AUSTRALASIAN SOCIETY FOR ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

ASACP Conference 2017

ASACP 2017 Conference Program

10-12 July 2017

Deakin University, Deakin Downtown

727 Collins St, Melbourne, Australia.

Keynote Speakers
Professor David R. Loy

Professor Jin Y. Park,

American University, Washington DC

Professor John Powers,

Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University

The conference will present papers in all areas of Asian and

Comparative Philosophy, with a special focus on the following streams:

Nonduality in Asian and Western Thought

Engaging Asian Philosophical traditions - why it is important to Philosophy
Methodology in Comparative Philosophy

10-12 July 2017 at Deakin University, Deakin Downtown 727 Collins St, Melbourne, Australia.
Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Conference

Deakin University 10 -12 July 2017

Deakin Downtown Level 12, Tower 2, 727 Collins Street, Melbourne Victoria 300

Acknowledgement

We would like to acknowledge the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin nations, the traditional owners of the land on
which we are gathered. We pay our respects to the local people for allowing us to have our gathering on their land
and to their Elders: past, present and future.

Special Thanks To

The Alfred Deakin Research Institute for Citizenship and Globalization especially to Sandra Kingston, Arlene
Pacheco, Sylviane Savanah and Kerry McEwin for their administrative support.
Our postgraduate volunteers Sarah Wyld, Andy Kirkpatrick and Kane Simpson for their help at the conference.
Professor Brenda Cherednichenko (The Faculty of Arts and Education Executive Dean) and Professor Matthew
Clarke (Head of School, Humanities and Social Sciences) for their help and support.
Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions. Springer Publishers and Bloomsbury Publishers.
Quirin Press for assistance with the conference website and the typesetting.

About the Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (ASACP)

ASACP is a professional society of researchers and thinkers on the frameworks, ideas and approaches of different
traditions in Asia. We believe that the Asian traditions of thought hold significant insights that continue to have
contemporary relevance. We seek to explain these insights, and to engage with Western and continental European
philosophical traditions so as to gain a richer and more diverse understanding of life, the earth, environment and
spirituality.
The ASACP is affiliated with the Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) and has previously held conferences
in conjunction with other academic societies and institutions, including the Society for Asian and Comparative
Philosophy (SACP), the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, and the International Society for Chinese
Philosophy (ISCP). The ASACP is committed to holding biennial conferences. It also has a long-standing
partnership with the peer-reviewed journal, Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions.
Visit the ASACP website

ASACP 2017 Conference Organising Committee:

Dr Leesa S. Davis, Deakin University (chair)

Dr Peter Wong, Sophia, International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions
Dr Monima Chadha, Monash University
A/Prof Karyn Lai, University of New South Wales

3
 Keynote Address Monday 10 July 10:30 12:00

Professor Jin Y. Park

American University

Derrida and Buddhism: or Learning to Live Finally

The last interview Jacques Derrida ever gave appeared in Le Monde on August 19, 2004, two
months before his death. A book entitled Apprendre vivre enfin (Learning to Live Finally, 2005)
is the result of that interview, which begins with a discussion of Derridas statement I would
like to learn to live, finally. The phrase appears in his seminal work Spectres de Marx (Specters of
Marx, 1993). It is noteworthy that Derridas first explicit engagement with Marxism begins with
a seemingly apolitical question: how to learn to live. What would it mean to learn to live? And
finally?

I would like to consider this question while engaging both Derridas philosophy and Buddhist
philosophy. Buddhism is an Asian religious philosophical tradition with a 2500-year history;
Derrida is a 20th-century French philosopher. Why do we want to consider them together?
What do they have in common, and how do they differ? What do the differences tell us about
each tradition and about our theme? Comparative philosophywhich some people now prefer
to call intercultural philosophyis a mode of philosophizing through which we reconfirm
fundamental issues shared in different traditions of thought as we seek a meaningful way to live.
It is also a means of marking the boundaries of a philosophical tradition.

Scholars have noted the similarity of worldview in Buddhism and in Derridas deconstruction.
Buddhist concepts of dependent co-arising, emptiness, and logic of Catukoi (four-cornered
logic) have been compared to Derridas diffrance, trace, text, and so on. In this presentation, I will
focus on Derridas last interview to explore what deconstruction, together with Buddhism, can
teach us about being human and living with others in our politically and socially turbulent
world.

Respondent: Professor Jack Reynolds (Deakin University)

4
 Keynote Address Tuesday 11 July 4:00 6:30
Introduced by: Deakin Vice-Chancellor Professor Jane den Hollander AO
and Executive Dean Faculty of Arts Professor Brenda Cherednichenko

THE
Max Charlesworth Lecture
2 ND BIENNIAL

Professor Max Charlesworth, AO FAHA (1925-2014), was the Foundation Dean of the School of
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Professor David R. Loy

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When I think of all the books I have read, and of the wise words I have heard spoken, and of the anxiety I have given to parents and grandparents,
and of the hopes I have had, all life weighed in the scales of my own life seems to me a preparation for something that never happens (W. B. Yeats).
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tends to happen, and what the alternative might be.
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5
The event is free and all are welcome.
""03&0leesa.davis@deakin.edu.au
Keynote Address Wednesday 12 July 10:00 12:00

Professor John Powers

Deakin University

Cross Cultural Philosophy at the Crossroads:

Where Do We Go From Here?

The field of comparative philosophy has made significant strides over the past several decades,
but there is still a long way to go before it is recognised as part of the mainstream of philosophy
and fully integrated into the curriculum of the major. This address will discuss some prominent
figures who have denigrated comparative philosophy in the past and chart the trajectory of such
ideas into the present. Concluding remarks will look at which strategies have proven effective in
advancing the discipline and possible future directions.

