THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, versus
Subsequently,
EFREN MATEO y GARCIA, Appellant, G.R. NO. 147678-87,
2004 July 7, En Banc
VITUG, J.:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count
of rape, allegedly committed on ten different dates - 07
October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12
January 1996, 29 February 1996, 08 May 1996, 02 July 1996,
18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 - were filed
against appellant EFREN MATEO. Except for the variance in
dates, the ten informations, later docketed Criminal Cases No.
9351 to No. 9360, inclusive, in the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac, uniformly read -
"The undersigned OIC Provincial Prosecutor upon
preliminary investigation conducted by the MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac,
Branch 1, accuses Efren Mateo of Brgy. Buenavista, Tarlac,
Tarlac of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality
of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Efren
Mateo y Garcia, who is the guardian of the complaining
witness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge
with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against her
consent."[1]
The trial ensued following a plea of not guilty entered by
appellant to all the charges.
According to Imelda Mateo, she was born on 11 September
1980 to the spouses Dan Icban and Rosemarie Capulong.
Rosemarie Capulong and appellant started to live together
without the benefit of marriage when private complainant was
only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and
appellant in a house in Buenavista, Tarlac, and adopted the
surname of appellant when she started schooling.
Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred
her mother, Rosemarie, was not at home. On 07 October
1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie went to Bamban
and returned home only the next day. The second rape was
said to have occurred on 14 December 1995, while her mother
was attending a seminar for day-care workers. Imelda recalled
the third rape to have been committed on 05 January 1996, the
same day her mother resigned from her job and left for Manila.
The fourth rape, she said, happened a week later, on 12
January 1996, when Rosemarie Capulong was attending yet
another seminar for day-care workers. The fifth incident was
on 29 February 1996, when Rosemarie left for Manila to follow-
up her application for an overseas job. The sixth rape took
place on 08 May 1996 when Rosemarie was once again in
Manila to attend to her application papers. On 01 July 1996,
Rosemarie and appellant left for Manila as Rosemarie was
scheduled to depart for Jeddah. Appellant returned home in
the evening of the next day, 02 July 1996, the same day the
job recruiter relayed the news that Rosemarie Capulong could
not yet leave for Jeddah. During the night, appellant again
molested Imelda. With Rosemarie finally away, appellant
frequented his nocturnal visits. On the night of 18 July 1996,
appellant went into her room and abused her while her siblings
were sleeping in the sala. The same incident was repeated on
the night of 16 August 1996 when appellant, already naked,
entered the room and sexually assaulted Imelda. The last rape
was committed on 28 August 1996. According to private
complainant, she never reported any of the ten incidents to
anybody because the accused had threatened to kill her and
her mother if she were to disclose the matter to anyone.
Imelda stated that each of the ten rape incidents were
committed in invariably the same fashion. All were perpetrated
inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac, during the night and,
each time, she would try to ward off his advances by kicking
him but that he proved to be too strong for her. These
incidents occurred in the presence of her three sleeping
siblings who failed to wake up despite the struggles she
exerted to fend off the advances. She recalled that in all ten
instances, appellant had covered her mouth with a
1
handkerchief to prevent her from shouting.
however, she changed her statement to say that on two
occasions, particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July
1996 and 18 July 1996, appellant had only covered her mouth
with his hands. Still much later, Imelda testified that he had not
covered her mouth at all.
The predictable pattern of the rape incidents testified to by
Imelda prompted the defense to ask her whether she had, at
any one time, taken any protective measure in anticipation of
the rape incidents. She replied that once she had requested
her brothers and sister to keep her company in the bedroom at
night but appellant had scolded them. On the night of the
fourth rape, she narrated that she armed herself with a knife
but, when appellant entered her room that night, she was not
able to retrieve the bladed weapon from under the bed as
appellant was sitting right on top of it.
Dr. Rosario Fider, the second witness for the prosecution,
stated that she had physically examined private complainant
on 14 October 1996 and found superficially healed lacerations
at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 positions on her private organ that could
have been caused by an insertion of an instrument or by
sexual intercourse. According to Dr. Fider, the lacerations
pointed to possibly one or two, and at most three, incidents of
rape, which had happened not earlier than two weeks before
the date of the physical examination.
Appellant denied each of the charges. On 07 October 1995,
the date of the first rape, he claimed that he was in Barangay
Talaga, Capas, to pick up newly hatched ducklings, numbering
about a thousand, which had to be properly fed, kept warm and
constantly cared for that required him to be around the entire
day and night for two weeks. The fowls had then to be brought
into an open field located one and a half kilometers away
which could be traversed by foot. He continued to tend to the
animals from 20 October 1995 until sometime in February
1996. During the period, he was able to go home only once a
week or three times a month.
On 14 December 1995, the supposed date of the second rape,
appellant admitted that he had temporarily left the care of his
ducks to go caroling with his wife, their daughter Imelda and
some friends. He immediately returned to care for his ducks,
located some 500 meters from their residence, that kept him
busy and away from home when the third, fourth and fifth rape
incidents were said to have taken place on the 5th and 12th of
January and 29th of February of 1996. While he admitted to
leaving occasionally the animals in order to go home, these
visits, however, were said to be brief and mainly for getting
some food and fresh clothes. Appellant could not recall when
exactly he sold the ducks but it was definitely prior to 08 May
1996, the day he was accepted and reported for work at the LA
Construction of Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac, located some three
kilometers away. On 08 May 1996, the date of the sixth rape,
he was at work from seven oclock in the morning until the
following day to finish a rush job.
On 01 July 1996, he accompanied his wife, Rosemarie, to
Manila who was scheduled to leave for Jeddah the following
day. Upon being advised that her flight was postponed, the
couple stayed in the house of one Luding Sevilla in Caloocan.
On 03 July, he returned to Tarlac. From 15 July to September,
1996, he was given the nightshift at the LA Construction.
Appellant asserted that it was impossible for him to have raped
private complainant on 28 August 1996 because at six oclock
that evening, his friends Boy Botio, Boy Pineda, Marvin
Dalangin and Nelson Castro had picked him up at his house to
attend the fiesta at Barangay Murcia, Concepcion, Tarlac,
where they spent the night.
Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the
malicious retribution of a vengeful stepdaughter. Allegedly,
on 11 October 1996, he took private complainant to task after
his son, Marlon Mateo, who had reported seeing her engaged
in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the room
of their house. Earlier, on 05 August 1996, he also learned that
Sharon Flores, a neighbor and a friend of private complainant,
had caught his stepdaughter and Navarro in a very
compromising position. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a
piece of bamboo. He then forbade her from going out at night
and leaving her siblings alone in the house.
Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of private complainant, rose
to testify in defense of her common-law husband. Capulong
asserted that she had not at any time, prior to her departure for
Jeddah, spent any night outside their house. Rosemarie said
that she was a day-care teacher from June 1990 until June
1996. On 07 October 1995, the date of the supposed first
rape, she was at home and did not go to Bamban as so
claimed by private complainant. Capulong disputed the claim
of private complainant that she attended a seminar for day-
care workers on 12 January 1996 since her job did not require
her to attend seminars except for regular meetings held on the
last Friday of every month, with each meeting lasting for only
half a day. The last seminar she had attended was in June of
1990 in Tarlac. On 29 February 1996, Rosemarie was also
certain that she spent the night at home as she had to report
for work the following day. She started obtaining documents
for her planned employment abroad only on 12 February 1996,
when she secured her birth certificate in Bamban as so
attested by the date appearing on the certification from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Bamban. On 08 May 1996, she
admitted being away from home while attending a general
assembly of day-care workers in Zambales. On that day,
appellant was likewise not at home due to his overtime work up
until about three or four oclock in the early morning. Imelda
herself, Capulong testified, had attended on that day the San
Miguel fiesta. Contrary to the allegation of private complainant,
the witness was not in Manila on the 5th and 12th of January
1996 because, at that time, she had yet no plans of working
overseas. She denied the assertions of private complainant
that Capulong had resigned from her day-care work on 05
January 1996, saying it was actually months later, or in June of
1996, when she quit her job. It was on 13 February 1996 when
she went to Manila for the first time to attend to her application
for a possible overseas work. She made subsequent trips to
the city, that is, on the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 24th of the month of
June, to follow-up her employment papers and to submit
herself to a medical check-up. All these visits only took a day,
and she would always be home in Buenavista at nightfall. On
01 July 1996, appellant accompanied her to Manila but, upon
learning that her flight was postponed, they spent the night in
Caloocan. The couple stayed together in Manila until 03 July
1996, when appellant decided to return to Tarlac. Rosemarie
worked in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, until 11 November 1996 when
she decided to return home.
Rosemarie Capulong corroborated the testimony of appellant
regarding his whereabouts from October 1995, when the ducks
were first brought to the field, until 15 December 1995, when
appellant had joined her and their friends caroling. Capulong
believed that the charges may have been fabricated by her
relatives who were jealous of appellant because it was he,
not they, who had been receiving the remittances of her
earnings from Saudi Arabia.
Sharon Flores, a neighbor, testified that, about noontime on 05
August 1996, she repaired to the house of private complainant
to investigate rumors regarding a man seen entering the
Capulong residence. When she went in, she saw private
complainant and Pikong Navarro lying on the bed, embracing
each other under a blanket.
Anselmo Botio, a friend of appellant, and Marlon Mateo, a
brother of private complainant, corroborated appellants alibi.
Botio said that on 28 August 1996, at six oclock in the evening,
he, together with appellant and some friends, went to attend
the fiesta in Barangay Murcia upon the invitation of one Ruben
Santos. The group arrived in Murcia at seven oclock that
evening and promptly had dinner and a drinking spree which
lasted until the morning of the next day.
Marlon Mateo testified that one day in October 1996, while his
mother was working overseas, he arrived home from school,
and saw Pikong Navarro and private complainant, both naked,
on the bed. Navarro was on top of private complainant and
was making thrusting motions. Marlon Mateo hurriedly left to
report the incident to his father.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its
decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding appellant guilty
2
beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape -
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of rape and to indemnify the complainant the sum of
P50,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of rape."[2]
More often than not, the Court has deemed it sufficient to
convict an accused for rape solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim.[3] The heavy reliance normally given
by the Court on the narration of the victim finds justification on
the fact that, generally, she would be the sole witness to the
incident and the shy and demure character of the typical
Filipina would preclude her from fabricating that crime. It is
imperative, nonetheless, that the testimony must be convincing
and straightforward in order to avoid any serious doubt from
being cast on the veracity of the account given.
Relative to the first supposed rape incident, private
complainant categorically stated that she had slept in the lone
bedroom of the house while her siblings and her stepfather
slept in the sala
Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he
undressed me, sir.
x x x xxx xxx
Q. How did (sic) he able to take you out from the room? In
what way?
A. She (sic) lifted me and still my mouth was covered, my
hands were stocked and I cannot move, sir.
Q. She (sic) lifted you by his two hands, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.[4]
Q. You testified on direct examination that there is only one
room in your house, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you were then sleeping inside your house in that
one room, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. While your brothers as well as your stepfather were then
sleeping outside your room, you [were] also sleeping, is that
right?
A. Yes, sir.[5]
In the next breath, however, she testified that all her three
siblings were sleeping with her on the night of 07 October 1995
-
Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he
undressed me, sir.
Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that he brought
you to the sala where your brothers Ryan and Marlon and your
sister Iris were then sleeping?
A. My brothers and sister were sleeping in the room, sir.
Q. Is it not a fact that there was only one room in your
house?
A. But they slept there on that night, sir.
Q. In other words, Madam Witness, you were sleeping
together with Ryan, Marlon, and Iris by that time in one room
together in one bed?
A. Yes, sir.[6]
Still, later, Imelda changed her testimony and said that her
brothers were in the sala and that it was only her sister Iris who
was with her in the bedroom when the rape incidents were
committed -
Q. How about your brother Ryan where did he sleep on
October 7, 1995?
A. At the sala, sir.
Q. Who was with him in the sala?
A. He [was] sleeping with my stepfather and my brother
Marlon, sir.
Q. How about Iris, where was she sleeping?
A. She was with me, sir.
Q. You mean to imply to the Court that according to you the
accused abused you on October 7, 1995, Iris [was] with you in
the room?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes, sir.
x x x xxx xxx
Q. You stated in your direct testimony that on October 7,
1995 your father entered your room where you were sleeping,
covering your mouth and forced you to go to the sala, do you
recall that statement?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you not remember that you have testified that he was
able to take you to the sala?
A. No, sir.
Q. And then when you reached the sala, you stated that the
accused criminally abused you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you not remember having been asked by the
prosecutor examining you, and now I cite to you your
statement; `Q - Public Prosecutor Llobrera, `Now, let us make
it clear. You said you were brought to the sala and your
answer, `Yes, sir. Do you not remember having made that
statement?
A. No, sir.
Q. And another question, `When you reached the sala what
were the first things he did to you and your answer, `He kissed
me, sir. Do you remember that?
A. No, sir. The first time he abused me was in the room,
sir.[7]
The Solicitor General would posit that the claim of private
complainant that she had the sole privilege of sleeping in the
lone bedroom of their house while the rest of the family,
namely both her parents and her three siblings, had to
squeeze themselves in the sala strained credulity, and that the
testimony of her mother, Rosemarie Capulong, to the effect
that the couple were the occupants of the single bedroom while
their children stayed in the sala where the television was
located, made more sense.
Imelda testified that her three siblings - Marlon, Ryan and Iris -
were sleeping inside the house every time the rape incidents
were committed. The identical testimony of everyone else in
the Mateo household, including her mother Rosemarie
Capulong and brother Marlon Mateo, exposed such assertions
to be a blatant lie and categorically stated that Ryan himself
had never stayed in the Mateo residence because he was
living with his grandparents since childhood.
Private complainant testified that during the rape incidents she
was gagged with a handkerchief which rendered her unable to
shout for help. Later on, however, she gave different versions
on whether appellant covered her mouth with his hand or with
a handkerchief during the rape incidents occurring on 07
October 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 18 July
3
1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996. Eventually, she
repudiated her earlier testimony by stating that appellant had
never covered her mouth, either with a handkerchief or with his
hand -
Q. Both the incidents of July 2 and July 18, according to
you, he only covered your mouth on both occasions?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He did not tie your mouth with anything?
A. No, sir.
Q. Miss Witness, in your statement also on August 20,
1997, you stated that the accused covered your mouth and tied
your mouth with a handkerchief on both occasions. Do you
remember having given that statement?
A. No, sir.
Q. So, you do not remember having made that statement?
A. No, sir.
Q. Recalling your testimony you gave on August 20, 1997,
for the July 2 occasion and the testimony that you gave as
appearing on page 18 of the transcript of stenographic notes.
These questions and answers were given and answered by
you. `Q. While he was doing all these things to you, did you
call for help? A. I cannot shout because my mouth was
covered with a handkerchief, sir. Q. Was he holding that
handkerchief? A. It was tied, sir. On July 17, 1997, you said
that the accused tied your mouth on July 2, 1996, and you said
that you cannot shout because your mouth was tied with a
handkerchief. Do you remember having stated that?
A. No, sir.
x x x xxx xxx
Q. On the July 18 occasion, you also stated in your direct
testimony on August 29, 1997, when asked these following
questions appearing on page 21 of the transcript of
stenographic notes. `Q. Tell the Court how did he rape you on
that night? A. On that night while I was sleeping in my room,
he tied a handkerchief in my mouth so I could not shout, sir.
Do you remember having stated that?
A. No, sir.
Q. And also you were asked this question: `Q. After tying
this handkerchief to your mouth, what did he do to you? You
said that he raped you. Do you remember having given this
statement?
A. No, sir.[8]
Also quite telling were some discrepancies in the testimony of
private complainant regarding the whereabouts of her mother
Rosemarie Capulong on the dates of the incidents. According
to private complainant, it was when her mother Rosemarie was
not at home when appellant would commit the dastardly
crimes. Not only did the account of Imelda contradict that of
Rosemarie but that Imelda herself would appear to have made
irreconcilable statements. According to her, on 07 October
1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie had gone to
Bamban to visit her mother. Subsequently, however, she said
that Rosemarie went to Bamban because she worked there,
only to later say that, at that time, Rosemarie had already
resigned from work. Imelda would further change her story by
stating that Rosemarie Capulong did not report for work that
day; then, in a quick turnaround, she remarked that her mother
did go to Bamban not to work but to get her birth certificate.
Interestingly, Imelda said that 07 October 1995 was a working
day, and that she had gone to school the following day.
Judicial notice could be taken of the fact, however, that 07
October 1995 was a Saturday and that the following day, a
Sunday, could not have been a school day. With respect to the
rape committed on 12 January 1996, Imelda testified that
Rosemarie was attending a seminar; yet, when cross-
examined, she told the trial court that on that day Rosemarie
went to Manila to borrow money from her cousin.
