NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES (SUMMARY)

International Court of Justice Contentious Case: The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany/Denmark;
Germany/Netherlands).

Year of Decision: 1969.

Note: This post discusses only aspects of the case related to treaty and customary international law.

Overview: The jurisprudence of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases sets out the dual requirement for the
formation of customary international law: (1) State practice (the objective element) and (2) opinio juris (the
subjective element). In these cases, the Court explained the criteria necessary to establish State practice
widespread and representative participation. It highlighted that the practices of those States whose interests
were specially affected by the custom were especially relevant in the formation of customary law. It also held that
uniform and consistent practice was necessary to demonstrate opinio juris opinio juris is the belief that
State practice amounts to a legal obligation. The North Sea Continental Self Cases also dispelled the myth that
duration of the practice (i.e. the number of years) was an essential factor in forming customary international
law.

The case involved the delimitation of the continental shelf areas in the North Sea between Germany and
Denmark and Germany and Netherlands beyond the partial boundaries previously agreed upon by these States.
The parties requested the Court to decide the principles and rules of international law that are applicable to the
above delimitation because the parties disagreed on the applicable principles or rules of delimitation.
Netherlands and Denmark relied on the principle of equidistance (the method of determining the boundaries in
such a way that every point in the boundary is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breath of the territorial sea of each State is measured). Germany sought to get a decision in favour of the
notion that the delimitation of the relevant continental shelf was governed by the principle that each coastal
state is entitled to a just and equitable share (hereinafter called just and equitable principle/method). Contrary
to Denmark and Netherlands, Germany argued that the principle of equidistance was neither a mandatory rule
in delimitation of the continental shelf nor a rule of customary international law that was binding on Germany.
The Court was not asked to delimit because the parties had already agreed to delimit the continental shelf as
between their countries, by agreement, after the determination of the Court on the applicable principles.

Facts of the Case:

Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the equidistance principle (A-B and C-D).
An agreement on further prolongation of the boundary proved difficult because Denmark and Netherlands
wanted this prolongation to take place based on the equidistance principle (B-E and D-E) where as Germany
was of the view that, together, these two boundaries would produce an inequitable result for her. Germany
stated that due to its concave coastline, such a line would result in her loosing out on her share of the continental
shelf based on proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline. The Court had to decide the principles
and rules of international law applicable to this delimitation. In doing so, the Court had to decide if the principles
espoused by the parties were binding on the parties either through treaty law or customary international law.

Questions before the Court (as relevant to this post):

Is Germany under a legal obligation to accept the equidistance-special circumstances principle, contained in
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, either as a customary international law
rule or on the basis of the Geneva Convention?
The Courts Decision:

The use of the equidistance method had not crystallised into customary law and the method was not obligatory
for the delimitation of the areas in the North Sea related to the present proceedings.

Relevant Findings of the Court:

1. Nature of the treaty obligation: Is the 1958 Geneva Convention, and in particular Article 6, binding on
Germany?

1. Article 6 of the Geneva Convention stated that unless the parties had already agreed on a method for
delimitation or unless special circumstances exist, the equidistance method would apply. Germany had signed,
but not ratified, the Geneva Convention, while Netherlands and Denmark were parties to the Convention. The
latter two States argued that while Germany is not a party to the Convention (not having ratified it), she was still
bound by Article 6 of the Convention because:

(1) by conduct, by public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic has unilaterally
assumed the obligations of the Convention; or has manifested its acceptance of the conventional regime; or
has recognized it as being generally applicable to the delimitation of continental shelf areas

(2) the Federal Republic had held itself out as so assuming, accepting or recognizing, in such a manner as to
cause other States, and in particular Denmark and the Netherlands, to rely on the attitude thus taken up (the
latter is called the principle of estoppel).

2. The Court rejected the first argument. It said that only a very definite very consistent course of conduct on
the part of a State would allow the Court to presume that the State had somehow become bound by a treaty
(by a means other than in the formal manner: i.e. ratification) when the State was at all times fully able and
entitled to accept the treaty commitments in a formal manner. The Court held that Germany had not
unilaterally assumed obligations under the Convention. The court also took notice of the fact that even if
Germany ratified the treaty, she had the option of entering into a reservation on Article 6, following which that
particular article would no longer be applicable to Germany (in other words, even if one were to assume that
Germany had intended to become a party to the Convention, it does not presuppose that it would have also
undertaken those obligations contained in Article 6).

