AKBAYAN-YOUTH vs COMELEC
FACTS: On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with
other youth movements sought the extension of the registration
of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has
already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks
that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition.
AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that
there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register
and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of
Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be
conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-
Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act
8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by
powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including
voters registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the extension of the voters
registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so
pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which
provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within
120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not
absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration
which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the
exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even
pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing
order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is
explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-
election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special
registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-
election matters because the additional voters from the special
two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the
book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed,
then entered into the computerized voters list; and then they
will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update
and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections
would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes
after the special registration. In short, it will cost more
inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth
voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in
AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was attached any actual complaint
from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising
from the fact that the voters registration has ended on
December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in
their pleading that they are asking an extension because they
failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not
appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those
who slumber on their rights.
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST vs COMELEC
FACTS: On February 12, 2009 the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8585 adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections to October 31, 2009,
instead of December 15, 2009 as fixed by their prior Resolution
No. 8514 pursuant to R.A. 8189 or the Voters Registration Act
of 1996. The public clamored for an extension but the COMELEC
argued that they need more time to prepare for the automated
elections. It contends that the Omnibus Election Code confer
upon it the power to promulgate rules ad regulations in order to
ensure free, orderly and honest elections. It also cited the case
of Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections where the court
denied a similar prayer for an extension of the deadline of voter
registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
Raymond V. Palatino, representative of Kabataan Party-list
assailed the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seeks
declaration of its nullity. Palatino contends that this would be
considered an encroachment of the legislative power of
Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter
registration under Section 8 of The Voters Registration Act of
1996. It was prayed that Resolution No. 8585 be declared null
and void and to extend the registration until January 9, 2010.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8585, adjusting the deadline of
voter registration to October 31, 2009 instead of December 15,
2009, is null and void
HELD: Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures
that the State derives its power from the consent of the
governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a
function of the State policy of people empowerment articulated
in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them,
bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and directive to the State to encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to
register daily during regular offices hours, except during the
period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days
before a special election.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the
mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably
held within the period provided by R.A. 8189, Sec. 8 - daily
during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days
before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no
occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other
dates or deadlines therefor.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void insofar
as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010
elections on October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is directed to
proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters
and holding the same until January 9, 2010.
ERNESTO YMBONG vs ABS-CBN
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a Rule 45 Petition seeking to set aside the
August 22, 2007 Decision1[1] and September 18, 2008
Resolution2[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
86206 declaring petitioner to have resigned from work and not
illegally dismissed.
The antecedent facts follow:
Petitioner Ernesto G. Ymbong started working for ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) in 1993 at its regional
station in Cebu as a television talent, co-anchoring Hoy Gising
and TV Patrol Cebu. His stint in ABS-CBN later extended to radio
when ABS-CBN Cebu launched its AM station DYAB in 1995
where he worked as drama and voice talent, spinner,
scriptwriter and public affairs program anchor.
Like Ymbong, Leandro Patalinghug also worked for ABS-
CBN Cebu. Starting 1995, he worked as talent, director and
scriptwriter for various radio programs aired over DYAB.
1
2
 On January 1, 1996, the ABS-CBN Head Office in Manila
issued Policy No. HR-ER-016 or the Policy on Employees
Seeking Public Office. The pertinent portions read:
1. Any employee who intends to run for
any public office position, must file
his/her letter of resignation, at least
thirty (30) days prior to the official filing of
the certificate of candidacy either for
national or local election.
xxxx
3. Further, any employee who intends to
join a political group/party or even
with no political affiliation but who
intends to openly and aggressively
campaign for a candidate or group of
candidates (e.g. publicly
speaking/endorsing candidate, recruiting
campaign workers, etc.) must file a
request for leave of absence subject to
managements approval. For this
particular reason, the employee should file
the leave request at least thirty (30) days
prior to the start of the planned leave
period.
x x x x3[3] [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.]
Because of the impending May 1998 elections and based
on his immediate recollection of the policy at that time, Dante
Luzon, Assistant Station Manager of DYAB issued the following
memorandum:
3 5
TO : ALL CONCERNED
FROM : DANTE LUZON
DATE : MARCH 25, 1998
SUBJECT : AS STATED
Please be informed that per company policy, any
employee/talent who wants to run for any
position in the coming election will have to
file a leave of absence the moment he/she
files his/her certificate of candidacy.
The services rendered by the concerned
employee/talent to this company will then be
temporarily suspended for the entire
campaign/election period.
For strict compliance.4[4] [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.]
Luzon, however, admitted that upon double-checking of
the exact text of the policy and subsequent confirmation with
the ABS-CBN Head Office, he saw that the policy actually
required suspension for those who intend to campaign for a
political party or candidate and resignation for those who will
actually run in the elections.5[5]
After the issuance of the March 25, 1998 Memorandum,
Ymbong got in touch with Luzon. Luzon claims that Ymbong
approached him and told him that he would leave radio for a
couple of months because he will campaign for the
administration ticket. It was only after the elections that they
found out that Ymbong actually ran for public office himself at
4
the eleventh hour. Ymbong, on the other hand, claims that in
accordance with the March 25, 1998 Memorandum, he informed
Luzon through a letter that he would take a few months leave
of absence from March 8, 1998 to May 18, 1998 since he was
running for councilor of Lapu-Lapu City.
As regards Patalinghug, Patalinghug approached Luzon
and advised him that he will run as councilor for Naga, Cebu.
According to Luzon, he clarified to Patalinghug that he will be
considered resigned and not just on leave once he files a
certificate of candidacy. Thus, Patalinghug wrote Luzon the
following letter on April 13, 1998:
Dear Mr. Luzon,
Im submitting to you my letter of
resignation as your Drama Production Chief and
Talent due to your companys policy that every
person connected to ABS-CBN that should seek an
elected position in the government will be forced
to resigned (sic) from his position. So herewith
Im submitting my resignation with a hard heart.
But Im still hoping to be connected again with
your prestigious company after the election[s]
should you feel that Im still an asset to your
drama production department. Im looking
forward to that day and Im very happy and proud
that I have served for two and a half years the
most stable and the most prestigious Radio and
TV Network in the Philippines.
As a friend[,] wish me luck and Pray for
me. Thank you.
Very
Truly Yours,
(Sgd.)
Leandro
Boy Patalinghug6[6]
Unfortunately, both Ymbong and Patalinghug lost in the
May 1998 elections.
Later, Ymbong and Patalinghug both tried to come back
to ABS-CBN Cebu. According to Luzon, he informed them that
they cannot work there anymore because of company policy.
This was stressed even in subsequent meetings and they were
told that the company was not allowing any exceptions. ABS-
CBN, however, agreed out of pure liberality to give them a
chance to wind up their participation in the radio drama,
Nagbabagang Langit, since it was rating well and to avoid an
abrupt ending. The agreed winding-up, however, dragged on
for so long prompting Luzon to issue to Ymbong the following
memorandum dated September 14, 1998:
TO : NESTOR YMBONG
FROM : DANTE LUZON
SUBJECT : AS STATED
DATE : 14 SEPT. 1998
Please be reminded that your services as drama
talent had already been automatically terminated
when you ran for a local government position last
election.
The Management however gave you more than
enough time to end your drama participation and
other involvement with the drama department.
