13. Determination of Just Compensation
In estimating
CONCEPT OF JUST COMPENSATION
Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
expropriator.
The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss/
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
landowner, but also prompt payment i.e payment within
a reasonable time from its taking.
There is no prompt payment when reimbursement is
conditioned upon the LBPs approval and release of the
amount is made to depend upon compliance with same
documentary requirements.
Prompt payment of just compensation does not only
contemplate the immediate deposit and release a of the
provisional compensation-it also encompasses the full
payment of the finally adjudged just compensation. There
can be no prompt payment when there is only partial
payment of the just compensation.
The factors used in valuation of lands
Capitalized net income which is based on land use and
productivity
Comparable Sales which is based 70% of the BIR zonal value
Market Value which is base on tax Declarations
Reckoning of Valuation
In determining just compensation, the value of the property
at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated
by the govt shall be the basis.
The time of taking does not only refer to that stage when
the title is transferred to the Republic of the Philippines or
the beneficiaries-it also refers to the time when the
agricultural land voluntarily offered by a landowner
CASES:
City of Manila vs. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208 (1913)
The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with
its improvements for use in connection with a new market at that
time being erected in the district of Paco. A complaint was filed
setting forth the necessary allegations, answer joined, and
commissioners were appointed, who, after viewing the premises and
receiving evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two reports
to the court. The court duly rendered its decision, confirming the
majority report as to the improvements, but reducing the price of the
land from P20 per square meter, as fixed by the majority report, to
P15 per square meter. Motions for a new trial having been made by
both parties and denied by the court, both parties appealed from that
part of the decision fixing the value of the land at P15 per square
meter. The record was therefore elevated to this court for a review of
the evidence and assigned errors of the parties. This court held that
P10 per square meter was just compensation for the land, and
rendered its decision accordingly.
The market value of property is the price which it will bring when it is
offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obliged to sell it, and is
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
brought by one who is under no necessity of having it.
its value all the capabilities of the property, and all the uses to which
it may be applied or for which it is adapted, are to be considered, and
not merely the condition is it an at the time and the use to which it is
then applied by the owner. It is not a question of the value of the
property to the owner. Nor can the damages be enhanced by his
unwillingness to sell. On the other hand, the damages cannot be
measured by the value of the property to the party condemning it,
nor by its need of the particular property. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surrounding, its improvements and
capabilities, may be shown and considered in estimating its value.
(Approved in Seaboard Air Line vs. Chamblin, 108 Va., 42.)
Issue
The question now arises, when may the court, with propriety,
overrule the award of the commissioners in whole or in part and
substitute its own valuation of the condemned property?
Held:
From a mere reading of section 246 and the remarks just made, it
should be clear that the court is permitted to act upon the
commissioners' report in one of several ways, at its own discretion.
The whole duty of the court in considering the commissioners' report
is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the
defendant by its final judgment in the matter, and in order to fulfill its
duty in this respect the court will be obliged to exercise its discretion
in dealing with the report as the particular circumstances of the case
may require. But generally speaking, when the commissioners' report
cannot with justice be approved by the court, one of three or four
circumstances will usually present itself, each of which has for its
antidote one of the methods of dealing with the report placed at the
disposal of the court by section 246. Thus, if it be successfully
established that the commissioners refused to hear competent
evidence, then all the evidence in the case would not be before the
court; the court could not, with reason, attempt to either approve or
change the report, as it stood, for the reason that all the evidence of
the case would not be before it; and the remedy in this case would be
to "recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of
facts." Again, if improper conduct, fraud, or prejudice be charged
against the commissioners, and this charge be sustained, it would be
safer to set aside the award thus vitiated and "appoint new
commissioners" who could render a report not tainted by these
things. But it is to be observed again that this discussion is confined
to a case were no competent evidence was refused by the
commissioners and no suspicion rests upon the motives of the
commissioners in making the award. When the only error of the
commissioners is that they have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them; or that they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of the evidence; or that they have used an improper
rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the award, then, in
such a case, if the evidence be clear and convincing, the court should
be able, by the use of those correct legal principles which govern the
case, to determine upon the amount which should be awarded
without remanding the cause. When the matter stands in this light, it
becomes the duty of the court to make "final order and judgment" in
which the proper award will be made and thus end the litigation
between the parties.
1
Landbank vs. Banal, GR 143276, July 20, 2004
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the
registered owners of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud,
Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary
administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of
the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the
Landbanks valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with
the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation.
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the
same on the facts established in another case pending before it.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average
production figures in another case pending before it and applying the
same to the present case without conducting a hearing and without
the knowledge or consent of the parties
2.w/n the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents
property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average
production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and
applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and
worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties
HELD:
1.Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and
with the knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining
here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard,
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the
necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain
matter, thus:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial,
the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court,
on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice
of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (emphasis added)
2. x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730
hectares, defendants determined the average gross production per
year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez
vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No.
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland
situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the
above-entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was
1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for coconut land and the price
per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In
the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production
per year per hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for
coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also
comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a
great variance in average production per year when in the two cases
the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of Basud,
Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52
kilos per hectare per year as average gross production. In
the Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the average gross
production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year.The court is
also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in
the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is
REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40,
Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial
judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in
determining the proper valuation of the subject property
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LEONILA P. CELADA
G.R. No. 164876 January 23, 2006
FACTS: Leonila P. Celada owns hectares of agricultural land which was
identified by the DAR as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the
CARP. The matter was then indorsed to LBP for field investigation and
land valuation. LBP valued the land at P2.1105517 per square meter
for an aggregate value of P299,569.61. The DAR offered the same
amount to respondent as just compensation, but it was rejected.
Nonetheless LBP deposited the same in cash and bonds in the name
of Celada. Pursuant to Section 16(d) of RA 6657 or CARP, the matter
was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for summary
administrative hearing on determination of just compensation.While
the DARAB case was pending, Celada filed a petition for judicial
determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR and the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) alleging that the current
market value of her land is at least P150,000.00 in RTC acting as
Special Agrarian Court.
In its Answer, LBP raised non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
as well as forum-shopping and respondent must first await the
outcome of the DARAB case before taking any judicial recourse. That
its valuation was arrived at by applying the formula prescribed by law
whereas respondents was based only on the "current value of like
properties". The DAR and the MARO filed an Answer averring that the
determination of just compensation rests exclusively with the LBP.
Thus, they are not liable to respondent and are merely nominal
parties in the case. PARAD affirmed the valuation made by LBP.
LBP elevated the matter to the CA which, however, dismissed the
appeal. Upon denial of its MR. Hence, this petition.
2
ISSUE: WON RTC (SAC) has jurisdiction over the petition for
determination of just compensation while administrative proceedings
are on-going.
HELD: We do not agree with petitioners submission that the SAC
erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondents petition for
determination of just compensation despite the pendency of the
administrative proceedings before the DARAB. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for
determination of just compensation without waiting for the
completion of the DARABs re-evaluation of the land. The Court
nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the
action for the following reason:
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court,
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners. This original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR
would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in
compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the
review of administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak
of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting
as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any
effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would
be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort
to the SAC by private respondent is valid.
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA
No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State.
The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is
vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondents
petition for determination of just compensation.
In the same vein, there is no merit to petitioners contention that
respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she
directly filed the petition for determination of just compensation with
the SAC even before the DARAB case could be resolved. The issue is
now moot considering that the valuation made by petitioner had long
been affirmed by the DARAB in its order dated April 12, 2000. As held
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is inapplicable when the issue is rendered
moot and academic, as in the instant case.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZ LIM AND PURITA LIM
CABOCHAN
529 SCRA 129 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)
Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have
in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore
administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity
was not put in issue.
FACTS: Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) compulsorily acquired lands
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
owned by Luz Lim and Purita Lim Caochan. The Land Bank computed
the value of the property at P725,804.21.
Lim however rejected Land Banks valuation. A summary
administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of
the property The PARAD initially valued it at P1,174,659.60 but later
reduced the amount to P725,804.21 upon motion of petitioner
Dissatisfied with the PARADs decision, respondents filed on January
26, 1998 a petition for determination of just compensation with the
RTC of Sorsogon where they prayed for a compensation of at
least P150,000 per hectare, or an aggregate amount of P4,925,44]The
case proceeded to trial, with the RTC appointing each partys nominee
as commissioner
By Report submitted on December 9, 1998,
Commissioner Florencio C. Dino II, respondents nominee, valued the
property at P1,548,000.Commissioner Jesus D. Empleo, petitioners
nominee, submitted his own report on February 8, 1999, valuing the
property at P947,956.68.
By September 14, 2001 Decision Branch 52 of
the Sorsogon RTC adopted the valuation submitted by respondents
commissioner (P1,548,000). Both parties moved for reconsideration,
and by December 21, 2001 Order the RTC reconsidered its earlier
decision and increased the valuation to P2,232,868.40
The RTC adopted the valuation submitted by the appointed
commissioner. Both parties moved for reconsideration. The RTC then
reconsidered its earlier decision and increased the valuation.
Landbank, not satisfied, filed a petition for review on certiorari for
fixing the valuation of Lims property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in adopting the calculations of
the LBP instead of the Administrative Order of DAR
HELD: In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, the Court
underscored the mandatory nature of
Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-
94 which provides that in determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors
shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the
property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land, shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation
The pertinent portions of Item II of DAR AO 6-92, as
amended by DAR AO 11-94, provide:
A. There shall be one basic formula for the
valuation of lands covered by
[Voluntary Offer to Sell] or [Compulsory
Acquisition] regardless of the date of
offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where: LV = Land Value
3
CNI = Capitalized Net Income Registrati
CS = Comparable Sales on of the
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration Valuation
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are Input
present, relevant and applicable.
B. Capitalized Net Income (CNI) This shall refer to the
A.1 When the CS factor is not present [25] and CNI and MV difference between the gross sales (AGP x SP) and total cost
are applicable, the formula shall be: of operations (CO) capitalized at 12%.

LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) Expressed in equation form:

A.5 For purposes of this Administrative Order, the date of
receipt of claimfolder by LBP from DAR shall mean the date CNI = (AGP x SP) CO
when the claimfolder is determined by the LBP to be .12
complete with all the required documents and valuation
inputs duly verified and validated, and is ready for final Where: CNI = Capitalized Net Income
computation/processing.
A.6 The basic formula in the grossing-up of valuation inputs AGP = Latest available 12-months gross production
such as x x x Market Value per Tax Declaration (MV) shall immediately preceding the date of offer in case of VOS
be: or date of notice of coverage in case of CA.
Valuation SP = The average of the latest available 12-months selling
input x prices prior to the date of receipt of the claimfolder by LBP
Grosse Regional for processing, such prices to be secured from the
d-up Consume Department of Agriculture (DA) and other appropriate
Valuati = r Price regulatory bodies or, in their absence, from the Bureau of
on Index Agricultural Statistics. If possible, SP data shall be gathered
Input (RCPI) from the barangay or municipality where the property is
Adjustme located. In the absence thereof, SP may be secured within
nt Factor the province or region
The RCPI Adjustment Factor shall refer to the ratio of RCPI CO = Cost of Operations
for the month issued by the National Statistics Office as of
the date when the claimfolder (CF) was received by LBP Whenever the cost of operations could not be obtained or
from DAR for processing or, in its absence, the most recent verified, an assumed net income rate (NIR) of 20% shall be
available RCPI for the month issued prior to the date of used. Landholdings planted to coconut which are
receipt of CF from DAR and the RCPI for the month as of the productive at the time of offer/coverage shall continue to
date/effectivity/registration of the valuation use the 70% NIR. DAR and LBP shall continue to conduct
input. Expressed in equation for joint industry studies to establish the applicable NIR for
RCPI for each crop covered under CARP
the Month .12 = Capitalization Rate
as of the
Date of D. In the computation of Market Value per Tax
Receipt Declaration (MV), the most recent Tax
of Claimfo Declaration (TD) and Schedule of Unit
lder by Market Value (SMV) issued prior to
LBP from receipt of claimfolder by LBP shall be
DAR or the considered. The Unit Market Value
Most (UMV) shall be grossed up from the
recent date of its effectivity up to the date of
RCPI
RCPI for receipt of claimfolder by LBP from DAR
Adjust
= the Month for processing, in accordance with item
ment
Issued II.A.A.6. (Emphasis and underscoring
Factor
Prior to supplied)
the Date
of Receipt Thus, in computing Capitalized Net Income (CNI), the
of CF Average Gross Production (AGP) of the latest available 12 months
RCPI for immediately preceding the date of notice of coverage, and the
the Month average Selling Price (SP) of the latest available 12 months prior to
Issued as the date of receipt of the claimfolder by LBP for processing, should be
of the used.