Respondent: Professor Jay Gareld (Smith College) via SKYPE

Monday 10 July 3:30 Presentation of

Graduate Essay Prize Winners
1st Prize: Jan Mihal
(University of Melbourne)
Exploring How Avidy Operates in Advaita Vednta through
The Model of Repression

2nd Prize: Songyao Ren

(Duke University)
The Zhuangist Views on Emotions

6
 Abstracts (in alphabetical order)
Greg Bailey (La Trobe University)
Is non-duality really important in ancient Indian thought?

The present paper has as its source the hugely influential Sanskrit epic the Mahbhrata and asks
the question whether duality as a description of existence is more important than non-duality,
and explores the implications of this for social behaviour. Whilst non-duality broadly understood
as the conceptual grasping of an ontology of self (tman/purua) or non-self (nirtman, or per-
haps nyat) as the intuitive and undisputable sense of true existence and permanency in a world
of constant movement or sasra, to what extent did this influence those outside of the con-
templative circles that propagated these ideas? Was the other side of duality, life in the world of
society and obligations, regarded as more fundamental than an ontological and epistemological
understanding of the permanent self ?

In the Mahbhrata ideas associated with non-duality are concentrated mainly in the third,
fifth and twelfth books, but overwhelmingly emphasis throughout the rest of this huge text is
placed on right conduct (sadcra, samyagvtti) within the tight parameters of dharma or the
normative conduct within the world. It is on the viability of this conduct for upholding the
dharmic construction of the world that philosophical and ethical argumentation seems to be so
often placed, rather than on the ontological nature of the permanent self as designating some kind
of condition beyond action.

Petra Brown (Deakin University)

Moral education: overcoming the East-West divide

There has been a perceived division between Eastern and Western approaches to higher education,
often viewed as a distinction between education understood as rote learning and education
understood as critical thinking. The former has been viewed as growing out of traditional and
restrictive Confucian values, the latter as emerging out of modern and liberating Enlightenment
values. However, in recent years, education as critical thinking has also come under threat in
the West due to marketization of the contemporary university, accompanied by a technocratic
approach that views education as a utilitarian tool in service of economic ends.

This paper argues that Socratic (explored through Hannah Arendt) and Confucian approaches
both challenge the contemporary technocratic approach to education. This paper looks at how
these approaches can cross the binary divide between East-West divisions of education, to find
common ground in a view of education that is more than driven by technocratic utilitarian ends,
concluding that both Socratic and Confucian approaches to education foster moral development
and a vision of personhood that provides an important critique of the modern global higher
education institution.

7
Adam Buben (Leiden University)
Personal Immortality in Transhumanism and Ancient Indian Philosophy

Transhumanism has much in common with religion as traditionally conceived. James J. Hughes
claims that a variety of metaphysics appear to be compatible with one form of transhumanism or
the other, from various Abrahamic views of the soul to Buddho-Hindu ideas of reincarnation to
animist ideas. Most notably, the range of technologically optimistic views held by transhumanists
shares with many religions a longing for transcendence of our presently frail and limited situation.
In contrast to the doctrines of many traditional religions, however, transhumanist salvation will
not come from divine intervention, but solely from our own ingenuity. Thus, the prevailing view
has been that transhumanism adopts and secularizes religious tropes, but is importantly hostile to
many traditional religions. Nonetheless, there is a growing number of voices arguing that shared
interests in elimination of suffering, immersion of individual minds in a universal intelligence,
or remaking the universe itself, indicate that certain construals of transhumanism might actually
be continuous with certain religious traditions. I focus on one common transhumanist goal
personal immortalitythat seems inherently opposed to the core philosophical foundations of at
least two major religions, which suggest that any yearning for extension of individual personalities
will ultimately be problematic.

Heawon Choi (University of British Columbia)

Nonduality in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism: Its Relation to Native Thought

My paper discusses nondualistic thinking as reflected in Chinese Buddhist thought during the
Six Dynasties era (220589), also called early medieval China. Buddhism, which was introduced
into China around the first century CE, began to penetrate the mode of thinking and life of Chi-
nese people during the Six Dynasties era. Buddhist doctrine and sutras were popularly accepted
by Chinese literati of the time who noticed kinship between Buddhist and native ideas. The Chi-
nese intellectuals were particularly interested in the Buddhist teaching of nonduality as explicated
in Mahyna Buddhist literature, such as the Prajpramit sutras; the Buddhist teaching re-
minded the Chinese of similar concepts found in their native philosophy. I examine the Buddhist
concept of nonduality as understood and interpreted by early medieval Chinese Buddhists. In so
doing, I address the ways in which the Chinese understood and explained Buddhist teaching in
close relation to indigenous concepts. In addition, I show that the Chinese Buddhist discussion of
nonduality led to the conclusion that emphasizes non-duality between conventional and ultimate
truth and, further, that refutes the dualistic view distinguishing mundane from otherworldly life.
I take this as reflecting the influence of a traditional Chinese worldview that values a life of reality
and this world, thereby distinguished from Indian Buddhism and its worldview.

8
John Claridge (Adelaide University)
The transcendence of being: the transience, sensuality and power of human association.

Why do people laugh or cry? My initial answer we are embodied in human relations and social
situations. But, what gives us discharge from this view? In this paper I wish to explore the appar-
ent, but false dichotomy between the situated existence of human beings and the emptiness
and non-inherence of living. As a trained social anthropologist I am confronted by the fact that
people believe in different realities. Just whose reality is correct? A misinformed question, as my
realty is just as affirmational as yours, or anyone from a different culture. In response to this I
explore the relationship between the concrete experience of living and its transcendence in given
situations, including extreme illness and such mundane activities as going on a wine tour. This
paper incorporates the Advaya interpretation regarding the nondualist position of conventional
and ultimate truth in Madhyamaka Buddhism, but goes further in asking: how is the phenomena
of being transcended in the emplacement of experience - the phenomenology of being (Casey
1996: 22).

