Professional Documents
Culture Documents
397–416
ZACHARY SELDEN
University of Florida
Abstract
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is in large part a product of the
institutional development of the EU and the consolidation of its authority over
internal issues. This parallels the development of the United States as a global actor
shortly after the federal government consolidated power over domestic affairs in the
1890s.
Introduction
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is evolving into a con-
crete structure with a significantly improved means of projecting influence in
the international environment. Under the framework of ESDP, Europe has not
only developed new military structures and capabilities; it is using them in
small but significant missions. Much has been written on the intricacies of
those developments, their effects on the relations between members of the
European Union (EU) and on the transatlantic relationship (Howorth, 2004;
Menon, 2004; Geigerich and Wallace, 2004; Deighton, 2002). The purpose of
this article, however, is to return to a more fundamental question: why is the
EU developing a capability to project power in the distinct absence of any
significant military threat to Europe?
International relations theory for the most part does not offer a good
answer to this question. Those in the offensive realist camp argue that states
the reach of any international organization. It may not be evolving into a state
in the Westphalian sense, but it is certainly acquiring many of the powers and
attributes traditionally associated with statehood.
This article begins with an examination of the rise of the United States
based on Zakaria’s study that demonstrates the importance of institutional
capacity in the development of power projection capabilities. Second, it
argues that state-centric realism can be applied to the EU because it has
adopted many of the characteristics and powers traditionally associated with
states. Third, it details the growth of ESDP and other tools of power projec-
tion, arguing that the timing of this development is consistent with the
predictions of state-centric realism.
Enlisted men were poorly paid and desertion rates were high: nearly one-third
of the Army deserted in 1871 (Weigley, 1984, p. 270). Much of the military
strength of the United States was in the hands of the individual states, which
provided militias of generally poor quality and training to national efforts.
Yet, by the first decade of the 20th century, the situation was radically
different. The United States had defeated Spain in the Spanish–American
war, taking possession of strategic islands and coaling stations from the
Pacific to the Caribbean in rapid succession. The United States Navy had been
transformed from a small and ageing fleet to being one of the most modern
and potent in the world. The United States was no longer a bit player in
international affairs as demonstrated by the role it played in ending the
Russo–Japanese war, and this was only a precursor to the decisive role
the United States would play in ending World War I and shaping the subse-
quent map of Europe. In a span of less than 40 years, the United States was
transformed from a minor player outside of its immediate region into a
significant global actor.
This transformation took place in part because of the massive expansion of
the American economy following the Civil War. Based on that alone, many
observers at the time expected that the United States would become a major
power in global affairs in the 1870s. Benjamin Disraeli predicted that the
outcome of the American Civil War would be, ‘a different America from that
which was known to our fathers and even from that which this generation has
had so much experience. It will be an America of armies, of diplomacy [. . .]
and probably of frequent wars’ (Disraeli, quoted in Sideman and Friedman,
1960, p. 233). Although Britain was most concerned about the emergence of
a potential rival and a new naval power, other European states also believed
that they could expect the United States to play a significantly larger role in
international affairs (Zakaria, 1998, p. 52).
Yet, it took nearly 30 additional years for the United States to begin to
fulfil those predictions. Disraeli was correct in his analysis; the United States
had the material power to become a major player in international affairs in the
1870s and 1880s. But it failed to live up to its predicted role because it lacked
the institutional capacity in the federal government to harness the nation’s
strength for expanding its interests in global affairs until the end of the
century. A series of changes between 1865 and 1900, however, gradually
shifted power away from the individual states to the federal government. At
the same time power also shifted within Washington from the legislative to
the executive branch. This combination of events created a central govern-
ment that was not only more capable of extracting resources, but more
importantly, capable of using them in the interests of the national government
(Zakaria, 1998, p. 92).
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402 ZACHARY SELDEN
of the United States died in the Senate or were never submitted for approval
because of the certainty of a Senate rejection (Beisner, 1986, p. 6).
Part of this was owed to the reluctance of the Congress to assume the
expense of expansion, but much of it was tied to the ongoing battles between
the states and the executive for authority over domestic affairs. Greater
involvement in foreign affairs would necessarily increase the power of the
federal government relative to that of the individual states. Becoming
embroiled in world affairs was consistently opposed by many in the United
States because it was feared that this would necessitate a large standing
military and, in turn, increased taxes and demands on the citizens and indi-
vidual states (Selden, 2004, p. 32; Kupchan, 2002). This concern, first articu-
lated by Thomas Jefferson in the earliest days of the republic, was a constant
in American political discourse and it was particularly salient in the aftermath
of the Civil War and the subsequent military occupation of the south.
