Page | 1
People vs. Magallanes
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
FACTS: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas,
under the direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who
took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP,
with Police Inspector Abetos cooperation, induced other police
officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis, civilian agents:
Fernandez, Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap
and detain, Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a
motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident
premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other accused secretly
buried the victims in a makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime
of murder for a fee of P500.00 each.
The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not
guilty and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises
Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the
offense. After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court received
evidence for the accused, but the reception of evidence was
suspended because of the motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles
filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself and
the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the
transmittal of the recors to the Sandiganbayan because the offenses
charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction because the informations do not state that the offenses
were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers
and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to
Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same
was denied.
The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later
inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of tne
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the
cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required
to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the
trial of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office
of the accused PNP officers
HELD: The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. When the
informations in the cases were filed, the law governing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was P.D. 1861 , which provides
that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases involving: 1) violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act; 2) offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office,
where the penalty prescribed is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P 6,000.00.
If the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried
by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information and not by the result of the evidence after
the trial. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the cases. The allegations in the complaint
or information of taking advantage of his position is not sufficient to
bring the offenses within the definition of offenses committed in
relation to public office. It is considered merely as an aggravating
circumstance.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction
over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A.
1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in
subsection (a) when the public officers rank is classified as Grade
27 or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved
occupy a position classified as Grade 27 or higher. Accused
Torres, who is highest in rank among the accused, only has a rank
classified as Grade 18.
Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which
was already acquired before the subsequent enactment of R.A. 7975
which limited the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to officers whose rank
 Page | 2

is Grade 27 or higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction

until the end of litigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction
of the courts at the time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only
referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at that time.
Petition is DENIED and the challenged orders are AFFIRMED.

Cuyos vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide with
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to proeperty through
reckless imprudence before the Municipal Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment
and the judge set the case for trial, but before it could commence,
petitioner filed a Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First
Instance. Cuyos claimed that there is lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the Municipal Court and contended that the damages suffered by
the Volkswagen he hit amounted to P18,000.00. He argued that
under Art. 365, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime would
carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to
three times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x
P18,000.00=P54,000.00).
Under 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court
of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by a fine
not exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone
the Trial. The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set
the case for trial. Cuyos verbal motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case against Cuyos
HELD: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General
that the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case.
The case at bar involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple
serious physical injuries and damage to property resulting from
reckless imprudence. Art. 365, par.2 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty imposable upon petitioner, if found guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence, would be prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods. At the time the complaint was
filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of
imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both.
Page | 3
Thus, because the penalty for damage to property through
imprudence or negligence as provided in Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is, a fine ranging from the amount equal to the value of
damages to three times such value, the case must be forwarded to
the Court of First Instance. Art. 365 simply means that if there is only
damage to property, the amount fixed shall be imposed, but if there
is also physical injuries, there should be an additional penalty for the
latter.
The applicable rule on allocation of jurisdiction on cases
involving cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or
physical injuries is summarized by justice Barrera. Barrera stated
that in such cases, Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable,
but there may be cases when the imposable penalty is within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, while the fine is under the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Since the information
cannot be split into two, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the
reckless imprudence. The maximum fine imposable for the crime in
this case is P54,000.00 and the maximum imprisonment for homicide
is six (6) years. Therefore, the criminal charge falls outside the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.
The order of the Municipal Court is SET ASIDE as null and
void and the Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.

Buaya vs. Polo
G.R. No. 75079 January 26, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized
to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and
accounting of the transactions and remit the same to the principal
office of CBIC in Manila. However, an audit of Buayas account
showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a
result, she was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.
Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the Regional
Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in
Cebu City, but the same was denied by respondent judge Polo. The
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence,
the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has
jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner Buaya
HELD: The allegations in the complaint or information determine the
jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases. 14(a) of Rule 110 provides
that the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential elements took place. The
subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed during the
period of 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila,
Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC Manila has no jurisdiction
because she is based in Cebu City is without merit.
Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction since the respondents
principal place of business is in Manila and Buayas failure to remit
the premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in
manila. Besides, estafa is a continuing offense which may be
prosecuted at any place where any of the essential elements of the
crime took place.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Page | 4
Zaldivia V. Reyes, Jr.
GR No. 102342/ July 3, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court on October
2, 1990 for violation of a Municipal Ordinance, allegedly committed
on May 11, 1990.
Petitioner moved to quash the said charge on the ground that it had
already prescribed, but the Municipal Trial Court denied the motion
forcing the petitioner to raise it to the Regional Trial Court wherein
the respondent sustained the decision invoking Section 1, Rule 110
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, particularly emphasizing
the last paragraph of the said rule, stating that it applies in all cases.
Petitioner however contends the decision and files a petition for
review of certiorari before the high court invoking Sections 1 and 2 of
the Rule on Summary Procedure and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No.
3326 as the provisions that governs the charge against her being a
violation of a municipal ordinance.
Issue:
Whether or not the said offense is covered by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure or covered by the Rule of Summary Procedure.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the rule emphasized by the respondent judge
 Page | 5

only governs cases that fall under the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and is not applicable to all cases as the said section had begun with
for all cases no subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases.

Thus, the respondent judges erred in denying the said motion on the
ground that the offense is governed by section 1, rule 110 of the
rules of criminal procedure.

People vs. Guillen
No. L-1477, January 18, 1950
Facts
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela
(Barrela) and to multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas,
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who
were the injured parties, as the information filed against him
provided.
Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him, but was
later found after duly admitting his intention to kill the President, the
lower court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was
sentenced with the highest capital punishment, for the murder of
Simeon Varela (Barrela) and to the multiple frustrated murder of
President Roxas and company.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said
crime.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused
guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murderer because the act of
Guillen was not fully realized when the bomb was kicked out of the
stage, preventing him from fulfilling his act of assassinating the
President. Therefore, Guillen is not guilty of the crime of multiple
frustrated murder but of the crime of multiple attempted murder.
CASE: People vs. Uganap
G.R. No. 130605 June 19,2001
FACTS:
The victim and some of the accused were close relatives.
Page | 6
Accused Tirso Arang is the half-brother of the victim, while accused-
appellant Felix Uganap is also the victims cousin. Accused Faustino
Uganap is the brother-in-law of the victim, being brother of the
latters wife, Leilani Asang.
The lone eye witness, Samuel Arang, cousin of the victim,that at
around 8:30 in the evening, he was walking home when he stopped
near the house of Salvador Uganap. He peeped through a hole in
the wall of the house and saw the (5) five accused, Felix Uganap had
a .38 revolver, while Nonoy Panday had a pistolized carbine. The
room was illuminated by a lamp. Samuel Arang moved away from
the house and hid behind a coconut tree. The accused went to the
house of Pedro Arang, which was 30 meters away from where the
witness was. Samuel stated that he saw Felix immediately shoot
Pedro when the latter opened the door. Samuel fled because they
were afraid.
Nolly Luchavez also testified that all of the accused was a
member of vigilante religious group called Ituman. That he was also
recruited when he was 14 years old. Felix Uganap was the groups
designated commander as Commander Matador. Luchavez left the
group.
Luchavez revealed that the plan to kill Pedro Arang was
proposed by Faustino Uganap at a coffee shop. Faustino paid Felix
P 3,000.00 for the purpose. The group intended to effect the killing
on December 24, but aborted because Pedro left the town to visit his
wife. Hence, the plan was set to January 6. Luchavez was unable to
go with the group because he had a fever.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is conspiracy and;
Whether or not the price or reward as an aggravating
circumstance will be appreciated.
HELD:
Salvador Uganap died before he could be arrested. The
accused appellant was convicted while the other accused were
acquitted, by RTC.
The review of criminal cases necessitates a re-examination
of the entire evidence on record. The Court is likewise not prohibited

