Antiporda vs. Garchitorena right to post bail for their temporary release.
right to post bail for their temporary release. Pablo Sola and two others have since
G.R. No. L-133289, 321 SCRA 551, December 23, 1999
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos filed
before the Sandiganbayan without claiming that one of the accused is a public officer
who took advantage of his position. The information was amended to effectively
describe the offense charged herein and for the court to effectively exercise its
jurisdiction over the same by stating that Antiporda took advantage of his position.
Accused filed a motion for new preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/
or recall warrant of arrest issued. The same was denied. The accused subsequently
filed a motion to quash the amended information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged because of the amended information. This was denied as well as the MR on
the same. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING: YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not
mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after
the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact
was omitted therein. However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same court, it
was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and
clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that
is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of
the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. In the case of Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e.,
jurisdiction over the offense, territory and person, must concur before a court can
acquire jurisdiction to try a case. It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial
jurisdiction over the case. And we are in accord with the petitioners when they
contended that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary
submission to the Court's authority.
People v. Sola
The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of
doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue.
The prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion
for bail.
Facts:
CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the
deceased bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in
his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. On September 16, 1980
armed with the above warrant, the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of
Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7
bodies. Seven (7) separate complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola
and 18 other persons. The municipal court found probable cause against the accused
and ordered their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the
been released from detention. The witnesses in the murder cases informed the
prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10
kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2 of the
accused are official with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been
released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. There have been
reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses.
Issues:
1. Whether or not change of venue is proper
2. Whether or not the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by the basic
requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged
with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted.
Held:
Change of venue
Change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the case to
Bacolod City. However, the case proceeds with this discussion: To compel the
prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to
reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the
very purpose for which courts have been established. The witnesses in the case are
fearful of their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either
refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.
Right of bail
The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive
Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing.
Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that
it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in
the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be
denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and
the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.
Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.
This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice
requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by
the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That
fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. (People vs. Sola, G.R. No.
L-56158-64 March 17, 1981)
G.R. No. 90625 May 23, 1991PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN, @ "Benny" and FRED DE GUZMAN,accused.
FACTS:
The information was filed against accused-appellant and his co-accused. When
arraigned with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty. Magsanoc, accused entered a
plea of not guilty.
 At the scheduled hearing, new counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that the
accused had expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
The court issued an order acknowledging the manifestation of the de oficio counsel
and noted there are two mitigating circumstances that maybe applied. The Prosecuting
Fiscal made no objection but also manifested that he has to look into the penalty
applicable. The hearing was reset to another date.
Upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the projected settlement
of the civil liability of this case, the hearing was reset again. However, counsel de oficio
for the accused did not appear, hence "a report on the projected settlement of the civil
aspect of the case cannot be made" and the hearing was reset again which schedule
was later on cancelled due to the compulsory retirement of the presiding judge.
In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial court.
The initial reception of evidence took place on 4/24/1987 with the accused-appellant
represented by Atty. Benjamin Pozon. Thereafter, hearings were had until the parties
completed the presentation of their evidence.
TRIAL COURT:
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
The accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. However, Judge Cipriano de Roma
erroneously directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA. The CA
transmitted to this Court on the records which were erroneously transmitted to it.
The accused is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and
conclusion of facts by the trial court. But that, the trial court erred in not applying the
indeterminate sentence law.
Accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of the penalty of reclusion
temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due
process of law or is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
prohibited by the Constitution" and he submits that "the righteous and humane
punishment that should have been meted out should be indeterminate sentence" with
"all mitigating circumstances as well as the legal provisions favorable to the accused . .
. appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and humanitarian reasons."
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was denied?
RULING:
There was no denial of due process.
REQUISITES:
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a
court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over
the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
People vs. Castillo: If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after
inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of the constitutional law, then he has had due
process.
All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records
further disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and unhampered
opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead guilty to
a lesser offense which prompted the court to cancel the hearing of 2/10/1987, but also
to confront the witnesses presented against him and to present his own evidence
If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have
faulted the trial court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but
definitely for more.
Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To make
that claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC or of any
other provisions therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for specific
crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the
RPC has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution,
the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All
of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty
which may be imposed in appropriate cases.
The same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel degrading and inhuman punishment
expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua. Thus: Sec. 19(l). Excessive fines shall not
beimposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua
As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We agree with the Solicitor
General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
RPC is now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in
view of theabolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the first
paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC shallapply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua
must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.
Alonte vs. Sevillano. Jr.
G.R. No. 131652 & 131728,287 SCRA 245, March 9, 1998
FACTS: Petitioners were charged for rape before the RTC of Binan, Laguna. A petition
for a change of venue to RTC of Manila was filed by the offended party. During the
pendency of such petition, the offended party executed an affidavit of desistance. The
court granted the change of venue. Public respondent Judge Savellano issued warrant
of arrest for both petitioners. Alonte surrendered and Concepcion posted bail.
They pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie
and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media
pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then
submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion Perpetua.
Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not
cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the
rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners-accused were denied of due process.
RULING: YES.
There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it
not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of
the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. The case is remanded to
the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The
principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted
statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial.
Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., respondents
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of estafa though
falsification of public documents before the RTC of Manila. Allegedly, Cruz executed an
Affidavit of Self-adjucation of a parcel of land when she knew that there were other
surviving heirs. The offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil
action. Hence, it was tried together with the criminal case.
The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the court ordered the return of the parcel
of land to the surviving heirs.
Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the trial
court. A petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed with the CA. This was also
dismissed by the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to render
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, involving a property in Bulacan.
Decision:
Case Remanded.
There are 3 important requisites which must be present before the court can acquire
criminal jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdiction before the subject matter, the
territory where the offense was committed, and over the person of the accused. In this
case, the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the
court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa though falsification of public
document. The court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime
was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The court also has acquire jurisdiction
over the accused because whe voluntarily submitted to the courts authority.
Art. 100 of the RPC provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. Art. 104 of the same Code provides that civil liability xxx includes
restitution. In this case, the civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal action
since the offended party did not reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was acquitted,
this did not dissolve the civil aspect of the case.
People of the Philippines vs. Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539. March 25, 2014.
May respondent, a private person, be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3 (g)
of R.A. 3019, even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
has died prior to the filing of the Information?
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Facts:
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in
entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. The present case is an offshoot of the Supreme Court's Decision in Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3 (g)
of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary
Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the
resolution finding probable cause.
The information was filed against respondent. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 28090. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued an order, directing the
prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused respondent considering that accused is a
private person and the public official, Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is
already deceased and not an accused in the case.
