Rule 111.

PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
LANDICHO V. RELOVA
FACTS: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the
offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then
lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally
dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."
On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia,
seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of
the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner
and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as
defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party
defendant

Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-
party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of
threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract
marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.
HELD:

RULING:

Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and
later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the
ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for
annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial
questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his
consent to the second marriage is not in issue.

"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by
accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the
criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused,
it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the
one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show
that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner
was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the
petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action,
filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage
with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged
by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial

declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy."

MAGANDIA, ABDUL JOMAR P

 Rule 111. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
APA VS FERNANDEZ
FACTS: This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of
respondent Judge Romuldo Fernandez of RTC, Branch 54 of Lapu-Lapu City
denying petitioners motion for suspension of arraignment and motion for
reconsideration in a criminal case filed against them. Petitioners anchor their
claim on a prior case regarding ownership. Petitioners allege that the civil case
filed in 1990 seeking declaration for nullity of land title of the owner which had
been filed three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting
was filed against them constitutes a prejudicial question.
ISSUE: Whether the question of ownership is a prejudicial question justifying the
suspension of the criminal case against petitioners.
HELD:
RULING: Petition to suspend Criminal Case No. 012489 based on the prejudicial
question presented was granted on basis that;

the prejudicial question is a question based on a fact distinct and

separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its
resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
elements of prejudicial question - (1) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
the criminal case alleges that petitioners squatted without the knowledge
and consent of the owner, which, in 1994 the civil case rendered the nullity
of the title of the owner and declared both petitioners and respondents as
co-owners of the land.
respondents argue that owners can be ejected from his property only if for
some reason, that is, he has let it to some other person. However, both
case of respondents and petitioners are based on ownership.

MAGANDIA, ABDUL JOMAR P

 Rule 111. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
ark travel express vs RTC Makati
FACTS: Herein petitioner Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed
with the City Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for False Testimony in a
Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira. In a resolution dated November 20,
1996, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict private respondents for
violation of said law and accordingly filed the respective Informations against
each of them before the MTC
Private respondents filed a petition for review of the City Prosecutors resolution
dated November 20, 1996 with the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a resolution
dated March 9, 1998, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito P. Zuo reversed the City
Prosecutors resolution dated November 20, 1996. The prosecution office of
Makati then filed with the MTC a Motion to Withdraw Information

However, on May 15, 1998, Ark Travel filed an Urgent Petition for Automatic
Review with the DOJ. In a letter dated May 27, 1998, Secretary Silvestre H. Bello
III resolved to treat the urgent petition as a motion for reconsideration, reversed
its resolution dated March 9, 1998 and directed the City Prosecutor to proceed
with the prosecution of Criminal Case. For this reason, the MTC issued an Order
dated June 10, 1998, denying the aforesaid Motion to Withdraw Information filed
by the prosecution
In the meanwhile, private respondents Baguio and Ira filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the May 27, 1998 resolution of then Secretary Bello III,
alleging that: (1) the March 9, 1998 resolution of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo
finding no probable cause to indict them has become final and executory
because the Urgent Petition for Automatic Review was filed way beyond the 10-
day reglementary period; and (2) the said resolution of May 27, 1998 did not
reverse the finding of the March 9, 1998 resolution that respondents did not really
act with malice/criminal intent because the resolution of the Secretary merely
stated that there was false testimony.
DOJ Undersecretary Jesus A. Zozobrado, Jr., signing For the Secretary, granted
the Motion for Reconsideration in a resolution
Consequently, private respondents filed with the MTC a Motion for
Reconsideration of its June 10, 1998 Order alleging that there is no longer any
obstacle, legal or otherwise, to the granting of the Motion to Withdraw Information
previously filed by the prosecution. The MTC denied the motion
Then The RTC denied Ark Travels motion for reconsideration
Hence, the present petition for certiorari

ISSUE: pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of private

respondents in the civil case, will the criminal action for false testimony must be
suspended
HELD: YES

RULING: The existence of the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of
the subject testimonies of private respondents is yet to be established. It is noted
that at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case filed by Ark
Travel is still pending decision. Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its
monetary claims and damages against NFMAI. It is only after trial that the
RTC can assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony and
correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the civil case is so intimately
connected with the subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In other words,
whether or not the testimonies of private respondents in the civil cases are
false is a prejudicial question. It is clear that the elements of a prejudicial
question are present as provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 7 Elements of Prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question

are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of

the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of private

respondents in the civil case, the criminal action for false testimony must perforce
be suspended. As such, under the attendant circumstances, although there is no
motion to suspend proceedings on the part of the private respondents, orderly
administration of justice dictates that the criminal cases should be suspended.

