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PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S

Republic of the Philippines


EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
SUPREME COURT
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
Manila
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
PER CURIAM:
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA,
(Implementing Rules).
EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM
TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO- In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW- On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO the petition be granted in part.
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ,
RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of
UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM the petition.
MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion
SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and
by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et
mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND,
al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed. found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
their earlier pleadings and during the hearing. provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its These provisions are:
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other "(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
Article XII of the Constitution: authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and "(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands; particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous said officials over said area terminates;
peoples;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
ancestral domains and ancestral lands; claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used
to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples." 5
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
more than 25 years; and autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, Petitioners pray for the following:
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation." 2
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid; obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules; Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from SO ORDERED.
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget


and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of


Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out
the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources." 7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban
filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8,
and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must
await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the
IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban
and Vitug.
EN BANC Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
[G.R. NO. 167707 : October 8, 2008] destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants 4 who live in the bone-
shaped island's three barangays.5
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, 6 which identified
BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. 7
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR
OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
AUTHORITY, Petitioners, v. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of
Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
similarly situated, Respondents. of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No.
1801.
[G.R. NO. 173775 : October 8, 2008]
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS titling purposes, respondents-claimants
PETITION, Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI,
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
AKLAN, Respondents. Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest,
DECISION had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
REYES, R.T., J.: lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. 10

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a Petition for
they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of
confirmation of imperfect titles.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered
the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition
for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 5">[3] issued by for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public
agricultural land. forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The Antecedents
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants' reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
G.R. No. 167707
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen
into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
(1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower
Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural court.24
growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters
and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants
declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12 The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that
the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. 25 Hence, the
of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case present petition under Rule 45.
for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda. 13

The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of [G.R. NO. 173775]
Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots
were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Aklan.15 The titles were issued on August 7, 1933.16 Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
RTC and CA Dispositions hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
with a fallo reading: shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and
other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. 30 They allege that
similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay.
applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land. building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. 31

SO ORDERED.17 Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying


Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the
island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926,
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants' right to have their occupied lands titled in known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner
their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. 19 The trial
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
appealed to the CA. disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release
the lots for disposition.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island. 33 THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE
Issues PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064
CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
[G.R. No. 167707]
V.
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to
acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34 CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY
AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
[G.R. NO. 173775]
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely: G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure
titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if
I. any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do
not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
Our Ruling
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE
TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public
OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE domain
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY
LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705? confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 36in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b)
II. Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.
106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine
their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF
executive acts.
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY
LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE? lands of the public domain.

III. The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, 41 giving
the government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted
FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. 43 Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of
IV. May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system)
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of
with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the
adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. 46 Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No.
to belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of
the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the
agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which
terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as
the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. 49 the Torrens system.66

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of
Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 51 the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding
July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims.52 On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July
of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were
26, 1894, was required.69
set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of
Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, 56 from on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the
the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, domain other than timber and mineral lands,70and privately owned lands which
the lands would revert to the State.58 reverted to the State.71

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
(2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA)
title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial
possessory information title.59 confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No.
1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish
to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. 61 The act provided for, among titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of
Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496
within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 shown."90
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
Private claimants' reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify
as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79 lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral,
or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines
that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and
proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in
agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late
classified."82 Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in
which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing
disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
Islands.
disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of x x x
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a Petitioner's reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is
legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
years is alienable and disposable.86
under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President
of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. 93
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept
the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum
assumed. They call for proof.87 in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions shown."94
of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an
agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an
Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as
were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes
classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148,
these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and
may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of
with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public
applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos v.
under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson v. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis
or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act ours)
No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian
doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from
the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands.96 Act
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land
Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or
was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since then,
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.97
In the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in
effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration
within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, court of the property's land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the
mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919,
been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants
or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine
a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land
the property's land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No.
the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it 926.
contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient
to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the
of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v.
The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case
must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue.
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a
in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here,
lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of agricultural.
proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on
settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar
the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,
including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral. those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
Private claimants' continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no
years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
Hence, they may apply for a title in their name. developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay
appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled: resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover;
or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island's tourism
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying
lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of
also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands." status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified timber land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to
National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
an unclassified land of the public domain. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the forest to alienable agricultural land.
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as
"a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan,
an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the
issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by
imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly
private ownership. beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay
into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA
Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the
lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable" 118 does not by itself proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public
classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. 121
not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section
3 provides: In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
supplied)cralawlibrary President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. 123
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-
its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then
meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
Bureau of Forest Development's authority to declare areas in the island as alienable
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
and disposable when it provides:
protection purposes.
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Contrary to private claimants' argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much
Forest Development. less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President
through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classification, subject to existing vested rights.
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the
1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801. provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring
conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA -
to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
development of the areas' tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the
islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas' agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
alienability.119 including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty- More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable
be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account and disposable land of the public domain.128
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law,
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did
the specific limits of the public domain.
not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained
an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar considered State property.
the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still
remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705. Private claimants' bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests. entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes
that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that clear from the wording of the law itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and
the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the possessory rights.130
land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June
the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be 12, 1945.
no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice126 on this point:
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the
word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name
subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations
needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation
reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no commenced on June 12, 1945.
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public Proclamation No. 1064.
domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have
not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. 127 automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally
bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied
lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
One Last Note knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces
a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents.
Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to
The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the
function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants' plight, We
are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc
prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral. and destruction to property - crops, livestock, houses, and highways - not to mention
precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply lumberman's decalogue.135
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will
this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. 1. The Petition for Certiorariin G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of 2. The Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title,
SO ORDERED.
such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the
present land laws. There is one such bill 133 now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to
decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to
appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest
reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not
becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance
between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic
progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation's survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry
v. Munoz:134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that
should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many
more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For,
forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common
Republic of the Philippines The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to
SUPREME COURT conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.
Manila
The investigating team reported that:
FIRST DIVISION
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for
G.R. No. 155450 August 6, 2008 spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive
the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan,
Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office
and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February
No. 2, petitioners,
22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May
vs.
1994.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA TURINGAN,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have
OF CAGAYAN, respondents. possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-
interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC
DECISION
Map 2999, since time immemorial.8
CARPIO, J.:
Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only
The Case released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982."
This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and 25 September In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land
20023 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The 21 May Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the
2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper
amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner
reconsideration.
filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation
The Facts and declaration of nullity of titles 9 on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued
2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still
Decree No. 3819284in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore,
(spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio
was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion
Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified
was classified as alienable and disposable.
as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject
property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.10 Private
Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and
that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued:
but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,6 issued in the name of the Province of
complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private
Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer
respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res
Certificate of Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the name of the private respondents,
judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.11 Private respondents
covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed
Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had
(DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the an ax to grind against private respondents.12
filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial
On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of
court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which
decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. 13
was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No.
381928. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of The Ruling of the Court
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds,
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no
actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of merit.
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations
which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of
allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree. 15
two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of
Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of
that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 the Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land
Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and
Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and
11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472
such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original
and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or
Constitutions. Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab
initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine
Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in constitution.
the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper
trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.14 (Citations omitted) xxxx
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the 15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles
thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect
Hence, this petition.
to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First
The Issues Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court
Petitioner raises the following issues:
and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or
1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force
remedies are no longer available; and effect whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking
jurisdiction; to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over
the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the
was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable.
amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of
4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to
petitioners failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available."
Carag and Victoria Turingan;
In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled:
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original
proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the
then Court of First Instance over the land; RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case. ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment
or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This
is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State
jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed
or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action alienable.
or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. 18
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as
Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law,
action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps24 petitioner
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part
fault of petitioner. of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the
National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994,
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were
contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as
factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance
timber land.25
with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.19
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No.
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
2874,26 which provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the
observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
classify the lands of the public domain into -
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for
(a) Alienable or disposable
the complete and proper determination of the case.
(b) Timber and
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits. (c) Mineral lands
Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class
to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition.
Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses
Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed
portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No.
when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the 2874.
adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which
portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in
have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:
1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the
power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain. SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
claim.20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized
the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.21
and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.
Insular Government,22 we ruled: However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare
lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had
From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with
their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same
the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all
reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly
lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in
published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the
use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as
with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the
x23 (Emphasis supplied) classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in
Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se
alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of
some public purpose in accordance with law. the 1935 Constitution which provides:
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
time. least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,27 the Republic sought to annul the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land
was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral
Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands
agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
Lands as provided in Act Nos. 92628 and 2874. The Court ruled: inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution." 29 When
the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution,
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the
spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the
authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and
disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands
that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the
Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and
2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
SO ORDERED.
the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since
July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these
applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for
the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate
of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the
land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in
open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed
number of years. It was the land registration court which had the
jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural,
forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree
No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject
property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral
land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag
proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government,
which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did
not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural.
Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision
rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
Republic of the Philippines or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other
SUPREME COURT words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that
Manila part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
EN BANC
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915 defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it
by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants. registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the
D.R. Williams for appellee. alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was
not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered
in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
JOHNSON, J.: registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a
From the record the following facts appear: stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted
at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto.
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila. owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of
the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the
torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De
petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third
of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the
certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to
the petition of the defendant also included said wall. all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon
that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the
included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better
petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of
land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with
wall, in the name of the defendant. very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be
owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall. altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it? direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court
registered in the name of two different persons. of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of
registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be
parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after
litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any
to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be
certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a
not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law
adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name
ignorance of the registration.
of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course,
where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land.
express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do
excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the
general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in
certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act.
Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and
48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case
1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different
ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of
holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the
the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with
"Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of
notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became
Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the
defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right,
general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the
and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their
earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate
failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating
the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to
such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens
respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the
titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall
hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to
to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then
title" (p. 237). the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely
upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation,
Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title,
or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree
they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the
shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments
sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate"
adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original
respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The
negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be
was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of
name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620,
day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is
its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs.
located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs.
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the
Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20
validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the
Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged
the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between
with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact
original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such
which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is
be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and
discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor;
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than
that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of
one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The
the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the
rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a
later certificate.
rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon and useless litigation.
the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be
against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights
recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts
"innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser,"
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the
as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their
mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona
land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of
fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of
appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would
what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that
such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used
all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that
in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of
all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times,
the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent
shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of
protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the
ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent
purchaser," in said sections.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining
owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all the real status of the title to the land.
of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor?
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal
We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to
rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"
because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be
should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and
the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to
"innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore
certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the
innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor,
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to
establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a
certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens
system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is Separate Opinions
notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in TRENT, J., dissenting:
good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think
not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the I dissent.
torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the
deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded reasoning and authority on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the
as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original
purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the holder of the later certificate, where there has been no transfer of title by either party
appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at fault in
the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser
notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder
answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony of the later certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the
with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We later certificate; the innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the
believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, issuance of the later certificate.
should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the
present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority
no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be opinion sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is
permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict entitled to the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later
therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of certificate.
land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that
public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his the rules laid down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly
negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he subject to exception, and of course of no binding force or authority where the
who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence. reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable to the facts developed in a
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties particular case.
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former proposition set forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would
registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We seem to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in
are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with
supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing all the requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as applied to the matter
with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and equitable rule when
two persons have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the same holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to demonstrate that such purchasers can
land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it is said, negligence may
registered title and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can he claim
regard should be protected, in the absence of any express statutory provision to the to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of
contrary. a duly registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands
described in a certificate of title of an earlier date.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to
be applied in cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid
Act; for it is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the adjudication and down under the various systems of land registration, other than those based on the
registration of titles by the Courts of Land Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, torrens system) insists that a purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land
and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the absence of Registration Court, is charged with notice of the contents of each and every one of
statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the courts to adjust the the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on file in the land
rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, registry office, so that negligence may be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that
taking into consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of
parties to avoid them." any one of the thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry
bears an earlier date than the date of the original registry of the land purchased by
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a
him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be without fault should he buy such land
case wherein the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still
because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that the land purchased by
more forceful reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.
him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a comparison
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well of the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to
settled equity rule that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that be found in the land registry office.
which first occurred will be given the preference." But it is universally laid down by all
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by
the courts which have had occasion to apply this equity rule that "it should be the last
the introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of
test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other equitable ground for
land. The avowed intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase
preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited in 16
of registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of
Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or
the vendor in order that he may rest secure as to the validity of the title to the lands
overlapping registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail
conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion that he is charged with
so as to deprive an innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the
notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the registrar so
earlier certificate contributed to the issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder
that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as
of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard to invoke the "just and equitable
negligence.
rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own title protected and
the title of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land
case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, registration, instead of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and
while the holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have secure, and instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain
prevented its issuance by merely entering his appearance in court in response to searches of the land record and registries, in order to ascertain the true condition of
lawful summons personally served upon him in the course of the proceedings for the the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and
issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights under the earlier uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the
certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment title to lands purchased by him.
to be entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am torrens system of land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly
contending for by reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes modelled is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature
to demonstrate that as between the original holders of the double or overlapping undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and all others dealing in registered
registration the general rule should prevail, because both such original parties must lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands
held to have been fault and, their equities being equal, preference should be given to furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent
the earlier title. to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of
the contents of every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the
and fault may be imputed to him should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result
reasoning whereby it undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor
of the lack of such knowledge.
of the original holder of the earlier certificate against purchasers from the original
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the holder of one or the other
desires to avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to determine
lands have been made the subject of double or overlapping registration, what course which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of that question in
should he pursue? What measures should he adopt in order to search out the favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of the
information with notice of which he is charged? There are no indexes to guide him nor registered title of the other and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the
is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he proposes to buy value of the whole system for the registration of lands. But, in the language of the
which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied and sometimes
fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights
course open to him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking into
overlapping registration, would even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid
comparison of the registered boundary lines contained in the certificate of title of the them."lawphil.net
tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in all the earlier certificates of
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down
title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of the author
in the majority opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has
of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly
actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the latter
registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be
certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which he has received personal notice of
acquired may be imputed to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the
the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of the pendency of
respective equities of the holders of lands which have been the subject of double or
such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as it
overlapping registration.
holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder appear and defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule.
of a registered certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be It is true that the order of publication in such cases having been duly complied with,
entered against him, adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another all the world is charged with notice thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in
applicant, if it appears that he was served with notice or had actual notice of the the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in permitting a default judgment to
pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration wherein such default be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier certificate so as to
judgment was entered. defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate.
Such a holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion)
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court
of requiring the holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the
of Land Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when
court" and to sit in the "mirador de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing
he has actual notice that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another
his lands; and I agree with the writer of the majority opinion that to do so would place
applicant, claiming the land as his own, is seeking to secure its registry in his name.
an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate, which was not
All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his appearance in those proceedings,
contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable
invite the court's attention to the certificate of title registered in his name, and thus, at
burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable
the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from the
negligence to him when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered
double or overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new
against him adjudicating title to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact
system of land registration which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to
that he has actual knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings in which such
relieve a holder of a registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title,
judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has been personally served with
when he has actual notice that it is being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction,
summons to appear and default his title.
and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to do, his lands become subject to double
or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject an innocent "Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective
purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting parties," it seems to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting
from the double or overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the equities set up by an innocent purchaser who acquires title to the land under a
land under a manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier certificate who permitted a default
equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the pendency of the
preference." It is only where both or neither of the parties are at fault that the rule is proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.
properly applicable as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent
certificate of registry to the same land.
purchaser in cases such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the convenience and public policy which militate in favor of the recognition of his title
right of the holder of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.
dealing with registered lands can confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to appear
unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be and defend their titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land
put to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction Registration, thereby enormously increasing the possibility and probability of loss and
is had with regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to eliminate damage to innocent third parties and dealers in registered lands generally, arising out
consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the land of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the Courts of Land
registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate Registration.
of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and
Carson, J., concurs.
specific occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a
Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to
the minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his
claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent purchaser and in
favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that under consideration
must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or overlapping registrations by
encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively,
to permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a
part of their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the
pendency of judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any
appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them the very
slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the court in
which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their right,
title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been conclusively
adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration
without actual notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of
things to be so rare as to be practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration
almost invariably occurs in relation to lands held by adjoining occupants or claimants.
It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double registration can take place, in the
absence of fraud, without personal service of notice of the pendency of the
proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such notice
to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which
application for registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner
can, even by the use of fraud, conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a
successful conclusion without actual notice to the adjoining property owners must be
rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original
holder of a certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon
the records of the Court of Land Registration with reference thereto and with no
knowledge that any part of the land thus purchased was included in an earlier
certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder of the earlier certificate
of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against him in the Court
of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of
title in favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired
title, and this despite the fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice
of the pendency of the proceedings and was personally served with summons to
appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to me that there can be no
reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties, and further
that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase
Republic of the Philippines The owner has also a right of action against the
SUPREME COURT holder and possessor of the thing in order to
Manila recover it.
FIRST DIVISION There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the
registered owners of the land in question have also the
corresponding right to the recovery and possession of the same.
G.R. No. 86787 May 8, 1992 The defendants who are in physical occupancy of the land
MILAGROS TUMULAK BISHOP, JUANA PANGILINAN, EMILIO MAXIMO, ANITA belonging to the plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to unjustly
PANGILINAN, MAGDALENA ROSETE, MANUEL DACUT, RECTO DIESTA, withhold the possession of the said land from the plaintiffs. The
VIRGINIA NOVICIO, and LINDA BONILLA, petitioners, defendants' occupancy of the land in question is unlawful and in
violation of plaintiffs right to the recovery and possession of the
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL AND JESUSA land they owned. The evidence presented by the defendants
SALANG, respondents. claiming as per certifications of the Bureau of Forestry that the land
occupied by them is within the alienable and disposable public land,
Saturnino Bactad for petitioners. deserves scant consideration as the said certification are without
basis in law. The moment the land in question was titled in the
name of the plaintiffs, it ceased to become a part of the public
CRUZ, J.: domain as the same became the private property of the registered
The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases resolving the owner, the herein plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the land made in
same issue, the answer will not change. the names of the defendants are not evidence of title, it appearing
that the land is already titled to the plaintiffs. The registration of the
In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic, land in the names of the defendants with the Assessor's Office for
Zambales, with a total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions are in the taxation purposes and the payments of real property taxes by the
possession of the petitioners. The entire parcel is registered in the name of the defendants can not and does not defeat the title of the plaintiffs to
private respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29018. the land. The fact that the defendants have been in occupancy of
On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of the land in question for quite a period of time is of no moment as
possession of the lots in question. The plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered prescription will not ripen into ownership because the land is
owners of the land. In their answer, the defendants claimed that the lots were part of covered by a torrens title. Acquisitive prescription will not be
the public domain and could not have been registered under the Torrens system. All available to land titled under Art. 496.
alleged long and continuous possession of the lots and produced tax declarations in PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the
their names. Two of them maintained that they had acquired their respective lots by Court finds and so holds that the plaintiffs being the registered
virtue of valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on inheritance. owners of the land in question are entitled to the possession of the
After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City same, and that the defendants who are occupying the land
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 1 He held in part as follows: belonging to the plaintiffs in violation of the right of the latter, are
duty-bound to restore possession of the same to the titled owners,
The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land the herein plaintiffs.
in question, necessarily have the lawful right to the physical
possession of the land. The owner of a land has a right to enjoy On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August 22, 1988. 2
and possess it, and he has also the right to recover and repossess Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners then came to this
the same from any person occupying it unlawfully. Court, urging reversal of the courts below.

Art. 428 New Civil Code They allege that:

The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a 1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not
thing, without other limitations than those have been validly registered under the Torrens system.
established by law. 2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by
laches.
3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to
faith entitled to the rights granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 quite title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality
of the Civil Code. of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
The petition has no merit.
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once
On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to the title was registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
an Original Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the
certificate is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
resumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that certificate. This presumption
Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with
covers the finding that the land subject of the certificate was private in nature and
use and has long become a settled rule of law.
therefore registrable under the Torrens system.
In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it
invoke the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the
must be shown that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case
constructions they have made on the lots in dispute.
and that there was actual fraud in securing the title. 3 Neither of these requirements
has been established by the petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the
Bureau of Forestry that the land in question was alienable and disposable public land. time he builds on it. 7 This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because they
The trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for lack of knew at the very outset that they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.
legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body cannot prevail
The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain
against court decision declaring the land to be registrable.
and even submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land
Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any was in fact registered under the Torrens system and such registration was
other representative of the Government for that matter, entered any opposition to the constructive notice to the whole world, including the petitioners. Apparently, the
land registration proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original Certificate of petitioners did not take the trouble of checking such registration. At any rate, the point
Title. No less importantly, an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of is that, whether the land be public or private, the petitioners knew they had no right to
fraud prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of occupy it and build on it. The Court of Appeals was correct in calling them squatters
registration 4 and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this late hour. And for having entered, without permission or authority, land that did not belong to them.
collaterally at that.
In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must asking us to overturn long established doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the
also possess it does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by the private Torrens system and the indefeasibility of titles issued thereunder for the protection
respondents of their tax declarations on the land is no indication that they have never and peace of mind of the registered owner against illegal encroachments upon his
acquired ownership thereof or have lost it by such omission. property. We are not disposed to take this drastic step on the basis alone of their
feeble arguments.
The second ground must also be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to
ordered.
eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if
it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to
demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches. Footnotes
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and 1 Original Records, pp. 95-103.
continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect contending
2 Rollo, pp. 11-15; Melo, J., ponente, with Herrera, M. and Imperial,
that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary JJ., concurring.
principle that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it
by prescription. 5 3 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Macalindog, 6 SCRA 938; Bernardo v.
6 Siojo, 58 Phil. 89.
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby:
4 Sec. 38 of Act No. 496 (now Section 32 of PD 1529); Hernandez
v. CA, 160 SCRA 821; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 144 SCRA
292; Municipality of Hagonoy v. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Republic of the Philippines
Resources, 73 SCRA 507. SUPREME COURT
Manila
5 Sec. 47 of PD 1529; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, supra; Umbay
v. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427; Barcelona, et al. v. Barcelona, et al., 100 FIRST DIVISION
Phil. 251.
G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988
6 31 Phil. 590.
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, plaintiff-appellee,
7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 75; Granados v. vs.
Monton, 86 Phil. 42; Caram v. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7; Arriola v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO
Gomez de la Serna, 14 Phil. 627. and EMELITA MAGCAMIT, defendants-appellants.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court *
(now Court of Appeals) dated January 31, 1984, reversing the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, 8th Judicial District, Branch III, and of
the resolution dated August 28, 1984 denying the motion for reconsideration filed
thereof.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and the Intermediate
Appellate Court are as follows:
On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, as owners of
a parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, comprising more or
less 105,710 square meters, sold for P30,000.00 said property in favor of spouses
Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (herein private
respondents) as evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." This sale with
right to repurchase was recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on
December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344. On January 31,1972 the sale was made
absolute by the spouses Vivas and Lizardo in favor of the private respondents for the
sum of P90,000.00; P50,000.00 of which was paid upon the execution of the
instrument, entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Tuluyan," after being credited with the
P30,000.00 consideration of the "Kasulatan Ng Mabibiling Muli," and the balance of
P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued. From the
execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse
and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the
property in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo
without the knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said
Spouses executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing
the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed
by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others, the property involved in
this case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid indebtedness in the amount of
P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of (2) ordering plaintiffs to turn over possession of the land to
the property in question, scheduling the public auction sale on June 28, 1974. The defendant National Grains Authority;
petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of Sale was
(3) ordering defendants-spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia
issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff.
Lizardo to pay plaintiffs the sum of P56,000.00 representing the
On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor amount paid pursuant to the Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Tuluyan
sold the subject real property in favor of itself. By virtue of the deed of absolute sale, marked Exhibit "3", with legal interest thereon from January 31,
TCT No. T-75171 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Laguna was issued in 1972 until the amount is paid, to pay an additional amount of
the name of the petitioner on July 16, 1974. It was only in July 1974, that private P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, an additional amount of
respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued Pl0,000.00 as moral damages, another amount of P5,000.00 by
covering the property in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in way of exemplary damages and to pay the costs of this suit. (Rollo,
favor of the petitioner. Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the P. 35).
petitioner NGA the amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the
The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to
Vivas spouses under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
to accept the payment. On July 31, 1974, counsel for private respondents made a
formal demand on the spouses Vivas and Lizardo to comply with their obligation After proper proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
under the terms of the absolute deed of sale; and soon after reiterated to the NGA, 1984, reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court as follows:
the offer to pay the balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale. On
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed
August 13, 1974 petitioner in its reply informed counsel of private respondents that
and set aside and another one is rendered ordering the National
petitioner is now the owner of the property in question and has no intention of
Grains Authority to execute a deed of reconveyance sufficient in
disposing of the same.
law for purposes of registration and cancellation of transfer
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject Certificate of Title No. T-75171 and the issuance of another title in
property were asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused. Petitioner filed a the names of plaintiff-appellants, and ordering defendants-
suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of Victoria, appellees Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo to pay the National
Laguna, but the case was dismissed. Grains Authority the sum of P78,375.00 (Exh. 3) within thirty (30)
days from the receipts of the writ of execution. No damages and
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First
costs. (Rollo, p. 19).
Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the
petitioner and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was
declared the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in possession denied. (Rollo, p. 26).
of the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said property, then, to
Hence, this petition.
order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and
conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises. (Record In the resolution of May 20, 1985, the petition was given due course and the parties
on Appeal, pp. 2-11). were required to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 128). The memorandum
for the petitioner was filed on July 3, 1985 (Rollo, p. 129) while the memorandum for
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner (defendant therein) maintained that it was
the private respondents was filed on August 26, 1985 1 Rollo p. 192).
never a privy to any transaction between the private respondents (plaintiffs therein)
and the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo that it is a purchaser in good The main issue in this case is whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement
faith and for value of the property formerly covered by OCT No. 1728; and that the between the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the sellers, and private respondents, the
title is now indefeasible, hence, private respondents' cause of action has' already buyers, to deliver the certificate of title to the latter, upon its issuance, constitutes a
prescribed. (Record on Appeal, pp. 16-22). breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by petitioner NGA, an
innocent purchaser for value.
After due hearing, the trial court ** rendered its decision on March 17, 1981, in favor
of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of said judgment reading as follows: It is undisputed that: (1) there are two deeds of sale of the same land in favor of
private respondents, namely: (a) the conditional sale with right to repurchase or the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
'Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabibiling Muli" which was registered under Act 3344 and (b)
(1) declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner the deed of absolute sale or "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" which was not
of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the registered; (2) the condition that the Certificate of Title will be delivered to the buyers
same; upon its issuance and upon payment of the balance of P40,000.00 is contained in the
deed of absolute sale; and (3) the land in question at the time of the execution of both including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209
sales was not yet covered by the Torrens System of registration. [1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said ruling, if
the purchaser is the only party who appears in the deeds and the registration of titles
It is axiomatic, that while the registration of the conditional sale with right of
in the property registry, no one except such purchaser may be deemed by law to be
repurchase may be binding on third persons, it is by provision of law "understood to
the owner of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in
be without prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case, it will be noted that
possession (Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).
the third party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has
obviously a better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions
with the suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner
spouses Vivas and Lizardo and private respondents. herein.
In their complaint at the Regional Trial Court, private respondents prayed among Thus, it has been invariably restated by this Court, that "The real purpose of the
others, for two alternative reliefs, such as: (a) to be declared the owners of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its
property in question or (b) to order the declared owner to reconvey or transfer the legality. "Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity
ownership of the property in their favor. of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casato," avoid the
possibility of losing his land." "An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the
allowed (Dominga vs. Santos, 55 Phil. 361; Singian vs. Manila Railroad, 62 Phil.
Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although
467)."
unregistered under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership
and the possession of the property in question. In fact, they argue that they have The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land
been and are still in possession of the same openly, continuously, publicly under a belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is
claim of ownership adverse to all other claims since the purchase on December 2, then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the
1971 (Rollo, p. 165). It is stressed that not until the month of July, 1974 did the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent
plaintiff learn that a title had been issued covering the property in question (Rollo, p. purchaser for value (Angeles vs. Sania, 66 Phil. 444 [1938], emphasis supplied).
15).
It will be noted that the spouses Vivas and Lizardo never committed any fraud in
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of procuring the registration of the property in question. On the contrary, their application
title to land under the Torrens System is an action in rem not in personam, hence, for registration which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 1728 was with complete
personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may knowledge and implied authority of private respondents who retained a portion of the
have jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such consideration until the issuance to said spouses of a certificate of title applied for
personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration under the Torrens Act and the corresponding delivery of said title to them. The
proceeding, for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide question therefore, is not about the validity of OCT No. 1728 but in the breach of
for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a to contract between private respondents and the Vivas spouses. Petitioner NGA was
proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown never a privy to this transaction. Neither was it shown that it had any knowledge at
(Moscoso vs. Court of appeals, 128 SCRA 719 [1984], citing: City of Manila vs. Lack, the time of the execution of the mortgage, of the existence of the suspensive
et al., 19 Phil. 324, 337; Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Director of Lands vs. Roman condition in the deed of absolute sale much less of its violation. Nothing appeared to
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120; Aguilar vs. Caogdan, 105 Phil. 661). It is excite suspicion. The Special Power of Attorney was regular on its face; the OCT was
thus evident that respondents' right over the property was barred by res judicata in the name of the mortgagor and the NGA was the highest bidder in the public
when the decree of registration was issued to spouses Vivas and Lizards. It does not auction. Unquestionably, therefore, the NGA is an innocent purchaser for value, first
matter that they may have had some right even the right of ownership, BEFORE the as an innocent mortgagee under Section 32 of P.D. 1529 and later as innocent
grant of the Torrens Title. purchaser for value in the public auction sale.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of Private respondents claim that NGA did not even field any representative to the land
title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of which was not even in the possession of the supposed mortgagors, nor present any
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the witness to prove its allegations in the ANSWER nor submit its DEED OF MORTGAGE
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the to show its being a mortgages in good faith and for value (Rollo, p. 110).
encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
Such contention is, however, untenable. Well settled is the rule that all persons
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as
dealing with property covered by a torrens certificate of title are not required to go
existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such
beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the certificate
certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world,
of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any THIRD DIVISION
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the
torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that
may subsequently defeat his right thereto (Centeno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA
545 [1985]).
More specifically, the Court has ruled that a bank is not required before accepting a
mortgage to make an investigation of the title of the property being given as security D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, G.R. No. 167232
(Phil. National Cooperative Bank vs. Carandang Villalon, 139 SCRA 570 [1985]), and INCORPORATED,
where innocent third persons like mortgagee relying on the certificate of title acquire
rights over the property, their rights cannot be disregarded (Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA Petitioner,
489 [1985]). Present:
Under the circumstances, the Regional Trial Court could not have erred in ruling that
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) complaint insofar as it prays that they be
declared owners of the land in question can not prosper in view of the doctrine of
indefeasibility of title under the Torrens System, because it is an established principle
that a petition for review of the decree of registration will not prosper even if filed YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
within one year from the entry of the decree if the title has passed into the hands of - versus -
an innocent purchaser for value (Pres. Decree No. 1529, Sec. 32). The setting aside Chairperson,
of the decree of registration issued in land registration proceedings is operative only
between the parties to the fraud and the parties defrauded and their privies, but not CHICO-NAZARIO,
against acquirers in good faith and for value and the successors in interest of the
latter; as to them the decree shall remain in full force and effect forever (Domingo vs.
The Mayon Realty Corp. et al., 102 Phil. 32 [19571). Assuming, therefore, that there VELASCO, JR.,
was fraud committed by the sellers against the buyers in the instant case, petitioner
NGA who was not privy therein cannot be made to suffer the consequences thereof NACHURA, and
As correctly declared by the trial court, the National Grains Authority is the lawful RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO PANES,
owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title. SALVADOR CEA, ABOGADO MAUTIN, DONARDO PERALTA, JJ.
PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO PERALTA and HILARION
As to private respondents' alternative prayer that the declared owner be ordered to
MANONGDO,
reconvey or transfer the ownership of the property in their favor, it is clear that there is
absolutely no reason why petitioner, an innocent purchaser for value, should
reconvey the land to the private respondents. Respondents.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
Promulgated:
City, now Regional Trial Court, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
July 31, 2009
Footnotes x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
* IAC, 4th Civil Cases Division, penned by Justice Porfirio V.
Sison,with the concurrence of Justices Abdulwahid A. Bidin,
Mareelino R. Veloso and Desiderio P. Jurado.
** Presided by Judge Conrado T. Limcaoco.
DECISION 200519 and all Titles derived thereat (sic), Damages, with Petition for the Issuance of
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order Ex-Parte, Etc. against
NACHURA, J.:
B.C. Regalado, Mar-Bay Realty, Inc., Spouses Gereno Brioso and Criselda M. Brioso,
Before this Court is a Petition1[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Spouses Ciriaco and Nellie Mariano, Avelino C. Perdido and Florentina Allado,
the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2[2] dated Eufrocina A. Maborang and Fe Maborang, Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura,
October 25, 2004 which reversed and set aside the Order3[3] of the Regional Trial Spouses Oscar Ikalina and the Register of Deeds (RD) of Quezon City.
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 216, dated November 8, 2001. Subsequently, respondents filed an Amended Complaint8[8] and a Second Amended
Complaint9[9] particularly impleading DBT as one of the defendants.
The Facts
In the Complaints, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner and claimant
Subject of this controversy is a parcel of land identified as Lot Plan Psu- of the subject property which he had declared for taxation purposes in his name, and
123169,4[4] containing an area of Two Hundred Forty Thousand, One Hundred Forty- assessed in the amount of P2,602,190.00 by the City Assessor of Quezon City as of
Six (240,146) square meters, and situated at Barangay (Brgy.) Pasong Putik, the year 1985. Respondents alleged that per Certification10[10] of the Department of
Novaliches, Quezon City (subject property). The property is included in Transfer Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) National Capital Region (NCR) dated
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 200519,5[5] entered on July 19, 1974 and issued in favor May 7, 1992, Lot Plan Psu-123169 was verified to be correct and on file in said office,
of B.C. Regalado & Co. (B.C. Regalado). It was conveyed by B.C. Regalado to and approved on July 23, 1948.
petitioner D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. (DBT) through a dacion en pago6[6] for
services rendered by the latter to the former. Respondents also claimed that Ricaredo, his immediate family members,
and the other respondents had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions
On June 24, 1992, respondents Ricaredo P. Panes (Ricaredo), his son of the subject property, and their possession preceded the Second World War. To
Angelito P. Panes (Angelito), Salvador Cea, Abogado Mautin, Donardo Paclibar, perfect his title in accordance with Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) as
Zosimo P. Peralta, and Hilarion Manongdo (herein collectively referred to as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree),
respondents) filed a Complaint7[7] for Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. Ricaredo filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 82 a case docketed as LRC Case
No. Q-91-011, with LRC Rec. No. N-62563.11[11]
[1]
1
Rollo, pp. 3-19.
[2]
2
Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75550, penned by Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the publication
Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices Regalado E. requirements for the Notice of Initial Hearing with the Land Registration Authority
Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-36.
[3]
3
Rollo, pp. 82-85. [8]
8
Id. at 197-209.
[4]
4
Records, Vol. 1, p. 15. [9]
9
Id. at 266-278.
[5]
5
Records, Vol. 3, pp. 723-739.
[6]
6
Id. at 740-755.
10
[10] Id. at 16.
[7]
7
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-13.
11
[11] Id. at 17-20.
(LRA), it was discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an (LRC) Pcs-18345 as shown in the consolidation-subdivision plan to include the
overlapping of portions of the land subject of Ricaredos application, with the subject property covered by Lot Plan Psu-123169.
subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by then, already been
conveyed by B.C. Regalado to DBT. In his Answer18[18] dated July 24, 1992, the RD of Quezon City interposed
the defense that at the time of registration, he found all documents to be in order.
Ricaredo asseverated that upon verification with the LRA, he found that the Subsequently, on December 5, 1994, in his Motion 19[19] for Leave to Admit Amended
subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado was deliberately drawn to cover portions of the Answer, with the Amended Answer attached, he admitted that he committed a grave
subject property. Respondents claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the mistake when he earlier said that TCT No. 200519 covered only one lot, i.e. Lot 503.
preparation of the subdivision plan did not actually cover the subject property. They He averred that upon careful examination, he discovered that TCT No. 200519 is
asserted that from the records of B.C. Regalado, they gathered that TCT Nos. composed of 17 pages, and actually covered 54 lots, namely: Lots 503, 506, 507,
211081,12[12] 21109513[13] and 211132,14[14] which allegedly included portions of the 508, 509, 582, 586, 655, 659, 686, 434, 495, 497, 299, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 493,
subject property, were derived from TCT No. 200519. However, TCT No. 200519 only 692, 776, 496, 785, 777, 786, 780, 783, 505, 654, 660, 661, 663, 664, 665, 668, 693,
covered Lot 503 of the Tala Estate with an area of Twenty-Two Thousand Six 694, 713, 716, 781, 779, 784, 782, 787, 893, 1115, 1114, 778, 669 and 788, all of the
Hundred Fifteen (22,615) square meters, and was different from those mentioned in Tala Estate. Other lots included therein are Lot 890-B of Psd 36854, Lot 2 of (LRC)
TCT Nos. 211081, 211095 and 211132. According to respondents, an examination of Pcs 12892 and Lot 3 of (LRC) Pcs 12892. Thus, respondents' allegation that Lots
TCT No. 200519 would show that it was derived from TCT Nos. 14814,15[15] 661, 664, 665, 693 and 694 of the Tala Estate were not included in TCT No. 200519
14827,16[16] 1481517[17] and T-28. was not true.

In essence, respondents alleged that B.C. Regalado and DBT used the On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario
derivative titles which covered properties located far from Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Tabangcura (Spouses Tabangcura) filed their Answer 20[20] with Counterclaim,
Quezon City where the subject property is located, and B.C. Regalado and DBT then claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value when they bought a house
offered the same for sale to the public. Respondents thus submitted that B.C and lot covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado, the latter being a
Regalado and DBT through their deliberate scheme, in collusion with others, used subdivision developer and registered owner thereof, on June 30, 1986. When
respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses
[12]
12
Id. at 21. Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City,

[13]
13
Id. at 22. Branch 97 which rendered a decision21[21] in their favor.

