1
the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from
I. LAND
REGISTRATION
City Mayor Of Paraaque vs. Ebio
621 SCRA 555
FACTS:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406
sqm. parcel of land in Paraaque City covered by Tax
in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land
was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents
assert that the original occupant and possessor land
was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was
given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then
on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and
possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an
affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He
also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married
Pedros daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in
October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits
from the Paraaque municipal office for the
construction of their house within the land. On April
21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land in
favor of Ebio. On March 30, 1999, the Office of the
Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution
No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from the
City Government of Paraaque for the construction of
an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the
said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma
Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound
traversing the lot occupied by the respondents.
Respondents immediately opposed and the project
was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were
surprised when several officials from the barangay
and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8)
coconut trees planted on the said lot. On March 28,
2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to vacate the area within
the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting
their claim over the subject property and expressing
intent for a further dialogue. The request remained
unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the
RTC of Paraaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in
question.
HELD:
No.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was
formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually
settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being
the case, the law that governs ownership over the
accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to
Article 457 of the Civil Code.
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually
upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof, belong to
the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions
that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do
not form part of the public domain as the alluvial
property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the
Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may
be subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be
acquired by prescription. No matter how long the
possession of the properties has been, there can be
no prescription against the State regarding property of
public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot
acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of
public dominion, the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments
along its banks does not form part of the public
domain by clear provision of law.
Roxas v. Enriquez
29 Phil 31
FACTS:
On the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner,
Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian,
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the purpose of having registered, under the
Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel
A, Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D. The only one of
said parcels to which attention need be given in the
present appeal is Parcel A. There was a discrepancy
with the boundary in the technical description of the
title and the plan presented in court.
The adjoining owners of the land, one of them are the
Heirs of Enriquez, were informed of such application,
but no one went to question it so they were declared
in default. The same application was published in two
newspapers. The court approved the application and
Consuelo was given the titles.
In 1912, the City of Manila applied for the correction
of the title because it covered a public road. It was
also in 1912 that Consuelo went to court to ask for a
correction of the title because there were 2 buildings
which were not included in the title, although it was in
the application.

During the hearing, the heirs of Antonio Enriquez,
owners of the adjoining land, appeared in court
questioning the title. The Court granted the motions of
the City of Manila and Consuelo and denied Enriquez
petition.
ISSUE:
Was the court correct in denying the opposition of the
heirs of Enriquez?
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
The appellants assert in their argument that "personal
notice was absolutely necessary in order to justify the
court below in rendering a decree in favor of the
plaintiff and appellee, in the first instance". The court
ruled that personal notice is not absolutely a
prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens
system. The record also shows that the clerk of the
Land Court made a certificate showing that that notice
had been issued and published in accordance with
the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said
"certificate of the clerk that he had served the notice
as directed by the court, by publishing or mailing,
shall be filed in the case before the return day, and
shall be conclusive proof of such service."
Section 38 of said Act No. 496 also provides that:
"Every decree of registration shall bind the land and
quite the title thereto, subject only to the exceptions
stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government, and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice or
citations, or included in the general description 'To all
whom it may concern.'"
The primary purpose of Torrens Land Law is the
registration of the title which the applicant or petitioner
has and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims,
just or unjust, against it. The requirement that
personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity
of registration would absolutely prohibit the
2
foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that to a collateral attack of his title obtained
personal notice could never be given to "unknown more than 28 years ago.
claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises Private respondents contention: The
from the existence of possible unknown claimants. evidence of ownership is admissible in a
partition case as this is not a probate or land
Lee Tek Sheng vs. CA registration proceedings when the courts
jurisdiction is limited.
354 Phil 556
Facts:
Issue: WON the annotation of a notice of lis pendens
is valid.
After his mothers death, petitioner Leoncio
Lee Tek Sheng filed a complaint against his Held: Yes.
father (private respondent) for the partition of
the conjugal properties of his parents. Petitioners claim is not legally tenable. The
annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any
The private respondent alleged that the 4
case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to
parcels of land registered in petitioners
a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel
name are conjugal properties.
of land.
The PR contends that the lots were
registered under Leoncios name only as a
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate
trustee because during the registration,
of title and not the title. Placing a parcel of land under
Leoncio was the only Filipino in the family.
the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed.
partition case and for the reconveyance of
Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The
the lots to its rightful owner the conjugal
TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
regime.
land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be
To protect the interest of the conjugal regime
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
during the pendency of the case, PR caused
the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only
TCT 8278.
the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of
Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said
ownership should not be confused with the certificate
annotation but it was denied by RTC on the
of title as evidence of such ownership although both
grounds that: (a) the notice was not for the
are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to
purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner
petitioners fears, his certificate of title is not being
and (b) also to keep the property within the
assailed by private respondent. What the latter
power of the court pending litigation. CA
disputes is the formers claim of sole ownership.
affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.