from instituting a finding of conspiracy, in reversal of the findings of
the lower court, when its existence is manifest from the evidence at
hand. In the instant case, however, nothing less than direct proof of a
previous agreement to kill the victim, plus an eyewitness account of
how the conspirators effected their plan, was submitted into evidence
but disregarded by the trial court.
The information alleges that the crime was attended
treachery and evident premeditation. Evidence fall short of treachery,
but the evident premeditation is present. Court also observes that
another aggravating circumstance was proven by evidence.
Luchavezs testimony that the taking of Pedro Arangs life carried the
price of P3, 000.00 was categorical, credible and unrebutted.
However, because under the Rules of Criminal Procedure as
revised on Dec.1, 2000, generic aggravating circumstances must be
specifically named in the information, the Court will allow for this
amendment to retroact for the benefit of accused appellant. Hence,
the aggravating circumstance of price or reward shall not be
appreciated. Reclusion Perpetua is applicable and award of
damages are the same.
CASE: People vs. Nuevo
G.R. No. 132169 October 26, 2001
FACTS:
Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 oclock in the evening
of December 4, 1994, Nuevo passed in their house and invited her
husband for the drinking spree at Anselmo Sr., his father. She was
left at home with her 10 month old daughter and her 9 years old
niece. At around 11:00 pm, appellant returned and entered their
room. She was awakened when appellant held her neck, pinned
down her arms and took off her clothing. She struggled to extricate
herself but to no avail.
Appellant lay on top of her and proceeded forcibly to have
sexual intercourse with her, Gemma Atis who was present,
witnessed what was being done to her. Appellant threatened her and
her niece. Roberta testified that she did not see him because it was
very dark that night, she identified him through his voice.
Page | 7
His husband corroborated part of his wifes story. He saw
Sanico left his fathers place at around 11:00 pm and returned only at
around 1:00 pm. Dr. Esmeralda Nadela testified that there is no fresh
injury found on the victim, that only old lacerations were present.
Sanico Nuevo, declared that he knew Roberta since they
were schoolmates in grade school and she was a former neighbor.
He denied, he invited Anselmo Jr. He denied raping Roberta. Trial
court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt with
aggravating circumstances. The accused was sentenced to suffer
the maximum penalty of death.
ISSUES:
Whether or not appellant was sufficiently identified by the
offended party based only on her recognition of the
sound of his voice;
Whether or not the prosecutions evidence suffices for the
conviction of rape and the imposition of the death
penalty on him.
HELD:
In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity with
another, identification becomes quite an easy talk even from a
considerable distance. In a number of cases, it is ruled that the
sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of
identification where the witness and the accused knew each other
personally and closely for a number of years.
In People vs. Amadore, it is held that the attendance of any
of the circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No.
7659, mandating the death penalty are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances and the absence of proper averment thereof in the
complaint will bar the imposition of that extreme penalty.
While the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the
use of a deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, court find
that these were not averted in the information. Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, provides that every
complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but also
the aggravating circumstances with specifity. This requirement has
retroactive effect.
 Page | 8

The result is that the crime committed by appellant is only

simple rape, which under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
amended by R.A. 7659, the law prevailing at the time of commission
thereof, is punished only with Reclusion Perpetua.

CASE: Casupanan vs. Laroya
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya and
the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan, figured in an accident. Two cases
were filed, with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas , Tarlac.
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-
delict.
When civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case,
filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of forum-shopping
considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted
the motion and dismiss the civil case.
Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration.
They insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the
motion for reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC and still it was denied for
lack of merit. They f iled a Motion for Reconsideration but RTC
denied the same.
ISSUES:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for
reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict
against the private complainant in the criminal case;
Whether or not there is forum-shopping.
HELD:
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the
ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that
Page | 9
the dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being
silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an
action without prejudice is not appealable. Clearly, the Capas RTCs
order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous. The essence of
forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively. It is present when in the two or more cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights of action and relief sought. There is
no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules
expressly allow the filing of separate civil action which can proceed
independently.
Under Section 1 of the Rule 111, what is deemed instituted
with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability
arising from the crime or ex-delito. All other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed
instituted and may be filed separately and independently even
without reservation.
In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in
the criminal action, not the accused.
 P a g e | 10

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas RULING:

(1) No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavit is
FACTS: based on mere hearsay.
RATIO: The general rule is that when the affidavit of the applicant or
On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
First Instance of Tayabas issued a search warrant on the basis of knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists
affidavit of Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he probable cause.
had no personal knowledge but through information from a reliable But when theapplicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
source. In other words, the applicant's knowledge of facts is based affidavit of one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of
on a mere hearsay. facts is necessary. TheCourtheld thatthe warrant is illegal because
In the affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as it is based on the affidavit of an agent who had no personal
follows: knowledge of the facts.
"That there are being kept is said premises books documents, The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant
receipts, lists chits, and other papers used by him in connection with issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
his activities as money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests, manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held
in violation of the law." liable for damages caused.
At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of the warrant, several agents of the (2) Yes, the search can be made at night.
Anti-Usury Board enterd the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez RATIO: Section 101 of General Orders number 58 authorizs a
seized some articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, search made at night when it is positively asserted that the property
journals. cash bonds, check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. However,
contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, since the search warrant is declared illegal(RULING 1), such search
receipt books, promissory notes and checks. could not be legally madeat night.
On July 8, Alvarez filed a petition alleging that the search was (3) Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of description.
illegal based on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at RATIO: Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of General
night and for non compliance in the particularity description rule in Orders Number 58 requires that the affidavit must contain a
issuing warrant. particular description of the placed to be searched and the person or
On September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled against the thing to be seized.
Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search warrant. But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description
must be rather general, it is not required that technical description be
ISSUES: given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.
Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into
(1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is based on consideration the nature of the articles as described it is clear that no
hearsay. other more adequate and detailed description could have been
(2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night. given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description
(3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of description as of the contents thereof.
required by the law. The description so made substantially complies with the legal
provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant
 P a g e | 11

was thereby placed in a position enabiling him to identify the articles

in question, which he did.

BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
No. L-64261
December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.:
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is
the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the premises known as
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers, respectively, were Court of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. Publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid search warrant?
Ruling:
The two search warrants were issued wihout probable
cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific
offense must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will
not suffice. In the case at bar, nothing specifically subversive has
been alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being
used as instruments and means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under P. D. No. 885, as amended. There is no
mention of any specific provision of the decree. In the words of Chief
Justice Concepcion, It would be legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof.
P a g e | 12
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General
GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523
Facts:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the
of certain real estate in said complaint to be located in the Province
of Tarlac. After the filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took
possession of the lands described therein, building its line, stations
and terminals and put the same in operation. Commissioners were
appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They held
several sessions, took a considerable amount of evidence, and
finally made their report. After the said report had been made and
fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on
a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss action,
upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the
lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of
Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the
complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has
the power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad
company for the condemnation of real estate located in another
province.
Held:
The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation

is governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the
venue of an action in condemnation proceedings generally are not
applicable to the proceedings by a railroad company to condemn
lands. Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions relating to
the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is. It was
not intended to meet a situation presented by an action to condemn
lands extending contiguously form one end of the country to the
other.
In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands,
while, with the consent of defendants, express or implied, the venue
may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the
plaintiff, it being one in which the lands sought to be condemned is
located, nevertheless, the defendants who have lands lying in
another province, or any one of such defendants, may by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to their, if one, his lands
to be changed to the province where their lands lie. In such case, the
action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the
province where originally begun, but would be severed as to the
objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the
appropriate province or provinces. Wherefore, the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to
proceed with the action according to law.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and
Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an
order mission to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas,
Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending person who are
allegedly engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the
said mission, they caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal
cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They left the place but
brought with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and fighting
cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfighting, including the
P a g e | 13
deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their way to the
Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot
Cabilto.
As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the
case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated
by the President on January 16, 1981, vesting in court martial
jurisdiction over crimes committed by the members of the Armed
Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in the performance of their
duty.
Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2,
1979. On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977
published in the Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created
under General Order No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
all offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines while in the performance of their duties. Clearly PD.
1822 and PD. 1822-A were promulgated after the filling of the
complaint however, General Order 59 was enacted before the
commission of the crime.
The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are
inapplicable to the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply.
Wherefore, the petition was GRANTED.

