9/15/2015 G.R. No.

71977

TodayisTuesday,September15,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.71977February27,1987

DEMETRIOG.DEMETRIA,M.P.,AUGUSTOS.SANCHEZ,M.P.,ORLANDOS.MERCADO,M.P.,HONORATO
Y.AQUINO,M.P.,ZAFIROL.RESPICIO,M.P.,DOUGLASR.CAGAS,M.P.,OSCARF.SANTOS,M.P.,
ALBERTOG.ROMULO,M.P.,CIRIACOR.ALFELOR,M.P.,ISIDOROE.REAL,M.P.,EMIGDIOL.LINGAD,
M.P.,ROLANDOC.MARCIAL,M.P.,PEDROM.MARCELLANA,M.P.,VICTORS.ZIGA,M.P.,andROGELIOV.
GARCIA.M.P.,petitioners,
vs.
HON.MANUELALBAinhiscapacityastheMINISTEROFTHEBUDGETandVICTORMACALINGCAGinhis
capacityastheTREASUREROFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

FERNAN,J.:

Assailedinthispetitionforprohibitionwithprayerforawritofpreliminaryinjunctionistheconstitutionalityofthefirst
paragraphofSection44ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1177,otherwiseknownasthe"BudgetReformDecreeof1977."

Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National
Assembly/BatasanPambansarepresentingtheirmillionsofconstituents,aspartieswithgeneralinterestcommonto
all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the
reliefsprayedfor"1listedthegroundsrelieduponinthispetitionasfollows:

A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE

FUNDAMENTALLAWBYAUTHORIZINGTHEILLEGALTRANSFEROFPUBLICMONEYS.

B.SECTION44OFPRESIDENTIALDECREENO.1177ISREPUGNANTTOTHECONSTITUTION
AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED
TRANSFEROFFUNDSARETOBEMADE.

C.SECTION44OFPRESIDENTIALDECREENO.1177ALLOWSTHEPRESIDENTTOOVERRIDE
THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN
APPROVINGAPPROPRIATIONS.

D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF

LEGISLATIVEPOWERSTOTHEEXECUTIVE.

E.THETHREATENEDANDCONTINUINGTRANSFEROFFUNDSBYTHEPRESIDENTANDTHE
IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINESAREWITHOUTORINEXCESSOFTHEIRAUTHORITYANDJURISDICTION.2

Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor
General,forthepublicrespondents,questionedthelegalstandingofpetitioners,whowereallegedlymerelybegging
an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. He
furthercontendedthattheprovisionunderconsiderationwasenactedpursuanttoSection16[5],ArticleVIIIofthe
1973Constitutionandthatatanyrate,prohibitionwillnotliefromonebranchofthegovernmenttoacoordinate
branchtoenjointheperformanceofdutieswithinthelatter'ssphereofresponsibility.

On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, they did, stating,
among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the
presentcaseinabeyance"untildevelopmentsarisetoenablethepartiestoconcretizetheirrespectivestands."3

Thereafter,Werequiredpublicrespondentstofilearejoinder.TheSolicitorGeneralfiledarejoinderwithamotionto
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dismiss,settingforthasgroundstherefortheabrogationofSection16[5],ArticleVIIIofthe1973Constitutionbythe
FreedomConstitutionofMarch25,1986,whichhasallegedlyrenderedtheinstantpetitionmootandacademic.He
likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as
basisforthepetition'sdismissal.

In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 6837981,
September22,1986,Westatedthat:

TheabolitionoftheBatasangPambansaandthedisappearanceoftheofficeindisputebetweenthe
petitionerandtheprivaterespondentsbothofwhomhavegonetheirseparatewayscouldbea
convenient justification for dismissing the case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolvednow,onceandforall,notonlytodispelthelegalambiguitieshereraised.Themoreimportant
purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect
condonewrongonthesimplisticandtolerantpretextthatthecasehasbecomemootandacademic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government.Thecitizencomestousinquestoflawbutwemustalsogivehimjustice.Thetwoarenot
alwaysthesame.Therearetimeswhenwecannotgrantthelatterbecausetheissuehasbeensettled
and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the
disputehasdisappeared,asinthiscase,itneverthelesscriesouttoberesolved.Justicedemandsthat
weactthen,notonlyforthevindicationoftheoutragedright,thoughgone,butalsofortheguidanceof
andasarestraintuponthefuture.