References: Casey, Edward S. How to get from space to Place. In Senses of Place, S. Feld and K.
Basso eds., pp. 4-13. New Mexico: School of American Research

Leesa S. Davis (Deakin University)

The Live Word: Dynamics of Nonduality in Chan/Zen Buddhism

Chinese Chan Buddhism (and later Japanese Zen) is famous for iconoclastic teaching stories
that are driven by the performative use of paradox and negation. For some scholars of Buddhism,
Chan texts are examples of a kind of anti-philosophy- illogical at best and vague mystical
utterances at worst.
However, it is the contention of this paper that Chan discourse is grounded in the dynamic
nondual philosophy of the Mahyna sutras and the Chan dialogues employ key Mahyna
de-reifying and non-substantializing strategies.

Using select paradigmatic teacher-student exchanges this discussion explores the dynamics of
paradox and negation in Chans teaching strategies and demonstrates how they are dynamically
structured to experientially disclose things as they are (yathbhtam) i.e., nondual (advaya).
Seen in this light, the Chan teacher-student exchanges are dynamic attempts to experientially
ignite nondual philosophical and spiritual understandings and are examples of philosophy in
action.

9
Aaron Grinter (PhD Candidate, Swinburne University)
The Grand Titration: Contemporary Discussions of the Comparative Philosophy
of Joseph Needham

The problem of integrating western and Asian thought has long been a hurdle for philosophy.
Joseph Needham composed the most substantial contribution to solving this problem in 1954,
Science and Civilisation in China. The multi-volume historiography (presently 27 volumes) rep-
resents an awe-inspiring triumph of painstaking scholarship, and remains the most significant ef-
fort to synthesise Chinese and western thought, systematically detailing 25 centuries of Chinese
discovery in mathematics, physics, chemistry, technology, medicine, and metaphysics. As well as
documenting Chinese history, his magnum opus asks a major question: Why did modern sci-
ence, the mathematization of hypotheses with implications for advanced technology, take its
meteoric rise only in the West? Needham sought to uncover why, despite centuries of prolific
discovery, China was overtaken by the west and, consequently, why Asian thought is seen to be
antiquated in comparison? Though Needham was unable to answer this question, he nonetheless
transformed the western perspective of Chinese science and thought and catalysed the apprecia-
tion of Asian philosophy. The aim is to recapitulate Needhams work and argue that what is re-
quired in the present global situation is a re-appreciation of diverse cultures and the construction
of a post-Eurocentric comparative philosophy with a greater appreciation for the biosphere.

GUAN Yinlin (PhD Candidate, University of Edinburgh)

The methods of having the goodness of human being Comparative study between
Platos Timaeus and the Laozi

What is the goodness of human being to Plato and the Laozi? This question is tricky for both of
them. Plato would say it is not relevant to the actions or decisions of human beings, nor health,
wealth or any other external conditions, but the goodness of human being is only relevant if they
aspire to become gods. There is, for sure, a turning point in Platonic philosophy from a philo-
sophic and virtuous focus to a cosmological focus from dialogue to dialogue. In order to have
the goodness of the human being, the rational soul of the tripartite soul needs to function in a
well-ordered assimilation with the revolution of the heavens. The observation of the revolution
of the heavens is the core for bringing a human beings rational soul back to cognitive health from
disturbance motions. For the Laozi however, it seems that the goodness of human being is like
the function of the Dao. It bears common features of the Dao like no-desire, acting with the flow,
and no artificial purpose oriented, human being should like the simplest life merely for the fulfil-
ment of their basic functional needs away from extra desires. The reasons, in the text of the Laozi,
for the fulfilment of the their basic functional needs are on the one hand acting like the Dao, on
the other hand, having held the least desire/ no desire towards external goods, it is the best way
to survey ( guan) what the Dao is and how the Dao functions. This in turn also affects on how
human beings act in order to have the goodness of themselves.

10
The methods of having the goodness for the human being are either the observation of the revo-
lution of the heavens in Plato or survey ( guan) the Dao in the Laozi. In this chapter, I will
examine the Timaeus with regard the relation between the observation of the heavens and the
macro-micro analogue; and the concept of guan to survey in the Laozi. I will argue that there is
profound relation between the goodness of human being and the observation of the cosmos and
the Dao in order to become like god/ the Dao. Furthermore, I will also examine the concept of
guan in the Laozi to argue that the method to learn, understand and emulate the Dao is by
guan. I will do this by means of a close textual analysis of, reviewing historical commentaries on,
and comparing and contrasting the concept of, shi to see with, the concept of guan, and I
will take it a step further by arguing that guan to survey is not simply a sensational perception
but also involves the process of cognition, understanding, and formulating the knowledge of the
sensational perception.

Although both Plato and the Laozi take it for granted that the goodness of a human being should
be finally to become god-like/ the Dao, but the targets are foundationally different in terms of
ontological existence in that Plato holds dualist thought but the Laozi holds monist thought.
That is to say, the rational soul eventually will go back to its own star without exceptions if it func-
tions well and is well-ordered. It will run away from the mischievous body. However, the Laozi
holds the belief that human beings will finally die without any condition, and the purpose of hav-
ing/ emulating the function of the Dao is having longevity to hold the body as long as possible,
not getting the body harmed from any external conditions.

