I.
PHILIPPINE LAW ON TORTS *Negligence omission of that diligence which is required by the
A. New Civil Code Art. 1157
Art. 1557. Obligations arise from: LAW, CONTRACTS, QUASI
CONTRACTS, ACTS OR OMISSIONS PUNISHED BY LAW; AND
QUASI-DELICTS
Obligation Ex Lege (Law) must be expressly or
impliedly set forth and cannot be presumed
Obligation Ex Contractu (Contract) must be complied
with in good faith; it is the law between parties
- Neither party may unilaterally evade his obligation in
the contract UNLESS 1) contract authorizes it; 2)
Other party assents
- Parties may freely enter into any stipulations,
provided they are not contrary to la, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy
Obligation Ex Quasi-Contractu (Quasi-Contract)
juridical relation resulting from lawful, voluntary and
unilateral acts, which has for its purpose the payment of
indemnity to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched
or benefited at the expense of another
- ACT giving rise to a QC must be lawful, voluntary
and unilateral
- Kinds:
a) Negotiorum Gestio unauthorized
management; arises whenever a person
voluntarily takes charge of the agency or
management of anothers abandoned business
or property without the latters authority
b) Solutio Indebiti undue payment; arises
when a person unduly delivers a thing through
mistake to another who has no right to demand
it
Obligatons Ex Maleficio or Ex Delicto (Delicts)
- Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable
- Scope of Liability
a) Restitution
b) Reparation for the Damage Caused
c) Indemnity for Consequential Damages
- Effects of Acquittal in Criminal Case
a) When due to reasonable doubt no civil liability
b) When due to exempting circumstances there
is a civil liability
c) When there is preponderance of evidence
there is civil liability
- Crimes without Civil Liability
a) Contempt
b) Insults to persons in authority
c) Gambling
d) Violations of Traffic Regulations
Obligaton Ex Quasi-Delicto or Quasi Maleficio (Quasi-
Delict) an act or omission arising from fault or
negligence which causes damage to another, there being
no pre-existing contractual relations between parties
- Elements:
a) There must be an act or omission
b) There must be fault or negligence attributable
to the person charged
c) There must be damage or injury
d) There must be a direct relation of cause and
effect between the act arising from fault or
negligence and the damage injury (proximate
cause)
e) There is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties
B. New Civil Code, Arts. 2176 to 2194
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter.
- It covers all wrongful acts or omissions as long as they
are not constitutive of breach of contract or not punishable
as offenses either under RPC or SL
Elements of Quasi-Delict (Culpa Aquiliana)
a) Damage to the plaintiff
b) Negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant or
some person for whose acts, he must respond was guilty;
and
c) Connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and damage
*Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury
*Fault condition where a person acts in a way or manner contrary
to what normally should have been done ; breach of statutory duty
or other act omission which gives rise to a liability in torts or would
give rise to the defense of contributory negligence
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place
Tests of Determining Negligence
- Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued?
Causal Connection Between the Fault or Negligence and the
Damage
- There must be a clear evidence that the cause of the
damage is the fault or negligence of the defendant.
- The fault or negligence of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury of the plaintiff
If there is a pre-existing contract
- The proper cause of action is breach of contract or culpa
contractual
- Exception: Contract of Carriage (In here, the basis of the
liability is the deliberate and malicious violation of the
contract)
Can there be a TORT or QUASI-DELICT in Breach of Contract?
- Gen. Rule: NO
- Exception: However, the existence of the contract does
not bar the commission of a tort by one against the other
and the consequent recovery of damages. Where the act
that breaks the contract may also be a tort, the contractual
relations of the parties does not bar the recovery of
damages
Interference with Contractual Relations
- It constitutes torts when a person induced another to
violate the latters contract with a third person
Cases where Art. 2176 is not applicable
a) Where there was a pre-existing contractual relation of
employer and employee between the parties
b) When the fault or negligence is punished by law as a
crime
c) If the action for quasi-delict is instituted after 4 years
d) When the injury suffered is the result of a fortuitous event
e) If there is no damage or injury caused to another party
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant
Kinds of Negligence
a) Criminal violation of the criminal law
b) Civil distinct and separate negligence which is CA or
QD of ancient origin, having always its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence
Modes of Enforcing Civil Liability Due to Fault or Negligence
The injured party has the option to:
a) Pursue a criminal action which includes the claim for civil
liability arising from the crime based on Art. 100 of the
RPC; or
b) Pursue an independent civil action based on QD under
Arts. 2176-2194 of the NCC
General Rule: The acquittal of the accused will not necessarily
exonerate him from civil liability. The civil liability arising from CA or
QD was never intended by la to be merged in the criminal action.
The criminal prosecution is not a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil rights.
Exception:
1. when it declares that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist
2. when it is declared that the accused is not the author of
the crime
3. when the judgment expressly declares that the liability is
only civil in nature
4. where the civil liability is not derived or based on the
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
5. where the acquittal is based on a reasonable doubt
6. where the civil action has prescribed
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also
applicable to QD
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation also demandable,
but such liability may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligation
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
 place. When negligence shows BF, the provisions of Arts.
1171 and 2201, par 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is
to be observed in the performance, that which is expected
of a good father of a family shall be required.
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law,
or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk,
no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen were
inevitable.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Proximate Cause
- is the adequate and efficient cause as in the natural order
of events, and under the particular circumstances
surrounding the case, would necessarily produce the
event.
- Is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have
occurred
- It is not necessarily the immediate cause, it is necessarily
the nearest time, distance or space
Contributory Negligence
- Act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendants negligence is the proximate cause of the
injury
- To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it
must be shown that he performed an act that brought
about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body
- Omission of the diligence required by the circumstances
by virtue of which a person could have avoided injury to
himself
- It requires foreseeability of harm to oneself
- A child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
Effects of Contributory Negligence
a) There can be no recovery for damages
b) A plaintiff is barred from recovering the damages for loss
or injury caused by the negligence of defendant only
when plaintiffs negligence is the sole legal cause of the
damage, or the negligence of the plaintiff and some
persons other than the defendants was the sole cause of
the damage
c) If the plaintiff and defendant are both at fault, the former
may recover, but the amount of his recover may only be
such proportion of the entire damage plaintiff sustained
as the defendants negligence bears to the combined
negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Doctrine of Comparative Negligence
- The negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant are
compared for the purpose of reaching an equitable
apportionment of their respective liabilities for the
damages caused and suffered by the plaintiff
Test to Determine Proximate Cause
a) Foreseeability Test where the particular harm was
reasonably foreseeable, at the time of the defendants
misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof
b) Natural and Probable Consequence Test where the
defendants liability is recognized only if the harm or injury
suffered is the natural and probable consequence of his
act or omission complained of
c) Sine qua non test where the defendants conduct will
not be considered as proximate cause of the event if the
event just the same would have occurred without it
d) Cause and Condition Test test where a distinction is
made between the active cause of the harm or injury and
the existing conditions upon which that cause operated. If
the defendant has made a passive static condition, which
made the damage possible, he is not liable
Assumption of Risk
Attractive Nuisance
- One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play and who fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises.
- Not applicable to the bodies of water
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
- Allows the recovery to plaintiff who happened to have
been negligent also, provided the defendant has the last
opportunity to avoid the incident but failed to do so
- There must be negligence on the part of both parties
- Also called the Humanitarian Negligence Doctrine, it
being an exception to the rule on contributory negligence.
It proceeds from the precepts of humanity and natural
justice
- Elements:
a) Plaintiff is placed in danger by his own
negligent acts and he is unable to get from such
situation by any means
b) Defendant knows that the plaintiff is in danger
and knows or should have known that the
plaintiff was unable to extricate himself
therefrom
c) Defendant had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident through the
exercise of ordinary care, but failed to do so,
and the accident occurred as a proximate
cause of such failure.
- Not applicable-
a) Collapse of a building or structure
b) When the claim or demand of the injured passenger
is the enforcement of the carriers contractual
obligation to bring him safely to his destination
c) When the injury or accident cannot be avoided by
application of all means at hand after peril has been
discovered
Res Ipsa Loquitor
- The thing or transaction speaks for itself
- Conditions to be met for RIL to apply:
a) The accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for defendants negligence
b) The accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of
c) The accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured
Principal Defenses in Actions Based on Negligence
a) Emergency Rule one who suddenly finds himself in
place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may have
been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence
b) Assumption of Risk - a voluntary assumption of a risk
of harm arising from the negligent conduct of the
defendant; it presupposes an intentional exposure to a
known peril
c) Contributory Negligence when the plaintiffs own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages
d) Volenti Non Fit Injuria - to which a person assent is not
esteemed in law as injury; one is not legally injured if he
has consented to the act complained of or was willing that
it shall occur
Rules in the Application of Comparative Negligence
a) Pure Comparative Negligence Rule - the plaintiff can
recover from the defendant regardless of the extent of the
negligence of the former
b) Arkansas Comparative Negligence Rule the plaintiff
can recover if his negligence is lesser in degree than that
of the defendant. If the combined negligence of both
parties falls on 50/50 basis, plaintiff cannot recover.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasked, even though the former are not engaged in the
business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what
is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupil and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Principle of Vicarious Liability or Imputed Liability one is not
only liable for his own quasi-delictual acts but also for those persons
for whom he is responsible under the law
Child and Youth Welfare Code, Art. 58 Parents and guardians
are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their
parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code
Basis of Vicarious Liability; Pater Familias
*Art. 2180 is not respondeat superior, which under American
Jurisprudence means that the negligence of the servant is
conclusively the negligence of the master.