Thus, although petitioners certificate of title may have
Petitioners contention: The resolution of an become incontrovertible one year after issuance, yet
incidental motion for cancellation of the contrary to his argument, it does not bar private
notice of lis pendens was improper to thresh respondent from questioning his ownership.
out the issue of ownership of the disputed
lots since ownership cannot be passed upon A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two
in a partition case and that it would amount grounds:

(1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting
the title of the adverse party
(2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect
the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was
convincingly shown to concur in this case.
It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing
to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires
an interest over said property does so at his own risk,
or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over
said property.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed
upon in partition case, suffice it to say that until and
unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be
premature to effect partition of the property. For
purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there
is nothing in the rules which requires the party
seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to
him. Besides, an action for partition is one case where
the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper.
Legarda vs. Saleeby
31 Phil 590
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot
of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of
land where it stands is registered in the Torrens
system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years
after the decree of registration is released in favor of
Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot
under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree
issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall
and the strip of land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its
improvement which has been registered under the
name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration
Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be
construed that where two certificates purports to
include the same registered land, the holder of the
earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of
registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the
law, once a title is registered the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner
once it has entered into the Torrens system.
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority
384 SCRA 152
FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree
created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease,
and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also
transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands
of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the
reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA
entered into a JVA with AMARI for the development of
the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a
joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by
Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as
the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was
conducted and it was concluded that the lands that
PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the
public domain; the certificates of title over the
3
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was
illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory
committee on the legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the
government stands to lose billions by the
conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to
AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the
renegotiations happening between the parties.
ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the
transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine,
which holds that the State owns all lands and waters
of the public domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian
doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are
owned by the State and except for alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain, natural
resources cannot be alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750
hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest
of the area are still submerged areas forming part of
Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will
reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas
of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs
to be incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay
are part of the lands of the public domain, waters
and other natural resources and consequently
owned by the State. As such, foreshore and
submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they
are classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the
PEA doesnt convert these inalienable natural

resources of the State into alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be
a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed
lands as alienable and disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public
use.
II. Ordinary Registration
Proceedings
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds
79 Phil 461
Facts: An alien bought a residential lot and its
registration was denied by the Register of Deeds on
the ground that being an alien, he cannot acquire land
in this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case
to the CFI, the court rendered judgement sustaining
the refusal of the Register of Deeds.
Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the
Philippines.
Held. No. Public agricultural lands mentioned in Sec.
1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include
residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court
stated:
Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by
the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate
their agricultural lands in favor of aliens.
Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines.
Halili vs. CA
287 SCRA 465
FACTS:
Petitioners appealed from the decision of the MTC
and RTC ruling that Helen Guzmans (American
citizen) waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son
was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition
against the sale of land to an alien.
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died
sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the
Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow,
defendant appellee Helen Meyers Guzman, and his
son, defendant appellee David Rey Guzman, both of
whom are also American citizens. Helen executed a
deed of quitclaim assigning, transferring and
conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and
interests in and over six parcels of land which the two
of them inherited from Simeon. Subsequently, David
Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-
appellee Emiliano Cataniag.
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a
complaint questioning the constitutionality and validity
of the two conveyances and claiming ownership
thereto based on their right of legal redemption under
Art. 1621[5] of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
Were the petitioners entitled to a right of redemption?
Was the sale of the lot to defendant-appellee
Cataniag valid?
HELD:
NO. The petitioners were not entitled to a right of
redemption. The subject land is urban. Thus,
petitioners have no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the
4
Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to
be redeemed is rural.
YES. The sale to Cataniag is valid. Non-Filipinos
cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands
of the public domain. But what is the effect of a
subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a
qualified Filipino citizen? Jurisprudence is consistent
that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid. Since the disputed land is now owned
by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen,
the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.
The objective of the constitutional provision -- to keep
our land in Filipino hands -- has been served.
Muller vs. Muller
500 SCRA 65
Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent
Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany
at a house owned by respondents parents but
decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents
which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the
cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property
was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition
for separation of properties before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition.