People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L- 19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640
Facts:
On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of
the SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of
Agricultural and Industrial Bank located in Bataan whose capital,
assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in action were
subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance Corp. herein
complainant with principal office in Manila.
Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and
during the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with
intent to defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and
encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to
quash the information on the ground that more than one offense is
charged and that the court had no jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction over the case
Held:
An essential element common to the two acts punishable by
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed
or repledged should be the same or identical property that was
mortgaged or pledged before such removal of repledging. In the
instant case, evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to
the bank are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile.
On the evidence presented, there is no showing that
properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties
P a g e | 14
mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in exhibit E
(properties pledge to Mateo Pinile). With these findings Jose
Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of First Instance of Manila
still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held that jurisdiction of
court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment or
stipulation.
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General
GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523
Facts:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the
Court of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation
of certain real estate in said complaint to be located in the Province
of Tarlac. After the filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took
possession of the lands described therein, building its line, stations
and terminals and put the same in operation. Commissioners were
appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They held
several sessions, took a considerable amount of evidence, and
finally made their report. After the said report had been made and
fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on
a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss action,
upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the
lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of
Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the
complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has
the power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad
company for the condemnation of real estate located in another
province.
Held:

The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation
is governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the
venue of an action in condemnation proceedings generally are not
applicable to the proceedings by a railroad company to condemn
lands. Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions relating to
the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is. It was
not intended to meet a situation presented by an action to condemn
lands extending contiguously form one end of the country to the
other.
In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands,
while, with the consent of defendants, express or implied, the venue
may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the
plaintiff, it being one in which the lands sought to be condemned is
located, nevertheless, the defendants who have lands lying in
another province, or any one of such defendants, may by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to their, if one, his lands
to be changed to the province where their lands lie. In such case, the
action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the
province where originally begun, but would be severed as to the
objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the
appropriate province or provinces. Wherefore, the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to
proceed with the action according to law.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and
Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an
order mission to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas,
Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending person who are
allegedly engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the
said mission, they caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal
cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They left the place but
P a g e | 15
brought with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and fighting
cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfighting, including the
deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their way to the
Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot
Cabilto.
As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the
case is pending trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated
by the President on January 16, 1981, vesting in court martial
jurisdiction over crimes committed by the members of the Armed
Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in the performance of their
duty.
Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2,
1979. On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977
published in the Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created
under General Order No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
all offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines while in the performance of their duties. Clearly PD.
1822 and PD. 1822-A were promulgated after the filling of the
complaint however, General Order 59 was enacted before the
commission of the crime.
The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are
inapplicable to the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply.
Wherefore, the petition was GRANTED.
People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L-
19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640
Facts:

On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of
the SAWMILL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of
Agricultural and Industrial Bank located in Bataan whose capital,
assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in action were
subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance Corp. herein
complainant with principal office in Manila.
Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and
during the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with
intent to defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and
encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to
quash the information on the ground that more than one offense is
charged and that the court had no jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction over the case
Held:
An essential element common to the two acts punishable by
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed
or repledged should be the same or identical property that was
mortgaged or pledged before such removal of repledging. In the
instant case, evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to
the bank are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile.
On the evidence presented, there is no showing that
properties listed in the information as exhibit D (properties
mortgaged to the bank) are the same properties listed in exhibit E
(properties pledge to Mateo Pinile). With these findings Jose
Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of First Instance of Manila
still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held that jurisdiction of
court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment or
stipulation.
P a g e | 16
CALEON V AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.
FACTS:
Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land
denominated at Lealtad, Sampaloc, Manila, which it leased to
petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner
constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without
the consent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two
of the four doors of the apartment to Rolando Guevarra and
Felicisima Estrada for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon
learning of the sub-lease, private respondent through counsel
demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises.
Agus filed a complaint for ejectment MTC of Manila, against the
petitioner citing as ground therefor the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is the unauthorized sub-leasing
of part of the leased premises to third persons without securing the
consent of the lessor within the required sixty (60)-day period from
the promulgation of the new law (B.P. 25).
Petitioner argued that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 cannot be applied in
this case because there is a perfected contract of lease without any
express prohibition on subleasing which had been in effect between
petitioner and private respondent long before the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25. Therefore, the application of said law to the case
at bar is unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of
contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioners contention is correct?
RULING:
The Supreme Court Ruled that the petitioners contention is
untenable. It is well settled that all presumptions are indulged in
favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt. In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. In
any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty
of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject
to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare

WHEREFORE, the Petition is Denied for lack of merit.
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century
Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and
seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign.
Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets
all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a
flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as
the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and
subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants. On
September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search
warrants. The NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided
the video outlets and seized the items described therein. An
inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private
respondents. The lower court later on lifted the 3 search warrants
and ordered the NBI to return the properties that were seized. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he
issued earlier upon the application of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal
knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the
alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only
the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the
P a g e | 17
application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that he had
personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private
respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging
to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much
credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of
the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application.
Witnesses in the hearing for an application for search warrants must
have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony as
to the alleged commission of the offense. Also, the sear warrant must
contain a specific description of the articles to be seized. General
warrants are constitutionally objectionable.
People vs. Gano
Facts
On December 31, 1994 at around 7:00 in the morning Sr.
Inspector Ernesto Garcia received a report of a massacre at a
residence in San Mateo Rizal. At the crime scene Garcia saw the
body of Pociano Salen and was thereafter informed the identity of
the suspect. The suspect in the name of Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan
Gano or Jerry Perez or several other known aliases was arrested
and detained in Butuan City after having tried to escape from the
authorities. On their way back to Manila Garcia disclosed that the
accused confessed to him his responsibility for the triple killing and
robbery.
Upon arraignment, the accused Castanito Gano made a
qualified admission by admitting the killing of the three (3) victims but
denying the charge of robbery. Considering that what is charged is a
complex crime with a single penalty, the accused with the assistance
of his counsel entered a plea of not guilty.
Issue
WON the voluntary confession being conditional could be mitigating?
Ruling

NO. The Court ruled that if the voluntary confession is conditional or
qualified, it is NOT mitigating. The accused was merely confessing to
the crime of homicide but NOT to robbery with homicide, a
considerably graver offence. For voluntary confession to be
appreciated as an extenuating circumstance, the same must not only
be made unconditionally but the accused must admit to the offense
charged, i.e. robbery with homicide and not to either robbery or
homicide only. Hence, if the voluntary confession is conditional or
qualified, it is not mitigating.
People vs. Yaoto
Facts
Accused-appellant Eduardo Yaoto was charged with two (2)
counts of rape and pleaded not guilty to both counts. In her medico-
genital examination, Dr. Armie Umil certified that Angeline Yaoto, 17
years old, suffered genital and extragenital injuries. It was found that
Angeline was not only sexually abused but was also physically
assaulted. Accused Yaoto assails the credibility of Angeline and
denied having raped her twice. He also assailed Angelines
testimony that he had bolo and an ice pick with which he threatened
her considering that the prosecution failed to produce said items in
evidence.
Issue
WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be admitted by
the SC?
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor, conduct and attitude especially under cross-examination.
Ordinarily, the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to
the credibility of the witness considering that it is in a better position
P a g e | 18
to observe her candor and behavior on the witness stand.
People vs. Bernabe
Facts
On or about October 29, 1998 in Pasay City Virgilio Bernabe
by means of force and intimidation employed upon Maria Esnelia
Bernabe, his daughter, a 17 year old minor, unlawfully have carnal
knowledge with said victim against her will and consent. Upon
arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.
During trial accused denied having raped his own daughter.
He testified that Maria Esnelia charged him with rape because he
resented her boyfriend who for sometime slept in their house. He
also depicted his daughter as a rebel and neglected her studies.
Accused also claimed that his two sisters assisted his daughter in
filing the rape case against him because of a land dispute between
them.
Issue
WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be admitted by
the SC?
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that when it comes to the issue of credibility the
Supreme Court as any other appellate court, would ordinarily defer to
the assessment and evaluation given by the trial court, for only trial
courts are in so unique a position as to be able to observe that
elusive and insurmountable evidence of the witness deportment on
the witness stand while testifying.
Gr no. 123340 August 29, 2002
Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al.,
respondents

Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of
estafa though falsification of public documents before the
RTC of Manila. Allegedly, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Self-
adjucation of a parcel of land when she knew that there were
other surviving heirs. The offended party did not reserve the
right to file a separate civil action. Hence, it was tried
together with the criminal case.
The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the court ordered
the return of the parcel of land to the surviving heirs.
Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration. This
was denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and
mandamus was filed with the CA. This was also dismissed
by the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had
jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case, involving a property in Bulacan.
Decision:
Case Remanded.
There are 3 important requisites which must be present
before the court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. The court must
have jurisdiction before the subject matter, the territory where the
offense was committed, and over the person of the accused. In this
case, the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving
estafa though falsification of public document. The court also had
jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed
within its territorial jurisdiction. The court also has acquire jurisdiction
over the accused because whe voluntarily submitted to the courts
authority.
Art. 100 of the RPC provides that every person criminally
P a g e | 19
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Art. 104 of the same Code
provides that civil liability xxx includes restitution. In this case, the
civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal action since the
offended party did not reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was
acquitted, this did not dissolve the civil aspect of the case.
GR no. 127107 October 12, 1998
Peter Paul Dimatulac and Veronica Dimatulac, petitioners vs.
Hon. Sensinando Villon, et. al., respondents.
Facts:
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in
Pampanga. A complaint for murder was filed in the MTC and
after preliminary investigation, Judge Designate David
issued warrants of arrest against the accused.
Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were arrested and it
was only Yambao who submitted his counter-affidavit. Judge
David then issued a resolution finding reasonable ground
that the crime of murder has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
Though it was not clear whether Pampanga Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or
upon motion of the private respondents, she conducted a
reinvestigation and resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were
in conspiracy, along with the other accused, and committed
homicide.
Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner
appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of
Justice. However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag ordered for
the release of David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An
information for homicide was also filed before the Regional
Trial Court.
Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and
recalled the warrants of arrest against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue
hold departure order and Urgent Motion to defer
proceedings. Judge Roura deferred the resolution of the first
Motion and denied the second. He also set the arraignment

of the accused.
The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for hastily
setting the date for arraignment pending the appeal in the
DOJ and for prejudging the matter. They also filed a Petition
for prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment with
the trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura. He also
stated that he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to
participate. Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and
was replaced by Judge Villon.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting
documentary evidence to support their contention that the
offense committed was murder.
Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the arraignment. The
Yabuts entered a plea of not guilty. The petitioners then filed
a Urgent Motion to set aside arraignment.
Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of
the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was present.
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have
already been arraigned and they would be put under double
jeopardy.
The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the appeal
was held not and academic due to the previous arraignment
of the accused for homicide.
Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment. The
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this
petition for certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case without having
the respondents within the custody of the law and for filing
the information pending the appeal of the resolution with the
DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the Motions
to set aside the arraignment.
P a g e | 20
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion in reconsidering his order.
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED.
Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse
of discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that the
Yabuts were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that the
prosecutor is not bound by the findings of the judge who conducted
the investigation, the resolution should be based on the review of the
record and evidence transmitted. Hence, she should have sustained
the recommendation since all the accused, except Yambao, failed to
file their counter-affidavits. It is impossible for Alfonso-Reyes to not
have known the appeal filed with the DOJ. The filing of an appeal is
provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing
in the law which prohibits the filing of an appeal once an information
is filed.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for
deferring the resolution to the motion for a hold departure order.
Since the accused were out on bail, the Motion should have been
granted since they could have easily fled. Though he is not bound to
the resolution of the DOJ, he should have perused the documents
submitted.
The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting
aside its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power of control
and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has been
deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is null and
void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.
P a g e | 21

G.R. No. 104392 February 20, 1996
RUBEN MANIAGO,petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN C.
AYSON, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO
BOADO,respondents.
MENDOZA,J.:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which
were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments,
(Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City Loakan, Baguio City.roper to its plant
site
one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger
jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of
the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against
petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by
private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. The complaint
was assigned to Branch IV of the same court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil
case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against
his driver. But the trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground
that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed
independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the
petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case.
Petitioner took the matter oncertiorariand prohibition to the Court of
Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed
independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the
right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition which it held allowed a
civil action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal
action even though no reservation to file the same has been made.
Issue:
The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation,
private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages
against petitioner under Art. 2176, 2180, 2177 of the Civil Code:
P a g e | 22
Held:
The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must
be reserved as required by Rule III, 1, otherwise it should be
dismissed.
a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for
the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have
been instituted with the criminal case. the right of the injured party to
sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising
from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the
Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted
with the criminal action.
Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for
recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has
always been regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rule
making power has been conferred by the Constitution on this Court,
it is in the keeping of this Court.
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the
employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found
insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for
damages. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to
implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act
or omission. As held in Barredo v. Garcia, the injured party must
choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will
bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil action he will
be deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver
on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against
the employer will be limited to the recovery of the latter's subsidiary
liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the
complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
P a g e | 23

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor,defendants-appellees.
BARREDO,J.:
Facts:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-
appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake." And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss.
Issues:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was
not reversed?
Held:
The issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration
and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of
fault or negligence as a source of obligation.
a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case
and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
P a g e | 24
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this
Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although he could have been
criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an
independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
forestalls a double recovery.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as aquasi-delictonly and not as a crime is
not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
thatculpa aquilianaincludes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
P a g e | 25

G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-
ECCI),petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS,respondents.
Facts:
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, an information for
estafa against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to
respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46.
Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an
employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of
petitioner.
respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and
petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with
preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time,
petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the grounds that
there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the
same facts, and that the complaint failed to contain a certification
against forum shopping.
the trial court issued an order dismissing the Civil Case. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and the trial
court granted respondent's, thereby recalling the dismissal of the
case.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal
case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.
Held:
as a general rule, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable." This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability
arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes
restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of
consequential damages.
P a g e | 26
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising
from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the
civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is
separately instituted.
only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the
independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to
refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately even without a reservation."
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.
GO VS. CA
FEBRUARY 11, 1992
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
Maguan was driving the opposite direction of a one-way
street in San Juan, Metro Manila. Rolito Gos car and Maguan nearly
bumped into each other in an intersection. Because of this, Go shot
Maguan and left the scene. A security guard of a nearby restaurant
saw the incident and took down the plate number of Gos car. Police
investigators were able to get Gos picture through the credit card
that Go used when he dined in restaurant near the crime scene the
witness positively identified Go as the gunman. Hence, a manhunt
was launched. Several days thereafter, Go went to the police station
where the witness identified him as the suspect. The police detained
Go. A complaint for frustrated homicide was filed by the police to the
Provincial prosecutor. Go was informed of his right to demand
preliminary investigation provided he waives the Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute such waiver.
Meanwhile, Maguan died. Hence, prosecutor filed am information of

murder without conducting preliminary investigation. Go posted cash
bond and was released after approval of the same by the court. The
prosecutor filed for leave of court to conduct preliminary investigation
and to prayed for the suspension of court proceedings pending the
preliminary investigation. The same was granted and arraignment of
Go was suspended. The following day, the court recalled its approval
and cancelled the bail of Go. Hence, Go filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus before the SC, which was remanded to
CA. Arraignment took place as scheduled and Go refused to enter
his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered for him. Then, CA
issued its decision dismissing the petition of Go on the grounds that
Go was validly arrested without a warrant and Go already waived his
right to preliminary investigation. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE 1:
Where or not Go was validly arrested without a warrant.
HELD:
NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, among others, that a peace officer or private person may
without warrant, arrest a person when an offense has in fact just
been committed, and the arresting person has personal knowledge
of facts and circumstances indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
In the case at bar, Go was arrested 6 days after the incident.
Hence, at the time of his arrest, the crime has not just been
committed. It would have been different if Go committed a
continuing crime. In addition, the police officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Go was he gunman. The police
arrested Go by relying on the statement of the witness. Finally, the
plate number of the car that was taken down by the witness did not
point to Gos car but to his wife.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not Go waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
P a g e | 27
HELD:
NO. While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory
and not constitutional, it is a component of due process of criminal
justice. It is a substantive right. To deprive an accused of this right is
to deny due process. Generally, said right is invoked before entering
a plea; failure to invoke the same amounts to waiver.
In this case, Go insisted that a preliminary investigation be
conducted upon the filing of the information before the court. The fact
that he posted bail did not amount to waiver of said right as he asked
for it when he filed for the approval of the cash bond. The court
granted his prayer for preliminary investigation before the approval of
the bond. Go even filed before the CA for such relief. Hence, Go was
entitled to a preliminary investigation. But since the trial had already
commenced, the trial should be suspended and preliminary
investigation should be conducted. Participation of Go during the trial
did not amount to waiver also as he was merely forced to do so to
avail his other rights.
KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/ K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING VS.
TAYPIN
331 SCRA 697 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng
Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco Devt Corp.,
the NBI filed an application for search warrant with the RTC of Cebu
City, to search the premises of petitioner located in Talisay Cebu, and
to seize the wrought iropn furniture found therein which had allegedly
been the object of unfair competition involving design patents,
punishable by Art 189 of the RPC, as the petitioner manufactured
wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by the Mendco without
securing any license or patent for the same. Seized in the premises
were the said pieces of furniture. Petitioners moved to quash the
warrant alleging, among others, that (a) respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (b) the crime they are
accused of does not exist. The denial of the motion prompted
petitioners to come to this court.
ISSUE:
 P a g e | 28

W/N the petitioners contention is of merit

HELD:
(a) No. The Court has consistently ruled that that a search warrant is
merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain in
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. The authority to issue search
warrants is inherent in all courts and may be effected outside their
territorial jurisdiction. In the instant case, the premises searched
located in Talisay Cebu are well within the territorial jurisdiction of the
respondent court. SC AO 113-95 merely specified which courts could
try and decide cases involving violations of IPR. The power to issue
search warrants in violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested
in the courts enumerated in SC Administrative Order.
(b) Yes. The issue referred to in Art. 189 of RPC had been rendered
moot and academic. Said article has already been repealed by the
Intellectual Property Right Code. Further, the acts complained of
does not fall under any of the provisions of the IPR Code. There
being no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin
to fulfill the constitutional requirements of such, and is therefore
defective on its face. Since the warrants are null and void, all the
seized properties must be returned to petitioners.

