5/25/2017 A.M.OCAIPINo.

11184CAJ

RepublicofthePhilippines
SupremeCourt
Manila
ENBANC


RE:VERIFIEDCOMPLAINTOF A.M.OCAIPINo.11184CAJ
ENGR.OSCARL.ONGJOCO,
CHAIRMANOFTHE
BOARD/CEOOFFHGYMN Present:
MULTIPURPOSEAND
TRANSPORTSERVICE CORONA,C.J.,
COOPERATIVE,AGAINSTHON. CARPIO,
JUANQ.ENRIQUEZ,JR.,HON. VELASCO,JR.,
RAMONM.BATO,JR.ANDHON. LEONARDODECASTRO,
FLORITOS.MACALINO, BRION,
ASSOCIATEJUSTICES,COURT PERALTA,
OFAPPEALS BERSAMIN,
DELCASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA,JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES,and
PERLASBERNABE,JJ.

Promulgated:

January31,2012
xx

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN,J.:

Judicialofficersdonothavetosufferthebruntofunsuccessfulordissatisfiedlitigantsbaselessand
false imputations of their violating the Constitution in resolving their cases and of harboring bias
and partiality towards the adverse parties. The litigant who baselessly accuses them of such
violations is not immune from appropriate sanctions if he thereby affronts the administration of
justiceandmanifestsadisrespecttowardsthejudicialoffice.

Antecedents

OnJune7,2011,theCourtreceivedaletterfromEngr.OscarL.Ongjoco,claiminghimselftobe
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OnJune7,2011,theCourtreceivedaletterfromEngr.OscarL.Ongjoco,claiminghimselftobe
the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the FHGYMN MultiPurpose
[1] [2]
and Transport Service Cooperative (FHGYMN). The letter included a complaintaffidavit,
wherebyOngjocochargedtheCAsSixthDivisioncomposedofAssociateJusticeJuanQ.Enriquez,
Jr.(asChairman),AssociateJusticeRamonM.Bato,Jr.,andAssociateJusticeFloritoS.Macalino
as Members for rendering an arbitrary and baseless decision in CAG.R. SP No. 102289 entitled
[3]
FHGYMNMultiPurposeandTransportServiceCooperativev.AllanRayA.Baluyut,etal.

ThegenesisofCAG.R.SPNo.102289startedonJuly26,2004whenFHGYMNrequested
the amendment of Kautusang Bayan Blg. 370297 of the City of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan
through the Committee on Transportation and Communications (Committee) of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (Sanggunian) in order to include the authorization of FHGYMNs Chairman to issue
[4]
motorizedtricycleoperatorspermit(MTOP)toitsmembers. Duringtheensuingscheduledpublic
hearings, City Councilors Allan Ray A. Baluyut and Nolly Concepcion, together with ABC
President Bartolome B. Aguirre and one Noel Mendoza (an employee of the Sanggunian), were
alleged to have uttered statements exhibiting their bias against FHGYMN, giving FHGYMN
reason to believe that the Committee members were favoring the existing franchisees Francisco
HomesTricycle
OperatorsandDriversAssociation(FRAHTODA)andBarangayMulawinTricycleOperatorsand
[5]
Drivers Association (BMTODA). Indeed, later on, the Sanggunian, acting upon the
[6]
recommendationoftheCommittee,deniedtherequestofFHGYMN.

On July 15, 2005, FHGYMN brought a complaint in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
LuzonchargingBaluyut,Concepcion,Aguirre,MendozawithviolationsofArticle124(2)(d)ofthe
Cooperative Code, Section 3(e) and (f) of the Republic Act No. 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt
PracticesAct), and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct for Public Officials
and Employees). The complaint also charged Eduardo de Guzman (FRAHTODA President) and
WilsondeGuzman(BMTODAPresident).Eventually,thecomplaintofFHGYMNwasdismissed
forinsufficiencyofevidenceastothepublicofficials,andforlackofmeritandlackofjurisdiction
astotheprivaterespondents.FHGYMNsoughtreconsideration,butitsmotiontothateffectwas
[7]
denied.

FHGYMNtimelyfiledapetitionforreviewintheCA.

In the meanwhile, FHGYMN filed in the Office of the President a complaint accusing Overall
DeputyOmbudsmanOrlandoC.Casimiro,DeputyOmbudsmanEmilioA.GonzalesIII,andGraft
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DeputyOmbudsmanOrlandoC.Casimiro,DeputyOmbudsmanEmilioA.GonzalesIII,andGraft
InvestigatorandProsecutionOfficerRobertC.RenidowithaviolationofSection3(i)ofRepublic
[8]
ActNo.3019arisingfromthedismissalofitscomplaint.