Jarrod Hyam(PhD Candidate, University of Sydney)

The Body Divine: Bauls of Bengal and Embodied Tantric Praxis

This essay presents an interdisciplinary analysis of psycho-physiological healing modalities among

the Baul minstrels of West Bengal, India. Applying Baul as a designating term is itself controver-
sial, as these minstrels form a non-systematic group of practitioners. Defying any singular philo-
sophical or religious paradigm, Bauls are deeply interwoven with the Sahajiya tradition of West
Bengal, India and Bangladesh. The Sahajiya milieu of Bengal illustrates a complex religious and
cultural confluence, exhibiting philosophical continuity between the tantric Buddhist Mahasid-
dhas of medieval northern India and modern Bengali Baul minstrels.

Applying a phenomenology of embodiment as developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and modern

theorists such as Natalie Depraz and Richard Shusterman, I offer a comparative phenomenologi-
cal analysis of Baul tantric practices or sdhana. I refer to these practices as somatic praxis, as
they are primarily focused on perfecting the body as a centre of sacred powers. This essay draws
from both ethnographical fieldwork and textual studies to elucidate theories of embodiment and
techniques of healing within the philosophical and religious contexts of these practices, which
aim to invoke an ultimate realisation of non-duality, advaya, for practitioners.

11
Gad C. Isay (Tel-Hai College, Israel)
The Concentric Pattern in Kongzis Analects

The prevalence of centrality, the concentric pattern, or some other close equivalents of this
pattern in the Chinese past have been long recognized. The association of this pattern, or its
close equivalents, with Confucian religiosity has been also proposed. However, the prevalence
of a concentric pattern in Kongzis Analects and its association with a sense of religiosity is yet
to be explored. The present paper deals with that question. Occurrences of the concentric
pattern are organized in the Analects in relationship to single persons, society, the general,
and the universal. The levels indicate the existence of various centers. The various concentric
patterns are parallel, or may be overlapping, others may be scattered. These levels, in turn,
form a concentric pattern and, as shown in the paper, are more fundamental and genuine the
closer they are to the core of the person. Successive levels are differentiated by degree and not
by kind, thus excluding the supernatural while affirming non-duality. This analysis raises ques-
tions such as: what distinguishes the center from the rings? How are center and rings related
to one another? How do those graphic conditions translate into human concerns? How to
explain the experience of religiosity within this context?

Jordan Jackson (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

The Dao and the Apeiron: Metaphysical Roots of Chinese and Greek Philosophy

Many scholars are reluctant to accept ancient Chinese and Greek thinking as belonging to the
same tradition. They argue that the focus and method of investigation contributed to vastly
different traditions, one being philosophy, the other being Chinese philosophy. In tracing these
traditions back to their original thinkers, a strong comparison can be drawn between early
Chinese metaphysical thinking and early Greek metaphysical thinking. Specifically, Anaxi-
manders concept of the apeiron and Laozis concept of the Dao are two examples of strikingly
similar metaphysical reasoning. From a historical perspective, both Anaximander and Laozi are
the first to introduce thought-out metaphysical systems by applying metaphysical reasoning to
non-metaphysical language. From a philosophical perspective, the Dao and apeiron serve simi-
lar functions in the metaphysical theories of Laozi and Anaximander and acted as foundations
for the development of Greek and Chinese metaphysics. In understanding both concepts from
historical and philosophical perspectives, it is apparent that Chinese and Greek philosophy had
similarities in their metaphysical roots, and their consequent developments should be thought
of as divergence within a single tradition.

12
Cullan Joyce (University of Divinity, Melbourne)
Comparing Mindfulness and Traditions of Religious Meditation: Another Approach to the
Question

I argue that mindfulness meditation implicitly critiques standard categories and concepts utilised
within scholarship of religious meditation. Traditions engaging with religious meditation must
therefore re-examine their approaches to meditative practice and experience. This paper explores
the challenge posed by mindfulness studies and argues for a different approach to traditions of
religious meditation.
I argue Mindfulness meditation is a non-theoretical tradition; its approach is not well ex-
plained by designations used by recent scholarship. I cite three examples. Firstly, that scholarship
on mysticism and religious experience presumed categories for describing inner experience such
as mind and psyche which are absent from recent mindfulness studies.
Secondly, some scholars of mysticism engaged the role played by concepts and language. They
considered whether experiences of large-scale objects such as God or of emptiness were concep-
tual or non-conceptual. However, I argue that phenomena analogous to these processes occur in
mindfulness meditation despite the absence of such objects.
Thirdly, James account of Religious experience privileged experiences that were outliers or
classified meditative effects. Neither of approaches engages with the results from mindfulness
studies.
From these arguments I propose the necessity of taking different, more descriptive, approach
to the examination of traditions of religious meditation.

Rajesh Kumar(National University of Singapore)

Gandhi And The Means-End Question in Political Theory

Several works on Gandhi have underscored the centrality of the means in his theory. This con-
ventional reading is inadequate for the following reasons. First, Gandhi views individuals as pur-
posive beings, therefore, he would not deny the significance of the end. The ends are as important
as the agents choice of means to realize them. Second, such views make Gandhi a moralist, one
who would advance moral means for all human actions, including political ones. For Gandhi,
however, the choice of means depended on the circumstances of actions. Third, such views fail
to consider that Gandhi emphasized upon the convertibility of means and ends. What I intend
to show is that Gandhi understood the means-end question in non-dual terms, and that this
understanding grounds his influential critique of modern civilization. I show this by contrasting
his views with that of J S Mills, whose consequentialism Gandhi rejected.