The subsequent conduct of a victim could also either confirm
or negate her claim of rape.[9] The human nature,
characterized by an instinct for self-preservation and an
aversion to humiliation, would dictate that a typical victim of
rape could display changes in behavior, erratic mood swings
and an alteration in her daily routine. No such changes were
observed in the case of private complainant. She testified that
on the day after the first incident on 07 October 1995, she
woke up at six o'clock in the morning, washed her face, and
went to school. There was no apparent attempt on her part to
run away from home despite every chance to escape from her
tormentor or to exercise every means available to ensure that
the incidents would not be repeated. At fifteen years old,
already old enough to think of her safety and well-being,
Imelda Mateo went about her usual business as if nothing
unusual had occurred. She continued to sleep in the same
bedroom with nary any precaution against the bestiality she
was sure would come everytime her mother was away.
While it may be argued that appellant's moral ascendancy over
Imelda was enough to intimidate her to suffer in silence; still, it
could well be improbable for a victim who had been raped no
less than ten times not to make a simple outcry against her
unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so.
The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial
court and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
The records would disclose that the first half of the trial, from
17 July 1997 until 15 October 1997, was conducted by Judge
Lino L. Diamsay. Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam conducted the
trial from 14 January 1999 until 24 February 1999. From 11
May 1999 until the day of the last hearing, it was Judge
Arsenio P. Adriano who heard the case. While this change of
the presiding judges would not invalidate the proceedings, it
did deny to the deciding magistrate the opportunity to observe
in entirety the demeanor of the witnesses which could well be
vital to the decision-making process, particularly where
credibility would, by and large, constitute the singular issue.
The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct
appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or
lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion
or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
x x x xxx xxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
22 of Republic Act No. 7659,[10] as well as procedural rules
contained in Section 3 of Rule 122,[11] Section 10 of Rule 122,
[12] Section 13 of Rule 124[13] and Section 3 of Rule 125[14]
of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the
constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it
does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favor of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the
Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the
crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some
are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient
to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best
demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and
4
appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme
Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is
the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct
mandate to review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by
the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere,
however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to
ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court
now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a
review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to
the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all
possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be
accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the
facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court
of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize
the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals
should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain
from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the
case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.[15]
Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period
since the re-imposition of the death penalty law in 1993 until
June 2004, the trial courts have imposed capital punishment in
approximately 1,493,[16] out of which 907 cases[17] have
been passed upon in review by the Court. In the Supreme
Court, where these staggering numbers find their way on
automatic review, the penalty has been affirmed in only 230
cases comprising but 25.36% of the total number.
Significantly, in more than half or 64.61% of the cases, the
judgment has been modified through an order of remand for
further proceedings, by the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law or by a reduction of the sentence. Indeed, the
reduction by the Court of the death penalty to reclusion
perpetua has been made in no less than 483 cases or 53.25%
of the total number. The Court has also rendered a judgment
of acquittal in sixty-five (65) cases. In sum, the cases where
the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated
consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penalty
cases directly elevated before the Court on automatic review
that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one (651) out of
nine hundred seven (907) appellants saved from lethal
injection.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure
is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court -
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have
the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely
within the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than
the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced
additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a
procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule
122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any
other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court
en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty,
are to be deemed modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all
pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition,
consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth. No
costs.

G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,
vs.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY
and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.
Tinga, J.:
Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2
dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-
Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie
Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.
The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29
December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Sibulan,
Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap
with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide,
Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The
pertinent portion of the information reads:
That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening of 28 December
2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-
wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue,
fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name
of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental,
thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number
NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two
female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus
causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R.
Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie
Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-
mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of
Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to
the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong
and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.
An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he
pleaded not guilty to the charge.5
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong,
Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of
court to file an amended information.6 They sought to add the
allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus:
"The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the
victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still
alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the
by-standers."7
On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed
an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend the
information be considered withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003,
the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was
considered withdrawn.9
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified
for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case,
petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which
was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated
15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecutions failure to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for
reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11
dated 25 April 2005.
In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the
demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless
imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by
respondents failed to establish the allegations in the
5
Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:
An examination of the allegations in the information and
comparing the same with the evidence presented by the
prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not
established said allegations. The facts and circumstances
constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It is
elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his
own affirmative allegations.
xxxx
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find
that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged.
Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who
has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to
establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime
or asked questions which would have proved the elements of
the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it
was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the
incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which
would prove that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is the person responsible for it. There was no
evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R.
Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in
evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the
bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as
no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was
a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged
damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any
manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no
documentary evidence was also presented to state the
damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed
it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou
Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie
Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the
victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the
shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the
incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the
accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for
it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically
bungled this case from its inception.
xxxx
The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the
prosecutions [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of
vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo
truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. The court again
is inclined to agree with this argument of the defense. It has
looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in
the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical
explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the
lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latters inner fender and tires.
Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of
its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1s ramming into the
rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of
vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with
their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the
entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to
collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve
towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused
the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.
xxxx
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove
two thingsthe fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the
elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged,
and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.
Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these
two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden
of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not
even offer evidence in his behalf.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted
and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his
temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered
released to the accused or his duly authorized representative.
SO ORDERED.13
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65,14 alleging that the MTCs dismissal of the case was done
without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner
the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the
civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Oriental, Br. 32.
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the
acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the
MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case.
The RTC ruled that the MTCs recital of every fact in arriving at
its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider
the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also
demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in
the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court,
except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after
the MTC gave due course to the accuseds demurrer to
evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule
119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on
the accuseds civil liability, especially since the judgment of
acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC
declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon
and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial
Court of Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is AFFIRMED. The
case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for
further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC
order, but these were denied for lack of merit in the order17
dated 12 September 2005.
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179.
The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed
decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there
being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the
criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the
proceedings before the MTC are
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v.
Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)18 which
ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to
property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the
case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to
property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the
corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also
found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which
govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence
where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As
there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged
and respondents were claiming the amount of P1,500,000.00
as civil damages, the case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction.
The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for
proper disposition of the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
6
decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is
determined by the allegations in the information, and that
neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of
the RTCs jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit
in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is
the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the
information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well
as abandonment of the victims.
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the
MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless
imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired
jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially
withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment.
Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTCs order
acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The petition has merit. It should be granted.
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the
basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging
petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and
damage to property. The Court of Appeals however declared in
its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the
same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of
abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records
however that respondents attempt to amend the information by
charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC
had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to withdraw
their motion to amend the information. The information filed
before the trial court had remained unamended.23 Thus,
petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the
offense alleged in the original Information without any
aggravating circumstance.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person
who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period. When such reckless
imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of
a person attended the same article imposes upon the
defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries
and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.24 Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of
felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of
the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions
punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo)
or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner,
were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium
period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum
period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case
was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No.
7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level
courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It
explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the
MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear
and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not
have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.27
Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had
properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings
before it were valid and legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to
evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal
cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for
an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal
of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may
not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy.29 But while the dismissal order consequent
to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is
still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial
court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only
legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon
demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court,
in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for
certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the
prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to
follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of
Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs
conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order
thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the
evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show
that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the
Rules of Court.
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for
the reception of evidence.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand
of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil
aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to
the MTC.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused
is acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based on delict may
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist32 or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by
the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.34 This is because when the accused files a demurrer to
7
evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court
should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the
demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the
case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter,
the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the
case.35
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that
the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that
petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him;
hence, petitioners civil liability has been extinguished by his
acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated
that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime
had been committed and that accused was the person
responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to
establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as
charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the
one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident.
Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the
accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused
by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of
the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by
petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of
reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to
remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil
aspect of the case, since petitioners acquittal has extinguished
his civil liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated
25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal
Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No.
3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting
petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149995 September 28, 2007
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001,1 affirming the
September 23, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617
convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the
"Bouncing Checks Law".
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and
issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on account or for the value the
check described below:
Check No. : 326317PR
Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de Roxas Branch
In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face amount of such check when
presented for payment within (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee
the face amount of said check or make arrangement for full
payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.2
On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioners
non-apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest.3 On June 27, 1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled
and set aside4 after petitioner posted the required bail. He was
arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.5
Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in
September 1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed money from
him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of
the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same
amount in favor of the complainant.6 However, when the check
was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for
insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding,
petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.7
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private
complainant was an investment by the latter who was his
business partner. He argued that the subject check was not
issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan
since his checking account was opened only on December 1,
1987.8 He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to
issue a check in his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile
supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessary
raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was
issued sometime in February 1988,9 complainant knew that
the same was not funded.10
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on
September 23, 1997 a Decision11 finding petitioner guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M.
Palana guilty as charged and sentences him to a prison term of
Six (6) months and to indemnify the private complainant the
sum of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case
until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.12
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the
check was issued as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting
petitioners "investment theory". In ruling against the existence
of a partnership between them, the trial court noted that the so-
called partnership venture, Palanas General Merchandising,
was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of
petitioner.13 The Court of Appeals also held that the act of
lending money does not necessarily amount to an investment
of capital.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A
CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS
ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE
THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE
ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE
PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM
BUSINESS REVERSALS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED
WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING
8
THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.14
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and
not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the
case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action15 and not during the arraignment of the accused.
The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg.
22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing
law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 12916 which
provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
xxxx
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not
less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of
not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both
fine and imprisonment17 at the discretion of the court. In the
present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the
case.18 The Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire
jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is
only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than
P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial
Court"19 on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial
Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court has
already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination
of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless
the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that
it is intended to operate on actions pending before its
enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive
provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have
not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express
proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No.
7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or
decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.20
The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the
commencement of the action by the filing of the Information
and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691
reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application
of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature.21
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains
petitioners conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The
elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as
follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the
prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the time he issued the
subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check.
Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it
was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds.
Thereafter, he received demand letters to pay the amount of
the check from private complainant but he did not comply with
it.22
In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or
value, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld
private complainants claim that the check was issued as a
guaranty for the loan and rejected petitioners "investment
theory". The issue as to whether the amount of the subject
check represents the amount of the money loaned by private
complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the alleged
partnership is a factual question involving the credibility of
witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate
court will not generally disturb the findings of the lower court
considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue
since it had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and
observing their conduct during the trial, which circumstances
carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the present
case, we see no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the
subject check was a loan and not an investment.23
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable
consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract,
or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to
act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. Since it was established that petitioner received
money from private complainant in various amounts,24
petitioner cannot now claim that the checks were not issued for
value.25
The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to
potential suppliers is not a valid defense. In Cueme v.
People,26 the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely
intended to be shown to prospective investors of her
corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen
of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making
or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere
act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed
by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases,
the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached.
Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of
good faith and absence of criminal intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to
be encashed or deposited in a bank, produce the same effect
as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the check
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the
9
purpose as well as the terms and conditions for which checks
are issued will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and banking
communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction
as to the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions,
hence, no such distinction can be made by means of
interpretation or application. What is important is the fact that
petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and those
checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is
irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.27
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the
subject check is likewise immaterial.1wphi1 Issuance, as
defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first
delivery of the check.28 In the case at bar, the Information
alleged that the check was postdated February 15, 1988
although issued in or about September 1987. During trial,
petitioner testified that the Checking Account was opened only
on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued sometime
in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the
information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the
criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so
much so that it affects his substantial rights.29 In a prosecution
for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject
check is material since it forms part of the second element of
the offense that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of
the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot be said that
petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised
by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued
the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to
cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the
same claiming that the same would only be shown to
prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that private
complainant knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals found that the subject check
was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was
intended to apply for account or for value. As such, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly
covered when presented for payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the
alternative penalty of fine may be imposed in lieu of
imprisonment considering that the prosecution failed to prove
or allege that petitioner is not a first-time offender.30 Hence, in
lieu of imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed
upon petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding
petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is ordered to pay private complainant the amount of
P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six
(6%) percent interest from date of filing of the Information until
the finality of the decision, the amount of which, inclusive of the
interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from
finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment,
petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167409 March 20, 2009
RODOLFO B. GARCIA, Retired Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental,
Petitioner,
vs.
PRIMO C. MIRO, OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS, Cebu City;
DANIEL VILLAFLOR, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR,
Bacolod City; HON. FRANKLIN M. COBBOL, Acting
Presiding Judge, MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
Occidental; and JULIETA F. ORTEGA, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to impugn the
Orders dated November 23, 20041 and January 26, 20052
issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental.
The antecedents are as follows:
On January 31, 2003, Julieta F. Ortega (Julieta) filed a letter
complaint3 before the Ombudsman-Vizayas, Primo C. Miro
(Miro), charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia, then Presiding
Judge of the MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental,
and Ricardo Liyage (Liyage), ambulance driver, Municipality of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, with the crime of murder and the
administrative offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of
authority.
The complaint arose from the death of Julietas husband,
Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., on November 12, 2002, as a result of
a vehicular mishap between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by
the petitioner and the motorcycle driven by the deceased.4
The letter complaint was treated as two (2) separate criminal
and administrative complaints docketed as OMB-V-C-03-0076-
B and OMB-V-A-03-0051-B, respectively.
On February 21, 2003, Deputy Ombudsman Miro approved a
Joint Evaluation Report5 dated February 12, 2003. In said
evaluation report, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Antonio B.
Yap found the letter complaint to be sufficient in form and
substance. He concluded that the offense charged is not
related to the functions of petitioner as a judge and can be the
subject of preliminary investigation.6 With regard to the
administrative aspect of the case, GIO Yap recommended that
the case be indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for appropriate action.7
GIO Yap also received information that it would be difficult on
the part of the prosecutors to conduct the investigation
because they regularly appear before the sala of petitioner for
their cases. The Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Occidental
also manifested that they would inhibit if the case would be
returned to them. Consequently, he deemed that it would be
more appropriate if the Office of the Ombudsman would
conduct the necessary investigation.8
Corollarilly, on March 8, 2003, petitioner compulsory retired
from the service.9
After the preliminary investigation, GIO Yap found the
existence of probable cause for the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide in OMB-V-C-03-0076-B. In
a Resolution10 dated August 12, 2003, he recommended the
filing of the corresponding charges against the petitioner but
dismissed the charges against Liyage.11
On January 27, 2004, an Information12 for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the
petitioner before the MCTC Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
Occidental, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No.
5982-C.
On March 1, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information13 on the following grounds: (1) that it does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form; (2) that the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
and over his person; and, (3) that the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so.14 Ultimately, petitioner
prayed that the information be quashed and be referred to this
Court for appropriate action.
On August 25, 2004, the MCTC issued an Order15 granting
the motion and, consequently, quashing the information.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court
10
granted in an Order16 dated November 23, 2004. The court
opined, among other things, that the case had nothing to do
with the performance of petitioners official functions and that
an administrative complaint against him had already been filed,
as such, the purpose of referring cases against judges and
court personnel to the Supreme Court has already been
served.17 Accordingly, the MCTC set aside its earlier order
and denied petitioners motion to quash, the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
subject motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution is
granted. Accordingly, the order of this court dated August 25,
2004, granting the accuseds motion to quash the information
is hereby reconsidered and set aside and, therefore, the
accuseds motion to quash the information is denied.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration,19 which
was denied in the Order20 dated January 26, 2005.
Hence, the petition.
At the outset, it is apparent that the present petition was
directly filed before this Court, in utter disregard of the rule on
the hierarchy of courts which, thus warrants its outright
dismissal. In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,21 this Court stressed that
"[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court,
it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the
writs procurement must be presented," thus:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue
the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally
be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals,
bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are
not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of
an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court
of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must
be presented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in
this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.22
Later, we reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma23 after
noting that there is "a growing tendency on the part of litigants
and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed
upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest
tribunal of the land." We stressed that -
[t]his Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as
well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction) is not exclusive. x x x It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals x x x. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however,
to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level x x x courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Courts docket. x x x.1avvphi1
Notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant petition for
failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this
Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a
pure question of law.
Petitioner argues that respondents violated this Courts
pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman,24 directing
the Ombudsman to refer all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before his office to the Supreme Court;25 and,
in Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,26
restricting not only the Ombudsman and the prosecution arm of
the government, but also other official and functionary thereof
in initiating or investigating judges and court personnel.27
Petitioners contentions are misplaced.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the two cases
cited by the petitioner involve the performance of
administrative and professional duties of the judges that were
involved. Caoibes concerns the judges dealings with his fellow
member of the Bench, while Fuentes touches on the acts of a
judge in the exercise of his official functions, particularly the
issuance of a writ of execution.
In Caoibes, two members of the judiciary got entangled in a
fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. One
of the judges filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman and an administrative complaint before this Court
over the same incident. When the Ombudsman denied the
motion of Judge Caoibes to refer the case to the Supreme
Court, he filed a petition for certiorari before this Court seeking
the reversal of the order. In granting the petition, the Court held
that:
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the
Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from
this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and
by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court
employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman
is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is
involved therein.
xxxx
Maceda28 is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power
of administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.29
In Fuentes, the issue was whether the Ombudsman may
conduct an investigation over the acts of a judge in the
exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an
administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme
Court.30 According to this Court:
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal
or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner
judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
11
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the
judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of
the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the independence of the
judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioners questioned order directing the attachment of
government property and issuing a writ of execution were done
in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The
order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of
jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution
was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into
in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court
that is tasked to supervise the courts. "No other entity or official
of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service
of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final
and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay
the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for
rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative
belongs to the courts alone."31
Indeed, supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest
ranked court employee, is vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court. However, that prerogative only extends to
administrative supervision. As such, the Ombudsman cannot
encroach upon this Courts task to oversee judges and court
personnel and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land.