6
 It has been decided therefore that all your drama
participation shall be terminated effective
immediately. However, your involvement as drama
spinner/narrator of the drama NAGBA[BA]GANG
LANGIT continues until its writer/director Mr.
Leandro Patalinghug wraps it up one week upon
receipt of a separate memo issued to him.7[7]
Ymbong in contrast contended that after the expiration
of his leave of absence, he reported back to work as a regular
talent and in fact continued to receive his salary. On September
14, 1998, he received a memorandum stating that his services
are being terminated immediately, much to his surprise. Thus,
he filed an illegal dismissal complaint 8[8] against ABS-CBN,
Luzon and DYAB Station Manager Veneranda Sy. He argued
that the ground cited by ABS-CBN for his dismissal was not
among those enumerated in the Labor Code, as amended. And
even granting without admitting the existence of the company
policy supposed to have been violated, Ymbong averred that it
was necessary that the company policy meet certain
requirements before willful disobedience of the policy may
constitute a just cause for termination. Ymbong further argued
that the company policy violates his constitutional right to
suffrage.9[9]
Patalinghug likewise filed an illegal dismissal
complaint [10] against ABS-CBN.
10
ABS-CBN prayed for the dismissal of the complaints
arguing that there is no employer-employee relationship
7 ABS-CBN. The Labor Arbiter likewise ruled that although the
8 11
9 12
10
between the company and Ymbong and Patalinghug. ABS-CBN
contended that they are not employees but talents as evidenced
by their talent contracts. However, notwithstanding their
status, ABS-CBN has a standing policy on persons connected
with the company whenever they will run for public office. 11
[11]
On July 14, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision12[12] finding the dismissal of Ymbong and Patalinghug
illegal, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,
judgment is rendered finding the dismissal of the
two complainants illegal. An order is issued
directing respondent ABS[-]CBN to immediately
reinstate complainants to their former positions
without loss of seniority rights plus the payment of
backwages in the amount of P200,000.00 to each
complainant.
All other claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.13[13]
The Labor Arbiter found that there exists an employer-
employee relationship between ABS-CBN and Ymbong and
Patalinghug considering the stipulations in their appointment
letters/talent contracts. The Labor Arbiter noted particularly
that the appointment letters/talent contracts imposed conditions
in the performance of their work, specifically on attendance and
punctuality, which effectively placed them under the control of
13
subject company policy is reasonable and not contrary to law,
the same was not made known to Ymbong and Patalinghug and
in fact was superseded by another one embodied in the March
25, 1998 Memorandum issued by Luzon. Thus, there is no valid
or authorized cause in terminating Ymbong and Patalinghug
from their employment.
In its memorandum of appeal14[14] before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), ABS-CBN contended that
the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case because
there is no employer-employee relationship between the
company and Ymbong and Patalinghug, and that Sy and
Luzon mistakenly assumed that Ymbong and Patalinghug could
just file a leave of absence since they are only talents and not
employees. In its Supplemental Appeal,15[15] ABS-CBN insisted
that Ymbong and Patalinghug were engaged as radio talents for
DYAB dramas and personality programs and their contract is
one between a self-employed contractor and the hiring party
which is a standard practice in the broadcasting industry. It
also argued that the Labor Arbiter should not have made much
of the provisions on Ymbongs attendance and punctuality since
such requirement is a dictate of the programming of the station,
the slating of shows at regular time slots, and availability of
recording studios not an attempt to exercise control over the
manner of his performance of the contracted anchor work
within his scheduled spot on air. As for the pronouncement that
the company policy has already been superseded by the March
25, 1998 Memorandum issued by Luzon, the latter already
clarified that it was the very policy he sought to enforce. This
matter was relayed by Luzon to Patalinghug when the latter
disclosed his plans to join the 1998 elections while Ymbong only
informed the company that he was campaigning for the
administration ticket and the company had no inkling that he
will actually run until the issue was already moot and academic.
14
15
ABS-CBN further contended that Ymbong and Patalinghugs
reinstatement is legally and physically impossible as the talent
positions they vacated no longer exist. Neither is there basis for
the award of back wages since they were not earning a monthly
salary but paid talent fees on a per production/per script basis.
Attached to the Supplemental Appeal is a Sworn
Statement16[16] of Luzon.
On March 8, 2004, the NLRC rendered a decision 17[17]
modifying the labor arbiters decision. The fallo of the NLRC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision of Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Aninon dated
14 July 1999 is MODIFIED, to wit:
Ordering respondent ABS-CBN to reinstate
complainant Ernesto G. Ymbong and to pay his full
backwages computed from 15 September 1998 up
to the time of his actual reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.18[18]
The NLRC dismissed ABS-CBNs Supplemental Appeal for
being filed out of time. The NLRC ruled that to entertain the
same would be to allow the parties to submit their appeal on
piecemeal basis, which is contrary to the agencys duty to
facilitate speedy disposition of cases. The NLRC also held that
ABS-CBN wielded the power of control over Ymbong and
Patalinghug, thereby proving the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between them.
16
17
18
 As to the issue of whether they were illegally dismissed,
the NLRC treated their cases differently. In the case of
Patalinghug, it found that he voluntarily resigned from
employment on April 21, 1998 when he submitted his
resignation letter. The NLRC noted that although the tenor of
the resignation letter is somewhat involuntary, he knew that it is
the policy of the company that every person connected
therewith should resign from his employment if he seeks an
elected position in the government. As to Ymbong, however,
the NLRC ruled otherwise. It ruled that the March 25, 1998
Memorandum merely states that an employee who seeks any
elected position in the government will only merit the temporary
suspension of his services. It held that under the principle of
social justice, the March 25, 1998 Memorandum shall prevail
and ABS-CBN is estopped from enforcing the September 14,
1998 memorandum issued to Ymbong stating that his services
had been automatically terminated when he ran for an elective
position.
ABS-CBN moved to reconsider the NLRC decision, but the
same was denied in a Resolution dated June 21, 2004.19[19]
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC, ABS-
CBN filed a petition for certiorari 20[20] before the CA alleging
that:
I.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY
MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS IN NOT HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENT YMBONG IS A FREELANCE
RADIO TALENT AND MEDIA PRACTITIONERNOT
A REGULAR EMPLOYEE OF PETITIONERTO
WHOM CERTAIN PRODUCTION WORK HAD BEEN
19
20
OUTSOURCED BY ABS-CBN CEBU UNDER AN
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORSHIP SITUATION,
THUS RENDERING THE LABOR COURTS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN THE ABSENCE
OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.
II.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING RESPONDENT
YMBONG TO BE A REGULAR EMPLOYEE OF
PETITIONER AS TO CREATE A CONTRACTUAL
EMPLOYMENT RELATION BETWEEN THEM WHEN
NONE EXISTS OR HAD BEEN AGREED UPON OR
OTHERWISE INTENDED BY THE PARTIES.
III.
