Risk Assessment Example - Mobile Offshore Unit (MOU) Relocation Operations PDF

Marine Safety Forum - Stage 1 Risk Assessment Example - Mobile Offshore Unit (MOU) Relocation Operations
Qualifying the Risk
The matrix used for determining the risk rating for this Stage 1 Risk Assessment has come from the Step Change in Safety Task Risk Assessment Guide (2007).
Hazard Severity
Negligible Slight M oderate High Very High
Negligible injury, no M inor injury Injury leading to a Involving a single M ultiple deaths
absence f rom w ork requiring first aid lost tim e incident death or serious
treatm ent injury
Very Unlikely
A freak com bination of factors
w ould be required for an L L L L L
incident to result
Unlikely
A rare com bination of f actors
L L L M M
Likelihood of Occurrence
w ould be required for an

incident to result
Possible
Could happen w hen additional
factors are present but L L M M H
otherw ise unlikely to occur
Likely
Not certain to happen but an
addit ional factor m ay result in L M M H H
an accident
Very Likely
Alm ost inevit able that
an incident M M H H H
w ould result
Risk Rating Criteria
To determine the Risk Rating (RR), multiply the Hazard Severity (S) by the Likelihood of Occurrence (L).
Low Risk Identified as L in the matrix. May be acceptable; however, review task to see if risk can be reduced further.
Task should only proceed with appropriate management authorisation after consultation with specialist personnel and assessment team. Where possible,
Medium Risk
the risk should be redefined to take account of the hazards involved or the risk should be reduced further prior to task commencement.
Identified as H in the matrix. Task must not proceed. It should be redefined or further control measures put in place to reduce risk. The controls should be re-
High Risk
assessed for adequacy prior to task commencement.
Page: 1 of: 18 Risk Matrix Applicable to Main Example Stage 1 Risk Assessment Document Version 3 - Revision 00 - February 2011
Marine Safety Forum - Stage 1 Risk Assessment Example - Mobile Offshore Unit (MOU) Relocation Operations
Probability Guidelines
It is appreciated the likelihood of occurrence is fairly subjective and open to personal interpretation. In an attempt to achieve a level of consistency, the following definitions are applied;
Very Unlikely A freak combination of factors would be required for an incident to result.
Unlikely A rare combination of factors would be required for an incident to result.
Possible Could happen when additional factors are present but otherwise unlikely to occur
Likely Not certain to happen but an additional factor may result in an accident.
Very Likely Almost inevitable that an incident would result
Severity Guidelines
Negligible Negligible injury or health implications, no absence from work. Negligible loss of function/production with no damage to equipment or the environment.
Minor injury requiring first-aid treatment or headache, nausea, dizziness, mild rashes. Damage to equipment requiring minor remedial repair, loss of
Slight
production or impact to the environment.
Event leading to a lost time incident or persistent dermatitis, acne or asthma. Localised damage to equipment requiring extensive repair, significant loss of
Moderate
function/production or moderate pollution incurring some restitution costs.
Involving a single death or severe injury, poisoning, sensitisation or dangerous infection. Damage to equipment resulting in production shutdown and
High
significant production loss. Severe pollution with short-term localised implications incurring significant restitution costs.
Very High Multiple deaths, lung diseases, permanent debility or fatality. Major pollution with long-term implication and very high restitution costs.
Control Measures
Controls should be chosen taking into account the following, which are in order of effectiveness:
1 Elimination
2 Substitution by something less hazardous and risky
3 Enclosure (enclose the hazard in a way that eliminates or controls the risk)
4 Guarding/Segregation of people
5 Safe system of work that reduces the risk to an acceptable level
6 Written procedures that are known and understood by those affected
7 Review the blend of technical and procedural control
8 Adequate supervision
9 Identification of training needs
10 Information/Instruction (signs, hand-outs)
11 Personal Protective Equipment (last resort) cannot be controlled by any other means
Page: 2 of: 18 Risk Matrix Applicable to Main Example Stage 1 Risk Assessment Document Version 3 - Revision 00 - February 2011
Marine Safety Forum -Stage 1 Risk Assessment Example - Mobile Offshore Unit (MOU) Relocation Operations
MSF AIDE MEMOIRE TO STAGE ONE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PLANNING MOU MOVES
The process that is usally followed when planning a MOU relocation is as follows;
1 Identify surface location and surrounding infrastructure
2 Identify Rig
3 Develop basic principles and a step by step method statement of how the MOU relocation will be carried out.
4 Hold a high level Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification meeting (Stage 1)
6 Publish and close-out actions arising from above
7 Develop formal MOU-Relocation procedures based on output of Stage 1 Risk Assessment
8 Publish and circulate MOU-Relocation procedures for review to all stake-holders
9 Hold pre-MOU-Relocation-meeting as a final Risk Assessment and document check
10 Amend and agree final procedures and issue for operations
11 Hold Stage 2 Risk Assessment offshore to review the procedures and Stage 1 Risk Assessment and apply local MOU and/or situation specific peculiarities
12 Hold documented Job Safe Analyses (JSA) and Toolbox Talks (Stage 3 Risk Assessment) onboard individiual vessels and installations offshore
Each Operator/Duty Holder during the process of planning MOU-Relocations is required to assess key risks associated with the activity and apply appropraite mitigations to reduce risk to "as low as reasonably
practicable".
Stage 1 of this document is intended to be a worked example of a risk assessment to act as a prompt for individual Operators/Duty Holders to hold their own internal risk assessments/hazard
identification.
It is recommneded that stage 1 of this document is used in the planning stage prior to development of formal procedures for the activity.
Stage 2 of this document is intended to be a prompt list to carrying out risk assessments offshore prior to the MOU move commencing and ideally should involve the operator/duty holder, MOU
owner, towmasters and vessel masters as a minimum. The basis of the stage 2 risk assessment is to review the approved MOU move procedures and stage 1 risk assessment and apply local
variations where applicable.
Page: 3 of: 18 Main Stage 1 Example Risk Assessment Document Version 3 - Revision 00 - February 2011
Example Risk Assessment Stage 1 Originated: Apr-08