In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was
in no way related to the performance of his duties as a judge.
The Information reveals:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses JUDGE RODOLFO B.
GARCIA, of the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING TO HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under
ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 12th day of November, 2002, at about
5:15 o'clock in the afternoon, at Sitio Tunga, Barangay
Bantayanon, Municipality of Calatrava, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused JUDGE RODOLFO
B. GARCIA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Judge of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
Occidental, with Salary Grade 26, then driving a Land Cruiser
Toyota bearing Plate No. FDB-193, along the road at Sitio
Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon, Calatrava, Negros Occidental, a
public highway, did then and there drive or operate said vehicle
in a reckless, negligent and imprudent manner without taking
the necessary precaution considering the grade, visibility and
other conditions of the highway, nor due regard to the traffic
rules and ordinances in order to prevent accident to persons or
damage to property, thereby causing by such recklessness,
negligence and imprudence the said vehicle to hit and bump
the motorcycle driven by Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., bearing
Plate No. FH-2324, with Josemarie Paghubasan as his
backrider, thereby causing upon Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. the
following physical injuries, to with [sic]:
xxxx
which injuries resulted to the death of Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.
CONTRARY TO LAW.32
From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against
the petitioner before the MCTC was warranted by the above
circumstances. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691,33
provides as follows:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case is beyond
contestation.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners allegation, the administrative
aspect of the case against him was endorsed by the
Ombudsman-Visayas to the OCA for appropriate action.34 In
addition, an administrative complaint against petitioner
involving the same facts was filed by Julieta Ortega with the
OCA. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter OCA
IPI No. 03-1403-MTJ, and is still pending to date. Petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of this fact considering that he filed a
Comment and Answer to the Complaint-Affidavit of Mrs. Julieta
Ortega,35 dated March 21, 2003. Thus, the Courts mandate,
as laid down in Caoibes, was more than satisfactorily complied
with.
To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC
is a criminal case under its own jurisdiction as prescribed by
law and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts
retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses
committed by judges of the lower courts.36
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros
Occidental, is ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal
Case No. 5982-C with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in
her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F.
CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.,
MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II,
ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN G. DUMLAO,
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL
C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN,
VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON,
ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S.
BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO
V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO,
REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G CUARTERO,
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO
G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ,
Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of
suspected members of the Kuratong Bale/eng Gang, is once
again before this Court this time questioning, among other
things, the trial qmrt's determination of the absence of probable
12
cause and its dismissal of the criminal actions.1
The Facts and the Case
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of
the Philippine National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task
Force Habagat (then headed by Police Chief Superintendent
Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC] led
by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.),
Criminal Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief
Superintendent Romeo M. Acop ), and National Capital Region
Command (headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Jewel
F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang2 along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal
Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary
execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who
were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved,
including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson,
Romeo M. Acop, Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B.
Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II, and 28 others (collectively, the
respondents).3 On review, however, the Office of the
Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder
against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the cases of
respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities were
downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson
pleaded not guilty.
Upon respondents motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
transfer of their cases to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused
had the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Pending the
resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutors motion for
reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed
Republic Act (R.A.) 8249 that expanded the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase
"principal accused" to apply to all pending cases where trial
had not begun. As a result of this new law, the Sandiganbayan
opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases.
Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A.
8249 in G.R. 1280964 but this Court upheld its validity.
Nonetheless, the Court ordered the transfer of the trial of the
cases to the RTC of Quezon City since the amended
informations contained no allegations that respondents
committed the offenses charged in relation to, or in the
discharge of, their official functions as required by R.A. 8249.
Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over
by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., could arraign respondents in
the re-docketed Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however,
SPO2 Delos Reyes and the other prosecution witnesses
recanted their affidavits. Some of the victims heirs also
executed affidavits of desistance. These prompted the
respondents to file separate motions for the determination of
probable cause before the issuance of warrants of arrests.
On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the
provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to
hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the
principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the
private complainants.
Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R.
Mendoza sought to revive the cases against respondents by
requesting the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another
preliminary investigation in their cases on the strength of the
affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo
Ramos. In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez
constituted a panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested
investigation.
Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy,
Lacson and his co-accused filed a petition for prohibition with
application for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila in Civil Case
01-100933. In an Order dated June 5, 2001, that court denied
the plea for temporary restraining order. Thus, on June 6, 2001
the panel of prosecutors found probable cause to hold Lacson
and his co-accused liable as principals for 11 counts of murder,
resulting in the filing of separate informations against them in
Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 81, now presided over by respondent Judge Ma.
Theresa L. Yadao.
On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC
of Manilas order which allowed the renewed preliminary
investigation of the murder charges against him and his co-
accused. Lacson also filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause. But on
June 13, 2001 he sought the suspension of the proceedings in
that court.
In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the RTC of Quezon City from issuing warrants of
arrest or conducting any proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-
101102 to 12 before it. On August 24, 2001 the CA rendered a
Decision, granting Lacsons petition on the ground of double
jeopardy since, although the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-
81679 to 89 was provisional, such dismissal became
permanent two years after when they were not revived.
Upon the prosecutions appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453,5
the Court ruled that, based on the record, Lacson failed to
prove compliance with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117
governing provisional dismissals. The records showed that the
prosecution did not file a motion for provisional dismissal and,
for his part, respondent Lacson had merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause. Nowhere did he
agree to some proposal for a provisional dismissal of the
cases. Furthermore, the heirs of the victims had no notice of
any motion for such provisional dismissal.
The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001
and directed the RTC of Quezon City to try the cases with
dispatch. On motion for reconsideration by respondent Lacson,
the Court ordered the re-raffle of the criminal cases to a
heinous crimes court. Upon re-raffle, however, the cases still
went to Branch 81, which as already stated was now presided
over by Judge Yadao.
On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims
submitted birth certificates showing that they were minors.
Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the
informations to show such minority and asked respondent
Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the
assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a
family court. The request for recall was denied.
On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion
before Branch 81, praying for the re-raffle of Criminal Cases
01-101102 to12 to the family courts in view of the changes in
the two informations. On October 24, 2003 the prosecution
also filed its consolidated comment ex-abundanti cautela on
the motions to determine probable cause.
On November 12, 20036 Judge Yadao issued an order,
denying the prosecutions motion for re-raffle to a family court
on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living
minors. She also granted the motions for determination of
probable cause and dismissed the cases against the
respondents since the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses
were inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary
investigations before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.
On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion
to recuse or disqualify Judge Yadao and for reconsideration of
her order. It also filed an administrative complaint against her
for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the
service, manifest partiality, and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment.7 On January 14, 2004, the prosecution filed an
urgent supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification
with motion for cancellation of the hearing on motion for
reconsideration.
13
On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying
the motion to recuse her, prompting the prosecution to appeal
from that order. Further, on January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao
issued another order, denying the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003 that
dismissed the action against the respondents. In response, the
prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the same. Finally, on
January 26, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the
prosecutions motion for reconsideration of its January 16,
2004 Order not only for lack of merit but also for having
become moot and academic.
On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti
cautela the notices of appeal that it filed in the cases.
Subsequently, on March 3, 2004 it filed the present special civil
action of certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The prosecution presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her
discretion in allowing Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-
raffled to other than among the RTC of Quezon Citys family
courts.
2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion
when she took cognizance of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12
contrary to the prosecutions view that such cases fell under
the jurisdiction of family courts.
3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion
when she did not inhibit and disqualify herself from taking
cognizance of the cases.
4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion
when she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack
of probable cause and barred the presentation of additional
evidence in support of the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration.
5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion
when she adopted certain policies concerning the conduct of
hearings in her court.
The Courts Rulings
Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes
respondents contention that the prosecutions resort to special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Since the
trial court dismissed the criminal actions against respondents,
the prosecutions remedy was to appeal to the CA from that
order of dismissal.
Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an
action is an appeal.8 Here, the prosecution in fact filed a notice
of appeal from such an order issued in the subject cases. But it
reconsidered its action and withdrew that notice, believing that
appeal was not an effective, speedy, and adequate remedy.9 In
other words, the prosecutions move was not a case of
forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a
belief that respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused her
discretion in issuing her various orders and that certiorari under
Rule 65 was the proper and all-encompassing remedy for the
prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say that the remedy
is altogether implausible as to throw out the petition outright.
Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and
filed its action directly with this Court, ignoring the principle of
judicial hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the
CA, and the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari, such concurrence does not give the People the
unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.10 In any case, the
immense public interest in these cases, the considerable
length of time that has passed since the crime took place, and
the numerous times these cases have come before this Court
probably warrant a waiver of such procedural lapse.
1. Raffle of the Cases
The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City
Executive Judge gravely abused her discretion when she
placed Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 under a separate
category which did not restrict their raffle to the citys special
criminal and family courts in accordance with SC
Administrative Order 36-96. Further, the prosecution points out
that she violated Administrative Order 19-98 when Branches
219 and 102 were left out of the raffle. The presiding judges of
these two branches, both heinous crimes courts eligible to
receive cases by raffle, had just been appointed to the CA.
The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct
of the raffle of the subject cases. The raffle maintained a
separate list for criminal and civil cases. Criminal cases
cognizable by special criminal courts were separately listed.
Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 were given a separate
heading, "Re-Raffle," but there was nothing irregular in this
since it merely indicated that the cases were not being raffled
for the first time.
The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219
and 102 from raffle since these branches remained without
regularly appointed judges. Although the pairing judges of
these branches had authority to act on incidental, interlocutory,
and urgent matters, this did not mean that such branches
should already be included in the raffle of cases.
Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the
raffle yet it did not then object to the manner by which it was
conducted. The prosecution raised the question only when it
filed this petition, a clear afterthought.
2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts
The prosecution points out that, although this Courts October
7, 2003 Resolution directed a re-raffle of the cases to a
heinous crimes court, the prosecution in the meantime
amended the informations to reflect the fact that two of the
murder victims were minors. For this reason, the Executive
Judge should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant
to Section 5 of R.A. 8369.
The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of
R.A. 8369, that vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations
of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the
victim is a minor. Thus:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below
eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of
age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time
of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is
found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain
any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred.
(Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law but
seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this
reason, when the need for such protection is not compromised,
the Court is able to relax the rule. In several cases,11 for
instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent
jurisdiction with the family courts in hearing petitions for
habeas corpus involving minors.
Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people
wanted the murder cases moved to a family court, are dead.
As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the
murder cases that require the special attention and protection
of a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in
those cases during trial since the minor victims are
represented by their parents who had become the real private
offended parties.
3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave
14
abuse of discretion in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the
cases against the respondents.
The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found,
first, in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel,
or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent
of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.
and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which states:
Rule 3.12. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where
the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These
cases include among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding;
xxxx
(e) the judge knows the judges spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or
any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall
indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12,
Canon 3 provide for the compulsory disqualification of a judge
while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for
his voluntary inhibition.
The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since
he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation
would unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their
cases. The mere imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment
is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence
that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform
his duties according to law without fear or favor. The Court will
not disqualify a judge based on speculations and surmises or
the adverse nature of the judges rulings towards those who
seek to inhibit him.12
Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have
inhibited herself for improperly submitting to a public interview
on the day following her dismissal of the criminal cases against
the respondents. But the Court finds nothing basically
reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadaos dismissal of the
multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and
stirred the media into frenzy for correct information. Judge
Yadao simply accommodated, not sought, the requests for
such an interview to clarify the basis of her order. There is no
allegation that she gave out false information. To be sure, the
prosecution never once accused her of making public
disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her
order dismissing such cases.
The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge
Yadaos statement that a very close relative stood to be
promoted if she was to issue a warrant of arrest against the
respondents. But this statement merely shows that she cannot
be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her. How can
this constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the
close relative she referred to was her spouse or child which
would be a mandatory ground for disqualification.
Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its
motion for reconsideration when she said in her comment to
the administrative complaint against her that such motion was
merely the prosecutions stubborn insistence on the existence
of probable cause against the respondents. The comment
could of course not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue
since she had precisely already issued an order holding that
the complainants evidence failed to establish probable cause
against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong about
characterizing a motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn"
position taken by the party who filed it. Judge Yadao did not
characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time she
filed her comment.
4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her
discretion when she set the motions for determination of
probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants
of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and
argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadaos duty was to
determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest
warrants solely on the basis of the investigating prosecutors
resolution as well as the informations and their supporting
documents. And, if she had some doubts as to the existence of
probable cause, the rules required her to order the
investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to
support the finding of probable cause within five days from
notice.
Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge
Yadao dug up and adopted the Ombudsmans findings when
the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of
robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the affidavits
submitted in that earlier preliminary investigation when such
documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the
cases. The prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp.
Abelardo Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably
explained the prior inconsistent affidavits they submitted before
the Ombudsman.
The general rule of course is that the judge is not required,
when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs
to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.13
But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses
tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent
statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge
Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based
on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the
inconsistent statements and related documents that the
witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records.
Besides, she received no new evidence from the
respondents.14
The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and
documents along with the criminal informations to enable
Judge Yadao to determine the presence of probable cause
against the respondents:
1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yus affidavit of March 24, 200115 in
which he said that on May 17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR
Command Head, ordered him to form two teams that would go
after suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were
seen at the Superville Subdivision in Paraaque City. Yu
headed the assault team while Marlon Sapla headed the
perimeter defense. After the police team apprehended eight
men inside the safe house, it turned them over to their
investigating unit. The following day, Yu just learned that the
men and three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police
in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos affidavit of March 24, 200116 in
15
which he said that he was part of the perimeter defense during
the Superville operation. After the assault team apprehended
eight male suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two
vans. Ramos then went to the office of respondent Zubia, TMC
Head, where he saw respondents Lacson, Acop, Laureles,
Villacorte and other police officers.
According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were
to be brought to Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a
supposed shoot-out and that this action had been cleared with
higher authorities, to which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of
approval. Before Ramos left the meeting, Lacson supposedly
told him, "baka may mabuhay pa diyan." Ramos then boarded
an L-300 van with his men and four male suspects. In the early
morning of May 18, 1995, they executed the plan and gunned
down the suspects. A few minutes later, P/S Insp. Glenn G.
Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed responsibility for the
incident.
3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes affidavit of April 24, 200117 in which
he corroborated Ramos statements. Medes said that he
belonged to the same team that arrested the eight male
suspects. He drove the L-300 van in going to Commonwealth
Avenue where the suspects were killed.
4. Mario C. Enads affidavit of August 8, 199518 in which he
claimed having served as TMC civilian agent. At around noon
of May 17, 1995, he went to Superville Subdivision together
with respondents Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told
Enad to stay in the car and observe what went on in the house
under surveillance. Later that night, other police officers arrived
and apprehended the men in the house. Enad went in and saw
six men lying on the floor while the others were handcuffed.
Enad and his companions left Sucat in the early morning of
May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but was awaken by
gunshots. He saw Dumlao and other police officers fire their
guns at the L-300 van containing the apprehended suspects.
5. SPO2 Noel P. Senos affidavit of May 31, 200119 in which
he corroborated what Ramos said. Seno claimed that he was
part of the advance party in Superville Subdivision and was
also in Commonwealth Avenue when the suspected members
of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed.
6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31,
199520 which narrated the events that took place on May 17
and 18, 1995. This report was submitted by Lacson, Zubia,
Acop and Canson.
7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports21 which stated that the
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested
negative for gunpowder nitrates.
The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits
and reports, taken together with the other documents of record,
fail to establish probable cause against the respondents.
First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the
testimony of Ramos, corroborated by those of Medes, Enad,
and Seno, who supposedly heard the commanders of the
various units plan the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City and actually execute such plan. Yus testimony is limited to
the capture of the gang members and goes no further. He did
not see them killed.
Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad,
and Seno, the prosecutions own evidencethe PNP
ABRITGs After Operations Report of May 31, 1995shows
that these men took no part in the operations against the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The report included a
comprehensive list of police personnel from Task Force
Habagat (Lacson), Traffic Management Command (Zubia),
Criminal Investigation Command (Acop), and National Capital
Region Command (Canson) who were involved. The names of
Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that list. Notably,
only Yus name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that
list. Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for
commendations and promotions, any omitted name would
hardly have gone unchallenged.

Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant
evidence against the respondents, submitted in the course of
the preliminary investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted in a related robbery charge against the police
officers involved a counter-affidavit. He claimed in that counter-
affidavit that he was neither in Superville Subdivision nor
Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng
operations since he was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at
his home on May 18.22 Notably, Medes claimed in a joint
counter-affidavit that he was on duty at the TMC headquarters
at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.23
Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole
picture and giving credence to Ramos and Medes statements,
dismissed the robbery case. More, it excluded Ramos from the
group of officers that it charged with the murder of the
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. Under the
circumstances, the Court cannot be less skeptical than Judge
Yadao was in doubting the sudden reversal after six years of
testimony of these witnesses.
Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but,
as he narrated, his role was limited to cornering and arresting
the suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at their safe
house in Superville Subdivision. After his team turned the
suspects over to an investigating unit, he no longer knew what
happened to them.
Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang members tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates. But this finding cannot have any legal
significance for the purpose of the preliminary investigation of
the murder cases against the respondents absent sufficient
proof that they probably took part in gunning those gang
members down.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the
criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the
panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the
Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If
he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court
three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1)
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds
probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of
doubt as to the existence of probable cause.24
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory. The courts first option under the
above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the
situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause against the respondents.
It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause"
that the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five days from notice. But that is not the case
here. Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and
Seno, nothing is left in the record that presents some doubtful
probability that respondents committed the crime charged.
PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases
16
in 2001, six years after it happened. It would have been
ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could produce
new witnesses in the five days required of the prosecution by
the rules.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the
crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.25
5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized
only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all
the offended parties but allowed each of the counsels
representing the individual respondents to be heard during the
proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably prohibited the
prosecutions use of tape recorders.
But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial
court ample inherent and administrative powers to effectively
control the conduct of its proceedings. Thus:
Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. Every court shall have
power:
xxxx
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a
person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial
investigation under its authority;
xxxx
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining
thereto;
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice;
xxxx
There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadaos policy of
allowing only one public prosecutor and one private prosecutor
to address the court during the hearing for determination of
probable cause but permitting counsels representing the
individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.26 The
burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused
is upon him, not upon the private prosecutors whose interests
lie solely in their clients damages claim. Besides, the public
and the private prosecutors take a common position on the
issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the
accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.
As for the prohibition against the prosecutions private
recording of the proceedings, courts usually disallows such
recordings because they create an unnecessary distraction
and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or
reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist on
being given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes
no claim that the official recording of the proceedings by the
courts stenographer has been insufficient, the Court finds no
grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadaos policy against such
extraneous recordings.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and
AFFIRMS the following assailed Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102
to 12:
1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the
prayer for re-raffle, granted the motions for determination of
probable cause, and dismissed the criminal cases;
2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion
of the respondents for the immediate resolution of the three
pending incidents before the court;
3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion
to recuse and the urgent supplemental motion for compulsory
disqualification;
4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003; and
5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion
for reconsideration of the January 16, 2004 Order.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571 October 19, 2004
ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; tis
Something, nothing;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
- Shakespeare: Othello, III, iii, 155.
Every man has a right to build, keep and be favored with a
good name. This right is protected by law with the recognition
of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal
offenses or tortious conduct.
In these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari,1
petitioner Roberto Brillante (Brillante), also known as Bobby
Brillante, questions his convictions for libel for writing and
causing to be published in 1988 an open letter addressed to
then President of the Republic of the Philippines Corazon C.
Aquino discussing the alleged participation of Atty. Jejomar
Binay (Binay), then the "OIC Mayor"2 and a candidate for the
position of Mayor in the Municipality (now City) of Makati, and
Dr. Nemesio Prudente (Prudente), then President of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in an assassination
plot against Augusto Syjuco (Syjuco), another candidate for
Mayor of Makati at that time.
On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position
of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati
Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the
course of the press conference, Brillante accused Binay of
plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused Binay
of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati
electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists
copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in
detail his charges against Binay.3
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote
news articles about the same. Angel Gonong, a writer for the
Peoples Journal, wrote a news article entitled "Binay Accused
of Plotting Slays of Rivals." It was cleared for publication by
Max Buan, Jr. (Buan), and Luis Camino (Camino), Editor-in-
Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the Peoples Journal.
Gloria Hernandez (Hernandez) wrote a similar article entitled
"Binay Slay Plan on Syjuco" which was cleared for publication
by Augusto Villanueva (Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel
(Manuel), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the
News Today.4
The open letter was subsequently published under the title
"Plea to Cory--Save Makati" in newspapers such as the
17
Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.5
The pertinent portions of the open letter read:
4. We have received reports that Atty. Binay and his group are
plotting the assassination of Mr. Augusto "Bobby" Syjuco, now
frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race.
These reports are:
1. On December 14, 1987, Atty. Binay and Dr. Nemesio
Prudente, president of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP), met at Puerto Azul in Cavite with, among
others, a Commander Luming, a Major Rafael Nieva, and a
commander Francis Baloloy. Subject of the meeting was
"Winning the Election at all Costs."
xxx xxx xxx
3. On December 17, 1987, Dr. Prudente, Atty. Binay and others
including some unidentified government officials discussed
operation "Dirty Fingers" after the ASEAN Summit Meeting.
The operation involves terrorism, the use of public school
teachers, the threat to kill or hurt political ward and precinct
leaders not supporting or opposed to Atty. Binay, and to use
these as samples to show rivals that his group is capable of
doing so, the planting of his squads in places close to potential
targets, the mobilization of "marshals" who will bring firearms
and to ferry hitmen to target points. The "marshals" will also be
used as "pointers" and to shelter the hitmen after
accomplishing or performing their missions.
xxx xxx xxx
4. On December 8, 1987, a certain Emilio Anecito, tagged as a
hitman in the group of Dr. Prudente, has been specifically
assigned to assassinate Mr. Syjuco, Aniceto has been
described as Iranian mestizo looking, about five (5) feet in
height, fair complexioned curly haired, sporting a mustache,
and fairly built bodily. He is said to be a silent person and
supposedly has a perfect score in hit missions assigned to him.
xxx xxx xxx
5. On December 10, 1987, it was reported that Major Rafael
Nieva had been assigned to work with Mr. Aniceto, Nievas
background report is that he:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Was hired by Dr. Prudente as security officer and personal
bodyguard.
d. Is a notorious killer used by the PUP forces and only his
employer can control or stop him.6
As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with
the Makati fiscals office four complaints for libel against
Brillante, as the author of the letter; Gonong, Buan and Camino
for writing and publishing the news article on Brillantes
accusations against him in the Peoples Journal;7 Hernandez,
Villanueva and Manuel for writing and publishing a similar
news article in the News Today;8 and for publishing the open
letter, Buan and Camino of the Peoples Journal;9 and Arcadio
A. Sison (Sison) as President of A. Sison and Associates, an
advertising agency.10
Francisco Baloloy (Baloloy), who was identified in the open
letter as among the persons who attended the meeting
organized by Binay and Prudente to plan the assassination of
Syjuco, likewise filed a criminal complaint for libel against
Brillante, Domingo Quimlat (Quimlat), Publisher and Editor-in-
Chief of Balita, and Sison as President of A. Sison and
Associates.11
Subsequently, five Informations for libel against Brillante were
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Similarly, on January 15, 1988, Prudente filed four complaints
for libel against Brillante and the editors and publishers of the
newspapers where the open letter was published. On January
16, 1989, four Informations for libel were filed against Brillante
and several co-accused with the RTC of Manila. Brillantes co-
accused in these cases were: (i) Buan, Editor-in-Chief of the
Peoples Journal;12 (ii) Amado P. Macasaet (Macasaet),
Publisher, and Noel Albano (Albano), Editor, of the Malaya;13
(iii) Sison, Public Relations Officer and Federico D. Pascual
(Pascual), Publisher and Executive Editor of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer;14 and (iv) Sison, Public Relations Officer and
Quimlat, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita.15
Buan was not included in the trial of the cases in the RTC-
Manila because he eluded arrest and was not arraigned. The
charges against Pascual and Quimlat were dropped upon
motion of the Assistant Prosecutor. The charges against
Macasaet and Albano were also eventually dismissed upon
motion of the prosecution. Only Brillante and Sison remained
as accused.16 Both pleaded not guilty to the charges against
them.
On January 25, 1993, the RTC-Manila acquitted Sison but
found Brillante guilty of libel on four counts. The dispositive
portion of the trial courts Decision in the consolidated cases
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused
Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt on four (4) counts, as author or writer, of
LIBEL defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
and penalized under Article 355 of the same code, and
sentencing him in each count to the indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2)
YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
at the rate of ONE (1) DAY for every P8.00 that he is unable to
pay, but which subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed
EIGHT (8) months.
Accused Bobby Brillante is ordered to pay the private offended
party, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, the total sum of P1,000,000.00 in
these four (4) cases for moral damages which the latter
suffered.
Accused Arcadio Sison is acquitted in the two cases against
him, his guilt of the charges against him not having been
established beyond reasonable [doubt].
Two-third (2/3) of the costs is assessed against accused Bobby
Brillante while the remaining one-third (1/3) is charged de
oficio.17
Subsequently, Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-
Manila to the Court of Appeals.18 Brillante contended that
when the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614 to 17
were filed by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989, the offense
had already prescribed because more than one year had
elapsed since the publication of the open letter on January 10,
11 and 12, 1988. He also averred that the open letter which he
wrote and caused to be published was not defamatory and was
without malice. Brillante also claimed that the publication is
considered privileged communication. Finally, he argued that
he is entitled to equal protection of the laws and should be
acquitted of the offenses charged like his co-accused.19
On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision in CA-G.R. No. 14475 affirming the decision of the
RTC-Manila. The appellate court held that the offense of libel
had not yet prescribed because the one-year prescription
period should be reckoned from the time that the private
complainant Prudente filed his complaint with the fiscals office
on January 15, 1988 and not when the Informations were filed
by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989. The Court of Appeals
added that under Section 1, Rule 110, which took effect during
the pendency of the cases against Brillante, the institution of
the complaint before the fiscals office or the courts for
preliminary investigation interrupts the prescriptive period of
the offense charged. It held that being a procedural rule,
Section 1, Rule 110, applies to the cases against Brillante.20
The Court of Appeals further held that the RTC-Manila did not
err in finding that Brillante had committed libel against
18
Prudente. It explained that the open letter, when read in its
entirety, gives the impression that Prudente is part of a
purported criminal conspiracy to kill Syjuco. According to the
appellate court, the open letter is a malicious defamation which
produced in the minds of the readers Brillantes intent and
purpose to injure the reputation of Prudente, thereby exposing
him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.21 The Court of
Appeals rejected Brillantes argument that the open letter may
be considered privileged communication because the evidence
does not show that Brillante wrote and published it out of a
legal, moral or social duty.22
The appellate court also debunked Brillantes allegation that he
was denied the equal protection of the laws because while the
charges against his co-accused were dropped, those against
him were not. According to the appellate court, he and his co-
accused are not similarly situated because he was convicted of
libel upon a finding that there existed evidence beyond
reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction. In contrast, the
charges against his co-accused were dismissed and their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.23
Brillantes contention that his conviction for libel on four counts
gave rise to double jeopardy because under our jurisdiction
protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offenses was also overruled by the
appellate court. It held that each and every publication of the
same libel constitutes a separate distinct offense and the
charge for one instance of publication shall not bar a charge for
subsequent and separate publications.24
Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, but the motion was denied in a
Resolution dated January 19, 1995.25
In the meantime, Brillante was likewise convicted for libel on
five counts by the RTC-Makati in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-
1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721. The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated March 22, 1993 of the RTC-
Makati reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060
and 89-721, finding accused Bobby Brillante, also known as
Roberto Brillante, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of libel charged in each of these five (5) cases, and
sentencing him in each of the cases to suffer imprisonment of
FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2)
YEARS prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay fine,
likewise in each of these (5) cases, of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
2. As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay
complainant, Jejomar C. Binay, the sum of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, in all the four (4) charges
(Crim. Cases Nos. 88-410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721),
considering the latters professional and political standing in
society, he being a lawyer and former Governor of the Metro
Manila Commission as well as director of various government
agencies.
3. As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay
complainant, Francisco Baloloy, the sum of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, in Criminal Case No.
88-3060.
4. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410 and 88-1412, ACQUITTING
accused Max Buan, Jr., Angel Gonong and Louie Camino, of
the two charges against them on the ground that their guilt has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
5. In Criminal Case No. 88-1411 (except for accused Brillante)
ordering the same ARCHIVED on the ground that the other
accused herein, Gloria Hernandez, Augusto Villanueva and
Virgilio Manuel, have not been brought to the jurisdiction of this
Court; let alias warrant issue for their arrest.

6. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-3060 and 89-721, likewise
ordering the same ARCHIVED ONLY WITH RESPECT TO
accused Arcadio Sison, who has not been brought to the
jurisdiction of this Court; let alias warrant issue for his arrest.
7. In all these cases, ordering accused Bobby Brillante, also
known as Roberto Brillante, to pay the proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.26
Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Makati to the Court
of Appeals,27 raising essentially the same arguments in his
appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475.
On February 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 15174 affirming the decision of
the RTC-Makati. It held that the filing of the complaint before
the fiscals office interrupts the period of prescription because
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code did not make any
distinction whether the complaint is filed in court for preliminary
investigation or for trial on the merits, because the filing of the
complaint for preliminary investigation is the initial step of
criminal proceedings. It added that it would be unfair to deprive
the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays which are not within his control.28
The appellate court also ruled that the open letter cannot be
considered privileged communication because it contains
libelous matter and was circulated to the public. Citing U.S. v.
Galeza,29 it held that while it is the right and duty of a citizen to
file a complaint regarding a misconduct on the part of a public
official, such complaint must be addressed solely to the
officials having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges.30
Lastly, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts
observation that unlike Brillante, his co-accused editors and
publishers could not be held liable for libel because the news
reports regarding the January 7, 1988 press conference which
were published in their respective newspapers sufficiently
informed the readers that the reference to Binays involvement
in the assassination plot were allegations made by Brillante
during the press conference and that said allegations were
reported for the sole purpose of informing the public of the
news regarding the candidates adverted to in the report.31
Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate
courts decision, but the motion was denied in a Resolution
dated August 17, 1995.32
Thereafter, Brillante filed the present Petitions for Review on
March 13, 1995 in G.R. No. 118757 and on October 10, 1995
in G.R. No. 121571. In G.R. No. 118757, he raises the
following arguments:
I claim on the Courts ruling in People v. Tayco35 that the
THE OFFENSE OF LIBEL CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION
(sic) HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED WHEN THE SAID
INFORMATION (sic) WAS FILED.
II
HE IS NOT GUILTY OF LIBEL HE IS CHARGED WITH,
BECAUSE THE LETTER HE CAUSED TO BE PUBLISHED
WAS WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED WITHOUT ANY MALICE
[N]OR MALICIOUS INTENT TO MALIGN THE PERSON,
HONOR AND REPUTATION OF THE COMPLAINANT
[PRUDENTE/BINAY] BUT SOLELY FOR THE JUSTIFIED AND
HONEST PURPOSE OF BRINGING TO THE ATTENTION OF
ALL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED THE REPORTS THEREIN
MENTIONED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. WHERE THERE
IS NO MALICE, THERE IS NO LIBEL.
III
IN TRUTH, PUBLICLY KNOWN PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
OF COMPLAINANT, DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE, ALREADY
IN OPERATION LONG BEFORE JANUARY 12, 1988,
INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT INCAPABLE OF
19
NOURISHING VIOLENT INTENTIONS AGAINST THE
POLITICAL OPPONENTS OF MAYOR BINAY.
IV
MOREOVER, CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTER
REFERRED TO IN THE LETTER INDUBITABLY RELATES TO
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THEN GOING ON AS WELL AS
THE PARTICIPATION OF PETITIONER AND COMPLAINANT
THEREIN, WHATEVER IS CONTAINED IN SAID LETTER
CAN AT MOST BE NO MORE THAN A POLITICAL LIBEL,
WHICH IS NOT PUNISHABLE.
WE EARNESTLY URGE THAT THIS PROPOSITION BE
ENUNCIATED AS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW
ON LIBEL.
V
IN THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS HONORABLE
COURT MAY PERCEIVE ANY CRIMINAL LIBEL IN THIS
CASE, THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER IS
CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY, AS TO THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED TO COMPLAINANT.33
In G.R. No. 121571, he makes the following assignments of
error:
I
THE OFFENSE HAD PRESCRIBED
II
THE PUBLICATION WAS A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
III
THE PUBLICATION WAS MADE WITHOUT MALICE
IV
IT MAY, AT MOST, ALSO BE CONSIDERED A POLITICAL
LIBEL WHICH IS NOT PUNISHABLE
V
THE DECISION VIOLATES PETITIONERS RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
VI
THE PENALTY IS CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE34
With respect to the issue of prescription, Brillante anchors his
prescriptive period of a crime is interrupted only upon the filing
of the complaint in court and not the filing thereof with the
fiscals office. According to Brillante, the ruling in People v.