Date
/ Effectivit
y/

CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW 4
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative
bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have
the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative
issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a
presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative
issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in
issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have
no option but to apply the same.
WHEREFORE, the November 11, 2005 Decision and March
13, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
73881 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 98-6432 is REMANDED to the court of origin,
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, which is
directed to determine with dispatch the just compensation due
respondents strictly in accordance with the procedures specified
above.
Landbank vs. Arieta Tan, GR 161834, Aug. 23, 2010
FACTS
Vda. De Arieta owned a 37.1 hectare agricultural land in
Kapalong Davao del Norte. Around 15 ha of the property was covered
by RA6657 through the VOS scheme, when ARIETA offered to sell the
said property to DAR for P2M/hectare. But, Land Bank valued and
offered just P76.4k/hectare for the property or Php 1.1M, which it
deposited in the account of ARIETA in cash and in bonds as provisional
compensation for the acquisition
Administrative proceedings to fix the just compensation
were then undertaken by the DARAB, which fixed the same at Php
686k/hectare or Php 10.3M. LBP filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. It then sought judicial determination of the just
compensation before the Special Agrarian Court in Tagum City.
ARIETA also filed a Motion for Delivery of the Initial
Valuation praying that LBP be ordered to deposit the DARAB
determined amount of Php 10.3M in accordance with the ruling LBP
v. CA & Yap.
LBP contends that the amount of the deposit should only be
the initial valuation. The SAC ordered that the amount determined by
DARAB be deposited. LBP appealed to the CA which dismissed the
petition upholding the SAC decision. According to the CA, Section 16
(e) was worded such that reference to the word deposit was after
conducting administrative proceedings by the DARAB of just
compensation.
LBP contends that this interpretation will unduly hamper
the execution of the CARP as the determination of the deposit is
dependent upon the decision of the DARAB and not the provisional
determination of LBP.
ISSUE
WON the deposit referred to in Section 16(a) only refers
to the amount determined by the DARAB after conducting
administrative proceedings to fix just compensation
HELD
LBP is correct. The CA made strained interpretation of
Section 16. Section 16(e) should be read to make the precondition of
the States taking of possession of the landowners property and the
cancellation of the landowners title:
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
(1) payment of the compensation (if the landowner already
accepts the offer of the DAR/LBP) or
(2) deposit of the provisional compensation (if the
landowner rejects or fails to respond to the offer of the DAR/LBP).
The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or the deposit of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
It was thus erroneous for the CA to conclude that the
provisional compensation required to be deposited as provided in
Section 16 (e) is the sum determined by the DARAB/PARAD/RARAD in
a summary administrative proceeding merely because the word
deposit appeared for the first time in the sub-paragraph immediately
succeeding that sub-paragraph where the administrative proceeding is
mentioned (sub-paragraph d). The construction made by the CA would
unduly hamper the land redistribution process.
Under the law, the LBP is charged with the initial
responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land
reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking.[12] Once an
expropriation proceeding or the acquisition of private agricultural
lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of LBP
begins. EO No. 405, issued on June 14, 1990, provides that the DAR is
required to make use of the determination of the land valuation and
compensation by the LBP as the latter is primarily responsible for the
determination of the land valuation and compensation. In fact, the
LBP can disagree with the decision of the DAR in the determination of
just compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC designated as SAC
for final determination of just compensation.
The amount of offer which the DAR gives to the landowner
as compensation for his land, as mentioned in Section 16 (b) and (c), is
based on the initial valuation by the LBP.[14] This then is the amount
which may be accepted or rejected by the landowner under the
procedure established in Section 16. Perforce, such initial valuation by
the LBP also becomes the basis of the deposit of provisional
compensation pending final determination of just compensation, in
accordance with sub-paragraph (e)
Diamond Farms, Inc. vs. Diamond Farms Workers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, GR 192999, July 18, 2012
Facts of the case
The Petitioner and CARP
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the commercial farming of
bananas. A portion of the land it owns was placed under CARP
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) coverage. Thus, its
certificates of title over portions of the land under CARP were
cancelled, and new TCTs were issued in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines. Subsequently, beneficiaries were identified, most of
whom were members of respondent cooperative. Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) were issued for them.
Petitioners Complaint
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful occupation against
respondents, alleging that it was the lawful owner of two parcels of
land within the portions covered by the CLOA and that the said CLOAs
had yet to attain finality owing to appeals filed by petitioner. Thus,
while the beneficiaries had yet to be designated with finality,
5
respondents refused to do work for petitioner, and forcibly entered
the land subject to the dispute and occupied the same.
Respondents Counterclaim
Respondents argued that indeed, petitioner had the TCTs of the
parcel of land subject to the dispute, but these were put under the
name of the Republic upon subjecting it to CARP. Thus, despite the
award of CLOAs to respondents, petitioner continued to manage the
land while paying wages them. Respondents thus demanded that
their rights under the CLOAs be established, and that the petitioner
pay them their production share.
The Lower Courts Ruling
The CA affirmed the DAR Adjudication Board ordering the petitioner
to turn over the possession of the land to the respondents.
Issue:
WON respondents are guilty of unlawful occupation. NO.
Ratio:
Respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation
The action taken by respondents to guard the land was reasonable
and necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent
what petitioner attempted to do.
- Respondents were simply protecting their right, after the
petitioners attempt to thwart the CARPs implementation.
What the petitioner did was install workers which it
conspired with on land already identified as falling under
CARP and having CARP-designated beneficiaries. This
served as an attempted roadblock to installing the
legitimate beneficiaries on the land.
Petitioners already lost ownership over the land
Petitioner itself acknowledged that there was a deposit of the initial
valuation of the land. It even manifested that the Republics TCTs
were neither attacked nor assailed in this case. Thus, upon
petitioners own reasoning, it already lost possession and ownership
over the land when the condition (payment of just compensation) was
fulfilled, which was not disputed in this case.
Petitioner must turn over possession to respondents
Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of
the CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded on the right of
farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or
collectively the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that
control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the
farmers.
Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, et al
The court ruled that the Constitution and the CARL intended the
farmers, individually or collectively, to have control over agricultural
lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught.
CODAL PROVISIONS:
Sec. 17, RA 6657
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation
DAR A.O. No. 05, S. 1998(PRINT na lang sa ibang paper)
Rule 67, Sec. 2, ROC
Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depositary. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders
of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the
court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government
bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the
authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally
ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed
by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other
proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court
with service of copies to the parties
14. Retention Rights, Exemption and Exclusion Sec. 3c, 6, 10, and
RA 7881 (1995)
Retention rights of the landowner
the landowner has the right to retain not more than five
hectares of his landholdings.
The retained area need not be personally cultivated by the
landowner- cultivation can be done indirectly through labor
administration.
The right to choose the retention are belongs to the
landowner. The chosen area should be compact or
contiguous. As long as it is compact and contiguous the
landowners choice of the area retained must be prevailed.
If the area chosen by the landowner is tenanted the tenant
may choose on whether to remain therein or be beneficiary
in the same or another agricultural land with similar
comparable features. Tenant have 1 year to exercise this
option from the time the landowner manifests his choice of
the area of retention.
If the tenant chooses to remain in the retained are, he will
no longer be considered as a tenant but an agricultural
lessee and he will no longer qualify as an agrarian reform
beneficiary.
If the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in the same or
another agricultural land, he loses his right to be a lessee of
the land retained by the landowner
Can spouses retain 5 hectares each under the agrarian reform law?
6
 It depends, if the property regime is conjugal or absolute
community-the spouse can retain only five hectares
If the property regime is separation of property-they can
retain 5 hectares each (total of 10)
Section 3 (c) Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.
SECTION 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in
this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public
or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to
factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder,
but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares.
SECTION 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds, and mangroves, national defense, school sites and
campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, seeds and
seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and
convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal
colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government
and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7881
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6657, ENTITLED "AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
SECTION 1. Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 3. Definitions. For the purpose of this Act,
unless the context indicates otherwise:
"(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or
Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by
persons whether natural or juridical." cdt
SECTION 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
"Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
"a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for
parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and
mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act.
"b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively
used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt
from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said
prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed
and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
"In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have
been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial
farms deferment or notices of compulsory
acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the
actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the
exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of
this Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree
to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall
be distributed collectively to the worker-beneficiaries
or tenants who shall form a cooperative or
association to manage the same.
"In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have
not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, the consent of the farm workers shall no
longer be necessary, however, the provision of
Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply." aisa
dc
"c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for national defense, school
sites and campuses, including experimental farm
stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedling research
and pilot production center, church sites and
convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and
Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal
burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and
penal farms actually worked by the inmates,
government and private research and quarantine
centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%)
slope and over, except those already developed, shall
be exempt from the coverage of this Act."
SECTION 3. Section 11 Paragraph 1 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 11. Commercial Farming. Commercial
farms, which are private agricultural lands devoted to
saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and cut-
flower farms, and cacao, coffee and rubber
plantations, shall be subject to immediate
7
 compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten (10)
years from the effectivity of this Act. In the case of
new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the
first year of commercial production and operation, as
determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period,
the Government shall initiate steps necessary to
acquire these lands, upon payment of just
compensation for the land and the improvements
thereon, preferably in favor of organized
cooperatives or associations which shall thereafter
manage the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries."
SECTION 4. There shall be incorporated after Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 32-A. Incentives. Individuals or entities
owning or operating fishponds and prawn farms are
hereby mandated to execute within six (6) months
from the effectivity of this Act an incentive plan with
their regular fishpond or prawn farmworkers or
fishpond or prawn farm workers' organization, if any,
whereby seven point five percent (7.5%) of their net
profit before tax from the operation of the fishpond
or prawn farms are distributed within sixty (60) days
at the end of the fiscal year as compensation to
regular and other pond workers in such ponds over
and above the compensation they currently receive.
"In order to safeguard the right of the regular
fishpond or prawn farm workers under the incentive
plan, the books of the fishpond or prawn farm owners
shall be subject to periodic audit or inspection by
certified public accountants chosen by the workers.
"The foregoing provision shall not apply to
agricultural lands subsequently converted to
fishpond or prawn farms provided the size of the land
converted does not exceed the retention limit of the
landowner."
SECTION 5. There shall be incorporated after Section 65 of
Republic Act No. 6657 new sections to read as follows: cdasia
"Sec. 65-A. Conversion into Fishpond and Prawn
Farms. No conversion of public agricultural lands
into fishponds and prawn farms shall be made except
in situations where the provincial government with
the concurrence of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) declares a coastal zone as
suitable for fishpond development. In such case, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) shall allow the lease and development of such
areas: Provided, That the declaration shall not apply
to environmentally critical projects and areas as
contained in title (A) sub-paragraph two, (B-5) and
(C-1) and title (B), number eleven (11) of
Proclamation No. 2146, entitled "Proclaiming Certain
Areas and Types of Projects as Environmentally
Critical and Within the Scope of the Environmental
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
Impact Statement (EIS) System established under
Presidential Decree No. 1586," to ensure the
protection of river systems, aquifers and mangrove
vegetations from pollution and environmental
degradation: Provided, further, That the approval
shall be in accordance with a set of guidelines to be
drawn up and promulgated by the DAR and the
BFAR: Provided, furthermore, That small-farmer
cooperatives and organizations shall be given
preference in the award of the Fishpond Lease
Agreement (FLAs).
"No conversion of more than five (5) hectares of
private lands to fishpond and prawn farms shall be
allowed after the passage of this Act, except when
the use of the land is more economically feasible and
sound for fishpond and/or prawn farm, as certified by
the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR), and a simple and absolute majority of the
regular farm workers or tenants agree to the
conversion, the Department of Agrarian Reform, may
approve applications for change in the use of the
land: Provided, finally, That no piecemeal conversion
to circumvent the provisions of this Act shall be
allowed. In these cases where the change of use is
approved, the provisions of Section 32-A hereof on
incentives shall apply."
"Sec. 65-B. Inventory. Within one (1) year from
the effectivity of this Act, the BFAR shall undertake
and finish an inventory of all government and private
fishponds and prawn farms, and undertake a
program to promote the sustainable management
and utilization of prawn farms and fishponds. No
lease under Section 65-A hereof may be granted until
after the completion of the said inventory.