13
Philip Martin (PhD Candidate, Macquarie University)
No-Eye and No-Mind: The Critical Origins of Nondualist Aesthetic Embodiment
in Nishida and Merleau-Ponty

One of the most influential approaches to phenomenological aesthetics is offered by Maurice

Merleau-Ponty. By focusing on reorienting philosophical thought towards the primacy of the
body, he develops a rich account of the relation of artistic expression to organic perception. Most
interestingly, in his later works his conception of everyday embodiment becomes problematised
and transformed such that the phenomenological conception of the world and its expressive re-
lation to the mind become intermingled to the point of nonduality. A productive comparison
can be made with Nishida Kitar, whose systematic philosophy is built around using Buddhist
concepts (particularly from Zen, Jdshinsh, and Kegon schools) to critically engage with Eu-
ropean philosophy. This project is often most evident in Nishidas writings on expression, art
and perception, which develop an integrated logic of worldly embodiment. Nishidas critiques of
Kant and Hegel in particular anticipate many elements of the approach taken by Merleau-Ponty.
This paper will analyse their resulting structural similarities, and the differences that emerge with
them, with respect to philosophical aesthetics by examining the critical philosophical histories of
sense perception (most centrally sight) that inform their accounts. While Merleau-Ponty deploys
his embodied phenomenology in a critique of Cartesian optics, Nishida draws upon Buddhist
concepts in a critical development of Neo-Kantian and Leibnizian understandings of sensible
synthesis and expression. For both thinkers the result is, to a greater or lesser degree, a systematic
nondualist philosophical aesthetics. However, they centre such understandings of aesthetic expe-
rience on fundamentally different understandings of what seeing might mean.

John R. Mercer (University of Tasmania)

Non-theistic Zen as meta-theory: implications for the evolution of qualitative Human Scien-
tific methodologies

Distinct from the quantified reductionism of the Natural Sciences, the Human Sciences explicitly
approach the tacit, embodied, unquantifiable realities of the lived human condition, using theories
and methods from phenomenology, hermeneutics and heuristics. However, due to constraints of
their dualistic underpinnings, these systems remain largely unable to transcend the limitations of
languicised textual forms. Consequently, they struggle for authentic and intimate access to phenom-
enal objects and processes.
In contrast, this presentation introduces non-theistic Zen as a non-dual philosophical system of
embodied phenomenological praxis, with its own hermeneutic phenomenological processes en-
coded and transmitted in embodied forms of text. Non-theistic Zen constitutes a meta-theoretical
foundation for an entirely alternative heuristic hermeneutic phenomenology based on no-self and
nothingness, with a capacity to engage and interpret embodied textual forms, while mitigating the
contamination of a self in first-hand experiential research. This potentially makes methodically
rigorous inquiry into lived, embodied phenomena, available for Human Scientific analysis. By open-
ing an explicit, contrasting tension between the non-dual meta-theory of non-theistic Zen, and the
western phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions, comparative philosophy potentially offers a
radical conceptual evolution for qualitative Human Scientific research methodologies.

14
Jan Mihal (PhD Candidate, University of Melbourne)
Exploring How Avidy Operates in Advaita Vednta Through the Model of Repression

Advaita Vednta1 holds that the self is non-dual and that it is one infinite consciousness. In this
essay I will explore how exactly this account is held to work and the specific role avidy plays in
this arrangement. In Part I, I will offer an explication of the Advaita view of self. This will not
be an argument for the position as much as it will be an exploration of textual sources and the
account of self that they articulate. I will then, in Parts II and III, examine the notion of avidy
specifically and the role it plays in accounting for the appearance of multiple selves where there is,
in fact, only one. An issue appears: the intuitive notion of ignorance as an effect of erroneous per-
ception must be reconciled with the role of avidy as cause of erroneous perception, of illusion. To
make the unintuitive notion that ignorance can cause illusion more plausible, I introduce in Part
IV the Model of Repression. This is a heuristic model for bridging the intuitive gap between
commonsense ignorance and avidy. I will then evaluate my model and some of the similarities
between itself and traditional Advaita.

Joseph S. OLeary (Tokyo, Independent Scholar)

Hegel and Nonduality

The position Hegel attains at the end of the Phenomenology is one of freedom, complete integration
and self-sufficiency, and a final simplicity and restored immediacy or suchness (as in Bud-
dhist tathat) in which all dualisms are overcome. Hegels penetrating wisdom is sustained and
guided by a spiritual instinct that merits close critical assessment from a Buddhist angle. Such
a Buddhist reading would also study the development of Hegels quest of nonduality from its
origins in the early enthusiasm shared with his fellow-students Schelling and Hlderlin. In the
process it could enable a deeper Western philosophical grasp of what Buddhists means by their
often puzzling talk of nonduality.
Looking at the very first dialectical exercise in the Phenomenology, in the chapter on sense
certainty, we find many leads for a Buddhist commentary on this great work. I shall focus first
on the desire for immediacy and security that drives the reflection, second on the way the re-
flection weans one away from clinging to illusory certitudes, in painful realization of constantly
recurring dualisms, and third on the way the initial desire is changed as a result (in this case
from empirical particularity to conceptual generality), as it will again and again be transformed
and enriched until at last it finds the fulfilment commensurate with its authentic scope.

15
Guy Petterson (University of Melbourne)
We Believe We Know What Comparison Is

Wir glauben zu wissen, was das ist: das Vergleichen. This statement is one of the starting points for
the discussion of comparison in Heideggers preliminary notes for the lecture course Introduction
to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing (1944/45), a course that sets out to develop a comparison
of thinking and poetizing, or philosophy and poetry. We may believe we know what comparison
is, especially in the field of comparative philosophy, but is this really the case? The preliminary
considerations for the lecture course (Thinking and Poetizing: Considerations on the Lecture)
provide some of the clearest expressions of Heideggers thinking about the nature of compari-
son and its significance for philosophy. In this paper I will explore Heideggers thinking about
comparison in conjunction with various ideas of comparison arising in the Indian tradition, in
fields such as Sanskrit grammar and poetics, and in some of the schools of Indian philosophy
which accept comparison as a distinct way of knowing. Comparison remains a relatively under-
explored idea in studies of Indian philosophy, and perhaps elsewhere, but is of critical signifi-
cance for engaging the problems of comparative philosophy in a more philosophical way.