EVEN ASSUMING THE ALLEGED EMPLOYMENT
RELATION TO EXIST FOR THE SAKE OF
ARGUMENT, RESPONDENT NLRC IN ANY CASE
COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
NOT SIMILARLY UPHOLDING AND APPLYING
COMPANY POLICY NO. HR-ER-016 IN THE CASE
OF RESPONDENT YMBONG AND DEEMING HIM AS
RESIGNED AND DISQUALIFIED FROM FURTHER
ENGAGEMENT AS A RADIO TALENT IN ABS-CBN
CEBU AS A CONSEQUENCE OF HIS CANDIDACY IN
THE 1998 ELECTIONS, AS RESPONDENT NLRC
HAD DONE IN THE CASE OF PATALINGHUG.
IV.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND DENIED DUE PROCESS TO
PETITIONER IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER ITS
SUPPLEMENTAL APPEAL, DATED OCTOBER 18,
1999, FOR BEING FILED OUT OF TIME
CONSIDERING THAT THE FILING OF SUCH A
 PLEADING IS NOT IN ANY CASE PROSCRIBED
AND RESPONDENT NLRC IS AUTHORIZED TO
CONSIDER ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL;
MOREOVER, TECHNICAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DO
NOT APPLY IN LABOR CASES.
V.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE RELIEF OF
REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES TO
RESPONDENT YMBONG SINCE HE NEVER
OCCUPIED ANY REGULAR POSITION IN
PETITIONER FROM WHICH HE COULD HAVE BEEN
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED, NOR ARE ANY OF THE
RADIO PRODUCTIONS IN WHICH HE HAD DONE
TALENT WORK FOR PETITIONER STILL EXISTING.
INDEED, THERE IS NO BASIS WHATSOEVER FOR
THE AWARD OF BACKWAGES TO RESPONDENT
YMBONG IN THE AMOUNT OF P200,000.00
CONSIDERING THAT, AS SHOWN BY THE
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, HE WAS NOT
EARNING A MONTHLY SALARY OF P20,000.00, The CA cited Patalinghugs resignation letter to buttress this
AS HE FALSELY CLAIMS, BUT WAS PAID TALENT
FEES ON A PER PRODUCTION/PER SCRIPT
BASIS WHICH AVERAGED LESS THAN P10,000.00
PER MONTH IN TALENT FEES ALL IN ALL.21[21]
On August 22, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed
decision reversing and setting aside the March 8, 2004 Decision
and June 21, 2004 Resolution of the NLRC. The CA declared
Ymbong resigned from employment and not to have been
illegally dismissed. The award of full back wages in his favor
was deleted accordingly.
21
The CA ruled that ABS-CBN is estopped from claiming
that Ymbong was not its employee after applying the provisions
of Policy No. HR-ER-016 to him. It noted that said policy is
entitled Policy on Employees Seeking Public Office and the
guidelines contained therein specifically pertain to employees
and did not even mention talents or independent contractors. It
held that it is a complete turnaround on ABS-CBNs part to later
argue that Ymbong is only a radio talent or independent
contractor and not its employee. By applying the subject
company policy on Ymbong, ABS-CBN had explicitly recognized
him to be an employee and not merely an independent
contractor.
The CA likewise held that the subject company policy is
the controlling guideline and therefore, Ymbong should be
considered resigned from ABS-CBN. While Luzon has policy-
making power as assistant radio manager, he had no authority
to issue a memorandum that had the effect of repealing or
superseding a subsisting policy. Contrary to the findings of the
Labor Arbiter, the subject company policy was effective at that
time and continues to be valid and subsisting up to the present.
conclusion, noting that Patalinghug openly admitted in his letter
that his resignation was in line with the said company policy.
Since ABS-CBN applied Policy No. HR-ER-016 to Patalinghug,
there is no reason not to apply the same regulation to Ymbong
who was on a similar situation as the former. Thus, the CA
found that the NLRC overstepped its area of discretion to a
point of grave abuse in declaring Ymbong to have been illegally
terminated. The CA concluded that there is no illegal dismissal
to speak of in the instant case as Ymbong is considered
resigned when he ran for an elective post pursuant to the
subject company policy.
Hence, this petition.
 Petitioner argues that the CA gravely erred: (1) in
upholding Policy No. HR-ER-016; (2) in upholding the validity of
the termination of Ymbongs services; and (3) when it reversed
the decision of the NLRC 4th Division of Cebu City which
affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter Nicasio C. Anion.22[22]
Ymbong argues that the subject company policy is a
clear interference and a gross violation of an employees right to
suffrage. He is surprised why it was easy for the CA to rule that
Luzons memorandum ran counter to an existing policy while on
the other end, it did not see that it was in conflict with the
constitutional right to suffrage. He also points out that the
issuance of the March 25, 1998 Memorandum was precisely an
exercise of the management power to which an employee like
him must respect; otherwise, he will be sanctioned for
disobedience or worse, even terminated. He was not in a
position to know which between the two issuances was correct
and as far as he is concerned, the March 25, 1998
Memorandum superseded the subject company policy.
Moreover, ABS-CBN cannot disown acts of its officers most
especially since it prejudiced his property rights.23[23]
As to the validity of his dismissal, Ymbong contends that
the ground relied upon by ABS-CBN is not among the just and
authorized causes provided in the Labor Code, as amended.
And even assuming the subject company policy passes the test
of validity under the pretext of the right of the management to
discipline and terminate its employees, the exercise of such
right is not without bounds. Ymbong avers that his automatic
termination was a blatant disregard of his right to due process.
He was never asked to explain why he did not tender his
22
23
resignation before he ran for public office as mandated by the
subject company policy.24[24]
Ymbong likewise asseverates that both the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC were consistent in their findings that he was
illegally dismissed. It is settled that factual findings of labor
administrative officials, if supported by substantial evidence, are
accorded not only great respect but even finality.25[25]
ABS-CBN, for its part, counters that the validity of
policies such as Policy No. HR-ER-016 has long been upheld by
this Court which has ruled that a media company has a right to
impose a policy providing that employees who file their
certificates of candidacy in any election shall be considered
resigned.26[26] Moreover, case law has upheld the validity of
the exercise of management prerogatives even if they appear to
limit the rights of employees as long as there is no showing that
management prerogatives were exercised in a manner contrary
to law.27[27] ABS-CBN contends that being the largest media
and entertainment company in the country, its reputation stems
not only from its ability to deliver quality entertainment
programs but also because of neutrality and impartiality in
delivering news.28[28]
ABS-CBN further argues that nothing in the company
policy prohibits its employees from either accepting a public
appointive position or from running for public office. Thus, it
cannot be considered as violative of the constitutional right of
24
25
26
27
28
suffrage. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized the
employers right to enforce occupational qualifications as long
as the employer is able to show the existence of a reasonable
business necessity in imposing the questioned policy. Here,
Policy No. HR-ER-016 itself states that it was issued to protect
the company from any public misconceptions and [t]o
preserve its objectivity, neutrality and credibility. Thus, it
cannot be denied that it is reasonable under the
circumstances.29[29]
ABS-CBN likewise opposes Ymbongs claim that he was
terminated. ABS-CBN argues that on the contrary, Ymbongs
unilateral act of filing his certificate of candidacy is an overt act
tantamount to voluntary resignation on his part by virtue of the
clear mandate found in Policy No. HR-ER-016. Ymbong,
however, failed to file his resignation and in fact misled his
superiors by making them believe that he was going on leave to
campaign for the administration candidates but in fact, he
actually ran for councilor. He also claims to have fully apprised
Luzon through a letter of his intention to run for public office,
but he failed to adduce a copy of the same.30[30]
As to Ymbongs argument that the CA should not have
reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, ABS-
CBN asseverates that the CA is not precluded from making its
own findings most especially if upon its own review of the case,
it has been revealed that the NLRC, in affirming the findings of
the Labor Arbiter, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to
apply the subject company policy in Ymbongs case when it
readily applied the same to Patalinghug.31[31]
29
30
31
Essentially, the issues to be resolved in the instant
petition are: (1) whether Policy No. HR-ER-016 is valid; (2)
whether the March 25, 1998 Memorandum issued by Luzon
superseded Policy No. HR-ER-016; and (3) whether Ymbong, by
seeking an elective post, is deemed to have resigned and not
dismissed by ABS-CBN.