The balance of power, however, between the states and Congress on the
one hand, and the federal government and the executive branch on the other,
began to shift rapidly with a series of reforms that began in the 1880s
(Zakaria, 1998, p. 92). Those changes occurred in response to the rapid
industrialization of the country. In particular, the rapid growth of the railways
created a continental market for goods that required national-level regulation.
The expansion of the rail system was subsidized by the federal government,
and with subsidization came government regulation (Angevine, 2004). The
Supreme Court strengthened the idea of federal supremacy over interstate
commerce and the railroads when it ruled repeatedly in this period that
the federal government had responsibility for the regulation of interstate
business.
Rapid industrialization also led to the birth of federal agencies such as the
Civil Service Commission in 1883, the Bureau of Labor in 1884 and the
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. At the same time, the rapid growth
in cities required new forms of regulation over the new technologies provid-
ing public services over large areas such as gas, electricity and telecom-
munications (Zakaria, 1998, p. 95). Reformers of the time successfully
campaigned to expand the power of the federal government to regulate an
increasingly large number of issues such as health and safety standards that
had previously been in the hands of the individual states or local authorities
(Sproat, 1968). This led to the creation of new bureaucracies under the control
of the federal government that gradually gained the expertise and competency
to expand its powers at the expense of the sovereignty of the individual states.
This power was centralized in the executive branch because most reformers at
the time saw the Congress as too parochial to cope effectively with such
challenges (Keller, 1977).
© 2010 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
404 ZACHARY SELDEN
that has far more authority and competency over core issues in domestic
affairs such as fiscal policy and regulatory policy. This leads to the final but
incomplete parallel between the two cases: shortly following its consolidation
of authority over internal affairs, the EU is now expanding its capacity to
influence international events.
Despite the parallels, can we apply a theory of state-centric realism to the
EU, which, of course, is not a state in the traditional sense? But before
addressing that question it is worthwhile to reconsider what constitutes a state
in the current international environment. It is a simple matter to demonstrate
that the EU is not a state in the Westphalian sense, but there are different types
of state, and sovereignty is rarely absolute (Caporaso, 1996; Krasner, 2004).
The EU has also been described as a ‘normative’ power whose influence and
actions are ‘civilizing’ international relations (Hill, 1990; Nicolaidis and
Howse, 2002; Sjursen, 2006). This normative power allows it to have state-
like influence in a variety of ways, most notably in international environmen-
tal regulation where the EU has played a leading role (Vogler, 2005; Vogler
and Bretherton, 2006). Nonetheless, the lack of sovereign state institutions
poses a challenge for realist analysis of the EU given the state-centric nature
of realism (Hyde-Price, 2006).
It is true that the EU lacks powers associated with sovereign states, but this
critique also could be applied to the United States in the 19th century. The EU
has no direct power to tax the citizenry, for example, but neither did the
United States federal government until World War I. The EU does not control
immigration policy, but as noted above, the United States federal government
did not gain control of this issue until 1882. The EU does not control an
independent military, but for much of its history the US Army was heavily
dependent on state militias for its manpower (Weigley, 1984). What the EU
increasingly provides, however, is a common regulatory structure across
Europe that has a direct impact on matters that were previously the exclusive
competency of the Member States. If not a state in the traditional sense, then
the EU is an institution that has taken on many of the characteristics of a state.
But if state-centric realism is an appropriate means of explaining the
development of ESDP, we would expect to see a certain chain of events. First,
an increased consolidation of EU authority over internal affairs that had been
previously under the sovereign control of the Member States, as well as an
expansion of the bureaucratic capacity to exercise that authority. In the case
of the EU, we would expect that authority and capacity to increase primarily
in the Commission, which can be likened to an executive and a federal
administration, rather than the Council, where the Member States have indi-
vidual representation. To some extent, the analogy can be made between the
Council and the US Senate in the 19th century when it was a potent chamber
© 2010 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
408 ZACHARY SELDEN
for the representation of the interests of the Member States. Second, follow-
ing this consolidation, we would expect to see the development of institu-
tional and power projection capabilities that allow the EU to expand its
influence in international affairs.