*Basis: Principle of Pater Familias. The reason for the masters
liability is negligence in the supervision of the subordinates. The
master; however, will be freed from liability if he can prove that he
had observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
*Bahia vs Litonjua: The responsibility imposed by this article arises
by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
the persons made responsible under the article, derived from their
failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage
*Actual Torfeasor is not exempt from liability. The minor, ward,
employee, special agent, pupil, students and apprentices who
actually committed the delictual acts are not exempted by law from
personal responsibility. They may be sued and made liable alone as
when the person responsible for them or vicarious obligor proves
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family or when
the minor or insane person has no parents or guardians. In the latter
instance, they are answerable with their own property.
*Nature of Responsibility of Vicarious Obligor. Direct and
primary; he is solidarily liable with the tortfeasor. His responsibility
is not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against
the negligent tortfeasor.The h
*Reason for VL of Parents. It is a necessary consequence which
imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them in proportion of their means,
while on the other hand, gives them the rights to correct and punish
them in moderation
Exception: proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage
*Liability of the Mother. 1) Death or Insolvency of the father. If the
mother was impleaded as a co-defendant of the father or was
impleaded alone while the husband is still well and alive, may move
to dismiss the case filed against her for being premature
*Absence of the Father. not mentioned in the law. If he is absent
under Arts. 390-391, the mother will be the one who is vicariously
liable. s
*VL Liability of Parents; Requisites
1. The child is below 21 years. RA 6809: reduced the legal age to
18, nonetheless the fact than the child is already emancipated
2. The child committed a tortious act to the damage and prejudice
of another person
3. The child lives in the company of the parent concerned whether
single or married
Requisites of Employers Liability under Art. 2180, (4)
1. Employee was chosen by the employer personally or through
another
2. The service is to be rendered in accordance with orders which the
employer has the authority to give at all times
3. The illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason
of the functions entrusted to him
Primary Liability and Subsidiary Liability of Employers The
injured party has 2 options in pursuing the civil liability of the
employer for the acts of his employees
*Civil Action: the liability of the employer is direct, primary and
solidary, if he proves the negligence of the employee
*Criminal Action: The liability of the employer is subsidiary if the
offender was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
States Imputed Liability only liable for acts imputed for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are
acting as special agents
Exception: When the State engaged in private business or
enterprise, it becomes liable as an ordinary employer
*Special Agent one who receives a definite and fixed order of
commission, foreign to the exercise of the ordinary duties of his
office
Imputed Liability of Teachers and Heads of Schools
General Rule: When the school is academic, the responsibility of
the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge
of such students
Exception: In the case of arts and trades, it is the head hereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable
Reddendo Singula Singulis. Teachers should apply to the word
pupils and students, and heads of establishment of arts and
trades to the word apprentices
Limited Liability of the School. The students must be in the school
when the tortious act was committed
-A student is in the custody of the school authorities as
long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within
its premises, whether the semester has yet begun or has already
ended.
- As lomg as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student right, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
*Basis of such liability: in loco parentis and are called upon the
to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered of the satisfaction of the claim.
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable
with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad
litem is pending
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it
may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
*Wild Beast Theory: The true rule of law is that the person who for
his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril,
and if he does not so, is prima facie answerable to all the damages
which is the natural consequence of the escape
*Exceptions to the Rule of Liability of the Possessor
1. If the damage was caused by a force majeure
2. If the damage was caused by the fault of the plaintiff or person
injured
3. If the damage was caused by the act of a third person
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations or at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article
2180 are inapplicable.
Rationale: to cope with the alarming increase of vehicular mshaps
-This article has also been applied to a calesa mishap where it was
held that the owner of the calesa who was not in the calesa at the
time of the incident is not liable for the acts of his cochero
Liability of a Car Owner:
*If present in the car If the causative factor for the accident was
the drivers negligence, the owner of the car, who was present in the
car, is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by
the exercise of due diligence, but did not do so
*If not present in the car The driver was negligent. The injured
party may still sue the car owner under Art. 2180, par. 5 for imputed
liability. The car owner may avail himself of the defense of not having
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
Pater Familias The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the
servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction
by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage
Effect when Driver is found negligent Once a driver is proven
negligent in causing damage, the law presumes the vehicle owner
equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving
proper selection employee as a defense. Malfunction or loss of
break is not a FE.
Effect of Ratification of Tortious Act of Driver or Employee
The employer is still liable if he ratifies the tortious acts or takes no
step to avert the damage
Art. 2185. Unless there is a proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
*A person driving a motor vehicle who was violating any traffic
regulation at the time of the accident is presumed to be negligent. It
is rebuttable presumption.
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper
government office a bond executed by a government controlled
corporation or office, to answer for damages to third person. The
amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent
public official.
Motor Vehicle Bond no IRR, but the car owner cannot renew the
registration of his car without first securing an insurance against TPL
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of food stuffs, drinks, toilet
article and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused
by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual
relation exists between them and the consumers.
Principle of Strict Liability in Torts means that the proof of
negligence is not necessary. It applies even if the defendant
manufacturer or processor has exercised all the possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product.
*Requisites:
1. The defendant is the manufacturer or processor of
foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods involved
2. The defendant used noxious or harmful substances in
the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drink or toilet articles
and similar goods
3. Plaintiff used or consumed such product unaware of
the injurious condition of the product
4. Plaintiffs injury or death was caused by the product
used or consumed
5. The forms of kinds of damages suffered and the
amount thereof
*Contractual relationship between the manufacturers or processors
and consumers is not necessary
*Effect of Contract between Manufacturer or Processor with
Plaintiff: Plaintiff is not precluded from filing a suit based on breach
of warranty whether express or implied. The principle applies. The
consumers cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract, with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it
not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be
between the seller and immediate buyer or attached to and
accompanying the product into consumers hands.
Options on Remedies. The ff are the plaintiffs remedies if he
desires to pursue a complaint against the manufacturer or
processor:
1. Theory of Strict Liability in Torts
2. Fault or Negligence
3. Breach of Warranty
4. Crime anchored on the violation of the FDA act wherein
the enforcement of which the doctrine of absolute criminal liability
may be applied
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms
and poison except when the possession or use thereof is
indispensable in his occupation or business.
* There is a rebuttable presumption that he is negligent when the
death or injury results from the defendants possession of
dangerous weapons or substances.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for
the damages resulting from its total or partal collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages
caused:
1. By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of
with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances
which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place.
2. By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to person or property
3. By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not
caused by force majeure
4. By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of
infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the
place.
*Injunction may be resorted to in order to prevent damage or
injury
Art. 2192. If damages referred to in the two preceding articles
should be the result of ant defect in the construction mentioned in
Art. 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only
against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with
said article, within the period therein fixed.
Prescriptive period = 15 years from the time the cause of action
has accrued
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or
falling from the same.
Head of the Family usually the father; in his absence, the mother
*Obligation: to supervise the members of the family; co-responsible
with the actual tortfeasor
*Nature of Liability absolute and exclusive
*Purpose of the Absoluteness of the Article
1. to compel the head of a family to see to it that no dangerous things
are placed on the window sills and other parts of the dwelling place
which may be thrown or fall by the accident
2. to compel him to supervise the members of the family or guests
from doing acts or activities which may result in the throwing or
falling of things from their house or dwelling
3. to relieve the victim of the difficult burden of identifying the
persons who caused the throwing or falling of the injurious thing
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict is solidary.
*It applies if there is joint tortfeasor
*Nature of Liability: civil liability arising from quasi-delict
*Joint Tortfeasors include all persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, air or abet
the commission of a tort, or who approve of if after it is done for their
benefit. They are each others principals
II. DEFINITION
A. Tort
- Commission of an act by one, without right, whereby
another receives some injury, directly or indirectly in
person, property or reputation
- A wrong independent of a contract or as a breach of duty
which the law, distinguished from a mere contract, has
imposed
- It is a wrong, and a wrong is a tortious act
B. Torts vs Quasi-Delict
- QD is a term designated by the Code Commission to refer
to those obligations which do not arise from law,
contractso or quasi-contracts or criminal offenses
because this term nearly corresponds to Roman
Classification of obligations and is in harmony with the
nature and kind of liability
- it rejected the use of term, Tort , which is broader because
in the general plan of the Philippine legal system,
intentional and malicious acts with certain exceptions are
governed by RPC
Naguiat vs NLRC
Petitioner: Sergio F. Naguiat under the name and style of Sergio F.
Naguiat Ent., Inc., & Clark Field Taxi, Inc
Respondent: NLRC, National Organization of Workingmen and its
members, Leonardo T. Galang
Citation: 269 SCRA 564
Date of Promulgation: March 13, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J
FACTS:
Clark Field Taxi Inc (CFTI) held a concessionaires contract
with the Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAEFS) for the
operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base
Sergio Naguiat CFTIs president; Antolin Naguiat CFTIs
VP
Like Sergio Naguiat Enterprises, a trading firm, CFTI was a
family-owned corporation
Individual respondents previously employed by CFTI as
taxi cab drivers
- During their employment, they were required to pay a
daily boundary fee of US$26.50 for those working from
1am-12nn; and US$ 27 for those working from 12nn to
12mn
- All the incidental expenses were also accounted against
them + gasoline expenses
- They worked for at least 3-4 times a week, depending on
the availability of taxi cabs
 - They earned not less than US$ 15 daily
- In excess of that amount, they were also required to make
cash deposits to the company which they could lter
withdraw every 15 days
Due to the phase out of the US military bases in PH, from which
Clark Base was not spared, AAEFES was dissolved, and the
services of the individual respondents were officially
terminated on November 26, 1991
AAFES Taxi Drives Association (Union)- through its
President, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations with
regard to the separation benefits that should be awarded in
favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the
separated drivers will be given PhP 500 for every year of
service as severance pay.