[14] In the pleadings filed by respondents, they alleged that the


14

aforementioned TCT bore the number 211152. However, a perusal of the


said title reveals that the TCT bears the number 211132; Records, Vol. 1, p.
288. [18]
18
Id. at 49-50.
[15]
15
Records, Vol. 1, p. 290. [19]
19
Id. at 395-397.
[16]
16
Id. at 291. [20]
20
Id. at 350-354.
[17]
17
Id. at 292. [21]
21
Penned by former RTC Judge Oscar Leviste.
On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000) pesos as attorneys
fees plus costs of suit.
owner and occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed
by B.C. Regalado in the formers favor; that respondents were not real parties-in- SO ORDERED.
interests because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over the property had
yet to be determined by the RTC where he filed his application for registration; that On September 12, 2000, DBT filed a Motion 25[25] for Reconsideration,
the other respondents did not allege matters or invoke rights which would entitle them based on the grounds of prescription and laches. DBT also disputed Ricaredos claim
to the relief prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that of open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than
the action inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT. 22[22] thirty (30) years, and asserted that the subject property could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession because it is covered by TCT No. 200519.
The RTC's Rulings

While the said Motion for Reconsideration was pending, Judge Bacalla
On June 15, 2000, the RTC through Judge Marciano I. Bacalla (Judge
passed away.
Bacalla), rendered a Decision23[23] in favor of the respondents. The RTC held that
the testimony of Ricaredo that he occupied the subject property since 1936 when he Meanwhile, on January 2, 2001, a Motion26[26] for Intervention and a
was only 16 years old had not been rebutted; that Ricaredo's occupation and Complaint in Intervention were filed by Atty. Andres B. Pulumbarit (Atty. Pulumbarit),
cultivation of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years in the concept of an representing the Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo Estate. The intervenor alleged that
owner vested in him equitable ownership over the same by virtue of an approved the subject property formed part of the vast tract of land with an area of 117,000
plan, Psu 123169; that the subject property was declared under the name of Ricaredo hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 779 issued by the
for taxation purposes;24[24] and that the subject property per survey should not have Honorable Norberto Romualdez on March 14, 1913 under Decree No. 10139, which
been included in TCT No. 200519, registered in the name of B.C. Regalado and belongs to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo. Thus, the Complaint 27[27]
ceded to DBT. The RTC further held that Spouses Tabangcura failed to present in Intervention prayed that the RTCs Decision be reconsidered; that the legitimacy
satisfactory evidence to prove their claim. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this and superiority of OCT 779 be upheld; and that the subject property be declared as
wise: belonging to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, In its Order28[28] dated March 13, 2001, the RTC, through Acting Judge
judgment is hereby rendered declaring Certificate of Title No.
200519 and all titles derived thereat as null and void insofar as the Modesto C. Juanson (Judge Juanson), denied Atty. Pulumbarits Motion for
same embrace the land covered by Plan PSU-123169 with an area
of 240,146 square meters in the name of Ricaredo Panes; ordering
defendant DBT Marbay Realty, Inc. to pay plaintiff Ricaredo Panes

[25]
25
Records, Vol. 3, pp. 799-808.
[22]
22
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 355-358. [26]
26
Id. at 837-838.
[23]
23
Rollo, pp. 56-61. [27]
27
Id. at 839-843.
[24]
24
Records, Vol. 2, pp. 709-710. [28]
28
Id. at 866.
Intervention because a judgment had already been rendered pursuant to Section of merit. The RTC held that prescription does not run against registered land; hence,
2,29[29] Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. a title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open or notorious
possession. Moreover, the RTC opined that even if the subject property could be
On April 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30[30] stating that there acquired by prescription, respondents' action was already barred by prescription
appeared to be a need for a clarificatory hearing before it could act on DBT's Motion and/or laches because they never asserted their rights when B.C. Regalado
for Reconsideration. Thus, a hearing was held on May 17, 2001. Thereafter, registered the subject property in 1974; and later developed, subdivided and sold the
supplemental memoranda were required of the parties.31[31] Both parties same to individual lot buyers.
complied.32[32] However, having found that the original copy of TCT No. 200519 was
not submitted to it for comparison with the photocopy thereof on file, the RTC On December 18, 2001, respondents filed a Motion for
directed DBT to present the original or certified true copy of the TCT on August 21, Reconsideration38[38] which the RTC denied in its Order39[39] dated June 17, 2002.
2001.33[33] Respondents moved to reconsider the said directive 34[34] but the same Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.40[40]
was denied.35[35] DBT, on the other hand, manifested that a copy of TCT No.
200519, consisting of 17 pages, had already been admitted in evidence; and that The CA's Ruling
because of the fire in the Office of the RD in Quezon City sometime in 1988, DBT,
despite diligent effort, could not secure an original or certified true copy of said TCT. On October 25, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated

Instead, DBT submitted a certified true copy of Consolidated Subdivision Plan Pcs November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June

18345.36[36] 15, 2000. The CA held that the properties described and included in TCT No. 200519
are located in San Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao,
On November 8, 2001, the RTC, through Judge Juanson, issued an Quezon City while the subject property is located in Brgy. Pasong Putik, Novaliches,
Order37[37] reversing the earlier RTC Decision and dismissing the Complaint for lack Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's testimony that there is
a gap of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not disproved or
[29] SEC. 2. Time to intervene.- The motion to intervene may be filed at
29
refuted. The CA found that Judge Juanson committed a procedural infraction when he
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the entertained issues and admitted evidence presented by DBT in its Motion for
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties. Reconsideration which were never raised in the pleadings and proceedings prior to
the rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches and
[30]
30
Records, Vol. 3, p. 867.
prescription clearly appeared to be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's
[31]
31
Id. at 884.
[32]
32
Id. at 885-888 and 890-893.
[33]
33
Id. at 894.
[34]
34
Id. at 896-900.
[35]
35
Id. at 902. [38]
38
Id. at 86-92.
[36]
36
Id. at 903-906. [39]
39
Id. at 101-103.
[37]
37
Rollo, pp. 82-85. [40]
40
Records, Vol. 3, pp. 939-940.
Motion for Reconsideration was not based on grounds enumerated in the Rules of THE TESTIMONY OF ENGR. VERTUDAZO ON THE BASIS OF
Procedure.41[41] THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF LOT 503 IN AN
INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT IS UNRELIABLE.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42[42] which was, however, V.


denied by the CA in its Resolution43[43] dated February 22, 2005.
MR. PANES HAS NEVER BEEN IN OPEN, ADVERSE AND
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
Hence, this Petition.
FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.44[44]

Distilled from the petition and the responsive pleadings, and culled from the
arguments of the parties, the issues may be reduced to two questions, namely:
The Issues
1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches
Petitioner raises the following as grounds for this Petition: as raised in the latter's Motion for Reconsideration?

I. 2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the
subject property?
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO ALLEGE PRESCRIPTION IN ITS
ANSWER IS NOT A WAIVER OF SUCH DEFENSE.
Our Ruling
II.
We answer the first question in the affirmative.
IT IS NOT ERRONEOUS TO REQUIRE THE PRODUCTION OF A
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF TCT NO. 200519 AFTER THE
DECISION ON THE MERITS HAS BEEN RENDERED BUT It is true that in Dino v. Court of Appeals45[45] we ruled:
BEFORE IT BECAME FINAL.
(T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an
III. action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or
other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco
A REGISTERED LAND CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED BY v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION. v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958;
Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v.
IV. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a
motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, [f] Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an

44

[41]
41
Supra note 2. [44] Supra note 1 at 7-8.
[42]
42
Rollo, pp. 150-163.
[45] 411 Phil. 594, 603-604 (2001), citing Gicano v. Gegato, No. L-63575,
45

[43]
43
Id. at 37-38. January 20, 1988, 157 SCRA 140.
answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the
5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on
fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.47[47]
the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta,
84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at
all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings However, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
(Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission
House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the
or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez; plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property,
16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the
facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run
otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would
record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or
otherwise established by the evidence. (Emphasis supplied) be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.48[48]
Thus, in Vda. de Gualberto v. Go,49[49] this Court held:
Indeed, one of the inherent powers of courts is to amend and control its
processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice. This includes the right
to reverse itself, especially when in its opinion it has committed an error or mistake in [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
judgment, and adherence to its decision would cause injustice. 46[46] Thus, the being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001 could validly entertain the defenses of issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule
applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the
prescription and laches in DBT's motion for reconsideration. trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to
However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the action filed before it was not simply for property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who
is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
reconveyance but an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for
Verily, an action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who
is in possession.
issuance of the original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years
from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of
title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD [47]
47
Millena v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 132, 138 (2000).
[48]
48
Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, June 8,
2007, 524 SCRA 492, 494.
[46]
46
Mauricio v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 164635,
November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 323, 331, citing Tocao v. Court of Appeals, [49]
49
G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 671, 681, citing
G.R. No. 127405, September 20, 2001, 365 SCRA 463, 464; and Astraquillo Development Bank of the Phils. v. CA, G.R. No. 129471, April 28, 2000, 331
v. Javier, G.R. No. L-20034, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 125. SCRA 267, 270.
Insofar as Ricaredo and his son, Angelito, are concerned, they established It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in
in their testimonies that, for some time, they possessed the subject property and that derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
Angelito bought a house within the subject property in 1987. 50[50] Thus, the adverse possession.53[53]
respondents are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title because persons
having legal, as well as equitable, title to or interest in a real property may bring such Article 112654[54] of the Civil Code in connection with Section 4655[55] of Act
action, and title here does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of No. 496 (The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 4756[56] of P.D. No.
the person filing the suit.51[51] 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is
unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held, successors. Possession is a mere consequence of ownership where land has been
nonetheless, that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the registered under the Torrens system, the efficacy and integrity of which must be
action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law. Therefore, laches will protected. Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to
not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the subject property has suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and
rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure
not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct
alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid
injustice. Laches will operate not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights,
but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation.52[52]
[53]
53
Abadiano v. Martir, G.R. No. 156310, July 31, 2008, 560 SCRA 676,
693; Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., G.R. No. 146823,
Albeit the conclusion of the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001, which August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 136, 148; Alcantara-Daus v. Sps. De Leon, 452
dismissed respondents' complaint on grounds of prescription and laches, may have Phil. 92, 102 (2003); Velez, Sr. v. Rev. Demetrio, 436 Phil. 1, 9 (2002);
been erroneous, we, nevertheless, resolve the second question in favor of DBT. Villegas v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 791, 801 (2001); Bishop v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 636, 641; and Barcelona,
et. al. v. Barcelona and Ct. of Appeals, 100 Phil. 251, 256-257 (1956).
[54] ARTICLE 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property,
54

ordinary prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to the
prejudice of a third person, except in virtue of another title also recorded; and
the time shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.
As to the lands registered under the Land Registration Act, the
provisions of that special law shall govern.
[50]
50
TSN, February 2, 1996, pp. 53-55. [55] SECTION 46. No title to registered land in derogation to that of the
55

registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.


[51]
51
Art. 477, New Civil Code; Mamadsual v. Moson, G.R. No. 92557,
September 27, 1990, 190 SCRA 82, 89. [56] SECTION 47. Registered land not subject to prescription. No title to
56

registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be


[52]
52
Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 430 (2000). acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of ownership over the subject property, and whose rights must be protected under
witnesses.57[57] Section 3261[61] of P.D. No. 1529.

Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by
is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the
ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by obligation. It is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing to
special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that the creditor, who accepts it as an equivalent of the payment of an outstanding debt. In
no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective
acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the
possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.58[58] performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while
the debt is considered as the purchase price.62[62]
Moreover, it may be stressed that there was no ample proof that DBT
participated in the alleged fraud. While factual issues are admittedly not within the
[61]
61
SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser
province of this Court, as it is not a trier of facts and is not required to re-examine or
for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
contrast the oral and documentary evidence anew, we have the authority to review
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
and, in proper cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts when the findings of affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment,
fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court. 59[59] In this subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and
regard, we reviewed the records of this case and found no clear evidence that DBT the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
participated in the fraudulent scheme. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,60[60] this such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in
the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
Court gave due importance to the fact that the private respondent therein did not
decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the
participate in the fraud averred. We accord the same benefit to DBT in this case. To
entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
add, DBT is an innocent purchaser for value and good faith which, through a dacion entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
en pago duly entered into with B.C. Regalado, acquired acquired the land or an interest therein whose rights may be
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include
an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

[57]
57
Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-67742, Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
October 29, 1987, 155 SCRA 248, 260. (Citations omitted) registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.
[58]
58
Feliciano v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 162593, September 26, 2006, 503 Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue
SCRA 182, 197, citing Natalia Realty Corporation v. Vallez, et al., G.R. Nos. his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person
78290-94, May 23, 1989, 173 SCRA 534.
responsible for the fraud (Emphasis supplied).
[59]
59
Tan v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 134, 141-142 (2001).
[62]
62
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111544, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA
[60]
60
G.R. No. 116111, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 366, 370. 424, 438. (Citations omitted)
It must also be noted that portions of the subject property had already been irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing
sold to third persons who, like DBT, are innocent purchasers in good faith and for with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
value, relying on the certificates of title shown to them, and who had no knowledge of issued therefor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
any defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce a reasonably determine the condition of the property.65[65]
prudent man to inquire into the status of the subject property. 63[63] To disregard
these circumstances simply on the basis of alleged continuous and adverse
possession of respondents would not only be inimical to the rights of the
aforementioned titleholders, but would ultimately wreak havoc on the stability of the WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Court of

Torrens system of registration. Appeals Decision dated October 25, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the Complaint filed by the respondents
A final note. for lack of merit.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a
system of registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder
should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the SO ORDERED.

State's agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest


damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to
land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims
that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system would forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are
ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 64[64] Thus, where
innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued,
acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard those rights and order the
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be
preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system
will have to inquire in every instance on whether the title had been regularly or

[63]
63
Agag v. Alpha Financing Corporation, G.R. No. 154826, July 31,
2003, 407 SCRA 602, 610. [65]
65
Republic v. Orfinada, Sr., G.R. No. 141145, November 12, 2004,
[64]
64
Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 442 SCRA 342, 359, citing Heirs of Spouses Benito Gavino and Juana Euste
424, 445. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120154, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 495, 509.
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988 Appellate Court was filed only to delay the implementation of the
writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in contempt of
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
court for engaging in a concerted but futile effort to delay the
vs. execution of the writs of possession and demolition and that
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO
petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by
SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P.
the filing of this petition before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On
TEODOSIO, respondents.
September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners. Order ' to maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate
Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering
Rico & Associates for private respondents. that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues
discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827
before the respondent court have already been passed upon in
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by
the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to render
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and
the petition moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of
the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases
the issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent
and the instant case is the same a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of
Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues
the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition
6406.
in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs of
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing possession and demolition is likewise ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo
of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated G.R. No. 64432)
December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this
filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of same date, another resolution was issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to
land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana (Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January
Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which
the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited pursuant to our
issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in
and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also G.R. No. 64432 became final on May 20, 1984.
have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided
considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No.
by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of possession be
carried out. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S.
of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28,
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On 1984:
August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Perez and
Gotera filed the petition for review on certiorari denominated as (a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions
G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by
petition was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated (b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated
March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This December 29, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court
decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the
instant case G.R. No. 64432--contend that the writs of possession (c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under
and demolition issued in the respondent court should now be Act 496, therefore she must register all orders, judgment,
implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate resolutions of this Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5,
thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED. 1986.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda
declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- and Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full
106098 is hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the
ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution
Barbara Cadastre. dated September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby
GRANTED.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register
the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is
Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432) hereby ordered to register the Order of this Court dated September
5, 1984 as prayed for.
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration
and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. xxx xxx xxx
Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for
Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo ORDER
Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved. This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the petitioners
64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986,
and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement the judgments of this Court. in compliance with the order of this Court dated November 25, 1
They prayed that an order be issued: 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria
Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, granted by the Court pursuant to its order dated December 15,
under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of Deeds 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30)
Helen P. Sornito to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of days period granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the
the lower court; same is hereby GRANTED.
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to
once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this Court
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia; within ten (10) days from the date of this order, after which period,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared annulled
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new
473, 64432 Rollo) Certificate of Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty.
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private
implementation by the judge below. respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 explanation in relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and manifestation
presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and asking for clarification on the following points:
January 6,1987 respectively, to wit: a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of
ORDER TCT T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals
(as mentioned in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the Resolution
movants through counsel on October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of dated September 17, 1986)?
Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and
formerly acting register of deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only
October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, the implementation of the writ of possession but also the
cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion
536, Rollo 4432) and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a
resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and stating therein: Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, order based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to
1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains wit:
is the implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED
to refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the "At any time after final judgment in favor of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to apply defendant or other disposition of the action such
disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in
implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further motions and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any
in these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo- case in which a memorandum or notice of Lis
64432) Pendens has been registered as provided in the
preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a
November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso certificate of the clerk of court in which the action
annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and or proceeding was pending stating the manner of
void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T- disposal thereof."
111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098. That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-
106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the
Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo
in the new certificates of titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus
court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
cancellation of lis pendens.
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No. cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or
64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing deemed cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the
the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending,
of titles. stating the manner of disposal thereof.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for appropriate action. Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this
denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the
order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in
to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court
to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and
the name of the petitioners. granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No.
pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis
petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid
cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue
is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title. ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the
reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:
64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido,
Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the
23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is party causing the registration thereof With the lis pendens duly
pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre. or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same,
October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871. unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation.
(Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why Phil. 3, 11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.)
respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)
Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of
titles of the petitioners. The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this
case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v.
This petition is impressed with merit. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which
Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the
Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the
in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for
T-25772 issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does
among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the
raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are
was as follows: unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the
xxx xxx xxx prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The
Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, supra)
respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare as
null and void the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the
Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly
Emphasis supplied) the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.

It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the
62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not. respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of
reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section
No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof
declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre which provides:
in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper
before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed. showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register
the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the
registration thereof. of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds
Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled No. 1529.
by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the
same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full
private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in
order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to
touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case
over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot
G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the
Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders
title. issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE.
Costs against the private respondents.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration SO ORDERED.
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference
to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of
Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of
the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the
function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title
is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's Third
International Dictionary of the English Language the word shall means "ought to,
must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws,
regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of
doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969 all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,
vs. Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners. Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected. Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square
MAKALINTAL, J.: meters in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No.
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in LRC Consulta 548 is hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion
No. 366. ... and in lieu thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby
substituted to succeed to all rights, participation and interest of
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a the vendor ...
duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an
instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be
annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548,
appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof in The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales contains an
favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares. additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title No.
548 have been issued (by the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr.
otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously annotated in the Andres Cabeldo, Notary Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the
memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of vendees, this 5th day of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three
undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by
different buyers. The pertinent entries read: petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Entry No. 5658. Sales. Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration,
who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal point in controversy, the Commissioner
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only observed:
in favor of Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548
is hereby cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters (1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the property
and in lieu thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548, having previously sold
succeed to all rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ... undivided portions thereof on three different occasions in favor of three
different buyers. Consequently, aside from the owner's duplicate issued to
Cornelio Balbin, there are now three co-owner's duplicates which are
Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ... presumably in the possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to
the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three co-
xxx xxx xxx owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of counsel for
the donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's duplicates was
unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a court of competent
Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are presumed to have been
lawfully issued.lawphi1.et
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title, petitioners would want
favor of Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is to compel annotation of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession, citing
hereby cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate
thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall
be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument." Under this Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
provision, according to petitioners, the presentation of the other copies of the title is concur.
not required, first, because it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim Capistrano, J., took no part.
to or interest in the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.
vendees-co-owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the duplicate
Footnotes
copies in their favor was illegal or unauthorized.
*Section
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that 43. Certificates where land registered in names of two or more
there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered persons. Where two or more persons are registered owners as tenants in
owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented common, or otherwise, one owner's duplicate certificate may be issued for
constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the the whole land, or a separate duplicate may be issued to each for his
corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies undivided share.
of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As
correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the
issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality
being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There
being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity
may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is
annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy
authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must
contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the
land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry
differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be
reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding
the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property
subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the
donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a
liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its
implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse
may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the result
of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character
of the property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio
Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its registration,
namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property which he donated was
more than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after
he had sold portions of the same land to three other parties.
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC
No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of
the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances
executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the
outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could
be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement
as to costs.
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968 Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant, Hence the present appeal by Almirol.
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee. The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether mandamus will lie to
compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in question.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on
his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over
CASTRO, J.: real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the
deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. 1
land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by
original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not
M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., L-17956, Sept. 30,
transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the 1953).
following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their non-
Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law on
considered conjugal property; registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered.
How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their invalidity before
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of their
New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but provisions? If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be
the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property without violating decided after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary
the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June 10, 1958). consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect
litigated afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale, it is Phil. 182-183).
necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of
the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act
extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the
heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid.
executed by their father. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to
register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
title, and to recover P5,000 in moral damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. It is Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration.
respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage,
or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any party in
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the respondent interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any
reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by appealing the decision Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the
of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the
for dismissal of the petition. party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands,
does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the
step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases Republic of the Philippines
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, SUPREME COURT
further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of Manila
the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision
may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after THIRD DIVISION
receipt of the notice thereof.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed the petition G.R. No. 175746 March 12, 2008
for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where any party in interest CHARLES L. ONG, Petitioner,
does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration," who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing vs.
the step to be taken or memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to
by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts. DECISION

ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16, 1969, is YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
affirmed, at petitioner's cost.1wph1.t
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006 Decision1 of the Court
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside the January 16,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave. 2002 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land
Sanchez, J., concurs in the result. Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution3 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Footnotes
1In re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228; The antecedent facts are as follows.
Smith Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61;
Register of Deeds, Pasig, Rizal vs. heirs of Hi Caiji, et al., 99 Phil. 25, 29-31; On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly
Mendoza vs. Abrera, et al., L-10519, April 30, 1959; Agricultural Credit authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed
Cooperative Association of Hinibiran vs. Yulo Yusay, et al., L-13313, April an Application for Registration of Title4 over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in
28, 1960; Dulay, et al., vs. Herrera, L-17084, August 30, 1962. Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four
(574) square meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the
subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property having acquired the same by
purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the
subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.

After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the Philippines
(respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as
required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to
prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not
appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the
application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the SO ORDERED.6
subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject
appropriation.
lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and his incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature
brothers, viz: and for the duration required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established sufficient
concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of
basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land
P.D. 1529. It noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated
was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine who acquired the same
1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to
by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho,
1971. Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest
Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses
actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of the application. Thus, the trial
Tony C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein
court erred in granting the application for registration of title over the subject lot.
applicants.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant and her
predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid. 1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS,
NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG,
The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of the
HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL PROPERTY
applicant and her (sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of land has (sic)
SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND
been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of
the instant application for registration on [July 1, 1999]. 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE
FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court hereby orders
THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS
and decrees the registration of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897
CORRECT.7
approved by the Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four (574) square meters, The petition lacks merit.
subject of the application for registration of title, in accordance with Presidential
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended, provides
Decree No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf and as representative of
his brothers namely, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG. SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City,
their duly authorized representatives:
Metro Manila, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino
Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
the applicant. open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
SO ORDERED.5
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
court a quo granting the application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.8 These requisites involve questions of fact
which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
a quo are generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized exceptions, as over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.20
is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses
findings.9 After a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and
Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
the subject lot.21 No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land was to visit the lot on several occasions.22 Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony
of the public domain. The Report10 dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands Bautista testified that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the
stated that the subject lot is "within the alienable and disposable zone as classified time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in
under Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 1997.23 Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence was presented to
21, 1927."11 This finding is, likewise, embodied in the Report12 dated January 7, establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by petitioners other
1999 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Community alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioners evidence failed to establish
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-
Copy13 of the plan covering the subject lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by
or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and law.
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show
The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and
Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,14 who in turn purchased the occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.24 Unfortunately,
same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.15 The petitioners evidence do not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all necessary in cases of this nature.25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in
surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979.16 The earliest tax declaration which was reversing the Decision of the trial court and in denying his application for registration
submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 2560617 issued in 1971 in the names of title over the subject lot.
of spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2006
conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which reversed and set
concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property.18 Even if we were to
aside the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan,
tack petitioners claim of ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged
Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006
predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971,
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
still this would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.1avvphi1 Costs against petitioner.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not SO ORDERED.
sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba:19

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by
the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous
with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks
to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
THIRD DIVISION On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a Second Amended Complaint[10] which
sought to annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in the original complaint, TCT
NELSIE B. CAETE, RONA ANAS, G.R. No. 154080
Nos. 274095 and 274096;[11] 274097 and 274098;[12] and 274099.[13]
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action, as well as
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
the remedy sought to be obtained, thus:
Corona,*
Nachura, and
4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest are
Reyes, JJ.
among those who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and
GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC.,
continuous possession in concept of owners of unregistered
Respondent. Promulgated:
parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat, Quezon
City, Metro Manila, which parcels of land are more particularly
January 22, 2008
described as follows:
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
(1) A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot
668, situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
x.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of
(2) A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot
Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled Genuino Ice
669, situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x
Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie B. Caete, et al., and its
x.
Resolution[2] dated June 26, 2002, dismissing petitioners Second Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial
5. That the above-described real property is a portion of a friar land
Court of Quezon City.
known as Piedad Estate, which property is intended for distribution
among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands
Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation
Act.
of title to property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-
140441;[3] 14399;[4] RT-94384 (292245);[5] RT-94794 (292246);[6] and
6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated or
292247.[7] Petitioners alleged that said titles are spurious, fictitious and were issued
derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued by the
under mysterious circumstances, considering that the holders thereof including their
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which transfer certificates of title
predecessors-in-interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the
are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and null and void, for the
property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under the Friar
following reasons: (a) that no record of any agency of the
Lands Act.[8] Petitioners also sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
government shows as to how and in what manner was OCT 614
614 from which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived.
issued; (b) that no record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether
judicial or administrative, can support defendants claim that the
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the ground that the
above-described property originated from OCT 614; and (c) that the
complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are not real parties-in-
transfer certificates of title over the above-described property were
interest; that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that petitioners failed to
issued under mysterious circumstances for the above-named
exhaust administrative remedies, but it was denied by the trial court. Respondent
defendants and their so-called predecessors-in-interest never had
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
any actual, adverse, physical possession of the said property, thus,
not allowed to acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant to a) The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the
the Friar Lands Act. allegations alone, plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real parties in
interest who may bring suit to cancel defendants (including
7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title of the respondent) titles; (2) based on the allegations and prayer of the
above-described property, which transfer certificates of title are null complaint, no relief, as a matter of law, may be granted;
and void, for reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6 hereof
x x x; b) Prescription has set in;

8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos. Q-95-22834
certificates of title in violation of the Friar Lands Act and other and Q-95-23111) filed by a different set of plaintiffs against a
existing laws are prejudicial to plaintiffs rights over the above- different set of defendants but which involve the same subject
described property. matter, cause of action and allegations of the plaintiffs, with respect
to the cancellation of OCT 614 and succeeding titles derived from it.
9. That equity demands that defendants transfer certificates of title Said complaints have since been dismissed by Branch 93 of the
as specified in Paragraph 7 hereof be declared fictitious, spurious Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the dismissal of which is the
and null and void ab initio. subject of a pending certiorari proceeding in the appellate court.[15]

PRAYER On January 3, 2001,[16] the trial court denied respondents motion to dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed hence respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendants: The appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari and dismissed
petitioners Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Hence,
(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all transfer the instant petition raising the following issues:
certificates of title derived therefrom;
A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
(2) Declaring as null and void defendants transfer certificates of title DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
over the property in litigation; PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-99-36483
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel DOES NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;
defendants transfer certificates of title and all transfer certificates of
title derived therefrom; B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT REAL
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in PARTIES IN INTEREST;
litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws.[14] C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the following ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; and,
grounds:
D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIED particularity.[23]
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT
DISMISSED THEIR COMPLAINT.[17] It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine the
nature of the action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the
We deny the petition. courts. This is because the complaint must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired on action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is better
December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates established than that which requires the complaint to contain a
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila statement of all the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated action. Additionally, Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides
in Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904.[18] that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. In the
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the Philippine case at bar, while there are allegations of fraud in the above quoted
Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided complaints, the same are not particular enough to bring the
originally into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in the course of controversy within the SEC's jurisdiction. The said allegations are
disposition, the number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was made not statements of ultimate facts but are mere conclusions of law.
by the Bureau of Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and
records show that even before the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of
have been disposed of.[19] The Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions
mass of the public domain and has become private land duly registered under of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is
the Torrens system following the procedure for the confirmation of private lands valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusions
prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid,
the public domain.[20] illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts
showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.[24]
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-
interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from Ultimate facts means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action, or
time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought such facts as are so essential that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the
by the Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the statement of the cause of action inadequate.[25]Cause of action has been defined as
United States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only actual other;[26] and its essential elements are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government were means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2) an obligation on the part of
given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and 3) an act or omission
settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the lands.[21] on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that every pleading shall an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the complaint
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case action.[27] In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of
may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.[22] And in all averments of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint as well as its annexes must be
considered.[28] The test in such case is whether a court can render a valid judgment Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires land under the Friar Lands
on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein.[29] Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to
purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, which means that
Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action against petitioners claimed actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the
a defendant or the action is premature is one of law. The trial court can consider all subject property is really of no moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-
the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However interest were actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands were acquired by
in so doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It the Government, and whose rights were not disregarded even though they were in
merely includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a occupation of the same before the government acquired the land; yet, no period of
finding of lack of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a time in relation to adverse possession is alleged.
calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself
to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these Petitioners Second Amended Complaint betrays no more than an incomplete
supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are narration of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits; the allegations
pure questions of law, and not questions of fact. therein partake of conclusions of law unsupported by a particular averment of
circumstances that will show why or how such inferences or conclusions were arrived
The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining at. It is replete with sweeping generalizations and inferences derived from facts that
whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on are not found therein. While there are allegations of fraud upon the claim that the
the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper subject titles were fictitious, spurious and obtained under mysterious circumstances,
appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court the same are not specific to bring the controversy within the trial courts
must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper jurisdiction. There is no explanation or narration of facts as would show why said titles
subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The said decisions, more importantly, form part are claimed to be fictitious or spurious, contrary to the requirement of the Rules that
of the legal system, and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity; otherwise, the
abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a allegation of fraud would simply be an unfounded conclusion of law. In the absence of
ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.[30] specific averments, the complaint is defective, for it presents no basis upon which the
court should act, or for the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer.
Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the need for particularity and
incipient substantiation in the petitioners Second Amended Complaint. As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide occupants of
the subject property within the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly
First, their initial claim that OCT 614 of which all the other subject titles are been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the property,
derivatives is null and void, has been proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac and although it is not stated for how long and since when. In their second amended
other cases, OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the complaint, they seek judgment
Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496.
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property
Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of Natural Resources, which was in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and
specifically tasked to investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate, found other existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
that as early as the period prior to the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate
had already been disposed of. They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property despite their alleged
adverse possession but only to be adjudged as the bona fide occupants thereof. In
Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land other words, petitioners concede the States ownership of the property.
registration, which means that all lots therein are titled.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the purpose In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments
of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is negate the existence of such right, for it would
correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute appear therefrom that whatever right might have
such suit. Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled and the issue need not be been violated by the defendant belonged to the
belabored. Thus government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant
argues that although his complaint is captioned
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper as one for cancellation of title, he has
parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did nevertheless stated therein several causes of
for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners action based on his alleged rights of possession
on the ground that they were derived from a spurious OCT No. and ownership over the improvements, on
4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent
respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the acquisition of the land, and on the damages
government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in
complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the relation to the improvements. These matters are
government under the Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled merely ancillary to the central issue of whether or
that only the government is entitled to this relief. The Court in that not defendant-appellees title should be canceled
case held: or amended, and they may not be leaned upon in
an effort to make out a cause of action in relation
The present motion to dismiss is actually to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief
predicated on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the prayed for in the amended complaint is the
Revised Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the cancellation or amendment of defendant-
complaint to state a cause of action, for it alleges appellees title.[31]
in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who
that he has no right to demand the cancellation or stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
amendment of the defendants title, because, the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest,
even if the said title were canceled or amended, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
the ownership of the land embraced therein, or of interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the
the portion thereof affected by the amendment, party must also be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
would revert to the public domain. In his constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand,
amended complaint the plaintiff makes no means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
pretense at all that any part of the land covered future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.[32]
by the defendants title was privately owned by
him or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the
is admitted therein that the said land was at all properties covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact
times a part of the public domain until December that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State,
18, 1964, when the government issued a title they would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified buyers or
thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is lessees of the property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the interest
any person or entity to relief, it can only be the required by law that grants them license or the personality to prosecute their
government. case. Only to the State does the privilege belong.
On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to state that since EN BANC
petitioners do not possess the necessary interest to prosecute the case for HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No.179987
cancellation of title in the courts, neither do they have the right to pursue Petitioner,
administrative remedies outside thereof. They are not the owners; nor are they Present:
qualified applicants therefor. It has not been shown by their complaint that they have PUNO,C.J.,
previously taken steps to avail of the benefits under the Friar Lands Act, since all they QUISUMBING,
seek, should the questioned titles be nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants YNARES-SANTIAGO,
of the property covered by the questioned titles. Neither is there any indication that CARPIO,
they possess the qualifications necessary to enable them to avail of the preference -versus-
granted under the Act. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA,
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent belatedly filed the CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO DE CASTRO, BRION,
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and that the appellate court gravely REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
abused its discretion when it entertained and resolved the same. Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.

The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying respondents motion to Promulgated:
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was received by the respondent on January April 29, 2009
16, 2001. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which x---------------------------------------------------x
was denied on February 28, 2001. Respondent received the order denying its motion DECISION
for reconsideration on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it filed a Notice to File TINGA, J.:
Petition for Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for certiorari was filed with the One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is
Court of Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence, the appellate court that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not
correctly entertained the same. titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-
called Third World. And it has many consequences.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals xxx
dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 dismissing petitioners Second The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 and the Resolution dated June 26, in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none
SO ORDERED. of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of
informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same means developed
by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers,
their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of
registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which
they use for their own informal business transactions.