[9]
OnJanuary31,2011,theCAsSixthDivisiondeniedthepetitionforreview.

FHGYMN,throughOngjoco,movedforthereconsiderationofthedenialofthepetitionfor
[10]
review,withprayerforinhibition, buttheCAsSixthDivisiondeniedthemotion.

Thereafter,Ongjocoinitiatedthisadministrativecaseagainsttheaforenamedmemberofthe
CAsSixthDivision.

Inthecomplaint,OngjocomaintainedthatrespondentmembersoftheCAsSixthDivisionviolated
Section14,ArticleVIIIofthe1987Constitutionbynotspecificallystatingthefactsandthelawon
whichthedenialofthepetitionforreviewwasbasedthattheysummarilydeniedthepetitionfor
review without setting forth the basis for denying the five issues FHGYMNs petition for review
raised that the denial was unjust, unfair and partial, and heavily favored the other party that the
denial of the petition warranted the presumption of directly or indirectly becoming interested for
personalgainunderSection3(i)ofRepublicActNo.3019andthattheOmbudsmanofficialswho
wereprobablyrespondentJusticesschoolmatesorassociatespersuaded,inducedorinfluencedsaid
Justicestodismissthepetitionforreviewandtomanipulatethedeliveryofthecopyofthedecision
[11]
toFHGYMNtopreventitfromtimelyfilingamotionforreconsideration.

Ruling

We find the administrative complaint against respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals
baselessandutterlydevoidoflegalandfactualmerit,andoutrightlydismissit.

Firstly, Ongjoco insists that the decision promulgated on January 31, 2011 by the CAs Sixth
Divisionhadnolegalfoundationanddidnotevenaddressthefiveissuespresentedinthepetition
forreviewandthattherespondentsasmembersoftheCAsSixthDivisiontherebyviolatedSection
14,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,whichprovidesasfollows:

Section14.Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyand
distinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.

Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofadecisionofthecourtshallberefused
duecourseordeniedwithoutstartingthelegalbasistherefor.
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duecourseordeniedwithoutstartingthelegalbasistherefor.

TheinsistenceofOngjocoisunfounded.Theessentialpurposeoftheconstitutionalprovisionisto
requirethatajudicialdecisionbeclearonwhyapartyhasprevailedunderthelawasappliedtothe
factsasprovedtheprovisionnowheredemandsthatapointbypointconsiderationandresolution
[12]
of the issues raised by the parties are necessary. Cogently, the Court has said in Tichangco v.
[13]
Enriquez, towit:

This constitutional provision deals with the disposition of petitions for review and of motions for
reconsideration.In appellate courts, the rule does not require any comprehensive statement of
factsormentionoftheapplicablelaw,butmerelyastatementofthelegalbasisfordenyingdue
course.

Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate
appellatecourt,afterdeliberation,decidestodenyamotionstatesthatthequestionsraisedare
factualorhavealreadybeenpasseduponorcitessomeotherlegalbasis.Thereisnoneedto
explain fully the courts denial, since the facts and the law have already been laid out in the
assailedDecision.(Emphasissupplied)

ItsdecisionshowsthattheCAsSixthDivisioncompliedwiththerequirementsoftheconstitutional
[14]
provision, viz:

Thepetitioniswithoutmerit.

PetitionerallegedthattheOmbudsmanerredinnotfindingrespondentsliableforviolationof
theCooperativeCodeofthePhilippinesconsideringthattheiractuationsconstitutedactsofdirector
indirectinterferenceorinterventionwiththeinternalaffairsofFHGYMNandthatrecommendation
todenyFHGYMNsapplicationwastantamounttoanyotheractinimicaloradversetoitsautonomy
andindependence.

Wedisagree.

Itiswellsettledthatinadministrativeproceedings,thecomplainanthastheburdenofproving,
by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is
unequivocal. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive. Conversely, when the findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not
adequatelysupportedbysubstantialevidence,theyshallnotbebindinguponthecourts(Marcelovs.
Bungubung,552SCRA589).