Olarte36 did not modify the doctrine in Tayco because in
Olarte, the Court referred to a complaint filed "in court," not in
the "fiscals office." The ruling in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals37 that a complaint filed with the fiscals office also
interrupts the prescriptive period of a criminal offense allegedly
cannot overturn the ruling in Olarte because the latter was
decided by the Court En Banc while Francisco was decided by
a mere division of the Court.38
It is further asserted by Brillante that the rule in the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure that the filing of the criminal complaint
with the fiscals office interrupts the prescriptive period, cannot
be applied retroactively to the cases against him because it
impairs his vested right to have the cases against him
dismissed on the ground of prescription.39 In addition, he
claims that Section 6(b), Rule 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which states that "[t]he pendency of a petition for
suspension of the criminal action still undergoing preliminary
investigation in the fiscals office shall interrupt the prescriptive
period for filing the corresponding complaint of information"
supports his position that prior to the amendment of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure in 1985, the prevailing rule was that
only the filing of the complaint or information in court tolls the
prescriptive period for a criminal offense.40
Brillante denies that he is liable for libel for causing to be
published his open letter implicating Binay, Prudente and their
associates in a planned assassination of Syjuco as well as
election-related terrorism, and in uttering remarks against
Binay and his associates during the January 7, 1988 press
conference. According to Brillante, his statements and
utterances were privileged communication because he made
them public out of a legal, moral and social duty to safeguard
the sanctity of the elections to be held on January 18, 1988,
and to avoid the unnecessary loss of life.41 Since his
statements were privileged communication, malice cannot be
presumed from them.42 Brillante adds that at the time he
made the statements, he honestly believed that they were true.
Citing an American case, Bays v. Hunt,43 he contends that
where there is an honest belief in the truth of the charges
made, and the publication is in good faith, one is not
responsible even for publishing an untruth.44
It is further asserted by Brillante that since Binay, the subject of
the allegedly defamatory statements is a public figure, his
(Brillantes) comments affecting Binays reputation is
constitutionally protected speech.45
Brillante also urges the Court to reverse his convictions,
reasoning that at most, what he may have committed is
"political libel" which should exempt him form criminal liability,
considering that election campaigns can become very heated
and candidates from rival camps often make charges and
countercharges which are offensive to the name, honor and
prestige of their opponents. He contends that statements made
by a candidate against his rivals, although derogatory, are for
the purpose of convincing the electorate to prevent suspicious
characters from holding public office. In essence, he posits the
view that "political libel" should be deemed constitutionally
protected speech.46
Brillante likewise argues that the multiple publication rule, i.e.,
that each publication constitutes one offense of libel, should
not have been applied to him, considering the factual
background of the open letter and the statements uttered by
him during the press conference.47
Anent the issue of equal protection, Brillante contends that he
should have been acquitted like his co-accused Angel Gonong
who wrote the news article in the Peoples Journal regarding
the January 7, 1988 press conference and Buan and Camino
who were the editors of that publication.48
The Solicitor General filed a Comment on each of the petitions.
The Solicitor General insists that the one-year prescriptive
period for libel should be reckoned from the date of filing of the
complaints with the office of the prosecutor as clarified by the
Court in Olarte and Francisco and as stated in the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which applies to
the complaints filed against Brillante as of October 1988.49
On the issue of libel, the Solicitor General insists that
Brillantes statements in the open letter clearly impute upon
Prudente and Binay a criminal conspiracy to assassinate
Syjuco.50 The Solicitor General also maintains that contrary to
Brillantes claims, the open letter cannot be considered
privileged communication because it was published without
justifiable motives and it was circulated for the information of
the general public instead of addressing the letter solely to the
authorities who had the power to curb the dangers alleged by
Brillante in the letter.51
The Solicitor General disagrees with Brillantes contention that
his statements are constitutionally protected because they are
criticisms of official conduct and deal with public figures.
According to the Solicitor General, the record shows that
Brillante did not have enough basis to pass off his accusations
as true considering that he admitted to relying on unnamed
"intelligence sources."52
20
It is also argued by the Solicitor General that Brillantes
statements cannot be exempt from criminal liability on the
ground that such statements were "political libel." Brillantes
claim, the Solicitor General asserts, has no basis in law or
jurisprudence.53
With respect to the issue of equal protection, the Solicitor
General avers that Brillante cannot be acquitted like his co-
accused publishers, editors and writers because their alleged
participation in the commission of the libel are different from
Brillante who is the author of the libelous statements. The
writers of the news reports were only narrating what took place
during the January 7, 1988 press conference, and wrote the
news articles to inform the public of Brillantes statements. In
the case of the editors and publishers who published the open
letter, they indicated in their respective publications that the
open letter was a paid advertisement. The publication of the
news reports in the newspapers was also done to inform the
public of what transpired during the January 7, 1988 press
conference.54
The Solicitor General further argues that the penalty imposed
upon Brillante is not excessive but is in accordance with law,
which considers one publication of a libelous statement as a
distinct offense from another publication of the same
statement.55
Thus, the Solicitor General prays that Brillantes petitions be
denied.56
Brillante thereafter filed a Reply to each of the Solicitor
Generals Comments. The replies reiterate Brillantes
arguments in his petitions.57
The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) whether
the offense of libel had already prescribed when the
Informations were filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati;
(2) whether Brillante is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of libel;
(3) whether Brillante was denied the equal protection of the
laws; and (4) whether the penalty imposed upon him is
excessive.
Save for the issue on the amount of moral damages, there is
no merit in the petitions.
With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth paragraph
of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
"crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one
year." In determining when the one-year prescriptive period
should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of
the same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of
prescriptive periods of offenses:
Computation of prescription of offenses.The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The aforequoted provision expressly states that prescriptive
period shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information. The meaning of the phrase "shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information" in Article 91 has been
settled in the landmark case of People v. Olarte,58 where the
Court settled divergent views as to the effect of filing a
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of
preliminary investigation on the prescriptive period of the
offense. The Court therein held that the filing of the complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of
prescription of criminal responsibility. It explained thus:
the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it
be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case
on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the
text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that
the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the
complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even
if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right
to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under
his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part
to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the
interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted," thereby indicating that the court in
which the complaint or information is filed must have the power
to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the
merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not
otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary
investigation where the proceedings may terminate without
conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the
accused because no prima facie case had been shown.59
Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals60
clarified that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office
also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a crime:
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court
conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the
Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal
force, for the express overruling also of the doctrine in People
vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or
denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office
which is required by law to conduct the preliminary
investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. In
chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by
the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for
preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals,
besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct
preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of
municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of
First instance . . ..61
There is no conflict in the pronouncements of the Court in
Olarte and Francisco as Brillante erroneously suggests. Olarte
laid down the doctrine that a complaint filed for purposes of
preliminary investigation tolls the running of the prescriptive
period of a criminal offense. The criminal complaint for libel in
that case was filed, for the purpose of preliminary investigation,
with the Justice of the Peace Court in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
Hence, in setting the doctrine, the Court referred to the "filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court."62 The question of
whether the doctrine laid down in Olarte also applies to
criminal complaints filed with the prosecutors office was
settled in Francisco. Specifically, the Court in Francisco
amplified the Olarte doctrine when it categorically ruled that the
filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the
running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
ruling that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed when the
informations against Brillante and his co-accused were filed in
the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati.
Neither did the appellate court err in sustaining Brillantes
conviction for libel.
Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as
"a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit
or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead."
21
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to
exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.63
There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three
elements of libel in the cases at bar.
An allegation made by a person against another is considered
defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a
crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or
imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.64 Brillantes statements during the January 7, 1988
press conference and in the open letter explicitly referred to
reprehensible acts allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and
their associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binays
opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjucos
assassination.
The element of publication was likewise established. There is
publication if the defamatory material is communicated to a
third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the
defamatory statement refers.65 In the cases at bar, it was
proven that Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the
press conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused
the open letter to be published in several newspapers, namely,
News Today, Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine
Daily Inquirer.
Further, Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay,
Prudente and their associates as the persons who participated
in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the
assassination of Syjuco not only in his open letter but also
during the press conference.
Thus, the determination of Brillantes culpability for libel hinges
on the question of whether his statements were made with
malice.
Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is
prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed; it implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm.66 It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the
truth or falsity thereof.67
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general
rule, that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive is shown.68
As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done
away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as
privileged communication.69
Privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged
or conditionally privileged. The Court in Orfanel v. People of the
Philippines70 differentiated absolutely privileged
communication from conditionally privileged communication in
this manner:
A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it
is not actionable, even if its author acted in bad faith. This
class includes statements made by members of Congress in
the discharge of their functions as such, official
communications made by public officers in the performance of
their duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties
or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the
hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given
by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the
course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or
statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are
responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said
witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly
privileged communications are those which, although
containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable
unless made with malice or bad faith.71 (Emphasis supplied.)
Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are
those mentioned in, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
1. A private communication made by a person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings,
or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.72
Brillante claims that he wrote the open letter and uttered the
statement complained of during the January 7, 1988 press
conference out of a social duty to disclose to all concerned the
dangers to which he and his fellow candidate Syjuco were
exposed in view of the concerted actions of Binay and
Prudente.73 In effect, he argues that his defamatory
statements and utterances fall under Article 354, No. 1 and are
in the nature of privileged communication; hence, malice
cannot be presumed but must be established beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court is not convinced.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a
qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made
the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make
the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is
made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a
board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter,
and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and
(3) the statements in the communication are made in good
faith and without malice.74
With respect to the first requisite, the Court in U.S. v. Caete75
clarified that the interest sought to be protected by the person
making the communication need not be his own, but may refer
to an interest shared by the other members of society.
It may therefore be argued that Brillantes statements, which
according to him were made in order to protect himself and
Syjuco as Binays rivals in the 1988 elections, as well as to
protect the electorate from possible acts of terrorism by Binay,
Prudente and their associates and from casting their votes for
undeserving candidates, satisfy the first requisite.
However, as the Solicitor General noted, Brillantes statements
were based merely on unconfirmed intelligence reports. His
belief in such intelligence reports hardly justifies the publication
of such serious imputations against his political rivals. As a
journalist and as a candidate for public office, Brillante should
have known that it is necessary to further verify the truth or at
least the reliability of the intelligence reports before making
them public. His hasty publication thereof negates the
existence of good faith and justifiable motives.
The pronouncement of the Court in U.S. v. Galeza76 is
enlightening:
Every communication is privileged which is made in good
faith with a view to obtain redress for some injury received or to
prevent or punish some public abuse. The privilege should not
be abused. If such communication be made maliciously and
without probable cause, the pretense under which it is made,
instead of furnishing a defense, will aggravate the case of the
defendant. And a party will be taken to have acted maliciously
if he eagerly seizes on some slight and frivolous matter, and
without any inquiry into the merits, without even satisfying
himself that the account of the matter that has reached him is
correct, hastily concludes that a great public scandal has been
brought to light which calls for the immediate intervention of the
people. (Citations omitted.)77
22
It is, however, the absence of the second element of a
privileged communication that unequivocally negates the
characterization of Brillantes statements as privileged
communication. The law requires that for a defamatory
imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be
privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the
person or persons who have some interest or duty in the
matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the
protection sought by the author of the statement.
In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily
addressed to then President Aquino, the communication
thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in
several newspapers of general circulation and was thus made
known to the general public. Even if the interest sought to be
protected belongs not just to Brillante but to the public in
general, certainly, the general public does not have the power
to remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by
Brillante in publishing the open letter or in uttering similar
statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference.
Brillante employed the shotgun approach to disseminate the
information which essentially destroyed the reputations of the
complainants. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and
is anathema to his claim of privileged communication.
In Daez v. Court of Appeals,78 Daez was charged with libel for
publishing a letter which accused the Mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan of corruption. The letter addressed to the Mayor was
sent not only to him but also to the Municipal Court, Municipal
Council and Chief of Police of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Daez
contended therein that he was not guilty of libel because he
was not motivated by malice or ill-will in publishing the letter,
but rather, he did it out of good intentions and a social duty to
bring about reforms in the administration of the municipal
government of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The Court affirmed his
conviction for libel and held:
The goodness of the intention is not always sufficient by
itself to justify the publication of an injurious fact; thus the
goodness of the end is not a sufficient motive to warrant the
employment of illicit means to obtain it. The existence of
justifiable motives is a question which has to be decided by
taking into consideration not only the intention of the author of
the publication but all the other circumstances of each
particular case. A communication made bona fide upon any
subject matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this
privilege would be slanderous and actionable. However, a
written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated among the
public.As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a
complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials,
which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision
over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and
the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however,
imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be
addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire
into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has
some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith. In the
instant case, none of the persons to whom the letter was sent,
was vested with the power of supervision over the mayor or the
authority to investigate the charges made against the latter.
(Citations omitted.)79
Thus, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the statements made by Brillante during the press
conference and in the open letter do not qualify as privileged
communication.
Indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged
communication is to permit all interested persons or citizens
with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity, to the
persons who could furnish the protection asked for. However,
to shield such privilege from abuse, the law itself requires at all
times that such petitions or communications shall be made in
good faith or with justifiable motives. If it is established that the
communication was made maliciously or to persons who could
not furnish the protection sought, then the author thereof
cannot seek protection under the law.80 As was explained by
the Court in Caete:
The plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy
require that the utmost possible freedom should be accorded
every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and
appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials
with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations
make it equally proper that members of a religious organization
should enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the
church authorities the misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or
of fellow-members. Manifestly, the right must be exercised in
good faith, and may not with impunity be made the occasion
for the venting of private spite. It is subject to the limitation and
restriction that such complaints must be made to a functionary
having authority to redress the evils complained of; that they
must be made in good faith and that they must not be actuated
by malice.81
The Court in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui82 clarified that the
fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is
not actionable; the privileged character of the communication
simply does away with the presumption of malice, and the
plaintiff has to prove the fact of malice in such case.
However, since the open letter and the statements uttered by
Brillante during the January 7, 1988 press conference are
defamatory and do not qualify as conditionally privileged
communication, malice is presumed and need not be proven
separately from the existence of the defamatory statement.83
Considering that all the elements of libel are present in the
cases against Brillante, the Court finds that no reversible error
was committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming his
convictions by the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati.
Neither does the Court find any basis in law to uphold
Brillantes proposition that his statements made during the
January 7, 1988 press conference and those in his open letter
constitute "political libel" and should thus be exempt from
liability. Unfounded and malicious statements made by one
against another in the course of an election campaign, or by
reason of differences in political views are not per se
constitutionally protected speech. Our laws on defamation84
provide for sanctions against unjustified and malicious injury to
a persons reputation and honor. Although wider latitude is
given to defamatory utterances against public officials in
connection with or relevant to their performance of official
duties,85 or against public figures in relation to matters of
public interest involving them,86 such defamatory utterances
do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally
protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or
unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties, the
same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.
With respect to the third issue, the Court agrees with the
appellate court that Brillantes right to equal protection of the
laws was not violated when he was convicted of libel while his
co-accused were acquitted.
The equal protection clause is not absolute; rather, it permits of
reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized
by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated
differently from another.87 It is sufficient that the law operates
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.88
As mentioned earlier, the cases against some of some of
Brillantes co-accused were dismissed during the pendency of
the cases before the trial courts.89 Still, some of his co-
accused remained at large,90 leaving the trial courts with no
option but to archive the case as against them. Brillantes other
co-accused were acquitted since, unlike Brillante, their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.91
The foregoing clearly shows that Brillante was in a situation
different from his co-accused. The prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt his liability for libel, as the
23
author of the open letter and the source of the defamatory
statements uttered against Binay, et al. during the January 7,
1988 press conference.
As such, his conviction for libel was not violative of the equal
protection clause.
The Court likewise finds no error on the part of the Court of
Appeals in affirming the penalties imposed upon him by the
trial courts of Manila and Makati.
The penalty for libel by means of writing or similar means is
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or a
fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the
civil action which may be brought by the offended party.92 It is
likewise settled that a single defamatory statement, if published
several times, gives rise to as many offenses as there are
publications. This is the "multiple publication rule" which is
followed in our jurisdiction, as explained in Soriano v.
Intermediate Appellate Court:93
We follow the "multiple publication" rule in the Philippines.
Thus, in the cases of Montinola D. Montalvo (34 Phil. 662,
[1916]) and United States v. Sotto (36 Phil. 389 [1917]), this
Court ruled that each and every publication of the same libel
constitutes a distinct offense. Stated more succinctly for
purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, every time the same written
matter is communicated such communication is considered a
distinct and separate publication of the libel.
We explained this as follows:
"The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a
single publication was to the effect that each communication of
a written or printed matter was a distinct and separate
publication of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate
cause of action. This rule ('multiple publication' rule) is still
followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to be
favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have
adopted the 'single publication' rule which originated in New
York, under which any single integrated publication, such as
one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one
broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of
action, regardless of the number of times it is exposed to
different people. . .(50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 cited in Time, Inc. v.
Reyes)" (39 SCRA 301, 313 [1971]).94
There is therefore no legal basis for Brillantes claim that the
penalties imposed upon him are excessive.