"The sustainable management and utilization of
prawn farms and fishponds shall be in accordance
with the effluent standards, pollution charges and
other pollution control measures such as, but not
limited to, the quantity of fertilizers, pesticides and
other chemicals used, that may be established by the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), and
other appropriate government regulatory bodies,
and existing regulations governing water utilization,
primarily Presidential Decree No. 1067, entitled "A
Decree Instituting A Water Code, Thereby Revising
and Consolidating the Laws Governing the
Ownership, Appropriation, Utilization, Exploitation,
Development, Conservation and Protection of Water
Resources." cd i
"Sec. 65-C. Protection of Mangrove Areas. In
existing Fishpond Lease Agreements (FLAs) and those
that will be issued after the effectivity of this Act, a
portion of the fishpond area fronting the sea,
sufficient to protect the environment, shall be
established as a buffer zone and be planted to
8
 specified mangrove species to be determined in
consultation with the regional office of the
DENR. The Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources shall provide the penalties for any violation
of this undertaking as well as the rules for its
implementation."
"Sec. 65-D. Change of Crops. The change of crops
to commercial crops or high value crops shall not be
considered as a conversion in the use or nature of the
land. The change in crop should however, not
prejudice the rights of tenants or leaseholders should
there be any and the consent of a simple and absolute
majority of the affected farm workers, if any, shall
first be obtained."
SECTION 6. There shall be incorporated after Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6657 a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 73-A. Exception. The provisions of Section
73, paragraph (E), to the contrary notwithstanding,
the sale and/or transfer of agricultural land in cases
where such sale, transfer or conveyance is made
necessary as a result of a bank's foreclosure of the
mortgaged land is hereby permitted." acd
SECTION 7. Separability Clause. If for any reason, any section
or provision of this Act is declared null and void, no other section
provision or part thereof shall be affected and the same shall remain
in full force and effect.
SECTION 8. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved: February 20, 1995
Exempting Prawn Farms and Fishponds from CARP
CASES:
Alita vs. CA, supra
Natalia Realty, et.al. vs. DAR, GR 103302, Aug. 12, 1993
Facts:
Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of
120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares or a total of
125.0078 hectares, which are covered by TCT No. 31527. Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite
areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were
designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties
are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties
into low-cost housing subdivisions with the reservation, petitioner
EDIC as developer of Natalia applied for and was granted preliminary
approval and location clearances by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission, which Natalia thereafter became Antipolo
Hills Subdivision. On June 15 1988, Ra 6657 went to effect.
Respondent issed a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately registered
its objection to the notice of coverage and requested the cancellation
of the Notice of Coverage.
Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be
agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by
Presidential Proclamation for the townsite reservation. DAR then
contended that the permits granted were not valid and binding since
they did not comply with t he implementing Standards, Rules and
Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree), and that there was no valid conversion of the
properties.
Issue:
Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its agencies prior
to June 15, 1988 covered by RA 6657.
Ruling:
No, Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands. And agricultural lands is referred to as land devoted
to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forst, residential,
commercial or industrial land. Thus, the underdeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as agricultural
lands for this land was intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural land by virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this
limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable
and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands." 17
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered
as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use.
They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion
in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in
question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing
subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from
the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain
petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of
the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed
its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands
are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government
agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to
Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus
. Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15
June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.
9
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,
respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error
to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
within the coverage of CARL.
DAR vs. Delia T. Sutton, et.al., GR 162070, Oct. 19, 2005
Respondent inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate devoted exclusively
to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to
the existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondent
made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner
DAR to avail incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657 known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 took effect. It
included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine.
An en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR,
ruled that land devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not
included in the definition of agricultural land.
In view of the Luz Farm ruling, respondent filed with petitioner DAR a
formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was
exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of
the CARL. Petitioner ignored their request.
DAR issue A.O No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portion
of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of
the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded the A.O fixed
the following retention limits, viz 1:1 animal-land ratio and the ration
of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of
cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operation of the CARL.
DAR Secretary Garilao issue an Order partially granting the application
of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL applying the
retention limit outlined in the DAR A.O No. 9. Petitioner ordered the
rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under
Compulsory Acquisition.
On October 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned
Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. no. 9 does not run
counter to the Luz Farm case as the A.O provided the guidelines to
determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-
raising.
Issue:
Whether of not DAR A.O No.9 is unconstitutional?
Held:
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in
nature. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to
issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to
them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in
modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of
public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations
have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial
review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of
administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body
concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a
law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The
rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to
abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the
Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the
scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, SC find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as
it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate
livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform
and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court
clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising
are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine
and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial,
not an agricultural, activity.
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have
been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian
reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as
1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in
Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of
the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed,
there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently
engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the
enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents
intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the
CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-
agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been
no change of business interest in the case of respondents.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the
reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is
an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On
the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an
earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of
the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the
terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping
from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification,
Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws
with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
10
Milestone Farms, Inc. vs. Office of the President, GR 182332, Feb. 23,
2011
FACTS: Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. was incorporated with the
SEC. On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock,
poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990,
this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to
livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of
its 316.0422-hectare property. Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993,
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and
regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for
livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on
January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant
to DAR A.O. No. 9.
Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and
Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular
inspection on petitioners property and arrived at the following
findings:
The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners
316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the
LUCEC's findings and recommendation, DAR Regional Director
Percival Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27,
1994, exempting petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from CARP.
The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
(Pinugay Farmers), represented by Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia),
moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was
denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24,
1994.Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers filed a letter-appeal with the
DAR Secretary.
Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible
Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 781-
T.The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later
reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, of Tanay, Rizal.
Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in its Decision dated
October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and
all defendants therein to vacate portions of the property covered by
TCT Nos. M-6013, M-8796, and M-8791. In its Resolution dated July
31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants therein failed to timely file
a motion for reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of
record received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same
became final and executory.
In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881,which
was approved on February 20, 1995. Private agricultural lands
devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from
the coverage of the CARL.
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an
Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring
75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.
On February 4, 2000, the Office of the President rendered a decision
reinstating Order declared the entire 316.0422-hectare property
exempt from the coverage of CARP.
Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA. the CA found
that, based on the documentary evidence presented, the property
subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the
animal-land and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9.
The CA also found that petitioner applied for exclusion long before
the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that
petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry, and
swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP coverage. Hence, the
instant petition is hereby granted.
Finally, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
Is the land exempted from CARL coverage?
HELD: In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as
it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock
farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear
intent to exclude, inter alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case
that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and
do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural
activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from
crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A
great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of
industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and
facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like
bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and
other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms
which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of
agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
***
While it is true that an issue which was neither alleged in the
complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process,the same is not without exception,such as
this case. The CA, under Section 3,Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, can, in the interest of justice, entertain and resolve factual
issues. After all, technical and procedural rules are intended to help
secure, and not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid
enforcement of the rules may thus be allowed to attain the prime
objective of dispensing justice, for dispensation of justice is the core
reason for the existence of courts.Moreover, petitioner cannot validly
claim that it was deprived of due process because the CA afforded it
11
all the opportunity to be heard.The CA even directed petitioner to file
its comment on the Supplement, and to prove and establish its claim
that the subject property was excluded from the coverage of the
CARP. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the
CA by submitting pleadings and pieces of documentary evidence, such
as the Investigating Teams Report and judicial affidavits. The CA also
went further by setting the case for hearing. In all these proceedings,
all the parties rights to due process were amply protected and
recognized.
DAR vs. DECS, GR 158228, March 23, 2004
FACTS: Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D which were donated by the
late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of
Education). Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name
of respondent DECS .
Respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation
for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from 1984-1994. The
contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10
agricultural crop years or until 2005. On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar
and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm
workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) of Escalante.
After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a "Notice of
Coverage" to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now
covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with
the farmer beneficiaries. The recommendation for coverage was
approved by DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved
the r, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional
Director. Respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
HELD: No.
While respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on
the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with
Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively
used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and
renovations of schools in the nearby locality, the court is inclined with
the petitioners argument that the lands subject hereof are not
exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually,
directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are
in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt
from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived
therefrom, that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes.
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their
exemption specifying those lands actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act.
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt
from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the purpose is "for
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes."
Roxas & Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NFSW and the DAR, GR 149548,
Dec. 4, 2009
FACTS
The main subject of the seven consolidated petitions is the application
of petitioner Roxas & Co., Inc. (Roxas & Co.) for conversion from
agricultural to non-agricultural use of its three haciendas located in
Nasugbu, Batangas containing a total area of almost 3,000
hectares. The facts are not new, the Court having earlier resolved
intimately-related issues dealing with these haciendas
The incidents which spawned the filing of the petitions
in G.R. Nos. 149548, 167505, 167845, 169163 and 179650 are stated
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Minita Chico-Nazario, the original
draft of which was made the basis of the Courts deliberations.
Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion
of its three haciendas from argricultural to non-agricultural on the
assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu,
Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural
uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the
three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued
on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R.
No. 167505.
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of
three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines
formally convened and took over legislative power from the
President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was
signed bythe President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15,
1988. Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed
with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda
Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico
and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR
in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.],
through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR
withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan
of Nasugbu,Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result,
petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for
conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The
petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP)
1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON
AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF
NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion
12
of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the
assumption that the issuance of PP 1520 which declared
Nasugbu,Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-
agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding,the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to thefarmer-beneficiaries in the three
haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15,
1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505.
Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an applicationfor exemption from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of
1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO)
No. 6, Series of 19943 which states that all lands already classified as
commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no
longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
ISSUES: Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the
Maragondon-TernateNasugbu tourism zone to non- agricultural use
to exempt Roxas & Co.s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP
coverage
RULING: PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE
AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDING
NASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS. Roxas & Co. contends that
PP 1520 declared the three municipalities as each constituting a
tourism zone,reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore,
converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.The perambulatory
clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector
comprising the [three Municipalitiesthat] have potential tourism
value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the
segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose.
Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority(PTA)
to identify what those potential tourism areas are. If all the lands in
those tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural
use, there would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA to
identify what those "specific geographic areas" are. In the above-cited
case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, the the Court made it clear that the "power
to determine whether Haciendas Palico,Banilad and Caylaway are
non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies
with the [Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court."
Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7,Series of 2004,
came up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed that .... B.
General areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays,
islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that merely: (1) recognize
certain still unidentified areas within the covered provinces,
municipalities, barangays,islands, or peninsulasto be with potential
tourism value and charge the Philippine Tourism Authority with the
taskto identify/delineate specific geographic areas within the zone
with potential tourism value and to coordinate said areas
development; or (2) recognize the potential value of identified spots
located within the general areadeclared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x x)and
direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas
development;could not be regarded as effecting an automatic
reclassification of the entirety of the land area declared as tourist
zone. A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism
valueof certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone
clearly does not allocate,reserve, or intend the entirety of the land
area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said
proclamation direct that otherwise CARP able lands within the zone
shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural. There being
no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances,
assuming[these] took effect before June 15, 1988, could not supply a
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein
from CARP coverage. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the
"potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area
declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-
agricultural use. A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does
not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is
still that process of conversion before oneis permitted to use it for
other purpose. 2. THE CLOAs ISSUED BY THE DAR in ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE NO. A-9999- 008-98 SUBJECT OF G.R. No. 179650 TO THE
FARMER-BENEFICIARIES INVOLVING THE NINE PARCELS OF LAND IN
HACIENDA PALICO MUST BE CANCELLED. The court held... . . . [t]he
failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due
process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the
power to nullify the [CLOAs] already issued to the farmer-
beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the
administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course.
Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural
lapses in the acquisition proceedings. . . . . Anyhow, the farmer
beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the
land. On the procedural question raised by Roxas & Co. on the
appellate court's relaxation of the rules by giving due course to
DAMBA-NFSW's appeal in CA G.R. SP No. 72198, the subject of G.R.
No. 167845: Indeed, the perfection of an appeal within the statutory
period is jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the assailed
decision final and executory. A relaxation of the rules may, however,
for meritorious reasons, be allowed in the interest of justice. The
Court finds that in giving due course to DAMBA-NSFW's appeal, the
appellate court committed no reversible error. Consider its
ratiocination: . . . . To deny [DAMBA-NSFW]'s appeal with the PARAD
will not only affect their right over the parcel of land subject of this
petition with an area of 103.1436 hectares, but also that of the whole
area covered by CLOA No. 6654 since the PARAD rendered a Joint
Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [DAMBA-
NSFW] with regard to [Roxas & Co.]'s application for partial and total
cancellation of the CLOA in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to R-
401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001. There is a pressing need for an
extensive discussion of the issues as raised by both parties as the
matter of canceling CLOA No. 6654 is of utmost importance, involving
as it does the probable displacement of hundreds of farmer-
beneficiaries and their families. . .
1) In G.R. No. 167540, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the November 24, 2003 Decision[46] and March 18, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 which
declared that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reclassified the
lands in the municipalities of Nasugbu in Batangas and Maragondon
and Ternate in Cavite to non-agricultural use;
2) The Court accordingly GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Department of Agrarian Reform in G.R. No.