Most of the drivers accepted the said amount in December
1991-January 1992, but the individual respondents herein
refused to accept theirs
Individual Respondents through National Organization of
Workingmen which they subsequently joined after disaffiliating
themselves with AAFES Union, filed a complaint against
Sergio Naguiat and his company, AAFES with Mark Hooper as
Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Union with
Eduardo Castillo as President, for payment of separation pay
due to termination/phase out
Complaint was further amended to include additional taxi
drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI
with Antolin Naguiat as VP and Gen. Manager, as party
respondents
- Allegations:
1. They were regular employees of Naguiat
enterprises although their application were
approved by CFTI
2. They have been assigned to Naguiat
Enterprises after having been hired by CFTI
and that the former managed, controlled and
supervise their employment
3. They were entitled to separation pay based on
their latest daily earnings of US$ 1 for working
16 days a month
Position Paper submitted to the LA, petitioners claimed the
fff:
1. The cessation of CFTI was due to great financial
losses and lost business opportunity resulting from
the phase out of Clark Air Base brought about by the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-
US Military Base Agreement
2. Admitted that CFT had agreed with the drivers union
through Pres. Castillo who claimed to have had the
blanket authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of
union members, to grant its taxi driver-employees
separation pay equivalent to PhP 500 for every year
of service
Labor Arbiter Findings:
1. Individual complainants were regular workers of
CFTI
2. Ordered CFTI to pay 12k for every year of service for
humanitarian consideration setting aside the
earlier agreement between CFTI and the drivers
union of PhP 500/year of service
3. At the time of the ceased operations, CFTI was
profitably earning and the cessation of its business
was due the untimely closure of Clark Air Base
NLRC:
1. Modified the LA by granting separation pay to the
private respondents
2. Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and
son at the same time the President and Vice-
President and General Manager, respectively,
should be joined as indispensable party whose
liability is joint and several.
MR of petitioners denied; hence they filed this Petition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO
Separation Pay
Petitioners stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base
because of the phase out of the US Military presence; and not
due to any great financial loss because petitioners taxi
business was earning profitably at the time of closure
Individual Respondents were entitled to separation pay
National Organization of Working Mens Personality to Represent
Individual Respondent-Employees
Petitioner is in estoppel for not having seasonably raised this
issue before LA or NLRC
Liability of Petitioner-Corporations and their Officers
Naguiat Enterprise is not the indirect employer of the individual
respondents much less a labor only contractor
Sergio Naguiat in supervising the taxi drivers and determining
their employment terms, was rather carrying out his
responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat
Enterprises is as separate corporatipn that is not involved at all
in the taxi business
CFTI was the actual and direct employer of the respondents
CFTI President, Sergio Naguiat is jointly and severally liable for
the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees,
as he was the one who actively managed the business
Corporation Code: 5) To the extent that the stockholders are
actively engage(d) in the management or operation of the
business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders
shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among
themselves. Said stockholders shall be personally liable for
corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably
adequate liability insurance.
Corporate Tort no definite scope; but TORT, consists in the
violation of a right given or the omission of the duty imposed by
law. Tort is a breach of legal duty
CFTI failed to comply with its law imposed duty or
obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was
actively engaged in the management or operation of the
business should be held personally and solidarily liable
Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable
No evidence that he participated in the management operation
of the business
No Denial of Due Process
Although Sergio and Antolin were not impleaded parties to the
complaint, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of LA when they filed a position paper in their
respective capacities
Albenson Enterprises vs CA
Petitioner: Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap and Benjamin
Mendiona
Respondents: CA and Eugenio Baltao
Citation: 217 SCRA 16
Date of Promulgation: January 11, 1993
Ponente: Bidin, J
FACTS:
September, October and November 1980 Enterprise
delivered to Guaranteed Industries located at 3267 V. Mapa
Street, Sta. Mesa Manila, the mild steel plate which the latter
ordered
Albenson was given a Pacific Banking Corp check with No.
136361 in the amount of PhP 2, 575 and drawn against the
account of E.L Woodworks
When the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored. Reason: Account Closed
Albenson through counsel traced the origin of the
dishonored check
- From the records of SEC, it was discovered that the
president of the Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
mild steel plates was one Eugenio Baltao
- Upon inquiry Albenson was also informed by the Ministry
of Trade and Industry that E.L Woodworks, a single
proprietorship business was registered in the name of one
Eugenio Baltao, and also upon verification with Pacific
Banking Corp, the signature of Baltao on the check was
verified
An extrajudicial demand was then given to Baltao to replace
or make good the check, but he denied issuing such. He also
said that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and could have not
transacted business with Albenson.
Feb. 14, 1983 - Albernson filed at OPP Rizal for violation of
BP 22 against Baltao
Complaint Benjamin Mendiona (employee) was the
affiant
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake,
his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business
establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the
Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the
very same business address of Guaranteed.
September 5, 1983 Asst. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an
Information against Eugenio Baltao for violation of BP 22.
Fiscal claimed that he had given him an opportunity to submit
evidence, but failed to do so
Baltao claimed ignorance of the complaint against him. He
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, alleging that he has not been
given the opportunity to be heard during the preliminary
investigation
Jan. 30, 1984 Fiscal Mauro Castro reversed the findings of
Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated Baltao, for the ff reasons:
- The signature on the check was not Baltaos
- No showing of the records of PI
- Baltao did not actually receive a notice of said
investigaton
Fiscal Sumawa was castigated by Fiscal Casto for failing to
exercise care and prudence in the performance of his duties,
thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly
notified of the complaint against him, and of the requirement to
submit counter evidence
Because of the unjust filing, Baltao filed a complaint for
damages against Albenson, Jesse yap and Benjamin
Mendiona, its employee
RTC QC the check is drawn against the account of E.L
Woodworks not of Guaranteed industries of which Baltao used
to be President --- ordered Albenson to pay Baltao damages:
(Actual 133, 350) ; (Moral 1M) ; (Exemplary 200k);
(Attorneys Fees 100k)
CA reduced the moral damages from 1M to 500k and AF
from 100k to 50k
 Albenson, Yap and Mendiona - filed this instant petition,
alleging that the court erred in:
1) Cause of action is not based on malicious
prosecution, but one for abuse of rights under Art. 21
2) Hitting and in effect maligning with an unjust criminal
case was, without more, a plain cause of abuse of
rights by misdirection and was therefore actionable
by itself, and which became inordinately blatant and
grossly aggravated when Baltao was deprived of his
basic rights to notice and a fair hearing in the so-
called PI
3) No evidence
4) Holding the petitioner corp, Yap and Mendiona
jointly and severally liable without basis in law and in
fact
5) Award of damages without evidence
Petitioners Contention:
1) The case filed was for malicious prosecution, not for
damages
2)
Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of Abuse
of Rights under Art. 19
Sets standards which may be observed in the exercise of ones
rights and duties
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with Art. 19 and resulted to damage to another person, a legal
wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible
Elements: 1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another
When the defendants were explicitly warned that plaintiff
Eugenio Baltao is not the same as the Eugenio Baltao the
defendants are dealing with, said defendants ran afoul of Arts.
19-21 when they still pursue a criminal case
Defendants not having been paid the amount certainly had the
right to complain, but the right is limited by certain constraints.
Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the
mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed
at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing
check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private
respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio
Baltaos conducting business in the same building he and
his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which
received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check
was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good
faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the
provincial fiscal.
Respondent is not entitled for claim of damages under malicious
prosecution
Elements: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact
that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the
action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable
cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice
2nd and 3rd element were lacking in this case
Petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister
design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by well-
founded anxiety to protect their rights
The mere act of submitting a case for the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution
Though petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in
determining the liability of private respondent for dishonored
check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to
bad faith warranting an award for damages
Case is founded on a case of mistaken identity, and were not
considered to be in bad faith. It could have been corrected only
if Eugenio Baltao filed his counter-affidavit
The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may
not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously
Respondent is not also entitled to actual damages
No proof as to the medical treatment expenses incurred for the
alleged nervous breakdown
No proof as to the business losses caused by the unjust
litigation
The court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guess
work as to the amount
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable
because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved,
otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no
damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA
488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for
respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages
in favor of private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
Attorneys Fees cannot also be awarded
Reason: no malicious prosecution
Elcano and Elcano vs Hill and Hill
Petitioner: Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano in their capacity as
ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased
Respondents: Reginald Hill, minor and Marvin Hill, as father and
natural guardian of said minor
Citation: 77 SCRA 98
Date of Promulgation: May 26, 1977
Ponente: Barredo
FACTS:
Reginald Hill minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
caused the death of Agapito, son of Pedro. He lives with his
father, Marvin, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence
Pedro and Patricia filed a criminal case against Reginald
but he was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mstake
Elcano then filed a case for damages against Marvin based
on Art. 2180 at CFI QC
Defendants filed for Motion to dismiss, with ff grounds:
1. Present action is against and a violation of Rule 107, Sec.
1 of RoC
2. Action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final or
in res judicata
3. No cause of action bc Marvin as relieved as guardian of
Reginald through emancipation of marriage
MTD denied by the trial court
MR granted
The acquittal of Regibnald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence the acquittal is not a
bar to the instant action against him
The separate individuality of a quasi-delict under the CC has
been fully recognized, even with regard to a negligent ac for
which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such
conviction, he could have been sued for his civil liability arising
from his crime
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law
Atty. Hill is not free from his responsibility to Reginald though he has
already been emancipated by marriage
Art. 399 states that emancipation by marriage of the minor is
not really full or absolute
Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It
shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons
It is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
Virata vs Ochoa
PETITIONERS: Candida Virata
Tomas Virata
Manolito Virata
Ederlinda Virata
Napoleon Virata
Aracely Virata
Zenaida Virata
Luzminda Virata
Pacita Virata
Evangelina Virata
RESPONDENTS: Victorio Ochoa
Maximo Borilla
The Court of First Instance of Cavite,
7th Judicial District, Branch V
stationed @ Bacoor, Cavite
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. L46179
PROMUL. DATE: January 31, 1978
PONENTE: Fernandez, J.
