EN BANC
charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.]
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo,
Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Hector B. Almeyda for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEDURE. Section 1,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly
signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the
cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read
in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative
intent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF BP NO. 129. Where
paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section
32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses
or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos. These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR
CITY ORDINANCES. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among
1
the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE CASE IS ACTUALLY FILED IN
COURT. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination
or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
any date before that.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326. This
interpretation is in consonance with Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of
fact, it does.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION IN CRIMINAL
CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. The Court feels that if there be a conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326
and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in
criminal cases is a substantive right.
7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY OR NOT THE
INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. The Court realizes that under the
above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with
the prosecutors office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from
their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a
rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for
violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayors permit
in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
Province of Rizal.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the
police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2
The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the
denial was sustained by the responded judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge
against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the following
cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
B. Criminal Cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
2
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does
not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other impossible penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x
SECTION 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope
of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however,
That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio, the
corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended
party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory
period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her
should have been dismissed on the ground prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with
the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:cralawnad
SECTION 1. How Instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the
complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with
the fiscals office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint
may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the
complaint with the Officer of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in
Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar,
this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions
holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period
of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
3
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months
before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the
other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which
was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply
to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in
the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those
offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to
the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the
rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that
rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to
Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct prescribed.
a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on any date before that. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish.
As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should
prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal
cases is a substantive right. 7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would
have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral
defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the
instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six
months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutors office if, intentionally or not, he delays
the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
corrected.cralawnad

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May

4

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 167571 : November 25, 2008]
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., Petitioner v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and
RODRIGO G. CAWILI, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s
(petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992,Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting
to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate,
Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both
Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were
dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and
upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During
the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-
affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the
case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover,
like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
5
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's
business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed
out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a
partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was
filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it
was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered
his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack
of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaintagainst Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the
Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year
period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March
1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did
not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and
not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four
(4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the
alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. 13 Moreover, ACP
Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI
could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J.
Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to
Act No. 3326.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3
April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was
directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner
with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised
Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also
cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the
one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari 25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9
August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in
view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ
attached to the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of
the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements
would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals
added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was
patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg.
22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe
in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
6
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing the petition for certiorari . They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay,
attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of
cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being
neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that
the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by
attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently
complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3
April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August
2004,33 a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of
Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the
information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals'
pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case
were clearly beyond his control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not
provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P.
Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in
four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing
of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226
was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus,
the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v.
Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint
signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. 44 These cases were followed by
our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation
or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the
prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
7
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot
try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information
is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be
interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property
Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change
in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become
the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case,
wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-
year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However,
from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period
of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he
had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to
suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act
No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively
pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg.
22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152662 : June 13, 2012]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification
and setting aside of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936,
entitled Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant
Virginia C. Malolos.cralaw
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal
8
Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered
DISMISSED.[3]
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint
for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan
(respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges
that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six
Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of
private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial
documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against
private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to Suspend
Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of
Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of
the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against
private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg.
22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the
amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both
checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges
involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September
1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were
filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to
MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged
that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated
5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were
raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City
reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision
reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk
of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the
Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts for
violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the
court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152
and 89153.[4]
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review[5] on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos.
149486-87.
In a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for
appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and
private complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch
218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason
that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
9
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it
was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the private [complainant] of the
fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had
elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended,
four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information
against the petitioner before the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the
petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03
February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes[7] the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to
in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, which means the filing
of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court,
considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the
prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8] likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.[9]
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the OSG,
while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act
No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of
special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the
Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged.[10] It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant
Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22
cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid
down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the judicial proceeding that could have interrupted
the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,[12] the CA allegedly failed to consider the
subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,[13] the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a
complaint with the Fiscals Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the
prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC
of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within
which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as
amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the
OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements
on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of
service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City
Prosecutors Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that
the offense charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on
erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC)[14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.[15] Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of
BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as
amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by
municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa
and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondents claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a
duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the
required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that
attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was
also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the
Docket Division of the OSG.
10
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling
that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326
entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against
the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot
try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco,
et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.[17] when it held that the filing of the complaint with the
Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.
Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special
laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those
covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The
ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v.
Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio Company Limited
v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,[23] the
Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively
interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in all fours with the
instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted
the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of 1995 is the
reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such
being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the
fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September
1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the
meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City
Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The
matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the
petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that
the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings,
which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court
of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the offended
must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.cralaw

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of
Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