Inthepresentcase,theDeputyOmbudsmanfoundnosubstantialevidencetoprovethatthere
was interference in the internal affairs of FHGYMN nor was there a violation of the law by the
respondents.AsaptlyruledbytheOmbudsman:

WhiletheutterancesmadebyrespondentsBaluyot,AguirreandMendozainthecourse
of public hearings earlier mentioned indeed demonstrate exaltation of FRAHTODA and
BMTODA,totheapparentdisadvantageofFHGYMN,thesamedoesnotimplyorsuggest
interference in the internal affairs of the latter considering that said remarks or comments
weremadepreciselyinthelawfulexerciseofthemandateoftheSangguniangPanlungsod
ofthelocalityconcernedthroughtheCommitteeonTransporationandCommunication.Itis
worthytoemphasizethatwereitnotforthecomplainantsletterrequestdatedJuly23,2004,
the committee concerned would not have conducted the aforementioned public hearings,
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the committee concerned would not have conducted the aforementioned public hearings,
thus, there would have been no occasion for the subject unfavorable remarks to unleash.
Thus,itwouldbeirrationaltoconcludethatsimplybecausethequestionedutteranceswere
unfavorabletoFHGYMN,thesameconstitutesinterferenceorinterventionintheinternal
affairsofthesaidcooperative.

In the same vein, while respondents Baluyot, Concepcion and Aguirre rendered an
adverse recommendation as against complaints letterrequest earlier mentioned, the same
doesnotsignifygivingofunduefavorstoFRAHTODAorBMTODA,orcausingofundue
injurytoFHGYMN,inasmuchassaidrecommendationordecision,astherecordsvividly
show, was arrived at by the said respondents in honest exercise of their sound judgment
basedontheirinterpretationoftheapplicableordinancegoverningtheoperationoftricycles
withintheirareaofjurisdiction.Evidenceonrecordnodoubtfailedtosufficientlyestablish
that, in so making the questioned recommendation, respondents Baluyot, Concepcion and
Aguirreactedwithmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithorgrossinexcusablenegligence. It
is likewise worthy to note that, contrary to complainants insinuation, the letterrequest
adverted to was acted upon by respondents Baluyot, Concepcion and Aguirre within a
reasonabletimeand,asamatteroffact,complainanthadbeennotifiedoftheactiontaken
bytheformerrelativetohisletterrequestorproposals.

Time and again, it has been held, no less than by the Supreme Court, that mere
suspicionsandspeculationscanneverbethebasisofconvictioninacriminalcase.Guided
bythesamedoctrinalrule,thisOfficeisnotdutyboundtoproceedwiththeindictmentof
thepublicrespondentsascharged.Indeedwellentrenchedistherulethat(t)hepurposeofa
preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble,expenseandanxietyofapublictrial,andalsotoprotectthestatefromuselessand
expensivetrials(JointResolution,October17,2005,Rollopp.142143).

Moreover, petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of the
officialdutiesofrespondentsbyaffirmativeevidenceofirregularityorfailuretoperformaduty.The
presumption prevails and becomes conclusive until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumptionandincaseofdoubtastoanofficersactbeinglawfulorunlawful,constructionshould
beinfavorofitslawfulness(Bustillovs.PeopleofthePhilippines,G.R.No.160718,May12,2010).

There being no substantial evidence to reverse the findings of the Ombudsman, the instant
petitionisdenied.

WHEREFORE,premisesconsideredthePetitionforReviewisDENIEDforlackofmerit.The
Joint Resolution dated October 17, 2005 and Joint Order dated April 25, 2006 of the Deputy
OmbudsmanofLuzonareAFFIRMED.

SOORDERED.

Indeed,thedefinitivepronouncementoftheCAsSixthDivisionthattheDeputyOmbudsman
found no substantial evidence to prove that there was interference in the internal affairs of FH
[15]
GYMNnorwasthereaviolationofthelawbytherespondents mettheconstitutionaldemand
foraclearanddistinctstatementofthefactsandthelawonwhichthedecisionwasbased.TheCAs
SixthDivisiondidnothavetopointoutanddiscusstheflawsofFHGYMNspetitionconsidering
thatthedecisionoftheDeputyOmbudsmansufficientlydetailedthefactualandlegalbasesforthe
denialofthepetition.
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denialofthepetition.
Moreover,theCAsSixthDivisionexpresslyfoundthatFHGYMNhadnotdischargeditsburdenas
[16]
the petitioner of proving its allegations with substantial evidence. In administrative cases
involvingjudicialofficers,thecomplainantsalwayscarriedontheirshoulderstheburdenofproofto
substantiatetheirallegationsthroughsubstantialevidence.Thatstandardofsubstantialevidenceis
satisfiedonlywhenthereisreasonablegroundtobelievethattherespondentisresponsibleforthe
misconductcomplainedofalthoughsuchevidencemaynotbeoverwhelmingorevenpreponderant.
[17]