If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,


and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going
to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about.
The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is
that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize. sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]

- Hernando De Soto[1] Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes
Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did
and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable not present any evidence to controvert the application.
as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en bancin order to provide definitive clarity
to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved
benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed dispositive portion of which reads:
our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye
on the endemic problems. WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
I. registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law,
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
years. Silang, Cavite.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the
State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his SO ORDERED.
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great- The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the confirmation of imperfect title.
Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their
son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC 2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the 3.May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. prescription?
Herbieto.[9]
4.Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before Registration Decree or both?[13]
this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just
four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court
therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in
first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory
had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since
especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication
to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title Bibonia,[14]promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the
under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree. same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was
patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June
case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
oral arguments, to wit: Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and
Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of
1.In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and
the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years
1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of
to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into private
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier? property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively
from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section Land Registration Act, to wit:
14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that
presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30- xxx
year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
declared alienable and disposable. the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof. prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
II. Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full under the provisions of this chapter.
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law
A. was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and
enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment
The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. This is not actually the case.
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands
disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and
into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands.
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for
town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21] Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for
thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguitexplained:
disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act
acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period
by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their
legalization.[22]Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July
supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942,
therein: which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have
been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may
same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
public domain. The provision reads: xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public
authorized representatives: Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily
established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
(1)those who by themselves or through and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
their predecessors-in-interest have been in public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the
possession and occupation of alienable and confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate
disposable lands of the public domain of title.
under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the
Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the
Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily
commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the
that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek
Property Registration Decree warrant comparison: registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most
recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
xxx in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.[24] the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
B. merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit,
disposable character of the land should have already been absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive
the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim
and not those distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia. be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering
our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt Registration Decree.
petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would
be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, from Herbieto are obiter dictasince the land registration proceedings therein is void ab
1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect 14(1) is indeed obiter.
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court,
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession That statement, disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient
cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private
was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a
therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the
whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945. [n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands
and Forestry to contest the application of
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
appellees on the ground that the property still
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein
showing that the lots in question are forestal
the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
land....
prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive
to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is
possession of public land for the period required by law would
now settled in favor of Naguit.
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err
in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned,
Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been
for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
alienability of the land subject of their application.
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession that
were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a
disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and
rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is
failed. Not so.
one of them.[29]

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is


Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable,
while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated
declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed
November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
to belittle.
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating
III.
that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
The provision reads: petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly A.
authorized representatives: The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible
basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is
xxx Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:

(2)Those who have acquired ownership All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
over private lands by prescription under the prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
provisions of existing laws. of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial
we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand,
refer to it as material for further discussion, thus: among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are
timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the timber or mineral lands.
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration
of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section real property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. faith,[34] as well as just title.[35]

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that
Civil Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows
possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such conversion, the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property
such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial
who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
Registration Decree. years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional
complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,
For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule. became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year
period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule
of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
public lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with
Registration Act, to wit: respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as
the point of reference.
xxx xxx xxx
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious which entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public under the provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to Section 14(1).
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of B.
this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription
under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There
the date 12 June 1945the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by
Rep. Act No. 1942. The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it prescription. The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by
applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil
Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth
use, and are intended for some public service or for the that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
development of the national wealth. shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide
belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord
the commerce of man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the
and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be
acquisition by prescription. used only by the Government.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply
or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The
the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress
converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for
the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further
provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription. The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example.
Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations
patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by Air Base.For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development
the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for Authority (BCDA)[40]which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer
the development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as them.[41]The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or in part.[42].Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some thereof are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
public service or for the development of the national wealth. regulations governing sales of government properties.[43]

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in
order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years
at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to either public service or the of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration
development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on
remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the
BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not
cease to be property of the public dominion. apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other
C. statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts
in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists
period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial with respect to Section 14(1).
be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in
the negative. IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion
property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired
to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which
within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that states that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify in character shall not be the object of prescription.
registration.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article
14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is
basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At
under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The
and the Civil Code. ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as
well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak for
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section themselves.
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year
period available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article
to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty- 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant
year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty- came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable
could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains: public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it
arguably did not preclude such registration.[50]Still, the gap was lamentable,
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial
ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein.
the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of
succession, and dacion in payment.[46] persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major V.
premise for the argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves
invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
rights. public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary length and quality of their possession.
prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion
lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But (a)Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public
acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code. Land Act.[51]

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the (b)The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not
a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
ownership.[48] under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article
Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D.
No. 1073).
(a)Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
Property Registration Decree. disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
(b)There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through alienation of said properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to regularize the informal
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
B. residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar. tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been
regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to
as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize
June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
of the Property Registration Decree. amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public
dominion property into patrimonial.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the only of that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring
The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No
VI. pronouncement as to costs.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays SO ORDERED.
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the
country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed DANTE O. TINGA
lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people Associate Justice
if we simply levied the law without comment.
Republic of the Philippines containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND
SUPREME COURT SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652), more or
Manila less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao City, issued in her name;
FIRST DIVISION
5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the
G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976
subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan
LANDS, plaintiff-appellee, (LRC) Psd-69322 which was approved by the Land Registration
vs. Commissioner on March 17,1967;
HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant, LAND REGISTRATION
6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-
COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, defendants.
B-1 contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez 2B-2 contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of
and Atty. Baltazar Llamas plaintiff-appellee. 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than
the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendant-appellant. in the name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner. 7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the
Land Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to
secure an order from the Court of First Instance of Davao in LRC
ESGUERRA, J.: (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the City
of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as
Title No. T-1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu
CA-G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final
thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
consideration and resolution of the pure question of law involved.
8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned
The factual background of the case is as follows:
registered Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and on the same date registered Lot
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa
First Instance of Davao, Branch 1, alleging, among others, the following: Villa Abrille;

3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and 9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the
defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in
Espaa Extension, Quezon City and Davao City, respectively. "(are accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication
included in this complaint, the first being the public Official charged as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the
under the law with the approval )." subdivision surveys of private Land Registration Law;
lands while the second is the Official vested with the authority to
10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a
issue certificates of titles, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as
result of the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322
amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
was formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason
4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa of the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land
Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao belonging to the public domain; and
11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the
18887 which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey case as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in
(LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the excess area of land belong to the its order of August 16,1969.
public domain (not private land) is null and void ab initio.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City filed her answer Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on
averring that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good their stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as
faith effected the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379B-2- follows:
B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor,
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and
respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of
unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First
stipulation of facts and allege:
Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the
same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887". 1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in
the Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol.
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the
A27, Page 40 under Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No.
allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit
1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim
the increase in area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in area of
Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;
the land was acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner, and the same was duly noted and approved by the Court of First 2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was
Instance of Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
out of Certificate of Title No. T- 1439 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest 1439 was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;
Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T-18886 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof,
TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan
had likewise been cancelled and several Transfer Certificates of Title were issued Psd-69322 by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner,
thereunder; that the subject increase of area was made in accordance with law and Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18886 and 18887 were issued by
existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein the defendant, Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which
defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was entitled under the law to claim, as she subdivision plan is hereto attached as Annex "A", and made integral
did, the increase or excess in area of her original land as her own. part hereof;

On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a 4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was subsequently
judgment on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the cancelled by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title
subject matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein was No. T-19077 was issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji a
approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that purchaser in good faith and for value;
on February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio 5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by
Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds throughout the the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order
Philippines to, among others, deny the registration of subdivision plans with increased dated March 27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto attached as
or expanded areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles, or if the Annex "B" and made part hereof;
plans have already been registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to
take appropriate steps for their cancellation. 6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is
hereto attached as Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;
7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was 11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted
by virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch 1, in with coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by the
Special Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate defendants, through their predecessor-in-interest;
Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition
12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of
ago as the coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
Title were issued to the following named persons, to wit:
13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
portion of the increase in area;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang; plan (LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-20690 contain the increase in
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
area; while all the other certificates of title issued under subdivision
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang; plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not contain any increase in area;

(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.; 15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B"
was without notice to the Director of Lands.
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27,
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang; 1970, which reads as follows:
(i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang; This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang; instituted by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands, against the Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang; by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration
Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao.
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision
Because the residue of the intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had
plan LRC Psd-71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land
been divided among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino Huang, Milagros
Registration Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan (LRC)
Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were directed to
Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made integral part
appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did.
hereof;
The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of
Lot 379-B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge of the xxx xxx xxx
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner and the court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV; The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 5609 of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of
9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer
or prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as Certificate of Title No. T. 1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and
the registered owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer
question; Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang,
T20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the name of
10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-
Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from
B-2-B and abuts the Davao River;
525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square instituted by the owner. And the only way by which a title to the land
meters. in question can be issued for the first time is for the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order
upon final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
to include the increase in area was a petition for approval of
after trial.
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the
Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and for issuance WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer
of new title under Section 44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690
court, which was assigned to Branch IV. and directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new
certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of
Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid
82,127 square meters, the land involved, shall have been
remedy was sought, notice before the hearing is required. The
segregated therefrom in accordance with law.
parties admit that there was no notice to the persons interested,
including the Director of Lands, before the petition was heard. Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille
brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however,
Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in
in its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and
Court for consideration and final disposition.
T-20690 even assuming arguendo that the same belonged to the
owner of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of
a petition for approval of subdivision plan and issuance of new Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of
titles, because a subdivision of a registered land under Section 44 notice to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title
of Act 496 does not authorize the inclusion of land or area not Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is the contention of the defendant-
embraced in the titled or in excess of what is stated in the title. And appellant that since the government agencies having to do with lands know all the
the approval by the Court of such subdivision plan does not lend time the increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government
validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to the area stated in agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved
the title. Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act increase in area, defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer the effect of the
496 would be a valid remedy 1. allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the approval of the aforementioned
subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is their honest belief that
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might
the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of their subdivision plan
have acquired a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it
concerned was well within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act 496,
under the operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for
as amended.
registration under Act 496 should have been filed. More so when
the title acquired is by continuous possession for at least 30 years Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision
under a claim of ownership And even assuming that the land is an plan, with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration
accretion, the fact that the riparian estate is registered does not Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the issuance
bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the operation of of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690)
the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land over the increased area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the
based upon final judgment promulgated by a court of competent conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of the
jurisdiction after due publication, notice and hearing, has been Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan
issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed concerned, as the required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-
by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed,
that no initial or original registration proceedings have been
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at a 4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing
judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in together with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto
ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T- by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission;
20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and
square meters.
place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those
opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of
known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which
admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision 7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named
Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao. in the notice or not;
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the 8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include
the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, 9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
unwarranted and irregular. This is so, for the increased area in question, which is not 10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final
a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree
mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant- of confirmation and registration;
appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather,
Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the 11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the Commission;
operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary approval of
corresponding Register of Deeds, and
subdivision plan.
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is
title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the
good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of
prescribed fees.
the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet been
brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court
Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act
496, the following requisites should all be satisfied: No special pronouncement as to costs.

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private SO ORDERED.


surveyor;
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the
Court;
Republic of the Philippines the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the
SUPREME COURT certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to
Manila Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for
new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
EN BANC
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in
vs. possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed,
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi
OF LANDS, appellant. for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the
execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant. "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the
Monico R. Mercado for appellee. proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession
and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza,
and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without
VILLA-REAL, J.: any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela
Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a
of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after
complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands,
considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor
praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel
of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E).
of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land
court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on
is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to
August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed
said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for
damages, with the costs.
twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to
allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August
was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said
control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and
accordance with law. as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the
justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First
jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi
Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the
then brought this action.
possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the
with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the
judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon
land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through
on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that
his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When concur.
on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Johnson, J., took no part.
Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors
Footnotes
for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already
made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be 1 41 Phil., 935.
estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long
that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of Republic of the Philippines
the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, SUPREME COURT
there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of Manila
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary EN BANC
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly vs.
since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO.
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the INC., ETC., respondents.
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an NARVASA, J.:
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of
State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it
of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
any right.
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
thereof.lawphi1.net December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover 3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
possession thereof and hold it. acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the
minorities;
same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable
ordered. as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
and Acer Infiel; for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October this chapter.
29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial. (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain; shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the
Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no
improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
sought to be registered on September 18, 1982; Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of
'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the
November 22, 1979. Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the
corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were
by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads: Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of
xxx xxx xxx Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the
lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public by earlier law. ...
Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this categorical language, in Susi:
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that: .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
due course or has to be dismissed. exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L- become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control
19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644). of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title
beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did
developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed not thereby acquire any right. 6
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without .... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven
property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct, occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
therein, segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully xxx xxx xxx
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that: As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength
prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to of said patent. 12
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute
itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not
title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State,
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply xxx xxx xxx
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a
was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
earlier law." 919).<re||an1w> 15
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and
to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there
(or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands. light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is
acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to
confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following
which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights. corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person,
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of
sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. the dissent in Meralco:
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new 6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error
rights in constitutional law. not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
xxx xxx xxx the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against
their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application here.
being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
Davao) this chapter. "
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in
for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already
the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient .
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
so acquired and sold or exchanged. property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application
and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by
on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco. the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in
vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine
the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the
brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question. acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be
instance. lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent
SO ORDERED. corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur. formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so
Separate Opinions expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified
corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented
1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the
of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant
no public lands are involved. was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief
October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the
prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question
unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the
possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability."
9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result,
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the
municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of
townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered
adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the
been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive
transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
(which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private
formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
transferred to respondent corporation. inapplicable. " 10
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the
and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest
the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the
occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so
jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of
establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is
which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation
extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such
December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed
December 31, 1987. 7 in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private
would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I
Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases)
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides: owners and vendors,
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but applicant Meralco
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
(a) ... indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have presumption therein provided in their favor.
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall supplied)
be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
this chapter. Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
(c) ... prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides: interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed
any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares .... 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352;
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original It has also been said that:
Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature
Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have
vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that
Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case. the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows: being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision
the land involved in the case. being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME. emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is
"literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part
afterwards transfer the title to ACME. nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]). be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make
apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of
proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private
laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy. property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro- as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases. confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a
Separate Opinions bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the
here. 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands
of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: no public lands are involved.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares)
this chapter. " unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open
the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the
. . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition
the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and
of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6 transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application transferred to respondent corporation.
for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of
view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso
effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to
Meralco decision was promulgated).<re||an1w> We reaffirm the established December 31, 1987. 7
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-
submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private
would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I
Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases)
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented
along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the (a) ...
realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result,
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a
petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the this chapter.
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private (c) ...
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
inapplicable. " 10 SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may
citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent
possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs.
required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic
is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva
possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such (a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over
procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed the land involved in the case.
in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of (b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the
"literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may
afterwards transfer the title to ACME. be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]). Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control
the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus
filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
owners and vendors, In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
applicant Meralco I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the
persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
presumption therein provided in their favor. doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied) thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title'
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive
citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo
of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this
2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351). I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the
It has also been said that: June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the
being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title'
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors
which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by SECOND DIVISION
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited
established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo [G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]
cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi. COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel
DECISION
vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi
doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence. TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed
the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan
dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)[3] of
Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for
registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to


Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP
060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application
seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The
public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the
heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of
Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995,
the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the
heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under
Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.[4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced
all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to
Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.[5] Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying
the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section
administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as
mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of
were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject ownership could even start.
land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-
Court[12] in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only
objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her
on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
application for registration.
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the
that the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose OSG argues.
Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering
proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration
Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
and confirmed in the name of Naguit.[6] First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.[7] However, the court denied the June 12, 1945, or earlier.
motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.[8]
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to provisions of existing laws.
the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its
decision, dismissing the appeal.[9] ....

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable
a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their
assailed decision of the RTC. predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
the Republic on September 4, 2000.[10]
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This
appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the governments is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used
prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership.
alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to
been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely
period.[11] located.[13] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, apply.
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those which form part of a
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
reservation for provincial park purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
ownership.[20] It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government
cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of
from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
Appeals,[21] forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered disposable and alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the property in question
considered an independent state.
was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.[23]
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the
the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12,
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the
possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case,
then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
prerogative over the property.
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles
Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute.[15] In that case, the subject land had been certified xxx xxx xxx
by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
admits that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[16] presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[17] wherein the shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural
bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership
disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis
of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased
Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public domain, while the
the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
Property Registration Decree uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
public domain. It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.[24] Clearly, the
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the
his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to
No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by ownership.[28]
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since
Code.[25] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[26] With such Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired person and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land deserving of protection under the law.
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the
Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
SO ORDERED.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with
coconut trees now over fifty years old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no JJ., concur.
impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as
correctly accomplished by the lower courts.

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been
in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there
could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land
was declared alienable or disposable.
SECOND DIVISION disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;[8]

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831,
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005] in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994;[9] and

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their
HERBIETO, respondents. sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold
to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.[10]
DECISION
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: an Opposition to the respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots
arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of title were not
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed the fideacquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public
Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11]
December 1999,[2] granting the application for land registration of the respondents.
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.[12] All
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial
David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous
registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.[14] Finally, the Notice was
Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999[15] and The Freeman Banat
and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application for News on 19 December 1999.[16]
registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Special Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for
Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;[4] registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to
offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]
commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
dispensing with the need for Surveyors Certificates for the Subject Lots;[6]
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422
of title covering the Subject Lots;[7] and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02
February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory,
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a
(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and decree of registration for the Subject Lots.[18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in
the Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject
2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus: Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENROs
certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has
acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v.
been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963.
Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that All
known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires
things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial
the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
character shall not be the object of prescription and that Ownership and other real
rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned
by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that
as amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a
they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other
single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are
trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein
co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only
appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject
when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even
the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within the same province.
assuming arguendo that appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25,
Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the
1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and
manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the
disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.
proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the
CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over
susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, it.
with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section
I
14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by
law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned
from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein
appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and Jurisdiction
in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant
application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no
reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.[20]
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
following arguments:
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents application for
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest registration.
had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even
concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic,
though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually
seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, accepted grounds for dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the
respectively. misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts
jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the
to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of
respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with
action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action);
and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts
and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined
pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have
above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court
been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is
with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or
regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the
mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not
application for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the
been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of before this Court.
the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly allows the mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not
following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;[24] and (2)
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition
the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that
did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this
the same are located within the same province.[25] The Property Registration Decree
Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial
is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single
Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual
respondents application for registration.
registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and jurisdiction in
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation,
rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through
then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action.
publication and service of notice.[29]
Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of
Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given
applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
character and whenever practicable and convenient. publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing
shall be made in the following manner:
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with
the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the 1. By publication.
joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case.[26]They are not even persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application for registration,
require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice
cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date
of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
respondents application for registration and even the registration decree that may be
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its
September 1999.
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result.
Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively
publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application for
requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and
same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02
the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and
directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots,
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official
Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied II
with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official
Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed
in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested Period of Possession
parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject
orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear
for publication, mailing and posting.[31]
and proceed with respondents application for registration, this Court nevertheless
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for
held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the acquiring title to public land.
issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10
August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for
printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the
Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after
the initial hearing. Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his
parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial 1950.[32]
hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it
was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents
deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No.
28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 29, 1992.[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963. confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;[34] and it
this chapter.
is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title
was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35] (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture
timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
State.[36] It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed,
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
as follows:
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be
(1) For homestead settlement;
entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title
(2) By sale; under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended,
now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the
(3) By lease; present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded
(a) By judicial legalization; or from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen
into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable,
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.[41] It is very
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of
Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire
mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,[39] then it imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or
can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalized.
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals was based on the
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under
exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 the Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows
individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.[42]
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration
Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Republic of the Philippines
Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the SUPREME COURT
State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by Manila
virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.[43] As EN BANC
established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan),
and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Petitioners,
Public Land Act. vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire RESOLUTION
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their BERSAMIN, J.:
application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties
the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the
ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the
claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the
every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential
the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44] Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject Lots must have
Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario
and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree. Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable
governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
be considered a special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a
and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general
confirmation of his title.1
law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46]
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department
2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED. Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan
SO ORDERED. Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as
Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
Tinga, J., out of the country. After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans
application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been
Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864- "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application
A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property
Ilog, Silang, Cavite. on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of earlier.
registration shall forthwith issue. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
SO ORDERED.3 In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v.
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive
by law for confirmation of imperfect title. prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and
v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134
Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years
stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable
15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for by the State.
purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession. The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with
elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
review on certiorari. Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable
prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Ruling
Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in We deny the motions for reconsideration.
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration
earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings laws of the Philippines.
therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the Classifications of land according to ownership
notice of initial hearing. Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either:
their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use,
reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the
such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where
belongs to a private individual. the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress
the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15This means that the public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the applicable.
conservation of such patrimony.16 Disposition of alienable public lands
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which
to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private disposed of, to wit:
persons.17 Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
Classifications of public lands follows, and not otherwise:
according to alienability (1) For homestead settlement;
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests (2) By sale;
on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 (3) By lease; and
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (a) By judicial legalization; or
classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in
the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. 21 The public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
through a positive act of the Executive Department.22 of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only xxxx
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
may not be. open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public
enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land
Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and
agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit: over it.
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
possession and occupation of the property subject of the application; predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
notorious; the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership; ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property
earlier; and subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite
domain. period of possession.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as
to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration
to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the
agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete
proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable by reason of the applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and
and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary
emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual
48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
agricultural. disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it
and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or sanctioned by the courts.31
reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and
1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected. occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as
requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to liberalize stringent requirements and
that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants,
intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or
written by the legislators. for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President,
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State. respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public SO ORDERED.
land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not THIRD DIVISION
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit: FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, G.R. No. 181502
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable Petitioner,
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Present:
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the CORONA, J., Chairperson,
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be - v e r s u s - CARPIO ,
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
VELASCO, JR.,
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
NACHURA and
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
PERALTA, JJ.
conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES,
has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37 Respondent.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer Promulgated:
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from February 2, 2010
the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already RESOLUTION
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a CORONA, J.:
condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription. This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June 16,
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June Florencia G. Diaz.
12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to vast tract of land[1] located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976.[2] She alleged that
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has
she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the
remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for
Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under
more or less 26 years.
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or
the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth.1wphi1
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic
Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the
237 (Proclamation 237)[3] in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property
public domain. inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable
settlement in the CA.[10]
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of Lands v.
Reyes[4] that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable as it formed On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.[11] On
part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the
No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, corresponding decree of registration in petitioners favor.[12]
1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and Development
Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG
of registration issued in its favor was declared null and void. filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the
decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land
Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision[5] dated July 1, subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended
(CA). In its decision[6] dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V. resolution)[13] annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the parties.
Mendoza (Mendoza decision),[7] the appellate court reversed and set aside the The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:
decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioners case as it ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
involved the same property. (1) x x x x x x
(2) x x x x x x
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to (3) x x x x x x
Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcias right to the property was largely (4) x x x x x x
dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title the (5) x x x x x x
probative value of which had already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and (6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court
inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed
that she did not validly acquire title thereto. between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted Diaz[;]
by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.[8] (7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated
May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement
motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the records is hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect;
from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate (8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of
court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution[9] upholding petitioners the Solicitor General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the
right to recall the records of the case. Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other
matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject
settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and finalize property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May
the same.
18, 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, Reynato S. Puno himself.[23] The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a
1999; third motion for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety:
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving
the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect
September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999 the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence,
Resolution; and that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer,
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz registration herein.
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502,
SO ORDERED. and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince
the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will
(Emphasis supplied) result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE
RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of the Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for
Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the CAs amended justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme
resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in
during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the
therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His failure to Motion is hereto attached as Annex A.
do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional right to due
process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void. The motion The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court
was denied.[14] involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court
of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari[15] in this Court. It was
denied for raising factual issues.[16] She moved for reconsideration.[17] This motion It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente
was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to
warranting a modification of the Courts resolution. The Court then ordered that no discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability
further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment to of the court to render impartial justice, because Mr. Justice
be made in due course.[18] Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision,
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who
Court en banc.[19] The Court denied[20] it considering that a second motion for appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.[21] Furthermore, the motion to refer the case same land registration proceedings in which he lost.
to the banc was likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate court to which
decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be appealed.[22] We reiterated our In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in
directive that no further pleadings would be entertained and that entry of judgment be the very same case.
made in due course.
In the case of the Alabang Boys[,] the public was outraged by the
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to actions of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice.
The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable to this case.
In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of
my constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:
unconstitutional, for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, (1) the former judgment or order must be final;
and reverse the very decision in which he had lost. (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad and parties; and
light. I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of (4) there must be between the first and
action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm second actions, identity of parties, of subject
than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice matter, and of causes of action. [24]
Mendoza.
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner
I fully support your call for moral force that will slowly and takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties.
eventually lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in
this moral decadence, in which we all find ourselves. the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be
determined independently of each other.[25]
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues This contention is erroneous.
to fight the dark forces that surround us everyday.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases Lands.[26] In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable
such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case
seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts decision to dismiss the
suffered under our judicial system. proceedings as the property in question was part of the public domain. Quintins
successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite knowledge of the proceedings
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original). did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino.
The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as well
as in this one, was whether our decision in the case in which another person was the
The language of petitioners letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat applicant constituted res judicataas against his successors-in-interest.
precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to her demands
to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the
vilified in the media and by the public. provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and
imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioners letter/third motion land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse
for reconsideration. claimant, but also against all persons.[27]

APPLICABILITY We also declared in Aquino that:


OF REYES
From another point of view, the decision in the first action has
become the law of the case or at least falls within the rule of stare
decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly
erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the authoritative By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military
view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:
the due administration of justice especially by a court of last resort
that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x[28] inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that
the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded
favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public
on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)[32]
military reservation. Thus, petitioners argument that the findings of fact of the trial
court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle that findings of fact of
lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this Court is untenable. Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are
Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this Courts ruling in Reyes, not registrable under CA 141.
and not the other way around.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended,
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area
should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land
insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether
in Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or
outside the commerce of man. under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the
title. (Emphasis supplied).[33]
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this
Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.[29] Notably, a judgment
rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been
contemplation.[30] reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the
recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct lands)[34] coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her
becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the position they predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce
occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-
declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court from whose interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because
decision all other courts should take their bearings."[31] prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession
thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession
ACQUISITION OF requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.[35] This
PRIVATE RIGHTS was our ruling in Almeda v. CA.[36] The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles
do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through an
official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its effectivity disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[37]
is subject to private rights, if any there be.
Coming now to petitioners contention that her private rights to the property, meaning exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from
her and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be
must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the
recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established. mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without
To reiterate: substantial inclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not
sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is possession of public land, however long the period may have
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because
the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
xxx number of years to constitute a grant from the State.[38]

xxx
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to
ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also
established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,[39] thus rendering
with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her application for
than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted: registration.

Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely NULLITY OF COMPROMISE
five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, AGREEMENT
could not have converted the same into a record of ownership
twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of
the Spanish Mortgage Law. On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that the
same was null and void.
xxx
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code
was cleared and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some which provides:
portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter,
Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites
forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, concur:
Maria Padilla died. x x x (1) Consent of the contracting parties;
xxx (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant,
and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through
under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion of the property
Office of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement located within the military reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that
with her.[40] The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the compromise part of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic could not validly enter
agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the into such undertaking as the subject matter of the agreement was outside the
OSG to represent the State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must commerce of man.
do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic
of the Philippines.[41]
PETITIONERS CONTEMPT
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for respondent, it OF COURT
was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a compromise
agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23,
of the Rules of Court which requires special authority for attorneys to bind their This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably be
clients. expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this Court
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by stating:
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect
special authority, compromise their clients litigation, or receive the destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence,
anything in discharge of a clients claim but the full amount in cash. that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer,
(Emphasis supplied). January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what she
contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code perceived as this Courts failure to exercise utmost prudence in rendering impartial
provides: justice in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:

Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502,
men, including future things, may be the object of a and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince
contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that
object of contracts. will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for
public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme
contract. (Emphasis supplied) Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in
resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the
Motion is hereto attached as Annex A.
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to law
and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of petitioners
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court xxx
involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court
of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio. The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a veiled threat[.] It was written
in response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the Alabang Boys case
Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which
discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the
of the court to render impartial justice, because Mr. Justice facts of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case
Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the
reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision in which
he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental
appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very fair play for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge
same land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.
supplied).
Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the
delivery of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no choice but they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she
to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the media. This is has offended your honors sensibilities, she is ready for the
evident in her arrogant declaration that: punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with
compassion as her letter to the Chief Justice was never written with
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even a view of threatening the Court.
greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad
light. xxx

But she hastens to add in the same breath that: Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was
however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, never meant as a threat.
and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.

The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible insinuations and threats of
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task: going public with this case. We are not blind to petitioners clever and foxy interplay of
threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this Court.
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen
again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice with
the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system. neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a careful and
thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto.
The records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner
When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this Court in
baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered: their respective resolutions.
As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition through a mere subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a statement in her petition to this
minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the Court did not Court that:
issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to
say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the
justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended nullity of the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in
resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on doubt the entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to
its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution the rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that
(signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition escaped the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L.
or motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who
decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who
deemed sustained.[42] stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcias successor-in-
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.[44] (Emphasis
successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this supplied).
resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that no further pleadings shall be
entertained in this case. Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause at all. If anything, it only
this Courts orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.
veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy although the tone
of petitioners compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner
compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court. is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion
is DENIED considering that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading
In Republic v. Unimex,[43] we held: and the plea utterly lacks merit.

A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five
entertained is a declaration that the Court has already considered Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from receipt of
all issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be dealt with
case with finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from filing more severely.
any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court, it
must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be
circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for Treble costs against petitioner.
clarification.
SO ORDERED.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS

If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right to
due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza decision late in
the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its
subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious that
it was only when her case became hopeless that her present counsel frantically
searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his clients lost cause,
Republic of the Philippines private opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general
SUPREME COURT default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world, except the Republic.6
Manila
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for registration in
SECOND DIVISION favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the spouses Fortuna] have
established [their] possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the
G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014
land sought to be registered, has been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners, the whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty
vs. (50) years."8
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses
DECISION Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has
been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the
BRION, J.: spouses Fortunas evidence Tax Declaration No. 8366 showed that possession
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioners, spouses over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off
Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision dated May 16, 20052 and the period provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the
resolution dated June 27, 20063 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. Property Registration Decree (PRD).
71143. The CA reversed and set aside the decision dated May 7, 20014 of the In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in Land Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and
Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372. disposable nature of the land,10 they failed to show that they complied with the length
THE BACKGROUND FACTS of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the
Republics argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a Fortunas predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession
2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San of the land only since 1948.
Fernando, La Union. The application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC
No. 2372. The CA denied the spouses Fortunas motion for reconsideration of its decision in its
resolution dated June 27, 2006.11
The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora
Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.
renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold
the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984. or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No.
1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors- notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public
in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead
No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lots survey plan, required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment
technical description, and certificate of assessment. introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.12
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977
application,5 it did not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and
published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Courts ruling in Taada, et al. v.
Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be THE COURTS RULING
deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their
dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No.
compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the
1942 amendment because Pastoras possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
public domain.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
present documentary evidence proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained
established
by Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the Provincial Assessors Office, who testified
that the records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War II. The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the
State.18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses
lands, mineral lands, and national parks, only agricultural lands may be
Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even
alienated.19 Public land that has not been classified as alienable agricultural land
before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for
new tax declaration. Second, the annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No.
registration of title to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the
8366 states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]"14 Since Tax Declaration
alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and
No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued,
disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find
at the latest, in 1947, indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of the
application only from the time that a public land has been classified as agricultural
lot before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No.
and declared as alienable and disposable.
2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot
Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098,15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification of public
are adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a
and resided in a place a few meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be
passed by these lots on her way to school since 1938. She knew the property was included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment and
owned by Pastora because the latters family had constructed a house and planted Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land
fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis of Macarias classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.21
testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the RTC granted the
spouses Fortunas application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098 in Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title
its decision of January 3, 2005.16 The RTCs decision has lapsed into finality acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the
unappealed. land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence
of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
The spouses Fortuna claim that Macarias testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
considered to prove Pastoras possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373 is a investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
separate registration proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property,
Lot No. 4457, and belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by
failure to present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC No. 2372, the the notation in the survey plan,22 which states:
spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of evidence x x x that [they] This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map
were able to trace and establish the identity and competency of Macaria[.]"17 No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.23
Commenting on the spouses Fortunas petition, the Republic relied mostly on the It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community
CAs ruling which denied the registration of title and prayed for the dismissal of the Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record,
petition. neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject
parcel[.]"24 However, we find that neither of the above documents is evidence of a title. This mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the
positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable original version of which states:
agricultural land of the public domain.
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
properties alienable and disposable character.25 These notations, at the very least, titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original
xxxx
classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in
Fabio,27 the Court ruled that [t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through ninety- four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
survey by the PENRO28 or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government
the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. [emphasis supplied]
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period
or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No.
disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories 1942, read:
or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring
the public land as alienable and disposable.29 (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a positive least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortunas claim of title through a public title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and underscore
land grant under the PLA should be denied. ours]
In judicial confirmation of imperfect On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by
or incomplete title, the period of requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947 SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the alienable alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient ground to deny the continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
petition and terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to address the other himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
important legal issues raised in the petition. ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years from 1945 up
agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain to its enactment in 1977 is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of
may be disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No.
1942 amendment, but whose possession commenced only after the cut-off date of Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that
June 12, 1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Pastora possessed the land prior to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe
Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa30that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner that was
predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While these circumstances may indeed indicate
25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of possession as of 1947, none proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of 8, 1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for the nature of Pastoras possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of
judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the conjunction
[PLA]." January 24, 1947 was considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
years counted backward from January 25, 1977 the effectivity date of PD No. 1073. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted;
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
based on the certification from the National Printing Office,31 PD No. 1073 was
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction."35 Nothing
on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for
in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and
applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the
occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described
PLA.
as "cogonal."36
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366 by
promulgation," the Court has declared in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et
relying on Macarias testimony in a separate land registration proceeding, LRC No.
al.32 that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity.
2373. Macaria alleged that she passed by Pastoras lots on her way to school, and
"[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
she saw Pastoras family construct a house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
area. However, the Court is not convinced that Macarias testimony constituted as the
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6
"well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases of this nature.
of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon
its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of land, all
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section of which are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These parcels of land
48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have were covered by three separate applications for registration, to wit:
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961 sq.
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
m., commenced by Emeteria;
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.
b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove
area of 4,006 sq. m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and
that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947
c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total area
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable
of 2,597 sq. m.
agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses Fortunas application for
registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the same
possessed the land since May 8, 1947. predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final rulings in LRC
Nos. N-1278 and 2373,37 upholding Pastoras ownership, be taken into account in
The spouses Fortunas allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax
resolving the present case.
Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have previously Republic of the Philippines
belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the Court to consider SUPREME COURT
that Pastoras claimed acts of possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria) Manila
encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that
EN BANC
Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess and declare that its entirety
belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of possession and occupation in what
must have been but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366
described Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been
G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974
referring to Lot No. 4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her
properties.
(Civil Case No. 3621)
The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding Pastora's
possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the spouses Fortuna. VICTOR BENIN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that vs.
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J. M. TUASON &
the lots have been officially reclassified as alienable lands of the public domain or that
CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
the nature and duration of Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the PLA,
thus, failing to convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or consider their G.R. No. L-26128 June 28, 1974
merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De las Santos:38

Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the (Civil Case No. 3622)
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private JUAN ALCANTARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh
MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON &
incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. G.R. No. L-26129 June 28, 1974
Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as do
minus. (Civil Case No. 3623)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the
DIEGO PILI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are
vs.
AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's MARIANO SEVERO TUASON y DE LA PAZ, ET AL., defendants. J.M. TUASON &
application of registration of title on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
against the spouses Fortuna.
Jose Palarca Law Offices for plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Manuel O. Chan & Rodolfo M. Caluag for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision, dated January 18, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor
Rizal, the Hon. Judge Eulogio Mencias, presiding in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his
3623. 1 predecessors in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel
of land from time immemorial; that upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa
On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the ownership and
substantially the same allegations. 2 possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest, as owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely and
continuously cultivated the land, planting thereon palay and other agricultural
In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that during his
possessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894,
complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the and when the cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in
municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed and registered their claim of ownership over the
approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land from said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for taxation purposes under
their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of the last
Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila
of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively and other places, after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed
enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had their houses in said land and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from their lessees or
said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral tenants.
survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin
and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared
said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint,
the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of
evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc.,
plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and
intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and
started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of
In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles),
possessors of two parcels of agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old roads, old bridges
complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio San Jose) in the municipality and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question, disregarding
of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately 148,118 the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals
square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased received from their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim
father Bonoso Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands, as
Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara were the children of described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or erroneously
Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their father, and included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as
they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the
possession of the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now
exclusively enjoying said products; that on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz,
Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the cadastral survey by the Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto
Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.
plaintiffs filed and registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs
had said lands declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of
Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners
subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the registration of
secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said lands two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate),
and plaintiffs collected monthly rentals from them. located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal,
of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square
meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the
In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681,
parcel of agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa
municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481
Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; defendants to pay the plaintiffs the market value of the lands in question in case of
that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries defendants' inability to reconvey the same; (7) to order the defendants to pay
and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the damages to the plaintiffs; (8) to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the
amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original defendants, their lawyers, their agents and representatives from disturbing the
application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered in ownership and possession of the plaintiffs during the pendency of these cases.
LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7,
1914 a decree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers.
17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of
land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914
in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with summons. The
jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in accordance with Sections
issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared.
void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and The other defendants were all declared in default.
because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree
are different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each
the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the area of of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court on July 20,
parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1955.
1 appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary
null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary injunction,
registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1 however, was lifted by order of the trial court on October 3, 1955, upon the posting by
appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of P14,000.00
No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in pursuant to the order of the court of September 26, 1955.
the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs
had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants
knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a
addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to motion for reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to
the time the complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order of the court of
described in paragraph V of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and September 26, 1955.
even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had
tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because On November 29, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer in each of
said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the three cases. In its answer, this defendant, among others, specifically denied
the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in each case. The answer contains
subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void. 3 special and affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the plaintiffs' cause of action is barred
by prior judgment and res judicata in view of the judgment of the Court of First
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases prayed the court: (1) to declare them owners Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-156 which was subsequently elevated to the
and entitled to the possession of the parcel, or parcels, of land described in their Supreme Court as G.R. No. L-4998, in which latter case the Supreme Court affirmed
respective complaint, as the case may be; (2) to revoke the decision of the Court of in toto the order of the lower court dismissing the case; (2) that the complaints failed
Land Registration, dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681, and to declare Decree No. to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants; (3) that
17431, dated July 6, 1914 null and void from the beginning with respect to Parcel No. the plaintiffs' action, assuming that their complaints state sufficient cause of action,
1(Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which include the lands had prescribed either under Act No. 496 or under statutes governing prescription of
of the plaintiffs; (3) to declare Original Certificate of Title No. 735, particularly as it action; (4) that defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good faith and for
refers to Parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) also null and void; (4) to declare null and valuable consideration of the parcels of land involved in the three cases; (5) that the
void all transfer certificates of titles issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and of registration proceedings had in LRC No. 7681 instituted by the defendant's
Quezon City subsequent to, and based on, Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (5) to predecessors in interest was in accordance with law, and the requirements for a valid
order the defendants, in the event Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is declared registration of title were complied with. By way of counterclaim the defendant prayed
valid, to reconvey and transfer title over the land described in their respective that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay damages as therein specified.
complaint in favor of the plaintiffs in each case, as the case may be; (6) to order the
The plaintiffs, amended their complaints in the three cases, by including additional 3621 and indicated as Parcel A, Parcel B and Parcel C, in SWO-
parties as plaintiffs, and the amended complaints were admitted by the trial court. The 40187 (Exh. "UU" and Exh. "VV");
defendant, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed a manifestation that it was reproducing and
realleging its answers to the original complaints as its answers to the amended F Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them
complaints in view of the fact that the amendments to the complaints consist merely to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels
in the inclusion of additional indispensable as well as necessary parties-plaintiffs. 4 of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No.
3623 and indicated as Parcel D and Parcel F, in SWO-40187 (Exh.
On June 7, 1962, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence, defendant J.M. "UU" and Exh. 'VV");
Tuason & Co., Inc. presented a motion to dismiss the cases upon grounds that (1) the
actions were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) that the actions barred by a prior G Ordering the Defendants and all persons claiming under them
judgment; and (3) that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence to prove their claim to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possession of the parcels
of ownership. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the third ground of its of land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No.
motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, as well 3623 and indicated in Parcel E, in SWO-491187 (Exh. "UU and
as to the motion of defendant to withdraw its third ground to dismiss. The trial court, in Exh. "VV");
an order dated December 3, 1962, granted defendant's motion to withdraw the third
ground of its motion to dismiss but denied the motion to dismiss. 5
H Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3621 the sum of P600.00 a month as actual damages for
After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to
cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: them;

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is I Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
hereby rendered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the 3623 the sum of P600.00 a month, as actual damages for
Defendants as follows: uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to
them;.
A Declaring that the decision, the decree and the title issued in
LRC No. 7681, are null and void, ab initio, and of no effect J Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
whatsoever; 3623 the sum of P150.00 a month as actual damages for
uncollected rentals from 1951 until such possession is restored to
B Declaring that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 found on them; .
page 136 Vol. A-7 of the Registration Book of Rizal is null and void
from the very beginning (and) of no effect whatsoever; K Ordering the defendants to pay the costs; .

C Declaring that all Transfer Certificates of Title emanating or L The defendants' counterclaim is hereby declared dismissed for
allegedly derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the lack of merit." 6
Province of Rizal are likewise null and void;
A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30,
D Declaring that the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said
3623 are the owners and entitled to the possession of the parcels defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal
of land claimed and described in paragraph V of their respective bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal. 7 The record on
complaints; appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by
the trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965. 8
E Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming under them
to vacate and restore to the plaintiffs the possesion of the parcels of Appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in this appeal, contends that the trial court
land described in paragraph V of the complaint in Civil Case No. committed the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in holding that the Land Registration Court IX. The trial court erred in denying and in dismissing appellant's
in GLRO No. 7681 lacked or was without jurisdiction to issue counterclaim and in sentencing appellant to pay the costs of these
decree No. 17431 for the alleged reason that: suits.