11
Republic of the Philippines Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
SUPREME COURT Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
Manila
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
FIRST DIVISION
Criminal Case No. 28001
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and
vs. confederating with the then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINIs ownership of two billion and five
hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four
x-----------------------x billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having
G.R. Nos. 174764-65 then a book value of P100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
vs. Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
DECISION design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking
BERSAMIN, J.: undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in
consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of
prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their corruption of public officials.
immediate family, subordinates and close associates.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Case
Criminal Case No. 28002
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and
informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then
his motion to quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close
Antecedents personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT")
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns
the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
12
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business,
transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for
and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure
and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering
and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently,
request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and
Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks,
commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as
accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse
the construction contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had
been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the
prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayans favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then
entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first
assailed resolution denying the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second
assailed resolution.10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT SECTION 4,
PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE
THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED JURISDICTION WITHOUT
HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THEACCUSED MUST BE A
PUBLIC OFFICER.
13
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONERSCONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE APPLICABLE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION
OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE
OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATIONS INCRIMINAL
CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT
OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730
entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled
Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG) against Disini and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No.
0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring
and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is appropriation of public funds, plunder of
the nations wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, 14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and
the husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship
xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in
exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful
concert, active collaboration and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their association and influence with
the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets,
engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits
through which defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as
unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations like the Westinghouse
Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse
Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously
exorbitant amount that included defendants staggering commissions defendant Rodolfo
Jacob executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for
appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr.
versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 9231992320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby
transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the records of the attached criminal case
which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some
parts or elements are also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the
Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been sequestered;
(iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are
constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the
suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases similar to that of
the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGGs letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint
against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts
subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for
preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioners
properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or
14
were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court
finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal
complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x
x x18
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief
that it could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said
preliminary investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG
would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject
of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be
forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take
appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the
preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were
reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became
the subject of Disinis motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not
allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
(E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated
by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither pertained
to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private
individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he
should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed
from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to
recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of
their relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and
defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
15
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the
Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini
only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal
cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an
impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to
sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction,
specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in
favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to
do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their
sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer
necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined
with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions
against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with
assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during
his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,"
expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President
Marcos immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction
as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disinis argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full
text of which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are
mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of
limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the ambit of the
qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive
mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection
with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disinis being a private
16
individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice or
accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription
starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and
given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of
Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse)
the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and architectural design of and to
construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the
respective contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of
corruption of public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by
Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer
corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct
bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times
the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of
prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the
amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to
crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved
on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not
being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to
February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable
prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that
prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2
of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed.
That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of
the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive
period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other
words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does
not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was
in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive
period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149),
and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the
ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the
special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only
from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or
acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject
herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an
exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have
elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly
discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it
was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes
committed prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and
conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would
have dared to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run
from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case
17
to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public
officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly
well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission
of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly
publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in
relation to it were discovered only through the PCGGs exhaustive investigation, resulting in
the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No.
0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public
character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the
course of official functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail
the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the
unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the
PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary
investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of
the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running
of the period of prescription. According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code
(R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is
interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted
by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before" investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change
in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become
the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or
information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary
investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not
yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the
offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground
that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The
fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this
ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential
elements of the offense as defined in the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not
considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the
offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to
trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal
Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically
put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines,
conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and
18
feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by
taking undue advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in relation to his
office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini,
President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective
contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The
felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code
are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer;
and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer
under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect
bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that:
(1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer;
and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the
award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position
and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that
would make him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be
placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or
indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted
Disinis offers, promises and gifts an essential element in direct bribery the allegation
that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation
by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary
advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has
to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the
government.

The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1)
Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official;
(2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and
received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the
entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in
connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had
family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the
engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the
PNPPP.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions
promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

19
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized
representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3,
Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER
DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio
City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly
authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City
Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render
any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. 1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La
Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan
and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-
complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto
Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left
front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang.
Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and
Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly
removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the
declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay
and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper
20
Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two
(2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No.
UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure
to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by
Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away
depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is P26,250.00. According to
complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid by the
respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other.
Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996
and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto
Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as
respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May
28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president,
Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave
Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-
respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He
admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that
the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that
he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and
his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him,
and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against
Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union,
Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of
Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against
respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of
Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are
absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel
clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the
prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which
prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly,
they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents,
except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by
virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation
of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding
informations against them in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with
unity of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled
[sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was
earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the
Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant
Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth P26,250.00
and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003.7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused
through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or
Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the
quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action
or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an
offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-
2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished
by prescription of the crime.
21
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized
by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7,
2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed
with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged
commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if
any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to
Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the
February 10, 2004 Order11 to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of
prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.
While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2,
2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003,
well within the prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on
April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order
granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the
ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished
on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of
City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that
(Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION
FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO
PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled
erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private
respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not when
the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City.
Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint
shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter"
and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the criminal action shall
interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise
provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not
the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in
determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that
the offenses charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be
commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the
petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as
required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall
be commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any
other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed
Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of
municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in court as
required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal
Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall
be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the
offenses charged have not prescribed.
22
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely
abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section
2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia,
held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a
judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the
commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since
the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the
respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through
Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court
held that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an
Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing
of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court.
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and
upheld the respondent judges Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated
April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of
the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the
offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended
by Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a
city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the
prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in
dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds
for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged
constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense,
were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had
no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of
the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v.
Judge Santiago23 which held that the private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of
the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the
ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The
Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which the
cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the
National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for
Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition" 26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the
procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription
period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive
period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law
provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction.
Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months
for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
23
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the
prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan
Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided,
however, that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and
corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are those component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or
component cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters
from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are
chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized
the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the
charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information
tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The
respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured
similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on
May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers
are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that
rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to
Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be
filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct
a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
24
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish.
As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should
prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in
criminal cases is a substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the
prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v.
Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other
cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to
violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of
the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They
had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the
original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did
not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in
arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the
offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial
Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003,
the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err
when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the
Department of Justice National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be
placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it
states that the crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in which the crime
was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the
provision of the Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling
place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of
"violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the
Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of
prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time,
from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or
25
information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justices Prosecution Staff
and established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices
were assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6
provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La
Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan,
and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to
file the Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as
amended.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted
in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of
Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the
necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to
say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays
the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent
as reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.