The Court however agrees with Brillante that the awards of
moral damages in the two cases to private complainants Binay,
Prudente and Baloloy are excessive considering the
circumstances surrounding the making and the publication of
the defamatory statements. Accordingly, the award of moral
damages in favor of private complainant Prudente is reduced
to a total of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in
Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-69616 and 89-
69617; and the award of moral damages to private
complainant Binay is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411,
88-1412 and 89-721. The award of moral damages to private
complainant Baloloy in Criminal Case No. 88-3060 is likewise
reduced to Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions are
GRANTED in part.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
14475 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award
of moral damages to private complainant Dr. Nemesio
Prudente in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-
69616 is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00). The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CR No. 15174 is likewise AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to private
complainants Atty. Jejomar Binay and Francisco Baloloy is
reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in
Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721,
and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) in Criminal
Case No. 88-3060, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE BAUTISTA, Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the
People of the Philippines assailing the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated June 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
72784, reversing the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 19, Manila and dismissing the criminal case for slight
physical injuries against respondent on the ground that the
offense charged had already prescribed.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and
his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private
complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the
Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement was reached.
The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action
dated August 11, 1999.2
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical
injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica
Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8,
1999 recommending the filing of an Information against herein
respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor
Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be
found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only
on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on
the ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-
day period of prescription from the date of the commission of
the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The
MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for
Certiorari, but the RTC denied said petition and concurred with
the opinion of the MeTC.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On
June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held
that, indeed, the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted
when the offended party filed a Complaint with the OCP of
Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded
that the offense had prescribed by the time the Information was
filed with the MeTC, reasoning as follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint
Resolution of ACP Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively
terminated the proceedings at the OCP. Hence, even if the 10-
day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his designated alter ego, to
act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought
not have been taken as late as the last day of the year 1999.
Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20,
2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To
use once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the
proceedings at the CPO was "unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very
much more than the prescriptive period of only two (2) months.
The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when
filed with the court on June 20, 2000. x x x3 (Emphasis
supplied)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as
24
follows:
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
appealed Orders of both courts below and Criminal Case No.
344030-CR, entitled: "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff,
-versus- Clemente Bautista and Leonida Bautista, Accused," is
ordered DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of
the foregoing CA Decision. The Court gives due course to the
petition notwithstanding the fact that petitioner did not file a
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the CA before the
filing of herein petition. It is not a condition sine qua non for the
filing of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.5
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP
effectively interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive
period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical
injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution in this case is
whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the
investigating prosecutors recommendation to file the proper
criminal information against respondent was approved by the
City Prosecutor.
The answer is in the negative.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philipppine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of
the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of
an information against respondent, the period of prescription
began to run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-
settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office
suspends the running of the prescriptive period.6
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon
the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation that an information be filed with the court.
The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the
complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such
time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the
proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in
filing the information but such mistake or negligence should not
unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended
party. As held in People v. Olarte,7 it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the
offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file
the requisite complaint.8
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot
be invoked by the petitioner in the present petition considering
that the delay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary
investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information
after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of
the investigating prosecutor to file the information.
The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any
explanation as to the delay in the filing of the information. The
Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of
the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly
inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not
filing the proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors apparent lack of a
sense of urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the
circumstances, the more appropriate course of action should
be the filing of an administrative disciplinary action against the
erring public officials.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 02-103990 is hereby
REINSTATED.
Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a
copy of herein Decision for appropriate action against the
erring officials.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168662 February 19, 2008
SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
EDGAR C. LIM, doing business as ORIGNAMURA
TRADING, respondent.
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
746602 and its resolution3 denying reconsideration.
Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation,
owns the copyright of various animated characters such as
"Hello Kitty," "Little Twin Stars," "My Melody," "Tuxedo Sam"
and "Zashikibuta" among others.4 While it is not engaged in
business in the Philippines, its products are sold locally by its
exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI).5
As such exclusive distributor, GGI entered into licensing
agreements with JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line
Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation.6
These local entities were allowed to manufacture certain
products (bearing petitioner's copyrighted animated characters)
for the local market.
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio
products, GGI asked IP Manila Associates (IPMA) to conduct a
market research. The research's objective was to identify those
factories, department stores and retail outlets manufacturing
and/or selling fake Sanrio items.7 After conducting several test-
buys in various commercial areas, IPMA confirmed that
respondent's Orignamura Trading in Tutuban Center, Manila
was selling imitations of petitioner's products.8
Consequently, on May 29, 2000, IPMA agents Lea A. Carmona
and Arnel P. Dausan executed a joint affidavit attesting to the
aforementioned facts.9 IPMA forwarded the said affidavit to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which thereafter filed an
application for the issuance of a search warrant in the office of
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.10
After conducting the requisite searching inquiry, the executive
judge issued a search warrant on May 30, 2000.11 On the
same day, agents of the NBI searched the premises of
Orignamura Trading. As a result thereof, they were able to
seize various Sanrio products.12
On April 4, 2002, petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro
Y. Kalaw IV of the Quisumbing Torres law firm, filed a
complaint-affidavit13 with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual
Property Piracy (TAPP) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
against respondent for violation of Section 217 (in relation to
Sections 17714 and 17815) of the Intellectual Property Code
(IPC) which states:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. - 217.1. Any person infringing
25
any right secured by provisions of Part IV of this Act or aiding
or abetting such infringement shall be guilty of a crime
punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to One hundred
fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) for the first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6)
years plus a fine ranging from One hundred fifty thousand
pesos (P150,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000)
for the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9)
years plus a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000) to One million five hundred thousand pesos
(P1,500,000) for the third and subsequent offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of
insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of imprisonment and
the amount of fine, the court shall consider the value of the
infringing materials that the defendant has produced or
manufactured and the damage that the copyright owner has
suffered by reason of infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when copyright subsists in a
work has in his possession an article which he knows, or ought
to know, to be an infringing copy of the work for the purpose of:
(a) Selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or
exposing for sale, or hire, the article;
(b) Distributing the article for purpose of trade or any other
purpose to an extent that will prejudice the rights of the
copyright of the owner in the work; or
(c) Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty of an
offense and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment and
fine as above mentioned. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent asserted in his counter-affidavit16 that he
committed no violation of the provisions of the IPC because he
was only a retailer.17 Respondent neither reproduced nor
manufactured any of petitioner's copyrighted item; thus, he did
not transgress the economic rights of petitioner.18 Moreover,
he obtained his merchandise from authorized manufacturers of
petitioner's products.19
On September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that:
Evidence on record would show that respondent bought his
merchandise from legitimate sources, as shown by official
receipts issued by JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper
Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation.
In fact, in her letter dated May 23, 2002, Ms. Ma. Angela S.
Garcia certified that JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper
Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation
are authorized to produce certain Sanrio products. While it
appears that some of the items seized during the search are
not among those products which [GGI] authorized these
establishments to produce, the fact remains that respondent
bought these from the abovecited legitimate sources. At this
juncture, it bears stressing that respondent relied on the
representations of these manufacturers and distributors that
the items they sold were genuine. As such, it is not incumbent
upon respondent to verify from these sources what items [GGI]
only authorized them to produce. Thus, as far as respondent is
concerned, the items in his possession are not infringing
copies of the original [petitioner's] products. (emphasis
supplied)20
Thus, in a resolution dated September 25, 2002, it dismissed
the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence.21
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.22
Hence, it filed a petition for review in the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor of the DOJ.23 In a resolution dated August
29, 2003,24 the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor affirmed
the TAPP resolution. The petition was dismissed for lack of
reversible error.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On
May 3, 2005, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
ground of prescription. It based its action on Act 3326 which
states:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only
by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after
eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years
or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for
any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or
more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after
twenty years; Provided, however, That all offenses against any
law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized
by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same may not
be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again
if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy. (emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, because no complaint was filed in court
within two years after the commission of the alleged violation,
the offense had already prescribed.25
On the merits of the case, the CA concluded that the DOJ did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition
for review.26 To be criminally liable for violation of Section
217.3 of the IPC, the following requisites must be present:
1. possession of the infringing copy and
2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of
the genuine article.
The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent knew that the merchandise he sold was
counterfeit. Respondent, on the other hand, was able to show
that he obtained these goods from legitimate sources.27
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner now essentially avers that the CA erred in concluding
that the alleged violations of the IPC had prescribed. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the pendency of a preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive
period.28 Moreover, the CA erred in finding that the DOJ did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint. Respondent is liable for copyright infringement
(even if he obtained his merchandise from legitimate sources)
because he sold counterfeit goods.29
Although we do not agree wholly with the CA, we deny the
petition.
Filing Of The Complaint In the DOJ Tolled The Prescriptive
Period
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for
violation of special laws starts on the day such offense was
committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings
against respondent (i.e., the accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4,
2002 or one year, ten months and four days after the NBI
searched respondent's premises and seized Sanrio
26
merchandise therefrom. Although no information was
immediately filed in court, respondent's alleged violation had
not yet prescribed.30
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,31 we
affirmed that the filing of the complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of
criminal responsibility.32 Thus, the prescriptive period for the
prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by
petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the
TAPP.
In The Absence Of Grave Abuse Of Discretion, The Factual
Findings Of The DOJ In Preliminary Investigations Will Not Be
Disturbed
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.33 Probable
cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial.34 Because a public prosecutor is
the one conducting a preliminary investigation, he determines
the existence of probable cause.35 Consequently, the decision
to file a criminal information in court or to dismiss a complaint
depends on his sound discretion.36
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide
latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. For this reason, courts generally do not interfere
with the results of such proceedings. A prosecutor alone
determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish
probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information
against the respondent.37 By way of exception, however,
judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.38 Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only
when the prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.39
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no
probable cause existed against respondent for violation of the
IPC. They were in the best position to determine whether or
not there was probable cause. We find that they arrived at their
findings after carefully evaluating the respective evidence of
petitioner and respondent. Their conclusion was not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160610 August 14, 2009
JUDELIO COBARRUBIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS SPECIAL FORMER SECOND DIVISION, and
HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Acting Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 255,
Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Resolutions dated 10 March
2003 and 9 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 72315.
The Facts
In 1994, petitioner Judelio Cobarrubias was charged with
Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5036), Homicide
(Criminal Case No. 94-5038), Violation of Section 261(Q) of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392), and Illegal
Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866
(Criminal Case No. 94-5037). Petitioner pleaded not guilty to
all the charges and trial followed.
On 20 March 2001, Presiding Judge Florentino M. Alumbres of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 255 (trial
court), issued an Order,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court rules that
the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5036 and
94-5037, and these cases are ordered DISMISSED.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for
further trial.
SO ORDERED.3
The prosecution did not appeal the trial courts Order. On 5
July 2001, petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion for
Correction of Clerical Error,4 alleging that in the dispositive
portion of the Order, Criminal Case No. 94-5038 should have
been dismissed instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037, which
should have been the case set for further trial. Petitioner
maintained that there was a typographical error in the
dispositive portion considering that in the body of the Order,
the trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
On 26 February 2002, respondent Acting Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda5 denied the motion, holding that the alleged
error was substantial in nature which affected the very merit of
the case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which
respondent Judge denied on 23 July 2002.
On 21 August 2002, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner sought to set aside the Orders dated 26 February
2002 and 23 July 2002 of respondent Judge.
On 23 August 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for failure to submit with the petition a clear duplicate
original or a certified true copy of the assailed Order dated 23
July 2002, and for failure of petitioners counsel to indicate his
current official receipt number and date of payment of the
current Integrated Bar of the Philippines membership dues,
pursuant to SC Bar Matter No. 287.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals granted. In a Resolution dated 11 December 2002, the
Court of Appeals directed petitioner to implead the People of
the Philippines as respondent. On 10 March 2003, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to
comply with the resolution.7 On 19 March 2003, petitioner filed
an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Admit
Amended Petition, which the Court of Appeals dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner contends that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON
THE GROUND OF A TECHNICALITY, DESPITE THE
PETITIONERS COMPLIANCE WITH ITS RESOLUTION
DATED 11 DECEMBER 2002.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION CONSIDERING THE MERITS THEREOF AND
THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER.8
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition meritorious.
27
Compliance with the Formal Requirements
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of
petitioner to comply with the resolution directing him to implead
the People of the Philippines as respondent . The Court of
Appeals held that the petition was prosecuted manifestly for
delay, which is a ground for dismissal under Section 8, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.9
However, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court also provides
that rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Thus, in several
cases, the Court has ruled against the dismissal of petitions or
appeals based solely on technicalities especially when there
was subsequent substantial compliance with the formal
requirements.10
In this case, the Court finds the petitioners failure to implead
the People of the Philippines as respondent not so grave as to
warrant dismissal of the petition. After all, petitioner rectified his
error by moving for reconsideration and filing an Amended
Petition, impleading the People of the Philippines as
respondent.
In Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos,11 where the petition for
certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals failed to implead the
People of the Philippines as an indispensable party, the Court
held:
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA,
respondents failed to implead the People of the Philippines as
a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously
defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents
herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent
in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on
the petition.
However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to
implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties
may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such
times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
may dismiss the complaint/petition for petitioners/plaintiffs
failure to comply.12 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Court of Appeals should have granted
petitioners motion for reconsideration and given due course to
the petition in view of petitioners subsequent compliance by
filing an Amended Petition, impleading the People of the
Philippines as respondent. Technicalities may be set aside
when the strict and rigid application of the rules will frustrate
rather than promote justice.13
Conflict Between the Fallo and the Body of the Order
Instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals, the
Court will resolve the issue raised by petitioner in order to
prevent further delay in the resolution of the case.
Petitioners main contention is that there is a clerical error in
the fallo or the dispositive portion of Judge Alumbres Order
dated 20 March 2001, which should have dismissed Criminal
Case No. 94-5038 instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037,
considering that in the body of the order, the trial court ruled
that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of petitioner in the charges for Frustrated Homicide
(Criminal Case No. 94-5036) and Homicide (Criminal Case No.
94-5038). However, respondent Acting Judge Maceda, who
was assigned to the trial court after Judge Alumbres retired,
denied petitioners motion for correction, holding that the
alleged error was substantial in nature.
For a clearer understanding of the issue, the pertinent portions
of the Order dated 20 March 2001 are hereunder quoted:
On the first and second charges of Homicide (Criminal Case
No. 94-5038) and Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-
5036), did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt in killing Edwin S. Martinez and the
wounding of Decampong "without any just motive"?
To the mind of the Court, the prosecution failed in this regard.
What is derogatory to the cases of the prosecution is the
Resolution dated July 7, 1994 of the Department of Justice
issued after a thorough preliminary investigation conducted by
an investigating panel composed of State Prosecutor Philip I.
Kimpo and Prosecution Attorney Emelie Fe M. delos Santos,
duly approved by then Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R.
Zuo.
The pertinent portions of the said Resolution is quoted as
follows:
xxx
xxx
"After hitting SI Martinez, respondent Cobarrubias, still seated,
pointed his gun towards agent Decampong and an exchange
of gun fire ensued leaving both of them wounded. Agent
Decampong was hit on his right shoulder while respondent
suffered wound on his "left thigh". (p. 4 Resolution).
It is, therefore, very clear that it was Decampong who first fired
at the accused from outside when he (accused) was seated
inside his car. It is very difficult to believe the story of the
prosecution that the exchange of fire between the accused and
the NBI agents happened while the accused was seated inside
the car.
In fact, the Resolution of the Department of Justice attest to the
fact that the accused was not the aggressor.
Pertinent portion of the Resolution (Exh. 2, 2-A & 2-B, 7/13/95
session) is quoted, thus:
"There is no treachery in the instant case as respondent was
not the aggressor. Respondent did not attack the victim
(Martinez) but only fired at the latter upon seeing him
approaching his car with a gun in his hand, while announcing
their being NBI agents and advising respondent and his
companion not to move. Hence, it cannot be said that
respondent employed means, methods or forms in the
execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make (RPC, Art. 14,
par. 16). In other words, for alevosia to apply, the killer must be
the aggressor and he must deliberately and consciously adopt
and employ a non-risky mode of execution that would insure
the successful consummation of his criminal act. As ruled by
the High Court, there is no treachery if the killing was
committed at the moment (People vs. Gutierrez, 113 SCRA
155; People vs. de Castro, L-38989, Oct. 29, 1982, 117 SCRA
1014; People vs. Magaddatu, L-36446, Sept. 9, 1983, 124
SCRA 594; or if the attack cannot be sudden and unprovoked
or unexpected (People v. Atienza, 115 SCRA 379 (1982); If no
time was left for the accused to deliberate on the mode of
attack or to prepare for the manner by which he could kill the
deceased with the full assurance that it would be improbable or
hard for the latter to defend himself or retaliate (People vs. De
Jesus, L-58505, Nov. 19, 1982, 18 SCRA 516; Or the attack is
unplanned (People vs. Manalang, L-471-36-37, July 28, 1983,
123 SCRA 583).
Neither is there evident premeditation in this case for the same
reason that herein respondent was not the aggressor or
attacker in the shooting incident or "encounter." Under the facts
of the case, it is clear that respondent never planned in killing
the victim.
Therefore, he could not have cling to a supposed
determination as there was no determination at all to speak of."