Policy No. HR-ER-016 is valid.
This is not the first time that this Court has dealt with a
policy similar to Policy No. HR-ER-016. In the case of Manila
Broadcasting Company v. NLRC,32[32] this Court ruled:
What is involved in this case is an unwritten
company policy considering any employee who
files a certificate of candidacy for any elective or
local office as resigned from the company.
Although 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 does not require
mass media commentators and announcers such
as private respondent to resign from their radio or
TV stations but only to go on leave for the
duration of the campaign period, we think that the
company may nevertheless validly require them to
resign as a matter of policy. In this case, the
policy is justified on the following grounds:
Working for the government and the
company at the same time is clearly
disadvantageous and prejudicial to
the rights and interest not only of
the company but the public as well.
In the event an employee wins in an
election, he cannot fully serve, as he
is expected to do, the interest of his
employer. The employee has to
32
 serve two (2) employers, obviously
detrimental to the interest of both
the government and the private
employer.
In the event the employee
loses in the election, the impartiality
and cold neutrality of an employee
as broadcast personality is suspect,
thus readily eroding and adversely
affecting the confidence and trust of
the listening public to employers
station.33[33]
ABS-CBN, like Manila Broadcasting Company, also had a
valid justification for Policy No. HR-ER-016. Its rationale is
embodied in the policy itself, to wit:
Rationale:
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
strongly believes that it is to the best interest of
the company to continuously remain apolitical.
While it encourages and supports its
employees to have greater political
awareness and for them to exercise their
right to suffrage, the company, however,
prefers to remain politically independent
and unattached to any political individual or
entity.
Therefore, employees who [intend] to run for
public office or accept political appointment
should resign from their positions, in order
to protect the company from any public
misconceptions. To preserve its objectivity,
neutrality and credibility, the company
33
reiterates the following policy guidelines for strict
implementation.
x x x x34[34] [Emphasis supplied.]
We have consistently held that so long as a companys
management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose
of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold
them.35[35] In the instant case, ABS-CBN validly justified the
implementation of Policy No. HR-ER-016. It is well within its
rights to ensure that it maintains its objectivity and credibility
and freeing itself from any appearance of impartiality so that
the confidence of the viewing and listening public in it will not
be in any way eroded. Even as the law is solicitous of the
welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an
employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own
business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.36[36]
It is worth noting that such exercise of management
prerogative has earned a stamp of approval from no less than
our Congress itself when on February 12, 2001, it enacted
Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election
Act. Section 6.6 thereof reads:
6.6. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer, reporter, on-air
correspondent or personality who is a
candidate for any elective public office or is
a campaign volunteer for or employed or
34
35
36
 retained in any capacity by any candidate or
political party shall be deemed resigned, if
so required by their employer, or shall take a
leave of absence from his/her work as such during
the campaign period: Provided, That any media
practitioner who is an official of a political party or
a member of the campaign staff of a candidate or
political party shall not use his/her time or space
to favor any candidate or political party.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
Policy No. HR-
ER-016 was not
superseded by
the March 25,
1998
Memorandum
The CA correctly ruled that though Luzon, as Assistant
Station Manager for Radio of ABS-CBN, has policy-making
powers in relation to his principal task of administering the
networks radio station in the Cebu region, the exercise of such
power should be in accord with the general rules and
regulations imposed by the ABS-CBN Head Office to its
employees. Clearly, the March 25, 1998 Memorandum issued by
Luzon which only requires employees to go on leave if they
intend to run for any elective position is in absolute
contradiction with Policy No. HR-ER-016 issued by the ABS-CBN
Head Office in Manila which requires the resignation, not only
the filing of a leave of absence, of any employee who intends to
run for public office. Having been issued beyond the scope of
his authority, the March 25, 1998 Memorandum is therefore
void and did not supersede Policy No. HR-ER-016.
Also worth noting is that Luzon in his Sworn Statement
admitted the inaccuracy of his recollection of the company
policy when he issued the March 25, 1998 Memorandum and
stated therein that upon double-checking of the exact text of
the policy statement and subsequent confirmation with the ABS-
CBN Head Office in Manila, he learned that the policy required
resignation for those who will actually run in elections because
the company wanted to maintain its independence. Since the
officer who himself issued the subject memorandum
acknowledged that it is not in harmony with the Policy issued by
the upper management, there is no reason for it to be a source
of right for Ymbong.
Ymbong is
deemed resigned
when he ran for
councilor.
As Policy No. HR-ER-016 is the subsisting company policy
and not Luzons March 25, 1998 Memorandum, Ymbong is
deemed resigned when he ran for councilor.
We find no merit in Ymbongs argument that [his]
automatic termination x x x was a blatant [disregard] of [his]
right to due process as he was never asked to explain why he
did not tender his resignation before he ran for public office as
mandated by [the subject company policy]. 37[37] Ymbongs
overt act of running for councilor of Lapu-Lapu City is
tantamount to resignation on his part. He was separated from
ABS-CBN not because he was dismissed but because he
resigned. Since there was no termination to speak of, the
requirement of due process in dismissal cases cannot be applied
to Ymbong. Thus, ABS-CBN is not duty-bound to ask him to
37
explain why he did not tender his resignation before he ran for
public office as mandated by the subject company policy.
In addition, we do not subscribe to Ymbongs claim that
he was not in a position to know which of the two issuances
was correct. Ymbong most likely than not, is fully aware that
the subsisting policy is Policy No. HR-ER-016 and not the March
25, 1998 Memorandum and it was for this reason that, as stated
by Luzon in his Sworn Statement, he only told the latter that he
will only campaign for the administration ticket and not actually
run for an elective post. Ymbong claims he had fully apprised
Luzon by letter of his plan to run and even filed a leave of
absence but records are bereft of any proof of said claim.
Ymbong claims that the letter stating his intention to go on
leave to run in the election is attached to his Position Paper as
Annex A, a perusal of said pleading attached to his petition
before this Court, however, show that Annex A was not his
letter to Luzon but the September 14, 1998 Memorandum
informing Ymbong that his services had been automatically
terminated when he ran for a local government position.
Moreover, as pointed out by ABS-CBN, had Ymbong been
truthful to his superiors, they would have been able to clarify to
him the prevailing company policy and inform him of the
consequences of his decision in case he decides to run, as
Luzon did in Patalinghugs case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED for lack of merit.
With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
UN vs ANG TANG HO
FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during
special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An
Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes
the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products.
Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53
which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the
price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang
Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta
of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The
said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO.
The sale was done on the 6 th of August 1919. On 08 August
1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that
there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the
Governor General.
HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed
because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO.
Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.
Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an
order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the
order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said
Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain,
so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated,
and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing
must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee
or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it
is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event.
AQUINO and ROBREDO vs COMELEC
Legislative district; population requirement. Petitioners Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek
the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716,
entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District
From Such Reapportionment.
Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, that the reapportionment introduced by Republic
Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard
that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No.
9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative. The provision draws a plain
and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a
district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city
must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010.
BIRAOGO vs PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. ---
Justice Jose P. Laurel
Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events
prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation
of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity
and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted
the good senator to the presidency.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for
prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of
Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B.
Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the
House of Representatives.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July
30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file
their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Held:
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court
in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the
Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of
all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to
know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a
promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of
the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that
clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court
stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle
legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power
to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with
care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257;
x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment."
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that
the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much
like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would,
at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the
Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to
decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These
offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but
will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible
indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is
violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it
does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as
its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan
hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in
virtually all administrations previous to that of former President
Arroyo.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions,
not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and
executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency
or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is
to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration"only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.
Decision
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is -
whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect
to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest
Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the
doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has
been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present
political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis
of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance
to the nations thrust to progress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No.
1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease
and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order
No. 1.
NAVARRO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat
Islands population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12
square kilometers and its average annual income is
P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President
approved into law R.A. 9355 creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC
conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification
of the creation of the province under the LGC which
yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative
votes. With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province
of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed
the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath
of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14,
2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected
their new set of provincial officials who assumed office
on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners
Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of
Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that
the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of
Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial
territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich
resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355
constitutional?
Suggested Answer:
February 10, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below
the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat
Islands, with an approximate land area of 802.12 square
kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of
2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts
proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the
land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption
is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no dispute that in
case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and
regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails,
because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic law, held the Court. (GR No.
180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12,
2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.
April 12, 2011 Ruling
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no.
180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled
that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL,
and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands, is declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation of
barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability.
However, with respect to the creation of municipalities,
component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local
government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as
expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if
the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province
under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated
under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands
or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-
created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy
decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and
Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but
fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461
(for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly
provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461
of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would,
then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective
local government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by
the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-
productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical.
Picture an intended province that consists of several
municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also
consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities
which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land
area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442,
respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to
comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers, even if it consists of several islands.
fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has
opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province
with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and
negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant
communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services
to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more
difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory
of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by
bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land
mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an
indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive
in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into
account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the
time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more
than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the
creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its
constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather
than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10,
2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which
cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province,
they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready
and capable of becoming a province. (Navarro vs. Executive
Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011)
PALPARAN VS HRET
FACTS:
In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the
sufficient voting percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of
Representatives in which Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the
first nominee of the said party-list group.
Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M.
Reyes. Jr. ,ErlindaCadapan, Antonia Flores, and JoselitoUstarez
are members of the other party-list groups filed with the HRET
a petition for quo warrantoagainst Bantay and its nominee,
Palaparan. They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the
House of Representative because he did not belong to a
marginalized and nderreprsented sectors which then are the
victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.
Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee and that
HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list that was elected to assume membership in the
House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such
question should be raised before the party-list group, not before
the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner Palparans qualifications.
Palparan filed a motio for reconsideration but the HRET denied
it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the
eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won
seats in the lower house of Congress.
RULINGS:
YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the
members of the Housse of Representatives are of two kinds:
members who shall be elected from legislative districts and
those who shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. Thus, it is the part-list representatives who are
elected into office, not their parties or organizations. Although
it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes member of
the House of Representatives.
As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987
Constitution , the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list
representatives and districts representatives are treated in like
manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. Once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his
oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins.
PGBI vs COMELEC
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Resolution all the pending incidents in this
case, specifically:
(a) the contempt charge1 against the respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec) for its alleged
disobedience to this Courts Status Quo Order 2 dated
February 2, 2010; and
(b) the issue of whether the petitioner, Philippine
Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), should be declared
to have participated in the party-list elections of May 10,
2010, in light of the Comelecs failure to obey our Status
Quo Order and our subsequent Resolution 3 granting
PGBIs petition to annul its delisting from the roster of
accredited party-list groups or organizations.4
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
These incidents arose from our Status Quo Order directing the
Comelec to restore and maintain the PGBI to its situation prior
to the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8679, pending the
resolution of the petition for certiorari that PGBI filed to
challenge this Comelec Resolution. Our Status Quo Order, in
short, directly ordered the Comelec to include PGBI in the list of
candidates under the party-list system in the May 10, 2010
elections pending the final determination of PGBIs qualification
to be voted upon as a party-list organization.
We issued the Status Quo Order on February 2, 2010. It was
served on the Comelec on the same date, 5 i.e., within the
period that the Comelec itself gave for the correction of any
error or omission in its published official list of party-list
participants in the May 10, 2010 elections. The Comelec itself
declared:
On January 30, 2010 at 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon,
pursuant to Comelec Minute Resolution No. 10-0042 dated
January 19, 2010, the Information Technology Department of
Comelec published a list of candidates with the instruction that
"(s)hould there be any misspelling, omission or other errors, the
concerned candidate must call the Law Departments attention
within five (5) days from this publication for the purpose of
correction. Thereafter, Comelec shall be relieved from liability" 6
and the final list shall then be prepared for printing.7
The Comelec responded the next day (February 3, 2010) to our
Status Quo Order by asking for its reconsideration and/or recall,
based on the following grounds/arguments:
1) There will be insurmountable and tremendous
operational constraints and costs implications in
complying with the status quo order.
2) To add the petitioners party/acronym in the database
of the List of Candidates for sectoral party/organization
or coalition participating in the party-list system of
representation will have a critical impact on the already
tight and overstretched election timelines of the
Commission. Copy of the Revised Automation
Implementation Calendar is hereto attached as Annex
"1".
3) Printing of the ballots is an intricate and complicated
process. It is not a simple process of encoding data in a
computer and printing the ballots using a printer
attached to the computer.
4) Prior to the printing of the ballots, several technical
and mechanical preparatory activities have to be done
which include among other things:
a. Generation and back-up of database containing
the candidates[] information;
b. Configuration of Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machines and Consolidation and
Canvassing System (CCS);
c. Creation and design of one thousand six
hundred seventy-four (1,674) ballot templates;
d. Production of the ballot templates;
e. Verification of each and every ballot template to
ensure that it contains the accurate names of
candidates for the national positions and acronyms
of sectoral party/organization or coalition
participating in the party-list system of
representation and their corresponding
assignments to the correct districts, provinces,
municipalities/cities, and clustered precincts. Since
the ballots are precinct-specific to ensure the
security of the voting and counting, this means
verification of seventy six thousand three hundred
forty (76,340) variations of the one thousand six
hundred seventy-four (1,674) ballot templates;
and
f. Placing several security markings in the ballots.
5) In fact, the installation of the Election Management
System, which is used to generate the PCOS machines
configuration and ballot templates production have
already been in place as of January 25, 2010.