167543 and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE its Resolution of July 20, 2005;
3) In G.R. No. 149548, the Court DENIES the petition for
review of Roxas & Co. for lack of merit;
4) In G.R. No. 179650, the Court GRANTS the petition for
review of DAMBA-NSFW and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the October
31, 2006 Decision and August 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82225;
5) In G.R. No. 167505, the Court DENIES the petition for
review of DAMBA-NSFW and AFFIRMS the December 20,
13
2004 Decision and March 7, 2005Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 82226;
6) In G.R. No. 167845, the Court DENIES Roxas & Co.s
petition for review for lack of merit and AFFIRMS the September 10,
2004 Decision and April 14, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals;
7) In G.R. No. 169163, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decisions
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. 401-
239-2001 ordering the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 and DARAB
Cases Nos. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 granting the
partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654. The CLOAs issued for Lots No.
21 No. 24, No. 26, No. 31, No. 32 and No. 34 or those covered by DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97) remain; and
8) Roxas & Co. is ORDERED to pay the disturbance
compensation of affected farmer-beneficiaries in the areas covered
by the nine parcels of lands in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-
008-98 before the CLOAs therein can be cancelled, and is ENJOINED
to strictly follow the mandate of R.A. No. 3844.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. DAR Secretary, GR
139285, Dec. 21, 2007
FACTS:
The Archbishop of Caceres owned several parcels of land planted with
rice, corn and coconut trees. He filed petitions for exemption from
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under PD 27 of these lands with the
Municipal Agrarian Reform District Office in Naga City. Two petitions
were however denied by the Regional Director of Department of
Agrarian Reform. The petitioner contended that such lands were
donations and he held the property only in trust capacity. He argued
that the donations had stipulations prohibiting him to sell, exchange,
lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage the subject lands, from which
he concluded that he was the landowner as contemplated by the
PD 27 and RA 6657. The petition was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Are the subject lands exempt from Operation Land Transfer under PD
27?
LAW:
RA 6657 provides for an exclusive list of exemptions as follows:
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
a) Lands actually, directly, exclusively used for
parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation,
fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt
from the coverage of this Act.
b) Private lands actually, directly, exclusively used
for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt
from the coverage of this Act: Provided, that
said prawn farms and fishponds have not been
distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
Award (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform
Program. In cases where the fishponds or prawn
farms have not been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the
consent of the farmworkers shall no longer be
necessary; however, the provision of Section 32-
A hereof on incentives shall apply.
c) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for national defense,
school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public
or private schools for educational purposes,
seeds and seedlings research and pilot
production center, church sites and convents
appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic
centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial
grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and
penal farms actually worked by the inmates,
government and private research and
quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen
percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed, shall be exempt from the
coverage of this Act. (As amended by RA 7881)
RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in holding that
subject lands are not exempt from the Operation Land Transfer of PD
27 and RA 6657. Supreme Court held that the Archbishop cannot
claim exemption in behalf of the Filipino faithful as the lands in
question clearly do not fall under any of the exemptions enumerated
by the law. The law is clear on the exemptions granted and there is no
room for interpretation. According to the decision in this case, the
Archbishop, as a religious leader, can just take solace in the fact that
his lands are going to be awarded to those who need and can utilize
them to the fullest.
Prov. Of Camarines Sur vs. CA, GR 103125, May 17, 1993
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988,
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate
property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish
a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:
WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has
adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development
plan, some of the vital components of which
includes the establishment of model and pilot
farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural
crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory
centers, 15 small scale technology soap making,
small scale products of plaster of paris, marine
biological and sea farming research center,and
other progressive feasibility concepts objective of
which is to provide the necessary scientific and
technology know-how to farmers and fishermen
14
 in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing
project for provincial government employees;
WHEREAS, the province would need additional
land to be acquired either by purchase or
expropriation to implement the above program
component;
WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent
properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol
Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot
development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through
its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for
expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San
Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of
the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon.
Benjamin V. Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the
issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at
the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated
December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of
P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer
for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the
expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property
and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions
were denied in the order dated February 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked:
(a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6,
1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the
expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the
motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They
also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from
enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of
injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed
that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings
under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and
that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition,
the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval
by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor
General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must
first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the
plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing
project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the
amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend
the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines
Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the
private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked
for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground
of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and
(ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned
resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the
Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the
Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the
lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural
use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation
is for a public purpose or public use.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power
of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the
condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g.
roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could
satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new
concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or
benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists
or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220
[1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage
of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the
center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and
craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong
v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage
in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
15
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum
the general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise
of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the
provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of
the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be
reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with
the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised
the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate
lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist
resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought
to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than
one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by
emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this
petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior
to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public
interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had
failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square
meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable
reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of
expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the
land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the
Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government
units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-
15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized
by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950,
50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate,
the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints
on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v.
Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such
delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its
limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated
power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the
power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which
provides:
A local government unit may, through its head
and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain
and institute condemnation proceedings for
public use or purpose.
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local
government, units must first secure the approval of the Department
of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the
Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of
five (5) years from its award, when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for,
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become
urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of
the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice
to the affected parties, and subject to existing
laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its
disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall
have fully paid his obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it
applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program
as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and
5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the
source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the
purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority.
While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such
authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted
by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication
(Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d.
241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed
for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without
first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be
the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that
shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be
expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of
legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination
16
and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State
ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174
NW 885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how
broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the
sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA
1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political
subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be
bound by provisions of law couched in general term.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of
the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the
Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation
cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the
owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality
of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining
just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what
they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial
court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court
to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the
Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department
of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents'
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets
aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to
dismiss of the private respondents.
Delfino vs. Anasco, GR 197486, Sept. 10, 2014
Facts:
Delfino owned parcels of land in Laguna totaling 35.4
hectares of which 20.8 was coconut land and 14.6 was
Riceland. He sold all of the coconut land leaving him only
Riceland of which 9.8 hectares are tenanted. The tenanted
portion being tilled by respondents was placed under
Operation Land Transfer under PD 27. After full payment
to the Land Bank of the Philippines of the amortizations, the
farmer-beneficiaries were issued Emancipation Patents
(EPs).
Before the EPs were registered, Delfino filed an Application
for Retention over the entire 14.6-hectare Riceland. The
Secretary of DAR gave him a maximum of 5 hectares (from
the tenanted portion as his retained area) as his right of
retention. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration
to the ruling of the DAR Secretary arguing that the order will
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
have the effect of cancelling the EPs and consequently
deprive them of ownership of the landholdings they
acquired pursuant to PD 27. The MR was denied. A petition
for review in the CA was likewise denied.
5 months later, Delfino sold 2 hectares of his tenanted
Riceland to SM Prime Holdings. Though covered by OLT, no
EP had been issued to this particular parcel of land. Delfino
subsequently filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for cancellation of the EPs
previously issued to respondents on the basis of the DAR
Secretarys Order granting him 5 hectares. This was granted
by the PARAD and affirmed the Secretary of DAR.
The respondents filed a Petition to Annul and/or Cancel the
DAR Secretarys Orders which was also denied by a new
DAR Secretary. This new DAR Secretary however clarified
the extent of the 5-hectare retention right given to Delfino
by the previous DAR Secretary. Whereas the previous DAR
Secretary did not clarify which parts of the Riceland the 5-
hectares were to be taken from, the new DAR Secretary
held that the land sold to SM Prime Holdings will form part
of the 5-hectares.
Delfino believing that the previous DAR Secretarys orders
were final and executory filed this suit.
Issues and Holding:
1.) Whether the clarification made by the new DAR Secretary
violated the rule on immutability of final judgments. No.
2.) Whether the inclusion of the two hectare portion sold to
SM Prime Holdings Inc In Delfinos retention area was in
derogation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657. YES
Ratio:
Issue 1
Delfino was granted five hectares from the tenanted portion as his
retained area. Said order had become final and executory. A
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect. There are,
however, exceptions to the general rule, namely:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In this case, the clarification made by the new DAR Secretary falls
under the fourth exception. The DAR Secretary thus found it fair and
equitable to include the portion sold to SM Prime Holdings to
Delfinos retention area. As explained by the Secretary, this
clarification was made in order not to circumvent the five-hectare
limitation as said landowner cannot [be allowed to] simultaneously
enjoy the proceeds of the [sale] and at the same time exercise the
right of retention to the maximum of five hectares.
Issue 2
17
SC AFFIRMED the decision made by CA, who upheld the Feb 2, 2006
order declaring the two hectare land which was sold to SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. was part of Delfins retention area.
It was noted that the right to choose the retention area pertains to
the landowner. However, the inclusion of the two (2) hectares which
is the subject of the Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1995 executed by
the respondent in favor of SM Prime Holdings, Inc., as retained area
is only to prevent the former to exercise his right of retention beyond
the maximum limits allowed by law. The herein respondent cannot
simultaneously enjoy from [sic] the proceeds of the Deed of Sale and
at the same time exercise the right of retention under CARP.
Key Notes:
Right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed
right (still subject to qualification by the
legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the land owners and tenants.
Right to choose the area to retain pertains to the
landowner. Thus, if the chosen area was
tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to
choose whether to remain or be a beneficiary in
the same or another agricultural land with similar
or comparable features.
Upon the effectivity of this Act,any sale,
disposition, lease, management contract or
transfer of possession of private lands executed
by the original landowner in violation of this Act
shall be null and void
SEC. 6. Retention Limits Excepts otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-
sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
created hereunder, but in no case shall retention
by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to
each child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications:
(1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and
(2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm:
Provided, That landowners whose land
have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder; Provided, further,
That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.
15. Land Valuation Secs. 17, 18, and E.O. 228 and P.D. 27
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
SECTION 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP
shall compensate the landowner in such amounts as may be agreed
upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with
the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent
provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the
just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid on one of the following modes, at the
option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions;
(a) For lands above Twenty-five percent fifty (50) hectares, insofar
(25%) cash, the balance to as the excess hectarage is be paid in
government concerned. financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above Thirty percent (30%) cash, twenty-four (24)
hectares the balance to be paid in and up to fifty (50) hectares.
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four Thirty-five percent (35%) (24) hectares
and below. cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations,
LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in
accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten
percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year
from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That
should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in
full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by
the landowner, his successors in interest or his assigns, up to the
amount of their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government,
including assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other
assets foreclosed by government financial institutions in the
same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were
paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of governmentowned or -controlled
corporations or shares of stocks owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution,
provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic
enterprise, preferably in a small-and medium-scale industry, in the
same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government; Provided, That
the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a
certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the
18
financial instruments: Provided, further, That the PARC
shall determine the percentage mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and
other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
In case of extraordinary inflation, the PARC shall take appropriate
measures to protect the economy.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 27 October 21, 1972
DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE
OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND
MECHANISM THEREFOR
In case of default, the amortization due shall be paid by the farmers'
cooperative in which the defaulting tenant-farmer is a member, with
the cooperative having a right of recourse against him;
The government shall guaranty such amortizations with shares of
stock in government-owned and government-controlled corporations;
No title to the land owned by the tenant-farmers under this Decree
shall be actually issued to a tenant-farmer unless and until the tenant-
farmer has become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized
farmer's cooperative;
Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform
Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by
hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the
provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other
existing laws and regulations;

In as much as the old concept of land ownership by a few has spawned The Department of Agrarian Reform through its Secretary is hereby
valid and legitimate grievances that gave rise to violent conflict and empowered to promulgate rules and regulations for the
social tension, implementation of this Decree.

The redress of such legitimate grievances being one of the All laws, executive orders, decrees and rules and regulations, or parts
fundamental objectives of the New Society, thereof, inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed and or
modified accordingly.
Since Reformation must start with the emancipation of the tiller of the
soil from his bondage, Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of October, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution
as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228 July 17, 1987
General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended do
hereby decree and order the emancipation of all tenant farmers as of
this day, October 21, 1972: DECLARING FULL LAND OWNERSHIP TO QUALIFIED FARMER
BENEFICIARIES COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27:
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF REMAINING UNVALUED RICE AND
This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands
CORN LANDS SUBJECT TO P.D. NO. 27; AND PROVIDING FOR THE
primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or
MANNER OF PAYMENT BY THE FARMER BENEFICIARY AND MODE OF
lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not;
COMPENSATION TO THE LANDOWNER

The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not,

WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 27; for purposes of determining the
shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of
cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer; provided that
five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated;
valuation shall be determined by crop productivity;

In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven
WHEREAS, there is a need to complete Operation Land Transfer and
(7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now
accelerate the payment to the landowners of lands transferred to
cultivate it;
tenant-farmers; and

For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred

WHEREAS, there is also a need to maintain the financial validity of the
to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land
Land Bank of the Philippines, the financing arm of the agrarian reform
shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 1/2) times the average
program of the government;
harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the
promulgation of this Decree;
NOW THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per
here order that:
centum per annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen (15) years of
fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations;

CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW 19
Sec. 1. All qualified farmer beneficiaries are now deemed full owners
as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27 (hereinafter referred to as P.D. No. 27).