(1) The amendment to the original plan was not As stated by the trial court in its decision, "These cases involve the validity of the
published; decision and the decree issued in LRC No. 7681 resulting in the issuance of Title No.
735, and the ownership and possession of several parcels of land, claimed by the
(2) The description of Parcel 1 in the decree is plaintiffs in their respective complaints...."
not identical with the description of Parcel 1 as
applied for and as published in the Official The lower court, summarizing its findings, among others, concluded that: (1) the
Gazette; decision and the decree in LRC No. 7681 are null and void ab initio, having been
rendered without jurisdiction; (2) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant
(3) Parcel 1 as decreed is bigger in area than to the decree in LRC No. 7681 is null and void, having been issued pursuant to a void
Parcel 1 as applied for; degree; (3) Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void because the No. 17431
in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree to be valid, had not been inscribed in
accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496; (4) all Transfer Certificates
(4) A. Bonifacio Road is the only boundary on the of Title allegedly emanating and derived from the void Original Certificate of Title No.
West of Parcel 1. 735 are likewise null and void; and (5) the plaintiffs in these three civil are the owners
and entitled to the possession of the parcels of land described in their respective
II. The trial court erred in finding that the transcription of the decree complaints.
No. 17431 was not in accordance with the law and that, therefore,
said OCT 735 was a complete nullity and the land remains We have carefully examined and studied the voluminous records, and the numerous
unregistered. documentary evidence, of these three cases, and We find that the conclusions of the
trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this
III. The trial court erred in taking cognizance of these cases despite Court.
its lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.
The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 that had been declared null and void ab initio
IV. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the by the trial court covers two big parcels of land, mentioned in said title as Parcel 1,
grounds of prescription and laches, and in denying the motions to having an area of 8,778,644.10 square meters more or less, known as the Santa
dismiss filed on said grounds. Mesa Estate; and Parcel 2, having an area of 15,961,246 square meters more or
less, known as the Diliman Estate. The three parcels of land involved in Civil Case
V. The trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground No. 3621, having an aggregate area of 278,853 square meters, more or less; the two
of res judicata and in denying the motion to dismiss filed on said parcels of land involved in Civil Case No. 3622 having an aggregate area of
ground. 154,119.7 square meters, more or less; and the one parcel of land involved in Civil
Case No. 3623, having an area of 62,481 square meters, more or less, are all
included in the area of Parcel 1. 9 The trial court, in its decision, states that the identity
VI. The trial court erred in declaring null and void all certificates of of the parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is not disputed and that both the
title emanating from OCT 735. plaintiffs and the defendant admit that the parcels of land litigated are found within the
boundaries of the present Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision (Parcel 1) covered by
VII. The trial court erred in holding that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 10 It is shown in the survey plans, presented by
not a purchaser in good faith and for value. both the plaintiffs and the defendant, that the six parcels of lands involved in these
three cases are located at the northwestern portion of Parcel 1. (Exhs. UU, VV; and
Exh. 29).
VIII. The trial court erred in awarding ownership of the lands
claimed by, and in awarding damages to, the appellees.
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime in 1911
Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose
Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto On March 7, 1914 the Court of Land Registration rendered a supplemental decision
Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the Court of Land Registration an application for the declaring that, on the basis of the decision of December 29, 1913 and of the report of
registration of their title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans the Surveyor of Court of Land Registration, the applicants Mariano Severo Tuason y
accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617 square meters, de la Paz and others were the owners of the land applied for, as described in the
and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters. The application was amended plan, in the proportion mentioned in the decision, and ordering that the land
docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another application covering three other applied for be registered in the names of the applicants and that a decree of
parcels of land, docketed as LRC No. 7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set registration be issued in accordance with the decision and the amended plan. On
for hearing on November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of March 27, 1914 the Chief of the Survey Division addressed a communication to the
hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of land applied for, registration court, in connection with LRC No. 7681, suggesting that the decision of
were published in the issue of the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911 (Exh. YY). On the court of March 7, 1914 be modified such that the decree of registration be based
November 20, 1911 the Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default upon the original plan as published and not upon the amended plan (Exh. Z-3). The
against the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of Lands and the Court of Land Registration did not follow the recommendation of the Chief of the
municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte (Exh. 28). On December 23, Survey Division. On July 6, 1914 Decree of Registration No. 17431 was issued by the
1911 the court issued an order authorizing the amendment of the plan in LRC No. Chief of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Court of
7681 (Exh. 23). November 11, 1913 the applicants and the Government entered into Land Registration of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681. The decree contains the
an agreement whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the technical description of the two parcels of land in accordance with the plan as
application for registration of title over the portion known as Hacienda Diliman (Parcel amended. It appears in the decree that Parcel 1 has an area of 8,798,644.10 square
2) on condition that the roads existing on said tract of land be allowed to remain, and meters, more or less, or an increase of 27.10 square meters over the area of
it was further agreed "that the issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made 8,798,617 square meters that was stated in the application for registration and in the
subject to all the exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by notice of hearing which were published in the Official Gazette of October 25, 1911;
Section 1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land and that Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 square meters, more or less, or a
Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and LRC No. 7681 decrease of 292,791 square meters from the area of 16,254,037 square meters that
which, among others, stated that during the registration proceedings the plans was stated in the application and in the notice of hearing that were published in the
accompanying the two applications were amended in order to exclude certain areas Official Gazette (Exhs. 25 and YY). All in all, there is a decrease of 292,763.90
that were the subject of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, square meters in the aggregate area of the two parcels of land sought to be
that the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration was registered.
ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new (amended) plans had
included lands which were not by the original plans, and whether or not the new plans Subsequently, on July 8, 1914, the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued
had excluded the lands that had already been covered by the decree in LRC No. Original Certificate of Title No. 735 in the names of the applicants, Mariano Severo
3563. The decision further stated that in the event that the new plans did not include Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la
new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of the proceedings in Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la
LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional decision would be made decreeing Paz (Exh. 30).
the adjudication and registration of the lands that were the subject of the registration
proceedings in favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, one 1. We shall now deal with the first error assigned by the appellant.
sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)
undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided The lower court declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab initio
portion; and to Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided because, according to said court, that title was based on Decree of Registration No.
portion. 17431 in LRC No. 7681 that was null and void, said decree having been issued
pursuant to a decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. 7681 which had
In compliance with the order contained in the decision of December 29, 1913, the no jurisdiction to render said decision.
Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration, on January 24, 1914,
submitted a report (Exh. 22) to the court which, among others, stated that the new As We have adverted to, Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covers two big parcels of
plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did not include any land that had not been land: Parcel 1, known as the Santa Mesa Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman
previously included in the original plan. Estate. The records show that these two parcels of land had been subdivided into
numerous lots, and most of those lots had sold to numerous parties Parcel 1
having been converted into a subdivision known as the Santa Mesa Heights
Subdivision, and the lots had been sold to private individual and entities, such that in
that subdivision now are located the National Orthopedic Hospital, the station of with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third
Pangasinan Transportation Co. (Pantranco), Sto. Domingo Church, Lourdes Church parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in
and others. Necessarily, as a result of the sales of the lots into which Parcel 1 was their rights because of failure of notice. 12 But if the amendment consists in the
subdivided, transfer certificates of title were issued to the purchasers of the lots, and exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original
these transfer certificates of title were based upon transfer certificates of title that plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case,
emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The trial court declared null and the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a
void all transfer certificates of title emanating, or derived, from Original Certificate of new publication. 14
No. 735.
In the case at bar We find that the original plan covering Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 that
The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of accompanied the application for registration in LRC No. 7681 was amended in order
Title No. 735 would invalidate the title over the entire area included in Parcel 1 to exclude certain areas that were the subject of opposition, or which were the subject
which admittedly includes the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs-and also the of another registration case; and the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
title over the entire area included in Parcel 2. Let it be noted that Parcel 1 has an area Registration was ordered to determine whether the amended plan included lands or
of 8,798,644.10 square meters, more or less, and Parcel 2 has an area of 15,961,246 areas not included in the original plan. In compliance with the order of the registration
square meters, more or less; while the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs court said Chief of the Survey Division informed the court that no new parcels were
have an aggregate area of only 495,453.7 square meters, more or less. In other included in the new (or amended) plan. Thus, in the decision of the Court of Land
words, the area of the six parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs is only a little over Registration in LRC Nos. 7680 and 7681, dated December 29, 1913 (Exh. 24), We
two per cent (2%) of the aggregate area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. But the decision of read the following:
the trial court nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 785, without any qualification.
Despues de las notificaciones y avisos de las dos solicitudes en
The trial court held that the Court of Land Registration had no jurisdiction to render ambos expedientes, se enmendaron los planos unidos a los
the decision in LRC No. 7681 because during the registration proceedings, after the mismos para excluir ciertas porciones que habian sido objeto de
original application and notice of hearing had been duly published, the plan of Parcel oposicion.
1 was amended and no publication regarding the amended plan was made. The trial
court pointed out that the area and the description of Parcel 1 in Decree of xxx xxx xxx
Registration No. 17431 are not identical with the area and description of Parcel 1
applied for and published in the Official Gazette. The trial court stressed on the point
that publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court to hear POR TANTO, ratificando como por la presente se ratifica la
and decide an application for registration and to order the issuance of a decree of declaracion de rebeldia general, se ordena:
registration, as provided in Act 496 (Land Registration Act).
"1.o Que el Jefe de la Division de Agrimensores
We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court de este Tribunal terreno que no haya sido
was without jurisdiction to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of comprendido en los planos originales ...." 15
Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application
for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and On January 24, 1914, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an Registration made a report to the court (Exh. 22), from which the report We read the
application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the following:.
application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or
in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment Cumpliendo lo mandado por el Tribunal en el No. 1 de la parte
consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land dispositiva de su Decision de fecha 29 de Diciembre proximo
not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of pasado, el que suscribe, despues de un detenido estudio de los
the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give planos unidos a los Expedientes arriba citados, tiene el honor de
notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new informar:
publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of
land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of
the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly 1.o Que los nuevos planos presentados por los solicitantes
included land. 11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed corresponden a las parcelas 1.a 2.a, y 3.a, del Expedients No.
7680 y a la 1.a parcela del No. 7681, que son las mismas a que se Diliman was amended, and no publication was made of the amended plan. Regarding
refiere el plano Exhibito A del No. 7680. the question of the non-publication of the amended plan, this Court said:

xxx xxx xxx Among the arguments made by the appellants of the Bagobantay
group, it is alleged that the Torrens title relied by the plaintiff is void,
4. Que los nuevos planos presentados de las parcelas 1.a, 2.a y and in support of this contention it stated that, during the course of
3.a del Expediente 7680, y de la 1.a del 7681 no incluyen terreno the registration proceedings, an order was made by the court for
alguno que no haya sido comprendido en los planos originales. 16 the amendment of the applicants and that this order was not
followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed the court
was without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants. In this
And so, in the supplemental decision of the Court of Land Registration in LRC No. connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in the
7681, dated March 7, 1914 (Exh. 24-A), the report of the Chief of the Survey Division Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil. 122). But the
was taken into consideration and the court ordered the registration of the lands brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that the rule
applied for by the applicants as described in the amended plan ("como esta descrito stated in the case cited has reference to an amendment of the plan
en el plano enmendado"). It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 by which additional land, different from that included in the original
did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not previously included in the original plan survey is intended to be brought within the process of registration.
which accompanied the application that had been published in the Official Gazette. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the exclusion of
There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order certain portions of the land covered by the original survey, and the
to vest the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from this it does not
application for registration in LRC No. 7681 and to order the issuance of Decree of appear that the portion intended to be excluded comprehended any
Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was based. part of the land which had been usurped. 18

Way back in 1933, this Court had occasion to rule on the validity of the very same The appellees, however, asserts that the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 which the trial court had declared null and void in vs. Acua, supra, is not applicable to the three cases now before this Court because
the three cases now before this Court. In the case of the Bank of the Philippine what was involved in said case was Parcel 2 of Original Certificate of Title No. 735,
Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was and not Parcel 1 which is the land involved in these cases. This assertion of the
assailed by the appellants (Pascual Acua and others) precisely upon the ground that appellees is not correct. The decision in that case states that the action was instituted
during the registration proceedings, which brought about the issuance of Original by the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the
Certificate of Title No. 735, the original plan of the applicants was ordered amended, purpose, among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others "certain lands
and no new publication was made of the amended plan and so it was urged that the contained in the Sta. Mesa and Diliman Hacienda located in the barrios of
registration court did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of the decree of Bagobantay and Diliman in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte."
registration in favor of the applicants. The action in this case was instituted by the 19 But what matters is the doctrine that was laid down by this Court in that case that
Bank of the Philippine Islands as receiver of the Tuason Entail for the purpose, is: that when the original survey plan is amended, after the publication of the
among others, of recovering from Pascual Acua and others certain lands included in application in order to include land not previously included in the original survey, a
the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios of Bagobantay and new publication of the amended plan is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon
Diliman, in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte Province of Rizal. the registration court to order the registration of the land that is added to what was
Upon hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that none of the included in the original survey plan. The ruling of this Court in the Bank of the
defendants owned any part of the land in controversy. On appeal, this Court observed Philippine Islands case has a decisive application in the three cases now before this
that the character in which the plaintiff sued was not open to question, and the Court.
material facts were as follows: The heirs of the Tuason estate, referred to as the
Tuason Entail, held a Torrens title to a tract of land with an area of about 1,600
hectares located in the province of Rizal. This property was then covered by Transfer The trial court laid stress on the point that publication of the amended plan of Parcel 1
Certificate of Title No. 3792 issued in lieu of older certificates dating from July 8, should have been made because it appears in the Decree of Registration No. 17431,
1914. This Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3792 emanated from Or Certificate of Title and as reproduced in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, that the area of said parcel
No. 735. 17 The appellants precisely sought to nullify the title of the heirs of the is "bigger" than the area stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette;
Tuason estate, which emanated from Original Certificate of Title No. 735, upon the and, also, that the boundaries of Parcel 1 stated in the decree are not identical with
ground, as now urged by the appellees in the three cases at bar, that during the the boundaries stated in the application as published in the Official Gazette. We paid
registration proceedings the original plan of the lands known as the Sta. Mesa and particular attention on this point of the lower court's decision, and our impression is
that the trial court had exploited certain minor discrepancies between the description not even attempt to show that this excess area of 27.10 square meters is included
of Parcel 1 in the decree of registration and its description in the original application, within the parcels that they are claiming. We cannot, therefore; consider this area of
in order to bolster its ruling that "to render a decision on the amended plan, boundary 27.10 square meters as an area that was separate and distinct from, and was added
descriptions, and additional lands comprised within Parcel 1 in Decree No. 17431, a to, the land that was covered by the original survey plan, such that the publication of
republication of such amended plan, boundary description, technical description and the amended plan would be necessary in order that the registration court could
additional areas is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court." 20 acquire jurisdiction over that area. As We have pointed out, this increase of 27.10
square meters was simply the result of the recomputation of the area when the
Oddly enough, when the lower court said that the area of Parcel 1 in the decree of original plan was amended. There is no showing that the recomputation is incorrect.
registration is bigger than the area of Parcel 1 in the application as published, it did Neither is there a showing that this small area of 27.10 square meters belongs to any
not mention the fact that the difference in area is only 27.10 square meters. We person and that person had been deprived of his property, or had failed to claim that
believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of decisive particular area because of the non-publication of the amended plan. On the other
consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. hand, there is the report of the Chief of the Survey Division of the Court of Land
735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on this circumstance and Registration (Exh. 22) stating that the amended plan of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 did
made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended plan there is this increase in not include any land which was not included in the original plan.
area as compared to the area appearing in the application as published, the Land
Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to render the decision decreeing the It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan
registration of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681. The Chief of the Survey Division of the is amended during the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously
Court of Land Registration, in his report to the court of January 24, 1914 (Exh. 22), included in the original plan should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction
stated that the new plan of Parcel 1 did not include any land that was not included in on the court to order the registration of the area that was added after the publication
the original plan. That report was made precisely in compliance with the order of the of the original plan. 22
registration court, in the decision of December 29, 1913 in LRC No. 7681, to inform
the court "si los nuevos planos incluyen o no terreno que no haya sido comprendido The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction
en los planos originales". That report was submitted by the Chief Surveyor "despues over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the
de un detenido estudio de los planos unidos a los expedientes". Under the foregoing publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned
circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters was already and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had
included in the original plan, and that the computation of the area in the original included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the
survey must have been inaccurate; and the error was corrected in the recomputation registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void
of the area when the amended plan was prepared. We made a careful study and in so far but only in so far as the land not included in the publication is
comparison of the technical description of Parcel 1 appearing in the application as concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not
published, and the technical description appearing in Decree of Registration No. included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the jurisdiction of the
17431 (Exhs. 19, 19-A and Z-6), and We accept the explanation of counsel for the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that
appellant that this seeming increase of 27.10 square meters had been brought about were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title
"by the fact that when the amendment of the plan was made, the distances and had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the
bearings in a few points along the southwestern boundary (Please see Exh. 19) were certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which
brought to the nearest millimeter and to the nearest second respectively; whereas, the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction. 23
the computation of the survey in the original plan was to the nearest decimeter and to
the nearest minute only". 21 We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square
meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... And so in the three cases now before this Court, even granting that the registration
included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published court had no jurisdiction over the increased area of 27.10 square meters (as alleged
in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than by appellees), the most that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree
8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of and the certificate of title insofar as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if
27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan that area can be identified. But, certainly, the lower court could not declare, and
was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared, should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings in LRC No. 7681; and,
can not be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1. certainly, the lower court erred in declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate
of Title 735 which covers not only the supposed excess area of 27.10 square meters
but also the remaining area of 8,798,617 square meters of Parcel 1 and the entire
Moreover, no evidence was presented to identify this area of 27.10 square meters, area of 15,961,246 square meters of Parcel 2. The trial court, in its decision, declared
nor to show its location, in relation to the entire area of Parcel 1. The appellees did Original Certificate of Title No. 735 "null and void from the very beginning and of no
effect whatsoever", without any qualification. This declaration by the lower court, if As described in Decree of Registration No. 17431 (Exh. 25), the boundaries of Parcel
sanctioned by this Court and given effect, would nullify the title that covers two big 1 are as follows:
parcels of land (Parcels 1 and 2) that have a total area of 24,759,890.10 square
meters, or almost 2,476 hectares. And not only that. The trial court declared null and PARCEL 1. Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao y
void all transfer certificates of title that are derived, or that emanated, from Original Escobar, et al., (Maysilo Estate): On the E. by San Juan River; on
Certificate of Title No. 735, regardless of whether those transfer certificates of title are the SW. by properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.,
the results of transactions done in good faith and for value by the holder of those Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W.
transfer certificates of title. Rosenstock & Co.; and on the W. by a road, Cementerio del Norte
and property of the Roman Catholic Church ...
It must be noted that the appellees in the present cases claim six parcels that have an
area of some 495,453.7 square meters (about 49.5 hectares), whereas the combined It will thus be noted that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on the northern, eastern, and
area of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 is 24,759,890.10 square meters (about 2,476 hectares). western sides, as they appear in the notice of hearing that was published and in
It must also be noted that both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 have been subdivided into Decree of Registration No. 17431, are the same. It is in the southwestern boundary
numerous lots (Exhs. 14 and 14-B) which have already been acquired by numerous where there appear some differences in the names of the owners, or in the
persons and/or entities that are now holding certificates of title which can be traced designations, of the adjoining lands. Thus, in the published notice of hearing, it
back to Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The decision of the lower court, however, appears that the names of the owners, or the designations, of the lands that bound
would render useless Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and all transfer certificates Parcel 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are parcel 3, properties of Benito
of title emanating, or derived, therefrom. The decision of the lower court would Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, parcel 2, Monasterio de Santa Clara and
certainly prejudice the rights of the persons, both natural and juridical, who had parcel 1; while in the decree of registration it appears that the lands that bound Parcel
acquired portions of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, relying on the doctrine of the 1 (of LRC No. 7681) on the Southwest are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y
indefeasibility of Torrens title. The decision of the lower court would, indeed, prejudice de la Paz, et al., Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios and C.W. Rosenstock
the rights of persons who are not parties in the present cases. And this is so, because & Co. Upon a careful examination of the records, We find that the lands that adjoin
the trial court, in its decision, did not adhere to the applicable decisions of this Court Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary, as indicated in the notice of hearing that was
in resolving the pertinent issues in these cases. published in the Official Gazette, are the same lands that are indicated in the decree
of registration as the lands that adjoin Parcel 1 at its southwestern boundary. There is
Another reason mentioned by the lower court to support its ruling that Decree of simply a change in the names of the owners or in the designations, of the lands. We
Registration No. 17431 is null and void is that the description of Parcel 1 in the decree find that parcels 3, 2 and 1, appearing as the boundary lands on the southwestern
of registration is different from the description of the same parcel in the notice of side of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681, as published, are in fact parcels of land that are
hearing of the original application for registration as published in the Official Gazette. owned, and had been applied for registration, by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
The different description that appears in the decree of registration, according to the et al. in LRC No. 7680. This LRC No. 7680 was heard and decided jointly with LRC
lower court, is an amendment to the Original survey plan that accompanied the No. 7681 by the Land Registration Court (Exh. 24). These parcels 3, 2 and 1 of LRC
application and the amended survey plan should have been republished; and No. 7680, being lands owned by Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., it may as
because there was no such republication the registration court was without well be stated in the decree of registration that those lands on the southwestern side
jurisdiction to issue the decree of registration. The lower court also committed an of Parcel 1 in LRC No. 7681 are the properties of Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
error in making this ruling. We find that the lower court incorrectly laid stress on Paz, et al., instead of designating them as parcel 3, parcel 2, and parcel 1 (of LRC
differences in the names of the owners, and on differences in the designations, of the 1680). And so, what appears in Decree of Registration No. 17431 as the properties of
lands that adjoin Parcel 1 along its southwestern boundary. We find, however, that Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al., at the southwestern side of Parcel 1 are
these differences are well explained in the record. no other than those very parcels 3, 2 and 1 that appear in the notice of hearing as the
lands that bound Parcel 1 on the southwest.
In the notice of hearing in LRC No. 7681 (Exhibits YY and YY-2) the boundaries of
Parcel 1 are stated as follows: In the description of Parcel 1 as published, it appears that one of the boundaries on
the southwestern side is Santa Clara Monastery, while in the decree of registration
Bounded on the N. by property of Rosario Negrao and others the words "Santa Clara Monastery" do not appear but, instead, are replaced by the
(Maysilo Estate); E. by the San Juan River; SW. by Parcel 3, words "C. W. Rosenstock & Co." It will be remembered that during the registration
properties of Benito Legarda, Hospital de San Juan de Dios, by proceedings the plan of Parcel 1 was ordered amended, and the surveyor, who
Parcel 2, Santa Clara Monastery, by Parcel 1; and W. by a road, prepared the amended plan must have found that what used to be the property of the
Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church. Santa Clara Monastery at the time of the original Survey was already the property of
C. W. Rosenstock & Co. when the amended plan was prepared. This can simply lands on the southwestern side of Parcel 1, because those dissimilarities are well
mean that there was a change of ownership from Santa Clara Monastery to C.W. explained in the records of these cases.
Rosenstock & Co. It must be considered that the original survey took place from
December, 1910 to June, 1911 (Exhibits 18 and 19), while the registration case was The lower court committed still another error when it made the finding that the only
decided on March 7, 1914. boundary of Parcel 1 on the western side is "A. Bonifacio road" and then declared that
the lands situated west of the A. Bonifacio road were never the subject of the
Under Section 40 of Act 496, the decree of registration "shall contain a description of registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681. The lower court declared the lands west of
the land as finally determined by the court." Evidently, the Court of Land Registration A. Bonifacio road as unregistered lands and awarded the ownership of those lands to
acted in consonance with this provision of the law when, in its decision in LRC 7681, the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (appellees in G.R. Nos. L-26127 and
it took into consideration the actual description of Parcel 1 as shown in the amended L-26128). This finding of the lower court is contrary to the evidence presented by the
survey plan, and when it disregarded the recommendation of the Chief of the Survey parties in these cases. Both the appellees and the appellant submitted as their
Division, dated March 27, 1914, that the decision of the court of March 7, 1914 "be evidence the notice of hearing of the application as published in the Official Gazette
based upon the original plans, as published, and not upon the amended plan." It may (Exhibit X, YY and YY-2; and Exhibit 26) and the decree of registration No. 17431
well be said that Decree of Registration N. 17431 simply contains the correct area of (Exhibit Y, and Exh. 25) wherein are clearly stated that the boundaries of Parcel 1 on
Parcel 1 and the correct names of the owners of the lands that bound Parcel 1 in LRC the West are: (1) a road, (2) Cementerio del Norte and (3) Roman Catholic Church
No. 1681 as of the time when the decision of the land registration court was rendered. (Exhs. Z-6, UU, and Exhs. 6, 18, 19 and 20). But the lower court considered the A.
Bonifacio road as the only boundary on the West, and ignored the two other
In this connection, the following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Domingo boundaries on the West that are mentioned both in the notice of hearing as published
vs. Ongsiako, 55 Phil. 361, 373-4, is pertinent: and in the decree of registration. The sketches and the survey plans, forming part of
the evidence on record, show that the road, labelled as "A. Bonifacio", goes alongside
the western boundary of Parcel 1 (separating Parcel 1 and the Cementerio del Norte),
We may further observe that underlying the contention of the until it reaches a point where it traverses the northwestern portion of Parcel 1, such
plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of that from the point where it enters the area of Parcel 1 what is left as the boundaries
registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which on the western side are the Cementerio del Norte and the Roman Catholic Church
is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all (Exhibits UU, VV, 17, 19 and 29). Ignoring the existence of the Cementerio del Norte
plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to and the Roman Catholic Church as the other boundaries of Parcel 1 on the West, the
errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been lower court declared that the lands west of the A. Bonifacio road, which form part of
permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the lands that are claimed by the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622, are
the land registered can be determined, the technical description in outside the boundary of Parcel 1 on the west and that those particular areas had
the certificate of title may be corrected without cancelling the remained as unregistered lands and are not covered by Original Certificate of Title
decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved No. 735. This finding of the lower court is contrary to the very admission of the
surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify appellees in these three cases that all the lands (six parcels in all) that they claim are
and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical included in the area of Parcel 1 mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. In
descriptions would lead to chaos. paragraph XIV of the original, as well as in the amended complaint, in each of these
three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the lands that they claim "had either been
We have taken note of the fact that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the fraudulently or erroneously included ... in Parcel 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) of
plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court are on the northwestern portion of the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the Province of Rizal."
24 In their appeal brief, the appellees categorically stated that "Both the appellees and
Parcel 1 (parcels labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, in Exh. UU; and Exhs. 17, 29 and 29-
B). They are far from the southwestern boundary. The circumstance, therefore, the appellant admit that these parcels of land claimed by the plaintiffs in these three
regarding the dissimilarity in the names of the owners, or the designations, of the (3) civil cases are located within Parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) covered by Original
lands that adjoin the southwestern side of Parcel 1 is of no moment insofar as the lots Certificate of Title No. 735". 25 In the pre-trial order of the lower court of December 18,
claimed by appellees are concerned. What matters is that the lots claimed by the 1957, it was stated that the parcels of land litigated in these are portions of the lands
appellees are included in Parcel 1 of LRC No. 1681 and are located at the covered by OCT No. 735. 26 The lower court itself, at the earlier part of its decision,
northwestern portion of said Parcel 1. Indeed, it was error on the part of the lower stated that "both the plaintiffs and the defendants admit that the parcels of land
court to make as one of the bases in declaring Decree of Registration No. 17431 and litigated in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are found within the boundaries of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void and of no effect whatsoever the the present Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision covered by Original Certificate of Title
aforestated dissimilarities in the names of the owners, or in the designations, of the No. 735" 27 The appellees in these two cases had never asserted that part of the
lands that they claim are outside the boundaries of Parcel 1, nor did they assert that
part of the lands that they claim have remained unregistered and not covered by SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year,
Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The lower court had made a finding not only hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the clerk. It
contrary to the evidence of the appellees but even more than what the appellees shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if
asked when it said in its decision that the western boundary of Parcel 1 is only the A. married, the name of the husband or wife. If the owner is under
Bonifacio road and that the lands claimed by the appellees west of this road had disability, it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a minor,
never been registered. This Court certainly can not give its approval to the findings shall state his age. It shall contain a description of the land as
and rulings of the lower court that are patently erroneous. finally determined by the court , . . The decree shall be stated in a
convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of title
2. The lower court also erred when it declared Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null hereinafter mentioned.
and void upon the ground that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the
Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496. In its Section 29 of Act 496 provides that as soon as the decree of title has been registered
decision, the lower court said: in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in Section forty-one, the property
included in said decree shall become registered land under the Act. Section 42 of Act
During the trial, the Book of Original Certificate of Title was brought 496 provides that the certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of
to the Court. The Court had occasion to see and examine the the decree.
`ENTRY' made in the Registration Book. The Court found that the
Face of the Title which, under ordinary circumstances, should be This Court has held that as defined in Section 41 of Act 496, the certificate of title is
Page 1 is found as Page 2. The sheet containing the technical the transcript of the decree of registration made by the register of deeds in the
description which should be page 2 is Page 1. The FACE of the registry. 29
Title, which should have been Page 1, contained the last portion of
the description of the land described in the decree. The sheet The appellant presented as evidence a photostat of Original Certificate of Title No.
containing the bulk of the description of the lands decreed should 735, as found in the Registration Book in the office of the register of deeds of Rizal
have been Page 2. The so-called Original Certificate of Title No. (Exhibit 50). 30 We have examined this document very carefully, and We find that it is
735 found on Page 138, Book A-7 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal a copy of the original that satisfies all the requirements of a valid Torrens title as
is, therefore, null and void because the provisions of Section 41 of provided for in Sections 40 and 41 of Act 496.
the Land Registration Law have not been complied with. Said
Section requires that the entry in the Registration Book must be a
transcription of the Decree and the paging should consist of a leaf On the face, or on the first page, of this title, there is the certification of the Chief of
or leaves in consecutive order .... 28 the Land Registration Office that the decree of registration was registered in Manila
on July 6, 1914 at 7:41 a.m.; and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
that the decree was received for transcription in his office on July 8, 1914 at 3:30 P.M.
The pertinent provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 reads, as follows: It is also stated on the face of this title that it was entered pursuant to Decree No.
17431 of the Court of Land Registration, dated at Manila on the 7th day of March
SEC. 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the 1914, in Case No. 7681 of said court. The names of the declared owners, their civil
registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified copy of status, their spouses if married, and their respective interest or share in the lands
such decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, covered by the title are stated on the face of this title. We have noted that the
who shall prepare the decree in accordance with section forty of Act technical descriptions of the lands (Parcels 1 and 2) covered by the title are copied on
numbered four hundred and ninety-six, and he shall forward a the sheets constituting the title. We have compared the technical descriptions of
certified copy of said decree to the register of deeds of the province Parcels 1 and 2 as they appear on this photostat of Original Certificate of Title No.
or city in which the property is situated. The register of deeds shall 735 (Exhibit 50) with the technical descriptions of these lands as they appear in the
transcribe the decree in a book to be called the "Registration Book" decree of registration (Exhibit Y for the plaintiffs, and Exhibit 25 for the defendant),
in which a leaf, or leaves in consecutive order, shall be devoted and We find that the technical descriptions appearing on the title are the complete
exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in and faithful reproduction, or transcription, of the technical descriptions appearing in
this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and the decree of registration.
shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office....
We have noted what the lower court found, that the technical descriptions of Parcels
The pertinent provisions of Section 40 of Act 496 reads, as follows: 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a technical
33;
description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and
this title is the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical indisputable. 34
descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page.
This circumstance, that is, that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1 and 2 do not We, therefore, hold that the formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration
begin on the face, or on the first page, of the title, is the basis of the lower court in No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not render null and void Original Certificate of
ruling that the decree of registration was not transcribed in the registration book in Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of land (Parcel 1 which
accordance with Section 41 of Act 496, and so Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is includes the lands claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by Original
null and void. We have noted, however, that in its decision the lower court made no Certificate of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens System of
mention that in the transcription of the decree in the registration book any of the data registration.
that is required in Section 40 of Act 496 to be included had been omitted. We have
also noted and this fact is undenied that the technical descriptions of Parcels 1
and 2 as they appear in Decree of Registration No. 17431 are fully and faithfully 3. The principal issue that has to be resolved in the present appeal is whether or not
transcribed on the photostat of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 (Exhibit 50). There the lower court had correctly declared that "Original Certificate of Title No. 735 ... is
is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that null and void from the very beginning and of no effect whatsoever. 35
photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead.
Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration In the preceding discussions, We have held that the lower court erred when it
Book, and also as copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that declared null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. We have found that the
the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first registration proceedings that brought about the decree of registration upon which was
page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said based the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were in accordance with the
certificate of title. We agree with the lower court that the transcription of the technical provisions of Act 496, as amended. We have held that the Land Registration Court
descriptions should begin, or should have been started, on the face, or on the first that ordered the issuance of the decree of registration had jurisdiction to hear and
page, of the title. We hold, however, that the fact that this was not so done in the case decide the application for registration filed by Mariano Severo, Teresa Eriberta, Juan
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 should not be taken as a factor in determining Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, and Augusto Huberto, all surnamed Tuason y de la Paz.
the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This defect in the manner of The records show that the notice of hearing of the application, which embodied the
transcribing the technical descriptions should be considered as a formal, and not a technical descriptions of the two parcels of land (Parcel 1, known as the Sta. Mesa
substantial, defect. What matters is that the original certificate of title contains the full Estate, and Parcel 2, known as the Diliman Estate), was duly published as required
transcription of the decree of registration, and that the required data provided for in by law. The records show that the hearing on the application was regularly held, and
Section 40 of Act 496 are stated in the original certificate of title. The lower court that the registration court had seen to it that no land which was not included in the
made a literal construction of the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 and strictly original survey plan and not covered by the original application was made the subject
applied its construction in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate of of the registration proceedings. We have found that the decree of registration was
Title No. 735. We believe that the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 should be properly issued by the Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the Land
interpreted liberally, in keeping with Section 123 of said Act which provides that "This Registration Court, and that said decree of registration was fully transcribed in the
Act shall be construed liberally so far as may be necessary for the purpose of Registration Book in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. We
effecting its general intent." If We adopt a literal construction of the provisions of have found also that the six parcels of land that are claimed by the appellees. in the
Section 41 of Act 496, as was done by the lower court, such that the defect in the three cases now before Us are all included in Parcel 1 that is covered by Original
manner or form of transcribing the decree in the registration book would render null Certificate of Title No. 735.
and void the original certificate of title, then it can happen that the validity or the
invalidity of a certificate of title would depend on the register of deeds, or on the In view of Our findings and conclusion that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was
personnel in the office of the register of deeds. The register of deeds, or an employee issued in accordance with the provisions of Act 496, and that the six parcels of land
in his office, can wittingly or unwittingly render useless a decree of registration that are claimed by the appellees in the present cases are covered by said certificate
regularly issued pursuant to a decision of a registration court and thus nullify by the of title, what is left for this Court to decide is whether or not the appellees still have
error that he commits in the transcription of the decree in the Registration Book an any legal right over the six parcels of land that they claim.
original certificate of title that has been existing for years. This strict interpretation or
construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly not promote the purpose of the
Land Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the Let it be noted that, as maintained by counsel for the appellees, the action of the
absolute title over a given landed property 31; to make, so far as it is possible, a appellees is principally to recover the ownership and possession of the six parcels of
certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such land mentioned and described in their complaints. The appellees would accomplish
title 32; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title their objective through alternative ways: (1) secure the nullification of the decision of
the Land Registration Court in LRC No. 6781, the nullification of the Decree of title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government
Registration No. 17431 and the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735; (2) and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or
if they fail in their efforts to secure the desired nullifications, with Original Certificate of citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern", and such
Title No. 735 being considered valid and effective, they seek the reconveyance to decree will not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
them by the defendants named in their complaints, including herein appellant J.M. person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment
Tuason & Co., Inc., of the six parcels of land that they claim; and (3) if they cannot or decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of
secure a reconveyance, they seek to secure payment to them by the defendants any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in
named in their complaints of the actual value of the six parcels of land that they claim. the competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after entry of
the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the
It appears to Us that the appellees are not sure of their stand, or have not adopted a land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree, or the certificate
definite stand, in asserting the rights that they claim. of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). In the
case now before Us, the Decree of Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered
on July 8, 1914. It is undisputed that no person had filed any petition for review of the
It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he decree of registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from July 8, 1914.
claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize That decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant
the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.
may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still
registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No
action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title Moreover, innocent purchases for value had acquired interest in the lands covered by
over the registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can Original Certificate of Title No. 735. 37
be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the person
(or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name. 36 The Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued on July 8, 1914 in the names of
the original an applicants for registration, namely, Mariano Tuason y de la Paz,
The lower court accepted, and sustained, the assertion of the appellees that the Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio
proceedings in LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration were null and void Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz and Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. Herein
and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void ab initio and of no effect. appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is not one of those who were registered as the
The trial court even went to the extent of declaring that some of the parcels of land original owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735. When the original
claimed by the appellees in Civil Cases Nos. 3621 and 3622 (now G.R. Nos. L-26127 complaints were filed in these three cases in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the
and L-26128 before this Court) were not covered by Original Certificate of Title No. parties named defendants in each of the three cases were Mariano Severo Tuason y
735. The lower court forthwith declared the appellees the owners of the parcels of de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz,
land claimed by them, as described in their complaints. Strangely enough, the lower Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusta Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, the
court, upon declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void, did not make heirs of each one of these defendants (without naming them), and J.M. Tuason & Co.,
any statement, or observation, regarding the status or situation of the remaining lands Inc. Of all the defendants named in the three complaints only defendant J.M. Tuason
(Parcels 1 and 2) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 after adjudicating to & Co., Inc. appeared and filed its answer to the complaints. All the other defendants
the appellees the six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints. did not appear, and so they were all declared in default. 38 It had to happen that way
because as of the time when the three complaints were filed on May 19, 1955 the
ownership of Parcel 1 that was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
In the present appeal counsel for the appellees had maintained, and has endeavored 735 had already passed to defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. In fact this defendant
to show, that the lower court was correct in annulling Original Certificate of Title No. had caused Parcel 1 to be subdivided and had sold the subdivision lots.
735 and in adjudicating in favor of the appellees the ownership and possession of the
six parcels of land claimed by them in their complaints.
The records show that Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was part of the
properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason (Tuason Entail) which became involved in a
But, as hereinbefore held by Us, the lower court erred in declaring Original Certificate litigation in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 39 During the pendency of the case
of Title No. 735 void and of no effect. We have held that Original Certificate of Title the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason were administered by the Bank of the
No. 735 was issued as a result of the registration proceedings in LRC No, 7681 which Philippine Islands as the judicial receiver. In the order of the Court of First Instance of
was regular and that said certificate of title is valid and effective. The proceedings in Manila, dated May 5, 1938, in Civil Case No. 24803, the Bank of the Philippine
LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision Islands, as receiver, was authorized, directed and ordered to execute, upon payment
rendered in said registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted to it of the sum of P763,925.75, a deed of transfer and assignment in favor of the
Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Another reason given by the lower court in declaring appellant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
31997, which was originally Parcel 1 included in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 Inc. a buyer in bad faith is that when said appellant bought Parcel 1 originally covered
(Exh. 13-B). On June 13, 1938 the receiver Bank of the Philippine Islands executed by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 it was aware of the fact that the appellees or
the deed of transfer and assignment (Exh. 13-A). Transfer Certificate of Title No. their predecessors in interest were in possession of, and were cultivating, the six
34853 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal was forthwith issued in the name of the Heirs parcels of land that they now claim in these cases. The conclusion of the lower court
of D. Tuason, Inc. (Exhs. 12-b and 36). The deed of transfer and assignment was is too strained. It should be remembered that the registered property bought by J.M.
approved by the court in an order dated June 17, 1938. This conveyance to the Heirs Tuason & Co., Inc. had an area of some 879 hectares. It could happen that certain
of D. Tuason, Inc. took place at a time when the Supreme Court had already decided relatives or ancestors of appellees had been squatting on some portions of the land
the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 Phil. 183) wherein this Court and claimed certain areas as their own, to the extent of having the areas claimed by
upheld the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 and also the validity of the them declared for taxation purposes in their names. Thus the appellees presented in
transfer certificate of title emanating therefrom. 40 evidence tax declarations that appear to have taken effect as of 1941. We have
noted, however, that at the back of those tax declarations are written the words "This
The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of the parcel is a duplicate of the land under Tax No. 764-J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc." (Exhs.
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 which was formerly Parcel E-Alcantara, F-Alcantara, FF-1-Benin, GG-Benin, HH-Benin, BBB-Pili, and BBB-1-
1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 clearly indicate that said Pili). 41 These annotations simply reveal that when the predecessors of the appellees
corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith and for had those tax declarations made to cover the lands that they claim, those lands were
value. On June 15, 1938 the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same property to already included in the tax declaration of appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Appellant
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had been exercising, and asserting, its proprietary rights
name of the latter (Exhs. 12-c and 37). over the lands in question after it bought the same from the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. 42
This is borne by the statement in the order, dated September 26, 1955, issued by
Judge Juan P. Enriquez who at the time was presiding the branch of the Court of First
The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a Instance of Rizal where these three were pending, as follows:
purchaser in bad faith. We do not find any evidence in the record that would sustain
such a finding of the lower court. One reason given by the lower court in declaring
appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser in bad faith is the fact that the 3. It having been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co. had title covering
incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. and the incorporators of J. M. Tuason & the land in question which they are subdividing into small lots for
Co., Inc. were practically the same persons belonging to the same Tuason family. We sale and in view of the observation under paragraph 2 hereof the
do not see anything wrong if some incorporators of the Heirs of D. Tuason Inc. are Court finds that there is no justifiable reason to maintain the writ of
also incorporators of the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. During these days when businesses preliminary injunction that has been issued. This is particularly true
are promoted, operated, and managed, through corporate entities, it is not surprising in Civil Case No. 2622, defendants having secured a final judgment
to see two or more corporations organized by the same persons or group of persons against plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara for ejectment
with different purposes, for different lines of business and with distinct or separate before the Municipal court of Quezon City; and such injunction
assets and interests. Besides, as has been shown, the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. would annul the order of the execution issued by the Quezon City
acquired the land (Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of Title No. 735) from the Bank of courts. It should be noted that the herein plaintiffs at the beginning
the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a pleaded to the Court that the area on which their respective houses
sale that was authorized, and subsequently approved, by the court. The Heirs of D. stand be not touched and their possession thereof be respected by
Tuason, Inc. paid the sum of P763,950.80 for the property. Certainly if the Heirs of D. defendant J. M. & Co. In other words, each plaintiff is merely asking
Tuason, Inc. had acquired the land originally covered by Original Certificate of Title for about 250 square meters each which represents the land on
No. 735 in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a valuable which the house stands and their immediate yard, and not the
consideration, thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good whole land covered by these three or 68 hectares. On the other
faith and for value, the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold hand, the Court requires J. M. Tuason & Co. to put up a bond of
same property to the latter was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was P2,000 in favor of each of the defendant (sic) to answer for
also a purchaser in good faith and for value even if it appears that the whatever damages he may suffer by reason of the continuance
incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family. The records during the action of the acts complained
of these cases are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel of. 43
1 in question by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was
fraudulent. Besides, the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing
against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now in It has been shown that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had acquired a valid title
question. From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no over the land which includes the six parcels that are claimed by the appellees. The
possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by said original fact, that the predecessors in interest of the appellees or any person, for that
certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of title derived from matter had not filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration in LRC
said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the No. 7681 within a period of one year from July 8, 1914 when the decree of
lands covered by the certificate of title. In this connection, let it be noted that appellant registration was issued, is a circumstance that had forever foreclosed any proceeding
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. became the registered owner of Parcel 1, which was for the review of said decree. As We have adverted to, that decree of registration had
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, only on June 15, 1938, or become incontrovertible. An action, similar to one brought by the appellees in each of
almost 24 years after Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued. the present cases, which attack collaterally the said decree of registration cannot be
entertained. 46 Neither may the action of the appellees for reconveyance of the lands
It can well be said that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had relied on the title of the Heirs of in question be entertained because such action had already prescribed, barred by
D. Tuason, Inc. when it bought the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title laches, considering that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been issued way
No.34853, and the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. likewise had relied on the title of the back in 1914 and the complaint in the present cases were filed only on May 19, 1955,
Mayorasgo Tuason (Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, et al.) when it bought the or after a lapse of some 41 years. Moreover, as of the time when these complaints
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31997 from the judicial receiver, duly were filed the six parcels of land claimed by the appellees are no longer covered by
authorized and approved by the court. We, therefore, can not agree with the lower the certificate of title in the names of the persons who procured the original
court when it declared appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. a purchaser on bad faith. registration of those lands. The title to Parcel 1, which includes the six parcels of land
claimed by the appellees, had passed to the hands parties who were innocent
purchase for value. This Parcel 1 which was one of the two parcels originally covered
The evidence shows that appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had converted the land by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was subsequently covered by Transfer
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, including the six parcels Certificate of Title No. 31997. As has been shown, this Parcel 1 was part of the
claimed by appellees into a subdivision, and numerous persons and entities had properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason and it was conveyed by order of the court in Civil
purchased the subdivision lots, and the purchasers in turn were issued transfer Case No. 24803 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to the Heirs of D. Tuason,
certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, based on the transfer certificate Inc., and the latter in turn conveyed the same to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. Transfer
of title in the name of J. M Tuason & Co., Inc. The buyers of the lots relied upon the Certificate of Title No. 34853 in the name of the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. was
certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid for cancelled and transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of J. M.
the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of Tuason & Co., Inc. It has also been shown that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even converted Parcel 1 to a subdivision. Numerous persons and entities bought those
churches. But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances, declared null and subdivision lots, and to those buyers were issued transfer certificates of title covering
void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from Original the lots that they acquired. It is very clear, therefore, that an action for reconveyance
Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And cannot prosper against appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., much less against the
the error is compounded when the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., registered owners of the lots that form parts of the six parcels of land that are claimed
Inc. and all those claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the by the appellees. 47
appellees the possession of the parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the
present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in
question, and who hold certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not Neither may the appellees have a cause of Action for damages against appellant J.
parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their M. Tuason & Co., Inc., considering that said appellant is not one of the original
titles and compel them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to registered owners that procured the registration of the land. There is no evidence that
the decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had anything to do with the registration proceedings which
process of law. 44 The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled brought about the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 even supposing
doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by that the registration was procured fraudulently.
the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and
incontrovertible. 45 4. Numerous cases have been decided by this Court, dealing on questions regarding
the validity and ineffectiveness of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The rulings of
In view of the foregoing discussions, it is obvious that the action of the appellees in this Court in those cases are necessarily relevant to, and of decisive bearing in, the
the three cases now before this Court must fail.. resolution of the issues involved in the three cases now at bar.
(a) We have earlier cited the case of the Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua (59 described in their complaint in favor of the plaintiffs, that the defendants' certificate of
Phil., 183), where the jurisdiction of the Court of Land Registration that issued the title be cancelled and the corresponding certificate be ordered issued in the names of
decree which was the basis of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was questioned, the plaintiffs. We quote from the decision:
and this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the registration court and categorically
pronounced the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. The material allegations of the complaint are: that plaintiffs are
owners of the parcels of land set forth in their complaint, which
(b) There is the case of Jose Alcantara, et al., versus Mariano Tuason y de la Paz, et parcels are situated along Bonifacio street, barrio of San Jose,
al. (G.R. No. L-4998, Mar. 13, 1953, 92 Phil. 796), where this Court declared that Quezon City, and that they have been in actual, open, and
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is incontrovertible and is conclusive against all continuous possession and enjoyment thereof without molestation
persons claiming, either by themselves or by their predecessors in interest, rights from defendants from time immemorial to the present; that on July
over the lands covered by said certificate of title. 8, 1914, defendants obtained a certificate of title (No. 735) over a
parcel of land, which included the lands by plaintiffs, and which they
We find that the Alcantara case is intimately related to the three cases at bar, and the and their ancestors had been enjoying as owners more than 30
rulings of this Court in that former case are of decisive application to these three years before the issuance of said title; that on June 23, 1950,
cases. defendants caused the removal of two houses of plaintiffs on the
land; and that defendants did not file any action against plaintiffs
before the inclusion of the lands in their title, in violation of the "due
On August 29, 1950 a complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal process of law" clause of the Constitution. There are other
(Quezon City Branch) by Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, Pascual Pili, Alejandro de Dios, allegations which really are arguments of legal discussion, thus:
Tomas Bagagonio, Quintina Sandoval, and Tomasa Lazaro against Mariano Tuason that defendants could not acquire title by the registration
y de la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, proceedings against the lawful holder, especially without formal
Inc. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-156. It will be noted that three of the notice, because registration is to confirm title, not to acquire it; that
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, namely, Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual the silence of the defendants since the issuance of their title shows
Pili, are among the original plaintiffs in the three cases now before this Court; Elias that this does not express the lawful status of their claim, etc. The
Benin, in Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara, in Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
Pili, in Civil Case No. 3623. Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs states no of action and that, if it does, the same is barred by the
in that Civil Case No. Q-156 claimed that they were the lawful owners of six (of the statute of limitations. The court sustained this motion on the second
ten) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of their complaint Jose Alcantara ground. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with
claiming two parcels, Elias Benin claiming three parcels, and Pascual Pili claiming the same substantial allegations, but with new ones, i.e., that it was
one parcel. Substantially, it is alleged in the complaint 48 that each plaintiff, by himself in January, 1950, that they learned that their lands were included in
and by his predecessors in interest, as lawful owner, had been in the actual, open the registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of
and continuous possession of his own respective parcel, or parcels, of land from time defendants' title; that defendants never claimed ownership to the
immemorial until January 1950 when the defendants by force and by the use of lands, but directly or indirectly allowed plaintiffs to continue
armed men started to convert their lands into a subdivision; that on July 8, 1914 the exercising their rights of ownership over the same. This amended
defendants had obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 735 over a parcel of land complaint was denied admission, and the motion for the
which included the lands possessed by them (plaintiffs) and which they and their reconsideration of the order of dismiss was also denied. Hence the
ancestors had been enjoying as owners, for more than thirty years before the appeal.
issuance of the title; that the silence and inaction of the defendants since the date of
their original certificate of title showed that said certificate of title did not express the
status of the their claim to the said parcels, that plaintiffs were not given formal notice In affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint, this Court held:
by the defendants of the registration of the lands, such that defendants' certificate of
title No. 735 was not in accordance with law, and that defendants did not have proper Without considering whether the trial court's refusal to admit the amended complaint
title for registration to the parcels of land owned by the plaintiffs, as described in the is erroneous or not we are constrained to hold that the dismissal of the action, even
complaint; and that because the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds was with the amended complaint is a basis thereof, is correct. From the allegations of both
still in the names of the defendants, successors in interest of the Tuasons y de la the original and amended complaints, it appears that the defendants are holders of a
Paz, and has not passed to innocent parties for valuable consideration, the certificate of title issued on July 8, 1914 as a consequence of registration
conveyance of the same to the plaintiffs was in order. The plaintiffs prayed that proceedings. There is no allegation in both original and amended complaints that the
therein defendants be ordered to execute deeds of conveyance of the parcels of land plaintiffs were not notified, or were not aware, of the registration proceedings. It is
presumed, therefore, that as occupants proper notices thereof were served on them Candido Pili, the alleged owner of the one parcel of land described in the complaint
and that they were aware of said proceedings. If this is so, then the plaintiffs, who and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
were, or whose predecessors in interest were, on the land during the registration
proceedings, were bound by said proceedings. The latter are in rem and bind the In those three cases, in the court below, herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
whole world, whether served with notice personally or not. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, (defendant therein) filed a motion to dismiss upon the principal ground "that the cause
17 Phil., 49). And the decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title of action (assuming there is one) is barred by prior judgment, or by the statute of
was issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive against the limitation". In its motion to dismiss J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. contended that the
plaintiffs. (Section 38, Land Registration Act). The supposed right of plaintiffs by decision of the Supreme Court in the Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the
reason of their alleged continued possession for thirty years was, therefore, destroyed plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the Court of the First Instance of
fully and completely by the registration proceedings, and their supposed ignorance of Rizal. The lower court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. In its answer to the
the inclusion of the lands can not exclude them from the effects of the registration complaint in each of these three cases, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. set up as affirmative
proceedings, and the supposed conduct of defendants in allowing plaintiffs to defenses the very grounds of its motion to dismiss. After the plaintiffs had closed their
continue on the land after registration can not serve as basis of any title or right direct evidence, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed another motion to dismiss upon the
thereto, because acts of a possessory character by tolerance of an owner does not ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and by a prior
constitute possession (Article 1942, Spanish Civil Code), and because no title to judgment, and that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence to prove their claim of
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by ownership. This second motion to dismiss was also denied by the lower court. 49
prescription or adverse possession (Section 46, Land Registration Act).
In its decision, which is now on appeal before this Court, the lower court held that the
Thus, in the Alcantara case, as in the Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Acua case, decision in the Alcantara case was not a bar to the action in these three cases, ruling
supra, this Court upheld the validity of the registration proceedings which culminated that there is no identity, of the parties, of the subject matter, and of the cause of
in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This Court declared that "the action, between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621,
decree of registration, in pursuance of which defendants' title was issued, binds the 3622, and 3623, on the other.
land and quiets title thereto and is conclusive against the plaintiffs." In other words, in
virtue of that decision, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156, among them Jose
Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, and their successors-in-interest, could no It is now contended by appellant J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., in the present appeal, that
longer question the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, nor claim any right "the trial court erred in not dismissing these cases on the ground of res judicata and in
of ownership over any portion of the land that is covered by said certificate of title. denying the motion to dismiss filed on said ground." 50

But Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara, and Pascual Pili again came to court to claim Does the judgment in the aforementioned Alcantara case operate as a bar to the
ownership over portions of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735. action of the appellees in the three cases at bar?
On May 19, 1955 Elias Benin, joined by his brother Victor Benin and his sister Marta
Benin, filed Civil Case No. 3621; Jose Alcantara joined by his brother Juan Alcantara, In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be
filed Civil Case No. 3622; and Pascual Pili, joined by his sister Luisa Pili, filed Civil present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a
Case No. 3623. These are the three cases which originated in the Court of First court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) which are now before this Court on appeal. judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs.
In the earlier part of this decision, We have pointed out that the complaints in these Cardona, 70 Phil. 281-283).
three cases had been amended so as to include as parties plaintiffs all the heirs of
the persons who were alleged to be the owners of the parcels of land claimed by the We find that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998) is a final
plaintiffs in each case. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 3621 was amended to judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
include all the heirs of Sixto Benin, the alleged owner of the three parcels of land subject matter and over the parties. The only requisite for res judicata which we have
described in the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs to determine is whether between Civil Case Q-156 (G.R. No. 4998), on the one hand,
in the case. The complaint in Civil Case No. 3622 was amended to include all the and Civil Cases Nos. 8621, 3622 and 3623 (G.R. Nos. L-26127, 26128 and 26129),
heirs of Bonoso Alcantara, the alleged owner of the two parcels of land described in on the other, there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
the complaint and the common predecessor in interest of all the plaintiffs in the case.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 3623 was amended to include all the heirs of
In our examination of the records and the evidence, We find that there is identity of After a careful study, We are of the considered view that the judgment in the
subject matter. In the lower court's pretrial order dated December 18, 1957, which Alcantara case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Elias Benin
was based on the agreement of the parties, it is stated in Civil Case No. 3621 (G.R. No. 26127), of plaintiff Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No.
3622 (G.R. No. 26128), and of plaintiff Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. 3623 (G. R. No.
That the parcels of land in litigation in Case No. Q-156 are 26129) under the doctrine of res adjudicata. We are likewise of the considered view
substantially identical to the same parcels of land litigated in them that the decision in the Alcantara case would serve to rule out the action of the other
cases Nos. 3621, 8622 and plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 under the doctrine of stare decisis.
3623. 51
In Civil Case No. 3621 the original plaintiffs were Victor Benin, Marta Benin, and Elias
We also find that there is identity of cause of action. It is apparent, upon reading the Benin--two brothers and a sister. In the amended complaint it was alleged that these
original complaint (Exhibit 1) in Civil Case Q-156 and the decision in the Alcantara three original plaintiffs had another brother, and another sister, namely Esteban Benin
case (G.R. No. L-4998), that the cause of action in Civil Case Q-156 was based on and Felipa Benin. But because all the five Benin brothers and sisters died, they were
the alleged fact that the defendants had dispossessed and deprived the plaintiff all substituted by their heirs, such that as of the time when Civil Case No. 3621 was
therein of the parcels of land described in the complaint, which were claimed by the decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Victor Benin; (2) the heirs of Marta Benin;
plaintiffs as their own and of which they had been in actual, open and continuous (3) the heirs of Elias Benin; (4) the heirs of Esteban Benin, and (5) the heirs of Felipa
possession from time immemorial, and that said lands were wrongly included in Benin.
Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In the three cases at
bar, plaintiffs (now appellees) also complain of having been dispossessed and In Civil Case No. 3622 the original plaintiffs were Juan Alcantara and Jose Alcantara.
deprived by the defendants of the parcels of land of which they were absolute owners Juan Alcantara died, and he was substituted by his heirs, such that as of the time
and possessors, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, since time Civil Case No. 3622 was decided the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Juan Alcantara,
immemorial and that their said lands wrongly included in Parcel 1 of Original and (2) Jose A. Alcantara.
Certificate of Title No. 735 that was obtained by the defendants. In Civil Case No. Q-
156, on the one hand, and in the three cases now at bar, on the other, the plaintiffs In Civil Case No. 3623 the original plaintiffs were Pascual Pili and Luisa Pili. In the
therein seek the nullification of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, and the amended complaint, it was alleged that Luisa Pili and Pascual Pili had two brothers
reconveyance to them of the parcels of land that they claim as theirs. 52 It appears who were already dead, namely, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili, so they were substituted
clear to Us that in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in the three cases at bar, the object or by their heirs. Luisa Pili died, and she was substituted by her heirs, such that as of the
purpose of the plaintiffs is to recover the ownership and possession of the same time Civil Case No. 3623 was decided, the plaintiffs were: (1) the heirs of Diego Pili;
parcels of land. (2) the heirs of Manuel Pili; (3) the heirs of Luisa Pili, and (4) Pascual Pili.

As far as the parties are concerned, We find that there is no exact identity of parties It would thus appear that of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 Elias Benin is the only
between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
and 3623, on the other. It appears that of the plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 3622 Jose E. Alcantara, who is still living, is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil
and 3623 only Elias Benin, Jose Alcantara and Pascual Pili were plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-156; of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 Pascual Pili, who is still living,
Case No. Q-156. In Civil Case No. Q-156, the defendants were Mariano Tuason y de is the only one who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-156.
la Paz, Heirs of Mariano Tuason, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc.,
while in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 the defendants were Mariano Severo,
Teresa Eriberta, Juan Jose, Demetrio Asuncion, Augusta Huberto, all surnamed It being Our finding that the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998-the
Tuason y de la Paz (the persons appearing as registered owners in Original Alcantara case) is a final judgment on the merits that was rendered by a court that
Certificate of Title No. 735), their heirs, and J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. We find that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, and that there is identity
the natural persons surnamed Tuason, and the heirs, refer to the persons who belong of subject matter and cause of action between Civil Case No. Q-156, on the one
to the Tuason family that secured the registration of Parcel 1 in Original Certificate of hand, and Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622, and 3623, on the other; and it appearing that
Title No. 735. The defendant Gregorio Araneta Inc. in Civil Case No. Q-156 is the Elias Benin is a party-plaintiff both in Civil Case Q-156 and Civil Case No. 3621; that
administrator of the Tuason properties. So, the parties defendants in all these cases Jose Alcantara is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case No.
are practically the same. We find, however, that in Civil Case No. Q-156 as well as in 3622; that Pascual Pili is a party-plaintiff in both Civil Case No. Q-156 and Civil Case
Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, it was the defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. No. 3623; and that the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-156 and in Civil Cases Nos.
that actually controverted the claims of the plaintiffs. 3621, 3622 and 3623 are practically the same persons and/or entities, We hold that
the doctrine of bar by a previous judgment or res adjudicata squarely applies to Elias
Benin, or to his heirs and successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3621; to Jose different from that claimed by Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-156. They all claim the
Alcantara and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3622; and to same right, based on the alleged ownership of their respective common predecessor
Pascual Pili and his heirs or successors in interest in Civil Case No. 3623. 53 in interest in Civil Case No. 3621 the common predecessor in interest being Sixto
Benin; in Civil Case No. 3622 the common predecessor in interest being Bonoso
We now consider the case of the other plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and Alcantara; and in Civil Case No. 3623 the common predecessor in interest being
3623. Candido Pili. In Civil Case No. Q-156 Elias Benin based his claim of ownership upon
the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily must be Sixto Benin;
Jose Alcantara, upon the ownership of his predecessor in interest who necessarily
It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership must be Bonoso Alcantara; and Pascual Pili, upon the ownership of his predecessor
of the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or in interest who necessarily must be Candido Pili. It follows, therefore, that the
successors in interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-4998 (Civil Case No. Q-156), which held
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their untenable the cause of action of the successors in interest, of Sixto Benin, of Bonoso
complaint on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who Alcantara and of Candido Pili, to recover the ownership and possession of any land
died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 735, would also foreclose a similar cause
one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and of action of all other persons who claim to be successors in interest of Sixto Benin, of
successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931. Bonoso Alcantara and of Candido Pili over any land covered by said certificate of title.
As We have adverted to, Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934,
When Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili, alleged in their complaint in Civil and Candido Pili died in 1931. These three predecessors in interest of the appellees
Case No. Q-156 (which was filed in 1950) that they were the owners of the parcels of died long after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, which took place
land specified in their complaint, having inherited the same from their ancestors and on July 8, 1914.
had been in possession of the same from time immemorial, each was claiming a right
as an heir of Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto Benin, and Candido Pili, respectively. Similarly, And so, even if there are plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three cases who are not
in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, the source of the rights claimed by the privies to plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin, and Pascual Pili in Civil Case No. Q-
plaintiffs Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili and all the other plaintiffs were 156 (G.R. No. L-4998 the Alcantara case) and were not parties in that case, still
their respective ancestor, or predecessor in interest, namely Bonoso Alcantara, Sixto the ruling of this Court in that former case, to the effect that therein plaintiffs or their
Benin and Candido Pili, as the case may be. predecessors in interest were bound by the proceedings in the registration court
which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735, holds and
Inasmuch as Sixto Benin died in 1936, Bonoso Alcantara died in 1934, and Candido applies to those plaintiffs in these three cases, because the claim of ownership of
Pili died in 1931, it is obvious that during all the time when the registration these plaintiffs is based on the same predecessors in interest of plaintiffs Jose
proceedings in LRC No. 7681 were taking place before the Court of Land Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili in said Civil Case No. Q-156. 54 It may well be
Registration, which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 said that the interests of the appellees in G.R. No. L-26127 (Civil Case No. 3621) who
on July 8, 1914, Sixto Benin, Bonoso Alcantara and Candido Pili were living. The claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of Sixto Benin were represented by
records show that no one of these three persons, or their representative, had filed any Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No.
opposition to the application for registration in said LRC 7681, nor did any one of 26128 (Civil Case No. 3622) who claim rights as heirs or successors in interest of
them, or their representative, file any petition for review of the decree of registration Bonoso Alcantara were represented by Jose Alcantara in Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R.
No. 17431 that was issued in said LRC No. 7681. No. L-4998); the appellees in G.R. No. 26129 (Civil Case No. 3623) who claim rights
as heirs or successors in interest of Candido Pili were represented by Pascual Pili in
It is Our view, therefore, that the decision of this Court, in G.R. No. L-4998, which Civil Case No. Q-156 (G.R. No. L-4998).
affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of
Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) in Civil (c) In the case of Albina Santiago, et al. vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-
Case No. Q-156 should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose 14223, November 23, 1960) 55, where Original Certificate of Title No. 735, was also in
Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and question, this Court ruled on issues akin to the issues involved in the three cases now
3623, respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that at bar. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621 do not claim a right which is different from that Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2918, against J. M. Tuason &
claimed by Elias Benin in Civil Case No. Q-156. Likewise, the plaintiffs in Civil Case Co. Inc. alleging, substantially, that their ancestor, Inocencio Santiago, was the owner
No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil of a parcel of land, evidenced by a document (attached to their complaint as Annex A)
Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right issued by the Spanish government on May 12, 1848 56; that Inocencio Santiago had
since then been in possession of the aforesaid land as owner, publicly, continuously This Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Albina
and adversely until his death, when his two children, Isaias and Albina, succeeded Santiago and her co-plaintiffs. 58 Regarding the contention of Albina Santiago and her
and continued to own and possess said land pro indiviso in the same character as co-plaintiffs that the judgment in the previous case (Civil Case No. Q-27, affirmed in
that of their predecessor that upon the death of Isaias Santiago his one-half share of G.R. No. L-5079) would not operate as res judicata against them because they were
the land was inherited by his eleven children who, together with their aunt Albina, not parties in that suit, and that they did not derive their title from the defendants in
continued to own and possess the land in the same character as that of their the previous suit, this Court held:
predecessors; that Albina and her co-plaintiffs came to know that J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. had previously filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Civil Case No. We agree with appellants that the decision in the preceding suit to
Q-27 for "quieting of title and recovery of possession" against five of the children of quiet title, prosecuted by the appellee Tuason & Co. against other
Isaias Santiago involving the parcel of land of which they were co-owners; that J.M. heirs of Ynocencio Santiago (99 Phil., 615; 50 Off. Gaz. 11, 5727),
Tuason & Co., Inc. had claimed that parcel to be part of the land covered by its can not constitute res judicata against these appellants who were
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that the judgment in Civil. Case No. Q-27, in not parties to that suit and do not derive their title from the
which they (Albina Santiago, et al.) were never impleaded as parties, had already defendants in the previous litigation (Rule 39, sec. 44 (b). There is
become authority for the proposition that a judgment may be made binding
final 57; that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had executed the judgment against them, in a subsequent litigation upon one who, although not a formal
excluding and rusting them from the enjoyment and possession of the land. Albina party to a previous suit, has actually conducted or controlled the
and her co-plaintiffs also alleged that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) of action or defense therein (65 ALR 1134), or who was adequately
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., as well as Original Certificate of Title No. 735 from which the represented in such previous litigation; but no clear proof of the
former was derived, did not include the parcel claimed by them; that even granting existence of such exceptional circumstance is before us in the
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 included the parcel claimed by them the present case. On the other hand, the rule is that co-owners are not
inclusion of that parcel in the certificate of title of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was done privies inter se in relation to the property owned in common.
through fraud because they, nor their predecessors, were not actually notified of the
registration proceedings. As ground for cancellation of the certificate of title of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs further alleged that the xxx xxx xxx
technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 had been falsified to
include areas never brought within the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, But granting that the plaintiffs-appellants herein are not privies of
since they were areas not included in the application and publication in the the defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same
registration proceedings; that long before the predecessors of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. property (S.C.G.R. No.
applied for, and secured, registration of the land which included their parcel of land L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former
they had already acquired ownership thereof not only by the document, Annex A of case, to the effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in
their complaint, but also by acquisitive prescription. Albina Santiago and her co- favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was
plaintiffs prayed, that J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be ordered to desist from enforcing Civil neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion
Case No. Q-27 against them; that a resurvey be ordered to determine whether or not con el estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 (37679) included the land described in their therein described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies
complaint; that a reconveyance to them be ordered of whatever portion of the land to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the
claimed by them may be found included in transfer Certificate of Title No. 119; that document does not depend upon the person who invoke it.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119 and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 be
ordered cancelled and substituted with a new certificate of title embracing only those If the late Ynocencio Santiago did not become the owner of the
lands included in the application, publication and/or decree in LRC No. 7681 of the disputed property by virtue of the document Annex A, then
Court of Land Registration. appellants herein, as heirs of Ynocencio have not acquired such
ownership either. It follows that the first and second causes of
Upon motion of defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the Court of First Instance of action of their complaint, predicated as they are on the assumption
Quezon City dismissed the complaint of Albina Santiago, et al., upon the grounds that that such ownership and its consequential rights resulted from
there was no cause of action, that the case was barred by a prior judgment in Civil Annex A, must necessarily fail. Not being owners, they can
Case No. Q-27 which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-5079, and complain of no invasion of dominical rights.
that the action of the plaintiffs, if they had any, had prescribed.
It will thus be noted that in the aforementioned decision in the Santiago case, even if saved by law (Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and
Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs were not considered privies to the defendants in cases cited therein). In addition, there being no allegation that the
Civil Case No. Q-27, and even if they were not parties in that previous case, this registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at
Court nevertheless applied to them the judgment (G. R. No. L-5079) in that previous the registration proceedings, and very much more than one year
case where it was pronounced that the document, Annex A of the complaint of Albina having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in
Santiago, et al., was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of
composision con el estado, and it did not establish the right of ownership of their reconveyance are obtainable any more.
predecessor in interest, Inocencio Santiago, Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs had
based their claim of ownership on that document (Annex A). 59 This Court held in that Regarding the claim of Albina Santiago and her co-plaintiffs that they had acquired
previous case that the document was unavailing against Transfer Certificate of Title title by prescription over the parcel of land claimed by them, this Court held:
No. 119 of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and against Original Certificate of Title No. 735.
It follows also that the allegation of prescriptive title in favor of
And so, following the logic of this Court in its decision in the Santiago case, in the plaintiffs does not suffice to establish a cause of action. If such
three cases at bar We hold that even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3621, except prescription was completed before the registration of the land in
the heirs of Elias Benin, are not privies to Elias Benin and were not parties in Civil favor of the Tuasons, the resulting prescriptive title was cut off and
Case No. Q-156; even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3622, except Jose Alcantara, extinguished by the decree of registration. If, on the contrary, the
are not privies to Jose Alcantara and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-156; and prescription was either begun or completed after the decree of
even if the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623, except Pascual Pili, are not privies to registration, it conferred no title because, by express provision of
Pascual Pili and were not parties in Civil Case No. Q156, still the pronouncement of law, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner (Act
this Court in the judgment in that previous case (G.R. No. L-4998), to the effect that 496, section 46).Thus, in this Santiago case, as in the Alcantara
the plaintiffs in that case and their predecessors in interest were bound by the case, this Court declared conclusive and indefeasible Original
registration proceedings which culminated in the issuance of Original Certificate of Certificate of Title No. 735 which was issued as a result of the
Title No. 735, holds and applies to all the plaintiffs (now appellees) in these three registration proceedings in L.R.C. No. 7681 of the Court of Land
cases. In that judgment this Court ruled out, or did not sustain, the rights claimed by Registration. There are many other cases where this Court has
the predecessors in interest of herein appellees over the land covered by Original made a similar pronouncement regarding Original Certificate of Title
Certificate of Title No. 735. These appellees, therefore, have not succeeded to any No. 735. 60
right that can derrogate the validity and conclusiveness of Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, and of the certificates of title that are derived from said original certificate of
title. In view of the findings, and the rulings, that We have hereinbefore made, it follows
that, as contended by the appellant, the lower court also erred when it declared the
appellees the owners of the lands claimed by them and in awarding damages to
Coming back to the Santiago case, as regards the contention of Albina Santiago and them, in these three cases. 61
her co-plaintiffs that the registration proceedings which resulted in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 were irregular and fraudulent, this Court held:
We consider it unnecessary to rule on the counterclaim of appellant J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., for damages and attorneys fees against the appellees 62, considering, as
(T)he mere fact that appellants herein were not personally notified the records show, that the appellees are persons who are not in a position to pay
of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of damages in any form. 63 We believe that the appellees had filed their complaints in
registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not the honest, but mistaken, belief that they have a good cause of action against the
constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. appellant corporation and not because they meant to embarrass or humiliate the
The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as persons who are identified or connected with the appellant.
against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only
against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also WHEREFORE, the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
against parties who were summoned by publication but did not Branch) in Civil Cages Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623, appealed from, is reversed and set
appear. The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest aside. The bond filed by appellant in the three cases in the court below for the lifting
freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character that of the writ of preliminary injunction is ordered cancelled. No pronouncement as to
existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates of costs.
title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances
IT IS SO ORDERED. Antecedent Facts

Republic of the Philippines Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to
SUPREME COURT represent more than 2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter
Manila lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of owners
continuously, exclusively and notoriously." 6 The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de
FIRST DIVISION Maricaban (Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered under a
Torrens title,7 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291, issued on October 17, 1906
by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.8 Maricaban covered several parcels of land with a
G.R. No. 192896 July 24, 2013 total area of over 2,544 hectares spread out over Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and
Paraaque.9
DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
Incumbent President, GREG SERIEGO, Petitioner, Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United States of
vs. America (USA) early in the American colonial period, to be converted into the military
BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent. reservation known as Fort William Mckinley, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
192 was issued in the name of the USA to cancel OCT No. 291. 10 The US
DECISION government later transferred 30 has. of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad Company,
for which TCT No. 192 was cancelled by TCT Nos. 1218 and 1219, the first in the
REYES, J.: name of the Manila Railroad Company for 30 has., and the second in the name of the
USA for the rest of the Maricaban property.11

Before us on Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision 2
dated September 10, 2009 and Resolution 3 dated July 13, 2010 of the Court of On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1688,
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85228 nullifying and setting aside for lack of and later that year, on September 15, 1914, TCT No. 1688 was cancelled and
jurisdiction the Resolution4 dated April 28, 2004 of the Commission on the Settlement replaced by TCT No. 2288, both times in the name of the USA. 12 On December 6,
of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COS LAP Case No. 99-500. The fallo of the assailed 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines
COS LAP Resolution reads, as follows: (Republic), and on September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled and replaced
by TCT No. 61524, this time in the name of the Republic. 13 On July 12, 1957,
President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort
Bonifacio, and reserving them for military purposes.14
1. Declaring the subject property, covering an area of 78,466 square meters,
now being occupied by the members of the Dream Village Neighborhood On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476
Association, Inc. to be outside of Swo-00-0001302 BCDA property. declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable 15 in the manner
provided under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 274 and 730, in relation to the Public Land
2. In accordance with the tenets of social justice, members of said Act,16 thus allowing the sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower
association are advised to apply for sales patent on their respective Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan.17
occupied lots with the Land Management Bureau, DENR-NCR, pursuant to
R.A. Nos. 274 and 730. On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172
amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-
3. Directing the Land Management Bureau-DENR-NCR to process the sales 000298 the areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition. 18
patent application of complainants pursuant to existing laws and regulation.
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed 19 creating the Bases Conversion and
4. The peaceful possession of actual occupants be respected by the Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark
respondents. and Subic military reservations and their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace
Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station
and Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses. Section 820 of the said law
SO ORDERED.5
provides that the capital of the BCDA will be provided from sales proceeds or f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau to process the application of
transfers of lots in nine (9) military camps in Metro Manila, including 723 has. of Fort the ASSOCIATION members for the purchase of their respective lots under
Bonifacio. The law, thus, expressly authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell the provisions of Acts Nos. 274 and 730. (Underscoring supplied)
the above lands, in whole or in part, which are hereby declared alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales Respondent BCDA in its Answer28 dated November 23, 2000 questioned the
of government properties,"21 specifically to raise capital for the BCDA. Titles to the jurisdiction of the COSLAP to hear Dream Villages complaint, while asserting its title
camps were transferred to the BCDA for this purpose,22 and TCT No. 61524 was to the subject property pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. It argued that under Executive
cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, Order (E.O.) No. 561 which created the COSLAP, its task is merely to coordinate the
23890, and 23891, now in the name of the BCDA.23 various government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems
or disputes, adding that BCDA does not fall in the enumeration in Section 3 of E.O.
Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a) approximately 148.80 has. reserved No. 561, it being neither a pastureland-lease holder, a timber concessionaire, or a
for the National Capital Region (NCR) Security Brigade, Philippine Army officers government reservation grantee, but the holder of patrimonial government property
housing area, and Philippine National Police jails and support services (presently which cannot be the subject of a petition for classification, release or subdivision by
known as Camp Bagong Diwa); b) approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base for the occupants of Dream Village.
the Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron of helicopters for the NCR and respective
security units; c) twenty one (21) areas segregated by various presidential In its Resolution29 dated April 28, 2004, the COSLAP narrated that it called a
proclamations; and d) a proposed 30.15 has. as relocation site for families to be mediation conference on March 22, 2001, during which the parties agreed to have a
affected by the construction of Circumferential Road 5 and Radial Road 4, provided relocation/verification survey conducted of the subject lot. On April 4, 2001, the
that the boundaries and technical description of these exempt areas shall be COSLAP wrote to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-
determined by an actual ground survey.24 Community Environment and Natural Resources Office-NCR requesting the survey,
which would also include Swo-00-0001302, covering the adjacent AFP-RSBS
Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully Industrial Park established by Proclamation No. 1218 on May 8, 1998 as well as the
subjecting its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions abandoned Circumferential Road 5 (C-5 Road).30
among the residents,25 on November 22, 1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with
the COSLAP to seek its assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and
m property, which they claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and thus is covered a blueprint copy of the survey plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical
by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been occupying the area for Director for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report states:
thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously
for several years," and have built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and
introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational and religious facilities. Dream 3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood
Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA under Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1, Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of
R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be Lot 13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the
processed by the Land Management Bureau (LMB). area actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA.31 (Emphasis ours and
underscoring supplied)
On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing an Amended
Petition26 in the COSLAP. Among the reliefs it sought were: COSLAP Ruling

d. DECLARING the subject property as alienable and disposable by virtue of On the basis of the DENRs verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that
applicable laws; Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302,
and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process the applications of Dream
Villages members for sales patent, noting that in view of the length of time that they
e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298, "have been openly, continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property in the
situated in the barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, which is concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their
presently being occupied by herein petitioner as within the coverage of respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside the claim of AFP-RSBS provisions of the Public Land Act."32
INDUSTRIAL PARK COMPLEX and/or BASES CONVESION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.
On the question of its jurisdiction over the complaint, the COSLAP cited the likelihood On Petition for Review39 to the CA, the BCDA argued that the dispute is outside the
that the summary eviction by the BCDA of more than 2,000 families in Dream Village jurisdiction of the COSLAP because of the lands history of private ownership and
could stir up serious social unrest, and maintained that Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561 because it is registered under an indefeasible Torrens title 40; that Proclamation No.
authorizes it to "assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are 172 covers only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 in Western Bicutan, whereas Dream
critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties Village occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302, which also belongs
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar to the BCDA 41; that the COSLAP resolution is based on an erroneous DENR report
critical situations requiring immediate action," even as Section 3(2)(d) of E.O. No. 561 stating that Dream Village is outside of BCDA, because Lots 10, 11, and portion of
also allows it to take cognizance of "petitions for classification, release and/or Lot 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are within the DA42; that the COSLAP was not justified in
subdivision of lands of the public domain," exactly the ultimate relief sought by Dream ignoring BCDAs request to postpone the survey to the succeeding year because the
Village. Rationalizing that it was created precisely to provide a more effective presence of its representatives in such an important verification survey was
mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems "in general," the COSLAP indispensable for the impartiality of the survey aimed at resolving a highly volatile
invoked as its authority the 1990 case of Baaga v. COSLAP, 33 where this Court said: situation43; that the COSLAP is a mere coordinating administrative agency with limited
jurisdiction44; and, that the present case is not among those enumerated in Section 3
It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take of E.O. No. 56145.
cognizance of cases which are "critical and explosive in nature considering, for
instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action." provides that it may assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes in
However, the use of the word "may" does not mean that the COSLAPs jurisdiction is "other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude,"46 and the present case
merely confined to the above mentioned cases. The provisions of the said Executive is one such problem.
Order are clear that the COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more
effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which The CA in its Decision47 dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no
are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural jurisdiction over the complaint because the question of whether Dream Village is
minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from the abolished PACLAP within the areas declared as available for disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is
whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on, decide and beyond its competence to determine, even as the land in dispute has been under a
resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed by it. The said private title since 1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency, the
Executive Order No. 561 containing said provision, being enacted only on September BCDA, in contrast to the case of Baaga relied upon by Dream Village, where the
21, 1979, cannot affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial disputed land was part of the public domain and the disputants were applicants for
Committee of Koronadal on September 20, 1978. Neither can it affect the decision of sales patent thereto.
the COSLAP which merely affirmed said exercise of jurisdiction. 34
Dream Villages motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate courts
In its Motion for Reconsideration35 filed on May 20, 2004, the BCDA questioned the Order48 of July 13, 2010.
validity of the survey results since it was conducted without its representatives
present, at the same time denying that it received a notification of the DENR
verification survey.36 It maintained that there is no basis for the COSLAPs finding that Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
the members of Dream Village were in open, continuous, and adverse possession in
the concept of owner, because not only is the property not among those declared On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, Dream Village interposes the
alienable and disposable, but it is a titled patrimonial property of the State.37 following issues:

In the Order38 dated June 17, 2004, the COSLAP denied BCDAs Motion for A
Reconsideration, insisting that it had due notice of the verification survey, while also
noting that although the BCDA wanted to postpone the verification survey due to its IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP IN COSLAP CASE NO. 99-500,
tight schedule, it actually stalled the survey when it failed to suggest an alternative THE HONORABLE CA DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT CONSISTENT
survey date to ensure its presence. WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT;

CA Ruling B
THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT COSLAP HAD NO 1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October 21, 1986
JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES HEREIN.49
2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986
The Courts Ruling
3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986
We find no merit in the petition.
4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January 15, 198753
The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.
However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows that Lots 3, 4,
That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with finality. In 5 and 6 thereof are inside the area segregated for the Libingan ng mga Bayani under
Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA, 50 it was categorically ruled as Proclamation No. 208, which then leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 as
follows: available for disposition. For this reason, it was necessary to amend Proclamation No.
2476. Thus, in Proclamation No. 172 only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 are
First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title declared alienable and disposable.54
and ownership over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and
Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and Makati is final and conclusive on the ownership of the The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not situated in Lot 1
then Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the of Swo-13-000298 but actually occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-
issue on the ownership of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to rest. Other than 0001302: "x x x Dream Village is outside Lot1, SWO-13-000298 and inside Lot 10, 11
their view that the USA is still the owner of the subject lots, petitioner has not put & portion of Lot 13, SWO-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78466 square meters.
forward any claim of ownership or interest in them.51 The area is actually is [sic] outside SWO-00-0001302 of BCDA."55 Inexplicably and
gratuitously, the DENR also states that the area is outside of BCDA, completely
The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are essentially not much different oblivious that the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio, even as the BCDA
from the controversy below. There, 20,000 families were long-time residents asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the abandoned right-
occupying 98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City, who vainly sought to avert their of-way of C-5 Road. This area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298
eviction and the demolition of their houses by the BCDA upon a claim that the land and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan ng
was owned by the USA under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme Court found that TCT No. mga Bayani, and the boundary line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really the
2288 had in fact been cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in the name of the Republic, proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which was abandoned when, as constructed, it was
which title was in turn cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, made to traverse northward into the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream Village has not
23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, all in the name of the BCDA. The Court disputed this assertion.
ruled that the BCDAs aforesaid titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and
beyond question, since TCT No. 61524 was cancelled in favor of BCDA pursuant to The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was
an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227, the legal basis for BCDAs takeover and abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga
management of the subject lots.52 Bayani does not signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor
that these lots would then become alienable and disposable. They remain under the
Dream Village sits on the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a
abandoned C-5 Road, which lies relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families affected by the
outside the area declared in construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as 0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the
alienable and disposable. south,56 making them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a
claim that the government has abandoned them to Dream Village.
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys were conducted by the
Bureau of Lands to delimit the boundaries of the areas excluded from the coverage of While property of the State or any
Proclamation No. 423: of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of
prescription, those "intended for
Barangay Survey Plan Date Approved some public service or for the
development of the national Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial
wealth" are considered property of property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together
public dominion and therefore not with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or
susceptible to acquisition by no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only
prescription. when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2)
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." prescription can commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be
Articles 420 and 421 identify what is property of public dominion and what is classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State
patrimonial property: that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an
express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of public
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: dominion.60

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the former
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and Maricaban have been legally disposed to settlers, besides those segregated for public
others of similar character; or government use. Proclamation No. 1217 (1973) established the Maharlika Village
in Bicutan, Taguig to serve the needs of resident Muslims of Metro Manila;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as amended by Proclamation No. 172 (1987),
intended for some public service or for the development of the national declared more than 400 has. of Maricaban in Upper and Lower Bicutan, Signal
wealth. Village, and Western Bicutan as alienable and disposable; Proclamation No. 518
(1990) formally exempted from Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of Cembo,
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and Pitogo, comprising
preceding article, is patrimonial property. 314 has., and declared them open for disposition.

One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public
susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,57 dominion of the State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is
it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject reserved for some public service or for the development of the national wealth, in this
military lands in Metro Manila case, for the conversion of military reservations in the country to productive civilian
uses.61 Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has
not even begun to run.
became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands
did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express
reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the Ownership of a land registered
former American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the under a Torrens title cannot be lost
law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" by prescription or adverse
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the possession.
public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then
explained that it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDAs claim that Lots 10, 11 and part of
the BCDA law that they become private property and cease to be property of the 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are the abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road, which is within
public dominion:58 the vast titled territory of Fort Bonifacio. We have already established that these lots
have not been declared alienable and disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as 172.
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."59 Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.62 Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property
Registration Decree, expressly provides that no title to registered land in derogation
of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential
possession. And, although the registered landowner may still lose his right to recover Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the
the possession of his registered property by reason of laches, 63 nowhere has Dream investigation and resolution of all kinds of land disputes between settlers, streamline
Village alleged or proved laches, which has been defined as such neglect or omission and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve
to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances land problems, or recommend other solutions. 67 E.O. No. 305, issued on March 19,
causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
it is a delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because involving public lands and other lands of the public domain,68 as well as adjudicatory
of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property or powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously
parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief land disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold
will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. 64 and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the
public domain."69
The subject property having been
expressly reserved for a specific On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the PACLAP and enlarged its
public purpose, the COSLAP functions and duties. Section 2 thereof even granted it quasi judicial functions, to wit:
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. The PACLAP shall have the following
settlers. functions and duties:

BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction to hear Dream 1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of
Villages complaint. Concurring, the CA has ruled that questions as to the physical the various government agencies and agencies involved in land problems or
identity of Dream Village and whether it lies in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00- disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers
0001302, or whether Proclamation No. 172 has released the disputed area for and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time-
disposition are issues which are "manifestly beyond the scope of the COSLAPs consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;
jurisdiction vis--vis Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561,"65 rendering its
Resolution a patent nullity and its pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said, under
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAPs duty would have been to refer the conflict to 2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the
another tribunal or agency of government in view of the serious ramifications of the attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof:
disputed claims: Provided, That when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its
resolution, order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding
In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having
cognizance of the case. It would have been more prudent if the COSLAP has [sic] just jurisdiction thereof;
referred the controversy to the proper forum in order to fully thresh out the
ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is, the impugned Resolution is a patent nullity
since the tribunal which rendered it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the pronouncements xxxx
contained therein are void. "We have consistently ruled that a judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of 4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have resolution of land disputes or problems at provincial level, if possible. (Underscoring
no legal effect."66 (Citation omitted) supplied)

We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific public purpose On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the PACLAP and created the
under R.A. No. 7227, which unfortunately for Dream Village does not encompass the COSLAP to be a more effective administrative body to provide a mechanism for the
present demands of its members. Indeed, this purpose was the very reason why title expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and
to Fort Bonifacio has been transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.70 Paragraph 2, Section 3 of
takes the dispute out of the direct jurisdiction of the COSLAP. A review of the history E.O No. 561 now specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can
of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes over public exercise its adjudicatory functions:
lands not reserved or declared for a public use or purpose.
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers xxxx
and functions:
Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various or problem lodged before it, namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having
government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the
or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is
settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of the parties
and time consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar
disputes; critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume
jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and
Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to
assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or
and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the problem.72 (Citation omitted)
parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring immediate action: The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent COSLAP cases, among
them Davao New Town Development Corp. v. COSLAP,73 Barranco v. COSLAP,74
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement NHA v. COSLAP,75 Cayabyab v. de Aquino,76 Ga, Jr. v. Tubungan,77 Machado v.
holders or timber concessionaires; Gatdula,78 and Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo.79

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot invoke Section 3(2)(e) of E.O.
grantees; No. 561 to assume jurisdiction over "other similar land problems of grave urgency,"
since the statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis prescribes that where
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
applicants; extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind as
those specifically mentioned.80 Following this rule, COSLAPs jurisdiction is limited to
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of disputes involving lands in which the government has a proprietary or regulatory
the public domain; and interest,81 or public lands covered with a specific license from the government such as
a pasture lease agreements, a timber concessions, or a reservation grants, 82 and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. where moreover, the dispute is between occupants/squatters and pasture lease
agreement holders or timber concessionaires; between occupants/squatters and
government reservation grantees; and between occupants/squatters and public land
xxxx claimants or applicants.

Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and demolition by the BCDA and the In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the Philippine National
seriousness and urgency of the reliefs sought in its Amended Petition, Dream Village Railways. The high court rejected COSLAPs jurisdiction, noting that the disputed lot
insists that the COSLAP was justified in assuming jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. is not public land, and neither party was a squatter, patent lease agreement holder,
99-500. But in Longino v. Atty. General,71 it was held that as an administrative government reservation grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of
agency, COSLAPs jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically mentioned in its any cultural minority, nor was the dispute critical and explosive in nature so as to
enabling statute, E.O. No. 561. The Supreme Court said: generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate
action.83
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as
such, could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the COSLAP has no
statutes. x x x. concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in respect of
disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws, since "the grant of the case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In
exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular
that no other court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land
cognizable by the DAR."84 Thus, instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the
should have simply referred private respondents complaint to the DAR or DARAB. need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and
According to the Court: damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the
COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem.
The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are
the power to resolve land disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from
to assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or
lands in which the government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the reservation grants.90 (Citations omitted)
land dispute in Baaga involved parties with conflicting free patent applications which
was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a complaint for
exclusively cognizable by the DAR.85 "interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing" over a private
parcel of land. The CA ruled that the parties were estopped to question COSLAPs
In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures encroaching into private jurisdiction since they participated actively in the proceedings. The Supreme Court,
property.1wphi1 The Supreme court ruled that COSLAP may resolve only land noting from the complaint that the case actually involved a claim of title and
disputes "involving public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a possession of private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC has jurisdiction since the
specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber dispute did not fall under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, was not
concession, or a reservation grant."86 critical and explosive in nature, did not involve a large number of parties, nor was
there social tension or unrest present or emergent.91
In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a boundary dispute
between two local government units, that its decision is an utter nullity correctible by In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Baaga to assert its jurisdiction. There,
certiorari, that it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void, Guillermo Baaga had filed a free patent application with the Bureau of Lands over a
and all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal public land with an area of 30 has. Gregorio Daproza (Daproza) also filed a patent
effect.87 application for the same property. The opposing claims and protests of the claimants
remained unresolved by the Bureau of Lands, and neither did it conduct an
investigation. Daproza wrote to the COSLAP, which then opted to exercise jurisdiction
In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not extend to disputes over the controversy. The high court sustained COSLAP, declaring that its jurisdiction
involving the ownership of private lands, or those already covered by a certificate of is not confined to the cases mentioned in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, but
title, as these fall exactly within the jurisdiction of the courts and other administrative includes land problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among
agencies."88 settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.

In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over controversies But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the other cases aforecited, the
relating to ownership and possession of private lands, and thus, the failure of land dispute in Baaga was between private individuals who were free patent
respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP decision before the appropriate applicants over unregistered public lands. In contrast, the present petition involves
court was held not fatal to the petition for certiorari that they eventually filed with the land titled to and managed by a government agency which has been expressly
CA. The latter remedy remained available despite the lapse of the period to appeal reserved by law for a specific public purpose other than for settlement. Thus, as we
from the void COSLAP decision.89 have advised in Longino, the law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any
land dispute or problem, but it has to consider the nature or classification of the land
In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction in disputes over involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for
private lands between private parties, reiterating the essential rules contained in immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 governing the exercise by COSLAP of its jurisdiction, to wit: destruction to property.

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is
one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer
SO ORDERED. 4. Owners Copy of Tax Declaration No. EL-009-01681 in the name of
Restituto A. Sarmiento;7
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT 5. Photocopy of the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated July 16, 1988;8 and
Manila
6. Special Power of Attorney executed by Restituto Sarmiento appointing
SECOND DIVISION Magdaleno Sarmiento as his attorney-in-fact.9

G.R. No. 169397 March 13, 2007 On January 17, 2001, the Solicitor General, through the Prosecutor of Taguig who
was deputized to assist in the case, filed, as counsel for the Republic of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Philippines (petitioner), an Opposition10 to respondents application for registration.
vs. Contending that (1) neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest were in
RESTITUTO SARMIENTO, represented by his attorney-in-fact, MAGDALENO open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot since
SARMIENTO, Respondent. June 12, 1945 or prior thereto, as required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (The Public Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1073; 11
(2) respondents muniments of title and/or tax declarations and tax payment receipts
DECISION do not appear to be genuine and do not anyway constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of his bona fide acquisition of the lot in the concept of an owner since June
CARPIO MORALES, J.: 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (3) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by respondent as he failed to file an
Restituto Sarmiento (respondent) through his brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno appropriate application for registration within six months from February 16, 1976, as
Sarmiento (Magdaleno) filed on November 29, 2000 with the Metropolitan Trial Court required under P.D. No. 892;12 and (4) the lot is part of the public domain belonging to
(MeTC) of Taguig, Metro Manila an application for registration 1 of a parcel of land, the Republic of the Philippines, hence, not subject to private appropriation.
delineated as Lot 535-D under Approved Survey Plan Swo-13-000465 with a total
land area of 2,664 square meters and located at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro At the initial hearing of the application on April 4, 2001, respondent offered and
Manila (the lot). marked in evidence documents proving compliance with jurisdictional requirements,
following which the MeTC issued an order of general default against the whole world,
Respondent claimed to have acquired the lot through donation under a Kasulatan ng except against the government.13
Pagkakaloob2 dated July 16, 1988 executed by his father, Placido Sarmiento
(Placido), which lot formed part of Lot 535 that was allegedly inherited by Placido After the conclusion of the testimonies of respondents brother-attorney-in-fact
from Florentina Sarmiento (Florentina). Magdaleno14 and adjoining lot owner Rodolfo Sta. Ana,15 the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through the Assistant Regional Director
Respondent further claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in for Legal Services and Public Affairs, filed its Report16 dated April 16, 2001 reiterating
open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public possession of the lot in the respondents claims as set forth in his application for registration.
concept of an owner for more than 30 years.3
The Land Registration Authority, through the Director of the Department of
Together with his application for registration, respondent submitted the following Registration, also filed a report with the MeTC with the information that it was not in a
documents: position to verify whether the lot was already covered by a land patent or a previously
approved isolated survey.17

1. Blueprint copy of the Conversion and Subdivision Plan Swo-13-000465 of


Lot 535 as surveyed for Magdaleno Sarmiento, et al;4 Respondents formal offer of evidence18 did not merit comment/opposition from
petitioner which in fact waived the presentation of evidence for the government. 19

2. Photocopy of Geodetic Engineers Certificate;5


By Decision20 of May 27, 2002, the MeTC granted respondents application for
registration. Thus it disposed:
3. Technical Description of Lot 535-D;6
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the allegations in the application to publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years now. x
have been sufficiently established by the applicants evidence, this Court hereby x x22
confirms the title of applicant Restituto Sarmiento, Filipino citizen, of legal age,
married to Betty Sarmiento and a resident of No. 11, Guerrero Street, Wawa, Taguig, Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, faulting the MeTC for granting the
Metro Manila over the subject parcel of agricultural land known as Lot 535-D, application despite respondents failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of
MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping under Conversion and Subdivision Plan submitting the original tracing cloth plan in evidence. 23 Petitioner advanced that
Swo-13-000465 situated at Barangay Wawa, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, according to the survey of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), the lot is
consisting of Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four (2,664) square meters and located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, hence, a part of the
hereby order the registration thereof in his name. Laguna Lake bed which is incapable of private appropriation. 24

After the finality of this Decision and upon payment of the corresponding taxes due on By Decision25 of May 20, 2005, the appellate court held that as the lot was sufficiently
the said lot, let an order for the issuance of decree of registration be issued. identified by the blue print copy of the plan and the technical description, the
presentation of the original tracing cloth ceased to become indispensable for the grant
SO ORDERED.21 of the application.26

In granting respondents application, the MeTC found that respondent and his The appellate court further held that petitioners claim that the lot forms part of the
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lot in the concept of an Laguna Lake bed cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and even assuming
owner for more than 30 years, viz: that it was properly raised, the purported ground survey of the LLDA had no probative
value since it was not a certified original copy.27
The subject lot was a portion of the parcel of land previously declared for taxation
purposes in the name of its original owner Florentina Sarmiento under Tax The appellate court thus affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Petitioners motion for
Declaration (T.D.) No. 4995 (Exhibit "N"). Upon the death of Florentina Sarmiento, a reconsideration having been denied by Resolution 28 of August 19, 2005, petitioner
portion of said land was inherited by Placido Sarmiento, the father of the herein now comes before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
applicant Restituto Sarmiento, while the other portion went to Placidos [s]ister
Teodora Sarmiento. On July 16, 1988, Placido Sarmiento transferred the portion of It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any
the parcel of land inherited by him from Florentina Sarmiento to his children, namely: grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the
herein applicant Restituto Sarmiento, Magdaleno Sarmiento and Conigunda person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the
Sarmiento by virtue of a deed denominated as "Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob" (Exhibits State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 29
"O" and "O-5"). (TSN, June 16, 2001).
While respondent did not state in his application the statutory basis of his application,
On April 24 and June 25, 1998, Magdaleno Sarmiento, among others, caused the it can reasonably be inferred that he seeks the judicial confirmation or legalization of
survey of the entire area of the parcel of land x x x According to the said plan, the his imperfect or incomplete title over the lot30 which he claims to be a riceland.
said survey is inside alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B, L.C. Map No.
2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry (Exhibit "K-2", supra).
Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is, under the Public Land Act, one of the means
by which public agricultural lands may be disposed.31
The said property was being planted to rice, watermelons, and other vegetables by
Florentina Sarmiento and her successors-in-interest themselves and by their hired
helpers for about fifty years (50) years already. It is not tenanted and there are no Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, 32 provides:
other persons having a claim over the said property since the Japanese occupation.
The said parcel of land is about two (2) kilometers away from the Laguna Lake but it Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
gets flooded for about two (2) months during the rainy season and sometimes up to public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
three (3) months if the town proper (poblacion) of Taguig is itself underwater. (TSN, titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
June 6, 2001). x x x of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
Applicant Restituto Sarmiento and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the subject parcel of land continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for and other natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
this chapter. public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
Under the above-quoted provision, an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
prove that (a) the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
the public domain; and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.33
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit
To support its contention that the lot does not form part of the disposable agricultural "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation
lands of the public domain, petitioner submitted before the appellate court the does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the
technical survey data and topographic map of the LLDA showing that the lot is land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
situated below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters. Since that was the first public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not
time petitioner raised the issue, the appellate court correctly glossed over it, for sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. 37 (Citations
offending basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.34 In any event, an omitted; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
examination of what purports to be the technical survey data of the LLDA shows that
it is not a certified original copy but a mere photocopy, the veracity and genuineness But even assuming that respondent has proven that the lot is alienable, his
of which cannot be ascertained by this Court. application would still be denied for failure to comply with the period of possession
requirement.
The absence or weakness of the evidence for petitioner notwithstanding, respondent
still bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the lot he seeks to register Originally, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act required applicants to have been in
forms part of the alienable agricultural land of the public domain. 35 possession and occupation of lands applied for since July 26, 1894. The law was later
amended by Republic Act (RA) 194238 which provided for a simple thirty-year
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and prescriptive period.39 RA 1942 has, however, already been amended by P.D. 1073,
subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the approved on January 25, 1977, which requires applicants to have been in possession
surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable and occupation of the lands applied for since June 12, 1945.1avvphi1
area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the
Bureau of Forestry." At the time respondent filed his application on November 29, 2000, he had only been
in possession of the lot for more than 12 years, following his acquisition of ownership
Menguito v. Republic36 teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove thereof from Placido by Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob40 dated July 16, 1988.
that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence Respondent seeks to tack his possession with that of his predecessors-in-interest,
to overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain. however.

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands From respondents evidence, his grandmother Florentina (from whom his father
of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey allegedly inherited the lot which was in turn donated to him) registered the lot for
plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map estate tax purposes in 1948.41
No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on
Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227). From an examination of this 1948 tax declaration, photocopy of which was marked as
Exhibit "N"42 by respondent, not only does it bear no number or the number is
illegible; the area of the "palayero" (riceland) cannot be determined as what is entered
under the column "Area" is "1-25-48" which apparently stands for June 25, 1948, the SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and SOCORRO G.R. No. 166577
date of registration for estate tax purposes. While this tax declaration names CARPO,
Florentina as the owner, there is a notation after her printed name reading deceased. Petitioners,
And it names Lucio and Jose Buenaflor as the administrators of the lot.
Present:
From the other tax declarations, Exhibits "N-1" up to "N-12"43 inclusive, presented by
respondent, it appears that Lucio and Jose Buenaflor acted as the property
administrators only until February 17, 1966 when Tax Declaration No. 8842 (Exhibit
"N-2"), which was registered on January 14, 1966, was cancelled by Tax Declaration
No. 8952 (Exhibit "N-3") whereon, for the first time, Placido and Teodoro Sarmiento PUNO, C.J.,
were named administrators of the lot. On March 30, 1966, Tax Declaration No. 8952
was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9631 (Exhibit "N-4") on which Placido appears - versus -
Chairperson,
as the owner of Lot No. 535 of which the lot in question forms part.

CARPIO MORALES,
To this Court, Tax Declaration No. 9631-Exhibit "N-4" does not constitute competent
proof of Placidos title over Lot 535. For one, respondent failed to prove that Placido is
an heir of Florentina. For another, respondent failed to prove the metes and bounds LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
of the "palayero" allegedly owned by Florentina and that the lot actually forms part
thereof. BERSAMIN, and

But even assuming arguendo that, as found by the MeTC, Placido was an heir and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
inherited Lot 535 from Florentina, respondent still failed to provide proof, nay allege,
that Florentina possessed Lot 535 since June 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED,
claim of ownership.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated May 20, 2005 and August 19, 2005, respectively, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The application for registration filed by respondent, Restituto
Sarmiento, over Lot 535-D, with a total area of Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four
(2,664) square meters situated at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila is DENIED. February 3, 2010

SO ORDERED. x----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

FIRST DIVISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners seek to set aside and annul the Decision66[1] dated December 22, (b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala
2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784, which reversed and set Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886) located in Bo. Tindig
aside the Summary Judgment67[2] dated December 22, 1998 of the Regional Trial na Manga, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters;
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 255. Also subject of the present petition is the
CA Resolution68[3] dated December 16, 2004 which denied the motion for (c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala
reconsideration of the earlier decision. Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of
May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 218,523 square meters; and
A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of the case, follows:
(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala
On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of
(Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title69[4] with the RTC of Makati City May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 155,345 square meters.
against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation (APVC), and the
Register of Deeds of Las Pias, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-292. No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the complaint.

In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209-square According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368
meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued and their derivatives appear to have been issued in the name of Ayala and purport to
in their names.70[5] They further alleged that Ayala Corporation was claiming to have cover and embrace the Carpos property or portion thereof duly covered registered
titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property under the already indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463 are inherently
covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporation had made such invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the duly issued derivatives of the Carpos
property its equity contribution in APVC to be developed into a residential subdivision. title.71[6] The Carpos additionally applied for a restraining order and writ of
Attached as annexes to the complaint were photocopies of: preliminary injunction to enjoin Ayala Corporation and APVC from doing construction
and development works on the properties in purported violation of the Carpos rights.
(a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the Carpos,
covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-56007) located in the Barrio of Almanza, The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment:
Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters;
(1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368
and all alleged derivatives thereof, issued in the name of Ayala Corporation and/or
APVC over the properties or portion thereof embraced in the Carpos TCT No. 296463
and issuing a writ of possession in favor of the Carpos and/or ordering Ayala
Corporation and APVC to surrender to the Carpos the properties or portion thereof
being occupied by the said corporations under inherently invalid or void titles; (2)
declaring TCT No. 296463 issued in their names as valid and the Carpos as the claimed the Carpos complaint was barred by res judicata in view of the 1941 decision
owners of the property described therein including the parcels of land being claimed of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro76[11] which upheld the ownership of a certain
and occupied by Ayala [Corporation] and APVC withou[t] valid and enforceable titles; Eduardo Guico over the subject property as Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a
and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to pay jointly and severally the amount certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting ownership of the same under his plan,
of P100,000 as attorneys fees plus costs of suit and litigation expenses.72[7] Psu-56007.

On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer, petitioners filed During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in its own name, TCT
an Amended Complaint, impleading respondent Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) in lieu No. T-41262, over the property previously covered by TCT No. T-5333.77[12]
of Ayala Corporation after purportedly verifying with the Register of Deeds of Las Pias
that the title to the subject property was registered in the name of ALI and not Ayala In the Order78[13] dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the
Corporation.73[8] present case was an action in rem and directed the transfer of the case to the RTC of
Las Pias where the disputed property is located. The case was thereafter assigned to
On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer with Branch 255 of the Las Pias RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082.
Counterclaims and Opposition to Application for Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction74[9] and Pre-trial Brief with Motion to Admit Amended On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Answer,75[10] respectively. ground that there was allegedly no genuine issue as to any material fact and the only
issue for the court to resolve was a purely legal one which of the two (2) titles
In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists having been should be accorded priority. According to ALI, the parties were relying on their
merged with ALI in 1991. ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, respective TCTs, and since ALI admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242 which was
T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos claimed property and the dispute issued more than twenty (20) years earlier than the Carpos predecessors title (OCT
pertained only to the land covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T- No. 8575), its title is, thus, superior. Expectedly, the Carpos filed an opposition to the
5333 in the name of Las Pias Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were genuine issues and
125945 in the name of Ayala Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation controversies to be litigated.
contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI. Further,
ALI alleged that it is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALIs motion for summary
traces back its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while judgment. This denial was challenged in a petition for certiorari with the CA in CA-
the Carpos title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also G.R. SP No. 44243.
In a decision79[14] dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALIs petition without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being
and ordered the RTC to render a summary judgment. Both parties moved for of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The
reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI filed a motion for partial reconsideration, property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No.
entreating the CA itself to render the summary judgment in the interest of judicial 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of the
economy and on a claim that the sole issue was legal. The Carpos, in their motion, Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan
insisted that there were genuine issues in this case that must be threshed out in a without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity
trial. Both motions were denied in the CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998.80[15] and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: That unless a survey
Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not
petitions for review on certiorari. In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged
the CAs refusal to render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. results are not entitled to credit and should be rejected.
132440, the Carpos assailed the CAs ruling that trial was
unnecessary.
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of
mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical
In separate minute Resolutions,81[16] the Court denied both petitions. Both description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same
parties motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In
another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration Commission
has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands,
Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
1998, finding the Carpos title superior to that of ALI and ruling, thus: Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which
defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242
had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim
was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land
of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendants
It will also be noted that aside from the admissions made
answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the by defendant ALI in its answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT No.
T-5333 that the date of survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs
pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the
property covered by TCT No. 296463 was surveyed on January 4-
Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be skeptical of the validity of the 6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest had
claimed ownership of the property ahead of that of defendant ALIs
issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the
predecessor-in-interest. The principle of prior registration cannot be
application should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for applied in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot
anymore be the subject of another survey, and there is already a
registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey plan
record of a prior survey in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the
reason why the survey plan has to be approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. This must be the reason why the later survey
in favor of Ayalas predecessor-in-interest did not anymore bear the
approval of the Director of Lands because had it been submitted for
approval, the records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an
earlier survey of the same land had already been made and dated November 22, 2000, reversed the CAs dismissal of ALIs appeal and remanded
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
the same to the CA for further proceedings.
Evidently, Ayalas claim of superiority of its title over that of
the plaintiffs cannot therefore be sustained. Be that as it may, the On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision in
fact that cannot be disputed on the basis of Ayalas answer is its
admission that SWO survey without the approval of the Director of favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
the Bureau of Lands was submitted in the alleged registration
proceedings, rendering the decree and the title issued thereunder
to be tainted with irregularity and therefore void.
FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the appeal is GRANTED, the assailed Summary Judgment of the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 255, dated December 22,
rendered: 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
rendered as follows:
(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the
plaintiffs Spouses Morris G. Carpo and Socorro (1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in
R. Carpo as valid and legal, and superior to that the name of defendant-appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is
of defendant Ayalas TCT No. T-5333; hereby declared to be the VALID title to the subject property;

(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, (2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of
TCT No. T-6055, TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 plaintiffs-appellees is declared to be NULL and VOID;
and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives as null
and void; (3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby
ORDERED to cancel plaintiffs-appellees TCT No. 296463, and any
(c) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to and all titles issued covering the subject property, for being
pay the sum of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; spurious and void, and of no force and effect.85[20]
and
The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
(d) To pay the costs.82[17]
by the CA in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004. Hence, the instant petition for
review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris Carpo.86[21] The Petition
contained the following assignment of errors:
On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed
by the CA in a Resolution83[18] dated May 14, 1999 for failure to pay the full amount
A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI pointed out that it paid the full DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS VALID
amount assessed by the cash clerk on duty at the RTC Las Pias. The motion was EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN APPROVED
BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.
also denied, prompting ALI to file with this Court a petition for review docketed as
G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALIs petition meritorious, the Court, in a Decision84[19] B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND
PRESCRIPTION. claimed by the Carpos under their TCT No. 296463 had an area of only 171,309
square meters and the total area of the properties in the titles invalidated by the trial
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN court was 799,262 square meters.
DECLARING THAT THE RTC RELIED HEAVILY ON AN
ALLEGED ADMISSION BY RESPONDENT OF THE VALIDITY OF
THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL
OF LAND.
It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving the same
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST parties, the CA ruled that:
PETITIONERS BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN
PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415, WITHOUT PROPER
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE
ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND WHETHER On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive
THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT.87[22] pleading did not deny the existence of a title in the name of the
plaintiffs/private respondents. Instead, it alleged:

14. The parcel of land described in TCT


Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision: (a) reversing and setting No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs,
completely overlaps the property covered by ALIs
aside the CA Decision dated December 22, 2003 and Resolution dated December 16, TCT No. T-5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces
2004; (b) reinstating and affirming in toto the RTCs Summary Judgment dated itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on
August 12, 1970, long after OCT No. 242 (the title
December 22, 1998; or in the alternative (c) remanding the case to the RTC for from which ALIs TCT No. T-5333 was derived)
further proceedings. was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of
Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No.
43516). Hence, ALIs TCT No. T-5333 is superior
After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and concur with to TCT No. 296463. xxx.
the CA that the Summary Judgment rendered by the trial court should be reversed This is an admission that the private respondents have a
and set aside. title to the property in question, and that the property described in
private respondents TCT No. 296463 completely overlaps the title
of petitioner ALI. This fact is further substantiated by an
Preliminary discussion regarding affidavit of Jose Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who, after
subject matter of the controversy attesting to his qualifications, competence and experience,
declared under oath:
At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary Judgment
declared null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT No. [125945] T- 9. In connection with the subject case,
6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. Affiant was requested to find out, based on the
T-4366 with a land area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a land technical descriptions in their respective titles, if
area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land area of 155,345 the lots described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No.
square meters, despite the lack of evidence of identity of the properties described in 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT
TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 with the property covered by the Carpos TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of LPVI,
No. 296463 or any portion of said property claimed by petitioners. This was grievous and, more previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-
and palpable error on the part of the trial court considering that the property being A, in the name of Ayala Corporation), TCT No.
4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368, x x x.

9.1. To accomplish
this task, Affiant resorted to the overlapping and identical boundaries between the private
plotting of the technical respondents TCT No. 296463 and petitioners TCT No. 125945,
descriptions found in the (formerly TCT No. T-5333).88[23] In addition to the affidavit of the
plaintiffs and ALIs respective Geodetic Engineer, the petitioner likewise attached to its Motion for
titles. The standard operating Summary Judgment copies of the following titles:
procedure, adopted by Affiant
in this particular instance, in xxxx
plotting properties is to study
the technical description in the In contrast, the private respondents never controverted the
titles and at the same time, to petitioners allegation that their (private respondents) title, TCT No.
get all the available survey 296463 traces its origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12,
plans described in the titles for 1970, while that of the petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242,
reference. issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover, the private respondents
attached no supporting document to its Opposition to the
9.2. To evidence this Motion for Summary Judgment.
plotting that Affiant conducted,
Affiant prepared a Sketch Plan Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of
reflecting Plaintiffs title vis-a-vis summary judgment appear to have been satisfied xxx.
ALIs title. Attached hereto as
Annex G is an original copy of xxxx
the Sketch Plan prepared by
the Affiant. Since the existence of two titles over the same
property, as well as the fact of overlapping of the technical
9.3. The orange- descriptions of the two titles are admitted in the pleadings, and
shaded portion on the Sketch substantiated by the supporting documents attached by the
Plan indicates the area defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for
covered by the title of the Summary Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any
plaintiffs and it is clearly shown material fact. If at all, the sole issue is a legal one, to wit:
in this plan that plaintiffs whose title (as to the conflicting ones) is superior and must be
claimed property entirely upheld. This issue may be decided on the basis of the
overlaps ALIs property affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the parties,
delineated in TCT No. T- as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In
41262. Plaintiffs claimed other words, there need not be a protracted trial thereon, since all
property (Lot 3, PSU-56007) that the trial court should do is to apply the law to the issue, taking
is in fact identical to ALIs lot into consideration the documents attached by the parties in their
(Lot 3, PSU-80886). respective pleadings and/or submitted together with the motion or
the opposition thereto. The same is true with the other defenses
9.4. The blue, pink raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit: res
and green lines on the judicata, prescription and laches which may likewise be
Sketch Plan indicate the resolved without going to trial.89[24] (Emphasis and
boundaries of ALIs TCT Nos. underscoring supplied.)
4366, 4367 and 4368,
respectively, and it is clearly
shown that these do not
overlap with plaintiffs
claimed property.

The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly indicates the


The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the separate respectively.
petitions for review filed with this Court by the parties were denied with finality. The
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in
parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CAs factual finding therein that the name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived
the only lots whose technical descriptions overlap are those covered by the Carpos from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970
pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case
TCT No. 296463 and ALIs TCT No. T-5333 which later became TCT No. T-41262. No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-
There was simply no basis for the trial court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in 32166.
the complaint.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July
27, 1971 in the name of Quezon City
The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the Summary Development and Financing Corporation, derived
from OCT No. 8931 which was issued on July 27,
Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2, plan Psu- 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO
47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Petitioners claims with respect Record No. N-31777.
to these properties are already barred by res judicata. In Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,90[25]petitioner Morris Carpo already asserted his with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over
purported ownership of these two properties based on a transfer certificate of title with by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera
Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT
the same survey plan number (Psu-56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,
his claim was discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration.
x x x.
(Realty), ALIs predecessor in interest,91[26] is the one with valid title to these
properties. The relevant portions of the Realty Decision are quoted here: xxxx

In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao


Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of
Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration
proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las 29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over
Pias, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035.
situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation among
Paraaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with
wit: two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed
by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No.
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved
name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was identical parcels of land, and identical applicants/oppositors.
derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21,
1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC xxxx
Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record
Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516,
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars,
the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before
Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970.
x x x.
xxxx this point. It is the CAs view that the trial courts pronouncement that OCT No. 242
was issued without an approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs
of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed presumption of regularity that said title enjoys.
by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal
confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-
We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the following
47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con
respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, portion of the Summary Judgment:
they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration
proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated
by Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur
as when as the decisions rendered therein. with Ayalas claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged
OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs
in their complaint. A reading of the defendants answer reveals that
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name
OCT No. 242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the
of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title, was
pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the
issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of the title
Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to be
in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original
land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for
that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not
a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The property being
prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No.
is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing
of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in emanating from a survey plan without the approval of the Director
respect thereof x x x.92[27] (Emphasis and underscoring ours; of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore
citations omitted.) void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held:
That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands
the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence.
We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results
are not entitled to credit and should be rejected.

First Assignment of Error The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of


mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same
Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of respondent are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In
is valid even without the requisite survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration Commission
has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands,
of Lands. et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).

Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which


Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CAs ruling on defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242
had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but
was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land
Registration Commissioner and under the law, the same is interest at the time the latter sought original registration of the
void.93[28] subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be
assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a
To begin with, a perusal of the defendants answer or amended answer decree in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-interest, under the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by
would show that, contrary to the trial courts allusions thereto, there is no admission on public officers. The court upon which the law has conferred
the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey plan that was duly jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise
such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively. This is as it
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. There is likewise no evidence on should be, because once a decree of registration is made under the
record to support the trial courts finding that the survey plan submitted to support the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree
may be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be
issuance of OCT No. 242 in the 1950 land registration proceedings was approved questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant
only by the Land Registration Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of could, by repeated actions, compel a court to review a decree
previously issued by another court forty-five (45) years ago. The
Lands. very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same
land may be subsequently brought under a second action for
registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALIs failure
It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT No. 242 was to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan
issued without a duly approved survey plan simply because the notation SWO approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original land
registration case.
appeared in the technical description of the said title which was attached to the
answer and due to ALIs failure to allege in its pleadings that the survey plan The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to
allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its predecessor-in-
submitted in support of the issuance of OCT No. 242 was approved by the Director of interest complied with the requirements for the original registration
the Bureau of Lands.94[29] of the subject property. A party dealing with a registered land need
not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true
owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest.
It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey plan Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the
transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor.
mentioned in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the appropriate authority all from the
It may rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the certificate of
notation SWO which appeared beside the survey plan number on the face of the title title issued for the subject property and the law will in no way
oblige it to go behind the certificate of title to determine the
or from a failure to allege on the part of ALI that a duly approved survey plan exists. condition of the property. This is the fundamental nature of the
We quote with approval the discussion of the CA on this point: Torrens System of land registration, to give the public the right to
rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense
with the need of inquiring further.95[30] (Underscoring ours;
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred when, in citations omitted.)
ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave emphasis
to defendant-appellants failure to allege that the survey plan of
OCT No. 242 was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Lands. It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the requirements It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the registration
for the issuance of decrees of registration, but upon the issuance of
decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land registration
such decree, it can most certainly be assumed that said
proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242
requirement was complied with by ALIs original predecessor-in-
and its derivatives, including ALIs TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the presumption of
regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued. That is
precisely the nature of such a presumption, it dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section To overturn this legal presumption
3 of the Rules of Court provides: carelessly more than 90 years since the
termination of the case will not only endanger
judicial stability, but also violate the underlying
principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so
would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage.
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be (Emphasis supplied.)
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxxx
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the requisites for
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the the issuance of a valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
a duly approved survey plan accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950
jurisdiction;
because it is presumed. It is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case would have the burden to present adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary.
were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like
manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute This, petitioners did not even attempt to do.
submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed
upon by them; x x x.

We cannot accept petitioners proposition that they did not have the burden
Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna96[31]:
of proof of showing the irregularity of ALIs title since the burden of proof purportedly
did not shift to them since no full-blown trial was conducted by the RTC.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the


Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that
Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1 of the
have been regularly issued by the accountable public officers
Rules of Court provides:
who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led
to the issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of
Cabuyao cannot be overturned without any countervailing
proof to the contrary. In the words of Tichangco v. Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of
Enriquez:97[32] a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law.
With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all
the bases of their cause of action, particularly their allegation that ALIs title is null and
In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it applied the
void and that such title should be cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint
principle Primus Tempore, Portior Jure (First in Time, Stronger in Right) in this case
would show that petitioners never alleged the purported lack of an approved survey
and found that ALIs title was the valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT.
plan as a defect of ALIs title. All that the complaint alleged is that ALIs titles should be
declared void for not being derivatives of the Carpos title. Implicit in that allegation is
that petitioners were relying solely on the supposed priority of their own title over
ALIs. It stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its Answer that its
Second Assignment of Error
mother title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved survey plan when
petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in their complaint or in any other Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their
pleading filed with the trial court. cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. According to them, since
the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a duly approved survey
Indubitably, in view of the CAs Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, this
plan, their cause of action did not prescribe. However, as discussed above, the
controversy has been reduced to the sole substantive issue of which between the two
conclusion of the trial court that OCT No. 242 is void was not sufficiently borne out by
titles, purporting to cover the same property, deserves priority. This is hardly a novel
the evidence on record. Verily, the premise upon which petitioners build their theory
issue. As petitioners themselves are aware, in Realty, it was held that:
of imprescriptibility of their action did not exist.

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is


that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CAs finding that:
the same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALIs predecessor-in-
a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before
the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the
such, it is the Courts firmly held view that plaintiffs-appellees claim
holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from
is barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.
the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued
in respect thereof x x x."98[33] (Emphasis supplied.) Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become
incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the time a
decree of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that
plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is also barred. Although
In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite,99[34] we held that [w]here plaintiffs-appellees complaint was for quieting of title, it is in
essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the
constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were alleging
better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title in said complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in
the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-
were derived.
interest. It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance,
which is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name, must
be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title, since such
issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALIs title is
traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period CA stated as follows:
expired in 1960.

By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence and
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to validity of plaintiffs-appellees title. We have read the pertinent
assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is pleading and We find ALIs statement to be of no moment.
principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right,
which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to Nowhere in ALIs statement was there an admission of the
permit. In the instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as well as their validity of plaintiffs-appellees title. x x x.
predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken
judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALIs title was The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a
derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if quo could have gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not
successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who only the existence, but also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees
relied on the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for certificate of title. x x x.101[36]
value, who are protected by the precise provisions of P.D. 1529,
thus:

SECTION 32. Review of decree of An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would readily
registration; Innocent purchaser for value The
decree of registration shall not be reopened or show that indeed the trial court relied on ALIs supposed admission of the existence of
revised xxx subject, however, to the right of any Carpos title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was valid. Pertinently, the trial court
person xxx to file in the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for reopening and review of merely declared:
the decree of registration not later than one year
from and after the date of entry of such decree of
The existence of plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 has been
registration, but in no case shall such petition be
admitted by defendant Ayala in its answer to have been originated
entertained by the court where an innocent
from OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970. It is very
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
significant that defendant ALI admitted it in its answer that OCT No.
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
8575 and plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 both originated from Decree
Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for
No. 131141 issued on October 15, 1969 in the name of Apolonio
value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Sabater as Annex G to defendant ALIs answer. This admission
Decree, it shall be deemed to include and
made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon it. It
innocent lessee, mortgagee or other
cannot therefore take position contrary to or inconsistent with
encumbrances for value.100[35]
its answer, and the facts are to be taken as true (Westminister
High School vs. Sto. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5,
1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255).
Third Assignment of Error

The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial court, in
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur
rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily on the alleged admission with Ayalas claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged
OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs
made by ALI on the validity of Carpos title, as declared by the CA. Specifically, the
in their complaint. x x x.102[37] Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.

It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-


appellees have on the subject property on the basis of Lot 3 Psu-
Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI admitted 56007, through their predecessor-in-interest, Florentino Baltazar,
the same had been clearly and finally denied by the Supreme Court
the validity of Carpos title with its admission of the said titles existence, that is the in Guico vs. San Pedro.
unmistakable import of the trial courts statements that ALIs admission of the
existence of Carpos title are conclusive upon it and bars ALI from taking a position
contrary to or inconsistent with its answer followed by the statement that the trial court For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1)
is not inclined to concur with Ayalas claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered
alleged OCT No. 242, absent of (sic) any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs. by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
This is yet another non sequitur argument on the part of the trial court which the CA parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
correctly pointed out in its own Decision. Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections with respect to the fourth
requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such
decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro
Fourth Assignment of Error
and the instant case.104[39]

As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decision in
the case of Guico v. San Pedro103[38] was binding on the Carpos as it proceeded to
We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of
discuss, thus:
Guico and the evidence on record that indeed the predecessors-in-interest of ALI and
the Carpos with respect to the subject property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the
conflicting claims over a tract of land situated in barrio Tindig na Baltazar, especially since the parties respective OCTs were not issued in these
Manga, Paraaque, Rizal, which was subdivided into eleven (11) persons names but rather a certain Alberto Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It
lots. The subject land was sought to be registered by a certain
Eduardo C. Guico on the basis of an accompanying plan Psu- cannot be categorically said that there was identity of parties between the Guico case
80886, which interestingly is also the basis of ALIs TCT No. T- and the instant case. Clearly, one of the elements of res judicata, i.e., that there must
5333, now TCT No. 41262. Guicos application was opposed by,
among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In any
under which plaintiffs-appellees title was derived. event, the CAs questioned Decision had sufficient basis in fact and law even without

It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on relying on the Guico case.
the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the instant
case), Lot 10 in favor of Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under
In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
which plaintiffs-appellees title was based, and the rest to the heirs
of Narciso Mayuga. While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his error in setting aside the patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the trial court.
Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated December 16, 2004 are hereby case mandatory or directory?
AFFIRMED.
Statement of the Case

SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause
such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.
But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the
Decisioni[1] promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolutionii[2]
promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appealsiii[3] in CA-G.R.
CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:iv[4]

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is


hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel,
Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the
parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are
hereby dismissed for want of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this
land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for


original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529.v[5] The application was docketed as Land Registration Case
THIRD DIVISION (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.vi[6] However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died.
Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO
ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
DECISION possession of the subject land since 1938.

PANGANIBAN, J.: In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:vii[7]

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration "x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing
Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to
Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general
the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process.xi[11]
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural
its pertinent portion provides:viii[8] defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.xii[12]
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has
a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:xiii[13]
provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the
second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper
of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to
process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this
legally infirm. wise:xiv[14]

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure
earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the
of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other
conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party
who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Courts Ruling
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on We find for petitioner.
Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is
appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition Newspaper Publication Mandatory
as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.ix[9]
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication
The Issue of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five
discretionx[10] in holding days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days
x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need from the date of the order.
not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC
Case No. 86 for want of such publication. The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration
by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -- which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the
inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.xviii[18]
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the
in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned -- nay, the whole world -
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all - who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively
persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted.
owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is
require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties
cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.

xxx xxx xxx It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official
Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements
requirement. for publication, mailing and posting.

The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not
initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has
character of a statute.xv[15] While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous
rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law
entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,xvi[16] the Court through Mr. vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.xix[19] There is no
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents
initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would requisites shall have been duly complied with.
not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons
named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land
by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
SO ORDERED.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.xvii[17] Being in
rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons,
including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process
must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose
rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171631

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

-versus- CARPIO-MORALES,*

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R.


DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and
GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ,
represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ,

Respondents.
Promulgated:

Republic of the Philippines


November 15, 2010
DECISION
Supreme Court

Manila

PERALTA, J.:
SECOND DIVISION
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision105[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land
dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the
Decision106[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for
Case No. N-11514, granting respondents application for registration and confirmation the year 2003 has been paid.
of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob108[4] dated June 18, 1987,
The factual milieu of this case is as follows: executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester),
who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz
(Alejandro) by virtue of a Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-
aari ng Namatay109[5] dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the
(Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land107[3] concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by
under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been
Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in
square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty
survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and (50) years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They
3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for maintained that the subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land of
registration, respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of the public domain.
attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the
application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date,
590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the
survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable jurisdictional requirements of the law.
by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3)
Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following
grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) After the decision shall have been become final and
executory and, upon payment of all taxes and other charges due
that the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of
on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration
applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute shall be accordingly undertaken.
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and
SO ORDERED.111[7]
(3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no
other oppositor to the application.
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.112[8] The CA,
in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default110[6] been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property
against the whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that
presented their evidence in support of their application. respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have
been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents
were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition
application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the raising the following grounds:
decision states:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH
hereto entered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT
dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
and residents of and with postal address at No. 65 Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described II
and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE
No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS'
containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY
(25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
DOMAIN.113[9] In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the
factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.114[10] It is not the
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a
adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an discretion.115[11]
owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property remained
to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA
that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present
evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and
adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land.
To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, Decree provides:
1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition,
respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file
Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes. in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues (1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
petition for review under Rule 45. and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The petition is meritorious.


From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by following annotation:
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.116[12] These the respondents
must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.117[13] This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
clasified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership In Republic v. Sarmiento,121[17] the Court ruled that the notation of the

are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision

been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.118[14] The burden Center, that this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B.

of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry, is

domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the

prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.

this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject
of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.119[15]

Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,122[18] the Court held that:

To support its contention that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084120[16] In the present case, the only evidence to prove the
(Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said
properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the
kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable,
legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a
we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.124[20]
certification from the Government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance
Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through
do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12,
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the
proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for 1945 or earlier.
registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and
occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado
Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,123[19] the
establish respondents predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject
Court held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19,
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification
1939,125[21] testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew that
status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
the land subject of this case belonged to them.126[22] Amado testified that he was a
(CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of
tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950,127[23] and on about
the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
the same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject land.128[24]
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within
the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no
the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land
These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the
and disposable. property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show
Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of
the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It is a
rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind
of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and
disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to establish that the subject land are part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence
possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.129[25] An applicant in a land classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2)
registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership
alleged ownership and possession of the land.130[26] since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the
subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of
respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of title
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and
or earlier.131[27] Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a
predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters
owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in- situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.
interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule
that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the
disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the SO ORDERED.

applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily


prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.132[28]

The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear


picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of
vs. registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.
VEGA, respondents.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the
following ratiocination:

BIDIN, J.: In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still
Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and
complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering
also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their
purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the
decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that
granting the application of respondent spouses for registration over the lots in registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens
question. System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of
their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular
Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that
where then natural-born Filipino citizens. title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the
purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are
(2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were
This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-
28)

An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their
respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence
respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of which reads as this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
follows:
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented therein.
the said application and confirms the title and possession of herein
applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired
spouses Mario B. Lapia and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian
citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It
residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170- maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public
124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada. lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State
under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains
to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the
land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned 18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants
land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on (respondents) and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
the evidence. possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of
the application for registration." This is not, however, the same as
As found by the trial court: saying that respondents have been in possession "since June 12,
1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also
Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents'
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by possession. They fall short of the required possession since June
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove
public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on
and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required
registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according to the
June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in
that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have
been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26) notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in
open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is
not, however, what the law provides.
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the
alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest
Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein,
disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the
taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the Registration Act, to wit:
vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and
"J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in interest had xxx xxx xxx
been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the
filing of the application for registration. But what is of great (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
Filipino citizens such that when they filed their application for domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27) for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues: all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for (Emphasis supplied)
taxation purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since
1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of property As amended by PD 1073:
are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic
VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that Act
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945. by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is
disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", no longer disposable under the Public Land Act
"the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not as by free patent . . .
whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only
a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has xxx xxx xxx
been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his
possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in As interpreted in several cases, when the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only conditions as specified in the foregoing provision
since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except are complied with, the possessor is deemed to
that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As grant, a government grant, without the necessity
aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary dispose of. The application for confirmation is
to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title. mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the be issued upon the strength of said patent.
certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land
since it still pertains to the State. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express
abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48
SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to
[1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
declared that: and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
. private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cario, ". . .(There are
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of
decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied) the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of
Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open,
continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA
604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private
cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a
vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of
(National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]). the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present
any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the
either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo
(Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria"
are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23
(National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession,
the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time
of. immemorial.

In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could
[1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands
the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the nature of (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their
predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced . . . All lands that were not acquired from the
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit Government, either by purchase or by grant,
executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove belong to the public domain. An exception to the
that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father rule would be any land that should have been in
Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a the possession of an occupant and of his
report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the for such possession would justify the presumption
alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was that the land had never been part of the public
affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33). domain or that if had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest (Cario v.
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S.
on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not
Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis. come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor in
We disagree. interest began in 1880.

In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born . . . alienable public land held by a possessor,
Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is personally or through his predecessors-in-
where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the prescribed statutory period (30 years under
the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he
private property by the mere lapse or completion transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property,
of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra) to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove upon in their application . . .
that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in
the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as xxx xxx xxx
ruled in both Cario and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos Considering that the private respondents became American citizens
v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule before such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no
enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property
Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under before they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from
the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed
as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because
disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive they were American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents
averments. therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time
immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated
from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens,
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
to prove that the property subject of the application is an alienable
and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was
pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens
Constitution). at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested
rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the
prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on
their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapias mother.
possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . .
When referring to possession, specifically "immemorial
possession," it means possession of which no man living has seen But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the
the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land
elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following
in the case of private respondents. . . . pertinent provisions, to wit:

. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . . or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property allegedly limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of
both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his
estate among his heirs in such manner as to remove the same Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15,
from the public domain under the Cario and Susi doctrines. Thus, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide. period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant
provision of which provides: The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also
be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his provides:
Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a
contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for
up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case the registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred
of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of
by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn
them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if statement showing the date and place of his birth; the names and
both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the
exceed the maximum herein fixed. area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in
the Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the
residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other
an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the
maximum areas herein authorized. The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the
instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it
passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before
private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title.
citizenship remains to be BP 185. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be
confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only
when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the
for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be
already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is
registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register
are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title
have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be
a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby
(1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). AFFIRMED.

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural- SO ORDERED.
born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a
parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born
Thus it states:

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a


natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.
Separate Opinions
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the
private respondents have observed "the limitations provided by law."

The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private
CRUZ, J., dissenting: respondents' name have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no
showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus: for registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements
in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should also be applied.
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of
land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements Filipinos who have become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with
for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? our own citizens, I see no reason why we should be less so with those who have
renounced our country.
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration
by qualified persons. It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly Feliciano, J.: concurring
inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition. I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the
result reached therein.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses
were natural-born Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just
question posed. before the dispositive portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be
stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982, does not purport to
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses
Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were
citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land, they can register it in their natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been
names now even if they are no longer Filipinos. naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine,
addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were already foreign nationals at
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the time they became transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were
the respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P.
transferred to them. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time
when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg.
185, especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be
private land to a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be exceeded both by the
foreigner. land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken
together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Thus it states:
Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were naturalized as citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
Canadian nationals. limitations provided by law.

Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the
private respondents have observed "the limitations provided by law."
# Separate Opinions

The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private
CRUZ, J., dissenting: respondents' name have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no
showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements
for registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus: in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should also be applied.

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former
land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Filipinos who have become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements our own citizens, I see no reason why we should be less so with those who have
for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? renounced our country.

There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration Feliciano, J.: concurring
by qualified persons. It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly
inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition. I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the
result reached therein.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses
were natural-born Filpinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just
question posed. before the dispositive portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be
stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982, does not purport to
cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were
Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to have been
citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land, they can register it in their naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can determine,
names now even if they are no longer Filipinos. addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were already foreign nationals at
the time they became transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P.
the respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time
transferred to them. when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg.
185, especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be
private land to a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be exceeded both by the
foreigner. land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken
together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and
Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185) instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below.

B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas
respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were naturalized as (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Canadian nationals. Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente
Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y
Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots,
together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had
established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof
since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. 2
Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to
Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both
residents of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.3

Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually
acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7
November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over
Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-
half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the
Spouses Abierra through various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia
between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate
Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.4

Republic of the Philippines In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim
SUPREME COURT dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra
Manila spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since
the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771
SECOND DIVISION despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the
1941 Decision and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot
No. 771. The records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007 Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was
rendered a few months before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Philippines in December of 1941.
vs.
LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent. No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the
DECISION City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case was set for hearing
and in all subsequent proceedings.5
TINGA, J.:
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26
laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case. It is a April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision6 finding merit in the petition for revival of
hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla,13
decree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a
land registration case wherein the decree of registration remained unissued after 26
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that years was already "final and enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador,
the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued explained:
that at the very least, Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a
decree of registration before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of
appeal was denied by the appellate court in its Decision 7 dated 24 July 2003. In its error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period
the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision.
by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
registration cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been especially judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil
considering that it had been established that the original records in the 1941 case had actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration
already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed. case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the
registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
action accrues.8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
establishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land
action before it is barred by statute of limitations. 9 It bears noting that the Republic and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
does not challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the
rights of the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the property is Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule
inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State. 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to
place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals10 land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes
and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in that case, the Court final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an
dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking the revival of judgment appeal. x x x
that declared a title null and void because the judgment sought to be revived had
become final more than 25 years before the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
the Court relied on Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely
Rules of Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against
hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty
the subsequent action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court
registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had become final. The or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has
Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of the been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is
petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years. ordered to be registered.14

Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision
but definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower in a land registration case was reiterated five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of
courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al. 15 In that case, it was similarly
decision in a land registration case."12 argued that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant
to a 1938 decision was, among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting
the argument, the Court was content in restating with approval the above-cited
excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directing
later in Rodil v. Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. the registration of title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days
Ibanez, etc., and Poras17 and Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the
the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall
of possession of the land never prescribes.19 send, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and
of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision
prescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final.
from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Ana doctrine was reiterated in Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration
another three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title.
Court of Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The doctrine of stare decisis The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The
compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling argument decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the
to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the Republic in its Land Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also
present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it be signed by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owners duplicate
never existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property is
the five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to land situated for entry in his registration book.
registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.23 The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the
(PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is
provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition
registration proceedings. to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the
land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the issue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to
principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the current arguments of transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
the Republic. Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of
registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations
are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other beyond discretion of amendment or review.
or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure
but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases.
Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance
land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the
land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The
judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive
adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an
a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration. attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.

The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the
contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be
precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997
judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason Rules of Civil Procedure.
being there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order
to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have
to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads: been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for
revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil
procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to
prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with subject of two separate applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in
whom the duty to issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently 1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to
established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order obtain a decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968. 24 On the other
from a land registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979,
impediment to the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the by which time the property had already been registered in the name of the other
practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The
passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or order, issues of prescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed their action to
as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing title only in
the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules
of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for
causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the the delay in filing the action for the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus
decree of registration. denied the petition on that score.

What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to
though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
should be observed that neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, prevail x x x," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain
nor did they make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were a certificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not
governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation that have stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the
marked both Sta. Ana and the present case. petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect
their interests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose the other
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the
original action for land registration, but from a successful motion by the Republic five (5) -year reglementary period.
seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While
one might argue that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we note that Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates
the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the order of its application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a
cancellation was made in the course of dispensing with an argument which was general rule for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought for belated
ultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different final
issue of prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of judgment which had already been executed and which was shielded by the legal
Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the judgment protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not
sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine have been a "ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate
was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the significantly more the judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that
extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the their right of ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was indubitable,
fact that the State no longer held interest in the subject property, having divested the considering the earlier decree of registration over the same property accorded to a
same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior to the filing of the action different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that the
for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the applicability of the rules of final judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by
prescription. legal design, has not been disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior
court. That presumption obtains in this case as well. Unless that presumption is
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still overcome, there is no impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as
another point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the precedent.25
certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not
since been utilized by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipside
final decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability of the rules of prescription or laches in
was promulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases do not operate to detract from
Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case. the continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that neither
prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a land registration
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even case, especially when the said judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether
more unconventional than that in Shipside. The property involved therein was the deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so
much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983,
stating the obvious. then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7,
granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan
Decision constituted res judicata that barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates Rs-07-000787.
title over the subject property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate
as res judicata only after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977.
in this case. We doubt that a final decisions status as res judicata is the impelling Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the
ground for its very own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and
defense or as a factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
terminology aside, the Republics arguments on this point do not dissuade from our
central holding that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court
standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application
predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay, was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
following the prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue
the decree of registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she
had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates her predecessors-in-interest- The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska,
in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn
original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to
and the petitioners application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer 2 calling
attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become
final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of
Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not petitioners application on the ground of res judicata.
offer any compelling argument to dispute such proof.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. motion of respondents, dismissed petitioners application on the ground of res
judicata. 31vvphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of
Republic of the Philippines whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the
SECOND DIVISION Land Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct"
decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents motion to dismiss LRC No.
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007 1437-N;5 and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents
after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant
judgment pass[d] into extinction."6
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res
L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and judicata.7
JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.
The petition fails.
DECISION
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree
CARPIO MORALES, J.: provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. The respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act
judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance
expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis
judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil supplied)
cases.
As for petitioners claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to
forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory
Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
supplied) a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced
by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or
oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents
when final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive
within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and period, the same does not lie.
registration.10
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison detre why Section 6, Rule 39 does
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration courts approval not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienzas application for
registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including
petitioner. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had UNENFORCEABLE.
become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of
registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section,
Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above
(DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period
first be approved by the Land Management Services of of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil
the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead submitted actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration
to the court a mere special work order.11 case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the
action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty. purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and ownership has been proved and confirmed
with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However,
if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance
of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is EN BANC
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of
the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and G.R. No. 123346
MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION,
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule Petitioners,
39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to Present:
place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a PUNO, C.J.,
land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes QUISUMBING,
final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an YNARES-SANTIAGO,
appeal. - versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) CORONA,
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CARPIO MORALES,
CORPORATION, TINGA,
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED. Respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting. NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
BRION, and
SO ORDERED.
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 31, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI- G.R. No. 134385


CULTURE, INC.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY


HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING

SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR


CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON
AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS
LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND
ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF MALABON,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the
RESOLUTION subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the
issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are
those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
TINGA, J.: Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace its
title to the title acquired by the Government through
expropriation.
In the Courts Resolution dated 14 December 2007,[1] the Court constituted a Special
Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the instant case on remand. The Special v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining
which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
Division was composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, with
Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the
Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in
Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member. We
accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
instructed the Special Division to proceed as follows:
SO ORDERED.[2]

The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with the
conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.
Resolution. The parties to these cases, namely CLT Realty Development Corporation
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special (CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (the Manotoks), the
Division is directed to make the following determinations based on the evidence
Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of Dimson), and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.
already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings
before it, to wit: (Araneta), were directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidence
to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-page Report[3]
(Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division submitted the sealed Report to
this Court.

Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary matter. On


February 17, 2009, the Manotoks filed a motion beseeching that copies of the report
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back
be furnished the parties so that they may submit their comments and objections
their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
thereon in accord with the principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32 of the Rules of
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks
Court. We deny the motion.
and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the
evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat
the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?
It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Court of
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Appeals for reception of evidence was strictly in accordance with Rule 32. Notably,
Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true
Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral of the case to a commissioner by written
and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a
superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons consent of both parties, whereas in the cases at bar, the Court did not endeavor to
and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
secure the consent of the parties before effectuating the remand to the Court of
Appeals. Nonetheless, our earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the 2] of the Caloocan Registry of Deeds. Allegedly, DIMSON had
transferred the subject property to ENRIQUEZ by way of an
adopted procedure does not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to our power under
absolute and irrevocable sale on 14 November
Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which 1979.Unfortunately though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ discovered
that the subject property was being occupied by ARANETA
appears conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary
wherein an agricultural school house is erected and that despite
processes and other means necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect. repeated demands, the latter refused to vacate the parcel of land
and remove the improvements thereon.

Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would not serve any
useful purpose. It would only delay the promulgation of the Courts action on the
Sealed Report and the adjudication of these cases. In any event, the present ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and countered
that it is the absolute owner of the land being claimed by
Resolution quotes extensively from the sealed Report and discusses its other
DIMSON and that the real properties in the Araneta Compound
substantive segments which are not quoted. are properly documented and validly titled. It maintained that it
had been in possession of the subject parcel of land since 1974.
For this reason, the claims of DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ were
The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the issues referred allegedly barred by prescription.
to the Special Division. It is a more than adequate basis for this Court to make the
During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in evidence,
following final dispositions in these cases. among others, certifications from the Land Registration
Commission attesting that TCTs Nos. 13574 and 26538, covering
the disputed property, are in the names of ARANETA and Jose
I. Rato, respectively. ARANETA also offered TCT No. 7784 in
evidence to prove that it is the registered owner of the land
described therein.
We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by the Special
On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding
Division in its Report.
the title of DIMSON over the disputed property xxx

Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of


THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was later
consolidated with CA-GR. SP No. 34819 in view of the inter-
DIMSON v. ARANETA related issues of the two cases.
CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819
[SC-G.R. No. 134385] In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 41883, sustained the RTC Decision in favor of DIMSON
finding that the title of ARANETA to the disputed land in a nullity.
On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First In CA-GR. SP No. 34819, the Court of Appeals likewise
Instance [CFI] of Rizal a complaint for Recovery of Possession invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying on the Supreme Court
and Damages against ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court
amended his complaint and included Virgilio L. Enriquez of Appeals, which declared null and void the certificates of title
[ENRIQUEZ] as his co-plaintiff. derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 may 1917. It was also
held that ARANETA failed to sufficiently show that the Order
In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is the sought to be nullified was obtained through extrinsic fraud that
absolute owner of a 50-hectare land located in Bo. Potrero, would warrant the annulment thereof.
Malabon, Metro Manila covered by TCT No. R-15169, [Lot25-A-
Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration their titles, which were all derivatives of OCT No. 994 covering
And/Or New Trial espousing therein as basis for its entreaty the over twenty (20) parcels of land located over a portion of Lot 26
various letters from different government agencies and in the Maysilo Estate. In substance, it was contented that the title
Department order No. 137 of the Department of Justice, among of CLT was an offspring of an ineffective grant of an alleged
others. undisputed portion of Lot 26 by way of attorneys fees to its
predecessor-in- interest, Jose B. Dimson. The MANOTOKS, in
On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied this connection, further contended that the portion of Lot 26,
by the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered subject of the present controversy, had long been disposed of in
DIMSON to maintain status quo until the finality of the aforesaid favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and hence, there
judgment. was nothing more in said portion of Lot 26 that could have been
validly conveyed to Dimson.

Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme


Court. Refuting the factual finding of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, ARANETA contended that there in only one OCT 994
covering the Maysilo Estate issued on 3 May 1917 pursuant to
the Decree No. 36455 issued by the Court of Land Registration Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the
on 19 April 1917 and added that there were subsequent MANOTOKS alleged that TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT
certifications issued by the government officials, notably from the No. 994, had been issued in the names of Alejandro Ruiz and
LRS, the DOJ Committee Report and the Senate Committees Mariano Leuterio on Sept ember 1918 by virtue of an Escritura
Joint Report which attested that there is only one OCT 994, that De Venta executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique
which had been issued on 3 May 1917. Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210 allegedly covered an
approximate area of 19,565.43 square meters of Lot 26. On even
date, TCT No. 4211 was transferred to Francisco Gonzales on
CLT v. MANOTOK the strength of an Escritura de Venta dated 3 March 1920 for
CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255 which TCT No. T-5261, covering an area of 871,982 square
[SC-G.R. No. 123346] meters was issued in the name of one Francisco Gonzales,
married to Rufina Narciso.

On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court [RTC] Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261, was
A COMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, issued to Rufina Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was later
Recovery of Possession and Damages against the MANOTOKS replaced with the names of Gonzales six (6) children. The
and the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II (Calookan property was then subdivided and as a result of which, seven (7)
City, Metro Manila) [CALOOCAN RD]. certificates of titles were issued, six (6),under the names of each
of the children while the remaining title was held by all of them as
In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot co-owners.
26 of the Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 177013, a derivative title of Eventually, the properties covered by said seven certificates of
OCT No. 994. As a basis of its proprietary claim, CLT averred title were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines. These
that on 10 December 1988, it had acquired Lot 26 from its former properties were then later subdivided by the National Housing
registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito [HIPOLITO], by virtue of a Authority [NHA], into seventy-seven (77) lots and thereafter sold
Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage. HIPOLITOs title was , to qualified vendees. As it turned out, a number of said vendees
in turn, a direct transfer from DIMSON, the registered owner of sold nineteen (19) of these lots to Manotok Realty, Inc. while one
TCT No. 15166, the latter having acquired the same by virtue of (1) lot was purchased by the Manotok Estate Corporation.
a Court Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557. During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of
the parties, approved the creation of a commission composed of
On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the validity of three commissioners tasked to resolve the conflict in their
respective titles. Accordingly, the created Commission convened
on the matter in dispute. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 [THE SUPREME
Buenaventura submitted an exhaustive Joint Final Report [THE COURT 2005 DECISION], the Supreme Court, through its Third
MAJORITY REPORT] finding that there were inherent technical Division, affirmed the RTC Decision and Resolutions of the Court
infirmities or defects on the face of TCT No. 4211, from which the of Appeals, which declared the titles of CLT and DIMSON as
MANOTOKS derived their titles (also on TCT No. 4210), TCT No. valid.
5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro Victoriano submitted his
Individual Final Report [THE MINORITY REPORT] dated 23 In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS and
October 1993. ARANETA, the Supreme Court, in turn, relied on the factual and
legal findings of the trial courts, which had heavily hinged on the
imputed flaws in said titles. Considering that these trial court
findings had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court highlighted the fact that the same were accorded the
highest degree of respect and, generally, should not be disturbed
on appeal.

After the conduct of a hearing on these reports, the parties filed


their respective comments/objections thereto. Upon order of the
trial court, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because the
Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report, the RTC, Supreme Court was not a trier of facts, it was not within its
on 10 May 1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of CLT and function to review factual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh
ordered, among others, the cancellation of the certificates of title the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.
issued in the name of the MANOTOKS.
THE SUPEME COURT RESOLUTION
The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on appeal
before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28 September Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their respective
1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, except as Motions for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court 2005
to the award of damages which was deleted. The MANOTOKS Decision.
then moved for reconsideration, but said motion was denied by
said appellate court in its Resolution dated 8 January 1996. After Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the Office of the
the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, the MANOTOKS Solicitor General [OSG] intervening on behalf of the Republic, the
filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. Supreme Court, in its Resolution of 14 December 2007 [THE
SUPREME CCOURT 2007 RESOLUTION] reversed and nullified
its 2005 Decision and categorically invalidated OCT No. 994
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT dated 19 April 1917, which was the basis of the propriety claims
of CLT and DIMSON. However, the Supreme Court resolved to
Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review, separately remand the cases to this Special Division of the Court of Appeals
filed by the MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan for reception of evidence.
Association, Inc., [STO. NIO], were consolidated.
To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of the
Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court were the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court made the following binding
report of the Fact Finding Committee dated 28 August 1997 and conclusions:
the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998
which concluded that there was only one OCT No. 994 issued, First, there is only one OCT 994. As it
transcribed and registered on 3 May 1917. appears on the record, that mother title was
received for transcription by the Register of CLT EVIDENCE
Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the
date which should be reckoned as the ate of In its Offer of Evidence,[[5]] CLT adopted the documentary
registration of the title. It may also be exhibits and testimonial evidence of witnesses submitted in the
acknowledged, as appears on the title, that case filed by CLT against STO. NIO in Civil Case No. C-15491,
OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of [CLT-STO NIO CASE]. These pieces of evidence include, among
the decree of registration on (19)* April 1917, others, the Majority and Minority Reports, the Formal Offer of
although such dated cannot be considered as Evidence in the presentation of the evidence-in-chief and rebuttal
the date of the title or the date when the title evidence in the CLT-STO NIO CASE consisting of various
took effect. certificates of titles, plans by geodetic engineer, tax declarations,
chemistry report, specimen signatures and letters of
Second. Any title that traces its source to correspondence.
OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 is void, for
such mother title is inexistent. The fact that
the Dimson and CLT titles made specific
reference to an OCT No. 994 dated (19) April MANOTOKS EVIDENCE
1917 casts doubt on the
The MANOTOKS sought admission of the following evidence:
Senate and DOJ Committee Reports; certificates of title issued to
them and their vendees/assignees, i.e., Republic of the
validity of such titles since they refer to an Philippines, the Gonzalezes, Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano
inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, Leuterio, Isabel Gil del Sola and Estelita Hipolito; deeds of
sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT absolute sale; contracts to sell; tax declarations and real property
claims over the subject property if singular tax receipts; the Formal Officer of Evidence of Philville
reliance is placed by them on the dates Development & Housing Corporation; [PHILVILLE], in Civil Case
appearing on their respective titles. No. 15045; this Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No.
52606 between CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders of Judge Palma
Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. dated 13 June 1966 and 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557 and
Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of the billing statements of SSHG Law Office. They also submitted
Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, in evidence the Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits of Rosa R.
especially in regard to their recognition of an Manotok and Luisa T. Padora; Affidavits of Atty. Felix B. Lerio,
OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title Atty. Ma. P.G. Ongkiko and Engineer Jose Marie P. Bernabe; a
which we now acknowledge as inexistent. copy of a photograph of BM No. 9; certified true copy of
Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or coordinates and reference point of L.M. No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10
Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 of Piedad Estate and TCT No. 177013 of CLT.[[6]]
dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case
operating under the factual setting the same
as or similar to that at bar.[4] DIMSON EVIDENCE

In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence,[[7]] DIMSON


II. submitted the previous decisions and resolutions passed relative
to these cases, various certifications of different government
agencies, OCT 994, subdivision plan of Lot 25-A-2, observations
The parties were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence before the Special of Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia showing the relative
positions of properties within Lot 25-A; the Novation of
Division. The Report names the evidence submitted to the Special Division for its
Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated 15 January 1948
evaluation: between Rato, Don Salvador Araneta and Araneta Institute of
Agriculture; copies of various certificates of titles to dispute some
of the titles held by ARANETA; several letter-requests and official opposed to the claims of the Araneta and the
receipts. Manotoks?

ARANETA EVIDENCE iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been
the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point
ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence various certificates of title, since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917,
specifically, OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No. 21857; TCT and if so, what are those proceedings, what are the
No. 26538; TCT No. 26539; TCT No. (7784)-738 and TCT no. titles acquired by the Government, and is any of the
13574. It also marked in evidence the certified true copies of parties able to trace its title acquired by the
Decree No. 36577; the DOJ and Senate Reports; letters of government through expropriation?
correspondence to the Land Registration Commission and the
Register of Deeds of Malabon City; survey plans of Lot 25-A and v. Such other matters necessary and proper in
TCT r-15169 of Dimson and; the affidavit of Engineer Felino M. ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title
Cortez and his curriculum vitae.ARANETA also offered the should prevail.
certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 in the name of Victoneta,
Inc.; TCT No. 13574 in the name of ARANETA; certifications
issued by Atty. Josephine H. Ponciano, Acting Register of Deeds The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of Appeals was to
of Malabon city-Navotas; certified true copy of Judge Palmas
ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were entitled to claim ownership over
Order dated 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557; Circular No. 17
(which pertains to the rules on reconstitution of titles as of 19 the subject properties to which they claimed title thereto. One set of properties was
February 1947) and its official receipt and; the owners duplicate
disputed between CLT and the Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between
copy of OCT No. 994.[[8]][9]
Araneta and the Heirs of Dimson.