3. Note: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), which came into force in 1980,
discusses in more detail treaty obligations of third States (those States who are not parties to the treaty). It
clearly stipulates that obligations arise for third States from a provision of a treaty only if (1) the actual parties
to the treaty intended the provision to create obligations for third States; and (2) third State expressly accept
those obligations in writing (Article 35 of the VCLT). The VCLT was not in force when the Court deliberated on
this case. However, as seen above, the Courts position is consistent the VCLT. (See the relevant provisions of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

4. The Court held that the existence of a situation of estoppel would have allowed Article 6 to become binding
on Germany but held that Germanys action did not support an argument for estoppel. The Court also held
that the mere fact that Germany may not have specifically objected to the equidistance principle as contained
in Article 6, is not sufficient to state that the principle is now binding upon it.
5. In conclusion, the Court held that Germany had not acted in any manner so as to incur obligations contained
in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. The equidistancespecial circumstances rule was not binding on Germany
by way of treaty law.

2. Nature of the customary international law obligation: Is Germany bound by the provisions of Article 6 of the
Geneva Convention in so far as they reflect customary international law?

6. Netherlands and Denmark argued that Article 6 also reflected the accepted rule of general international law
on the subject of continental shelf delimitation and that it existed independently of the Convention. Therefore,
they argued, Germany is bound by the subject matter of Article 6 by way of customary international law.

7. To decide if the equidistance principle bound Germany by way of customary international law, the Court
examined (1) the status of the principle contained in Article 6 as it stood when the Convention was being drawn
up; and (2) its status after the Convention came into force.

(a) What was the customary law status of Article 6 at the time of drafting the Convention?

8. The Court held that the principle of equidistance, as contained in Article 6 did not form a part of existing or
emerging customary international law at the time of drafting the Convention. The Court supported this finding
based on (1) the hesitation expressed by the drafters of the Convention, the International Law Commission, on
the inclusion of Article 6 into the Convention and (2) the fact that reservations to Article 6 was permissible
under the Convention. The Court held:

Article 6 is one of those in respect of which, under the reservations article of the Convention (Article 12)
reservations may be made by any State on signing, ratifying or acceding, for speaking generally, it is a
characteristic of purely conventional rules and obligations that, in regard to them, some faculty of making
unilateral reservations may, within certain limits, be admitted; whereas this cannot be so in the case of general
or customary law rules and obligations which, by their very nature, must have equal force for all members of
the international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion
exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favor. The normal inference would therefore be that any
articles that do not figure among those excluded from the faculty of reservation under Article 12, were not
regarded as declaratory of previously existing or emergent rules of law (see para 65 for a counter argument
and the Courts careful differentiation)

(b) Did the provisions in Article 6 on the equidistance principle attain the customary law status after the
Convention came into force?

9. The Court then examined whether the rule contained in Article 6 had become customary international law
after the Convention entered into force either due the Convention itself (i.e., if enough States had ratified the
Convention in a manner so as to fulfil the criteria specified below), or because of subsequent State practice (i.e.
even if an adequate number of States had not ratified the Convention, one could find sufficient State practice
to meet the criteria below). The Court held that Article 6 of the Convention had not attained a customary law
status. (Compare the 1958 Geneva Convention with the four Geneva Conventions on 1949 relating
to international humanitarian law in terms of the latters authority as a pronouncement of customary
international law).

10. For a customary rule to emerge the Court held that it needed: (1) very widespread and representative
participation in the Convention, including States whose interests were specially affected (in this case, they were
coastal States) (i.e. generality); and (2) virtually uniform practice (i.e. consistent and uniform usage) undertaken
in a manner that demonstrates (3) a general recognition of the rule of law or legal obligation (i.e. opinio juries).
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the court held that the passage of a considerable period of time was
unnecessary (i.e. duration) for the formation of a customary law.

Widespread and representative participation

11. The Court held that the first criteria was not met. The number of ratifications and accessions to the
Convention (39 States) were not adequately representative or widespread.

Duration

12. The Court held that the duration taken for a customary law rule to emerge is not as important as widespread
and representative participation, uniform usage, and the existence of an opinio juris. It held that:

Although the passage of only a short period of time (in this case, 3 5 years) is not necessarily, or of itself, a
bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely
conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it
might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked and should moreover have occurred in
such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.

Opinio juris

13. Opinio juris is reflected in acts of States (Nicaragua Case) or in omissions (Lotus case), in so far as those acts
or omissions were done following a belief that the said State is obligated by law to act or refrain from acting in
a particular way. (For more on opinio juris click here).