FACTS:
September 24, 1975 ARSENIO VIRATA died as a result of
having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay
City by a passenger jeepney driven by MAXIMO BORILLA and
registered in the name of VICTORIO OCHOA.
o Borilla is the employer of Ochoa.
o For the death of Arsenio, an action for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was instituted on
 September 25, 1975 against Borillo in CFI of Rizal,
at Pasay City (Crim. Case No. 3162-P).
At the hearing of the said criminal case on December 12,
1975, Atty. Julio Francisco (priv. prosec.), made a made a
reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against
the driver on his criminal liability.
o On February 19, 1976, Atty. Julio Francisco filed a
motion in said criminal case to withdraw the
reservation to file a separate civil action.
o On June 29, 1976, the heirs of Arsenio again
reserved their right to institute a separate civil action.
On July 19, 1977, they commenced Civil No. B-134
in the CFI of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch V, for damages
based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo and
the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio.
o On August 13, 1976, private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another
action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between
the same parties for the same cause.
o On September 8, 1976, CFI of Rizal, Pasay City, in
their decision on Crim. Case No. 3162-P, acquitted
accused Maximo on the ground that he caused an
injury by name accident.
o On January 31, 1977, CFI Bacoor, Cavite, granted
the motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages.
The heirs of Arsenio Virata can prosecute an action for damages
based on QD against Borillo and Ochoa
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties
may choose between an action under the Revised Penal
Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided,
they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing
a separate civil action for damages against the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The
acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in
Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of
Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict. The
source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No.
B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law.
Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are
two different sources of obligation.
Andamo vs CA
PETITIONERS: Natividad V. Andamo
Emmanuel R. Andamo
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 74761
PROMUL. DATE: November 6, 1990
PONENTE: Fernan, C.J.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
o Owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso)
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
o WITHIN THE LAND of the religious corporation were
waterpaths and contrivances, which ALLEGEDLY:
inundated and eroded petitioners land,
caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners crops and plants,
washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons,
and
exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
July 1982 petitioners instituted a criminal action before RTC
Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against EFREN MUSNGI,
ORLANDO SAPUAY and RUTILLO MALLILLIN, officers and
directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by
means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised
Penal Code.
February 22, 1983 petitioners filed another action action
against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed
as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same
court.
March 11, 1983 - respondent corporation filed its answer to the
complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
o April 26, 1984 - the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil
action, issued an order suspending further hearings
in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the
related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
August 27, 1984 the trial court DISMISSED the civil case for
lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted
ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the
Rules of Court which provides that criminal and civil
actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
APPELLATE COURT (February 17, 1986)
o AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court.
o A motion for recon filed the petitioners was DENIED
by the Appellate Court in its reso on May 19, 1986.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners can claim damages for the destruction
caused by the respondents waterpaths and contrivances based on
Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the CC on quasi-delicts
The petitioners can claim damages by reasons of the destruction
caused by the waterpaths and contrivances
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to
have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of
damages.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and
the causal connection between the act and the damage, with
no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties
make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. xxxx Although we recognize the
right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.
Wylie vs Rarang
PETITIONERS: M.H. Wylie
Capt. James Williams
RESPONDENTS: Aurora I. Rarang
The Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 74135
PROMUL. DATE: May 28, 1992
PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
AT THE NAVAL BASE.
o February 1978, petnr M.H. Wylie was the assistant
administrative officer and Capt. James Williams was
the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in
Subic Bay, Olongapo City.
o Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise
control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal.
Wylie, in his capacity as the asst. admin. officer, supervised the
publication of the Naval Base stations Plan of the Day
(POD), which featured important announcements,
necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to
military personnel. One of its regular features was the action
line inquiry.
February 3, 1978 the POD published, under the NAVSTA
Action Line Inquiry, the ff:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise
Control inspector/inspectress are (sic) consuming
for their own benefit things they have confiscated
from Base Personnel. The observation is even more
aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as
cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to
mention Auring who is in herself, a disgrace to her
division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. In
lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the
head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware
of this malpractice?
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other
personnel are prohibited from appropriating
 confiscated items for their own consumption or use.
Two locked containers are installed at the Main Gate
area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM
evidence custodian controls access to these
containers.
Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat
their meals at their worksite due to heavy workload.
Complaints regarding merchandise control guards
procedure or actions may be made directly at the
Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and
necessary action. Specific dates and time along with
details of suspected violations would be most
appreciated. Telephone 4-3430/4-3234 for further
information or to report noted or suspected
irregularities. Exhibits E & E-1.
o Aurora Rarang was the Auring being referred to
here, as she was the only one with that name in the
Office of the Provost Marshall, which was
conclusively proven when on February 7, 1978,
petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology
for the inadvertent publication.
Rarang instituted an action for damages in the CFI of Zambales
against Wylie, Capt. James Williams, and the US Naval Base.
She prayed for P300K moral damages, exemplary damages,
and P50K attorneys fees.
o RARANGS ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted
false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel
tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and
reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule.
o the libel was published and circulated in the English
language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base
personnel.
Wylie, Williams, and the Naval Base filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ff grounds:
o 1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of
their official functions as officers of the US Navy and
are immune from suit
o 2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US
government which cannot be sued without its
consent
o 3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.
o MOTION DENIED.
TRIAL COURT
o the acts of Wylie and Williams werent official acts of
the US government in the operation and control of
the Base but personal and tortious acts which are
exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign
country cant be sued in the court of another country
without its consent. Thus their acts werent
imputable against the US government but were done
in their individual and personal capacities
o They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and
exemplary damages, and P30K attorneys fees.
o However, the suit against the US Naval Base was
dismissed.
APPEAL
o Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune
from suit since the publication was made in their
official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and
that they did not intentionally and maliciously cause
the publication.
o Rarang also appealed as she wasnt satisfied with
the award.
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TCS DECISION - Rarang was
awarded P175K moral damages and P60K exemplary
damages.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
o they made the publication in the performance of their
official functions as administrative assistant (Wylie)
and commanding officer (Williams) of the US Navy
and were, therefore, immune from suit for their
official actions.
Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires
or where there is showing of bad faith (Chavez v.
Sandiganbayan).
It may be argued, as a general rule, that Capt. Williams as
commanding officer of the naval base was far removed in the
chain of command from the offensive publication and it would
be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything
which goes wrong on the base. However, in this particular
case, the records show that the offensive publication was sent
to the commanding officer for approval and that he approved
it.
The grant of rights, powers and authority to the US under the RP-
US Bases Treaty does not cover immunity of its officers from crimes
and torts
Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost
Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name
Auring if the article will be published. The petitioners,
however, were NEGLIGENT because under their direction,
they issued the publication without deleting the said name.
Such act or omission was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be
deemed part of official duty. It was a TORTIOUS ACT which
ridiculed the private respondent. As a result of petitioners act,
PR suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, especially so, since the article
was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their
personal capacities, are liable for the damages they caused the
Private Respondent.
C. Culpa Acquiliana vs Culpa Criminal
- A crime is an offense against the public pursued by the
sovereign
- Tort is a private injury which is pursued by the injured
party
o Criminal punishment is to vindicate states
interest an deter crime
o Tort Liability is to vindicate the individual
victim and the rights and to reinforce public
standards of behavior
Today, a single act might constitute both a crime
and a tort
Phoenix Construction vs Carbonel
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
Ponente: FELICIANO, J:
FACTS:
*In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m.
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home he
lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails-
and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a
marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening,
Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
*He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford
dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The
dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner
Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand
side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a
person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was
proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic.
*The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb)
in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck,
front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the
permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to
be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too
late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
*Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which
Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand,
countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his
own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without
a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised
due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
*The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against
Phoenix and Carbonel.
*Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the
trial court but modified the award.
No curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately
after the accident nor was any found in his car
Dionisio just alleged that it was misplaced
He was unable to probe possession of a valid curfew pass and
that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have
such pass that night
The relevance of a possession or non-possession of a curfew
pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other
related issues: whether he had purposely put out his headlights
before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly
arrest by the police for travelling onset of curfew without a valid
pass
Patrolman Cuynos testimonies were admissible.
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and
suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night
is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather
than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be
around at that time.
The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible
as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by
the trial court.
Ssubstantial weight should have been ascribed to such
testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have
purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the
Phoenix dump truck
Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights before he reached the
intersection
But, he succeeded in switching his lights on again at bright split
seconds before contact with the dump truck
Dionisio was negligent at the night of the accident
He was hurrying home and driving faster than he should have
been
He extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of
Gen. Lacuna and Gen. Santos and thus did not see the dump
truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road
lance
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the
dump truck was parked, and in other words, the negligence of
Carbonel
There as a reasonable relationship between Carbonels
negligence on the hand and the accident, and respondents
injury
The collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the truck drivers negligence
The truck drivers negligence is far from being a passive and
static condition, but an indispensable and efficient cause.