The prosecution alleged that the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion
for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
Respondent filed a motion to quash the information against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the Sandiganbayan, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with
whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor
was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be
prosecuted for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent also claims that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the
Sandiganbayan for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side
Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present
case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. In that case, the
Sandiganbayan granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The
prosecution questioned the said Sandiganbayan Resolution before the Supreme Court
via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In
a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, the Supreme Court denied the petition
finding no reversible error on the part of the Sandiganbayan. The SC Resolution
became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that the
Supreme Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
Issues:
1. May respondent, a private person, be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019, even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information?
2. May the SCs ruling in G.R. No. 168919 be applied to the instant case to cause the
quashal of information against respondent?
Ruling:
1. Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does
not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not
mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict
Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. 14 Were it not
for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3 (g)
of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted
in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person
must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist
where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case
where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone. S
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of
them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them
and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or
done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is
deemed to have been said, done or written by each of them and it makes no difference
whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death
of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.
The legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices," would be frustrated if the death of a public officer
would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in
violating the Anti-Graft Law.
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring
with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual
in nature and involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against
respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent
can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
2. No. Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, respondent already
posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation in
Criminal Case No. 28091. Respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is
well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.
In this case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing
his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 28090 only came after the Sandiganbayan issued an Order requiring the
prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a
contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly,
the Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as
enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals
who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public
officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3 (g)
of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer
be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the
Sandiganbayan is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case
involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
Facts:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were
later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2
Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of
Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion
perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at
large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified
the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a
criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge
Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent
motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order
denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of
the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief
sought by the dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of
the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.
David v. Agbay
[G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015]
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000,
they purchased a lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindor.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built
their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
2. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over
the subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
3. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code against the petitioner.
4. Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioners MLA was pending, petitioner
re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced
by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07 issued by the Consulate General of the
Philippines (Toronto).
5. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had
intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a
CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that
he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the
subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey
the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits
between him and private respondents family.
6. On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of
the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court.
Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
7. On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners MLA. It
ruled that petitioners subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did
not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
8. Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been
naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his
Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said
naturalization.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29,
2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath
of allegiance to the Republic
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, such is
qualified by the phrase under the conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country,
but the terminology used is different, re-acquired for the first group, and
retain for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before (first group) and after (second group) the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is Retention of Philippine
Citizenship, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and
retain to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition
and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under
which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost.
In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall
retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they
took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
wherein the following was explained:
The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by
virtue of Commonwealth Act 63The second aspect is the retention of
Philippine citizenship applying to future instances eacquired for those who
previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and
retention for those in the future.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the
effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos
under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still
a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized
as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways
by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-
acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification
was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err
in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
ARNOLD ALVA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent. (G.R. No. 157331, April 12, 2006)
Facts:
The present petition stemmed from an Information charging petitioner with having
committed the crime of estafa. It was alleged therein that Arnold Alva, by means of
false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he made to Yumi Veranga y
Hervera to the effect that he could process the latters application for U.S. Visa
provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00. He succeeded in inducing her to
give and deliver the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation and
representation, well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the reason that
the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain the amount of
P120,000.00.
On 5 September 1995, the RTC issued a Recall Order of the Warrant of Arrest against
petitioner in view of the approval of his bail bond. Upon arraignment, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the trial on the merits, the RTC
considered the case submitted for decision. On 4 May 1999, petitioners counsel filed
an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation praying for the resetting of the 5 May 1999
schedule of promulgation of the RTCs decision to 17 June 1999 in view of the fact that
said counsel already had a prior commitment on subject date. The RTC granted the
motion. The promulgation, however, was deferred only until 19 May 1999. On 18 May
1999, petitioners counsel again moved for the deferment of the promulgation, due to
prior "undertakings of similar importance." On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel
both failed to appear in court despite due notice. In his stead, claiming to be
petitioners representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the RTC a
hand written medical certificate expressing petitioners inability to attend the days
hearing due to hypertension. In response to the aforestated acts of petitioner and
counsel, the RTC issued an Order directing the promulgation of its decision in absentia
and the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his failure to
appear before it despite due notice. In its decision dated 25 March 1999, the RTC
found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.
Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, a document entitled Personal Bail
Bond dated 21 May 1999 issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to
have been filed before and approved by the RTC as evidenced by the signature of
Judge Muro on the face of said bail bond. For such reason, petitioner appeared to
have been admitted to bail anew after his conviction. Incompatible to the above
inference, however, in an Order dated 25 May 1999, judgment was rendered against
Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation, the bonding company that issued
petitioners original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failure to produce the
person of petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the
amount of its undertaking should not be forfeited. Police Superintendent Ramon
Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section, manifested to the RTC the
return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19 May 1999 for the reason that
the address of the accused is not within their area of responsibility. Nevertheless, De
Jesus reassured the RTC that the name of the accused will be included in their list of
wanted persons for our future reference. Examination of the records of the case
revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record without informing
the RTC.
On 26 July 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, which
was denied for lack of merit. On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the appellate
court required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed it
appearing that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted.
Petitioner filed a Compliance essentially stating therein that he immediately posted a
new bond for his provisional liberty and that the presiding judge of the lower court,
which issued the questioned decision, duly approved the new bond. A certified true
copy of the bond was submitted together with the Compliance. The Court of Appeals,
nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for "appellants failure to post a
new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive, and in view of the
fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had already expired."
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereto seeking its reversal.
On 19 February 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the MR stating that the appellant
has failed to submit himself under the jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of
the law since his conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail bond in place
when appellant took his appeal. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in
view of petitioners alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his
provisional liberty on appeal
2. Whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
court or to the custody of the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond.
Held:
1. NO. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioners
appeal. Within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal
procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made
the judgment of the RTC final and executory. Petitioners alleged failure to post a bail
bond on appeal is unimportant because under the circumstances, he is disallowed by
law to be admitted to bail on appeal. At the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and
during the pendency of his appeal even until now he remains at large, placing
himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.
Section 5 of Rule 114 provides that the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an
accused even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for a term of more than 6 years but less than 20 years. However, the same also
provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond
application upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the
five circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum
of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Quite
clearly, the approval of petitioners application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC.
Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person
who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be
premature, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be
curtailed. In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999
still remains unserved. Nothing in the records of the case, neither in the RTC nor the
Court of Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested, or that he voluntarily
surrendered or at the very least placed himself under the custody of the law. All told,
no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond dispute that the subject
bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved.
Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that
petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there
showing that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other court process
acknowledging such document. Be that as it may, even granting for the sake of
argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro, such approval did not render
the subject bail bond valid and binding for it has been established that petitioner was
not entitled to bail on appeal. That the prosecution appears not to have been given the
chance to object, as evidently required, to the application or approval of the subject
bail bond (with notice to the accused), fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity.
Nowhere in the original records of the RTC does it even show that the prosecution was
informed of petitioners application for bail, much less the approval of such application.