6) To comply with the status quo order will not only
affect the printing of the ballots but also have serious
implications on other activities of the Commission, such
as:
a. The setting of configuration of the PCOS and
CCS machines;
 b. Testing of PCOS machines in their actual
configuration with the ballots;
c. Deployment of PCOS and CCS machines and
transmission equipments;
d. Checking/testing, demos, and sealing of the
PCOS and CCS machines; and
e. Shipment of the ballots to all parts of the
country.
7) Due to several re-scheduling of the timelines of the
Commission, Smartmatic-TIM cautioned that it is
extremely risky to change the database containing the
candidates information at this point in time. Any change
in the database and other preparatory activities would
mean:
a. Twelve thousand (12,000) PCOS might not be
configured and dispatched to the field on time;
and
b. Four million eight hundred thousand
(4,800,000) ballots might not be printed before
the deadline and shipped out on time.
Even if the Commission will resort to contingency
measures to configure and ship out the twelve thousand
(12,000) PCOS machines on time, the printing of the
ballots cannot be completed before May 10, 2010. This
means that four million eight hundred thousand
(4,800,000) voters might not be able to vote due to lack
of ballots, thus disenfranchising them.
xxxxxxxxx
10) Hence, the Commission fervently requests the
understanding and forbearance of the Honorable Court
which is the bastion of our justice system, protector of
the democratic processes and our last resort in ensuring
a clean, peaceful, orderly and credible May 10, 2010
elections, to take a second look on the status quo order
issued on February 2, 2010.8
In its Comment to Comelecs Motion for Reconsideration with
Manifestation,9 PGBI essentially alleged that the Comelec
posited seemingly misleading and innocuous reasons in seeking
reconsideration. Among other arguments, it claimed that the
Comelec had been less than candid in its submissions: first,
compliance with the Status Quo Order at that point would not
disrupt the timetable or entail additional and costly expenditures
given that the Comelec had yet to terminate all related activities
and preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections; 10 second, the
Comelec had yet to promulgate, on February 11, 2010, its
decisions on several pending disqualification cases and recently
accredited six other party-list organizations to add to the more
than 154 previously accredited sectoral parties and/or
organizations. PGBI also manifested that the ballot template
that the Comelec published in its website on February 8, 2010
did not include the name or acronym of PGBI, in contravention
of the Status Quo Order; and third, the Comelecs blatant
disregard of the Status Quo Order reeked of official arrogance,
given this Courts determination that it should be included in the
ballot pending resolution of PGBIs petition for certiorari.11
In our Resolution of April 29, 2010, 12 we granted PGBIs petition
and, accordingly, annulled the assailed Comelec Resolutions in
SPP No. 09-004 (MP)13 which delisted PGBI from the roster of
duly registered national, regional and sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions. We declared at the same time that
PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or
organization in the May 10, 2010 elections. Despite the Status
Quo Order and the Resolution, however, PGBI was never
included in the ballot as one of the accredited party-list groups
or organizations eligible for election under the party-list system.
Hence, PGBI was never voted upon as a party-list candidate in
the May 10, 2010 elections.
Before the elections or on April 28, 2010, PGBI filed a
Manifestation (of Continuing Objection to Comelecs Defiance of
the Order of the Honorable Supreme Court). 14 It claimed that
Comelec Resolution No. 8815, dated April 5, 2007, excluded the
nominees of PGBI in the official list of party-
list/coalitions/sectoral organizations participating in the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Acting on this
Manifestation, we required the Comelec, via our Resolution of
May 7, 2010, to explain and show cause, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
Resolution, why it should not be held in CONTEMPT of COURT
for its alleged defiance of our Status Quo Order. 15
In its Compliance16 to the Show Cause Order (submitted on May
21, 2010), the Comelec reiterated the arguments it raised in its
Extreme Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and To Lift Status
Quo Order. Specifically, it reiterated that there were
"insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and
cost implications in complying with the status quo order," which
order (referring to the Status Quo Order) is tantamount to
technical, legal, and physical impossibility for respondents to
comply.17 The Comelec asked the Court to note the explanation
and accept it as sufficient compliance with the Show Cause
Order.
Required to comment on the Comelecs Compliance, PGBI filed
a Manifestation Cum Comment,18 asserting that a careful
reading of the Compliance reveals that the Comelec simply
deftly skirted and, ultimately, never obeyed the Status Quo
Order, and thus wantonly and contumaciously disregarded the
same. The PGBI additionally manifested that via a letter to the
Comelec on May 4, 2010, it raised the following concerns:
The preceding pronouncement [referring to the Courts
Resolution granting PGBIs petition] may appear to be
inconsequential and a pyrrhic victory in view of the error and
omission to include the name of the petitioner in the ballots for
the scheduled elections. How this Honorable Commission will
find the means and/or alternative to comply with and/or
implement the directive in said decision is a matter left to its
judgment and discretion.
Be that as it may, it is the petitioners considered view that a
definitive ruling, including the grant of its Motion for
Reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP), be expressly made in
order that the limitation prescribed in Section 6(8) of R.A. No.
7941, replicated in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847, promulgated
on June 25, 1996, will not apply to herein petitioner for
purposes of the May 2013 elections.
While the implementation of the dispositions in the said
Resolution has become a physical impossibility, it is petitioners
respectful submittal that it should not be penalized for not being
able to participate in the coming May 10, 2010 party-list
election. [parenthetical note at 1st paragraph supplied;
underscoring in the original].
Based on its apprehension that it might end up twice in
jeopardy of not being able to participate in the party-list
elections of 2013 in view of Section 6(8) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941, PGBI requested that the matter of its participation in
the May 2013 party-list elections be given a categorical ruling. 19
In its Reply,20 the Comelec asserted that a discussion on PGBIs
eligibility for the 2013 elections i.e., whether its declared
eligibility for the 2010 elections and its eventual inability to
participate thereto should be considered as a failure to
participate in the last two (2) elections, as defined in R.A. No.
7941 is purely academic, and is purely an advisory opinion
that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant. Judicial power, the
Comelec claimed, is limited to the determination and resolution
of actual cases and controversies involving existing conflicts that
are appropriate or ripe for judicial determination; it does not
extend to hypothetical, conjectural or anticipatory questions. It
claimed additionally that as the specialized constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall, PGBIs question is a matter
within its competence and primary jurisdiction to decide once it
becomes ripe for adjudication.
OUR RULING
After due consideration of the attendant facts and the
law, we find the Comelec guilty of indirect contempt of
this Court.
The Comelec Chair and Members are guilty of indirect contempt
of Court
We explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC21 the Courts contempt power as follows:
The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because
it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due
administration of justice.
Under our Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and
indirect. Direct contempt, which may be summary, is committed
"in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward
the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so."
Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the
presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and
hearing. Disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order or judgment of a court or injunction granted by a court or
judge constitutes indirect contempt. We quote Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, enumerating the acts punishable as
indirect contempt, as follows:
"SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act
of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any
court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property,
for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court,
and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order
or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent
the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into
court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings."
Based on the recited antecedent facts, it cannot be disputed
that the Comelec did not comply with our Status Quo Order; it
simply pleaded insurmountable and tremendous operational
constraints and costs implications as reasons for its avoidance
of our Order. It essentially posited that compliance with our
Status Quo Order was rendered impossible by the automation of
the May 10, 2010 elections.