The collision would have not occurred if the dump truck was
not parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking created an unreasonable risk of
injury for anyone driving down Gen. Lacuna St., and for having
so created the risk, the truck driver must be held responsible
Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is
one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to
anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant
may be negligence among other reasons, because of failure to
guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason.
Dionisios negligence was only contributory
He may recover damages as the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury as the truck drivers lack of due care and
negligence
Doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.
Carbonels proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence
on the part of his employer, Phoenix in supervising its employees
properly and adequately
The circumstance that Phoenix allowed its truck driver to bring
the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be
done early in the morning, when coupled with failure to show
any effort of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the
dump truck is parked hen away from the company premises, is
an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of
Phoenix
Claims of Damages
In view of substantial justice, 20-80 is the ration of the
allocation of damages.
Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent
appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be
borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80%
needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who
shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is
of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel
D. Cupla Acquiliana vs Culpa Contractual
- Tort is distinguished from a breach of contract in that the
latter arises under an agreement of the parties, whereas
the tort is ordinarily a violation of a duty fixed by law
although it may sometimes have relation to obligations
growing out of or coincident with a contract
Construction Devt Corp of the PHL vs Estrella
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioner,
vs.
REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE
PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS LAGUNA
TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO
DATINGUINOO, respondents. G.R.
No. 147791 September 8, 2006
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
*On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her
granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a
BLTB bus bound for Pasay City.
*Their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in
the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their
seats and pinned their knees to the seats in front of them. They
regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the
bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They were
brought to the Makati Medical Center where the doctors diagnosed
their injuries to be as follows:
Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella - Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd,
Lacerated wound, chin, Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg,
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right3
Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher - Extensive lacerated wounds,
right leg posterior aspect popliteal area
and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with severance of muscles.
Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and
antero-lateral compartment of lower leg. Fracture, open
comminuted, both tibial.
*Respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB,
Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1) that
Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and
BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic
laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees; (3) that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it
lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its passengers to grave
danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to
P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they
suffered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental
anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock,
and lifelong social humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with
justice, give respondents their due, observe honesty and good faith
which entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they
are entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
*CDCP filed its Answer6 which was later amended to include a third-
party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance,
Inc. (Phoenix).7
*On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding
CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable. The trial court held that
BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a
due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies
or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has
acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry respondents to their
destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage
while its failure to rebut the presumption of negligence made it liable
to respondents for the breach.
*Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it
owned bumped the BLTB bus from behind. Evidence showed that
CDCP's driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time of
the incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the
presumption that CDCP was negligent either in the selection or
in the supervision of its employees which it failed to rebut thus
making it and its driver liable to respondents.
*Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the
trial court, respondents moved that the decision be reconsidered but
was denied. Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the
The case filed is an action for cupla aquiliana or quasi-delict
It may be instituted against the employer for an employees act
or omission
The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is
direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
Petitioner failed to prove that it exercised due diligence of a good
father in the selection and supervision of Payunan
Petitioner is solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual damages
suffered by the respondents because of the injuries sustained
Payunan was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as
shown in the sketch of the police investigator
The owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common
carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same
Rule of Liability applies. The bus company, its driver, the
operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were
jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or their
heirs
Petitioner and its driver are jointly and severally liable for moral
damages; hence, there could be no double recovery
Claims of Moral Damages
80k was reduced to 50k, so as to commensurate the damage
inflicted
Exemplary Damages
May be awarded if the defendant acted with gross negligence
Petitioners driver was driving recklessly at the time its truck
rammed the BLTB bus
Petitioner who has direct and primary liability for the negligent
conducts of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees
20k
Attorneys Fees
Ordinary Concept: AF is the reasonable compensation paid to
a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered.
Basis: Agreement
Extraordinary Concept: AF is an indemnity for damages
ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation.
Basis: Art. 2208 ; payable to the client UNLESS, there is an
agreement that the same shall be given to the lawyer as an
additional compensation
AF was correctly awarded; 30% of the total amount recovered
Total amount adjudged shall earn 6% interest per annum from the
date of judgment of the trial court until finality of its judgment
CDCPs claim against Phoenix had already prescribed
Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant
to this chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to
the insurance company concerned a written notice of
claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration of the injuries
sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of
claim must be filed within six months from date of the accident,
otherwise, the claim shall be deemed waived. Action or suit for
recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be brought in
proper cases, with the Commissioner or Courts within one year
from denial of the claim, otherwise, the claimant's right of action
shall prescribe
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written
notice of claim must be filed within six months from the date of
the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six
months from the date of the accident, its claim has already
prescribed.
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Corp vs IAC
BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO
PON, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HEIRS OF PAZ VDA.
DE PAMFILO, THE HEIRS OF NORMA NERI, and BAYLON
SALES and NENA VDA. DE ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988
Ponente: PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
*The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB, for brevity) driven by Armando Pon
and Bus No. 404 of Superlines Transportation Company
(Superlines, for brevity) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the
highway traversing Barangay Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon in the
afternoon of August 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death
of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in
several injuries to Nena Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon Sales,
all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046.
*The evidence shows that as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating
the bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as
Bus No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the opposite direction.
Seeing thus, Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated
attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his
proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided
with each other.
*Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of
the deceased Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri
instituted separate cases in the Court of First Instance of
Marinduque against BLTB and Superlines together with their
respective drivers praying for damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two
buses were filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
*Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon
and Dasco, denied liability by claiming that they exercised due care
and diligence and shifted the fault, against each other. They all
interposed counterclaims against the plaintiffs and crossclaims
against each other.
*After trial on the merits, the lower court exonerated defendants
Superlines and its driver Dasco from liability and attributed sole
responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon, and
ordered them jointly and severally to pay damages to the
plaintiffs. Defendants BLTB and Armando Pon appealed from
the decision of the lower court to respondent appellate court
which affirmed with modification the judgment of the lower
court as earlier stated.
*Hence, this petition to review by certiorari of defendant BLTB
assigning a lone error, to wit: THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING THAT THE ACTIONS OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE BASED ON CULPA
CONTRACTUAL. (p. 12, Rollo). It is argued by petitioners that if the
intention of private respondents were to file an action based
on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage, they could
have done so by merely impleading BLTB and its driver Pon. As it
was in the trial court, private respondents filed an action
against all the defendants basing their action on culpa aquiliana or
tort.
Petitioners liability is anchored on both culpa contractual an culpa
acquiliana
The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of 3
and injuries of 2 passengers of DLTB was the negligence of
the driver of BLTB bus who recklessly operated and drove said
bus by overtaking a Ford Fiera, as he was negotiating the
ascending bend of the highway which was divided into 2 lanes
by a continuous yellow strip
Driver of BLTB admitted that the continuous yellow strip is a no
overtaking zone
Armando Pons Employer is also liable
Pon = primarily liable
BLTB = primary, direct and immediate, in view of the fact that
the death or injuries to its passengers was through the
negligence of its employee, and such liability does not cease
even upon proof that BLTB exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees
The common carriers liability for the death or injuries to its
passengers is based in its contractual obligation to carry its
passengers safely to their destination
BLTB is solidarily liable with its driver even though the liability
of the driver arose from a QD while that of the bus company
from a contract
The proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of the
driver of BLTB
He recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where
overtaking is not allowed by traffic rules and regulations
By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the
express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with
a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might
be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the
fault or negligence of the carrier
Gutierrez vs Gutierrez
Petitoner: Narciso Gutierrez
Respondent: Bonifacio Gutierrez, Maria V. De Gutierrez, Manuel
Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, And Saturnino Cortez
Citation:G.R. No. 34840
Date of Promulgation:September 23, 1931
Ponente: MALCOLM, J..
FACTS:
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of
private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other
on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the
municipality of Las Pias, Province of Rizal.
 The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and
was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being
operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and
was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs.
Manuel Gutierrez.
At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but
the mother, together will several other members of the
Gutierrez family, seven in all, were accommodated therein.
A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez,
was en route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila.
The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in
Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg which required
medical attendance for a considerable period of time, and
which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed
properly.
Respondents are guilty of negligence
Bonifacio is an incompetent chauffeur, as he was driving in an
excessive rate of speed
On approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and
contributed negligence to the accident
The guarantee given by the father at the time the son was
granted with license to operate a motor vehicle made the father
responsible for the acts of his son
Jointly and severally liable for 5k
Joseph vs Bautista
Petitoner: Luis Joseph
Respondent: Hon. Crispin V. Bautista, Patrocinio Perez, Antonio
Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan, Alberto Cardeno And Lazaro
Villanueva
Citation:G.R. No. L-41423
Date of Promulgation:February 23, 1989
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
The generative facts of this case as culled from the written
submission of the parties, are as follows:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck
with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73.
On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant
Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from
Pangasinan.
Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck
at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way
fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan.
While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to
overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction.
At about the same time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95
B, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro
Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in
the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the
cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to
ram a mango tree.
As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his
legs.