Christopher Pollard (Deakin University)

Zen meditation: Critical Reflections from an Embodied Phenomenological Perspective

Embodied phenomenology and Zen Buddhism share a conviction that, in deepening our un-
derstanding of lived experience, we deepen our understanding of human existence. However,
despite many fruitful points of contact between the two approaches, there are some fundamental
differences. These differences can be focused by considering the question of the epistemologi-
cal and metaphysical significance attributable to meditative practice. In this paper I explore this
question through a critical examination of two interconnected themes that underpin the Zen
Buddhist view: the account of the nature suffering and the account of the nature of discursive
thinking.
I argue that, although phenomenologists can agree with claims concerning a variety of benefits and
insights derivable from sitting meditation, they will baulk at the idea that meditational experience
allows you to, in Dogens words, grasp things directly. Unlike things and their reflections in the
mirror, and unlike the moon and its reflection in the water. From the phenomenological perspec-
tive the attribution of a special epistemological status to meditation will be seen as being based on a
pre-existent commitment to a Buddhist ontology, with its accompanying soteriological trajectory.
As such, this commitment will be viewed as deriving from the hermeneutical context of meditative
practice, as opposed to being groundable in lived experience, as Zen practitioners customarily hold,
and as ontological claims ought to be according to the phenomenological method.

16
Sahanika Ratnayake (Australia National University)
Paradigmatic Examples and Metaphysics: The role of examples in Buddhist and
Western Analytic Metaphysics.

I argue that the use of seemingly innocent examples when theorising about metaphysics is more
loaded, or theoretically laden, than it first appears in that certain paradigmatic examples are sug-
gestive of particular metaphysical questions over others.
On the Buddhist side one finds recurring examples of fire, seeds sprouting, the building of houses
etc. On the Western analytic side, you find Bertrand Russell peering around his office talking
about tables, you find Michael Devitt and his realism about middle sized objects and even those
who are sceptical of traditional metaphysics such as Amie Thomasson, focus on ordinary objects.
The Western tradition appears to have a preference for examples of objects or entities whereas the
Buddhist appeal to processes based examples.
These examples are generally used in an attempt to make another point or as motivating the meta-
physical project itself. However, the characteristic choices in examples themselves bring different
metaphysical questions to the fore. For instance, examples of objects are suggestive of questions
of individuation and identity due to their seemingly clear boundaries in a way that process based
examples are not. This is significant particularly for contemporary Western metaphysics as these
questions are taken to be substantive. We might think instead that the questions have their roots
in earlier, unexpected places and assumptions, as evidenced by the characteristic examples of each
tradition.

Songyao Ren (PhD Candidate, Duke University)

The Zhuangist Views on Emotions

In this paper, I will put forward an interpretation of the emotional life of the wise person for
the Zhuangists. Due to the heterogeneity of the text, my interpretation will only be one among
many. However, I will argue that this interpretation not only forms a coherent picture with
the Zhuangists other views such as pluralism, the good life and the self, but also is interesting
philosophically for its own sake. In particular, I will argue that the Zhuangists advocate a kind
of emotional equanimity characterized by unperturbed ease and joy. They see this emotional
equanimity as essential for leading a good life, one in which one does not confine oneself to a
particular value framework, but wanders about and explores different possibilities to fulfill the
plurality of values through the worlds endless transformation.
In what follows, I will first provide an overview of the scholarly debate on this issue and un-
veil the disconcerting disagreement that underlies it. Then, I will survey some passages in the
Zhuangzi and sketch my interpretation of the Zhuangist views on emotions. Finally, I will exam-
ine the theoretical foundation for this interpretation by referencing the Zhuangist pluralism and
their conception of the good life.

17
David Rowe (Deakin University)
Nietzsche and the (Buddhist) non-self

Nietzsche is a proponent of western non-dualist thought. He has Zarathustra tell us that soul is
just a word for something on the body. That Nietzsche is a non-dualist (at least, a non-substance-
dualist) is (arguably) uncontroversial and thereby uninteresting. More interesting is the extent to
which themes from Indian thought have either directly or indirectly affected Nietzsches concep-
tion of the self. His views, however, are conflicting. On the one hand, he portrays a conception of
an enduring self, one which has a diachronic identity and cultivates itself through a kind of self-
mastery. On the other hand, however, he portrays the self as non-existent (or a non-self ), made
up of only drives, instincts and affects. These seemingly contradictory natures of the self can be
reconciled, I argue, by understanding them as adhering to different standards. The non-self view
adheres to the descriptive facts of what the self actually is, whereas the enduring self appeals to a
norm, namely the norm that the strong individual ought to create herself as an enduring self. By
recognizing these two different standards Nietzsche is able to overcome the nihilism he supposes
is inherent in Buddhism, in part due to its acceptance of the non-self.

Matthew Sharpe (Deakin University)

What does the Sage Know?

In a conference in Taiwan some years ago, in a session on Confucianism, a questioner from the
floor expressed the notion that the Confucian questioning concerning the Sage was completely
foreign to Western thought. Recent research on classical philosophy by students of Pierre Hadots
has called this claim into question. All of the ancient philosophical schools, it shows, conducted
discourses around the constancy of the sage (Seneca) or his other virtues. In this paper, I want
to look in particular at the Stoic discourses around the sage, and what attributes and qualities are
attributed to him. The paper will open and close with reflections on comparative philosophy, and
the role that reunderstanding classical philosophy as a way of life may play in future work negoti-
ating between Eastern and Western tradition.