La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez
GR. Nos. L-63796-97 May 21, 1984
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
Facts:
La Chemise Lacoste SA is a foreign corporation, organized
and existing under the laws of France and not doing business in the
Philippines. It is undeniable from the records that it is the actual
owner of the trademarks LACOSTE, CHEMISE LACOSTE,
CROCODILE DEVICE and a composite mark consisting of the
word LACOSTE and a representation of a crocodile/alligator, used
on clothings and other goods specifically sporting apparels sold in
many parts of the world and which have been marketed in the
Philippines since 1964. In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly licensed
domestic firm applied for and was issued Reg. SR-2225 (SR stands
for Supplemental Register) for the trademark CHEMISE LACOSTE
& CROCODILE DEVICE by the Philippine Patent Office for use on
T-shirts, sportswear and other garment products of the company.
Two years later, it applied for the registration of the same trademark
under the Principal Register. The Patent Office eventually issued an
order dated 3 March 1977 allowing the application and holding the
registrant to be presumed the owner of the mark until after the
registration is declared cancelled. Thereafter, Hemandas & Co.
assigned to Gobindram Hemandas all rights, title, and interest in the
trademark CHEMISE LACOSTE & DEVICE. On 21 November
1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed its application for registration of
the trademark Crocodile Device (Application Serial 43242) and
Lacoste (Application Serial 43241). The former was approved for
publication while the latter was opposed by Games and Garments in
Inter Partes Case 1658. In 1982, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed a
Petition for the Cancellation of Reg. SR-2225 docketed as Inter
Partes Case 1689.
On 21 March 1983, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a letter-complaint alleging
therein the acts of unfair competition being committed by Hemandas
and requesting their assistance in his apprehension and prosecution.
The NBI conducted an investigation and subsequently filed with the
trial court (RTC Manila, Branch XLIX, National Capital Judicial
P a g e | 29
Region) two applications for the issuance of search warrants which
would authorize the search of the premises used and occupied by
the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and Garments both owned
and operated by Hemandas. The court issued Search Warrant
83-128 and 83-129 for violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code. The NBI agents executed the two search warrants and as a
result of the search found and seized various goods and articles
described in the warrants. Hemandas filed a motion to quash the
search warrants alleging that the trademark used by him was
different from La Chemise Lacostes trademark and that pending the
resolution of IPC 1658 before the Patent Office, any criminal or civil
action on the same subject matter and between the same parties
would be premature. La Chemise Lacoste filed its opposition. The
State Prosecutor likewise filed his opposition. The court was,
however, convinced that there was no probable cause to justify the
issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in its order dated 22 March
1983, the search warrants were recalled and set aside and the NBI
agents or officers in custody of the seized items were ordered to
return the same to Hemandas
The Supreme Court granted the petition in GR 63797-97,
reversing and setting the order dated 22 April 1983 of the RTC, and
made permanent the Temporary Restraining Order dated 29 April
1983. The Court, on the other hand, denied due course to the
petition in GR 65659 for lack of merit, and thus lifting and setting
aside the Temporary Restraining Order dated 5 December 1983.
Ruling:
Determination of probable cause mandatory for the
issuance of a valid search warrant; Probable cause
defined
As a mandatory requirement for the issuance of a valid
search warrant, the Constitution requires in no uncertain terms the
determination of probable cause by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce (Constitution, Art IV, Sec. 3). Probable cause has
traditionally meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant that are in themselves sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof

(People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667).
Determination of probable cause; No general formula or
fixed rule
The concept of probable cause was amplified and modified
by our ruling in Stonehill v. Diokno, (20 SCRA 383) that probable
cause presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. The question of whether or not probable cause exists
is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations (Central Bank v. Morfe, 20 SCRA 507). There is
no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of the existence
of probable cause since the existence depends to a large degree
upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination
(Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310),. However, the findings of the judge
should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reason, more so it is plain that our countrys ability to
abide by international commitments is at stake.
Correction of errors must be based on sound and valid
grounds
Herein, the court complied with the constitutional and
statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant
when at that point in time; it was fully convinced that there existed
probable cause. But after hearing the motion to quash and the
oppositions thereto, the court executed a complete turnabout and
declared that there was no probable cause to justify its earlier
issuance of the warrants. Although the lower court should be given
the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any, but the
rectification must be based on sound and valid grounds. The
allegation that vital facts were deliberately suppressed or concealed
by La Chemise Lacoste should have been assessed more carefully
because the object of the quashal was the return of items already
seized and easily examined by the court. The items were alleged to
be fake and quite obviously would be needed as evidence in the
criminal prosecution.
P a g e | 30
Application for a search warrant is heard ex parte
An application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is
neither a trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these applications must
be expedited for time is of the essence. Great reliance has to be
accorded by the judge to the testimonies under oath of the
complainant and the witnesses. Herein, the allegation of Hemandas
that the applicant withheld information from the court was clearly no
basis to order the return of the seized items.
Manalili vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 113447
October 9, 1997
FACTS:
The Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police was conducting
surveillance in front of the Kalookan City Cemetary due to reports of
drug addicts frequenting the area. They observed Alain Manalili in
the area, with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, signs
of being high on drugs. They stopped Manalili and asked for the
contents of his hands, which turned out to be a wallet. Inside the
wallet, police officers found what later on turned out to be crushed
marijuana. He was charged with Illegal Possession of Marijuana
under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Manalili claimed the charges were
trumped up and that the police officers had blackmailed him. In
addition, petitioner asserts that the evidence seized was inadmissible
against him, as fruits of an illegal seizure. On the other hand, the
Solicitor General counters that the search and seizure was valid, but
regardless of its validity, its defense had been waived by petitioner
since it was not raised in the lower court.
ISSUES:
1) Was the search of Manalili and seizure of marijuana valid?
2) May petitioner raise this defense for the first time on appeal?
RULING:
The General Rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by
a judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional. However, there are exceptions to the rule: 1)
 P a g e | 31

search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, 3)

seizure in plain view, 4) customs search and 5) waiver by the
accused. The court added another exception, the stop-and frisk,
which is the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him and pat him for weapons. This is for the safety of
police officers and the general public. Of course, the stop-and-frisk
must be grounded on probable cause that the accused has
committed an offense. As such, the court ruled that the search and
seizure was valid and admissible as evidence. In addition, Manalili
had effectively waived the defense of an invalid search since this
issue was not raised during the trial. Such issues may not be raised
for the first time on appeal.