The following proceedings thereafter took place:
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent
Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a
breach of contract of carriage and against respondents
Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and
never was an owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he
acquire ownership thereof in the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court,
filed his amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto
Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional
alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not
ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether
respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who
was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents
Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim
against her co-defendants for indemnity and subrogation in
the event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein
impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional
alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva,
Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru
their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P
1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of
claim releasing from liability the following parties, viz:
Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno,
Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva,
Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance Corporation
of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for
damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and
Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/
Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging
that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P
7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and
alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson
and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of
amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-
defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to
dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was
premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by
petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the
benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the
respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned
order dismissing the case, and a motion for the
reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal,
petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in declaring
that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of
respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the
benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in
dismissing the case.
The argument that the judgment on the compromise agreement
under the cause of action based on QD is not a bar to the cause of
action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable
Cause of Action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act
or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or
omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as
when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several
separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is
only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of
the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one person
In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner
sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a
single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action
against the different respondents through the appropriate
remedies allowed by law
Respondents are solidarily liable
The claim that there was an agreement entered into between
the parties during the pre-trial conference that, after such
payment made by the other respondents, the case shall
proceed as against respondent Perez is both incredible and
unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show, either
by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes
of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed such as
agreement
First PHL Intl Bank vs CA
Facts: In the course of its banking operations, the defendant
Producer Bank of the Philippines acquired 6 parcels of land with a
total area of 101 hectares located at Don Jose, Sta. Rosa, Laguna
and covered by TCT No. T-106932 to T-106937. The property used
to be owned by BYME Investment and Development Corporation
which hd them mortgaged with the bank as collateral for a loan. The
plaintiff originals, Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo wanted to
purchase the property and thus initiated negotiations for that
purpose. In the early part of August 1987 said plaintiffs, upon the
suggestion of BYME investments legal counsel, Fajardo met with
defendant Mercurio Rivera, manager of the property management
department of the defendant bank. The meeting was held in
pursuant to plaintiffs plan to buy the property. After the meeting,
plaintiff Janolo, following the advice of defendant Rivera made a
formal purchase offer to the Bank through a letter dated August
30,1987. Negotiations took place and an offer price was fixed at
P5.5million. During the course of the negotiations, the defendant
bank was placed under conservatorship and a new conservator was
appointed to which the name has been refused to recognize. A
derivative suit has been filed against Rivera for the damages
suffered from the alleged perfect contract of sale involving the 6
parcels of land.
Issue: Whether or not a derivative suit may lie involving the bank
and its stockholders.
Held: No. An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he hold stock in
order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials
of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones, to be sued or hold
the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder
is regarded as a nominal party with the corporation as the real party
in interest.
In the face of the damaging admissions taken from the complaint in
the second case, petitioners, quite strangely, sought to deny that the
second case was a derivative suit, reasoning that it was brought not
by the minority shareholders, but by Henry Co. etal. who not only
hold or control over 80% of the outstanding capital stock, but also
constitute the majority in the board of directors of petitioners bank.
That being so, then they really represent the bank, so whether they
sued derivatively or directly, there is undeniably an identity of
interest/entity represented.
In addition to the many cases, where the corporate fiction has been
regarded, we now add the instant case, and declare herewith that
the corporate veil cannot be used to shield an otherwise blatant
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping. Shareholders,
whether suing as the majority in direct actions or as the minority in
a derivative suit, cannot be allowed to trifle with court processes
particularly where, as in this case, the corporation itself has not been
remiss in vigorously prosecuting or defending corporate causes and
in using and applying remedies available to it. To rule otherwise
would be to encourage corporate litigants to use their shareholders
as fronts to circumvent the stringent rules against forum shopping.
From the facts, the official bank price, at any rte, the bank placed its
official, Rivera is a position of authority to accept offers to buy and
negotiate the sale by having the offer officially acted upon by the
bank. The bank cannot turn around and say, as it now does, that
what Rivera states as the banks action on the matter is not in fact
so. It is a familiar doctrine, the doctrine of ostensible authority, that
if a corporation on knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other
agent, to do acts within the scope of apparent authority, and thus
holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts,
the corporation will, as against any one who has in good faith dealt
with the corporation through such agent, he estopped from denying
his authority.
A bank is liable for wrongful acts of its officers done in the interest
of the bank or in he course of dealings of the officers in their
representative capacity but not for acts outside the scope of their
authority. A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of
confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds they my thus
be enabled to perpetrate in the apparent scope of their employment;
nor will it be permitted to shrink its responsibility for such fraud even
through no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. Accordingly,
a banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the
representation is made in the course of its business by an agent
acting within the general scope of its authority even though, in the
particular case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and
attempting to perpetrate fraud upon his principal or some other
person, for his own ultimate benefit.
Section 28-A of BP 68 merely gives the conservator power to revoke
contracts that are, under existing law, deemed not to be effective
i.e void, voidable, unenforceable or rescissible. Hence, the
conservator merely takes the place of a banks board of directors.
What the said board cannot do such as repudiating a contract
validly entered into under the doctrine of implied authority the
conservator cannot do either.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping.
HELD: Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of
interest and parties between the first case and the second case.
There is identity of interest because both cases sought to have the
agreement, which involves the same property, be declared
unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity of parties even
though the first case is in the name of the bank as defendant, and
the second case is in the name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still
forum shopping here because Henry Co essentially represents the
bank. Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability from the
agreement it entered into with Demetria et al.
The Supreme Court also discussed that to combat forum shopping,
which originated as a concept in international law, the principle of
forum non conveniens was developed. The doctrine of forum non
conveniens provides that a court, in conflicts of law cases, may
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Forum Shopping (Blacks Dictionary): occurs when a party
attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or
jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable
judgment or verdict
Test for Determining Forum Shopping: exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other
Vda de Severo et at., vs Go et al.
Petitoner: Julita T. Vda. De Severo, Antoniete Severo, Bernadit
Severo, Ricardo Severo, Jr. And Marisol Severo
Respondent: Luningning Feliciano Go And Joaquin Go, And The
Honorable Court Of First Instance Of Samar, Branch V
Citation:G.R. No. L-44330
Date of Promulgation:January 29, 1988
Ponente: BIDIN, J.
FACTS:
Ricardo Severo was an employee of herein private
respondents Luningning Feliciano Go and Joaquin Go, first as
baker of 'Joni's Cakes and Pastries," an enterprise owned by
respondents and finally, as driver-mechanic from 1961 up to
February 16, 1972.
On the latter date, unidentified armed men forcibly took away
and/or carnapped the car owned by respondents and driven
by Ricardo Severo who, in his efforts to resist the carnappers,
was shot and killed by the latter.
Up to now, the parties responsible for Severo's death have
not been Identified nor apprehended.
On September 18, 1974, herein petitioners, the widow and
minor children of Ricardo Severo, filed an action against
respondents-employers before the trial court for "Death
Compensation and Damages" in the total amount of
P74,500.00.
On November 18, 1974, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent Court
has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action but the same
was denied by respondent Court in its order dated January 9,
1975.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
by the trial court. On May 3, 1975, private respondents filed
their answer traversing the material allegations of the
complaint and raised as special affirmative defenses that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over the claim of the petitioner
and that the complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of
action.
During the pre-trial on January 16, 1976, private respondents
again filed a motion to dismiss reiterating their allegation that
the lower court has no jurisdiction over the claim of petitioner
and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Petitioners filed a reply (opposition) dated February 5, 1976
contending that their claim is not for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act but for damages under Article
1711 and Article 21 of the Civil Code, hence, cognizable by
the regular courts.
The respondent court, acting on the latest motion to dismiss,
issued an order dated April 6, 1976 stating that petitioners'
cause of action falls within the purview of the Workmen's
Compensation Act and the proper forum was the Workmen's
Compensation Commission.
It declared itself without jurisdiction following Our ruling in the
case of Robles vs. Yap Wing, L-20442, October 4, 1971, 41
SCRA 267, to wit:
The Court after a careful consideration of the
grounds in the defendants' motion, and
considering the allegation of the complaint
describing their main cause of action, which is
a claim for death compensation and damages,
is of the opinion and so holds that this Court has
no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The
plaintiffs' right to relief being derived on an
accident resulting in death of Ricardo Severo,
an employee of the defendants, while engaged
in the performance of the task assigned to him,
this Court is devoid of statutory competence to
pass upon the subject matter of the plaintiffs'
claim, as of the time the cause of action accrue,
falls within the purview of the Workmen's
Compensation Act as amended and, therefore,
the proper form (sic) was the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, thru its regional
offices under the Department of Labor, a body
empowered to act upon all claims for
compensation for death, injury or sickness.
Thus our Supreme Court in the case of Ciriaco
Robles vs. Yap Wing, No. L-20442, Oct. 4,
1971 ruled:
Before the enactment of Republic Act No.
722(Amending Act. No. 3228), which took
effect on June 20, 1952, claims for
compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act were cognizable by the
regular courts, but since then, as provided in
Section 46 thereof as amended, 'the
Workmen's Compensation shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for
 compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court. ... In relation to this, Section 5
of the Act provides that the rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee by reason
of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and
remedies accruing to an employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the
Civil Code or other laws, because of said injury.