Koji Tanaka (Australian National University)

The Catukoi Is Not A Logical Principle

Many Buddhist texts appeal to the Catukoi (four-corners) as the main form of argumentation
and reasoning. They consider not two but four possibilities: true, false, true and false, neither
true nor false. Buddhist scholars have recently started to formalise the mechanism that must be
behind the Catukoi in terms of modern logic. In so doing, they have identified the Catukoi as a
logical principle. Priest claims that the Catukoi is a venerable principle in Buddhist logic. Gar-
field praises the Catukoi as the highest logical achievement by Buddhist philosophers. While
Buddhists have developed a rigorous tradition of investigating the logical principles underlying
rational argumentation and reasoning, the Catukoi is not part of this development. In this paper,
I will show that the Catukoi is not a logical principle and that formalising it in terms of modern
logic should not be considered as part of Buddhist logic.
18
Sonam Thakchoe (University of Tasmania)
On the Problem of Necessary Connection in Mental Causation: Vasubandhu,
Ngrjuna and Hume, A Reply to Siderits

Does mental causation require ultimately direct and necessary causal connection between a pre-
vious consciousness-event and a subsequent consciousness-event? If the answer is affirmative,
then how is this possible? If the answer is negative how is mental causation possible? In his
article: Causation Humean Causation and Emptiness, Mark Siderits claims the Sautrntika-
Vasubandhu is Humean about causation insofar as both understand causation is just a matter
of constant conjunction and both reject necessary connection. I beg to differ. I think they both
take necessary connection very seriously. Therefore, I will instead argue that the Sautrntika-
Vasubandhu truly beliefs in necessary connection in mental causation, even though he may have
a real challenge in showing how such a direct and necessary causal relation is possible between
momentarily occurrent tropes or dharmas of any two immediately consecutive moments of cog-
nition. I will claim Humes approach to causation is more compatible with Ngrjunas argu-
ing to the effect that, like Ngrjuna, Hume denies necessary connection ultimately, and like
Ngrjuna, Hume advances necessary connection in mental causation as customary truth.

Eiichi Tosaki
Piet Mondrian and the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness

Dutch painter, Piet Mondrian (1872-1944), was emblematic of European modernist art with his
geometric non-figurative painting. Mondrians Neo-plastic canvases seem rigid and mathematical,
coolly composed of black grids blocked in with flat primary colour. The initial impression is typically
of somewhat mechanical imagery. However, on closer inspection these same canvases are dynamic
and can elicit a sense of rhythm. Neo-plasticism (1917-1944) was a rule-bound creative activity:
strictly primary colours, with black, grey, and white, and dissected by straight lines only. Neo-
plasticism was against pictorial-space, against repetition and, surprisingly, disparaged any refer-
ence to forms or shapes. Elimination of those basic elements of Western painting demonstrates
Mondrians antipathy towards conventional European painting. His abstract art is a philosophical
realization [manifestation?] of his thinking and artistic practice, and represents a deconstruction
of the conventions of European painting.
In my thinking, Mondrians canvases touch upon the concept of emptiness in terms of Buddhist un-
derstanding of that term. According to this observation, Mondrians neoplastic doctrine penetrates
the European convention of time and space, and closely aligns with Asian philosophical thinking:
Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism. Mondrian, although ultimately against the Christian tradi-
tion later in his life, had a limited understanding of Buddhist ideas, having been brought up in a
strict Calvinist family.
This paper will investigate the legitimacy of Mondrians painting philosophy, drawing from my
own investigations of the expression of rhythm in visual art, East and West. Mondrians think-
ing had a tendency toward mystification (via Theosophy), which results in his rather esoteric
theory of visual rhythm, based on non-repetition and non-sequential time. This paper also intro-
duces material in a recent Springer publication (in press) titled Mondrians Philosophy of Visual
Rhythm - Phenomenology, Wittgenstein, and Eastern thought.
19
Philippe Turenne (Kathmandu University)
Comparative philosophy/theology: On the methodological importance of addressing
religious aspects of Buddhist philosophy, and how to do that

Partly in view of the legitimate and important objective of convincing philosophers of the
importance of studying non-Western traditions, comparative studies of Buddhist thought have
proceeded along the lines of a comparative philosophy that, more than often based on different
takes on philosophical problems and rational reconstruction, have erased some aspects of Bud-
dhist philosophy. This presentation will draw from recent works in comparative to argue that a
meaningful, deep conversation with Buddhist thought needs to include aspects of Buddhist
thought that may at first not seem like they belong to philosophy. In short, a real conversation
between Western and Buddhist philosophy needs to acknowledge that these two traditions do not
share an exactly common notion of what philosophy is, where religious or theological elements
belong in relation to philosophy, and a rigorous reflexive effort to address those differences.

Qingjie James Wang(Chinese University of Hong Kong)

The Debate on Kongfuzi: Manufactured or not ?

Lionel M. Jensen once told us that Western understandings of Confucianism differ significant-
ly from the original Chinese ideas they claim to represent. Jensen then took this a rather shocking
step further, claiming that even Kongzis additional Chinese designation of Kong Fuzi
on which the Latinization Confucius is based scarcely existed prior to Matteo Riccis
(15521610) arrival in China. These terms, Jensen says, were entirely manufactured by Ricci
and other Western Jesuit missionaries.
This paper will not delve into the entirety of the views put forth in Jensens work. My aim is limited
in asserting a simple historical fact that long before the arrival of Jesuit missionaries in the late
Ming dynasty, Chinese texts from historical records to literatureand even including the Con-
fucian classics that Jensen claims to have checked exhaustivelyinclude numerous instances of
the use of the appellation Kong Fuzi. From my own preliminary gathering and examination of
resources, the earliest records in Chinese of the term Kong Fuzi can be traced at least back to the
early Tang dynasty, over 700 years before Ricci came to China. All on its own, this is more than
enough to prove Jensens claim that the Jesuits created and manufactured the term to be overly
hasty, contestable or even fundamentally flawed.