As when there is a concurrence of the enumerated circumstances and the range of
penalty imposed, the prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to object and
present evidence, if necessary, with notice to the accused. Approval of an
application for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution of such
application or, at the very least, failing to allow it to object, is not the product of
sound judicial discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not to mention
violative of respondent Peoples right of procedural due process.
This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case
at bar reveals that petitioner violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification his failure to appear before the RTC, despite due notice, on the day of
the promulgation of the latters judgment, absent any justifiable reason. His absence
was a clear contravention of the conditions of his bail bond to say the least. While,
indeed, a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez,
allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating therein the reason for the latters
absence, the RTC found insubstantial the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it
ordered the promulgation of its judgment in absentia. It also issued a bench warrant of
arrest against petitioner. Upon examination, the subject medical certificate merely
states that petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension. It failed to
elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioners physical
incapability to present himself before the court even for an hour or two; thus, it
considered the absence of petitioner unjustified. Further, it should be recalled as well,
that as early as 4 May 1999, petitioner and counsel had already been notified of the 19
May 1999 schedule of promulgation. The first having been postponed in view of the
Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May 1999) filed by petitioners counsel.
Another telling evidence of the violation of petitioners original bail bond is when he
failed to inform the RTC of his change of address. By failing to inform the RTC of his
change of address, petitioner failed to hold himself amenable to the orders and
processes of the RTC. It was an unmistakable complete breach of the conditions of his
bail bond.
Following from the above discussion, the conviction of petitioner to a period
beyond six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years in tandem with attendant
circumstances effectively violating his bail without valid justification should have
effectively precluded him from being admitted to bail on appeal. The issue of the
validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal having been laid to rest by Section 5
of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioners alleged failure to
post a bail bond on appeal is, therefore, unimportant as, under the
circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. Thus,
for all legal intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than that at
the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his
appeal even until now he remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale,
and protection of the law.
Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether
or not petitioner has lost his right to appeal his conviction now ensues. The Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioners appeal. Within the
meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner
impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the
RTC final and executory. By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the
legal processes of the land, petitioner revealed his contempt of the law and placed
himself in a position to speculate at his pleasure his chances for a reversal. By
jumping bail, petitioner has waived his right to appeal.
2. For the resolution of the second issue, it should have been sufficient to state
that for reasons stated in the foregoing discussion, the question posed has now
become academic. However, to diminish the confusion brought about by ostensibly
equating the term "jurisdiction of the court (over the person of the accused)" with that
of "custody of the law", it is fundamental to differentiate the two. Custody of the law is
accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender; while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can
be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such
as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Moreover,
jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an accused
escapes from the custody of the law, but continues until the case is terminated.
Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner when he appeared at the
arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged notwithstanding the fact that
he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive. As to whether or not petitioner has
placed himself under the custody of the CA, we cannot say the same for "being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own
will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the
law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
detention." In the case at bar, petitioner, being a fugitive, until and unless he submits
himself to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under the jurisdiction of the
courts, he cannot be granted any relief by the CA
People v. Hon. Emeterio Ocaya
G.R. No. L-47448; May 17, 1978 Teehankee, J.
Facts: On or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon, Philippines
accused Esterlina Marapao, Leticia Marapao, and Diosdado Marapao, attacked and
assaulted one Mrs. LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still on the twelfth (12th)
day from her child delivery, wrestling her to the ground and thereafter throwing and
hitting her with a fist-size stone at the face, which injury considerably deforms her face,
and further causing upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES to suffer a relapse (nabughat in the
local dialect) arising from her weak constitution due to her recent child delivery, which
relapse incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a period of more
than thirty days. The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has
been held, much less that warrants for the arrest of the accused had been issued.
Instead, after "scanning the records of (the) case", respondent judge motu proprio
ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less physical injury is not
within the jurisdiction of the court". The fiscal's motion for reconsideration proved futile
with respondent judge.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing teh case for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Held: Yes. It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined
by the allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by the result of the
evidence presented at the trial,' much less by the trial judge's personal appraisal of the
affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the case without hearing
the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a proper trial. It is
equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would
indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial, court's jurisdiction was committed does
not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in it under the allegations
of the information as filed since "(once) the jurisdiction attaches to the person and
subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are
of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached. Respondent judge's
actions and premature and baseless declaration that the victim's declaration as to the
period of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious doubts as to whether the State
and the offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of
the case from him, since seemingly with his erroneous pre-conceptions and
predilections, he has adversely prejudged their case as one merely of slight or less
serious physical injuries. The case below should therefore be transferred to another
court presided by another judge.
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
FACTS:
 On October 29, 1984, the Petitioner who was then 11 years old was playing with best
friend Teodoro Almine Jr. and three other children in their backyard. The children were
target-shooting bottle caps placed 15 to 20 meters away with an air rifle borrowed from
a neighbour.
In the course of game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which
caused his unfortunate death.
The examining fiscal after investigation exculpated petitioner due to his age and
because the unfortunate appeared to be an accident.
Victims parents appealed to Ministry of Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a case
against petitioner for Homicide through reckless imprudence.
On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the said information on the
following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense
b) Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or
justification
c) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of
defendant
His primary argument was that the term discernment connotes intent under the
exempting circumstance found under Article 12, Section 3 of the RPC. If this was true,
then no minor between the age of 9 to 15 may be convicted of quasi offense under
Article 265 which is criminal negligence.
On April 4, 1986, the said motion was denied with respect to the first and third
grounds relied upon decision on and part was deferred until evidence shall have been
presented during trial.
A petition for certiorari was filed.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
2 . W H E T H E R T H E C O U RT H A D J U R I S D I C T I O N O V E R T H E C A S E
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY
LUPON.
HELD:
1 Yes.
Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a determination to do
certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is
essential to such intent. Discernment means: the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong.
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime
can exist, and because the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him)
from criminal liability.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are
indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously,
intent is wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential
element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age
be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-
offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of
the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen
may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the
said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase Any person. . .
without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere
debemos.
Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of
appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted w/
discernment.
Because of this, Guevarra was not exempted.
2 Yes.
The petitioners contention that he was entitled to a two-degree privileged mitigating
circumstance due to his minority because of P.D. 1508. He argued that this can be
applied to his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not higher than
arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium
as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC.
The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable
under the law for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed.
The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P
200.00; (emphasis supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508
has said:
The law says punishable, not punished. One should therefore consider the penalty
provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in
particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal
liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that,
in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense
attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect
criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied
with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has
been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA
470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED.
Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.
Gonzalez et al. vs. Gen. Abaya
G.R. No. 164007, Aug. 10, 2006
The nature of the military justice system
Coup d'etat vis-a-vis violation of the Articles of War
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City, where they disarmed the security guards
and planted explosive devices around the building. They then declared their withdrawal
of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President
of the Republic.