The claim for compensation of the petitioners based on the NCC
does pertain to the jurisdiction of regular couts
The court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and
remedies granted by the Workmens Compensation Act
The employee or his heirs have the choice of action and
corresponding relief either an ordinary action for damages
before the regular courts or special claim for compensation
under the WCA
Petitioners have opted to seek their remedy before the
regular courts
Their demand is predicated on the employers liabilitu for the
death of their employee
Fabre Jr vs CA
Petitioners: Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil
Respondents: Court of Appeals, The Word for The World Christian
Fellowship, Inc., Amyline Antonio, John Richards, Gonzalo
Gonzales, Vicente V. Que, Jr., Icli Cordova, Arlene Gojocco, Alberto
Roxas Cordero, Richard Bautista, Jocelyn Garcia, Yolanda
Cordova, Noel Roque, Edward Tan, Ernesto Narciso, Enriqueta
Locsin, Francis Norman O. Lopez, Julius Caesar Garcia, Rosario
Ma. V. Ortiz, Marietta C. Clavo, Elvie Seniel, Rosario Mara-Mara,
Teresita Regala, Melinda Torres, Marella Mijares, Josefa
Cabatingan, Mara Nadoc, Diane Mayo, Tess Plata, Mayette Jocson,
Arlene Y. Mortiz, Liza Mayo, Carlos Ranario, Rosamaria T. Radoc
and Bernadette Ferrer
Docket No.: G.R. No. 111127
Date of Promulgation: July 26, 1996
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners
o Spouses Fabre were owners of a 1982 model
Mazda minibus which was used as bus service
for school children which they operated in
Manila.
o The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom
they hired in 1981, after trying him out for two
weeks; job was to take school children to and
from the St. Scholasticas College in Malate,
Manila.
November 2, 1984
o Respondent Word for the World Christian
Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with
petitioners for the transportation of 33 members
of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La
Union and back in consideration of which
private respondent paid petitioners the amount
of P3,000.00.
o The group was scheduled to leave on
November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o clock in the
afternoon; several members of the party were
late, the bus left Tropical Hut at the corner of
Ortigas Avenue and EDSA at 8:00 o clock in the
evening.
o Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus.
o Usual route to Caba, La Union was through
Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at
Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner
Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being
his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a
detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen,
Pangasinan.
o At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon
a sharp curve on the highway, running on a
south to east direction, which he described as
siete; road was slippery because it was raining,
causing the bus, which was running at the
speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the
left road shoulder.
o The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign
along the road and rammed the fence of one
Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on
its left side, coming to a full stop only after a
series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the
road.
o A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and
smashed its front portion.
o Several passengers were injured.
o Private respondent Amyline Antonio was
thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down
by a wooden seat which came off after being
unscrewed. It took three persons to safely
remove her from this position. She was in great
pain and could not move.
o The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not
see the curve until it was too late; he said he
was not familiar with the area and he could not
have seen the curve despite the care he took in
driving the bus, because it was dark and there
was no sign on the road.
o He said that he saw the curve when he was
already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He
allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per
hour, but it was too late.
November 3, 1984
o Lingayen police investigated the incident then
filed a criminal complaint at Lingayen RTC
against the driver, Porfirio Cabil.
o Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano
P1,500.00 for the damage to the latters fence.
o On the basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance
the case against petitioners Fabre was
dismissed.
Respondent Amyline Antonio
o was seriously injured; brought this case in the
RTC of Makati.
o As a result of the accident, she is now suffering
from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed
from the waist down.
o During trial she described the operations she
underwent and adduced evidence regarding
the cost of her treatment and therapy.
o Immediately after the accident, she was taken
to the Nazareth Hospital in Ba-ay, Lingayen but
it was not adequately equipped so she was
transferred to the Sto. Nio Hospital, also in the
town of Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives
however, the x-ray taken showed that the
damage to her spine was determined to be too
severe to be treated there.
o She was therefore brought to Manila, first to the
Philippine General Hospital and later to the
Makati Medical Center where she underwent
an operation to correct the dislocation of her
spine.
April 17, 1989 RTC Makati Decision
o No convincing evidence was shown that the
minibus was properly checked for travel to a
long distance trip and that the driver was
properly screened and tested before being
admitted for employment. Indeed, all the
evidence presented have shown the negligent
act of the defendants which ultimately resulted
to the accident subject of this case.
Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World
Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline
Antonio were the only ones who adduced
evidence in support of their claim for damages,
the Court is therefore not in a position to award
damages to the other plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby renders judgment against defendants
Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio
Cabil y Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiffs the following amount:
1) P93,657.11 as
compensatory and actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the
reasonable amount of loss of
earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral
damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and
5) 25% of the recoverable
amount as attorneys fees;
6) Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio but
dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on
the ground that they failed to prove their respective
claims. The Court of Appeals modified the award of
damages as follows:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P600,000.00 as compensatory
damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
6) Costs of suit.
 o The Court of Appeals sustained the trial
courts finding that petitioner Cabil failed
to exercise due care and precaution in
the operation of his vehicle considering
the time and the place of the
accident. The Court of Appeals held that
the Fabres were themselves
presumptively negligent.
Petitioners were negligent
The relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in
origin and nature; nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract
may be also tort
Cabil drove the bus negligently while his employer, Fabres,
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection
and supervision of their employee
It was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was
raining, and, as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it
was dark. He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that
there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is undisputed that
Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and
only slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30
meters ahead
By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given
the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was
Cabils first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his
vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony that the
vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be
running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per
hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.
Cabre was negligent in the selection and supervision of employees
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by
finding that the applicant possessed a professional drivers
license. The employer should also examine the applicant for
his qualifications, experience and record of service. Due
diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as
actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance
with the rules.
Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union,
apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving
for school children only, from their homes to the St.
Scholasticas College in Metro Manila. They had They had
tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could
remember the names of the children he would be taking to
school, which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a
long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La
Union was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn the
presumption of negligence on the part of an employer hired him
only after a two-week apprenticeship.
Fabres did not have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for common carriers to apply
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air for compensation, offering their services to
the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods
or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as a sideline).
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the
passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not
excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of their employee
Damages can be awarded to Amyline Antonio
This case falls within Art. 2219 providing for payment of moral
damages in QD
On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract
of carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized by Art.
1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabils gross negligence
amounted to bad faith
The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees was also
properly made
Fabres and Cabil are jointly and severally liable for damages
sustained by the passengers
Emenciana Vda De Medina vs Cresencia
Petitioners: Emerenciana M. Vda. De Medina, Et al.
Respondents: Guillermo Cresencia, Et al.
Docket No.: G.R. No. L-8194
Date of Promulgation: July 11, 1956
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
May 31, 1953
o A passenger jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-
2232 (Manila), driven by Brigido Avorque,
smashed into a Meralco post on Azcarraga
Street, resulting in the death of Vicente Medina,
one of its passengers.
A criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence
was filed against Avorque (criminal case No. 22775 of the
CFI Manila), to which he pleaded guilty on September 9,
1953.
The heirs of the deceased, however, reserved their right
to file a separate action for damages, and on June 16,
1953, brought suit against the driver Brigido Avorque
and Appellant Guillermo Cresencia, the registered owner
and operator of the jeepney in question.
Defendant Brigido Avorque did not file any
answer; while Defendant Cresencia answered,
disclaiming liability on the grounds:
1. that he had sold the jeepney in question on October
14, 1950 to one Maria A. Cudiamat;
2. that the jeepney had been repeatedly sold by one
buyer after another, until the vehicle was purchased
on January 29, 1953 by Rosario Avorque, the
absolute owner thereof at the time of the accident.
In view of Cresencias answer, Plaintiffs filed leave and
was allowed to amend their complaint making Rosario
Avorque a co-Defendant; and the latter, by way of
answer, admitted having purchased the aforesaid
jeepney on May 31, 1953, but alleged in defense that she
was never the public utility operator thereof.
The case then proceeded to trial, during which, after
the Plaintiffs had presented their
evidence, Defendants Guillermo Cresencia and Rosario
Avorque made manifestations admitting that the former
was still the registered operator of the jeepney in question
in the records of the Motor Vehicles Office and the Public
Service Commission, while the latter was the owner
thereof at the time of the accident; and submitted the
case for the decision on the question of who, as between
the two, should be held liable to Plaintiffs for damages.
The lower court, by Judge Jose Zulueta, held that as far
as the public is concerned, Defendant Cresencia, in the
eyes of the law, continued to be the legal owner of the
jeepney in question; and rendered judgment against him,
jointly and severally with the driver Brigido Avorque, for
P6,000 compensatory damages, P30,000 moral
damages, P10,000 exemplary damages, P10,000
nominal damages, P5,000 attorneys fees, and costs,
while Defendant Rosario Avorque was absolved from
liability.
Defendant Cresencia appealed.
Cresencia is liable to the Commission and the public for the
consequences incident to the operation of jeepneys, also to the
damages sustained by Plaintiff by reason of the death of Vicente
Medina resulting from the reckless imprudence of the driver,
Brigido Avorque
Sale of the jeepned was admittedly without the approval of
Public Service Commission; hence, Guillermo continues to be
liable
The law requires the approval of the Public Service
Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege
pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the
certificate issued to the grantee; and that if property covered
by the franchise is transferred or leased without this requisite
approval, the transfer is not binding against the public or the
Service Commission; and in contemplation of law, the grantee
of record continues to be responsible under the franchise in
relation to the Commission and to the public
Plaintiffs action for damages is independent of the criminal case
filed against Brigido and not based on the employers subsidiary
liability
Based on breach of contractual obligation to carry his
passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual)
No need to prove Brigidos insolvency before damages can be
recovered to the carrier, for in CC the liability of the carrier is
direct and immediate
Award of the nominal damages is untenable
Nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages
Aboitiz Shipping vs CA
ABOITIZ v CA
Petitioner: Aboitiz Shipping Corporation
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, Lucila C.
Viana, Sps. Antonio Viana and Gorgonia Viana, and Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation
Docket No.: G.R. No. 84458
Date of Promulgation: November 6, 1989
Ponente: Regalado, J.