20
Peter Wong (Sophia Journal)
On the Cultivation of Sympathy in Promoting Understanding between Diverse
Religious Traditions

The paper begins with a somewhat unconventional interpretation of Mencius on the cultivation
of bravery which concludes with a sceptical view on the use of method in deliberately cultivat-
ing bravery. The upshot of my reading of Mencius is that with regard to cultivation, there are no
shortcuts, there are no methods, there is only the gradual deepening of openness and sensitivity
under ever-widening circumstances, paying constant attention to the arising of ones emergent
feelings of sympathy, shame, deference, and discrimination.

My suggestion is that Mencius approach to moral cultivation could be adopted with regard to
the encounter of religious traditions very different from ones own. The Western default of intel-
lectual engagement in resolving differences between religious traditions according to beliefs and
doctrines is insufficient in bridging the gulf across certain religious and philosophical divides.
Attempts at development of universal frameworks or principles in understanding the unfamiliar
might be counterproductive and distorting of what is valuable in the one encountered. What is
needed is an attitude of sympathetic engagement, one that pays close attention to what is similar
and different in a manner that fully engages our religious, moral and intellectual sensibilities.

21
 9:00 10:00 Conference Registration Coffee and Tea 10:00 10:30 Welcome to Country
10:30 12:00 Keynote Address Jin Y Park Derrida and Buddhism Respondent: Jack Reynolds
12:10 12:50 (Room 1) Matthew Sharpe What does the Sage Know? (Room 2) Sahanika Ratnayake Paradigmatic Examples and Metaphysics ...
12:50 1:50 Lunch (Provided)
1:50 2:30 (Room 1) Petra Brown Moral education: overcoming the East-West divide (Room 2) Jordan Jackson The Dao and the Apeiron: Metaphysical Roots of Chinese ...
2:30 3:10 (Room 1) Philippe Turenne Comparative philosophy/theology ... (Room 2) Aaron Grinter The Grand Titration: Contemporary Discussions ...
3:10 3:35 Break (Coffee and tea) 3:35 3:40 Graduate Essay Prizes

Monday 10 July
3:40 4:20 (Room 1) 1st Prize: Jan Mihal Exploring How Avidy Operates ... (Room 2) 2nd Prize: Songyao RenThe Zhuangist Views on Emotions
4:20 5:00 (Room 1) Adam Buben Personal Immortality in Transhumanism and ... (Room 2) Rajesh Kumar Gandhi and The Means-End Question in Political Theory
6:00 ~ Conference Dinner: Indian Curry Vault, 18-20 Bank Place, Melbourne 3000 Tel: 03 96 00 01 44 http://curryvault.com.au/contact/

9:00 9:40 Greg Bailey Is non-duality really important in ancient Indian thought?
9:40 10:20 Joseph S. OLeary Hegel and Nonduality 10:20 10:50 Break (Coffee and tea)
10:50 11:30 Leesa Davis The Live Word: Dynamics of Nonduality in Chan/Zen Buddhism
11:30 12:10 (Room 1) David Rowe Nietzsche and the (Buddhist) non-self (Room 2) Sonam Thakchoe On the Problem of Necessary Connection in Mental Causation ...
12:10 12:50 (Room 1) Heawon Choi Nonduality in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism ...
12:50 2:00 Lunch (Provided)
(Room 2) Koji Tanaka The Catukoi Is Not A Logical Principle

2:00 2:40 (Room 1) Philip Martin No-Eye and No-Mind: The Critical Origins ... (Room 2) John Claridge The Transcendence of Being: The Transience, Sensuality and ...
2:40 3:20 (Room 1) Cullan Joyce Comparing Mindfulness and Traditions of Religious ... (Room 2) Jarrod Hyam The Body Divine: Bauls of Bengal and Embodied Tantric Praxis

Tuesday 11 July
3:20 4:00 Break (Coffee and tea)
The Second Biennial Max Charlesworth Lecture, Introduction: Deakin Vice-Chancellor Professor Jane den Hollander AO; Dean Faculty of Arts Professor Brenda Cherednichenko
4:00 6:30 Keynote Address: Professor David R Loy Preparing for something that never happens: Buddhist reflections on the nonduality of means and ends Respondent: Bronwyn Finnigan

Own Dinner Arrangements

A S A C P C onference 2 0 1 7 T I M E T A B L E

10:00 12:00 Keynote address John Powers Cross Cultural Philosophy at the Crossroads: Where Do We Go From Here? Respondent: Jay Garfield via SKYPE
12:00 12:40 (Room 1) Guy Petterson We Believe We Know What Comparison Is (Room 2) Qingjie James Wang The Debate on Kongfuzi: Manufactured or not ?
12:40 1:40 Lunch (Not Provided Please make own lunch arrangements)
1:40 2:20 (Room 1) John R. Mercer Non-theistic Zen as meta-theory ... (Room 2) Gad C. Isay The Concentric Pattern in Kongzis Analects
2:20 3:00 (Room 1) Eiichi Tosaki Piet Mondrian and the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness (Room 2) Guan Yinlin The methods of having the goodness of human being ...
3:00 3:30 Break (Coffee and tea)
3:30 4:10 (Room 1) Christopher Pollard Zen meditation: Critical Reflections ... (Room 2) Peter Wong On the Cultivation of Sympathetic Engagement in Comparative Philosophy

Wednesday 12 July
4:10 4:30 Conference Closing