It also decreed the separation of properties between
them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it
was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC. It
held that respondent merely prayed for
reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership
to him. It ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the
petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house
situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to
reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to
reimbursement.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is an express prohibition against foreigners
owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite a constitutional
prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional
prohibition, he put the property under the name of his
Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity. It
has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Republic vs. CA and Lapia
235 SCRA 567
FACTS:
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots
347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a
total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the
time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then
natural-born Filipino citizens. On February 5, 1987,
the spouses filed an application for registration of title
of the two (2) parcels of land before the Region l Trial
Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time,
however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and
have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. An opposition was filed by the Republic
and after the parties have presented their respective
evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision
confirming private respondents' title to the lots in
question
. provides:
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of
the trial court based on the following ratiocination: In
the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants
were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land
in controversy from its former owner. For this reason,
the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands
by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they
5
are the rightful owners of the subject realty
considering also that they had paid for it quite a large
sum of money.
Issue: Whether or not a foreign national can apply for
registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the
requirements for registration under the Public Land
Act (CA 141).
Held: The Court disagreed on the petition to seek to
defeat respondents' application for registration of title
on the ground of foreign nationality.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr.,
stated: As could be gleaned from the evidence
adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee
simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or
possessory information title under Section 19 of the
Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not
present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such
as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the
"concession especial" or especial grant; (c)the
"composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title;
(d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e)
the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information
title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a
gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23
SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim
is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-
in-interest, since time immemorial.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was
passed into law, the relevant provision of which
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the
legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine
laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the

case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural
land, to be used by him as his residence.
In the case of married couples, one of them may avail
of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both
shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall
not exceed the maximum herein fixed. In case the
transferee already owns urban or rural lands for
residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for
residential purposes which, when added to those
already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum
areas herein authorized. The Court is of the view that
the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in
the instant case since said requirements are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom
compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in
the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the
land registration court prior to the approval of an
application for registration of title. An application for
registration of title before a land registration court
should not be confused with the issuance of a
certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only
when the judgment of the land registration court
approving the application for registration has become
final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is
the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185,
before the register of deeds should be complied with
by the applicants. This decree of registration is the
one that is submitted to the office of the register of
deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of
the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of
registration, the register of deeds has no participation
in the approval of the application for registration of
title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
The petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Cario v. Insular Government
41 Phil 935
Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a
certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land
as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited
under Igorot customs. There was no document of title
issued for the land when he applied for registration.
The government contends that the land in question
belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all
lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those
with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no
prescription against the Crown.
Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the
Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice
Holmes declared:
It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in
the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and
never to have been public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession
under a claim of ownership since time immemorial
and independent of any grant from the Spanish
Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
MCIAA vs. Tirol
588 SCRA 635
In this regard, well-settled is the rule that registration
of instruments must be done in the proper registry in
order to effect and bind the land. Prior to the Property
Registration Decree of 1978, Act No. 496 (or the Land
Registration Act) governed the recording of
transactions involving registered land, i.e., land with a
Torrens title. On the other hand, Act No. 3344, as
amended, provided for the system of recording of
transactions over unregistered real estate without
prejudice to a third party with a better right.
6
Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by a Torrens
title is sold, but the sale is registered under Act No.
3344 and not under the Land Registration Act, the
sale is not considered registered and the registration
of the deed does not operate as constructive notice to
the whole world.
Under the established principles of land registration, a
person dealing with registered land may generally rely
on the correctness of a certificate of title and the law
will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine
the legal status of the property, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry. Applying this standard to
the facts of this case, we rule that respondents
exercised the required diligence in ascertaining the
legal condition of the title to the subject property as to
be considered innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith.
DBP vs. COA
422 SCRA 459
A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property which involves the existence of equitable
duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the
property to deal with it for the benefit of another. A
trust is either express or implied. Express trusts are
those which the direct and positive acts of the parties
create, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words
evincing an intention to create a trust.
Tala Realty Services Corp. vs. Banco
Filipino
392 SCRA 506
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco
Filipino) filed before 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTC)
17 complaints for reconveyance of different properties
against Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala
Realty) et al.