Itisinthedischargeofourroleinsociety,asabovequoted,aswellastoavoidgreatdisservicetonationalinterest
thatWetakecognizanceofthispetitionandthusdenypublicrespondents'motiontodismiss.Likewisenoteworthyis
thefactthatthenewConstitution,ratifiedbytheFilipinopeopleintheplebisciteheldonFebruary2,1987,carries
verbatimsection16[5],ArticleVIIIofthe1973ConstitutionunderSection24[5],ArticleVI.AndwhileCongresshas
notofficiallyreconvened,Weseenocogentreasonforfurtherdelayingtheresolutionofthecaseatbar.

Theexceptiontakentopetitioners'legalstandingdeservesscantconsideration.ThecaseofPascualv.Secretaryof
PublicWorks,etal.,110Phil.331,isauthorityinsupportofpetitioners'locusstandi.Thus:

Again, it is wellsettled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a
directinjuryinconsequenceofitsenforcement.Yet,therearemanydecisionsnullifyingattheinstance
oftaxpayers,lawsprovidingforthedisbursementofpublicfunds,uponthetheorythattheexpenditure
of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Althoughtherearesomedecisionstothecontrary,theprevailingviewintheUnitedStatesisstatedin
theAmericanJurisprudenceasfollows:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to
attacktheconstitutionalityofastatute,thegeneralruleisthatnotonlypersonsindividually
affected,butalsotaxpayershavesufficientinterestinpreventingtheillegalexpenditures
ofmoneysraisedbytaxationandmaythereforequestiontheconstitutionalityofstatutes
requiringexpenditureofpublicmoneys.[11Am.Jur.761,Emphasissupplied.]

Moreover,inTan v. Macapagal,43SCRA 677andSanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards

taxpayers'suits,thisCourtenjoysthatopendiscretiontoentertainthesameornot.

Theconflictbetweenparagraph1ofSection44ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1177andSection16[5],ArticleVIIIofthe
1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44
provides:

ThePresidentshallhavetheauthoritytotransferanyfund,appropriatedforthedifferentdepartments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
AppropriationsAct,toanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydepartment,bureau,orofficeincludedin
theGeneralAppropriationsActorapprovedafteritsenactment.

Ontheotherhand,theconstitutionalprovisionunderconsiderationreadsasfollows:

Sec.16[5].Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations,however,thePresident,
the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutionalcommisionsmaybylawbeauthorizedtoaugmentanyiteminthegeneralappropriations
lawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespectiveappropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the

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constitutionalcommissionsconsiderableflexibilityintheuseofpublicfundsandresources,theconstitutionallowed
the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in
anotheritemintheappropriationofthegovernmentbranchorconstitutionalbodyconcerned.Theleewaygranted
wasthuslimited.Thepurposeandconditionsforwhichfundsmaybetransferredwerespecified,i.e.transfermay
beallowed for the purpose ofaugmenting an item andsuchtransfer may be made only ifthere are savingsfrom
anotheritemintheappropriationofthegovernmentbranchorconstitutionalbody.

Paragraph1ofSection44ofP.D.No.1177undulyoverextendstheprivilegegrantedundersaidSection16[5].It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
ExecutiveDepartmenttoanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydepartment,bureauorofficeincludedintheGeneral
AppropriationsActorapprovedafteritsenactment,withoutregardastowhetherornotthefundstobetransferred
are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standardssetinthefundamentallaw,therebyamountingtoanunduedelegationoflegislativepowers,butlikewise
goesbeyondthetenorthereof.Indeed,suchconstitutionalinfirmitiesrendertheprovisioninquestionnullandvoid.

"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds,
provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the
minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and
dispositionofpublicfundsasembodiedinSections16and18ofArticleVIIIofthe1973Constitution.Hence,the
conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)] the restrictions on the use of public funds for
publicpurpose[Sec.18(2)]theprohibitiontotransferanappropriationforanitemtoanother[See.16(5)andthe
requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the
expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly
observedbypetitioners,inviewoftheunlimitedauthoritybestoweduponthePresident,"...Pres.DecreeNo.1177
opensthefloodgatesfortheenactmentofunfundedappropriations,resultsinuncontrolledexecutiveexpenditures,
diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may
wellexpand[sic]publicmoneynotonthebasisofdevelopmentprioritiesbutonpoliticalandpersonalexpediency."
5Thecontentionofpublicrespondentsthatparagraph1ofSection44ofP.D.1177wasenactedpursuanttoSection16(5)of
ArticleVIIIofthe1973Constitutionmustperforcefallflatonitsface.

Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government
againstacoordinatebranchtoenjointheperformanceofdutieswithinthelatter'ssphereofresponsibility.

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and
Company,Boston,explained:

...Thelegislativeandjudicialarecoordinatedepartmentsofthegovernment,ofequaldignityeachis
alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting
within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an
unwarrantableassumptionbythatotherofpowerwhich,bytheConstitution,isnotconferreduponit.
The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three
departmentssubordinatetoanother,whenexercisingthetrustcommittedtoit.Thecourtsmaydeclare
legislativeenactmentsunconstitutionalandvoidinsomecases,butnotbecausethejudicialpoweris
superiorindegreeordignitytothelegislative.Beingrequiredtodeclarewhatthelawisinthecases
which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a
legislativeenactmentcomesinconflictwithit.Butthecourtssit,nottorevieworrevisethelegislative
action,buttoenforcethelegislativewill,anditisonlywheretheyfindthatthelegislaturehasfailedto
keepwithinitsconstitutionallimits,thattheyareatlibertytodisregarditsactionandindoingso,they
only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges
assumed to act and to render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high
authority,thejudgesclaimnojudicialsupremacytheyareonlytheadministratorsofthepublicwill.If
anactofthelegislatureisheldvoid,itisnotbecausethejudgeshaveanycontroloverthelegislative
power,butbecausetheactisforbiddenbytheConstitution,andbecausethewillofthepeople,which
is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v.
Commissioners,&c.,2Bay,38,61Peoplev.Rucker,5Col.5Russv.Com.,210Pa.St.54460Atl.
169,1L.R.A.[N.S.]409,105Am.St.Rep.825](pp.332334).

Indeed,wherethelegislatureortheexecutivebranchisactingwithinthelimitsofitsauthority,thejudiciarycannot
andoughtnottointerferewiththeformer.Butwherethelegislatureortheexecutiveactsbeyondthescopeofits
constitutionalpowers,itbecomesthedutyofthejudiciarytodeclarewhattheotherbranchesofthegovernmenthad
assumedtodoasvoid.ThisistheessenceofjudicialpowerconferredbytheConstitution"inoneSupremeCourt
andinsuchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw"[Art.VIII,Section1ofthe1935ConstitutionArt.X,Section
1ofthe1973ConstitutionandwhichwasadoptedaspartoftheFreedomConstitution,andArt.VIII,Section1ofthe
1987Constitution]andwhichpowerthisCourthasexercisedinmanyinstances.*

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PublicrespondentsarebeingenjoinedfromactingunderaprovisionoflawwhichWehaveearliermentionedtobe
constitutionallyinfirm.Thegeneralprinciplerelieduponcannotthereforeaccordthemtheprotectionsoughtasthey
arenotactingwithintheir"sphereofresponsibility"butwithoutit.

Thenationhasnotrecoveredfromtheshock,andworst,theeconomicdestitutionbroughtaboutbytheplundering
oftheTreasurybythedeposeddictatorandhiscohorts.Aprovisionwhichallowseventheslightestpossibilityofa
repetitionofthissadexperiencecannotremainwritteninourstatutebooks.

WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionisgranted.Paragraph1ofSection44ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1177ishereby
declarednullandvoidforbeingunconstitutional.

SOORDERRED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, MelencioHerrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla,Bidin,SarmientoandCortes,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1Petition,p.3,Rollo.

2pp.67,Rollo

3p.169,Rollo.

4Therelevantportionsreadasfollows:

TheCourtdeveloped,foritsowngovernanceinthecaseconfessedlywithinitsjurisdiction,aseriesof
rulesunderwhichithasavoidedpassinguponalargepartofalltheconstitutionalquestionspressed
uponitfordecision.Theyare:

1.TheCourtwillnotpassupontheconstitutionalityoflegislationinafriendly,nonadversary
proceeding,decliningbecausetodecidesuchquestions"islegitimateonlyinthelastresort,andasa
necessityinthedeterminationofreal,earnestandvitalcontroversybetweenindividuals.Itneverwas
thethoughttht,bymeansofafriendlysuit,apartybeateninthelegislaturecouldtransfertothecourts
aninquiryastotheconstitutionalityofthelegislativeact."Chicago&GrandTrunkRy.v.Wellman,143
U.S.339,345.