There is little doubt that the EU has increased its authority over domestic
affairs, particularly since the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. The SEA
was built around the idea of creating a single economic space across the EU,
but doing so pushed greater authority to the Commission. In a burst of activity
following the SEA, the Commission initiated more than 300 new pieces of
legislation covering common environmental, health and safety standards
(Hix, 2005, p. 33). The Treaty on European Union (TEU), which entered into
force in 1993, further consolidated the authority of the Commission to initiate
legislation over internal affairs to include transportation regulation and con-
sumer protection (Sandholtz, 1993). The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 pushed
more power toward the Commission by allowing it to initiate legislation on
matters of justice and home affairs, an area which had been previously the
exclusive domain of the Member States acting within the framework of the
Council. The basic pattern since 1987, therefore, has been an upward ratch-
eting of the authority of the EU over domestic affairs. In particular, the
authority and competency of the Commission has increased to meet the
demands placed on it by the Member States. Meeting the self-imposed dead-
lines for economic and monetary union, for example, pushed the Member
States to delegate more agenda-setting authority to the Commission in the
early 1990s (Hix, 2005, p. 34).
Thus, the Member States have increasingly delegated authority to the EU
over a range of domestic affairs from health and safety regulation to fiscal and
monetary policy. Those who approach the study of the EU from an intergov-
ernmental perspective argue that it is one thing for the EU to assume greater
authority over the ‘low’ politics of economic affairs, but quite another to be
delegated greater authority over the ‘high’ politics of defence and security
issues (Moravcsik, 1998). Yet, the Schengen Agreement that allows for free
movement across borders represents a significant delegation of authority from
the Member States to the European Union that affects their national security,
despite the fact that it was conceived to facilitate the movement of goods
across the common economic space. As the European Security Strategy
states, the main threats to Europe today are generally seen to be emanating
from trans-national terrorist organizations and criminal syndicates.1 Unlike
the cold war, the current security threats do not mass on the border with
1
The European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, December 2003. Available at:
«http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf».
Spillover from low to high politics can also be seen in the de facto
diplomatic role played by Commission delegations abroad. As the economic
power of the EU increases, third parties seek a consistent point of contact who
can ‘speak for Europe’. Yet, the lack of an EU diplomatic service means that
the state holding the Presidency shoulders much of the burden of representing
EU policy in the rest of the world through its embassies. That is both awkward
for third parties as the Presidency rotates every six months and difficult for
smaller EU Member States with limited diplomatic representation around the
world. The Commission delegations, therefore, act as, ‘quasi-diplomatic ser-
vices, represent[ing] the Commission but primarily for Community tasks’
(Duke, 2002, p. 855). Third party states may prefer to work with Commission
delegations, which they see as an, ‘element of constancy compared to the
complicated rotating presidency system’ (Duke, 2002, p. 855). As the EU
enlarges and adds more small states with limited diplomatic representation,
complementary pressures build to push more competency toward the Com-
mission delegations as representatives of the EU abroad. Most EU Member
States have diplomatic representation in less than 90 countries, and only four
have representation in more than 100 of the nearly 200 countries that
compose the international community. For most Member States of the EU, a
more centralized diplomatic representation in the form of the Commission
delegations represents a way to stretch limited resources (Holland, 1997,
p. 10).
Thus, economic integration has not only dramatically increased the
authority of the EU relative to the Member States over internal affairs, it also
appears to be driving more authority toward the EU on international affairs.
If the parallel with the United States holds, state-centric realism predicts that
the EU would develop institutional and power projection capabilities to have
greater influence in the international arena shortly following the consolidation
of power over internal affairs in the central authority. Although the EU’s
capabilities in this regard are still in the formative stages, the rapid develop-
ment of new structures and capabilities demonstrates considerable movement
in this direction. Above all, the timing of those developments following close
on the heels of the EU’s growth in authority over internal affairs fits with the
predictions of state-centric realism.
The development of ESDP from raw idea to burgeoning institution in a
very brief period is impressive given the weight of the issues and the generally
slow pace of developments in the EU. ESDP became a concrete issue at the
Maastricht summit in 1993, but in the intervening years, and particularly
since 1998, ESDP began to crystallize with increasing speed. It now has a
permanent bureaucracy in the form of the EU military committee and military
staff, a framework for conducting operations and securing force goals from
© 2010 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
POWER IS ALWAYS IN FASHION 411
the Member States, the beginnings of an agency for defence and armaments
co-operation, and a security strategy that puts forth the political mechanisms
and conceptual reasons for how and when this force would be used.
The EU, however, is not just developing the institutional mechanisms; it
is using them in small but significant operations in the Balkans and Africa.