First Annual Revision Sep-09
Summary of Activities Covered by this Worked Risk Assessment Second Annual Revision: Feb-11
This example of High Level Risk Assessment applies to the planning and execution of rig move operations.
Existing Control Measures

North West European Area Guidelines - Version 2 National Statutory Requirements
Current Common Marine Inspection Document with all actions addressed MOU Owner Safety Management System
MSF Template of Data Marine Operations Manuals all parties
MSF Anchor Handling Manual Lessons Learned from previous operations
MSF MOU Move Procedure - Content Guidance Anchor Manufacturers Handling Instruction
MSF AHTS Checklist International Shipboard Management Code
MOU Move Specific Procedures
# Activity Hazards Consequences Initial Risk Control Measures Action By Residual Risk Actions
S L RR S L RR
Step 1 Confirmed Location and Rig Identification.
S L RR S L RR
Step 2 - Planning
Identifying Specific Requirements
Assessing the location Weather Inability to achieve location VH VL H Define limits of weather VH U M
Water depth Inadequate procedures Site survey
Seabed conditions Mooring analysis & deployment / recovery
load analysis
Currents Inadequate vessel and Traffic Survey
equipment specification
Tides Field drawings
Hind Casting & Weather Forecasting
Subsea infrastructure Damage to seabed assets Heights determined for seabed clearances
and/or towing and mooring for anchor handling and towing
assemblies
Location approval
Mooring assemblies Catenary Calculations
Other assets Location historical data (where applicable)
Traffic density Previous experience of location

Dynamic loadings Tidal & Current Data
People Lack of competence/ Lack of Incorrect data VH VL H Approved vendors VH U M
time/ resource constraints
Experience e.g. Inability to achieve required Contractor audits