Mata vs. Judge Bayona et. Al.
GR No. L-50720 March 26, 1985
Ponente: De Castro
Facts:
An information was filed against Soriano Mata, petitioner,
alleging that he offered, took and arranged bets on Jai Alai game by
selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority
from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned. Thereafter, a search warrant was
issued by the respondent Judge against him for violation under PD
810, as amended by PD 1306.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be
found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to
the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City
Fiscal its whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent Judge
replied, it is with the court. This led petitioner to file a motion to
quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
The motion was denied by respondent Judge stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath
of private respondents and that the fact that documents relating to
search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the
criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not
specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.
Issue:
W/N the search warrant issued by respondent Judge were
valid.
Ruling:
The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative
of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge must before
issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant or witnesses he may produce and take their depositions
P a g e | 32
in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient.
Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking
the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record. However,
illegality of search warrant does not call for return of things seized
which are prohibited.
Orquinaza vs. People
Facts:
On Feb 5, 2003, Edilyn Arida, an employee of Calamba Model
Makers factory, together with her witness, Julio Espinili, executed a
sworn statement regarding the allege act of Orquinaza, the general
manager of the said factory, of kissing her and touching her breasts
while she was taking a nap. The case was referred as a case of
sexual harassment. Orquinaza filed a petition to dismiss the
complaint arguing that it does not contain allegation to constitute the
crime of sexual harassment. The assistant city prosecutor filed with
the MTC an information charging the petitioner with acts of
lasciviousness. A warrant of arrest was issued against Orquinaza.
Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion praying that the warrant be
recalled, the information be quashed, the arraignment be invalidated
and the case be dismissed. He also claims that he was deprived of
his right to due process since the information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted
by the prosecutor was for sexual harassment and not for acts of
lasciviousness. The motion was denied. He again filed for a motion
for reconsideration which was again denied. He filed a petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of preliminary
investigation?
Held:
Based on the affidavits submitted by the parties, the assistant city
 P a g e | 33

prosecutor concluded that the more proper charge should be acts of

lasciviousness. The conduct of another preliminary investigation for
the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be futile because the
complainant would be presenting the same evidence which have
already been studied by the prosecutor. The lack of preliminary
investigation would still not be a ground to quash the information
against the accused much less does it affect the courts jurisdiction.
The remedy of the accused is to call the attention of the court to the
lack of preliminary investigation and demand as a matter of right that
one be conducted.

No. L-47448 May 17, 1978
The People of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Hon. Emeterio
Ocaya, et. al., respondents
Facts:
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the
court of Hon. Ocaya charging Esterlina Marapao, Letitia
Marapao, and Diosdado Marapao of the crime of serious
physical injuries.
Records show that neither the arraignment nor the trial was
made on merit and no warrats of arrest were issued. Instead,
the respondent judge held that the respondents should be
charged of either slight or less serious physical injuries only.
This is so, even if the affidavits show that Lolita Ares, the
victim, was incapacitated for more than 30 days and a scar
was left on her face, deforming it.
Hon. Ocaya, motu proprio, ordered the dismissal of the case
since the crime or slight or less physical injuries is not within
the jurisdiction of the court.
The fiscals motion for reconsideration was denied by Hon.
Ocaya. Accordingly, the respondent judge evaluated the
case without hearing the parties nor the witnesses, nor
having received their evidence, as well as ruling against the
deformity on the basis of the medical certificate.
The Provincial Fiscal then filed the petition at bar for the
nullification of Hon. Ocayas orders.
Issue:
Whether Hon. Oaya acted with grave abuse of discretion for
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Decision:
The orders of the respondent judge was held NULL & VOID.
P a g e | 34
The jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the information or criminal complaint, and not by
the result of the evidence presented at the trial, nor the trial judges
personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits without hearing the
parties and their witnesses. Moreover, once jurisdiction has attached
to the person and subject-matter, the subsequent happening of
events, though it may have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in
the first instance, will not divest the court of jurisdiction already
attached.
People vs Agbulos
Facts:
Angelita Bangit filed a complaint against Joselito Agbulos, charging
him with Forcible abduction with rape. Agbulos was arraigned on
January 23, 1981 where he pleaded guilty. On April 25, 1984, the
prosecution rested its case. On August 13,1984, a warrant of arrest
was issued against Agbulos, but was later on recalled because it was
issued to the wrong bonding company, thus the hearing was reset on
November 5, 1984,. On the said date, Agbulos failed to appear
before the court. The bonding company was given 30 days to
produce the person of the accused and show the cause why
judgement should not be rendered against them. The bonding
company fails to surrender the accused and the court issued an
order stating that upon motion of fiscal, judgement will issue against
the full amount of the bond. Trial was further reset to January 30,
1985 and still the accused failed to appear. Pursuant to the order of
the court on the judgement on the bond, accused was deemed to
have waived his right to present evidence, thus, Defense counsel
just manifested that they were adopting the testimony of prosecution
witness Ernesto Tamayo, thereafter; the defense rested its case. On
July 11 1985, judgement was rendered against the bonding
company, and on June 15 1985, accused was found guilty of forcible
abduction with rape, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and indemnification. On August 16, counsel for accused
appealed.
Issue: Was the trial in absentia valid? Whether or not the accused
may appeal?
 P a g e | 35

Held:
Yes, it was perfectly valid in accordance with the constitution. The old
case of people vs Avancea required the presence of the accused at
certain stages of the trial. This only results in the discontinuance of
the trial as long as the defendant would not reappear or remain at
large. This rule would work for the fugitives advantage. This rule is
now modified by the bill of rights which allows trial in absentia. The
prisoner cannot simply escape and thwart the continuance of
prosecution and conviction against him provided that he has been
arraigned, duly notified, and his failure to appear unjustified. By the
same rule, the accused forfeits his right to appeal. Rule 124, section
8 of the 1985 rules on criminal procedure provide that the court
may, upon motion of the appellee, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

People vs Baao
Facts:
Rowena Frederico is a thirteen year old school drop out,
finishing only grade 1 and of limited native intelligence. She claims
she was raped five times by accused appellant Baao; three times in
December 1982, done in the bathroom of accused-appellants house
in Dasmarias Cavite, and twice in February 1983, the fourth done in
the backyard while the fifth was done in the living room. On March 4
1983, Rowena decided to tell her mother about the offenses. She
said that the first three rapes were done at 8am on dates of
December she could not recall, while the fourth was at about 10 pm
on Feb 17, and the fifth at noon of Feb 23. She claimed that all rapes
were done through force and threat of death and that the first rape
caused laceration of her hymen and there was full penetration and
pain in all instances. The victim was subjected to physical
examinations under Dr. Maximo Reyes, medico-legal officer of the
NBI. According to Dr. Reyes findings, Rowena underwent intercourse
for not more than five times, and that the findings were compatible
with the testimony of the victim. Lucia Federico, the victims mother,
also testified that after she came to know of the rapes, the accused-
appellants wife approached her and offered her 2000 Php so she
would withraw the charges.
The Accused-appellant relied mainly on denial and alibi. He claims
that he was just being set up because he once caught the girl sealing
soft drinks from his sari sari store and had scolded her. He also
claims that at the times stated by Rowena on which dates she was
supposedly raped, he was with his daughter at her house near
Manila International Airport in Baclaran, to do some carpentry work.
His daughter testified and said the same thing. He also argued that
the complaint was filed to extort money from him, an amount of
15,000 which was later reduced to 8000. The Trial Judge rejected
the charges on the second, third and fifth rapes. This leads the
defense to invoke falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, claiming that
since the three charges were rejected, the rest should also be
rejected.
P a g e | 36
Issue:
Whether or not this was merely a tale concocted by Rowena.
Whether or not the two charges of rape should also be
rejected since the other three were rejected by the court.
Held:
Accused-Appellant was held guilty of the crime charged. His
contentions were rejected. His alibi of being in Baclaran on
December is not enough to relieve him of the charges because he
couldnt show that he did not have any opportunity to go back to
Dasmarinas during that month. Also, considering the demeanour of
the victim, she couldnt have made up such a story on her own. Alibi
is an inherently weak defense.
On the contention that all charges should be rejected since three
were rejected, it could also conversely be argued that since truth was
found on the first and fourth rapes, accused should also be held
liable for all five rapes and be convicted. The choice really is whether
it should be total acquittal or total conviction for all five charges of
rape.
People vs. Doria
Facts:
Florencio Doria @ Jun was a seller of illegal drugs. Upon a tip of an
informant, PO3 Manlangit together with the informant posed as a
buyer of marijuana, PO1 Badua tagged along as support in the
whole operation. PO3 Manlangit was able to give the marked bills
worth P1600 to Florencio, left and after sometime returned with the 1
brick marijuana at hand. They were able to arrest Florencio
inflagrante delicto in selling the marijuana to them, when asked
where the marked bills where Florencio replied that it was at the
place of Neneth. The group went to the house of the so called
Neneth, when there they saw the person whose name was Violeta
Gadao carrying water to her house, they questioned her where the
marked bills were. At this time also a box with a flap open was seen
by the PO3 Manlangit, his suspicion peeked because he saw at the