The EU has conducted approximately 20 missions since 2003 (Keohane and
Valasek, 2008. p. 1). From an initial mission in 2003 in Macedonia, the list of
missions has grown to include peace-keeping, border monitoring, rule of law
assistance and humanitarian relief. There is reason to be sceptical about some
of those operations which are short-lived and are of dubious effectiveness
(Haine and Giegerich, 2006). But at the same time, the general trend in EU
operations has been toward larger and longer missions, which demonstrates
an increased logistical capability and willingness to engage.
What is apparent from this experience is that European military resources
are stretched to provide the forces and logistical support for limited opera-
tions. Yet, there are signs that European militaries are developing the ability
to deploy and sustain small military forces in challenging environments. The
stark contrast between the inability of European militaries to cope with
the demands of the Balkan wars of the 1990s and their ability to operate in the
distant and unforgiving environment of Afghanistan is a clear illustration of
this trend. But ongoing progress in strategic air and sea lift could give
European militaries the ability to move their forces with progressively less
direct support from the US over the next decade. European countries are also
investing considerable amounts into Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems
(Flournoy et al., 2005; Shimkus, 2005). If properly leveraged, those devel-
opments could allow European states as individuals, or the EU as a collective,
to project a larger amount of sustainable military force in the near future.
In addition, the Member States have formed a network of asset sharing
arrangements and co-ordination mechanisms within an EU framework to
wring more effectiveness out of their existing strategic lift assets. The Sealift
Co-ordination Centre at Windhaven, the Netherlands, which arranges for
ships that would otherwise be travelling empty or only partially loaded on
return trips to carry the material of other partner countries, is one such
co-ordination cell (Shimkus, 2005). Another co-operative project that is
showing some signs of success is the European Airlift Co-ordination Centre
in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. This centre co-ordinates the airlift and refu-
elling assets of Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and the
Netherlands. Its initial success has led to a combined approach for air and
sealift operations that could maximize the utility of all strategic transportation
equipment.
© 2010 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
412 ZACHARY SELDEN
3
Calculated from the Nato–Russia Comependium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence,
NATO Press Release (2007) 141, 20 December 2007. Available at: «http://www.nato-otan.org/docu/pr/
2007/p07-141e.html».
Conclusion
State-centric realism predicts that states develop their capabilities to exert
greater influence in the international environment when the state itself devel-
ops the institutional capability to channel national resources in that direction.
In a federal system such as the United States, this meant that the federal
government first needed to consolidate authority over internal affairs, which
gave it the bureaucratic capability and authority to expand its influence in the
international environment. The individual states were reluctant to allow the
federal government to amass power at the expense of their autonomy, but
the process was driven by economic necessity and the demands of a
continent-wide market.
To a large extent, this parallels the EU’s development of ESDP in the wake
of its increased authority over internal affairs. It is important to note, however,
why the EU is moving in this direction in the absence of a significant threat
to Europe. It is the result of an organic process related to how federal systems
evolve as they consolidate power across their Member States and then seek to
have greater influence beyond their borders. It is not a product of balancing
against a specific threat or against power in general: those basic paradigms of
international relations do not offer a satisfactory explanation because they fail
to consider the effect of institutional development. From a realist perspective,
states want to have as much power and influence in the international envi-
ronment as they can, but that is conditioned by their institutional capability.
The development of ESDP may have reflexive effects on the EU itself. If
interests expand with capabilities, then it is likely that the EU’s interests will
grow to take on progressively larger and more difficult missions under ESDP.
Some of those will inevitably require rapid decisions, which could be a driver
for more streamlined decision-making structures in the EU. It is possible to
have a complex process of consultation between Member States and the EU
institutions on a range of issues that, while significant, are not immediate
crises. But adding a harder security dimension to the EU means that some
matters may need rapid and firm action requiring a more centralized decision-
making process (Howorth, 2001). Thus, there could be a self-reinforcing
cycle in which the increased authority of the EU leads to more international
engagement, which in turn drives even more decision-making power toward
Brussels.
Regardless of the implications for the future, the relatively rapid progress
of ESDP in the absence of a military threat to Europe begs the question, ‘why
now?’ The short answer is that the EU has the ability to do so now because
of a permissive international environment and internal developments that
render it more capable of projecting power to gain greater influence over
international events. The parallels with the US in the late 19th century are
striking as it went through a similar developmental pattern that transformed
it from a minor player in international affairs to a significant actor in a span
of approximately 40 years. What we are witnessing today in the development
of the EU as an international actor may be a product of the interna-
tional environment, but more important, the product of its own institutional
development.
Correspondence:
Zachary Selden
University of Florida
Tel +32 2 513 2865
email zselden@ufl.edu
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