plaintiffs aver that they are the registered owners of the
subject property which they acquired from Guillerma Coronel Vda. de
Cruz; that their tenant, Navarro, relinquished his tenancy rights on 6 April
1985, and since then, no one was installed as tenant; that in 1995,
respondents were dispossessed of their property when petitioner refused
the entry of and surrender the possession of farmland to Mr.Godofredo
Tosco, a lessee of respondents. Jurisdiction pertains to the RTC where an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title takes place.

7. Not long thereafter, [respondents] discovered that [petitioner] Jesus
Velasquez entered the farmland without their consent and without the
knowledge of their predecessor-in-interest. Thus, they confronted
[petitioner] for his actuations.
8. However, from 1985 up to the present, [petitioner] Jesus Velasquez
never paid even a single centavo to [respondents] as rent for the use of
the land. Worse, [petitioner] converted the farmland into a fishpond
without notice and consent of the [respondents] or their predecessor-in-
interest;
The issuance of the emancipation patent was brought to the attention of
the Court of Appeals through a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the appellate court and rightfully so. Our discussion is and
should be limited only on the issue of tenancy, which is determinative of
jurisdietion. The validity of the emancipation patent, which may or may
not involve tenancy, cannot be decided by this Court. We can only
resolve said issue if brought before us on appeal and only after the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.[19]

9. Sometime in 1988 and 1989 Fernando Cruz and Jose Cruz, brothers of
[Paterno Cruz], attempted to visit the farmland but they were menacingly
denied entry by the [petitioner];

10. Considering that [respondents] never received any rental payment

from [petitioner], they sought means on how tc earn income therefrom.
Hence, on July 6, 1995, [respondent] Paterno Cruz, together with his
siblings, entered into a lease contract over the premises subject matter of
this action with Godofredo M. Tosco. x xx

11. Unfortunately, [petitioner] unjustifiably refused the entry of and

surrender to Mr.Godofredo Tosco the peaceful possession of the
farmland. This, [petitioner] did, despite receipt from [respondent]
Rosario Cruz a letter informing him that Mr. Tosco would be the lawful
possessor of the lot by virtue of his lease contract with [respondents]. x
xx

14. On account of [petitioner's] illegal occupancy of the lot in

controversy, [respondents] were deprived of their income that could be
derived from the rental thereof, the amount of which is submitted to the
sound discretion of this Honorable Court, after [petitioner] is ordered to
account for all the benefits he derived from use of the premises.[17]

Reading the material allegations of the Complaint, the decision under

review concluded that the case below was for recovery of possession or
an accionpubliciana, a plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the
complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession had become illegal,
the action will be an accionpubliciana.[18]