After much negotiation, the group finally laid down their arms. Subsequently, an
Information for coup detat was filed against them with the RTC, at the same time that
they were tried at court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. They question the
jurisdiction of the court martial, contending that the RTC ordered that their act was not
service-connected and that their violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War (RA 7055)
was absorbed by the crime of coup detat.
ISSUE:
Whether the act complained of was service-connected and therefore cognizable by
court martial or absorbed by the crime of coup d'etat cognizable by regular courts
RULING:
The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. Military
law is established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve
the tranquility and security of the State in times of war, but also to preserve the
tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more
dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military
body. The administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time
immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of
military law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline.
For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any
organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in
peace and in war.
The Court held that the offense is service-connected. xxx It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the
charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers.
Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offense is the penalty
prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military
court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the
military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
PEOPLE AND PHOTOKINA VS. BENIPAYO (G.R. NO. 155573 APRIL 24, 2009)
Facts:
In the first libel case filed against him, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman COMELEC,
delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the
Philippines" held at UP Diliman which was subsequently published in the Manila
Bulletin. Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the
respondent when he stated in his speech that Even worse, the Commission came
right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could
have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isnt even a
requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they
are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to
the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5
billion-peso price tag., filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-
Complaint for libel. The case was dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction since the
offense was committed in relation to his office, hence vesting the jurisdiction on the
Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 155573
Respondent as COMELEC Chair was a guest of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by
Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television shows
episode that day was entitled "COMELEC Wars.", where Respondent against
discussed that Photokinas funds are being used to campaign against him. Another
information for libel was instituted against Respondent but also dismissed by the RTC
rationating that being an impeachable officer, the jurisdiction must be with the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crime of libel filed against Benipayo.
Held:
YES. The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations
in providing that the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately
with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
RA 7691 also did not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over libel cases because although it
was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the RTCs by expanding the
jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later
enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special
nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in
character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other
courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law. A later enactment
like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-
settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a
special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment.
Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that
granted by a general law on the MTC.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime
is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that
the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former
COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above
disquisition, gross error.
SAMSON VS DAWAY
Facts:
Two informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section
170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save
for the dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P.
Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes distribute, sell and/or offer for sale
CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and
paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic
Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would
cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public.
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil
Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the same branch; and also in
view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge
petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated August 9, 2002, the trial court
denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings.
Issue:
Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the
arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the
ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency of a
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for
unfair competition?
Held:
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases
xxx xxx xxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his
discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted
before the Court do not show the date of filing of the petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice.15 Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion
to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to discharge the burden of
proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the
questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must
prove his allegations.
GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 170122 OCTOBER 12, 2009
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed for a petition for the forfeiture of the properties
amounting to PhP 143,052,015.29 allegedly amassed by then Maj. Gen. Carlos
Garcia, his wife Clarita and two children, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193 (Forfeiture
Case 1). Another forfeiture case was subsequently filed to recover funds amounting to
PhP 202,005,980.55 docketed as Civil Case No. 0196 (Forfeiture Case 2), raffled to
the 4th Division.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB
charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) which placed
the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99, docketed as
Crim. Case No. 28107, raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As per the Sheriffs return, the corresponding summons involving Forfeiture 1 were
issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. The SB subsequently
issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic. The Garcias filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for
forfeiture. The SB denied the Motion to Dismiss and declared the Garcias in default.
Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and
consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in
different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA
8249. This motion was denied by the SB. The Garcias filed another motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the
plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b)
that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements. The SB merely noted the motion.
As regards Forfeiture 2, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his
return, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the
PNPDetention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his
receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen.
Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: Im
receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will
not guarantee it being served to the above-named(sic).
Issue:
1. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner despite improper service of
summons.
2. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over the forfeiture case despite the filing of the
plunder case.
Held:
1. NO. It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be
bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode
authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over a person. It is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were
served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP
DetentionCenter, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also
undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made
on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center.
However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and
defective. The requirements for a valid substituted service of summons are:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service
(2) Specific details in the return
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants
office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of
summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj.
Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a
valid substituted service of summons.
Also, petitioners special appearance to question the courts jurisdiction is not voluntary
appearance. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed
to have appeared voluntarily before the court.
2. YES, Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the
plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil
cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that
the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution, the
civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal
offense as such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to
recover unlawfully acquired properties. Secondly, a forfeiture case under RA 1379
arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus
negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107
absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be
established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by
preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents
properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired
said properties.
Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 161784-86 April 26, 2005
FACTS: On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman submitted three Amended
Informations to the Sandiganbayan against Virginio Villamor (Municipal Mayor) and
Dinah Barriga (Municipal Accountant) of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. The First
Amended Information charged Barriga and Villamor with Malversation of Public Funds.
The facts of this information stated that on or about January 1996, the said acccused
had in their possession and custody public funds amounting to P23,047.20 intended
for the payment of 5 rolls of Polyethelene pipes to be used in the Corte-Canumong
Water System Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. Being public officers, they
were held accountable for the funds. However, by this same capacity, the said accused
misappropriated, took, embezzled, and converted the said amount for their own
personal use and benefit . The second and third Amended Informations charged
Villamor and Barriga with Illegal Use of Public Funds. The facts of the Second
Information stated that on or about November 1995, the said accused had in their
possession and control public funds amounting to P1305.00, representing a portion of
the CVWSP Fund intended and appropriated for the Construction of Deep Well and
Spring Box (Level I projects) and Water Works System (Level II projects) of specific
brgy beneficiaries and recipients. By reason of the duties of their office, they are held
accountable for the said funds. However, by such capacity, they connived,
confederated and helped each other to disburse the said amount for the Spring Box of
Brgy. Natimo-an, Carmen, Cebu. - a brgy not included as a recipient of the CVWSP
Trust Fund. Thus, the accused used the said fund to a public purpose different from
which it was intended or appropriated. The facts of the Third Information stated that on
or about January 1997, the accused had in their possession P267, 537.96 from the
CVWSP Fund intended for the same purpose as that in the 2nd Information. However,
the accused disbursed the said amount for the construction & expansion of Brgy.
Cantucong Water System, a level II project, thus the public funds were used for a
public purpose different from that which it was intended or appropriated.
ISSUES: 1. WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crimes charged. 2. If
the court has jurisdiction, WON Barriga should also be held liable:
A. Despite the Amended Informations' failure to show the intimate relations between
the crimes charged and her official duties?
B. Despite being only of SG 24?
C. Despite the fact that she is not an accountable officer since, as Municipal
Accountant, the funds in the Amended Informations were not under her control of
administration?