Banco Filipinos complaints commonly alleged that in
1979, expansion of its operations required the
purchase of real properties for the purpose of
acquiring sites for more branches; that as Sections
25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act limit a banks
allowable investments in real estate to 50% of its
capital assets, its board of directors decided to
warehouse some of its existing properties and branch
sites. Thus, Nancy L. Ty, a major stockholder and
director, persuaded Pedro Aguirre and his brother
Tomas Aguirre, both major stockholders of Banco
Filipino, to organize and incorporate Tala Realty to
hold and purchase real properties in trust for Banco
Filipino; that after the transfer of Banco Filipino
properties to Tala Realty, the Aguirres sister
Remedios prodded her brother Tomas to, as he did,
endorse to her his shares in Tala Realty and
registered them in the name of her controlled
corporation, Add International.
Thus, Nancy, Remedios, and Pedro Aguirre controlled
Tala Realty, with Nancy exercising control through her
nominees Pilar, Cynthia, and Dolly, while Remedios
exercised control through Add International and her
nominee Elizabeth. Pedro Aguirre exercised control
through his own nominees, the latest being Tala
Realtys president, Rubencito del Mundo.
In the course of the implementation of their trust
agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some
of its properties. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to
Banco Filipino the properties for 20 years, renewable
for another 20 years at the option of Banco Filipino
with a right of first refusal in the event Tala Realty
decided to sell them.
Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for
itself, and demanded payment of rentals, deposits,
and goodwill, with a threat to eject Banco Filipino.
Thus arose Banco Filipinos 17 complaints for
reconveyance against Tala Realty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trust agreement is void
HELD:
In Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Court, by Decision
dated November 22, 2002, ruling on one of several
ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against Banco
Filipino arising from the same trust agreement in the
reconveyance cases subject of the present petitions,
held that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus
be enforced.
An implied trust could not have been formed between
the Bank and Tala as the Court has held that where
the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the
fraud.
The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek
enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala
since its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by
the Bank, it warehoused its branch site holdings to
Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program and
purchase new branch sites including its main branch
in Makati, and at the same time avoid the real
property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of
the General Banking Act which it had already
reached.
Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on
its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act
and that its warehousing agreement with Tala was a
scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank
opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a
spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to
reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a
first preference to buy at the same transfer price.
This agreement which the Bank claims to be an
implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while the Court
finds the sale and lease of the subject property
genuine and binding upon the parties, the Court
cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the
parties intended to create it. In the words of the Court
in the Ramos case, the courts will not assist the
7
payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing
a resultant trust for him in accordance with the clean
hands doctrine. The Bank cannot thus demand
reconveyance of the property based on its alleged
implied trust relationship with Tala.
Alvarez vs. PICOP
606 SCRA 444
Ancestral domains remain as such even when
possession or occupation of the area has been
interrupted by causes provided under the law such as
voluntary dealings entered into by the government
and private individuals/corporation. Therefore, the
issuance of TLA No. 43 in 1952 did not cause the
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous
Peoples to lose their possession or occupation over
the area covered by TLA No. 43.
The issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title is merely a formal recognition of the ICCs/IPs
rights of possession and ownership over their
ancestral domain identified and delineated in
accordance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,
and therefore, cannot be considered a condition
precedent for the need for an NCIP certification. In the
first place, it is manifestly absurd to claim that the
subject lands must first be proven to be part of
ancestral domains before a certification that they are
not part of ancestral domains can be required.
Melecio vs. CA
534 SCRA 62
FACTS:
Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his
heirs. However, during probate proceedings, Jesus
and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that
the will has been extinguished by implication of law
alleging that before Melecios death, the land was
sold to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus
eventually sold it to Navat.

Trial court admitted the will to probate and declared
the TCT null and void. However, the CA on appeal
denied probate on the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE:
W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided
for in Article 810 of CC.
HELD:
YES. The law does not specify a particular location
where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and
executed in the hand of the testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of
the execution is plain from the tenor of the succeeding
words of the paragraph. It states that this being in the
month of March 17th day, in the year 1968, and this
decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is no
other than Melecio Labrador, their father. This clearly
shows that this is a unilateral act of Melecio who
plainly knew that he was executing a will.
Republic vs. Dignos-Sorono
549 SCRA 58
FACTS: 2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu in favor of the following in four equal
shares:
a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono
share in the two lots;
b) Tito Dignos share in the two lots;
c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents
share in the two lots; and
d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents
share in the two lots
It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the
adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who
was awarded share in the two lots, sold the entire
two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA) via a public instrument entitled Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale without the knowledge of
respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were
the adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two
lots.