However, we find this explanation unacceptable, given the
Comelecs own self-imposed deadline of February 4, 2010 for
the correction of errors and omissions, prior to printing, of the
published list of participating party-list groups and organizations
in the May 10, 2010 elections.
The Comelec deadline could only mean that the Comelec had
determined that changes in the official ballot could still be made
at any time prior to the deadline. In the context of the cases
then pending involving the registration of party-list
organizations, the deadline was a clear signal from the Comelec
that the cases would have to be resolved before the deadline;
otherwise, the Comelec could not be held liable for their non-
inclusion.
We fully read and respected the Comelecs signal, fully aware
that we have to balance the interests the Comelec has to
protect, with PGBIs intent to be voted as a party-list
organization. Thus, on February 2, 2010, we issued our Status
Quo Order after a preliminary but judicious evaluation of the
merits of PGBIs motion for reconsideration, only to receive the
Comelecs response on February 3, 2010 manifesting that it
could no longer change the ballots because of the nature of an
automated election.
In an exercise as important as an election, the Comelec cannot
make a declaration and impose a deadline, and, thereafter,
expect everyone to accept its excuses when it backtracks on its
announced declaration. The Comelec knew very well that there
were still cases pending for judicial determination that could
have been decided before the deadline was set.
Although the recent case of Liberal Party v. Commission on
Elections,22 involved the registration of political parties, we
found that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in allowing
the out of time registration of the NP-NPC coalition despite the
mandatory deadline the Comelec itself had set. In this case, we
underscored the significance of the Comelecs compliance with
its self-imposed deadlines, particularly in the implementation of
the first-ever automated elections of May 10, 2010.
To be excused, the Comelec needed more than its generalized
descriptions of the process of ballot printing and the alleged
problems it faced. We needed reasons on how and why the
deadline was set, as well as detailed and specific reasons why
PGBI could no longer be listed while other errors and omissions
could still be remedied.
Unfortunately for the Comelec, we did not see that kind of
justification in its Compliance before us. Like the Comelec, we
expect obedience to and respect for our Orders and
Resolutions, and we cannot be sidetracked based solely on
supposed operational constraints caused by the automated
polls. Its treatment of our Status Quo Order simply meant that
even before the Comelec deadline, a definitive ruling that a
party-list organization should be included in the list to be voted
upon would have been for naught as the Comelec would have
anyway pleaded automation constraints. Even if its excuse had
been meritorious, the Comelec effectively would have been
guilty of misrepresentation on an election matter and in dealing
with this Court.
Although we have recognized the validity of the automation of
the May 10, 2010 elections in Roque, Jr. v. Comelec,23 we stress
that automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral
process. An equally important aspect of a democratic electoral
exercise is the right of free choice of the electorates on who
shall govern them; the party-list system, in the words of Ang
Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Comelec ,24 affords them
this choice, as it gives the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors the opportunity to participate in governance. Wittingly
or unwittingly, the Comelec took this freedom of choice away
and effectively disenfranchised the members of the sector that
PGBI sought to represent when it did not include PGBI in the list
of qualified parties vying for a seat under the party-list system
of representation. This is a consideration no less weighty than
the automation of the election and cannot be simply
disregarded on mere generalized allegations of automation
difficulties.
The Appropriate Penalty
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides the penalty for
indirect contempt. Section 7 of Rule 71 reads:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt . - If the respondent is
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he
may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos
or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x
In the past, we have found the Chairman and members of the
Comelec guilty of indirect contempt in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC.25 In that case, we held that the
Chairman and members of the COMELEC guilty of contempt and
required them to pay a fine in the amount of P20, 000.00 for
"degrading the dignity of th[e] Court;26 for brazen disobedience
to its lawful directives, in particular its Temporary Restraining
Order dated May 9, 2001; and for delaying the ultimate
resolution of the many incidents of the case, to the prejudice of
the litigants and of the country." We also warned the Comelec
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely in the future.27
Evidently, the Rule cited above does not provide that reprimand
may be imposed on one found guilty of indirect contempt.
However, we have in recent cases imposed a penalty less than
what is provided under the Rules if the circumstances merit
such.28
In Alcantara v. Ponce,29 the Court, instead of citing the
respondent Atty. Escareal-Sandejas for contempt, chose to
reprimand her (and warned her that her commission of the
same act would be more drastically dealt with) noting her
apparent inexperience in practice of the profession, especially in
appellate proceedings before the Court. Similarly, in Racines v.
Judge Morallos,30 the Court, after finding Jaime Racines guilty of
indirect contempt, merely reprimanded him because "he is not
learned in the intricacies of the law."
In the present case, special circumstances exist which call for
our leniency and compel us to impose the penalty of severe
reprimand instead of of imprisonment and/or fine under Section
7, of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as we have ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party. We emphasize that although
automation is a special circumstance that should be considered
in the present incidental matter, however, its effect on the
Comelecs non-compliance is merely to mitigate, not to totally
exculpate, the Comelec from liability for its failure to comply
with our Status Quo Order. In other words, even if we grant
that automation might have posed some difficulty in including a
new party in the party-list listing, the Comelec still failed to
prove to our satisfaction that the PGBIs inclusion was
technically impossible and could not have been done even if the
Comelec had wanted to. Thus, at the most, we can give the
Comelec the benefit of the doubt to the extent of recognizing its
excuse as a mitigating factor.
Therefore, instead of imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine provided under Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court, we deem it proper to impose upon the Comelec,
particularly on its Chair and Members the penalty of severe
reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
At this juncture, we take judicial notice of Comelec Chairperson
Jose A.R. Melos resignation effective January 15, 201131 and
Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Gregorio Y. Larrazabals
retirement on February 2, 2011.32 We hasten to clarify that their
departure from government service, however, do not render
moot and academic their liability for indirect contempt, since
"contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of
government." Thus, in Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 33 we
held:
Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of
government. Thus, it covers government officials or employees
who retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt.
Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to avail himself of an
early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt
citation, if he perceives that he would be made responsible for a
contumacious act. The higher interest of effective and efficient
administration of justice dictates that a petition for contempt
must proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of
the government official or employee, more so if it involves a
former member of the bench.
PGBIs Participation in the May 10, 2010 Party-List Elections
We partly agree with the Comelec that we cannot recognize
PGBI to be a party-list organization fully qualified to run under
the party-list system in the coming 2013 party-list elections. The
question of full and total qualification is not ripe for judicial
determination as this is not before us for resolution.
Participation in a previous election and the level of votes in
favor of a participating organization are not the only
qualification issues that can arise in a party-list election, and we
cannot assume that PGBI shall meet all other legal standards to
qualify as a party-list organization in the 2013 elections.34
But separate from the question of PGBIs overall qualification is
the narrower question of its participation in the May 10, 2010
elections an issue that is subsumed by the issues in the main
certiorari case. As shown above, PGBI intended to participate in
the May 10, 2010 elections but it was not able to do so because
the Comelec did not contrary to our express directive
include it in the list of party-list organizations to be voted upon
in the May 10, 2010 elections. As it was the Comelec itself
which prevented PGBI from participating in the May 10, 2010
party-list elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave abuse of
discretion, from the list of accredited party-list groups or
organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to the list
despite our directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be deemed
to have participated in the May 10, 2010 elections, and cannot
be disqualified for non-participation or for failure to garner the
votes required under Section 6(8) of R.A. No. 7941. To conclude
otherwise is to effectively recognize the ineffectiveness of our
Status Quo Order, of our April 29, 2010 Decision, and of this
Court.