HELD: 1. Yes. Based on the allegations in the Amended Informations and RA 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the crimes of Malversation and Illegal
Use of Public Funds.
RA 8249 -SB has orig jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public officers
and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories thereunder
enumerated at the time of the commission of such crimes.
2 classes of public office-related crimes under Sec.4(b), RA 8249:
a. Public office is constituent element - offense cannot exist without office
b. Intimately connected with public office - perpetrated by p.o./employee while in
exercise of functions
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and
felonies under the first classification. The Sandiganbayan likewise has original
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies committed by the public
officers and employees enumerated in Section(a)(1) to (5) under the second
classification if the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the
intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused,
and the discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular.
The public office of the accused Municipal Mayor Virginio Villamor is a constituent
element of malversation and illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayors
position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended Informations alleged that the
petitioner conspired with her co-accused in committing the said felonies, the fact that
her position as municipal accountant is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an
accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her.
2. Yes.
A. Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a constituent element
of the crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information
specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime charged, or
that the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties.
B. The classification of the petitioners position as SG 24 is of no moment. The
determinative fact is that the position of her co-accused, the municipal mayor, is
classified as SG 27, and under the last paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if
the position of one of the principal accused is classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense.
D. Under Section 474 of the Local Government Code, she is not obliged to receive
public money or property, nor is she obligated to account for the same; hence, she is
not an accountable officer within the context of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual control of
public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
Even then, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant
can never be convicted for malversation under the Revised Penal Code.
The name or relative importance of the office or employment is not the controlling
factor. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee is the factor which
determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or
employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal government may be held
guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates
the same.
It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds/ property
by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for
malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer/private
individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal
use of public funds or property.
The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial treasurer in
committing six counts of malversation is also a co-principal in committing those
offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in
committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People v. Sendaydiego, G.R.
Nos. L-33252 to L-33254).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga
City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R.
POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN
MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES
FACTS:
A sub-police station was established upon the orders of Mayor Leroy S. Brown in sitio
Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan. Said sub-station was composed regular
and special policemen all armed with pistols and high power guns. It was alleged that
criminal complaints were entertained in the said sub-station and that defendant
Joaquin R. Pollisco acted as investigating officer and exercised authority to order the
apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without
due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court.
On June 4, 1958, Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested upon orders of Mayor Brown
without any warrant or complaint filed in court. Tebag was allegedly maltreated while
being taken into the sub-station and was again mauled at the sub-station, said torture
resulted to Tebags death.
The private respondents were then charged with the crime of murder before the Court
of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan.
Senator Roseller Lim entered his appearance for the private respondents. The
prosecution is questioning said appearance due to the constitutional prohibition for
senators and members of the House of Representatives to appear as counsel in any
criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation of his office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged is committed in relation to the offices of the private
respondents.
HELD:
Yes, a mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an affirmative
answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of
Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes
consisting of regular policemen and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by
him with pistols and high power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo,"
which is under his "command, ... supervision and control," where his codefendants
were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding
investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without
due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with
this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his
orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the
crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according
to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with
their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held
their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
Soller v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144261-62
FACTS:
This was a case for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raising the issue of the
propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo
Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel Luarca wherein petitioners
are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders
as defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1829.
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard,
was shot and killed along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while
driving a motorcycle together with petitioner Sollers son, Vincent M. Soller. His body
was brought to a medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller,
the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health
Officer. An autopsy was conducted on the same night on the cadaver by petitioner Dr.
Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector,
and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
A complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with
the Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the
investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by:
(a) altering his wound
(b) concealing his brain
(c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he
had only one; and
(d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his wound
when in truth there was.
Petitioners Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and
claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic
because it was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that
petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his wife
Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy
considering that the procedure involved sawing which required male strength, and that
Mrs. Macabaels consent was obtained before the autopsy.
But two Information were indeed filed with the Sandiganbayan charging the petitioners
for criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of Jerry
Macabael with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in
the investigation of criminal case for murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the
son of herein respondents.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the performance of the
duties of at least one of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly
charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
entire case and over all the co- accused.
HELD:
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. The court held that the rule is that in
order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law
should be inquired into. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly
from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For
this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at
the time of the commencement of the action.
The Court found:
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999
charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1,
Paragraph b of P.D. 1829.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as provided by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.
The Supreme Court observed that the bone of contention here is whether the offenses
charged may be considered as committed in relation to their office as this phrase is
employed in Section 4 of PD 1892.
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario, the Supreme Court interpreted the requirement that an
offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that the offense cannot exist
without the office or that the office must be a constituent element of the crime. People
vs. Montejo[51]enunciated the principle that the offense must be intimately connected
with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance, though
improper or irregular of his official functions.
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted
earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to
their offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/
connection between the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of
official functions of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders was committed in relation to the office of petitioner
Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a)
of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners were described as being all public
officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I,
Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, there was no allegation that the offense of altering
and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity,
authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for
murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated information in the
autopsy report and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent
the apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the
performance of official function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1892 may be
committed by any person whether a public officer or a private citizen, and accordingly
public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the Information in Criminal
Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy
report would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein
petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller. Thus there is a categorical
indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the
offenses and they would have committed the offenses charged even if they did not
respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately
connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the
offenses charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function
of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan. So the petition was granted and
the orders were set aside for being void for lack of jurisdiction.
Serana vs Sandiganbayan (Remedial Law)
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
FACTS:
Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by Pres. Estrada as
student regent of UP to serve a one-year term from Jan.1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On
Sept. 2000, petitioner together with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC
the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects of the
OSFRI was the renovation of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave
P15M as financial assistance for the said project. The source of funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.
However, the renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and
system-wide alliances of students conseguently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Ombudsman. After due investigation, the
Ombudsman instituted a criminal case against Serana and her brother, charging them
of Estafa.
Serana moved to quash the Information, contending that the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction over the offense charged nor over her person in her capacity as UP
student regent. She contends that Estafa falls under Crimes Against Property and not
on the chapter on Crimes Committed by Public Officers, only over which, she argues,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Furthermore, she argues that it was not the
governement that was duped, but Pres. Estrada, because the money came from the
Office of the President and not from government funds. As to jurisdiction over her
person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer since she
merely represents her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in
an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and over Serana
HELD:
YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is one of
those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin
requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is
committed in relation to their office.
It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At
most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public
officer.
A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right, authority, and
duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed or enduring
at the pleasure of the power, an individual is interested with some portion of sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan,
also has jurisdiction over the other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan
v. People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law.
Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan
The Case:
Danilo was a Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with Salary Grade
26 when he was charged with violation of Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of
Republic Act 6713. An Information was thus filed against him before the
Sandiganbayan. Prior to his arraignment, he filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, asserting that under Presidential Decree 1606
as amend by Section 4 (A) (1) of RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to
try and hear a case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the
position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below
Salary Grade 27. The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed, arguing that he
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive
branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so
since the term Regional Director and higher are separated by the conjunction and,
which signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are
conjoined together relating one to the other to give effect to the purpose of the law.
The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without
indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers intention that officials
occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan Second Division denied the motion, holding that the position of
Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A
No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of
the executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including
those officials who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of
the ruling, this Courts pronouncements in Inding and Binay v. Sandiganbayan were
cited.
The petitioner elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
The Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution.1 By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.2 The decree was later amended by P.D.
No. 1606,3 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 1294 P.D. No. 1860,5 and P.D. No.
18616.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided
for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.7 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 148 and 14-a,9
and R.A. 7080,10 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No.
1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 797511, R.A. No. 8249,12 and just this year,
R.A. No. 10660.13
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
which states:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
x x x
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades.14 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15
That the phrase otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher qualifies regional give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or
director and higher is apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco
on Senate Bill Nos. 1353 and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249,
respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
over the cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the
time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain
grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.16 (Emphasis
supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that
Court to concentrate on the larger fish and leave the small fry to the lower courts.
This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to
the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades
were at Grade 26 or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and
retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary
grades were at Grade 27 or higher and over other specific public officials holding
important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x x17 (Emphasis
supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to
big-time cases involving the so-called big fishes in the government rather than those
accused who are of limited means who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called
small fry, which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.18
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by
the law.19 In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.20 The specific inclusion constitutes
an exception to the general qualification relating to officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.21 As
ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has
jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the
principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those
specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise,
except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of
their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public
officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts where
none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or
higher. By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule,
after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will
that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its
every word. 22
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,23 a
department manager of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),24 a
student regent of the University of the Philippines,25 and a Head of the Legal
Department and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-
Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)26 fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he
hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly
argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco. Therein, the accused was the
Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at
the time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his position was classified as Director
II with Salary Grade 26.27 It was opined:
Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was
occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the
cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.
We sustain petitioners contention.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e),
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and
employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade 27
or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the
position of Director II with Salary Grade 26 under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in
serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs
prayed for.28
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC Assistant Chief, Personnel Division
of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position
is classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.29
There is no merit in the OSPs allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the
ground that respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner. Records disclose that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on September 17,
2009. Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010, prior to the filing of the petition on April
30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the
Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Gregorio Honasan II petitioner vs.
The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
Of the Department of Justice
G.R.No. 159747 April 13,2004
Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of the
Ombudsman (consti), concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to
conduct preliminary investigation (consti)
Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code
Facts:
August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint
with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:
July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by military personnel who
occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II
On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator
Honasan in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila
Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels
occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their
withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National
Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only program
that would solve the ills of society.
Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:
June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan arrived with Capt.
Turinga to hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and
armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will
run the new government. They had a blood compact and that he only participated due
to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa
ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.
July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo
Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting
he attended, having a press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel.
He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the
banner is the same as their blood compact wound.
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a
Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed
acts were committed in relation to his public office by a group of public officials with
Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan
Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him
to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the ground that
the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
Issues:
Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the
Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground
that it was not published
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation
because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher)
thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.
Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit
1. No.
Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to
wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the
category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as
distinguished from the authority to prosecute
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman
case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their
regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal
agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office
of the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against
public officers and employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct
the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to
act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of
crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code
which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution.
Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation
to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the
Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
2. In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and
regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective.
In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so called letters of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ
and the office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among
prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of
preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in
general.
3. No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve
the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by
the DOJ Panel.
Consigna v. People
The Facts:
Silverina (Consigna), the then Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Sur,
obtained a loan in the amount of P320,000.00 from Hermilina (Moleta) purportedly to
pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal
gymnasium as the towns Internal Revenue Allotment had not yet arrived. She issued
three Land Bank of the Philippines checks signed by Jaime (Rusilon), the municipal
mayor. Despite several demands for payment, Siilverina refused to pay hence
Hermilina deposited the checks for payment to her account in Metrobank. The checks
were dishonoured for lack of funds. The next day, she deposited the checks to her
LBP account; it was again dishonoured, and upon verification she found out that the
account was already closed and the municipalitys funds transferred to the
Development Bank of the Philippines/ She also learned that Silverina was relieved
from her position as Municipal Treasurer. She thus filed two cases and the
corresponding Informations filed against Silverina, and Jaime, one for Estafa, and one
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019. In her defense, Siverina argued that
the court had no jurisdiction as the crime charged did not specify the the of Estafa
allegedly committed, and the Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as the crime as charged can stand independently of
public office and public office is not an element of the crime. She argues that he
allegations in the Information that the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office is not sufficient That phrase is a mere conclusion of law
not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense
charged and the discharge of accuseds official duties. . There was also no
misrepresentation as the complainant demanded payment from Jaime. On the other
hand, Jaime denied liability, arguing that his connection to case came about when he
signed the checks. Even so, the court allowed the prosecution for estafa under Article
315 par 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, the Sandiganbayan convicted
Silverina as charged, but acquitted Jaime, hence Silverina elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.
The Issue:
1 Whether or not the court a quo committed a reversible error for
finding petitioner guilty of estafa, based on information which does not specifically
designate the provision allegedly violated.
2 Whether or not petitioner is guilty of estafa as penalized under Art.
315 (2)(a) of the RPC.
3 Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Ruling:
Preliminarily, We here note a common disorder in petitions that mingle the concepts
involved in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 and in the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, as a prevalent practice of litigants to cure a lapsed appeal.
We shall discuss the distinction.
With regard to the period to file a petition, in Rule 45, the period within which to file is
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from.
1 In contrast to Rule 65, the petition should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution.2
Regarding the subject matter, a review on certiorari under Rule 45 is generally limited
to the review of legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of law which have been
properly raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition.3 A Rule 65 review,
on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the propriety of the trial
courts jurisdiction whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so, whether the
exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.4 Otherwise stated, errors of judgment are
the proper subjects of a Rule 45 petition; errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule
65 petition.
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to only in the absence of
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.5 So
when appeal, or a petition for review is available, certiorari cannot be resorted to;
certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal.6 A Rule 65 certiorari petition
cannot be a substitute for a Rule 45 petition so as to excuse the belatedness in filing
the correct petition. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.7
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.8
Petitioner was correct when she filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45. However,
instead of raising errors of judgment as a proper subject of a petition for review under
Rule 45, the petition formulated jurisdictional errors purportedly committed by the court
a quo, i.e., whether or not the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion,9 which
is the proper subject of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Noticeably, the petition
does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith by the court a quo in its proceedings;10
and the petition does not raise a denial of due process in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.11
Importantly, however, the petition followed the period specified in Rule 45. It was timely
filed. For that reason, we excuse the repeated referral to the supposed grave abuse of
discretion of the Sandiganbayan and treat the petition as, nonetheless, one for review
of the questioned decision. We thus recast the arguments as:
1 Whether or not the court a quo committed a reversible error for
finding petitioner guilty of estafa, based on information which does not specifically
designate the provision allegedly violated.