2.TheCourtwillnot"anticipatequestionofconstitutionallawinadvanceofthenecessityofdeciding
it."Liverpool.N.Y.&P.S.S.Co.v.EmigrationCommissioners,113U.S.33,39..."Itisnotthehabitof
theCourttodecidequestionsofaconstitutionalnatureunlessabsolutelynecessarytoadecisionofthe
case.'Burtonv.UnitedStates.196U.S.283,295.

3.TheCourtwillnotformulatearuleofconstitutionallawbroaderthanisrequiredbytheprecisefacts
towhichitistobeapplied."Liverpool,N.Y.&P.S.S.Co.v.EmigrationCommissioners,supra.

4.TheCourtwillnotpassuponaconstitutionalquestionalthoughproperlypresentedbytherecord,if
thereisalsopresentsomeothergrounduponwhichthecasemaybedisposedof.Thisrulehasfound
mostvariedapplication.Thus,ifacasecanbedecidedoneitheroftwogrounds,oneinvolvinga
constitutionalquestion,theotheraquestionofstatutoryconstructionorgenerallaw,theCourtwill
decideonlythelatter.Silerv.Louisville&NashvilleR.Co.,213U.S.175,191Lightv.UnitedStates,
220U.S.523,538.Appealsfromthehighestcourtofastatechallengingitsdecisionofaquestion
undertheFederalConstitutionarefrequentlydismissedbecausethejudgmentcanbesustainedonan
independentstateground.BereaCollegev.Kentucky,211U.S.45,53.

5.TheCourtwillnotpassuponthevalidityofastatuteuponcomplaintofonewhofailstoshowthathe
isinjuredbyitsoperation.Tylerv.TheJudges,179U.S.405Hendrickv.Maryland,235U.S.610,621.
Amongthemanyapplicationsofthisrule,noneismorestrikingthanthedenialoftherightofchallenge
toonewholacksapersonalorpropertyright.Thus,thechallengebyapublicofficialinterestedonlyin
theperformanceofhisofficialdutywillnotbeentertained.....InFairchildv.Hughes,258U.S.126,the
CourtaffirmedthedismissalofasuitbroughtbyacitizenwhosoughttohavetheNineteenth
Amendmentdeclaredunconstitutional.InMassachusettsv.Mellon,262U.S.447,thechallengeofthe
federalMaternityActwasnotentertainedalthoughmadebytheCommonwealthonbehalfofallits
citizens.

6.TheCourtwillnotpassupontheconstitutionalityofastatuteattheinstanceofonewhohasavailed
himselfofitsbenefits.GreatFallsMfg.Co.v.AttorneyGeneral,124,U.S.581...
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7."WhenthevalidityofanactoftheCongressisdrawninquestion,andevenifaseriousdoubtof
constitutionalityisraised,itisacardinalprinciplethatthisCourtwillfirstascertainwhethera
constructionofthestatuteisfairlypossiblebywhichthequestionmaybeavoided.'Cromwellv.
Benson,285U.S.22,62."[pp.176177,Rollo].

5p.14,Rollo.

*Casanovasvs.Hord8Phil.125McGirrvs.Hamilton,30Phil.563CompaniaGeneraldeTabacos
vs.BoardofPublicUtility,34Phil.136CentralCapizvs.Ramirez,40Phil.883Concepcionvs.
Paredes,42Phil.599USvs.AngTangHo43Phil.6McDanielvs.Apacible,44Phil.248Peoplevs.
Pomar,46Phil.440Agcaoilivs.Suguitan,48Phil.676GovernmentofP.I.vs.Springer,50Phil.259
ManilaElectricCo.vs.PasayTransp.Co.,57Phil.600:Peoplevs.Linsangan62Phil.464People
andHongkong&ShanghaiBankingCorp.vs.JoseO.Vera,65Phil.56Peoplevs.Carlos,78Phil.
535CityofBaguiovs.Nawasa,106Phil.144CityofCebuvs.Nawasa,107Phil,1112Ruttervs.
Esteban93Phil.68.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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