Sec. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D.
No. 27 shall be based on the average gross production determined by
the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with
Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, Series of 1973, and related
issuances and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
average gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a
half (2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied by Thirty Five Pesos
(P35.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of
palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the
government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October
21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and
corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost
to the farmer and compensation to the landowner.
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer beneficiary after
October 21, 1972, shall be considered as advance payment for the
land. In the event of dispute with the land owner regarding the
amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department
of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land Production
concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its
submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform
Memorandum Circular No. 26, Series of 1973, and other pertinent
issuances. In the event a party questions in court the resolution of the
dispute, the landowner's compensation claim shall still be processed
for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust
Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the
court.
Sec. 3. Compensation shall be paid to the landowners in any of the
following modes, at the option of the landowners:
(a) Bond payment over ten (10) years, with ten percent
(10%) of the value of the land payable immediately in cash,
and the balance in the form of LBP bonds bearing market
rates of interest that are aligned with 90-day treasury bills
rates, net of applicable final withholding tax. One-tenth of
the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the
date of issuance until the tenth year.
The LDP bonds issued hereunder shall be eligible for the
purchase of government assets to be privatized.
(b) Direct payment in cash or in kind by the farmer-
beneficiaries with the terms to be mutually agreed upon by
the beneficiaries and landowners and subject to the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform; and
(c) Other modes of payment as may be prescribed or
approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council.
Sec. 4. All outstanding Land Bank bonds that are retained by the
original landowners-payee or by their heirs, are deemed matured up
to on-twenty fifth (1/25) of their yearly face value from their date of
issue to the date of this Executive Order and may be claimed by the
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
original landowner-payee by surrendering the bonds to the Land Bank.
The original landowner-payee may claim payment for the remaining
unmatured period of the surrendered bonds under any of the modes
of compensation provided in Section 3, subsections (a) (b) or (c)
hereof.
In order to meet the financial requirements mentioned in this Section,
the Central Bank shall remit to the Land Bank such sums as may b
necessary from the Sinking Fund established by the Land Bank from
the retirement of its bonds and other long-term obligations and which
Sinking Fund is administered by the Central Bank: Provided, however,
That there is no change in maturity of other outstanding Land Bank
bonds acquired and held by transferees from original bondholders.
The landowner is exempt from capital gains tax on the compensation
paid to him under this Executive Order.
Sec. 5. In the event that the landowner does not accept payment of
the compensation due him, his compensation shall be held in trust for
him by the Trust Department of the Land Bank. The cash portion of the
compensation and such portions that mature yearly shall be invested
by the Trust Department only in government securities fully
guaranteed by the Republic of the Philippines. All the net earnings of
the investment shall be for the benefit of the landowner, his heirs or
successors in interest.
The rights of the landowners may be exercised by his heirs upon his
death.
Sec. 6. The total costs of the land including interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum with a two percent (2%) interest rebate for
amortizations paid on time, shall be paid by the farmer-beneficiary or
his heirs to the Land Bank over a period up to twenty (20) years in
twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. Lands already valued and
financed by the Land Bank are likewise extended a 20-year period of
payment of twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. However, the
farmer-beneficiary if he so elects, may pay in full before the twentieth
year or may request the Land Bank to structure a repayment period of
less than twenty (20) years if the amount to be financed and the
corresponding annual obligations are well within the farmer's
capacity to meet. Ownership of lands acquired by the farmer-
beneficiary may be transferred after full payment of amortizations.
Sec. 7. As of the date of this Executive Order, a lien by way of mortgage
shall exist in favor of the Land Bank on all lands it has financed and
acquired by the farmer-beneficiary by virtue of P.D. No. 27 for all
amortizations, both principal and interest, due from the farmer-
beneficiary or a valid transferee until the amortizations are paid in full.
Sec. 8. Henceforth, failure on the part of the farmer-beneficiary to pay
three (3) annual amortizations shall be sufficient cause for the Land
Bank to foreclose on the mortgage.
Sec. 9. Thirty (30) days after final notice for payment to the defaulting
tenant-farmer, a copy of which notice shall be furnished to the
Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank may foreclose on the
mortgage by registering a certification under oath of its intent to
foreclose with the Registry of Deeds of the city or province where the
land is located attaching thereto: a copy of the final notice for
20
payment; proof of service to the tenant-farmer and the Department
of Agrarian Reform of the final notice for payment; and a certification
that at least three (3) annual amortizations on the land or the sum
thereof remain unpaid. The mortgage is deemed foreclosed upon
registration of said documents with the Registry of Deeds.
In the event the defaulting tenant-farmer could not be served the final
notice for payment, the Land Bank shall post the notice for payment
in the town hall, public market and barangay hall or any other suitable
place frequented by the public of the barangay where the defaulting
tenant-farmer resides. A certification by the Land Bank to this effect
will substitute for the proof of service of the final notice of payment
for purposes of foreclosure.
The Register of Deeds of all cities and provinces are directed to have a
separate registry book to enter all the requirements of foreclosure as
provided herein.
Sec. 10. The tenant-farmer, or any of his compulsory heirs may lift the
foreclosure within a period of two (2) years from its registration by
paying the Land Bank all unpaid amortizations on the land with
interest thereon of six percent (6%) per annum. In case of failure to lift
the foreclosure within the said period, ownership of the land shall be
deemed transferred to the Land Bank.
Sec. 11. The Land Bank, not later than three (3) months after its
acquisition of the land, shall sell the foreclosed land to any interested
landless farmer duly certified to as a bona fide landless farmer by the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the barangay or the two closest
barangays where the land is situated. The cost of the land is the
unpaid amortizations due on the lands as of the date of the sale with
interest thereon of six percent (6%) per annum. In the event that there
is more than one interested buyer, the actual buyer shall be
determined by lottery in the presence of all the buyers or their
representatives and a representative of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. The Deed of Conveyance executed by the Land Bank in favor
of the farmer transferee shall be registered with the Register of Deeds
of the city or province where the land is located. Ownership shall
transfer to the farmer transferee only upon registration with the
Registry of Deeds. The lien of the Land Bank by way of mortgage on
the remaining unpaid amortizations shall subsists on the title of the
transferee.
Sec. 12. The Land Bank, at least one (1) month prior to the sale, shall
furnish the Department of Agrarian Reform with a notice of sale and
shall post a similar notice in the town hall, public market and barangay
hall or any other suitable place frequented by the public of the
barangay where the property is located. The notice shall state the
description of the property subject of the sale, the price, the date and
place of sale.
Sec. 13. The National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration is hereby authorized to issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary relative to the registration with the
Register of Deeds of all transactions/activities required herein taking
into consideration the need to protect the integrity of the Torrens
System, the interests of the parties and innocent third parties.
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
All transactions/activities and their corresponding documents that are
registered with the Register of Deeds pursuant to the requirements of
P.D. No. 27 and this Executive Order shall be free from all documentary
stamps and registration fees.
Sec. 14. The Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank are
authorized to issue the additional implementing guidelines of this
Executive Order which shall not be later than sixty (60) days from the
date hereof.
Sec. 15. To ensure the successful implementation of the Agrarian
Reform Program, an Agrarian Reform Operating Fund (Agrarian Fund)
shall be set up by the National Government in the Land Bank. The
amount of this Agrarian Fund, to be determined by the Government
Corporation Monitoring and Coordinating Committee hereinafter
referred to as GCMCC), will source the funding requirements for Land
Bank to carry out the full implementation of this program which will
include the net operating losses directly and indirectly attributable to
this program and the credit facilities to farmers and farmers'
organizations. Within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this
Executive Order, the Land Bank shall submit to the GCMCC its funding
requirements for 1987. Thereafter, within sixty (60) days after the end
of each calendar year, the Land Bank shall submit to the GCMCC an
accounting of all drawings the Land Bank had made against the Fund.
At the same time, it will also submit its prospective funding
requirements for the current year for review and validation of the
GCMCC. The amount approved by the GCMCC shall be deemed
appropriate and the amount programmed for release in coordination
with the Department of Finance, Budget and Management and the
National Economic and Development Authority. Within thirty (30)
days from GCMCC's approval, such funds shall be remitted to the Land
Bank for credit to the Agrarian Fund.
Sec. 16. If any part of this Executive Order is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, it shall not affect any other part thereof.
Sec. 17. All laws, presidential decrees, orders, letters of instructions,
rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 18. This Executive Order shall take effect upon its signing and
publication as provided by law.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 17th day of July, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
CASES:
Landbank vs. Hon. Eli Natividad, GR 127198, May 16, 2005
Facts:
Delfino owned parcels of land in Laguna totaling 35.4 hectares of
which 20.8 was coconut land and 14.6 was Riceland. He sold all of the
coconut land leaving him only Riceland of which 9.8 hectares are
tenanted. The tenanted portion being tilled by respondents was
placed under Operation Land Transfer under PD 27. After full
21
payment to the Land Bank of the Philippines of the amortizations, the
farmer-beneficiaries were issued Emancipation Patents (EPs).
Before the EPs were registered, Delfino filed an Application for
Retention over the entire 14.6-hectare Riceland. The Secretary of
DAR gave him a maximum of 5 hectares (from the tenanted portion
as his retained area) as his right of retention. Respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to the ruling of the DAR Secretary arguing
that the order will have the effect of cancelling the EPs and
consequently deprive them of ownership of the landholdings they
acquired pursuant to PD 27. The MR was denied. A petition for review
in the CA was likewise denied.
5 months later, Delfino sold 2 hectares of his tenanted Riceland to SM
Prime Holdings. Though covered by OLT, no EP had been issued to this
particular parcel of land. Delfino subsequently filed a petition with the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for cancellation of
the EPs previously issued to respondents on the basis of the DAR
Secretarys Order granting him 5 hectares. This was granted by the
PARAD and affirmed the Secretary of DAR.
The respondents filed a Petition to Annul and/or Cancel the DAR
Secretarys Orders which was also denied by a new DAR Secretary.
This new DAR Secretary however clarified the extent of the 5-hectare
retention right given to Delfino by the previous DAR Secretary.
Whereas the previous DAR Secretary did not clarify which parts of the
Riceland the 5-hectares were to be taken from, the new DAR
Secretary held that the land sold to SM Prime Holdings will form part
of the 5-hectares.
Delfino believing that the previous DAR Secretarys orders were final
and executory filed this suit.
Issues and Holding:
3.) Whether the clarification made by the new DAR Secretary
violated the rule on immutability of final judgments. No.
4.) Whether the inclusion of the two hectare portion sold to
SM Prime Holdings Inc In Delfinos retention area was in
derogation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657. YES
Ratio:
Issue 1
Delfino was granted five hectares from the tenanted portion as his
retained area. Said order had become final and executory. A
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect. There are,
however, exceptions to the general rule, namely:
(1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party;
(3) void judgments; and
(4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In this case, the clarification made by the new DAR Secretary falls
under the fourth exception. The DAR Secretary thus found it fair and
equitable to include the portion sold to SM Prime Holdings to
Delfinos retention area. As explained by the Secretary, this
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
clarification was made in order not to circumvent the five-hectare
limitation as said landowner cannot [be allowed to] simultaneously
enjoy the proceeds of the [sale] and at the same time exercise the
right of retention to the maximum of five hectares.
Issue 2
SC AFFIRMED the decision made by CA, who upheld the Feb 2, 2006
order declaring the two hectare land which was sold to SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. was part of Delfins retention area.
It was noted that the right to choose the retention area pertains to
the landowner. However, the inclusion of the two (2) hectares which
is the subject of the Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1995 executed by
the respondent in favor of SM Prime Holdings, Inc., as retained area
is only to prevent the former to exercise his right of retention beyond
the maximum limits allowed by law. The herein respondent cannot
simultaneously enjoy from [sic] the proceeds of the Deed of Sale and
at the same time exercise the right of retention under CARP.
Key Notes:
Right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right (still subject
to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the land
owners and tenants.
Right to choose the area to retain pertains to the landowner. Thus,
if the chosen area was tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to
choose whether to remain or be a beneficiary in the same or another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features.