28
(P. 8 & 9 Resolution dated
July 7, 1994, DOJ Emphasis
Supplied)
"Not being the aggressor," it is apropos that the accused did
not incite, much less, provoke the shooting. Decampong
admitted while being cross examined that the accused
"withdrew" or "ran away" after being hit on the left thigh, which
will fortify the conclusion that there was no unlawful aggression
on the part of the accused.
The elements of self-defense are (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
(People vs. Hubilla, Jr., 252 SCRA 471).
The unlawful aggression, by way of the sudden blocking of the
car of the accused, and the unexpected shot hitting the
accused on the left thigh, came from the agents. There was no
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused as he was
merely inside his car when he was shot.
In People versus Mallari, 212 SCRA 777, the Supreme Court
ruled that there can be no evident pre-meditation without proof
of planning. Evident pre-meditation must be established
beyond reasonable doubt and must be based on external acts
which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate
deliberate planning. (People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227).
Witness: (Norman Decampong)
"Together with Special Investigation [sic] Edwin Martinez, we
ran towards Doa Manuela Subdivision while the accused
together with . . . I was not able to notice the two companions
ran away."
(P. 44 TSN, Nov. 3, 1994)
With respect to the charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms
(P.D. 1866) and Violation of Election Code on Comelec Gun
Ban (Sec. 261(q) Election Code), the Court needs these
charges to be disputed by countervailing evidence of the
accused. It is premature to rule on these charges at the
moment without any evidence to the contrary. Thus, Criminal
Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for the reception
of the defense evidence.
xxx
It is aciomatic [sic] that the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense
(People vs. Lapinoso, G.R. No. 122507, Feb. 25, 1999). Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprecedented mind. In criminal
cases, the accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is
shown beyond doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof, as excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty (People vs. Datukon Bansil, G.R.
No. 120163, March 10, 1999).
On the whole, the meager evidence for the prosecution casts
serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. It does not pass
the test of moral certainty and is inefficient to rebut the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court rules that
the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5036 and
94-5037, and these cases are ordered DISMISSED.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for
further trial.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis supplied)
It is clearly stated in the body of the assailed Order that the trial
court held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for Homicide (Criminal
Case No. 94-5038) and Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case
No. 94-5036), thus:
On the first and second charges of Homicide (Criminal Case
No. 94-5038) and Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-
5036), did the prosecution prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt in killing Edwin S. Martinez and the
wounding of Decampong "without any just motive"?
To the mind of the Court, the prosecution failed in this
regard.15 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the basis for such
ruling.
As regards the two other charges for Illegal Possession of
Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Criminal Case
No. 94-5037) and Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No.
7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392), the trial court held that it was
still premature to rule on these charges and that further
evidence was needed, thus:
With respect to the charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms
(P.D. 1866) and Violation of Election Code on Comelec Gun
Ban (Sec. 261(q) Election Code), the Court needs these
charges to be disputed by countervailing evidence of the
accused. It is premature to rule on these charges at the
moment without any evidence to the contrary. Thus, Criminal
Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for the reception
of the defense evidence.16 (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
However, the trial court inadvertently designated the wrong
criminal case number to the charge for Illegal Possession of
Firearms. Instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037, the trial court
erroneously wrote Criminal Case No. 94-5038, which is the
criminal case number of the charge for Homicide.
Unfortunately, this error was repeated in the dispositive portion
of the Order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court rules that
the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5036 and
94-5037, and these cases are ordered DISMISSED.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set for
further trial.
SO ORDERED.17 (Emphasis supplied)
In the dispositive portion, the trial court erroneously dismissed
Criminal Case No. 94-5037 which refers to the charge for
Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No.
1866, while Criminal Case No. 94-5038 which refers to the
charge for Homicide was set for further trial.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the
fallo, or the dispositive part, and the body of the decision or
order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo is the final
order and becomes the subject of execution, while the body of
the decision merely contains the reasons or conclusions of the
court ordering nothing.18 However, where one can clearly and
unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision that
there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the
decision will prevail.19 Thus, in Spouses Rebuldea v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,20 the Court held that the trial
court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it corrected the
dispositive portion of its decision to make it conform to the
body of the decision, and to rectify the clerical errors which
interchanged the mortgagors and the mortgagee.
In this case, considering the clear finding of the trial court that
the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of petitioner in the charges for Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide, while the two other charges for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Violation of the Omnibus Election Code require
further evidence, it is only just and proper to correct the
dispositive portion to reflect the exact findings and conclusions
29
of the trial court. Thus, in accordance with the findings of the
trial court, Criminal Case No. 94-5036 (Frustrated Homicide)
and Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide) should be
dismissed, while Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866)
and Criminal Case No. 24-392 (Violation of Section 261(Q) of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 7166) should be set for further trial.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Resolutions dated
10 March 2003 and 9 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72315 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
dispositive portion of the Order dated 20 March 2001, of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 255, is
CORRECTED to conform to the body of the Order by
dismissing Criminal Case No. 94-5036 (Frustrated Homicide)
and Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide), and setting for
further trial Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866) and Criminal
Case No. 24-392 (Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No.
7166).
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837 March 23, 2004
VISITACION L. ESTODILLO, ET AL., complainants,
vs.
JUDGE TEOFILO D. BALUMA, respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified complaint dated December 26, 2002, Jovelyn
Estudillo (Jovelyn) assisted by her mother, Visitacion L.
Estodillo, charges Judge Teofilo D. Baluma with Gross and
Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleges that her administrative complaint arose
from the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11627 for Other Acts
of Child Abuse1 entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs.
Fredie Cirilo Nocos y Urot" by respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 1, a Family Court.
The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary
investigation with the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tubigon-Clarin, Bohol. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, Judge James Stewart E. Himalaloan found that
there was sufficient ground to hold the herein accused for trial
for the offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse defined in Sec. 10
(1), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610.2 The record of the
case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
where, after a review by Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
Macario I. Delusa, he failed an Information dated October 28,
20023.
Respondent dismissed the Information in an Order dated
November 21, 20024 ratiocinating, thus:
EXAMINING the Information, the two (2) copies of the same
forming parts of the Records in this case appearing in pages
28 and 30, the court finds that the same is not subscribed and
sworn to by the prosecutor.
...
A CAREFUL EXAMINATION on the four corners of the
Information will readily show that the information had not been
subscribed by the prosecutor and this will militate against the
validity of the information and towards nullity and total
worthlessness of the same. Since the Information is defective,
the Court is left without any alternative except to dismiss this
case. Any other act by the Court will tantamount to validating
the defective information. The Court can act in this case only
when a correct information is filed, which is beyond procedure
for the Court to order.
The prosecution through Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Revival5 on December 12, 2002 alleging
that there was no necessity for the Information to be under
oath since he merely concurred with the resolution of the
investigating judge and that he "has properly subscribed and
signed the Information with the approval of the Provincial
Prosecutor".
On January 10, 2003, respondent issued an Order6 granting
the motion for reconsideration, reinstating and reviving the
case but at the same time requiring the public prosecutor to file
a new information "incorporating the formalities called for under
Rule 112, Section 4 and the circular of its department
implementing the pertinent laws on the matter, within ten (10)
days from notice hereof."
On January 30, 2003, the prosecution filed an ex parte motion
to increase the bail bond of the accused7 but respondent
refused to act on it because the prosecution had not yet
complied with his order to file a new information.8
On January 31, 2003, the prosecution filed a "Manifestation"9
stating that it "will not file a new information as ordered, the
same being contrary to law and jurisprudence and is
unprocedural."
Complainant, therefore, seeks the assistance of the Court to
investigate this impasse considering that the bond of the
accused had been cancelled earlier.
Complainant also alleges that previously, respondent judge
had dismissed Criminal Case No. 11514 against a certain
Eduardo Vedra for Unjust Vexation on the same ground. The
prosecution, in a motion for reconsideration, explained that
what is required to be under oath is a complaint, not an
information where the Rules merely require that it be
subscribed. Respondent granted the motion and revived the
case without requiring the filing of a new information.
Complainant wonders why respondent did not require the filing
of a new information in the Vedra case, but insisted on the
filing of such new information in the present case. This,
according to the complainant, is clearly gross ignorance of the
law.
In his Comment, respondent avers: The complaint did not
comply with Rule 7, Section 5, Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which required a certification of non-forum shopping.
He denies that he stood pat on his original order because he
had already issued an Order dated 27 February 2003 which
found probable cause to warrant the placing of the accused,
Fredie Cirilo Nocos, under custody in order to stand trial and
fixed his bond at P60,000.00. The complainant, including
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat, the trial prosecutor who instigated the
filing of herein administrative complaint and Atty. Esther
Gertrude Biliran, who notarized and obviously prepared the
complaint, were mentally dishonest for not mentioning the fact
that before herein complaint was filed on March 8, 2003, he
had already issued the aforecited Order dated February 27,
2003. Prosecutor Ucat and Atty. Biliran had evil motives when
they instigated the filing of the complaint against him even
before he had issued the new order and for continuing with it
after he issued the Order of 27 February 2003.
Respondent maintains that he had efficiently discharged his
duties as judge although his Branch is one of the most heavily
burdened branches in the Tagbilaran City area and that to cope
with this heavy load, he works even at night and on Sundays
and holidays, writing decisions and drafting orders.
Respondent included in his Comment a "Counter-complaint"
against Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D.
Biliran an administrative case for disbarment or for disciplinary
sanction for gross violation of the canons under the Code of
Professional conduct and for deceit, dishonesty, failure to
exercise candor, fairness, good faith, doing falsehood or
30
consenting to its doing and abuse of procedures.
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat filed a "Rejoinder"10 stating that he is
in quandary why the respondent tagged him as the trial
prosecutor when in fact the record shows that Prosecutor
Helen T. Cabatos was the one who handled the subject
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 11627) and Prosecutor
Macario I. Delusa was the one who filed the Information. He
asserts that the only thing he did was to administer the oath of
the complainant in the original letter-complaint subject matter
of the herein administrative case. He points out that it was in
another case, Criminal Case No. 11514 for Unjust Vexation
entitled "The People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Vedra,
a.k.a. Eddie" that he acted as the prosecutor. That case was
dismissed by respondent in an Order dated November 25,
2002 on the same ground that the Information was not
subscribed by the prosecutor. Upon a Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer For Revival of the Case,
respondent granted it in an Order11 dated January 2, 2003. He
likewise answered point by point all the accusations hurled by
respondent in the latter's counter-complaint.
Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran also filed a "Rejoinder"12
wherein she denied having participated in the filing of the
complaint except to take the oath of the complainant. She
avers that at the time herein administrative case was filed on
March 8, 2003, complainants have not yet received the
February 27, 2003 Order issued by respondent judge which
found probable cause to warrant the placing of the accused,
Fredie Cirilo Nocos under custody in order to stand trial and
fixed his bond at P60,000.00. Likewise, she denied the
accusations of the respondent judge and proferred her
defenses against it.
Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends
that: 1) this case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter; and 2) respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning
that a repetition of the offense will merit a more drastic action
of the Court.
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 4. Information defined. An information is an accusation
in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court.
There is no requirement that the information be sworn to.
Otherwise, the rules would have so provided as it does in a
complaint which is defined as a "sworn written statement
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended
party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated".13 In a case, we ruled that the
information need not be under oath, the reason therefore being
principally that the prosecuting officer filing it is charged with
the special duty in regard thereto and is acting under the
special responsibility of his oath of office.14 Clearly,
respondent had confused an information from a complaint.
A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was
subscribed or signed by Prosecutor Macario I. Delusa. It is
thus clear that respondent erred in dismissing the subject
Information on the ground that it was not under oath.
As aptly observed by the Court Administrator in the evaluation
submitted by him:
It is clear that respondent erred in dismissing the information
filed by Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat on the ground that it was not
sworn to. The Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly defines an
information as "an accusation in writing charging a person with
an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the
court" (Section 4, Rule 110). The Rules do not require that it be
under oath for otherwise, it would have provided so. On the
other hand, a complaint is defined as "a sworn statement
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended
party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated" (Section 5, Rule 110).
Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that
both a complaint and an information need to be under oath.
But the oath is not required when it is a public prosecutor who
files the information because he does so under the oath he
took when he qualified for his position. The position of the
public prosecutor was that the preliminary investigation had
been conducted by the municipal circuit trial judge of Tubigon-
Clarin and the latter's resolution was concurred in by the
prosecutors.
It appears from the record that the respondent corrected
himself by issuing his Order of 27 February 2003 where he
found that "the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estudillo,
father of the victim, the affidavit of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the
victim executed with the assistance of Visitacion Estudillo, her
mother, the medico-legal certificate issued by Isidro Fermites,
Jr., on Jovelyn Estudillo, the certification of the facts of birth of
Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the records of the proceedings during the
preliminary examination at the First Level Court, its Order
dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated September
19, 2002, this court finds probable cause to warrant that the
accused be placed in the custody of the law to stand trial."
The error of the respondent is not a serious one. He, however,
must be reminded that as judge he must be conversant with
the rules and laws that it is his office of apply. He deserves a
reprimand for his failure to understand an elementary rule of
law.15
We agree with Court Administrator Velasco.
The records disclose that respondent, in effect, apparently
rectified his error when he issued an Order dated February 27,
2003, portions of which read as follows:
EXAMINING the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estodillo,
father of the victim, the affidavit of Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the
victim executed with the assistance of Visitacion-Estodillo her
mother, the medico legal certificate issued by Isidro Permites,
Jr., M.D., on Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the certification on the facts
of birth of Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the records of the proceedings
during the preliminary examination at the First Level Court, its
Order dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated
September 19, 2002, this Court finds probable cause to
warrant that the accused be placed in the custody of the law to
stand trial.16
However, it is noted that said Order did not have any reference
at all nor did it attempt to reconcile the previous Orders he
issued on which bases the herein administrative complaint was
based, namely: the Order dated November 21, 2002
dismissing the Information, the Order dated January 10, 2003
reinstating and reviving the case but requiring the prosecution
to file a new information, and the Order dated January 30,
2003 refusing to act on the prosecution's ex-parte motion to
increase amount of bail until the filing of a new information,
thus resulting in the grievance submitted by complainant which
could have been easily averted had respondent been more
meticulous in the performance of his duties as presiding judge
of a regional trial court.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct mandates
judges to "be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence". It is imperative that judges must be conversant
with basic legal principles17. Judges are called to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws.18 They are not common men and women, whose errors,
men and women forgive and time forgets19. Judges sit as the
embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last recourse
where all other institutions have failed".20
As to the counter-complaint of respondent Judge against
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran,
the same should be dismissed for failure of respondent to
refute their respective "rejoinders", dated June 11, 2003 and
June 6, 2003.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Teofilo D. Baluma is found
guilty of violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial
Conduct and REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
31
severely.
The counter-complaint of Judge Teofilo D. Baluma against
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran is
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 170609-13 January 30, 2009
BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Petitioner
vs.
HON. VIRGILIO M. PATAG, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33,
VICENTE C. ARAGONA, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
CORONA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 assailing the orders
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated
August 25, 20052 and September 19, 20053 in Criminal Case
Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 captioned People of the
Philippines versus Bernie Miaque, et al.
On January 31, 2000, five Informations for libel4 were filed in
the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 26, against petitioner Bernie G.
Miaque and three others.5 In an order dated February 17,
2005,6 these Informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction
over the offenses charged. Specifically, said Informations failed
to allege either that private respondent (therein private
complainant) Vicente Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City
at the time of the commission of the offenses or that the
alleged libelous remarks were printed or first published in Iloilo
City.7
On June 22, 2005, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jerry
Maraon issued a resolution recommending the filing of
Informations for libel against petitioner and his co-accused.
Accordingly, five new Informations for libel docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 were filed against
petitioner and his co-accused in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch
33, presided by respondent Judge Virgilio M. Patag.
The new Informations were similarly worded as those
previously quashed but with these added allegations: (1)
Aragona, Regional State Prosecutor VI of the Department of
Justice, held office at the Hall of Justice, Iloilo City or (2) the
alleged libelous remarks were written, printed and published in
Iloilo City (on the pertinent dates thereof). Said Informations
were likewise signed and filed by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Maraon.
In view of the filing of the new Informations, petitioner filed his
motions (dated August 8, 2005) not to issue warrants of arrest
and, if already issued, to recall them and remand the
Informations to the Provincial Prosecutors Office for
preliminary investigation.8 In an order dated August 25, 2005,
respondent judge denied petitioners motions on the ground
that petitioner was beyond the courts jurisdiction as he was
not under the custody of the court.9 Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied in an order dated September 19,
2005. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner challenges the August 25, 2005 and September 19,
2005 orders of respondent judge for being contrary to law and
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. He
contends that the Informations were filed without the
mandatory preliminary investigation. Moreover, the new
Informations were filed by one who had no authority to do so
because these were filed by the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors
Office and not the Iloilo City Prosecutors Office. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter supposedly belonged to the latter.
Petitioner likewise assails the refusal of respondent judge to
recall the warrants of arrest issued against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the
People of the Philippines, contends that the quashed
Informations were merely amended to include the allegations
that Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offenses or that the libelous remarks were
printed and first published in Iloilo City. A new preliminary
investigation was therefore unnecessary. On the warrant of
arrest, the OSG alleges that the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over petitioner in view of the filing of his August 8, 2005
motions. The filing of the motions supposedly was tantamount
to voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the court.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is
incorrect for it violates the hierarchy of courts.10 A regard for
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should
be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed
in the Court of Appeals.11 This rule, however, may be relaxed
when pure questions of law12 are raised as in this case.