Naval Architects location
Approval authorities Inadequate procedures Industry accreditation
Warranty Assurance Inadequate vessel and Proven history
Survey equipment specification
S L RR S L RR
Step 3 - Planning
Develop Procedures
Input data Lack-of or wrong input data Schedule delay VH VL H Site survey data VH U M
Inadequate selection of vessels, Mooring analysis and recovery / deployment
personnel, equip load analysis
Incorrect mooring plan Location HAZOP / HAZID
Incorrect location Accurate field survey data
Survey procedures
Verification of data
Lessons learned including use of previous
procedures
Competence of author Lack of knowledge Schedule delay VH VL H Review and approval process which should VH U M
define reviewers
Inadequate specification / Approved Vendors
selection of vessels, personnel,
equipment
Incorrect mooring plan Contractor audits
Damage to property and Proven history
equipment
Harm to personnel Realistic schedule to be identified
Unrealistic scheduling
Lack of understanding of Schedule delay VH VL H Existing control measures VH VU L
required content Inadequate specification / No additional controls identified
selection of vessels, personnel,
equip
Incorrect mooring plan
Damage to property and
equipment
Harm to personnel
Critical items / issues not
identified
S L RR S L RR
Preparation, Review, Pressure of time Inadequate time to prepare, VH L H Sufficient time and resources allowed for VH U M
Approval and develop and review procedures preparation and developing procedures
distribution of
Procedures and
Onshore pre-move
Procedures issued in sufficient time to allow
meeting
adequate review
Competency of review team. Inadequate review VH L H Procedures to be reviewed by competent VH U M
personnel and as a minimum to include:
(i) Operator
(ii) MOU Owner
(iii) Survey Reps
(iv) Procedure Author
(v) Marine competent MOU mover
Distribution Correct procedures are not VH L H Define distribution list VH U M
distributed to the relevant
parties.
Relevant parties not prepared Final revision of procedures to be signed off
by accountable personnel
Potential delays
S L RR S L RR
Step 4 - Planning
In-Field Operations
Timing Inadequate preparation Shortcuts VH VL H Planning Adequate notification period for VH U M
period moves to be defined.
SIMOPS Time pressure Resources
Delay in operation Integrated communication between relevant
parties
Equipment, vessel and
personnel lead times /
availability
Damage to Equipment
People Lack of competent and Harm to personnel VH VL H Existing control measures H U M
experienced people
Inadequate manning Damage to equipment Approved vendors with competency
assurance systems in place
Changes to personnel Delay to schedule Demonstrable work experience available
(CV, work history)
Poor or lack of meaningful Lack of continuity Shift change not to be undertaken during
communication critical operations
Unsafe practices Dilution of experience Realistic schedule that includes allowance
for familiarisation, delays and rest periods
Lack of understanding of Personnel competent for proposed operation

equipment, operation and
procedures
Inexperience of proposed Clear roles and responsibilities
operations
Fatigue Adequate shift change handover to take
place
Loss of focus Staggered shift change where possible
New crews to be adequately briefed in the
operation
Crew changes during MOU move operations
to be adequately assessed using
Management of Change process
S L RR S L RR
Chartering Vessels AHTS not fit for purpose Damage to, or loss of vessels, VH VL H Existing Control Measures H U M
property / assets
Duty Holders to satisfy themselves that a
vessel assurance process is in place and is
verified.
Inadequate selection of vessels Person chartering vessel has to be familiar
and crew with the operation and the vessels intended
activity
Injury to personnel Vessel requirements clearly defined
Schedule delay Vessel meets defined specification in
procedures
Mobilisation Equipment and/or Delay to schedule H P M Existing control measures M U L
demobilisation of mobilisation location not fit for
Equipment purpose
Incorrect vessel preparation Damage to equipment / Correct Load out plan with defined load list
property / assets supplied to vessels
Competence of people Harm to people Approved vendors responsible for supplying
equipment as per operators / rig owners
standards
Confirmation of equipment at mobilisation

meets procedural requirements
Certified equipment
Level 2 Risk Assessment to be undertaken
specific to the equipment being mobilised
Substitute equipment to be confirmed with

operator / MOU owner prior to mob
Adequate time given to vessel configuration
S L RR S L RR
Vessel Procedural Insufficient time to mobilise Delay in operation VH VL H Existing control measures VH U M
Review and Detailed personnel, undertake MOU
Operational Briefing induction and familiarisation
and final assurance Insufficient time to review Damage to, or loss of vessels, Adequate time given to vessel to review and
and mobilisation procedures property / assets discuss the procedures, understand the
operation and the vessels role
Lack of understanding of Harm to people Competent and experienced personnel
procedures familiar with the operation to conduct the
vessel briefings and final assurance
Inadequate briefing Lack of understanding of
operation
Insufficient rest time Fatigue
Mobilisation, Insufficient time to mobilise Delay in operation VH VL H Existing control measures VH U M
Procedural Review and personnel, undertake MOU
Detailed Operational induction and familiarisation
Briefing of assigned
MOU move personnel
e.g. Tow Master,
Marine Rep, Survey
rep, etc.
Insufficient time to review Damage to, or loss of vessels, Competent and experienced personnel
procedures property / assets familiar with the operation
Lack of understanding of Harm to people Adequate time given to review and discuss
procedures the procedures, understand the operation
and their role
Inadequate briefing Lack of uunderstanding of Sufficient time in process to ensure MOU
operation induction and familiarisation is undertaken
Insufficient rest time Fatigue Sufficient rest time to be given prior to