Upon the effectivity of this Act,any sale, disposition, lease,
management contract or transfer of possession of private lands
executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null
and void
SEC. 6. Retention Limits Excepts otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but
in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and
(2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm:
Provided, That landowners whose land have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original
homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own
the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.
Josefina Lubrica vs. Landbank, GR 170220, Nov. 20, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2 of Federico C. Suntay
over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
22
In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682
hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)4 and Executive Order No. 228
(1987).5 The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer
beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP
fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was
deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from
Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land consisting of two lots,
namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing
an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2
was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161
hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at
P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted
summary administrative proceedings for determination of just
compensation.
ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation should be based
on the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment.
HELD: Yes.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just
compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the
property can be taken away from its owners.27 The transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government are
conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner
of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to
date, they have not yet received just compensation. Thus, it would
certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the
failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance
with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important
considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator,
the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
Landbank vs. CA and Pedro Yap, GR 118712, Oct. 6, 1995
Facts:
Yap and Santiago are landowners whose landholdings were acquired
by the DAR, subjecting it for transfer to qualified CARP beneficiaries.
Aggrieved by the compensation valuation of DAR and LBP,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a
preliminary mandatory injunction. The case was referred to CA for
proper determination and disposition.
Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted without jurisdiction when they opened trusts
accounts in lieu of the depositing in cash or bonds, before the lands
was taken and the titles are cancelled. Respondents claim that before
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
the taking of the property, the compensation must be deposited in
cash or bonds.
DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit was a substantial
compliance with the rule on taking and compensation. LBP confirms
that the certificate of deposit expresses "reserved/deposited".
CA ruled in favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR filed a petition. DAR,
maintain that the word "deposit" referred merely to the act of
depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as
form of deposit.
Issue: Whether the opening of trust account tantamount to deposit.
Ruling:
Contention of DAR is untenable. Section 16 of RA 6657 provides:
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)
It is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP
bonds, there is no ambiguity.
16. Land Redistribution Secs. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27
SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP
shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the
same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the
same municipality in the following order of priority: (a) agricultural
lessees and share tenants; (b) regular farmworkers; (c) seasonal
farmworkers; (d) other farmworkers; (e) actual tillers or occupants of
public lands; (f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries;
and (g) others directly working on the land. Provided, however, That
the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this
Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land of
their parents: and Provided, further, That actual tenant-tillers in the
landholdings shall not be ejected or removed
therefrom. Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have
culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to
become beneficiaries under this Program. A basic qualification of a
beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude, and ability to cultivate
and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a
system of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary,
so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or
any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such
beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the
performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC. If, due to the
landowner's retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or
workers on the land, there is not enough land to accommodate any or
some of them, they may be granted ownership of other lands
available for distribution under this Act, at the option of the
beneficiaries. Farmers already in place and those not accommodated
in the distribution of privately-owned lands will be given preferential
rights in the distribution of lands from the public domain.
23
SECTION 23. Distribution Limit. No qualified beneficiary may
own more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land.
SECTION 24. Award to Beneficiaries. The rights and
responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the
DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be
completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the
DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the
beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided
for in this Act, and shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds
concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title.
SECTION 25. Award Ceilings for Beneficiaries. Beneficiaries shall
be awarded an area not exceeding three (3) hectares which may cover
a contiguous tract of land or several parcels of land cumulated up to
the prescribed award limits. For purposes of this Act, a landless
beneficiary is one who owns less than three (3) hectares of
agricultural land. The beneficiaries may opt for collective ownership,
such as co-ownership or farmers cooperative or some other form of
collective organization: Provided, That the total area that may be
awarded shall not exceed the total number of co-owners or member
of the cooperative or collective organization multiplied by the award
limit above prescribed, except in meritorious cases as determined by
the PARC. Title to the property shall be issued in the name of the co-
owners or the cooperative or collective organization as the case may
be.
SECTION 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. Lands awarded pursuant
to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty
(30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The
payments for the first three (3) years after the award may be at
reduced amounts as established by the PARC: Provided, That the first
five (5) annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of
the value of the annual gross production as established by the DAR.
Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten
percent (10%) of the annual gross production and the failure to
produce accordingly is not due to the beneficiary's fault, the LBP may
reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal obligations to make
the repayment affordable. The LBP shall have a lien by way of
mortgage on the land awarded to the beneficiary; and this mortgage
may be foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of
three (3) annual amortizations. The LBP shall advise the DAR of
such proceedings and the latter shall subsequently award the
forfeited landholdings to other qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary
whose land, as provided herein, has been foreclosed shall thereafter
be permanently disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under this
Act. cd
SECTION 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. Lands acquired
by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold, transferred or
conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the
government, or the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period
of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the children or the spouse
of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from
the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of
the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land
is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM) as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice
thereof by the BARC. If the land has not yet been fully paid by the
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred or conveyed,
with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any
other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or conveyance,
shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the
land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the
availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately
preceding paragraph. In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the
latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the
amounts the latter has already paid, together with the value of
improvements he has made on the land.
Samuel Estribillo et.al., vs. DAR and Hacienda Maria, Inc., GR
159674, June 30, 2006
Doctrine: Cancellation and Indefeasibility of Title The transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents
acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate
of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for
the issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no longer
be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed
to another person.
Facts: Petitioners are recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over
parcels of land which were formerly part of a forested area which
have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of
respondent Hacienda Maria. Petitioners occupied and tilled theses
areas believing that the same were public lands. PD No. 27 was issued
mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.
Hacienda Maria requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings
be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving
compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants
to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under
Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area
was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding
TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to
petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with
RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under
Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former
landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either
rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation
was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the
TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was
not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established
tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitioners appealed
to the DARAB, which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the
CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs
became indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their
registration.
Issue: Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after
their issuance
Ruling:
YES. The Court ruled that certificates of title issued in administrative
proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial
proceedings. Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance. The
DARAB, however, ruled that the EP is a title issued through the
agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction
24
and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it
is not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title.
The DARAB is grossly mistaken.
Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court provides that
certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as
indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:
It must be emphasized that a certificate
of title issued under an administrative proceeding
pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant
case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under a judicial registration proceeding,
provided the land covered by said certificate is a
disposable public land within the contemplation
of the Public Land Law.
There is no specific provision in the
Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the
Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529,
fixing the one (1) year period within which the
public land patent is open to review on the
ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and
clothing a public land patent certificate of title
with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent
pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly
reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration
Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by
implication by this Court to the patent issued by
the Director of Lands duly approved by the
Secretary of Natural Resources, under the
signature of the President of the Philippines in
accordance with law. The date of issuance of the
patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the
issuance of the decree in ordinary registration
cases because the decree finally awards the land
applied for registration to the party entitled to it,
and the patent issued by the Director of Lands
equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys
the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our
mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit
of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a
family home, and to encourage the settlement,
residence and cultivation and improvement of the
lands of the public domain. If the title to the land
grant in favor of the homesteader would be
subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it
has been given by the Government through the
process of proceedings in accordance with the
Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty,
confusion and suspicion on the governments
system of distributing public agricultural lands
pursuant to the Land for the Landless policy of the
State.
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the
distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless would arise
if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an
administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27
as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same
as that in the Public Land Act where Prof.
Antonio Noblejas commented:
Inasmuch as there is no positive
statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the
titles granted thereunder, such silence should be
construed and interpreted in favor of
the homesteader who come into the possession
of his homestead after complying with the
requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land
Registration Law should be interpreted to apply
by implication to the patent issued by the Director
of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural
Resources, under the signature of
the President of the Philippines, in accordance
with law
After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section
105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-
farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No.
27), the TCTsissued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the
same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one
year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the
patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject
matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another
person
As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.[26]:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding
public land patents and the character of the
certificate of title that may be issued by virtue
thereof, is that where land is granted by the
government to a private individual, the
corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and
the certificate of title is issued to the grantee;
thereafter, the land is automatically brought
within the operation of the Land Registration
Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming
entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section
38 of the said Act. In other words, upon
expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of
registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter
IX[27] on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued
in registration proceedings.
25

The only defense of respondents, that the issue of
indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with the
DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised
before the RARAD
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the
corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-
interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:
17. Land Tenure Improvement Secs. 12 and 32
SECTION 12. Determination of Lease Rentals. In order to protect
and improve the tenurial and economic status of the farmers in
tenanted lands under the retention limit and lands not yet acquired
under this Act, the DAR is mandated to determine and fix immediately
the lease rentals thereof in accordance with Section 34 of Republic Act
No. 3844, as amended: Provided, That the DAR shall immediately and
periodically review and adjust the rental structure for different crops,
including rice and corn, or different regions in order to improve
progressively the conditions of the farmer, tenant or lessee.
SECTION 32. Production-Sharing. Pending final land transfer,
individuals or entities owning, or operating under lease or
management contract, agricultural lands are hereby mandated to
execute a production-sharing plan with their farm workers or
farmworkers' reorganization, if any, whereby three percent (3%) of
the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed
within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to
regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals
or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum
unless the DAR, upon proper application, determines a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional
ten percent (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said
regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of
the fiscal year. To forestall any disruption in the normal operation of
lands to be turned over to the farmworker-beneficiaries mentioned
above, a transitory period, the length of which shall be determined by
the DAR, shall be established. During this transitory period, at least
one percent (1%) of the gross sales of the entity shall be distributed to
the managerial, supervisory and technical group in place at the time
of the effectivity of this Act, as compensation for such transitory
managerial and technical functions as it will perform, pursuant to an
agreement that the farmworker-beneficiaries and the managerial,
supervisory and technical group may conclude, subject to the approval
of the DAR.
CASES:
Caballes vs. DAR, GR 78214, Dec. 5, 1988 (168 SCRA 247)
FACTS:
The landholding situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu which consists
of only sixty (60) square meters was acquired by the spouses Arturo
and Yolanda Caballes by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July
24, 1978 executed by Andrea Millenes .
In 1975, before the sale of the land in favor of the Caballes
spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his
house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
P2.00 to the previous owner, Andrea Millenes. Millenes likewise
allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the
produce thereof would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. From
1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In
1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant bananas and
camote.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new
owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry
they intended to build would be close to his house and pursuaded him
to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the
landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land
occupied by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new
owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed
the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a
confrontation before the Barangay Captain but failed to reach an
agreement. All the efforts exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon
from the landholding were in vain as Abajon simply refused to budge.
On April 1, 1982, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating
that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting
bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge,
Abajon, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on
the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious
mischief was filed against Abajon. (Obviously, all the planting on the
property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by
Abajon.)
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
DAR, through its new Minister, Heherson Alvarez, held that said
criminal case is not proper for trial, since there is the existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties, and that the case was
designed to harass Abajon into vacating his tillage. The Caballes are
legally bound to respect the tenancy of Abajon, since Abajon is still
considered as an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-
square meter portion of the commercial lot of the Caballes.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:
Public respondents, DAR & Hon. Alvarez, gravely erred in holding that
the criminal case is not proper for trial and hearing by the court since
the private respondent, Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant. (The
criminal case for malicious mischief filed against Abajon should be
declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can
resume.)
RESOLUTION: The SC dismissed the criminal case. They held that The
private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious
mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized
occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees,
he owns said crops including the fruits thereof. The private
respondent's possession of the land is not illegal or in bad faith
because he was allowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy
the premises. In other words, the private respondent worked the land
in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners.
Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and
cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the
landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious
mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of
another," is absent because the private respondent merely cut down
his own plantings.
Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608, 1992
Facts:
26
The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square
meters in Laguna. The Landowner then entered in to a contract with
the petitioner and employed him to be laborer on the land with the
wage of 5.00 peso a day.
The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation and then went
to Ministry of Agrarian reform and asked the court to fix the
agricultural lease rental of the land and his request was granted.
The private respondent then filed a complaint of illegal detainer
against the petitioner that was that was dismissed by the Ministry of
Agrarian reform for the existence of Tenancy relations between the
parties. The Private respondents appealed to the office of the
President alleging that there was no tenancy relation between the
parties.
The RTC rendered dismissed the complaint and assailed that there
was a tenancy relation between the parties.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?
Held: No, it was clear that the petitioner were not intended to be
tenant but a mere employee of the private respondent as showed in
the contract. The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work. The
court stressed many cases that:
"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of
the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and as in this case, their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and
are not contrary to law, are even more important."
It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under Section
5(a) R.A 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to
or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system.
Therefore the court laid down the requisites for the tenancy
relationship to exist:
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2) The subject is agricultural land;
3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and
6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is
clear that it is not a tenancy relationship that exists between the
parties, what they have is employee-employer relationship.