We grant the petition. The Informations must be quashed.
One of the issues raised in the petition is the authority of the
Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors Office to file and sign the new
Informations against petitioner. The offenses charged in each
of the new Informations were alleged to have been committed
in Iloilo City but said Informations were filed by the Iloilo
Provincial Prosecutors Office.
Sections 9 and 11 of Presidential Decree No. 127513 provide:
SEC. 9. Offices of Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals Staffing.
-- There shall be in each province and each subprovince; one
provincial fiscal and such number of assistant provincial fiscals
as may hereinafter be provided for.
There shall be in each city one city fiscals and such number of
assistant city fiscals as may hereinafter be provided.
xxx
SEC. 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and
Functions. The provincial fiscal or the city fiscal shall:
a) xxx
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the
necessary information or complaint prepared or made against
the persons accused. xxx (emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that the alleged acts of libel were committed in
Iloilo City. Who then had the authority to file and sign the new
informations against petitioner and his co-accused? The
Charter of the City of Iloilo provides:14
[The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have charge
of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations
of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and
in the Municipal Trial Court of the city, and shall discharge all
the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law
upon provincial fiscals.
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have
the necessary informations or complaints prepared against the
persons accused. xxx15
The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly
lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutors Office. The Iloilo
Provincial Prosecutors Office was clearly bereft of authority to
file the new Informations against petitioner. An Information,
when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer,
cannot be filed by another.16 The court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the
Information. We held in People v. Hon. Garfin:17
It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which,
among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over
the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. xxx
Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as
lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by
32
silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
The foregoing considered, the Informations corresponding to
Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 were fatally
defective. The common infirmity in the Informations constituted
a jurisdictional defect that could not be cured.18 There was no
point in proceeding under a defective Information that could
never be the basis of a valid conviction.19
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated August
25, 2005 and September 19, 2005 are hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of new
Informations by an authorized officer. The warrants of arrest
issued are likewise QUASHED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE
RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present
petition for review filed on May 30, 2008 the August 30, 2007
Decision1 and the April 18, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that affirmed the trial courts
Orders of January 24, 31, February 7, 8, all in 2007, and
denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged
with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January
12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Branch 150 to which the case was raffled, presided by Judge
Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order4 against
petitioner who was placed under police custody while confined
at the Makati Medical Center.5
After petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial
court approved,6 he was released from detention, and his
arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion7 praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the
evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine
the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 20078
deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the prosecution
to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense
and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its
inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 20079
denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed
these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the public
prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after
the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs,
or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the
prosecutors recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for
the judicial determination of probable cause.10 Petitioner also
separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with
prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended
Information.11
The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders,
viz: (1) Order of February 7, 200712 that admitted the
Amended Information13 for murder and directed the issuance
of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8, 200714
which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner
questioned these two orders via supplemental petition before
the appellate court.
The appellate court dismissed petitioners petition, hence, his
present petition, arguing that:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO
CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE
BELOW WHEN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD
ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE LOWER COURT. HENCE,
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR
IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUCH
REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE
RULES OF COURT[;]
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE PROSECUTOR
VELASCOS AMENDED INFORMATION, ISSUING A
WARRANT OF ARREST, AND SETTING THE CASE BELOW
FOR ARRAIGNMENT, CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY
AND LEGALITY OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31
JANUARY 2007, WHICH LED TO THE QUESTIONABLE
REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL AMENDED
INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]
CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCOS
FINDINGS IN HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2007
ARE BLATANTLY BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND
CONJECTURES, WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR
MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE BEING ADDUCED DURING THE
REINVESTIGATION, RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE
AT LEAST ALLOWED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR A
HEARING FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE.15 (emphasis in the original omitted)
Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21,
2007 pushed through during which petitioner refused to plead,
drawing the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent
Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela16
which the trial court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order
of May 21, 2007,17 it finding that the evidence of guilt for the
crime of murder is not strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner
to post bail in the amount of P300,000 for his provisional
liberty.
The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from
the appellate court, went on to try petitioner under the
Amended Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the
trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide, sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. From the Decision, petitioner
filed an appeal to the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 32159, during the pendency of which he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal. The appellate
court denied petitioners application which this Court, in G.R.
No. 189122, affirmed by Decision of March 17, 2010.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the
present petition had been rendered moot since the
presentation of evidence, wherein petitioner actively
participated, had been concluded.18
Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from
mootness of the petition, for in the present case, petitioner did
not, by his active participation in the trial, waive his stated
objections.
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or
irregular preliminary investigation. An application for or
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging
the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against
33
him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The
court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not
later than the start of the trial of the case.
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to
challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge
against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended
Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended
Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his
arraignment. During the arraignment on March 21, 2007,
petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised
were still pending resolution by the appellate court, thus
prompting the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment
from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation applies "only if he voluntarily enters
his plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto."19 There must be clear and
convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause.
When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his
act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of,
an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is
possible.20
From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably
infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him
from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so
timely invoked. Other than its allegation of active participation,
the OSG offered no clear and convincing proof that petitioners
participation in the trial was unconditional with the intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In fact, on
January 26, 2010, petitioner still moved for the early resolution
of the present petition.21
Whatever delay arising from petitioners availment of remedies
against the trial courts Orders cannot be imputed to petitioner
to operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be deemed as a
voluntary relinquishment of petitioners principal prayer. The
non-issuance of such injunctive relief only means that the
appellate court did not preliminarily find any exception22 to the
long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a
criminal prosecution.23 Consequently, the trial of the case took
its course.
The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial courts
rendition of judgment.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.24
The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the
Amended Information for murder operates as a supervening
event that mooted the present petition. Assuming that there is
ground25 to annul the finding of probable cause for murder,
there is no practical use or value in abrogating the concluded
proceedings and retrying the case under the original
Information for homicide just to arrive, more likely or even
definitely, at the same conviction of homicide. Mootness would
have also set in had petitioner been convicted of murder, for
proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is much higher than
probable cause, would have been established in that instance.
Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground
of mootness, the Court proceeds to resolve the legal issues in
order to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar
and public.26 In the present case, there is compelling reason
to clarify the remedies available before and after the filing of an
information in cases subject of inquest.
After going over into the substance of the petition and the
assailed issuances, the Court finds no reversible error on the
part of the appellate court in finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of the four trial court Orders.
In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the
prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from the trial
court an investigation or reevaluation of the case except
through a petition for review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). In cases when an accused is arrested without a
warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of preliminary
investigation belongs only to the accused.
The contention lacks merit.
Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving
an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the
complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without
need of such investigation provided an inquest has been
conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or
unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be
filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the
proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party
or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of
his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail
and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15)
days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a
preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
defense as provided in this Rule. (underscoring supplied)
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a
complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one
day without regard to fine.28 As an exception, the rules provide
that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of
a lawful arrest without a warrant29 involving such type of
offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been
conducted.30
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation
conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving
persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant
of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining
whether said persons should remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in court.31
It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of
both the arrested person and the private complainant during
the brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies
available to them before and after the filing of a complaint or
information in court.
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN
COURT, the private complainant may proceed in coordinating
with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the
latters conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has
the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation,
provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection against delay
in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this
remedy is not available to the private complainant since he
cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the
provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing of a
complaint or information with the proper judicial authorities
within the applicable period,32 belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary
nature and the attendant risk of running against Article 125,
ends with either the prompt filing of an information in court or
the immediate release of the arrested person.33 Notably, the
rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for
reconsideration.34
Contrary to petitioners position that private complainant should
have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not
34
immediately available in cases subject of inquest.
Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary
is by "petition by a proper party under such rules as the
Department of Justice may prescribe."35 The rule referred to is
the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal,36
Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall "apply to
appeals from resolutions x x x in cases subject of preliminary
investigation/ reinvestigation." In cases subject of inquest,
therefore, the private party should first avail of a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the
matter to the DOJ Secretary.
In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the
private complainant may pursue the case through the regular
course of a preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN
COURT, the rules yet provide the accused with another
opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation within five
days from the time he learns of its filing. The Rules of Court
and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether
the private complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of
the victim did in the present case, a similar right to ask for a
reinvestigation.
The Court holds that the private complainant can move for
reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing
disquisition.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor.37 The private complainant in a criminal case
is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by
himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the
information had been filed in court, the proper party for that
being the public prosecutor who has the control of the
prosecution of the case.38 Thus, in cases where the private
complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal
action,39 and is granted the authority to prosecute,40 the
private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.
In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the
accused, trial prosecutors must "examine the Information vis--
vis the resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to
make the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that
the information is sufficient in form and substance."41
x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the
error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the
records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact
may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again,
realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially determine
the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or
evident, nor is it required that such nuances as offenses
includible in the offense charged be taken into account. It
necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can and
should institute remedial measures[.]42 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department of the government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the
right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests
the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion
of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on
a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors.43
The prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite,
however.44 The standing principle is that once an information
is filed in court, any remedial measure such as a
reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound discretion of
the court. Interestingly, petitioner supports this view.45 Indeed,
the Court ruled in one case that:
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of
the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.
Although the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in
court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For
while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court, once the case had already been brought
therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper
thereafter
should be addressed to the court for its consideration and
approval. The only qualification is that the action of the court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law.
xxxx
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may
be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or
consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-
investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw
the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case,
such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise
be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.46
(underscoring supplied)
While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro47 held that to ferret out the truth,
a trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation, the Court therein
recognized that a trial court may, where the interest of justice
so requires, grant a motion for reinvestigation of a criminal
case pending before it.
Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for
reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having
brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is
thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching
regarding the disposition thereof,48 subject to the trial courts
approval of the resulting proposed course of action.
Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal
information as what happened in the present case, the Courts
holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an
information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of
the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from
the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by
the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses
to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (emphasis
supplied)
In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or
substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be
made without leave of court.49 After the entry of a plea, only a
formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and
only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if
the same is beneficial to the accused.50
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information
are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An
35
information which is void ab initio cannot be amended to
obviate a ground for quashal.51 An amendment which
operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise
impermissible.52
Considering the general rule that an information may be
amended even in substance and even without leave of court at
any time before entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of
a reinvestigation at that stage is a mere superfluity?
It is not.
Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation be
it a complete disposition or an intermediate modification53 of
the charge is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, which must make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial court
would ultimately make the determination on the proposed
course of action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a
reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the
evidence for purposes of buttressing the appropriate motion to
be filed in court.
More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving
a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of
law demands that no substantial amendment of an information
may be admitted without conducting another or a new
preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the
Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that a substantial
amendment in an information entitles an accused to another
preliminary investigation, unless the amended information
contains a charge related to or is included in the original
Information.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the
Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right
but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The following have been held to be mere formal amendments:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction;
(2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3)
additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial
right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and
not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with
additional precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance.55
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are
related does not necessarily or automatically deprive the
accused of his right to another preliminary investigation. Notatu
dignum is the fact that both the original Information and the
amended Information in Matalam were similarly charging the
accused with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

In one case,56 it was squarely held that the amendment of the
Information from homicide to murder is "one of substance with
very serious consequences."57 The amendment involved in
the present case consists of additional averments of the
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty,
which qualify the offense charged from homicide to murder. It
being a new and material element of the offense, petitioner
should be given the chance to adduce evidence on the matter.
Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment essentially
varies the prosecutions original theory of the case and
certainly affects not just the form but the weight of defense to
be mustered by petitioner.
The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA58
and Pacoy v. Cajigal,59 wherein the amendment of the caption
of the Information from homicide to murder was not considered
substantial because there was no real change in the recital of
facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of
the Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances
were already clearly embedded in the original Information.
Buhat pointed out that the original Information for homicide
already alleged the use of superior strength, while Pacoy
states that the averments in the amended Information for
murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the
original Information for homicide. None of these peculiar
circumstances obtains in the present case.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is
required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case
was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial
amendment of the Information. There is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner
and for the same objective of determining whether there exists
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.60 What is essential is that
petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the
charge of murder61 after the claimed circumstances were
made known to him as early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to
present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended
charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely
observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate,
even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v.
Court of Appeals states that the rules do not even require, as a
condition sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary
investigation, the presence of the respondent as long as efforts
to reach him were made and an opportunity to controvert the
complainants evidence was accorded him.62
In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails
the hurried issuance of the last two assailed RTC Orders
despite the pendency before the appellate court of the petition
for certiorari challenging the first two trial court Orders allowing
a reinvestigation.
The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a temporary retraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.63 The
appellate court, by Resolution of February 15, 2007,64 denied
petitioners application for a temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction. Supplementary efforts to seek
injunctive reliefs proved futile.65 The appellate court thus did
not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court when it proceeded with the case and eventually
arraigned the accused on March 21, 2007, there being no
injunction order from the appellate court. Moreover, petitioner
opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest
remedy that was available after the reinvestigation and which
could have suspended the arraignment.661avvphi1
Regarding petitioners protestations of haste, suffice to state
that the pace in resolving incidents of the case is not per se an
indication of bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of
Justice,67 the Court held:
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-
36
judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an
injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt
dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The orderly
administration of justice remains as the paramount and
constant consideration, with particular regard of the
circumstances peculiar to each case.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officers
official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such
presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present
contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The
swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot
be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the
presumably regular performance of not just one but five state
prosecutors.68
There is no ground for petitioners protestations against the
DOJ Secretarys sudden designation of Senior State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City Prosecutor of
Makati City for the present case69 and the latters conformity
to the motion for reinvestigation.
In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose
the public prosecutor who will conduct the reinvestigation or
preliminary investigation.70 There is a hierarchy of officials in
the prosecutory arm of the executive branch headed by the
Secretary of Justice71 who is vested with the prerogative to
appoint a special prosecutor or designate an acting prosecutor
to handle a particular case, which broad power of control has
been recognized by jurisprudence.72
As for the trial courts ignoring the DOJ Secretarys
uncontested statements to the media which aired his opinion
that if the assailant merely intended to maim and not to kill the
victim, one bullet would have sufficed the DOJ Secretary
reportedly uttered that "the filing of the case of homicide
against ano against Leviste lintek naman eh I told you to watch
over that case there should be a report about the ballistics,
about the paraffin, etc., then thats not a complete
investigation, thats why you should use that as a ground"
no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, can be imputed
to it.
The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a
"determination to file the Information even in the absence of
probable cause."73 On the contrary, the remarks merely
underscored the importance of securing basic investigative
reports to support a finding of probable cause. The original
Resolution even recognized that probable cause for the crime
of murder cannot be determined based on the evidence
obtained "[u]nless and until a more thorough investigation is
conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in
evidence[.]"74
The trial court concluded that "the wound sustained by the
victim at the back of his head, the absence of paraffin test and
ballistic examination, and the handling of physical evidence,"75
as rationalized by the prosecution in its motion, are sufficient
circumstances that require further inquiry.
That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently
assessed in the bail hearings does not affect the prior
determination of probable cause because, as the appellate
court correctly stated, the standard of strong evidence of guilt
which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly
higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which is
sufficient to initiate a criminal case.76
In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court
for not conducting, at the very least, a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause, considering the lack of
substantial or material new evidence adduced during the
reinvestigation.
Petitioners argument is specious.
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held
for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made
a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not
be compelled to pass upon.77
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by
the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself
that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge
cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.78 Paragraph (a),
Section 5,79 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the
procedure to be followed by the RTC.
To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of
probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such
motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally evaluate the
resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting
evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused.80
evidence already submitted.85
Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions
of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a petition for review
on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. The Court
cannot thus review the evidence adduced by the parties on the
issue of the absence or presence of probable cause, as there
exists no exceptional circumstances to warrant a factual
review.86
In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the
appellate court, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope.
It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction.1avvphi1 It is
not to stray at will and resolve questions and issues beyond its
competence, such as an error of judgment.87 The courts duty
in the pertinent case is confined to determining whether the
executive and judicial determination of probable cause was
done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Although it is possible that error may be committed
in the discharge of lawful functions, this does not render the act
amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.88
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
97761 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and

personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already
make a personal determination of the existence of probable
cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists,
he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.81 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to

determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.82
Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing
for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly,
petitioner "cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be
[since t]he extent of the judges examination depends on the
exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the
case require."83 In one case, the Court emphatically stated:

The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must
determine the presence or absence of probable cause within
such periods. The Sandiganbayans determination of probable
cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not
adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted
from his determination of probable cause by needless motions
for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.84
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters,

arguing that no circumstances exist that would qualify the
crime from homicide to murder.

The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence

deserves no credence, because new pieces of evidence are
not prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is not
material that no new matter or evidence was presented during
the reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that
reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat
investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not
prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for
the prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings and the
37