FACTS:
Appeal by certiorari
May 11, 1975
o Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V
Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila,
 having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the
sum of P23.10.
May 12, 1975
o Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor,
Manila, and the passengers therein
disembarked, a gangplank having been
provided connecting the side of the vessel to
the pier. Instead of using said gangplank
Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck
which was on the level with the pier.
o After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation took over the
exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said
vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement dated July 26, 1975 between the
third-party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation and defendant Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation.
o The crane owned by the third party defendant
and operated by its crane operator Alejo
Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and
one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel
had disembarked, it started operation by
unloading the cargoes from said vessel.
o While the crane was being operated, Anacleto
Viana who had already disembarked from said
vessel obviously remembering that some of his
cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went
back to the vessel, and it was while he was
pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the
place where his cargoes were loaded that the
crane hit him, pinning him between the side of
the vessel and the crane.
o He was thereafter brought to the hospital where
he later expired three (3) days thereafter, on
May 15, 1975, the cause of his death according
to the Death Certificate being "hypostatic
pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of
the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder".
o For his hospitalization, medical, burial and
other miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife,
herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00.
Anacleto Viana who was only forty
(40) years old when he met said
fateful accident was in good health;
average annual income as a farmer
or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans
of palay annually.
His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio
and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his
death had been recipient of twenty
(20) cavans of palay as support or
P120.00 monthly.
Because of Anacleto's death,
plaintiffs suffered mental anguish
and extreme worry or moral
damages.
For the filing of the instant case, they
had to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee
of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages
against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage.
Answer to Vianas complaint: Aboitiz denied responsibility
contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer as the
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which
handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of
Aboitiz; averred that since the crane operator was not an
employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under
the fellow-servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-
party complaint against Pioneer imputing liability thereto
for Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly
caused by the negligence of the crane operator who was
an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and
supervision.
Answer to third-party complaint: Pioneer raised the
defenses that Aboitiz had no cause of action against
Pioneer considering
1. that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for
breach of contract of carriage to which Pioneer
is not a party;
2. that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a
good father of a family both in the selection and
supervision of its employees as well as in the
prevention of damage or injury to anyone
including the victim Anacleto Viana;
3. that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was
the direct and proximate cause of his death;
4. and that the filing of the third-party complaint
was premature by reason of the pendency of
the criminal case for homicide through reckless
imprudence filed against the crane operator,
Alejo Figueroa.
April 17, 1980 Decision of the trial court
o Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas for
damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to
reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the
latter paid the Vianas.
Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for
reconsideration wherein they similarly raised the trial
court's failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with
gross negligence despite the overwhelming evidence
presented in support thereof.
In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to Pioneer's
motion, that under the memorandum of agreement the
liability of Pioneer as contractor is automatic for any
damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising
from the operation of its arrastre and stevedoring service.
October 27, 1982 Order of the trial court
o Absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the
Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish
a case of negligence against the crane operator
which the court a quo ruled is never presumed,
aside from the fact that the memorandum of
agreement supposedly refers only to Pioneer's
liability in case of loss or damage to goods
handled by it but not in the case of personal
injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly
invoke the fellow-servant rule simply because
its liability stems from a breach of contract of
carriage.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of of the trial court
except as to the amount of damages awarded to the
Vianas.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the doctrine
laid down in La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is
applicable in the case at bar.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner liable
for damages in the face of the finding of the lower courts
that Anacleto Viana was guilty of contributory negligence.
3. Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when
it dismissed petitioner's third-party complaint against private
respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation instead of
compelling the latter to reimburse the petitioner for whatever
damages it may be compelled to pay to the private
respondents Vianas.
HELD:
At threshold, it is to be observed that both the trial court and
respondent Court of Appeals found the victim Anacleto Viana guilty
of contributory negligence, but holding that it was the negligence of
Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre
operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the direct,
immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.
1. No.
Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed
from the time Anacleto Viana disembarked from the vessel and that
he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes
prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was
no longer reasonable e and he consequently ceased to be a
passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues
until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination
and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once
created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted
from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to
be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all
the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after
his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-
passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that
the person transported has been carried to his destination if,
for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to
claim his baggage.
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the
aforesaid case of La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of
carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment
the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a
place selected by the carrier at the point of destination,
but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
alighting from a train, walks along the station platform
is considered still a passenger. So also, where a
passenger has alighted at his destination and is
proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the
report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been
 shot, and he in good faith and without intent of
engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother,
he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and
thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the
protection of the railroad company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one
of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted
from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was, must have
followed the father. However, although the father was still
on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to
hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that
even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving
vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be
near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances,
it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised
the 'utmost diligence' of a 'very cautious person' required by
Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common
carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely
its passengers. ... The presence of said passengers near
the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore,
to be considered still as passengers of the carrier,
entitled to the protection under their contract of
carriage. 14
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to
rule as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable
presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time
should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the
case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business,
the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account
such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case
of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the
passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the
case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim
met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the
existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the
victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists
such a justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's
business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a
longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common
carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of
cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are
capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to
the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship
passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to
disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus
passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a
very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically
claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time
entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La
Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are
to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we
cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a
passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred,
the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had
every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier
is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their
baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the
victim had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to
prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim was taking
his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier. In
consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum
time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may
be presumed that the victim had just gotten off the vessel when he
went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he had already
disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises
was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which
was possible only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was
admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels
that the unloading operations shall start only after that time.
Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim
Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time
of his tragic death.
2. No.
Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case. 15 More particularly, a
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured,
the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach of
contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to
prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-
performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to
carry the passenger safely to his destination, 18 which, in the
instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its
passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation
subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a
passenger's death or injury the operator of the vessel was at fault or
negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is
incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to the passengers
of common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a
stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this
Court has likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of the
law by exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from
common carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the
passengers who often become hapless victims of indifferent and
profit-oriented carriers. We cannot in reason deny that petitioner
failed to rebut the presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining
in the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner had
inadequately complied with the required degree of diligence to
prevent the accident from happening.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that
there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as
claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged
presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and
not indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept
petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were
sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question
was fraught with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the
existence of the supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around
the unloading area and the guard's admonitions against entry
therein, these were at most insufficient precautions which pale into
insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the danger to
which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that
petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that
said precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to
subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area.
By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts
approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" to be
exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which is
required by law of common carriers with respect to their passengers.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still
petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it
could definitely have prevented, the former's death. Moreover,
in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has
expressly conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of
Appeals that petitioner did not present sufficient evidence in
support of its submission that the deceased Anacleto Viana
was guilty of gross negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard
to claim otherwise.
3. No.
No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by
respondent court's declaration that there was no negligence on the
part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the trial
court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being
absolved of any liability.
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in
proving the alleged gross negligence of the victim, hence its present
contention that the death of the passenger was due to the
negligence of the crane operator cannot be sustained both on
grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on its present theory.
Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that
Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its
unloading operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have
been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as
a defendant, and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-
party complaint only after ten (10) months from the institution of the
suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not within the ambit of
the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the
corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common
carriers like Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what
we have said that no negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but,
that on the contrary, the failure of Aboitiz to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger is the
rationale for our finding on its liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
CALALAS v CA
Petitioner: Vicente Calalas
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and
Francisco Salva
Docket No.: G.R. No. 122039
Date of Promulgation: May 31, 2000
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and
awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche
Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
 August 23, 1989 (10:00 AM)
o Respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a
college freshman majoring in Physical
Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas.
o The jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor
an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back
of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
o On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off; Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger.
o An Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and
owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear
portion of the jeepney; Sunga was injured.
She sustained a fracture of the "distal
third of the left tibia-fibula with severe
necrosis of the underlying skin."
Closed reduction of the fracture, long
leg circular casting, and case
wedging were done under sedation.
Her confinement in the hospital
lasted from August 23 to September
7, 1989.
Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo
V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon,
certified she would remain on a cast
for a period of three months and
would have to ambulate in crutches
during said period.
October 9, 1989
o Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the
diligence required of him as a common carrier.
o Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner
of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-
party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident.
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490),
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-
delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower
court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-
delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code.
The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint
against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to
Sunga.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Calalas is liable on the basis of his
contract of carriage to Sunga.
HELD:
Yes.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He
contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by
Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of
moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by
evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-
delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case
the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused
to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon
the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.[2] In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage
to petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where
there is no relation between him and another party. In such a
case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is
a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function
of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar
as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects
regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence
required of common carriers with regard to the safety of
passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases
of death or injury to passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos.
5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles
1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of
petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in
the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
against petitioners contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not
properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two
meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of
the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his
motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede
the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or
taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight,
obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the
highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner driver took in more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any
motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight
or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in
a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained
by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent
in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners
contention that Sungas taking an "extension seat" amounted
to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should
not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked
constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be
present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the
debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did
not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with
its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging
that it is excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention
well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year
college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman
University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the
injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of
that school year. She testified that she had no more
intention of continuing with her schooling, because she
could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major
in Physical Education "because of my leg which has a defect
already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was
under confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured
left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon
also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture
side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical
Education as her major subject, because "my left leg x x x
has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the
inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover
moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just
and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is
not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code.[5] As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger,
as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages
since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of
carriage. Sungas contention that petitioners admission in open
court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a
nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.
The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the
hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the
plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March
31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

Calalas vs CA