MAGANDIA, ABDUL JOMAR P

 Rule 111. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS
land bank of the Philippines vs jacinto
FACTS: The First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from the
petitioner Land Bank in the aggregate amount of P400 million. As security for the
loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC, issued in favor of Land
Bank nine (9) postdated checks amounting to P465 million and drawn against
FWCCs account at the Philippine National Bank.
Later, before the checks matured, petitioner and respondent executed several
letter agreements which culminated in the execution of a Restructuring
Agreement on June 3, 1998. Under the new agreement, the loan obligation
contracted under the Credit Line Agreement of August 22, 1997 was
restructured, its terms of payment, among others, having been changed or
modified. When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan obligation under the
terms of their restructured agreement, petitioner presented for payment to the
drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured. However, all the checks
were dishonored or refused payment for the reason Payment Stopped or Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds. Respondent also failed to make good the checks
despite demands.
Hence, on January 13, 1999, Land Bank, through its Assistant Vice President,
Udela C. Salvo, Financial Institutions Department, filed before the Makati City
Prosecutors Office a Complaint-Affidavit against respondent for violation of B.P.
22. Respondent filed his Counter-Affidavit denying the charges and averring that
the complaint is baseless and utterly devoid of merit as the said loan obligation
has been extinguished by payment and novation by virtue of the execution of the
Restructuring Agreement. Respondent also invoked the proscription in the May
28, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 133 in
Special Proceedings No. M-4686 for Involuntary Insolvency which forbade
FWCC from paying any of its debts.
In a Resolution dated March 3, 1999, Prosecutor George V. De Joya
dismissed the complaint against respondent, finding that the letter-agreements
between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan
agreement. It was held that there being novation, the checks issued pursuant to
the original loan obligation had lost their efficacy and validity and cannot be a
valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of B.P. 22.
On June 21, 1999, petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the DOJ for review. On April 10,
2000, the DOJ issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal. However, upon motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner, the DOJ reversed its ruling and issued a
Resolution dated October 25, 2000 holding that novation is not a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the above Order but it was denied in
a Resolution dated December 18, 2000. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA.
the CA, in the assailed Decision, reversed the Resolution of the DOJ and
reinstated the Resolution of Prosecutor De Joya dismissing the complaint.While
the CA ruled that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability, it
nevertheless held that novation may prevent criminal liability from arising in
certain cases if novation occurs before the criminal information is filed in court
because the novation causes doubt as to the true nature of the obligation. Also,
the CA found merit in respondents assertion that a prejudicial question exists in
the instant case because the issue of whether the original obligation of FWCC
subject of the dishonored checks has been novated by the subsequent
agreements entered into by FWCC with Land Bank, is already the subject of the
appeal in Civil Case No. 98-2337 (entitled, First Womens Credit Corporation v.
Land Bank of the Philippines for Declaration of Novation) pending before the
CA. The CA also gave consideration to respondents assertion that the Order
dated May 28, 1998 of the RTC proscribing FWCC from paying its debts
constitutes as a justifying circumstance which prevents criminal liability from
attaching.

ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THAT THE ELEMENT OF A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION EXISTS IN THE
INSTANT CASE AND THAT THE RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FILING OF
INFORMATIONS IN COURT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT WAS MADE WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
HELD: We grant the petition
RULING: The High Court dismissed respondents contention that the novation of
the credit line agreement was a prejudicial question in the prosecution for violation
of B.P. 22. According to the Court, the mere act of issuing a worthless check,
even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. The agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the gravamen of the offense being the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment. Thus, even if it will be subsequently
declared that a novation took place between respondents and petitioner,
respondents are still not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for
the dishonored checks.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a

criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that
must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.The elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section
7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, as follows:
(i) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the

criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be
rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.[Not
every defense raised in a civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify
suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal case and its resolution
should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity
that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil
case does not involve a prejudicial questionNeither is there a prejudicial question
if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other.

In the instant case, we find that the question whether there was novation of the
Credit Line Agreement or not is not determinative of whether respondent should
be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

MAGANDIA, ABDUL JOMAR P