14. The Court examined 15 cases where States had delimited their boundaries using the equidistance method,
after the Convention came into force (paras. 75 -77). The Court concluded that even if there were some State
practice in favour of the equidistance principle, the Court could not deduct the necessary opinio juris from this
State practice. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases confirmed that both State practice (the objective element)
and opinio juris (the subjective element) are essential pre-requisites for the formation of a customary law
rule. This is consistent with Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the ICJ. The Court explained the concept of opinio
juris and the difference between customs (i.e. habits) and customary law:

Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of
law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e, the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very
notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming
to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself
enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are performed
almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and
not by any sense of legal duty. (Para 77).

15. The Court concluded that the equidistance principle was not binding on Germany by way of treaty or
customary international law. In the case of the latter, the principle had not attained a customary international
law status at the time of the entry into force of the Geneva Convention or thereafter. As such, the Court held
that the use of the equidistance method is not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas concerned in the
present proceedings.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd, (Belgium v. Spain)
Citation. I.C.J. 1970 I.C.J. 3.
Brief Fact Summary. Belgium (P) claimed Spain (D) should be held accountable for the injury to a Canadian
corporation operating in Spain.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based
on general international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory.
Facts. On behalf of Belgian nationals (P) who had invested in a Canadian corporation, Belgium (P) sued Spain
(D) on the premise that Spain (D) was responsible for acts in violation of international law that had caused
injury to the Canadian corporation and its Belgian shareholders (P).
Issue. Does a state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory?
Held. Yes. A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory. It is highly
imperative to draw a distinction between those obligations of a state toward the international community as a
whole and those arising from the field of diplomatic protection. It is only the party to whom an international
obligation is due can bring a claim if a breach of an obligation that is the subject of diplomatic protection
occurs.

Discussion. The basic right of all human persons was mentioned by the Court to be protected against slavery
and racial discrimination as deriving from basic general international law. Such rights may derive from
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character. Such obligations are obligations erga
omnes, that is, all states have a legal interest in their protection.Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) case bri

Procedural History:
Action for damages for the expropriation of a corporation.

Overview:
-Belgium (P) brought an action for damages against Spain (D) on the ground that its nationals as shareholders
of the Barcelona Traction Co., incorporated and registered in Canada, had been seriously harmed by actions of
Spain (D) resulting in expropriation.
-The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co. was incorporated and registered in Canada for the purpose of
developing and operating electrical power in Spain (D).
-After the Spanish Civil War, the company was declared bankrupt by a Spanish court and its assets were
seized.
-After the Canadian interposition ceased, Belgium (P) brought an action for damages against Spain (D) for
what it termed expropriation of the assets of the Traction Co. on the ground that a large majority of the stock
of the company was owned by Belgian (P) nationals.
-Spain (D) raised the preliminary objection that Belgium (P) lacked standing to bring suit for damages to a
Canadian company.

Issue:
Does the state of the shareholders of a company have a right of diplomatic protection if the state whose
responsibility is invoked is not the national state of the company?

Outcome:
No. In order for a state to bring a claim in respect of the breach of an obligation owed to it, it must first
establish its right to do so. This right is predicated on a showing that the defendant state has broken an
obligation toward the national state in respect of its nationals. In the present case it is therefore essential to
establish whether the losses allegedly suffered by Belgian (P) shareholders in Barcelona Traction were the
consequence of the violation of obligations of which they are beneficiaries.
-In the present state of the law, the protection of shareholders requires that recourse be had to treaty
stipulations or special agreements directly concluded between the private investor and the state in which the
investment is placed. Barring such agreements, the obligation owed is to the corporation, and only the state of
incorporation has standing to bring an action for violations of such an obligation. Nonetheless, for reasons of
equity a theory has been developed to the effect that the state of the shareholders has a right of diplomatic
protection when the state whose responsibility is invoked is the national state of the company. This theory,
however, is not applicable to the present case, since Spain (D) is not the national state of Barcelona Traction.
Barcelona Traction could have approached its national state, Canada, to ask for its diplomatic protection.
-For the above reasons, the Court is of the opinion that Belgium (P) lacks standing to bring this action.

Rule:
the state of a shareholders corporation has a right of diplomatic protection only when the state whose
responsibility is invoked is the national state of the company.

Analysis:
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 185, states that failure of a state to pay
just compensation for the taking of the property of an alien is wrongful under international law, regardless of
whether the taking itself is conceived as wrongful. Such a wrongful taking is characterized either as tortious
conduct or as unjust enrichment