Govt of US vs.

Purganan

Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale 0522 dated 16 June 1999,
supplemented by Notes 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of
the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of
justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) 1069, also
known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and
was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The
validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before the Supreme Court in GR
139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to
furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, the Supreme Court issued its 17 October 2000 Resolution. By an
identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its
earlier Decision. It held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. Finding
no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which
was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the
subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on 15 April 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in
Indictment No. 99-00281 CRSEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code
Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1069. Before the RTC could act on the
Petition, Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that
Jimenezs application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC
granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court
a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. The DOJ filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings
are pending.

Held: Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition
request and arrest warrant. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from
the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." Hence, the second sentence in
the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for
the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought
to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present
case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him,
not before the extradition court. The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into
place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused
to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their
detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis
of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition. The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary
has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, the right to due process
is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process
extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to
every situation calling for its application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied
for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein. Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived
essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving
the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.