open flap the same wrappings as the 1 brick he got from Florencio at
that time. PO3 Manlangit open the box and found 10 bricks of the
same marijuana. Simultaneously PO1 Badua was able to get the
marked bills out of Violeta and arrested her. The RTC ruled in favour
of the police and imposed upon Florencio and Violeta the penalty of
Death, the 11 bricks of marijuana were destroyed. The case went to
the SC for automatic review.
Issue:
W/N Florencio is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs
W/N Violeta is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs
Held:
Florencio is guilty, he was caught inflagrante delicto, and the law
authorizes such arrest without a warrant in such cases.
The law authorizes entrapment, that is the police conducts an
operation against the accused without inducing him to commit
the said crime.
The law authorizes the mix of both subjective and objective test in
determining if there is entrapment in a case. The subjective test
looks on the daily practice, background and life of the accused in
determining if the crime is indeed committed out of his volition
and without inducement. The objective test looks into the
conduct of the police in trying to plan and execute the
entrapment against the accused, if it has no inducement in the
whole of its process.
Entrapment there is no inducement and the accused did the crime
out of his volition. Instigation the crime was committed with
inducement by the police and the accused did the crime not of
his volition.
Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on criminal procedure enumerate
the valid Arrests without a warrant:
When, in his prescence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit the offense.
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
P a g e | 37
person to be arrested has committed it; and
When the prisoner to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped
from a penal establishment or place he is serving final
judgement or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
No, Violeta cant be guilty of selling illegal drugs because the drugs
were illegally seized from her house. The marked bills found in
her person also didnt prove her participation in the sale of drugs
by Florencio
The 5 instances where a search and seizure without a warrant is
valid when:
Search incident to a lawful arrest
Search of moving motor vehicle
Search in violation of customs laws
Seizure of evidence in plain view
When the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizure
Option b, c, and e can be immediately disposed of as a reason.
Since the arrest of Violeta was without a warrant and doesnt fall
among the exceptions provided in Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on criminal procedure, the search and seizure cant be the
first exception to a valid warrantless search and seizure. As to
(a) it was not in hot pursuit, and as to (b) theres no probable
cause.
The search and seizure cant also be considered in plainview,
because PO3 Manlangit himself admitted that the items in the
box could have been other items. That marijuana cant be readily
identified with just the flap open and the plastic pack sticking out.
Florencio was convicted with Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of
P500,000
While Violeta was acquitted
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA
G. R. No. 123872

Jan. 30, 1998
Regalado, J.:
Facts:
Ruben Montilla, alias Joy was charged for violating Section
4, Article 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, R. A. No. 6425, as
amended by R. A. No. 7659 in an information which alleges: That on
or about 20th day of June 1994, at Brgy. Salitran, Dasmarinas,
Cavite, xxx the above-named accused, not being authorized by law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer,
transport and deliver 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves which are
considered prohibited drugs.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted on appellant
invalidates the evidence obtained from him?
Ruling:
A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the
arresting officer with authority to validly search and seize from the
offender (1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those that may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense. On the defense argument that
the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the
evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and
the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof
was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5
(a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
People vs. Nitafan
Facts:
On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of
Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation
to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were filed against private
respondent Imelda R. Marcos. After arraignment, Marcos pleaded
not guilty. Petitioners filed motions for the consolidation of the three
informations with the 21 other remaining cases pending before the
RTC. The Solicitor General alleged in its motion that the indictable
acts under the three informations form part of and is related to the
transaction complained. RTC granted the consolidation and the 3
infornations were re-raffled and re-assigned to Branch 52-Manila
P a g e | 38
presided public respondent Judge Nitafan. Without any motion from
the accused, Judge Nitafan issued an order requiring petitioners to
show cause why the cases should not be dismissed on the ground
that it violates Marcos right against ex post facto law and the two
other informations on the ground that private respondents right
against double jeopardy was violated. On August 7, 1992,
respondent judge issued an order dismissing the 1st criminal case on
the ground of ex post facto law and also dismissed the two remaining
criminal cases on the ground of violation of private respondents right
against double jeopardy. Prosecution filed for a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether a judge can motu proprio inititate a motion to quash an
information?
Held:
In the case at bench. Private respondent pleaded to the charges
without filing any motion to quash and as such she has deemed to
have waived and abandon her right to avail any legal ground which
she may have properly and timely invoked to challenge the complaint
or information. If the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is
not only pre-judging the case but also takes the side of the accused.
It is clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in
resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those
ground stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception
is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the
competence of the court to hear and pass judgement on the cause.
The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused.
There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to
motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by
the accused.
PRUDENTE V DAYRIT
PADILLA; December 14, 1989

the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for
FACTS
- On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the
Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police
District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now
Associate Justice of the CA, an application1 for the issuance of a
search warrant, for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, etc.). Dimagmaliw alleged, among others that: That he has
been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that
Nemesio Prudente who may be found at the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines (PUP), Anonas St., Sta., Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila,
has in his control or possession firearms, explosives, handgrenades
and ammuntion which are illegally possessed or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense which the said Nemesio
Prudente is keeping and concealing at the premises of the PUP. In
support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt.
Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of ISAD,
executed a "Deposition of Witness"2 dated 31 October 1987,
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge.
- On 1 Nov 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant
was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar
Dula Torre, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
They found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr.
Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with 3 live fragmentation
hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers.
- On 6 Nov 1987, petitioner Prudente moved to quash the search
warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt.
Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which
formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the
examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching
questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general
warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place
to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and
(4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of
P a g e | 39
that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
Respondent Judge issued denied the petitioner's motion and
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this present recourse.
ISSUES
1. WON the Search Warrant is invalid as it does not show a probable
cause since it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances
which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and
his witness but based on hearsay evidence
2. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it failed to
particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there
were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the
PUP
3. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it was
issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued
only in connection with one specific offense
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant must be
shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
Reasoning
[a] In his application for search warrant, Dimagmaliw stated that "he
has been informed" that Prudente "has in his control and
possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that
he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." In his supporting
deposition, Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous
surveillance for several days, they "gathered informations from
verified sources" that the holders of the said firearms and explosives
are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and
his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned
search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through
information from other sources or persons. [b] What the records

show is the deposition of witness, Angeles, as the only support to
Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on
hearsay. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of
Dimagmaliw and the declaration of Angeles in his deposition were
insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant. As held
in the Alvarez case: "The oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause."
2. NO
Ratio A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search
warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St.,
Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, more particularly, the offices of the
Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and
the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the
places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional
injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place
to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor
and second floor of the PUP.
3. NO
Ratio The application for search warrant which was captioned: "For
Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)."
means that it was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession
of firearms and explosives.
Reasoning
[a] While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged
violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession
of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc."
referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search
warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
P a g e | 40
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to
mention the particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated is
not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score.
[b] The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does
not recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal
possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of
ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of explosives.
Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of the
above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice
adopted by the courts is to file a single information for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The Search Warrant No. 87-14
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Sapiera vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on several
occasions, purchased from Monrico Mart grocery items, mostly
cigarettes and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de
Guzman. These checks were signed by Sapiera on the back. When
they were presented for payment, the checks were dishonoured
because the drawers account was already closed. Respondent
Ramon Samua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner but both
failed to pay. Hence, four charges of Estafa were filed against
Sapiera while two counts of BP 22 was filed against Arturo de
Guzman. These cases were consolidated. On December 27 1999,
the RTC Dagupan city acquitted Sapiera of all charges of Estafa but
did not rule on the civil aspect of the case. Arturo de Guzman was
held liable for the 2 BP 22 cases and was ordered to pay Sua
167,150 Php as civil indemnity and was sentenced for imprisonment
of 6 months and 1 day. Respondent Sua appealed regarding the civil
aspect of Sapieras case but the courtdenied it saying that the
acquittal of petitioner was absolute. Respondent filed a petition for
mandamus with the Court of Appeals praying that the appeal be
given due course, this was granted. On January 1996, CA rendered
a decision ordering Sapiera to pay 335000 php to Sua. Sapiera filed