2 Whether or not petitioner is guilty of estafa as penalized under Art.
315 (2)(a) of the RPC.
3 Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Petition must fail.
1. On the first issue, petitioner insists that even if the court a quo already admitted
that the Information failed to specifically identify the mode or manner by which estafa
was committed by petitioner, it nonetheless went on to convict her by relying on the
allegation in the Information of deceit and misrepresentation and applying par. (2)(a),
Art. 315 of the RPC.
Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.
12 As held in People v. Dimaano:13
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must
be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of
the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as
to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused
has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. (Emphasis
supplied)
As early in United States v. Lim San,14 this Court has determined that:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused
what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids
him in a defense on the merits. x x x. That to which his attention should be directed,
and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him,
either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the
crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption
of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of
law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real
interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know
the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his
substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged? not Did you commit a crime named murder. If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of
the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say
what the name of the crime is or what it is named. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners argument is as outdated as it is erroneous. The averments in the two (2)
sets of Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and
circumstances constituting the elements of the crime of estafa as to duly inform them
of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare their respective
defenses.
2. Contrary to the submission of petitioner, false pretense and fraudulent acts
attended her transaction with Moleta. The law explicitly provides that in the prosecution
for Estafa under par. (2)(a), Art. 315 of the RPC, it is indispensable that the element of
deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused,
be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being
essential that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the
only motive which induced the offended party to part with his money. Paragraph 2(a),
Art. 315 of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or
concealment, are the following: (a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.15
As borne by the records, petitioners representations were outright distortions of the
truth perpetrated for the sole purpose of inducing Moleta to hand to her the amount of
P320,000.00 purportedly for the Municipality of General Luna. Being the Municipal
Treasurer, there was reason for Moleta to rely on petitioners representations that
money is needed for the payment of the employees salary as well as for the
construction of the gymnasium. There was also a ring of truth to the deception that the
share of the municipality from the IRA is forthcoming. Added to this, petitioners
representations were even supported by the issuance of three (3) LBP checks to
guarantee payment taken from the account of the municipality and signed by no less
than the municipal mayor, giving the impression that the loaned amount would indeed
be utilized for public purposes.
As the court a quo correctly observed:
It is undisputed that Consigna obtained a loan from Moleta for the reason that the
municipality lacked funds for the June 15, 1994 payroll of the employees and materials
of the gymnasium. However, several circumstances point to the fact that Consignas
representation has no basis. She contradicted her own testimony that at the time she
borrowed from Moleta on June 14, 1994, the municipality suffered a shortage of funds,
with her admission that when she was relieved as a municipal treasurer, the
Municipality had more than 1 million in Land Bank from the IRA of P600,000.00 a
month for the past three months x x x. This means that when she left her post before
the second week of July x x x, the municipality had money from the April to June 1994
IRA, enough to meet the need of P320,000.00. x x x16
The circumstances and the reason behind the issuance of the three (3) checks given
to Moleta by petitioner was testified to by Rusillon:
He was the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, in
1994. In the morning of June 14, 1994, he received the amount of P268,800.00 from
accused Consigna, as evidenced by a voucher (Exh. 1) signed by him on the same
day. The money was to be used for the purchase of materials for the gymnasium of the
municipality which construction started in 1992. After signing the voucher, he ordered
Consigna to prepare a check for P130,000.00 (Exh. 2) for the June 15, 1994 payroll of
the municipalitys employees. After the check was prepared, he again ordered
Consigna to make another two checks, one for P130,000.00 (Exh. 3) dated June 14,
1994 intended for the expenses of the municipal building and for the daily transactions
of the municipality in the following days, and the other check was for P60,000.00 (Exh.
4) dated July 11, 1994 for the purchase of medicines for the municipalitys health
office. The latter check was postdated to July because it would be charged against the
IRA in the 3rd quarter of 1994 since they bought medicines at that time on a quarterly
basis as the budget allowed only P240,000.00 per year for such expenditure.17
3. Anent the issue on the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction committed by the court a quo when it took cognizance of Criminal Case
No. 24182, charging petitioner for taking advantage of her official position and the
discharge of the functions as such, petitioner averred that the charge was erroneous
because borrowing of money is not a function of a Municipal Treasurer under the
Local Government Code. Petitioner asserts that the last sentence of Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019 cannot cover her.
We find such reasoning misplaced.
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.18
There is no doubt that petitioner, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer
discharging official functions when she misused such position to be able to take out a
loan from Moleta, who was misled into the belief that petitioner, as municipal treasurer,
was acting on behalf of the municipality.
In Montilla v. Hilario,19 this Court described the offense committed in relation to the
office as:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in
our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the
relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the
office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined
in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two
to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder
or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the
same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary took advantage of his
office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even
as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on
the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of
the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with certainty
during trial that the manner by which petitioner perpetrated the crime necessarily
relates to her official function as a municipal treasurer. Petitioners official function
created in her favor an impression of authority to transact business with Moleta
involving government financial concerns. There is, therefore, a direct relation between
the commission of the crime and petitioners office the latter being the very reason or
consideration that led to the unwarranted benefit she gained from Moleta, for which the
latter suffered damages in the amount of P320,000.00. It was just fortunate that
Rusillon instructed the bank to stop payment of the checks issued by petitioner, lest,
the victim could have been the Municipality of General Luna.
As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera v.
Sandiganbayan20 that there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates Sec.
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged
under either mode or under both.21 This was reiterated in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,22
where the Court held that the use of the disjunctive term or connotes that either act
qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In this case, petitioner was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the
alternative mode of causing undue injury to Moleta committed with evident bad faith,
for which she was correctly found guilty. Evident bad faith connotes not only bad
judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. Evident bad
faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes,23 which manifested in
petitioners actuations and representation.
The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner capitalized on her official function to commit
the crimes charged. Without her position, petitioner would not have induced Moleta to
part with her money. In the same vein, petitioner could not have orchestrated a
scheme of issuing postdated checks meddling with the municipalitys coffers and
defiling the mayors signature. As correctly found by the court a quo:
x x x Likewise worthy of stress is [petitioners] failure to establish that the amount she
disbursed to Rusillon came from the money she loaned from Moleta. If indeed the
P268,800.00 advanced to Rusillon was charged against the loan, then, this should
have been reflected in the municipalitys books of accounts. The same is true with the
P320,000.00 and the P32,000.00 given to Moleta if the proceeds of the loan really
went to the municipalitys treasury. It is a standard accounting procedure that every
transaction must be properly entered in the books of accounts of the municipality. A
cash that comes in is a debit to the asset account and every loan incurred is a credit to
the liability account.24
Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the issue
raised by petitioner that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or other concessions.