commencement of operations
S L RR S L RR
Pre-Operational Vessels do not understand Delay in operation VH P H Existing control measures M U L
Commencement the MOu requirements
Meeting (offshore) MOU does not understand Damage to, or loss of vessels, Discussion between the MOU and the
the vessels capabilities and property / assets vessels to ensure accurate sharing of
limitations information and vessel equipment availability
Failure to manage any Harm to people MOU to fully understand the vessels
changes capabilities and limitations
MOU and vessel crew are not Confirmation and agreement from vessels
familiar with their roles in the that they understand their roles in the
operation. operation
Clear lines of communication Operational status of vessels and MOU to
and accountability are not be confirmed
defined.
Lack of co-ordination of Define communication lines and

operation accountability
Failure to identify specific Continual review of all factors to be
risks associated with the undertaken and communicated until such
operation times as a start time has been identified and
agreed between all parties.
Confirmation that Level 2 Risk Assessments
have been undertaken and any issues
shared with all parties involved in the
operation
Management of change assessment
S L RR S L RR
Establishing and Information on environmental Damage to, or loss of vessels, VH VL H Operational status of vessels and MOU to M U L
assessing conditions and forecast not property / assets be confirmed within operating limits and
environmental available or incorrect continual reviews to be undertaken
Conditions
Insufficient environmental Harm to people Suitable weather window identified and

working window agreed for each phase of the operation to
commence or be suspended
Inadequate monitoring and Damage to the environment Suitable monitoring equipment to be
appraisal of environmental available onsite and utilised
conditions
Operating out with the safe Accurate and up-to-date Environmental
working limits of the vessels information and forecasting to be provided
and/or and MOU and verified
Open lines of communication between MOU
and vessels and vice-versa to advise of any
change in status
S L RR S L RR
Step 5 - Vessel Demobilisation
Release of vessels Premature release of vessels Reduced redundancy and/or VH P H Planning - adequate notification period for VH U M
capability of remaining vessels moves to be defined.
Resources
Integrated communication between relevant
parties
Marine Safety Forum - Stage 2 Risk Assessment Example - Mobile Offshore Unit (MOU) Move Operations
Risk Assessment Stage 2 Prompt Originated: Apr-08

First Annual Revision Sep-09
Second Annual Revision: Feb-11
Activity Typical Hazards Potential Typical Control Measures Comment
Consequences
The following points are included to act as an 'aide memoire' to assist in the Stage 2 Risk Assessment - To be discussed Offshore
Anchor Handling Dropped Objects Damage to, or loss of

vessels, property / assets
Transfer / Receiving PCP Failure to follow procedures Harm to people Break out limits and strategy to be
defined
Chasing Out / Stripping back Vessels in close proximity Damage to the Good communication between rig /
to rig / platform and each environment vessels
other
J Hooking / Grappling Collision Delay to schedule Extension line to be highlighted
beyond anchor position
Crane / lifting operations Vessel capsize Man Overboard Identify vessel excursion limits from
intended mooring track
Winch Operation Other marine traffic Flooding Back deck clear policy when wires
and equipment are under tension
Breaking Out Breakdown in Planned Maintenance System

communications
Recovery / Decking the Anchor Equipment failure Certified and/or inspection and
testing regime of equipment in place
Recovery and deployment of Working on deck and / or Mooring analysis calculations

mooring system over side
Fitting of specialised moorings Over stressing equipment Decking / Overboarding to be carried
out in safe area (clear of such as
subsea assets)
Bolster / Un-bolstering Anchor High breakout loads Awareness of anchor orientation
when decking / overboarding
Page: 14 of: 18 Stage 2 (Offshore) Risk Assessment Example Prompt List Version 3- Revision 00 - February 2011