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), erected
a security fence one of the lot and relocated a
number of families, who had built their dwellings
within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to
enhance airport security.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax
Declarations of the 2 lots. Respondents soon asked
the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons
permission to occupy the lots but the same was
ignored. Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for
Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before
the RTC of Lapu-lapu City. Respondents further
alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-
interests sold, alienated or disposed of their shares in
the lots of which they have been in continuous
peaceful possession. Respondents furthermore
alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-
interest had given them any written notice of its
acquisition of the share of Tito Dignos.
The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its
Answer with Counterclaim, maintained that from the
time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest
CAA, it has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive
prescription, it had acquired valid title to the lots since
it was a purchaser in good faith and for value; and
assuming arguendo that it did not have just title, it
had, by possession for over 30 years, acquired
ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. At all
events, petitioner contended that respondents action
was barred by estoppel and laches.
8
The trial court found for respondents. the CA affirmed
the trial courts decision. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of
Tito binding to the respondents
2. WON estoppel and laches should work against
respondents
HELD: the petition is denied
1. NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this
Courts decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a
co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to thesale.This is
because under the aforementioned codal provision,
the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing
owned in common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a
co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale
of the entire property by one co-owner without the

consent of the other co-owners is NOT null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired
only the rights pertaining to the sellers-heirs of Tito
Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two
lots.
2. NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of
acquisitive prescription. Petitioners insistence that it
acquired the property through acquisitive prescription,
if not ordinary, then extraordinary, does not lie. It
bears emphasis at this juncture that in the
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and
Tito Dignos heirs the following material portions
thereof validate the claim of respondents that the two
lots were registered: x x x x
That since the OCT of Title of the above-mentioned
property/ies has/have been lost and/or destroyed
and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute
said title/s at its own expense and that the HEIRS-
VENDORS, their heirs, successors and assigns bind
themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so that
the said lot/s may be registered in the name of the
VENDEE in accordance with law x x x x
Republic vs. CA and Naguit
GR No. 144057, Jan. 17, 2005
Facts:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land. The application
sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over
the land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government,
and Angeles opposed the petition. The court issued
an order of general default against the whole world
except as to Angeles and the government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land
was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he
renounced all his rights to the subject property and
confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of
Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying
the same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact
and administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees in addition to existing
coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and
paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied
the land openly and in the concept of owner without
any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for
registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be
alienable. Since the subject land was declared
alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not
have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the
land was not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of
the public domain which were not declared alienable
or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree that the subject land
be first classified as alienable and disposable before
9
the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
Held:
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
governing original registration proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1)
that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1)
of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes
the government from giving it effect even as it decides
to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation
would even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not
yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in
the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already
an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of
registration of title under Section 14(1) had been met
by Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared
alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land
evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
she purchased the property; as well as the tax
declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in
1954, which strengthened one's bona fide claim of
ownership.
Malaban vs. Republic
587 SCRA 172
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an
application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in
Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of
the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth
being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his
four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena,
had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino.
After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during
trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by
the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the
subject property was verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved
the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the
RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
10
known as the Property Registration Decree, should
the land be classified as alienable and disposable as
of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established
that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on
acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the
subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of
their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession
since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
the development of national wealth, under Article 422
of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least
ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient
to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership
over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax
Declarations they presented in particularis to the
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2)
as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development
of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422
of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject
property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property
of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Republic vs. Iglesia ni Cristo
591 SCRA 438
In 1978, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) purchased a parcel of
land from one Carmen Racimo in Ilocos Norte. In
1979, INC sought to register said land under its name
pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law.
The Director of Lands opposed the application as it
averred that the said parcel of land is part of the
alienable public land; that INC cannot register said
land because it is not a Filipino citizen. INC argues
that it is a private land because Racimo, its
predecessor-in-interest has been in possession
thereof for more than 30 years; that the Constitutional
prohibition does not apply to INC, a corporation sole
11
(solely incorporated by one man, Erao Manalo, a
Filipino citizen), hence it can acquire said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not INC can register said parcel of
land under its name.
HELD: No.
The disputed land has never lost its public character.
Racimo, though occupying said land for more than 30
years, never applied for confirmation of incomplete or
imperfect title over said land. Under the law, all lands
that were not acquired from the Government either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As
exception to the rule would be any land that should
have been in the possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law allows the
registration of alienable public lands but only by
Filipino citizens. INC is not a Filipino citizen. There is
no basis on the contention that as a corporation sole,
INC is not prohibited from holding said land. The
benefit only applies to Filipino citizens not to a
corporation sole which has citizenship.
NOTE: 60% rule: Corporations and Partnerships of
which at least 60% of their capital belong to Filipinos
may acquire real property.