Secondly, Ongjoco ought to know, if he genuinely wanted the Court to sustain his allegations of
misconductagainstrespondentJustices,thathisadministrativecomplaintmustrestonthequalityof
the evidence and that his basing his plain accusations on hunches and speculations would not
suffice to hold them administratively liable for rendering the adverse decision. Nonetheless, he
exhibited disrespect for respondent Justices judicial office by still filing this administrative
complaintagainstthemdespiteconcedingintheadministrativecomplaintitselfhishavingnoproof
ofhischarges,viz:

21. The petition to review in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation had
reachedthisfarandmayreachtheSupremeCourtduetocorruptpracticesandculpableviolationof
the1987ConstitutioncommittedbyOmbudsmanofficialsandthehereinrespondentsoftheCourtof
Appeals.AMotionforReconsiderationwassubmittedwithprayerfortherespondentstoinhibit
themselvestoactonit.Otherwise,itwilladdtocongestthecourtdocketwhichthisHonorable
Court should intercede to look deeper into this matter by exercising its disciplinary functions
over herein respondents. The arbitrary denial of the Petition for Review rendered by the herein
respondentsismeantthatthereisnosufficientgroundoutofthefive(5)issuesraisedtoengendera
[18]
wellfoundedbeliefthatnosingleoffensehasbeencommitted.
xxx
24. Though there was no clear evidence to link Ombudsman officials, they may have
persuaded,inducedorinfluencedthehereinrespondents,whoareeithertheirschoolmatesor
associates,todenythePetitionforReviewintheirbidtoestablishinnocenceontherelatedoffense
chargedagainstthemon18August2010beforetheOfficeofthePresidentdocketedasOPDCCase
No.11C006.Likewise,theymayhavemanipulatedthedeliveryofacopyofDecisionintendedfor
the petitioner in order for the latter to fail in submitting a motion for reconsideration purposely to
make the Decision final and executory by which the said Ombudsman officials could use such

[19]
Decision to attain impunity on complaint against them filed with the Office of the President.
(emphasissupplied)

It is evident to us that Ongjocos objective in filing the administrative complaint was to take
respondentJusticestotaskfortheregularperformanceoftheirsworndutyofupholdingtheruleof
law.Hewouldtherebylaythegroundworkforgettingbackatthemfornotfavoringhisunworthy
cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of administrative
investigation and prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular
performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the independence of the
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performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the independence of the
[20]
Judiciary.

We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and
criminalactionsbroughtagainstanyjudgeinrelationtotheperformanceofhisofficialfunctionsare
neithercomplementarytonorsuppletoryofappropriatejudicialremedies,norasubstituteforsuch
[21]
remedies. Anypartywhomayfeelaggrievedshouldresorttotheseremedies,andexhaustthem,
insteadofresortingtodisciplinaryproceedingsandcriminalactions.WeexplainedwhyinIn Re:
[22]
JoaquinT.Borromeo:

Giventhenatureofthejudicialfunction,thepowervestedbytheConstitutionintheSupremeCourt
andthelowercourtsestablishedbylaw,thequestionsubmitstoonlyoneanswer:theadministrative
or criminal remedies are neither alternative or cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available,andmustwaitontheresultthereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary
postulationcanhaveonlyintolerablelegalimplications.Allowingapartywhofeelsaggrievedbya
judicial order or decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal
prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensablefirststep,confertheprosecutor(Ombudsman)withanincongruousfunctionpertaining,
nottohim,buttothecourts:thedeterminationofwhetherthequestioneddispositioniserroneousin
its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment,
whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal
litigation,apossibilityhereaftermorefullyexplored.

Suchactionsareimpermissibleandcannotprosper.Itisnot,asalreadypointedout,withinthepower
ofpublicprosecutors,ortheOmbudsmanorhisDeputies,directlyorvicariously,toreviewjudgments
orfinalordersorresolutionsoftheCourtsoftheland.Thepowerofreviewbyappealorspecialcivil
actionis not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance
withawelldefinedandlongestablishedhierarchy,andlongstandingprocessesandprocedures.No
otherreviewisallowedotherwiselitigationwouldbeinterminable,andvexatiouslyrepetitive.

Inthisregard,wereiteratethatajudgesfailuretocorrectlyinterpretthelawortoproperly
[23]
appreciatetheevidencepresenteddoesnotnecessarilyincuradministrativeliability, fortohold
himadministrativelyaccountableforeveryerroneousrulingordecisionherenders,assuminghehas
erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable. His
judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to
[24]
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him only when the error is so
[25]
gross,deliberateandmalicious,oriscommittedwithevidentbadfaith, oronlyinclearcasesof
violationsbyhimofthestandardsandnormsofproprietyandgoodbehaviorprescribedbylawand
[26]
therulesofprocedure,orfixedanddefinedbypertinentjurisprudence.
What the Court sees herein is Ongjocos proclivity to indiscriminately file complaints. His
proclivityremindsusnowofJoaquinT.BorromeowhomthisCourtpronouncedguiltyofindirect
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proclivityremindsusnowofJoaquinT.BorromeowhomthisCourtpronouncedguiltyofindirect
contempt of court he repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to
[27]
him. The Court imposed the penalty for contempt of court to the end that he may ponder his
[28]
seriouserrorsandgravemisconductandlearnduerespectfortheCourtsandtheirauthority.