Consequences
Setting Anchor Vessel(s) unable to hold Adequate positive stability to be
station and/or heading maintained in worst case scenario
Loss of control of anchor Minimum separations and distances
and/or equipment on deck to be agreed and adhered to
between all parties involved in the
operation
Survey equipment not Change of rig thruster status to be
working, ready or set-up advised
properly
Entanglement of wired with Operational status of vessels and rig
vessel(s) to be confirmed within operating
limits and continual reviews to be
undertaken
Excessive movement of Suitable crane assembly (pennant
crane assemblies length, hook, headache ball)
Lack of understanding of All Emergency release procedures to
emergency preparedness be defined and clearly understood
during operation
Operating outwith safe Equipment to be operated within
working limits manufacturers specification
Tandem operations Survey Quality Assurance
Procedures
Unable to maintain required Redundancy in survey equipment
tension
Water tight integrity policy strictly
adhered to during the operation

Consequences
Towing Other marine traffic Damage to, or loss of Existing control measures NWEA Guidelines to be reviewed with
vessels, property / assets regard to SWL vs BL
Passing / Recovery of Tow Bridle Proximity of towing vessel Harm to people Good communication ISM reference to be resolved
to rig
Under Tow Tow length vs water depth Damage to the Limitation of equipment known and
environment understood
Inadequate passage plan Delay to schedule Certified and inspected equipment
and connections
Change in environmental Collision Planned Maintenance System
conditions
Critical motions exceeded Flooding and/or capsize Tow Master visual inspection and
(rig and vessels) review of rig towing system
Towing arrangements and Loss of control of tow Limiting loads to take into account
equipment not fit for age and condition of equipment
Purpose
Loss of tow Man Overboard Emergency Tow arrangements
clarified before commencement of
tow
Equipment failure Water tight integrity checks to be
undertaken
Equipment failure Rig specific passage plan prepared
Loss of water tight integrity Spare tow wire available and

accessible on tow vessel
Inadequate communication Navigation warnings
If heli-ops undertaken during tow

then speed and heading to be
agreed

Consequences
Manoeuvring / Positioning Proximity to other assets Damage to, or loss of Existing control measures
(surface and subsea) vessels, property / assets
Inability to maintain Harm to people Good communication

intended track
Equipment Failure Damage to the Limitation of equipment known and
environment understood
Poor communication Delay to schedule Certified and inspected equipment
and connections
Excessive thrust from rig Collision Planned Maintenance System
Flooding and/or capsize Limiting loads to take into account
age and condition of equipment
Loss of control of tow Contingency procedures to be
agreed and understood
Unable to achieve final Emergency Procedures clarified
position before commencement of approach
Interfaces with other assets / 3rd

parties
THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WERE IDENTIFIED AS NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE RISKS INVOLVED TO A LEVEL THAT IS AS LOW AS IS REASONABLY PRACTICABLE':
No. ACTION WHEN BY WHOM ACTION TAKEN CLOSED

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Action Tracking Sheet Stage 1 Risk Assessment Example Action Tracking List Version 3 - Revision 00 - February 2011

Risk Assessment Example - Mobile Offshore Unit (MOU) Relocation Operations PDF

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Marine Safety Forum - Stage 1 Risk Assessment Example - Mobile Offshore Unit (MOU) Relocation Operations

Qualifying the Risk

w ould be required for an

Risk Rating Criteria

Example Risk Assessment Stage 1 Originated: Apr-08

Existing Control Measures

Traffic density Previous experience of location

Experience e.g. Inability to achieve required Contractor audits

Lack of understanding of Personnel competent for proposed operation

Confirmation of equipment at mobilisation

Substitute equipment to be confirmed with

Adequate time given to vessel configuration

Insufficient rest time Fatigue Sufficient rest time to be given prior to

Lack of co-ordination of Define communication lines and

Insufficient environmental Harm to people Suitable weather window identified and

Risk Assessment Stage 2 Prompt Originated: Apr-08

Anchor Handling Dropped Objects Damage to, or loss of

Breaking Out Breakdown in Planned Maintenance System

Recovery and deployment of Working on deck and / or Mooring analysis calculations

Activity Typical Hazards Potential Typical Control Measures Comment

Activity Typical Hazards Potential Typical Control Measures Comment

Loss of water tight integrity Spare tow wire available and

If heli-ops undertaken during tow

Activity Typical Hazards Potential Typical Control Measures Comment

Inability to maintain Harm to people Good communication

Interfaces with other assets / 3rd

No. ACTION WHEN BY WHOM ACTION TAKEN CLOSED

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