Nonetheless, to finally settle the issue, the last sentence of the said provision is not a
restrictive requirement which limits the application or extent of its coverage. This has
long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,25 where we
categorically declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law
will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions. Quoted hereunder is an excerpt from
Mejorada:26
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to any public officer is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with
the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section
3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic)
or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of public officers may
not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as
applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,27 where the
Court affirmed the Mejorada ruling that finally puts to rest any erroneous interpretation
of the last sentence of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law.
All the elements of the crimes as charged are present in the case at bar. All told, this
Court finds no justification to depart from the findings of the lower court. Petitioner
failed to present any cogent reason that would warrant a reversal of the Decision
assailed in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 24182-83 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. NO. 128096 JANUARY 20, 1999
FACTS:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson
of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo
de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-
intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that
what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub
out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said
incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified
the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty -six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.
Petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11)
information for murder before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They contend that the said law limited
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal
accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a
Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
The Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. While these motions for reconsideration
were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the
filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 and No.
1094 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator
Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase
"principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the
President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands
pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996." Petitioner and entervenors' posture that
Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law 33
because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in
the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act
of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness.
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls
under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense
charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled
corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared
in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
ISSUE:
Whether Sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
None. An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the
offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while
he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between the
offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court
has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused
PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.
Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)
FACTS: Crisostomo was appointed the President of the Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC) by the President of the Philippines. During his incumbency, two
administrative charges were filed against him for illegal use of government vehicles,
misappropriation of construction materials, oppression and harassment, grave
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty before the Office of the President. Likewise, he
was also charged with violation of Anti-Grant and Corrupt Practices Act with the
Tanodbayan. As such, he was preventively suspended and Dr. Mateo was designated
as the officer-in-charge in his place. Meanwhile, Pres. Marcos passed PD 1341
converting PCC into PUP with Mateo as President. Crisostomo was later acquitted and
his administrative charges were dismissed.
ISSUE: Did PD 1314 abolish PCC?
HELD: PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the PCC into what is now PUP.
What took place was a change in the academic status of the educational institution,
not in its corporate life. Hence, the change in its name, the expansion of its curriculum
offerings and changes in its structure and organization. As a general rule, when the
purpose of the lawmaking authority is to abolish the office and create a new one, he
says so. In the instant case, PD 1314 merely states that PCC is converted into the
PUP. In addition, the law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned
by the PCC were being transferred to the PUP but only that they stand transferred
to it. Stand transferred simply means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC
were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution.
***Q: Who has the power to reorganize? A: It depends. In order to determine who has
the power to reorganize, it is essential to characterize whether the body to be
reorganized is a department or an instrumentality of government. Under EO 292, the
President is given the power of control over all departments, bureaus and offices under
the executive branch. Since the power of control includes the power to reorganize,
then the power to reorganize a department, a bureau or an office can be said to be
lodged in the President. On the other hand, an instrumentality is, as a general rule,
created by statute or made pursuant to a law. So unless the law creating such
instrumentality delegates the authority to reorganize to a separate body, the power to
reorganize such is with Congress. ***Q: When is reorganization of administrative
agencies valid? A: First, determine whether the agency is a department or an
instrumentality in order to determine who has the authority to reorganize. Then,
determine whether the reorganization is done in good faith, not in good faith, or in bad
faith. Reorganization is in good faith if done for the purpose of economy and efficiency.
***Q: May a public officer validly claim violation of security of tenure as a result of
abolition of office? A: It depends on the validity of the abolition. Was the abolition
done by someone who has authority? To determine who has authority to abolish, bear
in mind the three modes of creating an office: (1) Constitution; (2) Statute; and (3)
authority by law. An office created by the Constitution may only be abolished by
Constitutional amendment or revision, unless the Constitution itself provides for
another mode of abolition. Likewise, an office created by Statute, may, as a general
rule, be only abolished by Congress, unless this power is delegated. And the President
may abolish an office if such office is under his power of control and Congress has not
provided for a different mode of abolition. So if the abolition is made by someone with
authority, then was it done in good faith? Abolition is in good faith if the purpose is for
economy and efficiency, or if it not done in bad faith, bearing in mind the circumstances
evidencing bad faith. If done in good faith, then the abolition is valid. When there is
valid abolition, there can be no separation or removal from office and the affected
public officer cannot claim violation of security of tenure for there can be no tenure to a
non-existent office. ***Q: May an official of an abolished office claim vested right to that
office? A: There is no such thing as a vested right to an office. The only exceptions
are those offices established by the Constitution, such as the Constitutional
Commissions, etc. ***Q: In case of abolition and a new office is thereby created, may
the incumbent of the abolished office claim preference to that new office? A: The
concept of preference is illustrated in the next-in-rank rule. Under that rule, anyone
who is employed on a permanent basis in a position that has been previously
determined to be next-in-rank to the vacated office and who is qualified is given
preference to said office. This presupposes that there is an old office which is vacated.
Thus, the rule does not apply to a newly created office, which necessarily entails new
positions. Besides, preference only means that the old employee should be considered
first but it does not automatically follow that they should then be automatically
reappointed.
SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU G.R. NOS. 111771-77 NOVEMBER 9, 1993
Facts:
Mayor Antonio Sanchez was charged before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna of seven
informations of homicide, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta
and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez moved to quash the information on the
ground, among others that as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by
the Sandiganbayan, among others.
Issue:
Whether it is the Sandiganbayan who has jurisdiction over petitioner.
Held:
NO. The petitioners contention that since most of the accused were incumbent public
officials or employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases
against them should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the
regular courts, is untenable. Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by
P.D. No.1861, provides:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously
does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither
is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the
office of the petitioner.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide
and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential
element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.
Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime
charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official
functions.
Adaza vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 154886
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against the
spouses Mayor Adaza and wife Aristela Adaza. Two Informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan: falsification of voucher by counterfeiting the signature of PTA
President Mejoranda and falsification of DBP check by counterfeiting the signature of
Mejoranda, relating to the construction of a school bldg consisting of 2 classrooms.
Sandiganbayan found Mayor Adaza guilty in the first case, but acquitted him and his
wife in the second case.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction if there was no allegation showing
that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately
connected to the duties of his office as mayor?
: No. For an offense to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a
violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b)
R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in
items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph A of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to
the office.
Although petitioner was described in the information as a public officer there was no
allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was
intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any allegation to show how he
made use of his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged.
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this allegation that is controlling, not
the evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial.
However, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate charge against
him before the proper court.