HavingdeterminedthattheadministrativechargeagainstrespondentJusticeshadnofactual
andlegalbases,wecannothesitatetoshieldthembyimmediatelyrejectingthecharge.Wedoso
because unfounded administrative charges do not contribute anything worthwhile to the orderly
administrationofjusticeinstead,theyretardit.

Nor should we just let such rejected charge pass and go unchallenged. We recognize that
unfounded administrative charges against judges really degrade the judicial office, and interfere
withthedueperformanceoftheirworkfortheJudiciary.Hence,wedeemtobewarrantedtonow
direct Ongjoco to fully explain his act of filing an utterly baseless charge against respondent
Justices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court: (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against
AssociateJusticeJuanQ.Enriquez,Jr.,AssociateJusticeRamonM.Bato,Jr.,andAssociateJustice
FloritoS.Macalinoforitsutterlackofmeritand(b)ORDERSEngr.OscarL.Ongjocotoshow
cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be punished for indirect
contemptofcourtfordegradingthejudicialofficeofrespondentAssociateJusticesoftheCourtof
Appeals,andforinterferingwiththedueperformanceoftheirworkfortheJudiciary.

SOORDERED.


LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice


WECONCUR:



RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice




ANTONIOT.CARPIOPRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
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ANTONIOT.CARPIOPRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




DIOSDADOM.PERALTAMARIANOC.DELCASTILLO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice



(Onleave)
ROBERTOA.ABADMARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




JOSEPORTUGALPEREZJOSECATRALMENDOZA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice



(OnLeave)
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENOBIENVENIDOL.REYES
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice



ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE
AssociateJustice

[1]
Rollo,p.2.
[2]
Id.,pp.311.
[3]
Id.,pp.1220.
[4]
Id., pp. 3435 (the other amendment was to implement a colorcoding scheme for the tricycles belonging to the two existing
operators/driversassociationsandthecomplainantcooperative).
[5]
Id.,pp.3436.
[6]
Id.,p.36.
[7]
Id.,pp.3738.
[8]
Id.,pp.6171.
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[8]
Id.,pp.6171.
[9]
Id.,pp.1220.
[10]
Id.,pp.2131.
[11]
Id.,pp.910.
[12]
CivilServiceCommissionv.Ledesma,G.R.No.154521,September30,2005,471SCRA589,602.
[13]
G.R.No.150629,June30,2004,433SCRA325,341.
[14]
Rollo,pp.1720.
[15]
Rollo,p.18.
[16]
Rollo,p.18.
[17]
Manejav.deCastroPanganiban,A.M.OCAIPINo.031347MTJ.January17,2005.
[18]
Rollo,pp.89(emphasissupplied).
[19]
Rollo,pp.910.
[20]
ComplaintofMr.AurelioIndenciaArriendaAgainstSCJusticesPuno,Kapunan,Pardo,YnaresSantiago,etal.,A.M.No.031130
SC,June9,2005,460SCRA1.
[21]
InRe:WenceslaoLaureta,March12,1987,148SCRA382,420,wheretheCourtstated:
To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim that the members acted with deliberate bad faith and
rendered an unjust resolution in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent
consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such
collegiateactsandresolutionsandtodisregardutterlythepresumptionofregularperformanceofofficialduty.Toallowsuch
collateralattackwoulddestroytheseparationofpowersandunderminetheroleoftheSupremeCourtasthefinalarbiterofall
judicialdisputes.
[22]
A.M.No.9376960,February21,1995,241SCRA405.
[23]
Estrada,Jr.v.Himalaloan,A.M.No.MTJ051617,November18,2005,475SCRA353,360.
[24]
Visitacionv.Libre,A..M.No.RTJ051918,June8,2005,459SCRA398,407Estrada,Jr.v.Himalaloan,A.M.No.MTJ051617,
November18,2005,475SCRA353,360.
[25]
InReJoaquinT.Borromeo,supra,note22.
[26]
WongJanRealtyv.Espaol,A.M.No.RTJ011647,October13,2006,472SCRA496,503.
[27]
Supra,note22,p.466.
[28]
Id.

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