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590, 1974
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner
of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral
contract of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them.
Defendant was notified that the contract would be terminated, but
upon request was extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the
trial court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court
of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the
motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was
originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano
for as long as the defendant wanted, subject to the condition that he
would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that which was
already a fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be
reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of
the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue leasing as
long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it
personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of
determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings,
repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid of helpers since he
became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over
who said that she helps her father in administering the leased
property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar
who is residing near the fishpond, defendants other children are all
professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in
Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural
leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,
pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case
is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with
the aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4,
Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties
has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and
therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New
Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and
the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested
with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this
Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and
appellant as that of a civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy under
Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance
is without jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in
nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD:
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law
lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil
law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend
to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee
need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose,
the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture,
whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
27
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by
the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy
Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person
together with members of his immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with
the aid of labor available from members of his immediate
farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a
fixed amount in money or in produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and
the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land",
specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for
the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural
land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the
purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law
lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied
with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it
wasnt raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy agreement was
severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally
because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members
of appellant's immediate farm household work the land. Only the
members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether
related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support
and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included
in the term "immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land. A person, in order to be
considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his
immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore,
who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and
he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the
land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land
as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No.
1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the
relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act
No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
18. Conversion of Agricultural Lands Sec. 65 and RA 7160 (Sec. 20)
SECTION 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years
from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized
and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the
beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties,
and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
Section 20. Reclassification of Lands. -
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed
by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the
purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition
in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where
the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That
such reclassification shall be limited to the following
percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent
component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class
municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five
percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural
lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six
hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise
known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law", shall not be affected by the said
reclassification and the conversion of such lands
into other purposes shall be governed by Section
65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and
upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to
reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next
preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with
existing laws, continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases
for the future use of land resources: Provided. That the
requirements for food production, human settlements, and
industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for
reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete
application for reclassification within three (3) months from
receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
28
 (e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing,
amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657.
CASES:
Jose Luis Ros, et.al. vs. DAR, GR 132477, Aug. 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of
land. By virtue of a Municipal Ordinance, these lands were reclassified
as industrial lands. As part of their preparation for the development
of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the
necessary permits and appropriate government certifications.
However, the DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands
for industrial use and directed the petitioners to cease and desist from
further developments on the land.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. However, the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR
which has jurisdiction, dismissed the complaint.
When the case was brought to the SC, it was referred to the
CA. However, the CA affirmed the dismissal of the case. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary jurisdiction over the case.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise
known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural
lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of
conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to
approve or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,
pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the
DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the reclassification or
conversion of agricultural lands.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested
in the DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by
the trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts
from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For
agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of injunction against the
DAR.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. (CREBA) vs. Sec.
of Agrarian Reform, GR 183409, June 18, 2010
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
FACTS:
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October
1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3 entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses,"
which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to
land use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private
agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural
uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99,4 entitled "Revised Rules and
Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land
use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands,
to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial,
institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be
devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock,
poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land from
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3)
those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that
previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative
Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules
on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97
and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent
therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for
conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural
lands for real estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which
temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use
conversion applications.
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual
slow down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing
shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but
more so of the whole nation.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT
HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.
HELD: yes?
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
before 15 June 1988" have been included in the definition of
agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid
sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules
and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes
the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use
conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural
lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses
29
and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of
land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of
1990, which Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by
this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657
on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve land
conversion.38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the
authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion.
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between
reclassification and conversion that agricultural lands though
reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before
they can be used for the purpose to which they are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs
conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988.45 The said date served as the
cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural
lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or
authority.46 Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already
subject to DARs conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not
suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is
needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands. It
bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes.
The Hon. Carlos Fortich, et.al. vs. The Hon. Renato Corona, GR
131457, April 24, 1998
Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the
petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the
Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years
under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in
the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property
under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38
million.
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare
donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property
was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency
of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary
Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal
to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without
giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title
on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the
issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No.
00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-
beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 of the Registry of Deeds of
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
Bukidnon.
NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against
DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19,
1997, restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying
and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben
D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said
order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had
already become final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by
alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are
real parties in interest as they were previously identified by
respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare
property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by
the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners
claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said
resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-
beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically
blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely
political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying
the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and
executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners further
allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November
1997. They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the
subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law
and it would be a futile exercise to seek reconsideration.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been
to file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the
present petition; and
(3) Whether or not Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
Held:
1. In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper
or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment
and an error of jurisdiction.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an
appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the
30
act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This
error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-
judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be taken
to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or
resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law.
However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an
allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was
issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent
Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996
which had long become final and executory. In other words, the
crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error
of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus,
the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution
is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what
the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section
1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary
cases in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is
wholly void.
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person
aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for
certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition
must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts
or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed
in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the
jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with
the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the
act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed
only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or
the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of
concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through
now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction)
is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts ,
which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court,
with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129, the latters competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed.
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or
the nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been
the judicial policy to be observed.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction
over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid
future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by
the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed
later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the
petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would
only result in a waste of time and money.
2. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the
President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No.
18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President
shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final
after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by
the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed
within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be
allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall
apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no
one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the
said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify
its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has
31
no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second
motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section
7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration
is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even
if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in
exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph
of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was
not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996
to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the
Office of the President had long become final and executory, the same
can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our
jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have
upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata The rule of res
judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and
quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble
purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there
would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this
principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power
of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
3. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than
by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation
commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is
pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes
and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the
court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against
forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs.
Lopez and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case
No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant.
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not
guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party
has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the
petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each
other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the
nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On
the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the
annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following
grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner
NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null
and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was
made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice
to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is
entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification
of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President
dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the
previous two cases were instituted
Heirs of Luis A. Luna, et.al., vs. Ruben A. Afable, et.al. GR 188299,
January 23, 2013
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. J-7205 (T-54199), with an area of 158.77
hectares, located in Barangay Guinobatan, Calapan City, Oriental
Mindoro.4 100.2856 hectares of the landholding was subjected to
compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) through a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition
dated 20 August 1998 issued by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) and published in a newspaper of general circulation on 29, 30
and 31 August 1998.5
Respondents were identified by the DAR as qualified farmer-
beneficiaries; hence, the corresponding Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) were generated, issued to respondents
and duly registered in their names on 12 October 1998.6
On 21 October 1998, petitioners filed before the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB) Oriental Mindoro a Petition for "Cancellation of
CLOAs, Revocation of Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and
Upholding and Affirming the Classification of Subject Property and
Declaring the same outside the purview of RA No. 6657."7 The
petition was anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land in
question into a light intensity industrial zone pursuant to Municipal
Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981, enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan
of Calapan, thereby excluding the same from the coverage of the
agrarian law.
32
The Ruling of the DARAB Calapan City
In a Decision dated 26 August 1999, the DARAB disposed of the
petition in the following manner:
IN THE LIGHT OF the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the Cancellation of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award x x x issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform in favor of private respondents pursuant
to RA No. 6657 covering the subject parcel of land under
TCT No. 5-7205 [sic] (T-54199) of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Oriental Mindoro, in the name of Luis Luna,
et. al.,
2. Upholding and affirming the classification of the subject
parcel of land into residential, commercial and institutional
uses pursuant to RA No. 2264 (Autonomy Act of 1959) and
the Local Government Code of 1991;
3. Declaring the farmholding in question outside the
purview of Republic Act No. 6657;
x x x x8
The DARAB found that petitioners property is exempt from the CARP
as it has been reclassified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657. According to the DARAB, the records of
the case indicate that subject parcel of land was classified as within
the residential, commercial and industrial zone by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro through Resolution No. 139,
Series of 1981, enacted on 14 April 1981 as Municipal Ordinance No.
21. Moreover, the Office of the City Assessor has also classified the
property as residential, commercial and industrial in use under the tax
declaration covering the same. Finally, the Office of the Deputized
Zoning Administrator, Urban Planning and Development Office,
Calapan City, issued a Certification on 25 September 1998 stating that
"under Article III, Section 3, No. 7 of Resolution No. 139, Municipal
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1981, areas covered by this [sic] provisions
has [sic] been declared as Light Intensity Industrial Zone prior to the
approval of RA 6657 x x x."9
The DARAB cited Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series
of 1990, which provides that a parcel of land is considered non-
agricultural and, therefore, beyond the coverage of the CARP, if it had
been classified as residential, commercial, or industrial in the city or
municipality where the Land Use Plan or zoning ordinance has been
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of RA No. 6657. The
aforementioned Opinion of the DOJ further states that all lands falling
under this category, that is, lands already classified as commercial,
industrial or residential, before 15 June 1988 no longer need any
conversion clearance from the DAR.10
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the DARAB Central Office.
The Ruling of the DARAB Central Office
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
The Central Office of the DARAB found that its local office in Calapan
City erred in declaring petitioners property outside the coverage of
the CARP by relying solely on the assertion of the landowners that the
land had already been reclassified from agricultural to non-
agricultural prior to 15 June 1988.11
The DARAB held that the local Adjudicator misconstrued DOJ Opinion
No. 44, Series of 1990 and, in the process, overlooked DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 2, Series of 1994 which provides the
grounds upon which CLOAs may be cancelled, among which is that
the land is found to be exempt or excluded from CARP coverage or is
to be part of the landowners retained area as determined by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative. Thus,
the DARAB concluded, the issue of whether or not petitioners land is
indeed exempt from CARP coverage is still an administrative matter
to be determined exclusively by the DAR Secretary or his authorized
representative. In short, an exemption clearance from the DAR is still
required. In this connection, DAR AO No. 6 was issued on 27 May 1994
setting down the guidelines in the issuance of exemption clearance
based on Section 3(c) of RA No. 6657 and DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series
of 1990. Pursuant thereto, "any landowner or his duly authorized
representative whose lands are covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44-S-
1990, and desires to have an exemption clearance from the DAR,
should file the application with the Regional Office of the DAR where
the land is located."12 (Underlining omitted)
Accordingly, the DARAB set aside the Decision dated 26 August 1999
of the DARAB Calapan City for lack of jurisdiction and referred 13 the
case to the Regional Office of DAR Region IV for final determination
as to whether the land covered by TCT No. J-7205 (T-54199) in the
names of Luis Luna, et al. is exempt from CARP coverage.14
In an apparent response to the above ruling of the DARAB holding that
petitioners still need an exemption clearance from the DAR,
petitioners filed an application for exemption from CARP coverage of
subject land.
The Ruling of the DAR
(On Petitioners Application for Exemption from CARP coverage)
In an Order dated 16 December 2003, then DAR Secretary Roberto M.
Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) granted petitioners application for
exemption based on the following findings:
In a joint ocular inspection and investigation conducted by the
representatives of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office MARO, PARO
and Regional Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and
ImplementationRCLUPPI on September 18 2003, disclosed the
following findings:
1. The documents (HLURB and Deputized Zoning
AdministratorDZA Certifications) show that the whole 158
hectares is exempted from the coverage of RA 6657;
2. It is not irrigated;
33
 3. The area where subject property is located can be
considered as already urbanizing; and
4. The topography is generally flat and the property is
traversed by a concrete highway hence accessible to all
means of land transportation.
Issue
1. the core issue for resolution is whether the land subject of
this case had been reclassified as non-agricultural as early
as 1981, that is, prior to the effectivity of the CARL and,
therefore, exempt from its coverage.
2. whether or not petitioners landholding falls within the
reclassified zone, thereby taking it out of the coverage of
the CARL
held
1. we find that the area where subject property is situated was
really intended to be classified not as agricultural, as in fact
it was declared as a residential, commercial and
institutional in 1998."
It is clear from the last clause of the afore-quoted provision that a land
is not agricultural, and therefore, outside the ambit of the CARP if the
following conditions concur:
the land has been classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as
residential, commercial or industrial; and
the town plan and zoning ordinance embodying the land
classification has been approved by the HLURB or its predecessor
agency prior to 15 June 1988.
It is undeniable that local governments have the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands.44Section 345 of RA No. 2264
(The Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal
and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission.46By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature
may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its
political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present,
but also on the future projection of needs.47 It may, therefore, be
reasonably presumed that when city and municipal boards and
councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or district in their
cities or municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone
pursuant to the power granted to them under Section 3 of the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at the same time, reclassifying any
agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence,
ensuring the implementation of and compliance with their zoning
ordinances
2. "with respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered
by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
DAR to approve such conversions may be exercised from
the date of the laws effectivity on June 15, 1998." Thus, AO
No. 6 states that "all lands that were already classified as
commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no
longer need any conversion clearance." Designed "to
streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on
DOJ Opinion No. 44," the AO laid down the procedure and
guidelines for the issuance of exemption clearances58 for
landowners whose lands are covered by DOJ Opinion No.