a motion for reconsideration. The CA the issued a resolution noting
that the admission of both parties that Sua already collected 125000
for the 2 check paid by De Guzman on the BP 22 cases. It appears
that the payment should be deducted on her liability as they involved
the same two checks which Sapiera was involved in. the CA
deducted the liability to 210,000 Php. Hence this petition by Sapiera
claiming that the CA erred in rendering such decision because she
was acquitted and the fact from which the civil liability exists did not
exist.
Issue: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she
was acquitted in the criminal charges against her.
Held:
Yes. Sec. 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court provides that
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil, unless this shows that the fact from which the civil liability is
based is proven to not have existed because of such acquittal. Civil
liability is not extinguished where: (a) the acquittal is not based on
reasonable doubt. (b) Where the court expressly declares that the
liability is not criminal but only civil, (c) where the civil liability is not
derived from or based on the criminal act. The decision of the case
would show that the acquittal was based on failure of the prosecution
to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between her and
De Guzman. Since all checks were signed by Sapiera on the back,
sec 17 of Negotiable instruments law says that she would be
considered an indorser of the bill of exchange and under section 66
thereof would be held liable for breach of warranty and is held liable
to pay the holder who may be compelled to pay the instrument.
Stonehill vs. Diokno L-19550 June 19, 1967
FACTS:
Respondent judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against the
corporate offices and private residences of the accused. The
warrants directed police officers to seize and take possession of
various items of personal property such as books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, etc. The warrants
P a g e | 41
were based on alleged violations of Central Bank Laws, Tariff Laws,
and the like. Petitioners assailed the validity of the warrants as such
warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized. In
addition, petitioners assert that other items not included in the
warrants, such as cash, were also seized. They filed petitions with
the court, seeking the quashal of the warrants and the return of their
seized property. On the other hand, public respondents claimed the
warrants were valid, and any defects were cured by consent of the
petitioners. They also claim that such evidence, regardless of the
validity of the warrants, were admissible as evidence in court.
ISSUES:
1) Are the 42 search warrants valid?
2) Are the documents and other effects admissible as evidence
against respondents?
RULING:
The seized items were taken from two kinds of locations: the offices
of the petitioners and their residences. With regards to the seized
items from the offices, petitioners have no cause of action since only
the corporation, as a separate juridical personality, may question the
validity of the warrants. As the petitioners filed the objection in their
personal capacities, the court cannot act on the petition. As to the
effects seized from the homes of petitioners, it is clear that the
warrants were General Warrants, issued on the basis of no specific
offense and with no particular definition of the items to be seized.
General Warrants are prohibited by the Consititution since there are
clearly issued to conduct fishing expeditions, and not on the basis of
actual probable cause. The Constitution provides that items to be
seized must be particularly described and probable cause can only
be found in connection with one specific offense. Since these
items were seized on the basis of an invalid warrant, they are to be
deemed fruits of a poisonous tree. As such, they may not be used
as evidence against the petitioners.
VENUS VS DESIERTO
OCTOBER 21, 1998

J. DAVIDE
FACTS:
Eriberto Venus (Venus) was the mayor of New Washington,
Aklan. The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality issued a
Resolution authorizing Venus to negotiate with the Board of
Liquidators in the purchase of a lot in the municipality. Hence, Venus
went to Manila and submitted with the Board of Liquidators the
resolution and a letter-proposal for the purchase of the lot. The
proposal was rejected by the board and set bidding on Sept. 19,
1988. Venus informed the SB of the denial. Then, Venus sought the
opinion of the Provincial Auditor as to the requirements of bidding in
order that the municipality may validly participate. The Provincial
Auditor opined that it would be impossible to participate as it would
need a resolution from the SB. And that the funds would be pre-
audited before its release, which would take at least 2 weeks. This
means that the funds will not be available on the day of bidding.
Using his personal funds, Venus went to Manila and asked for the
postponement of the bidding but it was denied. Hence, Venus bid
and got the property, being the highest bidder, using his own money.
The lot was used as garage for the municipalitys fire truck free of
charge. Nearly four years after the sale, SB members Mars
Regalado and Harry Abayon filed a complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor charging Venus with violation of paragraph H, Sec. 3 RA
3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act). It was forwarded to the
Deputy Ombudsman of Cebu and was dismissed. Ombudsman
Vasquez disapproved the dismissal and the case was re-raffled to
Deputy Ombudsman Tanco who recommended the filing of
information against Venus. Upon review, Special Prosecutor Ines
found reasonable ground for filing of information against Venus.
Ombudsman Desierto approved the resolution recommending the
filing of information against Venus. The information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Upon his surrender to the Sandiganbayan, it was
found out that Venus was not given the opportunity to file a motion
for reconsideration of the resolution recommending the filing of
information. Sandiganbayan then granted him time to file a motion
for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration was filed before the
Office of Special Prosecutor. Said prosecutor recommended the
P a g e | 42
dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. Desierto
disapproved the recommendation. Meanwhile, Sandiganbayan set
Venus arraignment. Hence, this petition for prohibition with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not arraignment may be restrained with
injunction or writ of prohibition.
HELD:
YES. Generally, criminal prosecutions may no be restrained
through injunction or prohibition as the determination of probable
cause for the filing of information is within the discretion of
ombudsman or prosecutor. However, in the case of Brocka vs.
Enrile, the Supreme Court provided exceptions to the above-
mentioned rule. Among those enumerated is when there is clearly no
prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.
In the case at bar, the Deputy Ombudsman found no ground
to believe that Venus violated RA 3019 but the Ombudsman and the
other Deputy Ombudsman disagreed. In the motion for
reconsideration, the special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal
of the case. In human relations, good faith is always presumed. He
who charges bad faith has the burden of proving the same. In not
finding facts constituting bad faith, it was an error for the ombudsman
to pass on the duty of finding bad faith to Sandiganbayan. There was
no bad faith in the actuations of Venus. The resolution issued by the
SB was for him to negotiate with the Board of Liquidators for the sale
of the lot. Venus did as he was mandated and returned with the
denial of their offer. The municipality did not intend to participate in
the bidding as shown by the absence of a resolution to that effect
and the absence of the funds for the occasion. Venus faithfully
performed his duty and this duty ended when he asked for
postponement even if it was denied. Further, RA 3019 requires that
bad faith must be EVIDENT. In finding no bad faith, logically there
could be no evident bad faith. Hence, there was no prima facie case
against Venus.
In finding the manifest innocence of Venus, the Supreme

Court ordered Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case.
Villaflor vs. Vivar
Facts:
An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar
for beating Gian Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his
way out, Gian met Dindo who told that next time, I will use my gun on
you. The injuries sustained by Gian turned out to be more serious
than they had appeared so an Information for serious physical
injuries was filed and the charge for slight physical injuries was
withdrawn. Another Information for grave threats was filed against
Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he filed a Motion to
Quash the Information for grave threats since it was made in
connection with the charge of serious physical injuries should have
been absorbed by the latter, and because the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over it. MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed for a
motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in
the RTC RTC granted the motion to quash and denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petiton for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of preliminary investigation?
Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation be considered a ground to quash the
informations?
Held:
The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the information. In the case a
bar, a preliminary investigation was for slight physical injuries
P a g e | 43
was conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the
Information was however amended when petitioners injuries
turned out to be more serious. However the change in the
information was only a formal amendment and did not violate
the right of Vivar against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, since it still involves the same facts.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides the grounds on which an accused can move to
quash the complaint or information. Nowhere in the rule
mention of a lack of preliminary investigation as a ground for
a motion to quash. When accused failed to assert any
ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, he has
deemed waived his right.
Washington Distillers, Inc. Vs Ca
Facts:
On the basis of a search warrant issued by the Judge of the RTC of
Manila, 314, 289 pieces of 350cc round white flint bottles were
seized by the NBI from the premises of petitioners in San Fernando,
Pampanga for alleged violation of RA 623, otherwise known as An
act to regulate the use of duly stamped or marked bottles, boxes,
casks, kegs, barrels, and other similar containers, as amended by
RA 5700. Petitioners filed a motion to quash on the ground that the
RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction to issue a warrant to be executed
in Pampanga, which was granted. A motion for reconsideration was
issued my private respondents but was denied. Thereafter, private
respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
and CA set aside the decision of RTC ruling that a search warrant
may be enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC of Manila
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant issued against petitioners is valid.
Held:
 P a g e | 44

No. The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its validity as
a result of the failure of the NBI to commence criminal prosecution
and the bottles seized from them should be returned to petitioners in
the absence of any civil action for their recovery.

What is noticeable about this case is the that possession of the

bottles was transferred to private respondents through the
expediency of a search warrant, so that instead of merely being an
ancillary writ issued either as an incident of criminal proceedings, the
proceeding for search warrant have become, for all intents and
purposes, the main proceedings by which private respondents have
been able to obtain possession of what it claims to be its property.
There was neither complaint by which the petitioners could have
been informed of the charge against them nor answer by which they
could have heard in the defense, before property claimed by them
was taken from them and given to private respondents.