As a final note, the subject of the Courts action is the
COMELECs disobedience to our Status Quo Order of February 2,
2010 in the case in caption. The composition of the COMELEC
has since then changed. We therefore clarify that this
Resolution affects and reflects on the COMELEC and its
membership as then constituted as they were the ones directly
responsible for the disobedience.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Comelec Chair 35 and
Members36 are hereby found GUILTY of CONTEMPT of the
Supreme Court for their disobedience to our lawful directive,
specifically the Status Quo Order dated February 2, 2010. They
are accordingly SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for this disobedience.
They are further WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. shall be deemed not
to have transgressed the participation and level of votes
requirements under Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 with
respect to the May 10, 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.
BANAT vs COMELEC
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats
this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula
from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even
if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred
that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void
because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in
the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it
mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote,
there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT
also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in
the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate,
questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA
7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is
the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in
the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every
5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat
allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that
will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower
house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it
may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007
elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x
(0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall
not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the
lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall
be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no
constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered
2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which
garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal
80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose
there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only
50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes
cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed
50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners
2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not
qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2%
to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as additional seats are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding
off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation
of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at
least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given
their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these
two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats
for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner
2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists
hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. ( Please refer to the
full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in
the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least
2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and
multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product,
which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall
still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total
vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the
party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x
(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79
remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed
and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those
seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats
are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)
from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there
is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941
against major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections as the word party was not qualified and that even
the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately
allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice
Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the
framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people
who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the
people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall
participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure
that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
ROMULADEZ-MARCOS vs COMELEC
FACTS:
The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a
candidate to contest elections to the House of Representatives
in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative of the
constituency of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo (a candidate for the
same position) applied
to Commission on Elections [COMELEC] to have Imelda
Romualdez-Marcoss application rejected on the grounds that it
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The
constitutional requirement for residency for election purposes
stated that in order to contest a position, the candidate must
have resided in the location for which they are standing for a
period of one year or more. The purpose of the provision was to
prevent the possibility of strangers or newcomers who were
unacquainted with the needs of a community standing for
office. In her original application form, Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos had stated that she had resided in Leyte for seven
months. In response to the complaint fled by Cirilo Roy Montejo
she amended the time of residency in her application from
seven months to since childhood. She claimed that the entry
of the word seven in her original Certifcate of Candidacy was
the result of an honest misinterpretation, which she now
sought to rectify. She further stated that she had always
maintained Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or
residence. COMELEC, after considering the petition of Cirilo Roy
Montejo to have the candidacy of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
rejected, found the claim meritorious and refused the
petitioners original application for candidacy and her amended
version. COMELEC rejected the petitioners application for
candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed that she did
not intend to make Tacloban her domicile, that she had
registered as a voter in different places, and on several
occasions had declared that she was a resident of Manila.
COMELEC stated that although she spent her school days in
Tacloban she had abandoned residency when she chose to stay
and reside in other places. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting a
declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes,
of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time
she applied to contest the 1995 elections.
She argued that the meaning of residency in the Constitution,
which designated the requirements for candidacy for election
purposes, was that of domicile. She argued that she had
domicile in Leyte because that was her place of original domicile
and she had not acted to replace that domicile with another.
She also argued that her marriage and changes of residency
alongside her husband when he changed residency did not
result in a change in her place of domicile. In support of that
argument she claimed that section 69 of the Family Code 1988,
which gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family
domicile, illustrates the intent of the Philippines Parliament to
recognize the rights of women. She claimed therefore that since
she had domicile in Leyte she automatically fulfilled the
requirements for a one-year residency for election purposes.
The respondents argued the meaning of residency in Article 110
of the Civil Code 1950 was the meaning that should be applied
to the constitutional requirement for a one-year residency prior
to qualifying for candidacy for the elections. Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos, they argued, had changed her residency to that of her
husband upon her marriage and at the same time automatically
gained her husbands domicile. After returning to Leyte she had
resided there for only seven months and she therefore did not
satisfy the one year requirement for candidacy.

HELD:
The majority of the Supreme Court (eight judges in favor, four
against) held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was a resident of
the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore
possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte
as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. The
Court held that the term residence in the context of qualifying
for certain elected positions is synonymous with the term
domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which one intends to return after an absence. A person can only
have a single domicile, although they can abandon one domicile
in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must
demonstrate three (3) requirements:
1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one;
3. and one must act in accordance with that intent.
Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements
have been met will the residence of origin be lost, otherwise
residency will be deemed to continue.
The Court held that the meaning of residence in Article 110 of
the Civil Code, which states that the husband shall fix the
residence of the family, is different therefore to the meaning of
residence in the Constitution. The term residence may have one
meaning in civil law (as under the Civil Code) and another
different meaning in political law as represented in the election
requirements identified in the Constitution. Residency is
satisfied under the Civil Code if a person establishes that they
intend to leave a place when the purpose for which they have
taken up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be
for pleasure, business, or health and a person may have
different residences in various places. However, residency in the
Constitution as opposed to the Civil Code means domicile and
therefore the key issue is to determine the domicile of the
petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. The Court held that
Article 110 does not create a presumption that a wife
automatically gains a husbands domicile upon marriage. When
the petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in
1954, she was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code
to follow her husbands actual place of residence as fixed by
him. The right of the husband to fix the residence was in
harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify
the family. It recognised the fact that the husband and wife
bring into the marriage different domiciles and if the husband
has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may live
together. However, the term residence in Article 110 of the
Civil Code does not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be
correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile as a result of
her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
The Court also held that it would be illogical for the Court to
assume that a wife cannot regain her original domicile upon the
death of her husband, if she has not positively selected a new
one during the subsistence of the marriage itself.
The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced
to replace the Civil Code, confirmed the petitioners argument
that marriage does not automatically change a wifes domicile to
that of her husband. The Family Code replaced the term
residence (used in the Civil Code) with the term domicile.
Article 69 of the Family Code gives a husband and wife the right
to jointly fix the family domicile. The provision recognised
revolutionary changes in the concept of womens rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of
mutual agreement between the spouses. The provision
recognised the right of women to choose their own domicile and
removed the automatic transfer of a husbands domicile to his
wife.
BELGICA vs OCHOA
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative
Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No.
209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the
Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as
the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development
Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the
following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken
down to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects
like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft
projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood
programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of
funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the
legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel
comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and
(b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by
Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their prok barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear
that government funds are being used in legit existing projects
but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then
conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others,
filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the
other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to
which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement
the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF
funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the
law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it
was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as
the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds
go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF,
the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress
alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power
but only insofar as the prepossess of referendum and initiative
are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be
delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this
shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in
times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual
legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of
legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively
and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the
power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power
of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to
be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the
legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the
president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage
their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils
(LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the
part of the members of the house of representatives, whats
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate
a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman
is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied
in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that
is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF
becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential
pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from
the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which
created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended
by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among
others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form
part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be
used to further finance energy resource development and for
other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a
part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund
(the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section
29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case
of PD 910 and PD 1869.