44, Series of 1990 and desire to obtain an exemption
clearance from the DAR. Such exemption clearance does
not mean that the DAR Secretary is exempting the land from
CARL coverage, with the implication that the land was
previously covered; it simply means that the CARL itself has,
from the start, excluded the land from CARL coverage, and
the DAR Secretary is only affirming such fact.
Valcurza, et.al. vs. Atty. Tamparong, Jr., GR 189874, Sept. 4, 2013
Casimiro N. Tamparong, Jr. (respondent) is the registered owner of a
landholding with an area of 412,004 square meter. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental allegedly passed a
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance - classifying respondent's land from
agricultural to industrial.
A Notice of Coverage was issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) on 3 November 1992 over 276,411 square meters out
of the 412,004 square meters of respondent's land. The 276,411
square meters of land were collectively designated as Lot No. 1100.
The DAR Secretary eventually issued Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) No. 00102751 over the land in favor of Rodulfo
Valcurza, et al (petitioners). As a result, OCT No. E-4640 was issued in
favor of petitioners on 30 May 1994.
Respondent filed a protest against the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage on the ground that his land was
industrial, being found within the industrial estate of PHIVIDEC per
Zoning His protest was resolved in a Resolution[13] issued by Regional
Director Benjamin R. de Vera on 9 October 2000. The Resolution
denied respondent's protest because Zoning Ordinance No. 123,
Series of 1997, never unequivocally stated that all the landholdings
within the PHIVIDEC area had been classified as industrial.
Furthermore, the Municipal Planning and Development Council of
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, issued a letter to the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) stating that Lot No. 1100 was classified as
agricultural per Municipal Ordinance No. 51-98, Series of 1982. Also,
PHIVIDEC certified that the same lot is located outside the PHIVIDEC
Industrial Estate
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate
of Land Ownership Award in PARAB
As the PARAB exercised delegated authority from the DARAB, it was
but proper for the former to rule on the complaint. in the exercise of
this jurisdiction, the PARAB found the CARP coverage irregular and
anomalous because the issuance of the CLOA, as well as its
registration with the Register of Deeds, happened before the survey
plan was approved by the DENR.
On appeal, the DARAB held that the identification of lands that are
subject to CARP and the declaration of exemption therefrom are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with
the CA, which ruled that the annulment of duly registered CLOAs with
the Land Registration Authority falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
34
of the DARAB and not of the regional director. Furthermore, the
subject landholding was considered industrial because of a zoning
classification issued by the Municipal Council of Villanueva, Misamis
Oriental, prior to 15 June 1988. This ruling is consistent with the
power of local governments to reclassify lands through a local
ordinance, which is not subject to DAR's approval
W/n Decision that the land is industrial based on a zoning ordinance,
without a prior finding on whether the ordinance had been approved
by the HLURB
HELD
We ruled in Heirs of Luna v. Afable as follows
The meaning of "agricultural lands" covered by the CARL was
explained further by the DAR in its AO No. 1, Series of 1990, dated 22
March 1990, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses,"
issued pursuant to Section 49 of the CARL. Thus:
Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in RA 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15
June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use. (Emphasis
omitted)
It is clear from the last clause of the afore-quoted provision that a land
is not agricultural, and therefore, outside the ambit of the CARP if the
following conditions concur:
1. the land has been classified in town plans and zoning ordinances
as residential, commercial or industrial; and
2. the town plan and zoning ordinance embodying the land
classification has been approved by the HLURB or its predecessor
agency prior to 15 June 1988. AIDTHC
It is undeniable that local governments have the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Section 3 of RA No. 2264 (The
Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal and/or
city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission.
By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange,
prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political
jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also
on the future projection of needs. It may, therefore, be reasonably
presumed that when city and municipal boards and councils approved
an ordinance delineating an area or district in their cities or
municipalities as residential, commercial, or industrial zone pursuant
to the power granted to them under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy
Act of 1959, they were, at the same time, reclassifying any agricultural
lands within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the
implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances.
The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective
territorial jurisdiction through zoning and reclassification is an
exercise of police power. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
of a locality. Ordinance No. 21 of the Sangguniang Bayanof Calapan
was issued pursuant to Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959
and is, consequently, a valid exercise of police power by the local
government of Calapan.
The second requirement that a zoning ordinance, in order to validly
reclassify land, must have been approved by the HLURB prior to 15
June 1988 is the result of Letter of Instructions No. 729, dated 9
August 1978. According to this issuance, local governments are
required to submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances,
enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of Human
Settlements one of the precursor agencies of the HLURB for review
and ratification. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the records of the case show the absence of HLURB
Certifications approving Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance Resolution
No. 51-98, Series of 1982, and Zoning Ordinance No. 123, Series of
1997. Hence, it cannot be said that the land is industrial and outside
the ambit of CARP.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition dated 19
November 2009 is hereby GRANTED. The 24 September 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01244-MIN
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 26 April 2005 Decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board
is REINSTATED.
19.Mechanisms for Program Implementation & Financing Program
Secs. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 63, and RA 9700 (Sec. 21)
SECTION 41. The Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. The
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) shall be composed of the
President of the Philippines as Chairman, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform as Vice-Chairman and the following as members; Secretaries
of the Departments of Agriculture; Environment and Natural
Resources; Budget and Management; Local Government: Public
Works and Highways; Trade and Industry; Finance; Labor and
Employment; Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority; President, Land Bank of the Philippines;
Administrator, National Irrigation Administration; and three (3)
representatives of affected landowners to represent Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao; six (6) representatives of agrarian reform
beneficiaries, two (2) each from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao,
provided that one of them shall be from the cultural communities.
SECTION 42. Executive Committee. There shall be an Executive
Committee (EXCOM) of the PARC composed of the Secretary of the
DAR as Chairman, and such other members as the President may
designate, taking into account Article XIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution. Unless otherwise directed by PARC, the EXCOM may
meet and decide on any and all matters in between meetings of the
PARC: Provided, however, That its decisions must be reported to the
PARC immediately and not later than the next meeting.
SECTION 43. Secretariat. A PARC Secretariat is hereby established
to provide general support and coordinative services such as inter-
agency linkages; program and project appraisal and evaluation and
general operations monitoring for the PARC. The Secretariat shall be
headed by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who shall be assisted by
an Undersecretary and supported by a staff whose composition shall
be determined by the PARC Executive Committee and whose
35
compensation shall be chargeable against the Agrarian Reform Fund.
All officers and employees of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
SECTION 44. Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM). A Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM) is hereby created in each province, composed of a
Chairman, who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the EXCOM, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer as Executive Officer, and one representative each from the
Departments of Agriculture, and of Environment and Natural
Resources and from the LBP, one representative each from existing
farmers' organizations, agricultural cooperatives and non-
governmental organizations in the province; two representatives from
landowners, at least one of whom shall be a producer representing the
principal crop of the province, and two representatives from farmer
and farmworker-beneficiaries, at least one of whom shall be a farmer
or farmworker representing the principal crop of the province, as
members: Provided, That in areas where there are cultural
communities, the latter shall likewise have one representative. The
PARCCOM shall coordinate and monitor the implementation of the
CARP in the province. It shall provide information on the provisions of
the CARP, guidelines issued by the PARC and on the progress of the
CARP in the province.
SECTION 45. Province-by-Province Implementation. The PARC shall
provide the guidelines for a province-by-province implementation of
the CARP. The ten-year program of distribution of public and private
lands in each province shall be adjusted from year by the province's
PARCCOM in accordance with the level of operations previously
established by the PARC, in every case ensuring that support services
are available or have been programmed before actual distribution is
effected.
SECTION 46. Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC). Unless
otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of Executive Order No.
229 regarding the organization of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) shall be in effect.
SECTION 47. Functions of the BARC. In addition to those provided in
Executive Order No. 229, the BARC shall have the following functions:
(a) Mediate and conciliate between parties involved in an agrarian
dispute including matters related to tenurial and financial
arrangements; acd (b) Assist in the identification of qualified
beneficiaries and landowners within the barangay; (c) Attest to the
accuracy of the initial parcellary mapping of the beneficiary's tillage;
(d) Assist qualified beneficiaries in obtaining credit from lending
institutions; (e) Assist in the initial determination of the value of the
land; (f) Assist the DAR representatives in the preparation of periodic
reports on the CARP implementation for submission to the DAR; (g)
Coordinate the delivery of support services to beneficiaries; and (h)
Perform such other functions as may be assigned by the DAR. (2) The
BARC shall endeavor to mediate, conciliate and settle agrarian
disputes lodged before it within thirty (30) days from its taking
cognizance thereof. If after the lapse of the thirty day period, it is
unable to settle the dispute, it shall issue a certificate of its
proceedings and shall furnish a copy thereof upon the parties within
seven (7) days after the expiration of the thirty-day period.
SECTION 48. Legal Assistance. The BARC or any member thereof
may, whenever necessary in the exercise of any of its functions
CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW
hereunder, seek the legal assistance of the DAR and the provincial,
city, or municipal government.
SECTION 49. Rules and Regulations. The PARC and the DAR shall
have the power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or
procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules
shall take effect ten (10) days after publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
SECTION 63. Funding Source. The initial amount needed to
implement this Act for the period of ten (10) years upon approval
hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund created under
Sections 20 and 21 of Executive Order No. 229. Additional amounts
are hereby authorized to be appropriated as and when needed to
augment the Agrarian Reform Fund in order to fully implement the
provisions of this Act. Sources of funding or appropriations shall
include the following: a) Proceeds of the sales of the Assets
Privatization Trust; b) All receipts from assets recovered and from
sales of ill-gotten wealth recovered through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government; c) Proceeds of the disposition of
the properties of the Government in foreign countries; d) Portion of
amounts accruing to the Philippines from all sources of official foreign
grants and concessional financing from all countries, to be used for
the specific purposes of financing production credits, infrastructures,
and other support services required by this Act; cdt (e) Other
government funds not otherwise appropriated. All funds appropriated
to implement the provisions of this Act shall be considered continuing
appropriations during the period of its implementation.
SECTION 21. Section 63 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows: "SEC. 63. Funding Source.
The amount needed to further implement the CARP as provided in
this Act, until June 30, 2014, upon expiration of funding under Republic
Act No. 8532 and other pertinent laws, shall be funded from the
Agrarian Reform Fund and other funding sources in the amount of at
least One hundred fifty billion pesos (P150,000,000,000.00).
"Additional amounts are hereby authorized to be appropriated as and
when needed to augment the Agrarian Reform Fund in order to fully
implement the provisions of this Act during the five (5)-year extension
period. "Sources of funding or appropriations shall include the
following: "(a) Proceeds of the sales of the Privatization and
Management Office (PMO); "(b) All receipts from assets recovered
and from sales of ill-gotten wealth recovered through the PCGG
excluding the amount appropriated for compensation to victims of
human rights violations under the applicable law; ITCcAD "(c)
Proceeds of the disposition and development of the properties of the
Government in foreign countries, for the specific purposes of financing
production credits, infrastructure and other support services required
by this Act; "(d) All income and collections of whatever form and
nature arising from the agrarian reform operations, projects and
programs of the DAR and other CARP implementing agencies; "(e)
Portion of amounts accruing to the Philippines from all sources of
official foreign aid grants and concessional financing from all
countries, to be used for the specific purposes of financing
productions, credits, infrastructures, and other support services
required by this Act; "(f) Yearly appropriations of no less than Five
billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) from the General Appropriations
Act; "(g) Gratuitous financial assistance from legitimate sources; and
(h) Other government funds not otherwise appropriated. "All funds
appropriated to implement the provisions of this Act shall be
36
considered continuing appropriations during the period of its
implementation: Provided, That if the need arises, specific amounts
for bond redemptions, interest payments and other existing
obligations arising from the implementation of the program shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act: Provided, further,
That all just compensation payments to landowners, including
execution of judgments therefor, shall only be sourced from the
Agrarian Reform Fund: Provided, however, That just compensation
payments that cannot be covered within the approved annual budget
of the program shall be chargeable against the debt service program
of the national government, or any unprogrammed item in the
General Appropriations Act: Provided, finally, That after the
completion of the land acquisition and distribution component of the
CARP, the yearly appropriation shall be allocated fully to support
services, agrarian justice delivery and operational requirements of the
DAR and the other CARP implementing agencies."

CLAVERIACAD AGRALAW 37