III.
As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to obtain an order in 1977
issued by Judge Marcelino Sayo of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan
We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the Special Division. To
Cityon the basis of which he was able to register in his name properties belonging to
repeat, the Special Division was tasked to determine the following issues based on
the Maysilo Estate. Judge Sayos order in turn was sourced from a 1966 Order issued
the evidence:
by Judge (later Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the CFI of
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace Rizal. Dimsons titles reflected, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April
back their claims to Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
1917.[10] Among these properties was a fifty (50)-hectare property covered by
No. 994 dated 3 May 1917:
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151169, which apparently overlapped with the
property of Araneta covered by TCT No. 13574 and 26538. [11] Araneta was then and
ii. Whether the respective imputed flaws in the titles
of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the still is in possession of the property. The Araneta titles state, as their mother title,
Supreme Court 2005 Decision, are borne by the
OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Consequently, Dimson filed an action for recovery of
evidence.Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient
to defeat said claims? possession against Araneta.

iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966


Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of
Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do
these orders establish a superior right to the subject
properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as Another property in Dimsons name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of the Maysilo
Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in turn sold the same to CLT. Said We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made it clear that the Heirs
property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-177013, which also reflected, as its of Dimson were heavily reliant on the OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.
mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917. [12] Said property claimed by CLT
encroached on property covered by titles in the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks
[DIMSON], on the strength of Judge Sayos Order dated 18
traced their titles to TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, both issued in 1918 and both reflecting, October dated 18 October 1977, was issued separate certificates
of title, i.e., TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, 15168 and 15169, covering
as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.
portions of the Maysilo Estate. Pertinently, with respect to TCT
No. 15169 of DIMSON, which covers Lot 25-A-2 of the said
estate, the following were inscribed on the face of the instrument.
It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied on the validity
of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the basis of their claim of ownership. IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said
land was originally registered on the 19 th day
However, the Court in its 2007 Resolution held that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917
of April in the year nineteen hundred and
was inexistent. The proceedings before the Special Division afforded the Heirs of seventeen in the Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Dimson and CLT alike the opportunity to prove the validity of their respective claims
Volume NA page NA , as Original Certificate
to title based on evidence other than claims to title the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT of Title No. 994 pursuant to Decree No. 36455
issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429 Record No.
No. 994. Just as much was observed by the Special Division:
______

This Certificate is a transfer from Original


Nonetheless, while the respective certificates of title of DIMSON
Certificate of Title No. 994/NA, which is
and CLT refer to OCT 994 issued on 19 April 1917 and that their
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the
previous postulations in the present controversies had been
above-described land is concerned.[[14]]
anchored on the supposed validity of their titles, that which
emanated from OCT 994 of 19 April 1917, and conversely the
invalidity of the 3 May 1917 OCT 994, the Supreme Court has yet
again allowed them to substantiate their claims on the basis of
other evidentiary proofs:
From the above accounts, it is clear that the mother title of TCT
no. 15169, the certificate of title of DIMSON covering the now
disputed Lot 25-A-2, is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917.
Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and CLT bear the onus of
Manifestly, the certificate of title issued to DIMSON, and as a
proving in this special proceedings, by way of the evidence
matter of course, the derivative title later issued to CLT, should
already presented before and such other forms of evidence that
both be voided inasmuch as the OCT which they emanated had
are not yet of record, that either there had only been an error in
already been declared inexistent.[15]
the course of the transcription or registration of their derivative
titles, or that other factual and legal bases existed to validate or
substantiate their titles aside from the OCT No. 994 issued on 19
The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer any explanation why
April 1917.[13]
their titles reflect the erroneous date of 19 April 1917. At the same time, it rejected
Were they able to discharge such burden? CLTs explanation that the transcription of the erroneous date was a typographical
error.
A.
As can be gleaned from the records, both DIMSON and their successor-in-interest
CLT, had failed to present evidence before this Court to prove that there had been a 15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2, on June 8, 1978,
mere typographical error in the transcription of their respective titles with regard to the is overlapping with defendant-appellants title
date of registration of OCT No. 994. CLT specifically harps on this assertion that there TCT Nos. 13574 and 21343, not derived from
had only been a typographical error in the transcription of its title.[ [16]] On the other OCT No. 994.[[19]]
hand, while DIMSON had refused to categorically assert that there had been such a
typographical error causing the invalidity of their title, their failure to proffer any
reason or argument which would otherwise justify why their title reflects 19 April 1917 So viewed, sans any proof of a mechanical error in the
and not 3 May 1917 leads this Court to conclude that they simply had no basis to transcription or annotation on their respective certificates of
support their proprietary claim. title, the present inquiry then hinges on whether the Order
dated 13 June 1966 issued by then Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma
Thus, without proffering any plausible explanation as to of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557
what led to the erroneous entry of the registration dated of OCT [PALMA ORDER] and Judge Sayos Order dated 18 October
994, DIMSON are left without any recourse but to substantiate 1977 [SAYOS 18 OCTOBER 1977 ORDER], can be validated
their claim on the basis of other evidence not presented during and authenticated. It is so since the brunt of the proprietary
the proceedings below, which would effectively prove that they claims of both DIMSON and CLT has its roots on said Orders.
had a valid proprietary claim over the disputed properties. This is
specifically true because DIMSON had previously placed reliance
on the MWSS doctrine to prove the validity of their title. [17]

Perforce, in consideration of the foregoing, this leads Us to the


Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly constrained to rely on THIRD ISSUE as presented by the Supreme Court, to wit:
the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo, which was allegedly sourced from the 1966 Order of
Whether the factual and legal bases of
Judge Muoz Palma. On that issue, the Special Division made the following Palmas 13 June 1966 Order and Sayos 18
October 1977 Order are true and valid.
determinations:
Assuming they are, do these orders
establish a superior right to the subject
It should be recalled that in their appellees brief in CA- properties in favor of the Dimsons and
G.R.CV No. 41883, therein appellee Jose Dimson specifically CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta
denied the falsity of TCT No. R-15169 alleging that the and the Manotoks?
contention is already moot and can be determined by a
controlling decision.[[18]] Jose Dimson expounded on his As it is, in contending that their certificates of title could be
reliance as follows: validly traced from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994, DIMSON
point out that their title was issued pursuant to a court order
In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage issued by Judge Palma in Case No. 4557 and entered in the
System (for brevity MWSS) case, Jose B. memorandum of Encumbrance of OCT No. 994. DIMSON also
Dimsons (as private respondent) title TCT No. insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857 and 26538 were mere
15167 issued for Lot 28 on June 8, 1978 microfilmed or certified copies and, therefore, inadmissible.
derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April Lastly, DIMSON reiterated the flaws and irregularities which
19, 1917, is overlapping with MWSS title TCT voided the titles of the ARANETA in the previous proceedings
No. 41028 issued on July 29, 1940 derived and focused on the burden of ARANETA to present evidence to
from the same OCT 994, registered on May 3, defeat their titles.
1917.
The foregoing contentions of DIMSON find to factual and legal
(Same facts in the case at bar; Jose B. basis. As we see it, Sayos 18 October 1977 Order, which
Dimson (plaintiff-appellee) title TCT No. R- apparently confirmed Palmas 13 June 1966 Order, raised
serious questions as to the validity of the manner by which it original.
was arrived at.
Court:
It is worthy to note that as early as 25 August 1981, counsel for
the ARANETA applied for a subpoena duces tecum addressed I did not see the original also. When the records
to the Clerk of Court of CFI Pasig for the production of of this case was brought here, I checked the
therecords of LRC Case No. 4557 for purposes of determining records, there were so many pages missing
the genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge and the pages were re-numbered but then I
Palma and also of her Order granting the confirmation. A saw the duplicate original and there is a
certain Atty. Contreras, Officer-in-Charge of the said court, certification of a woman clerk of Court, Atty.
appeared and manifested in open court that the records Molo.
pertaining to the petition for Substitution of names of Bartolome
Rivera, et al. could no longer be located inasmuch as they had Atty. Directo:
passed hands from one court to another. That is the reason why we want to see this
document, we are surprised why it is missing.
What is perplexing to this Court is not only the loss of the entire
records of Case No. 4557 but the admission of Judge Sayo that Court:
he had not seen the original of the Palma Order. Neither was
the signature of Judge Palma on the Order duly proven We are surprised also. You better ask Judge
because all that was presented was an unsigned duplicate Muoz Palma.
copy with a stamped notation of original signed. Equally
perplexing is that while CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557 on file,
said file pertained not to an LRC case but to a simple civil
case.[[20]] Thus:

Atty. Contreras:
Atty. Directo:
May I make of record that in verifying our
The purpose of this subpoena duces tecum is records, we found in our original vault LRC
to present your Honor the Order Order (sic) of application no. N-4557 but the applications
Judge Palma in order to determine the were certain Feliciano Manuel and Maria Leao
genuineness and authenticity of the signature involving Navotas property because I was
of Judge Palma in this court order and which wondering why they have the same number.
order was a basis of a petition in this court to be There should be only one.
confirmed. That is the reason why we want to
see the genuineness of the signature of Judge Atty. Directo:
Palma.
Aside from that, are there other cases of the
COURT: same number?

No signature of Judge Palma was presented in Atty. Contreras:


this court. it was a duplicate copy not signed.
There is a stamp only of original signed. No, there should be only number for a particular
case; that must be a petition after decree
Atty. Directo: record.

That is the reason why we want to see the Atty. Ignacio:


share.[[23]] Even if we are to base the 25% of Jose Dimson on
This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a simple the 19.7 hectares allotted to the Riveras, it would appear that
civil case. Jose Dimson would only be entitled to more or less five
xxxxxx (5)hectares of the Maysilo Estate. Obviously, basing only on
TCT No. 15169 of Dimson which covered a land area of 50
hectares (500,000 square meters),[[24]] it is undisputable that
Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA insist the total properties eventually transferred to Jose Dimson went
that Palmas 13 June 1966 Order had been recalled by a over and beyond his supposed 25% share.
subsequent Order dated 16 August 1966, [RECALL
ORDER],[[21]] wherein the trial court dismissed the motion filed What is more, Palmas 13 June 1966 Order specifically required
by DIMSON on the courts findings that x x x whatever portion of that x x x whatever title is to be issued herein in favor of Jose
the property covered by OCT 994 which has not been disposed Dimson, the same shall be based on a subdivision plan duly
of by the previous registered owners have already been certified by the Land Registration Commission as correct and in
assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome Rivera and his accordance with previous orders issued in this proceedings,
assignees, as a result of which there is no portion that is left to said plan to be submitted to this court for final approval.
be given to the herein supposed assignee Jose Dimson.
Interestingly however, despite such requirement, DIMSON did
However, We are reluctant to recognize the existence not submit Survey Plan LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4429 SWO-5268
and due execution of the Recall Order considering that its which allegedly was the basis of the segregation of the lands, if
original or even a certified true copy thereof had not been only to prove that the same had been duly approved and
submitted by either of the two parties relying on it despite certified correct by the Land Registration Commission. What
having been given numerous opportunities to do so. was submitted before the RTC and this Court was only the
Subdivision Plan of Lot 25-A-2 which notably does not bear the
stamp of approval of the LRC. Even an inspection of the exhibit
for CLT does not bear this Survey Plan, which could have, at
the very least, proven the authenticity of the DIMSON title.

Indeed, We find the absence of this piece of evidence as


Be that as it may, even if We are to consider that no Recall crucial in proving the validity of the titles of DIMSON in view of
Order was ever issued by then Judge Palma, the validity of the the allegation of contending parties that since the survey plan
DIMSON titles over the properties in the Maysilo Estate upon which the land titles were based contained the notation
becomes doubtful in light of the fact that the supposed share SWO, meaning that the subdivision plan was only a product of
went beyond what was actually due to Jose Dimson under the a special work order, the same could not have passed the LRC.
Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It should be recalled that Neither was it duly certified by the said office.[25]
Palmas 13 June 1966 Order approved only the conveyance to
Jose Dimson of 25% of whatever share of Bartolome Rivera
has over Lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT 994 x x x subject In addition, the Special Division took note of other irregularities attending
to availability of undisposed portion of the said lots.[[22]]
Dimsons TCT No. R-15169.

In relation to this, We find it significant to note the [Firstly], OCT No. 994 showed that Lot 25-A of the
observations contained in the Senate Committee Report No. Maysilo Estate was originally surveyed on September 8-27, 1911,
1031 that, based on the assumption that the value of the lots October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911. Yet, in said TCT No.
were equal, and (C)onsidering that the share of Maria de la R-15169, the date of the original survey is reflected as Sept. 8-
Concepcion Vidal was only 1-189/1000 percent of the Maysilo 27, 1911 and nothing more.[[26]] The variation in date is revealing
Estate, the Riveras who claimed to be the surviving heirs of considering that DIMSONs titles are all direct transfers from OCT
Vidal will inherit only 197, 405.26 square meters No. 994 and, as such, would have faithfully adopted the mother
(16,602,629.53 m2 x 1.1890%) or 19.7 hectares as their lots data. Unfortunately, no explanation for the variance was ever
offered. the Palma Order, the subject of the case was the confirmation of
Jose Dimsons claim over the purported rights of Rivera in the
Equally worthy of consideration is the fact that TCT No. disputed properties. The case did not partake of the nature of a
15169 indicates that not only was the date of original registration registration proceeding and thus, evidently did not observe the
inexistent, but the remarks thereon tend to prove that OCT No. requirements in land registration cases. Unlike in a land
994 had not been presented prior to the issuance of the said registration case, therefore, Jose Dimson needed to file an action
transfer certificate. This manifest from the notations NA on the before Judge Sayo to seek confirmation of Palmas Order dated
face of DIMSONs title meaning, not available. It bears 13 June 1966.
emphasizing that the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to
the purchaser without the production of the owners duplicate is So viewed the general rule proscribing the application of
illegal (Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and does not confer laches or the statute of limitations in land registration cases,[[30]]
any right to the purchaser (Philippine National Bank vs. as well as Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]). The Registrar of Deeds must, its provisions on revival of judgment applies only to ordinary civil
therefore, deny registration of any deed or voluntary instrument if actions and not to other or extraordinary proceedings such as
the owners duplicate is not presented in connection therewith. land registration cases, is clearly not applicable in the present
(Director of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil. 19 [1926]; Hodges vs. case. The legal consequences of laches as committed by
Treasurer of the Phil. 50 Phil. 16 [1927].[[27]] DIMSON and their failure to observe the provisions of Rule 39
should, therefore, find application in this case and thus, the
confirmation of DIMSONs title, if any, should fail.

Parenthetically, the allegations of DIMSON would further


show that they derive the validity of their certificates of title from
In has also been held that, in cases where transfer the decreased Jose Dimsons 25% share in the alleged hereditary
certificates of title emanating from one common original rights of Bartolome Rivera [RIVERA] as an alleged grandson of
certificate of title were issued on different dates to different Maria Concepcion Vidal [VIDAL]. However, the records of these
persons or entities covering the same land, it would be safe to cases would somehow negate the rights of Rivera to claim from
conclude that the transfer certificate issued at an earlier date Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration
along the line should prevail, barring anomaly in the process of Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65
registration.[[28]] Thus, (w)here two certificates purport to include years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil
the same land, the earlier in date prevails. X x x. In successive Case Nos. 4429 and 4496).[[31]] It can thus be deduced that, if
registration, where more than one certificate is issued in respect Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963, then he must have
of a particular estate or interest in land, the person is deemed to been born around 1898. On the other hand, Vidal was only nine
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder or whose claim (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been born only on
is derived directly from the person who was the holder of the 1905.This alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. x x x[[29]] ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Riveras alleged grandmother,
was seven (7) years younger than her alleged grandson. Serious
doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal,
xxx for him to claim a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo
Still another indication of irregularity of the DIMSON title Estate.[32]
over Lot No. 25-A is that the issuance of the Sayo Order
allegedly confirming the Palma Order was in itself
suspect.Gleaning from the records, DIMSON filed the Motion These findings are consonant with the observations raised by Justice Renato Corona
only on 10 October 1977, or eleven (11) years after obtaining the
in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion on our 2007 Resolution. To wit:
supposed sanction for the issuance of titles in this name.
Besides, what was lodged by Jose Dimson before the sala of
then Judge Palma was not a simple land registration case
TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an
wherein the only purpose of Jose Dimson was to establish his
area of 891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT No. R-
ownership over the subject parcels of land, but, as reflected in
17994 issued in the name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other
hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer from TCT No. R-15166 in Fecha del instrumento Agosto 25, 1918
the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in turn, was supposedly a
direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918

Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title revealed that Hipolito 10:50- AM


acquired ownership by virtue of a court order dated October 18,
1977 approving the compromise agreement which admitted the Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an
sale made by Dimson in her favor on September 2, 1976. area of 891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to the total area
Dimson supposedly acquired ownership by virtue of the order sold in 1918 pursuant to the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at
dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in Civil Case the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was made on June 13,
No. 4557 awarding him, as his attorney's fees, 25% of whatever 1966, no portion of Lot No. 26 remained undisposed of, there
remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 that were undisposed was nothing for the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal to
of in the intestate estate of the decedent Maria de la Concepcion convey to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had nothing to convey
Vidal, one of the registered owners of the properties covered by to Hipolito who, by logic, could not transmit anything to CLT.
OCT No. 994. This order was confirmed by the CFI of Caloocan
in a decision dated October 13, 1977 and order dated October
18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732.

However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No. 994, Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of
particularly the following entries, showed: the Maysilo Estate described in Hipolito's certificate of title was
not approved by the chief of the Registered Land Division as it
AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el appeared to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079, Psd-5080
presente Certificado en cuanto a una and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. How Hipolito was
extencion superficial de 3,052.93 metros able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was therefore perplexing, to say
cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y the least.
descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de
Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P Leuterio, el All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the
primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el trial and appellate courts. The circumstances called for the need
Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido to preserve and protect the integrity of the Torrenssystem.
el certificado de Titulo No; 4210, pagina 163 However, the trial and appellate courts simply disregarded
Libro T-22. them.[33]

Fecha del instrumento Agosto 29, 1918


The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on the validity of Jose
Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918
10.50 AM Dimsons titles, which he obtained consequent to the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo.
Consequently, we cannot give due legal recognition to any and all titles supposedly
AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el covering the Maysilo Estate obtained by Dimson upon the authority of either the
presente Certficado el cuanto a una extencion
purported 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma or the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo.
superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados,
descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de
Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el
primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el B.
segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido
el certificado de Titulo No 4211, pagina 164, Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the MANOTOKS and their
Libro T-22.
predecessors-in-interest, on one hand, and those of DIMSON, on the other, the titles
held by ARANETA and the MANOTOKS must prevail considering that their titles were City and designated as Lot 26, Maysilo Estate, LRC Swo-5268.
TCT No. T-177013 shows that its mother titles is OCT No. 994
issued much earlier than the titles of the latter.
registered on 19 April 1917. Tracing said claim, Estelita Hipoloto
executed a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
CLT on 10 December 1988. By virtue of this transfer, Hipolitos
TCT No. R-17994[[37]] was cancelled and in lieu thereof, CLTs
TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT No. R-17994. Hipolito, on the
other hand, was a transferee of the deceased Dimson who was
allegedly the registered owner of the subject land on the basis of
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and even invalidate TCT No. 15166.
the claims of all persons who seek to derive ownership from the Dimson titles. These
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the titles of
include CLT, which acquired the properties they laid claim on from Estelita Hipolito DIMSON, the title of CLT should also be declared a nullity
inasmuch as the nullity of the titles of DIMSON necessarily
who in turn acquired the same from Jose Dimson. Just as much was concluded by
upended CLTs propriety claims. As earlier highlighted, CLT had
the Special Division as it evaluated CLTs claims. anchored its claim on the strength of Hipolitos title and that of
DIMSONs TCT No. 15166. Remarkably and curiously though,
TCT No. 15166 was never presented in evidence for purposes of
For its part, CLT contended that even at the trial court level, it
tracing the validity of titles of CLT. On this basis alone, the
maintained that there was only one OCT No. 994 from where its
present remand proceedings remain damning to CLTs claim of
claim emanates. It argued that its case against the MANOTOKS,
ownership.
including that of STO. NIO, was never decided based on the
doctrines laid down in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
Moreover, considering that the land title of CLT carried
System v. Court of Appeals[[34]] and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of
annotations identical to those of DIMSON and consequently
Appeals.[[35]]
included the defects in DIMSONs title, the fact that whatever
typographical errors were not at anytime cured by subsequent
Before this Special Division, CLT insists that the MANOTOKS
compliance with the administrative requirements or subjected to
failed to submit new competent evidence and, therefore, dwelling
administrative correction bolsters the invalidity of the CLT title
on the alleged flaws of the MANOTOKs titles, the findings and
due to its complete and sole dependence on the void DIMSON
conclusions of the court-appointed commissioners as adopted by
title.[38]
the trial court, then upheld by the Honorable Court in its Decision
dated 28 September 1995 and finally affirmed in the Supreme
Courts Decision dated 29 November 2005, therefore stand, as
IV.
there is no reason to disturb them.
The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the claims of the Heirs of
Furthermore, CLT contends that the Orders of Judge Palma and Dimson and CLT. We likewise tasked the Special Division to ascertain as well the
Judge Sayo are no longer open to attack in view of their finality.
validity of the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta, titles which had been annulled
Lastly, CLT asserts that the properties covered by the
MANOTOKS titles and those covered by the expropriation by the courts below. Facially, these titles of the Manotoks and Araneta reflect, as their
proceedings did not property pertain to and were different from
valid mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Nonetheless, particular issues
Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it maintains that the MANOTOKS
cannot use as basis for the validity of their titles the expropriation were raised as to the validity of the Manotok and Araneta titles independent of their
undertaken by the Government as a means of staking their
reliance on the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 vis--vis the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT
claims.
No. 994.

To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43 square meters of land


A.
covered by TCT No. T-177013[[36]] located in Malabon, Caloocan
We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division quoted the 5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5
defendant) is TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of defendant
observations of the trial court, which upheld Dimsons claim over that of Araneta, citing
Araneta cancels TCT 6196 instead of TCT 26539.That was never
the following perceived flaws of TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, from which Araneta explained. TCT 6196 was not even presented in Court.
derived its titles, thus:
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of
593,606.90 was cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of only
390,282 sq.m.
Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the
name of Jose Ma. Rato from where defendant was said to have
7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in
acquired TCT 13574 and TCT 7784 now TCT 21343 in the name
its name, when the registration of the document entitled Novation
of Araneta and the other documents related thereto:
of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit M) was
suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no title was received by the
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record
Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was
No. are both 4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also shows that it has
filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948 (Exhibit N and N-1).
Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First
53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, no new certificate of title
Instance, Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429,
shall be entered, no memorandum shall be made upon any
issued for Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on
certificate of title by the register of deeds, in pursuance of any
March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A
deed or other voluntary instrument, unless the owners duplicate
Bartolome Rivera et al.)
certificate is presented for such endorsement.
How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both have
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is not
Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued in
reflected on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT 26538
Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna,
(Exhibit 7-defendant) meaning that TCT 26538 still exists and
respectively.
intact except for the encumbrances annotated in the
Memorandum of Encumbrances affecting the said title (Exhibits
2) TCT no. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Ma.
16, 16-A and 16-N David & Santos)
Rato are not annotated in the Original Certificate of Title 994,
where they were said to have originated.
9) In the encumbrances annotated at the back of TCT 26539
(Exhibit 4-defendant) there appears under entry No. 450 T 6196
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land
Victoneta, Incorporated covering parcel of land canceling said
Improvement Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925 was
title (TCT 26539) and TCT 6196 was issued ( x x x) which could
only registered and was stamped received by the Office of the
have referred to the Deed (sic) of Sale and Mortgage of 8-23-47
Securities and Exchange Commission only April 29, 1953 when
(Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before Entry 5170 T-8692
the Deed of Sale & Mortgage was executed on August 23, 1947
Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company, with Date of
(Exh. 5 defendant) and the Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale
Instrument: 1-10-29, and Date of Inscription: 9-21-29.
and Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947 (Exh. M0. So,
that when Philippine Land Improvement was allegedly given a
special power of attorney by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in
the execution of the said two (2) documents, the said Philippine
In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land
Land Improvement Company has not yet been duly registered.
Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the
document, Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated
4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of
November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does not appear.
Jose Ma. Rato, both cancel 21857 which was never presented in
Court if only to have a clear tracing back of the titles of defendant
Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent
Araneta.
of the value of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the Instancia de Riza, de fecha 28 de Julio de
Philippine Land Improvement Company. Said entry was also 1924, y que en au lugar se had expedido el
entered on TCT 26539. Certificados de Titulo No. 8692, folio 492 del
Tomo T-35 del Libro de Certicadads de
The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the Transferencia.
documents presented by defendant Araneta are not in
possession of said defendant, for according to witness Zacarias Date of Instrument Julio 28, 1924.
Quintan, the real estate officer of the said defendant Araneta
since 1970, his knowledge of the land now in possession of Date of Inscription Agosto 1, 1024 10:19 a.m.
defendant Araneta was acquired by him from all its documents
marked in evidence which were obtained only lately when they SGD. GLICERIO OPINION, Register of deeds
needed for presentation before this Court.[[39]][40] Agosto 19, 1924[[42]]

In accordance with the decree, RATO was issued on 1


The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual contentions, and August 1924, TCT No. 8692[[43]] which covers Lote No. 25 A-3
del plano del subdivision, parte del Lote No. 25-A, plano Psu-(not
ultimately concluded that the Araneta claim to title was wholly valid. We adopt in full
legible), Hacienda de Maysilo, situado en el Munisipio de
the following factual findings of the Special Division, thus: Caloocan, Provincia del Rizal x x x.[[44]] The parcel of land covers
an approximate area of UN MILLION CUATROCIENTOS CINCO
MIL SETECIENTOS VEINTICINCO metros cuadrados con
NOVENTA decimetros cuadrados (1,405,725.90) mas o menos.
As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA, it maintains
As reflected under Entry No. 14517.T-8692,[[45]] the parcel of land
that it has established by direct evidence that its titles were
covered under this certificate of title was subdivided into five (5)
validly derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. With regard
lots under subdivision plan Psd-6599 as per Order of the court of
to the imputed flaws, it asseverates that these were unfounded
First Instance of Rizal. Consequently, TCT Nos. 21855, 21856,
and thus, labored to refute all of them. ARANETA further
21857, 21858 and 21859 were issued.
expounded on the nullity of the Palma and Sayo Orders which
was the basis of DIMSONs titles.
Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on 23 May 1932, this
certificate of title issued in RATOs name,[ [46]] cancelled TCT No.
The documentary exhibits it proffered traced its
8692[[47]] with respect to the property it covers. On its face, TCT
certificates of title to OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917.
No. 21857,[[48]] was a derivative of OCT No. 994 registered on 3
From the titles submitted, its predecessor-in-interest was Jose
May 1917. It covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of subdivision plan Psd-
Ma. Rato y Tuazon [RATO], one of the co-heirs named in OCT
6589, being a portion of Lot No. 25-A-3, G.L.R.O Record No.
No. 994, who was allotted the share of nine and five hundred
4429. Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was cancelled by TCT No.
twelve one thousandths (9-512/1000) percent share of the
26538[[49]] and TCT No. 26539[[50]] which were both issued in the
Maysilo Estate.[[41]] For this reason, to ascertain the legitimacy of
name of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon on 17 September 1934.
the derivative title of ARANETA, the origin and authenticity of the
title of RATO need to be reassessed.
With respect to TCT No. 26539, the certificate of title
showed that it covered a parcel of land designated as Section
Verily, attesting to RATOs share on the property, Entry
No. 2 of the subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot
No. 12343/O-994 of the Owners Duplicate Copy of OCT no. 994,
25-A-3-C having an approximate area of 581,872 square
records the following:
meters.[[51]] Thereafter, TCT No. 26539 was cancelled by TCT
No. 6196[[52]] whose registered owner appears to be a certain
12343/O-994 Auto: Jose Rato y Tuason - - -
Victoneta, Inc. This parcel of land has an area of 581,872 square
Queda cancelado el presente seartificado en
meters designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-
cuanto a una estension superficial de
10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C.
1,405,725.90 metro Cuadrados mas o menos
descrita en el Lote No. 25-A-3, an virtud del
As shown on its face, TCT No. 6196 issued on 18
auto dictado por el Juzgado de Primera
October 1947 in the name of Victoneta, Inc. and its mother title
were traced from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Later, In summation, ARANETA had shown that RATO, as one
TCT No. 6196 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 13574 of the co-owners of the property covered by OCT NO. 994, was
was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture on 20 May assigned Lot No. 25-A-3. His evidence of ownership is reflected
1949.[[53]] It covers a parcel of land designated as section No. 2 on TCT No. 8692 issued in his name. RATO held title to these
of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C. It parcels of land even after its subdivision in the 1930s. Further
has an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters. subdividing the property, RATO was again issued TCT No.
21857, and later TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still covering Lot
No. 25 A-3-C. In all his certificates of title, including those that
On the other hand, appearing under Entry No. 16086/T- ultimately passed ownership to ARANETA, the designation of the
No. 13574 of TCT No. 6196 is the following: lot as either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 was retained,
thereby proving identity of the land.
Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 SALE in favor of
the ARANETA INSTITUTE OF More importantly, the documentary trail of land titles
AGRICULTURE, vendee: Conveying the showed that all of them were derived from OCT No. 994
property described in this certificate of title registered on 3 May 1917. For purposes of tracing ARANETAs
which is hereby cancelled and issuing in lieu titles to Oct No. 994, it would appear that the evidence presented
thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13574, ultimately shows a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to
page 74, Book T-345 in the name of the said mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin and legitimacy of
vendee. (Doc. No. 149, page 98, Book II, S. of the proprietary claim of ARANETA had been well substantiated
1949 of Notary Public for Manila, Hospicio B. by the evidence on record and on this note, said titles deserve
Bias). validation.

Date of Instrument May 18, 1949 Under the guidelines set, we shall now proceed to
Date of the Inscription May 30, 1949 at 11:00 evaluate the imputed flaws which had been the previous bases of
a.m.[[54]] the trial court in invalidating ARANETAs titles.

One of the flaws observed on the titles of ARANETAs


TCT No. 26538[[55]] in turn showed on its face that it predecessor-in-interest was that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No.
covers a parcel of land designated as Section 1 of subdivision 26539 in Ratos name refer to Decree No. 4429 and Record
plan Psd-10114 being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an area No.4429, as basis of their issuance. This is being questioned
of 592,606.90 square meters.[[56]] inasmuch as Decree No. 4429 refers to a decree issued by the
CFI of Isabela while Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary
On 4 March 1948, TCT No. 26538 was cancelled by TCT Land Registration Case No. 31 March 1911 in CLR No. 5898 of
No. 7784, which was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Laguna.
Agriculture. TCT No. 7784 covers four (4) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 390,282 square meters.[[57]] It would appear Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA insisted that the
from the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 consolidated with CA- same was a mere typographical error and did not have any effect
G.R. CV No. 41883 that TCT No. 7784 was eventually cancelled on the validity of their title. It further contended that the number
by TCT No. 21343.[[58]] As per attachment of ARANETA in its 4429 was the case number of Decree No. 36455 and was used
Answer dated 6 march 1980 filed in Civil Case No. 8050, a mere interchangeably as the record number.
copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that it covers a parcel of land
designated as Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan Psd-24962 being a This Court finds that the incorrect entry with respect to
portion of Lot 6, described as plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record the Decree and Record Number appearing on the title of
No. 4429 with an approximate area of 333,377 square ARANETAs predecessor-in-interest cannot, by itself, invalidate
meters.[[59]] However, for reasons unknown, a copy of TCT No. the titles of ARANETAs predecessors-in-interest and ultimately,
21343, whether original or certified true copy thereof, was not that of ARANETA. To the mind of this Court, the incorrect entries
submitted before this Court. alluded to would not have the effect of rendering the previous
titles void sans any strong showing of fraudulent or intentional certified microfilm copy of TCT No. 21857 and a certified true
wrongdoing on the part of the person making such entries. Fraud copy of TCT No. 6196 marked as Exhibits 5-A1A and 19-A1A,
is never presumed but must be established by clear and respectively. However, it failed to submit a copy of said TCT No.
convincing evidence.[[60]] The strongest suspicion cannot sway 21343. Be that as it may, we will not hasten to declare void TCT
judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. The sea of No. 7784 as a consequence of such omission, especially so
suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is since TCT No. 21343 appears to be a mere derivative of TCT No.
without rudder or compass.[[61]] 7784. Given that the validity of TCT No. 7784 had been
preponderantly proven in these proceedings, the authenticity of
The Supreme Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, said title must be sustained. Besides, ARANETAs failure to
Inc.[[62]] acknowledged that certain defects on a certificate of title, submit TCT No. 21343 had never been put into issue in these
specifically, the interchanging of numbers, may occur and it is proceedings.
certainly believable that such variance in the copying of entries
could be merely a typographical or clerical error. In such cases, With respect to the difference in the area of more than
citing with approval the decision of the appellate court, the 200,0000 square meters between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No.
technical description in the title should prevail over the record 26538, we find that the trial court failed to consider the several
number.[[63]] conveyances of portions of TCT No. 26538 before they finally
passed on to ARANETA. Thus, on the Memorandum of
Thus, what is of utmost importance is that the Encumbrance of TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that portions of
designation and the technical description of the land, as stated this piece of land had been sold to various individuals before the
on the face of the title, had not been shown to be erroneous or same were transferred to ARANETA on 4 march 1948. Naturally,
otherwise inconsistent with the source of titles. In ARANETAs since the subject land had been partially cancelled with respect
case, all the titles pertaining to Lot No. 25 had been verified to be to the portion disposed of, it could not be expected that the area
an offshoot of Decree No. 36455 and are all located in Tinajeros, of TCT No. 26538 will remain the same at the time of its transfer
Malabon. At any rate, despite the incorrect entries on the title, the to ARANETA. Even assuming that the entire area covered by
properties, covered by the subject certificates of title can still be TCT No. 26538 had been disposed of, this fact alone, cannot
determined with sufficient certainty. lend us to conclude that the conveyance was irregular. An
anomaly exists if the area covered under the derivative title will
It was also opined that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. be much more than its predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this is
26539 in the name of RATO had not been annotated on OCT No. not so in the case before us.
994 from which said titles had supposedly originated. It should be
stressed that what partially cancelled OCT No. 994 with respect The trial court, relying on Exhibit N, further asserted that
to this subject lot were not TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 but TCT ARANETA should not have been issued TCT No. 7784
No. 8692 issued on 1 August 1924. In fact, TCT Nos.26538 and considering that the registration of the Novation of Contract, deed
26539 are not even the immediate predecessors of OCT No. 994 of Sale & Mortgage was suspended/denied and no title was
but were mere derivatives of TCT No. 21857. Logically therefore, received by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said
these two certificates of title could not have been annotated on document was filed in the said Office on march 4, 1948. A
OCT No. 994, they not being the preceding titles. perusal of Exhibit N submitted before the trial court, shows that
the suspension or denial was merely conditional considering that
In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994 shows an entry, the person seeking registration had give days within which to
which pertains to Jose Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical correct the defects before final denial thereof. As we see it, the
condition of the copy submitted to this Court, the entry remains Notice merely contained a warning regarding the denial of the
illegible for us to make a definite conclusion.[ [64]] On the other registration of the voluntary deed but, in no way, did it affect the
hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994 found on the Owners Duplicate vested rights of ARANETA to be land. The fact that the title to the
Copy of OCT No. 994 specifically recorded the issuance of TCT land was subsequently issued free from any notation of the
No. 8692 over Lot No. 25-A-3.[[65]] alluded defect creates a reasonable presumption that ARANETA
The other flaws noted on ARANETAs certificates of title was in fact able to comply with the condition imposed. This is
pertained to its failure to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and especially true since the notice itself contained a note, Just
21343. As we have discussed, ARANETA offered in evidence a Completed, written across the face of the letter.
Notably also, with the evident intent to discredit and
Records also reveal the RTCs observation with regard to refute the title of ARANETA, DIMSON submitted TCT Nos.
Aranetas failure to disprove the result of the plotting made on the 26538[[69]] and 21857,[[70]] which are both derivatives of OCT
subject land (Exhibit K) to the effect that TCT 26538 overlaps No.994 registered on 3 May 1917 and cover parcels of land
portion of TCT 15159 and TCT 26539 also overlaps the other located in Malabon, Rizal. However, these certificates of title
portion of said TCT R-15169. The trial court further noted that reflect different registered owners and designation of the land
TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) and TCT 26539 (Jose Rato) and covered.
TCT 21343 (Araneta) are overlapping each other within Lot 25-A.
That portion of TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) along bearing Pertinently, Exhibit M-Dimson relating to TCT No. 26538,
distance points to 17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 1 and 2 shaded in registered on 12 June 1952, points to one Angela Bautista de
yellow color in the Plan is not covered by TCT 21343 Alvarez as the registered owner of a 240 square meter of land
(Araneta).[[66]] designated as Lot No. 19, Block 14 of the subdivision plan Psd-
5254 being a portion of Lot No. 7-A-1-A. This certificate of title
Scrutinizing Exhibit K, it becomes apparent that the said cancels TCT No. 14112/T-348 and refers to a certain TCT No.
evidence relied upon was only a private survey conducted by 30473 on the inscriptions.
Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia which had not been duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands and was based only on Exhibit N-Dimson, on the other hand, pertaining to TCT
photocopies of relevant land titles.[[67]] What is more, said No. 21857 was issued on 30 March 1951 to one Angela I.
geodetic engineer also failed to adequately explain his Tuason de Perez married to Antonio Perez. This certificate of
observations, approach and manner of plotting the relative Title covers a parcel of land described as Lot No. 21, Block 16 of
positions of the lots.[[68]] From all indications, the conclusions the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-140, G.L.R.O. Record
reached by said geodetic engineer were anchored on unfounded No. 4429. It ahs an area of 436 square meters and cancels TCT
generalizations. No. 21856.

Exhibit Q-Dimson[[71]] consisting of TCT No. 8692 covers


two parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Block No.
Another defect cited on ARANETAs title was the 44 of the consolidation Subdivision Plan Pcs-188 with a total area
absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of of 3,372 square meters. It was issued to Gregorio Araneta,
TCT No. 26538 of the alleged sale between RATO and Incorporated on 7 May 1948. This certificate of title cancelled
ARANETA.As pointed out by ARANETA, the copy of TCT No. TCT No. 46118.
26538 submitted to the trial court contained entries only up to the
year 1947, thus, explaining the (1) lack of entry with regard to the Comparing these titles to those of the ARANETA, it is
issuance of TCT No. 7784 in favor of ARANETA considering that apparent that no identity of the land could be found. The
the same was issued a year later and; (2) entry pertaining to Supreme Court, in the case of Alonso v. Cebu City Country Club,
Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company which was Inc.[[72]] agreeing with the Court of Appeals dissertation in said
entered way back on 21 August 1929. case, ruled that there is nothing fraudulent for a certificate of title
to bear the same number as another title to another land. On this
Nonetheless, it still cannot be denied that Rato and score, the Supreme Court elucidated as follows:
ARANETA together with Don Salvador Araneta, entered into a
voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the
ownership of the subject property. Moreover, no conclusion On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-
should have been reached regarding the total cancellation of 1151) bears the same number as another title
TCT No. 26538 inasmuch as TCT No. 7784 cancelled the former to another land, we agree with the Court of
certificate of title to the extent only of Three Hundred Ninety Appeals that there is nothing fraudulent with the
Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Two (390,282) square meters. fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.s reconstituted
title bears the same number as the title of
another parcel of land. This came about remand.Needless to state, it is not for the Heirs of Dimson to rely
because under General Land Registration on the weakness of ARANETAs titles and profit from it. Rather,
Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February they should have focused on the strength of their own titles since
19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular it is not within our office to decide in whose hands the contested
No. 6, RD 3, dated August 5, 1946, which were lands should go, our task being merely to trace back the parties
in force at the time the title was reconstituted on claims to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.[75]
July 26, 1946, the titles issued before the
inauguration of the Philippine Republic were
numbered consecutively and the titles issued
There is no question that the Araneta titles were derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3
after the inauguration were numbered also
consecutively starting with No. 1, so that May 1917, particularly from the share of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon, one of the co-heirs
eventually, the titles issued before the
named in OCT No. 994. The Special Division correctly assessed, among others, the
inauguration were duplicated by titles issued
after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic reference to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429 in some of the antecedent titles
x x x.
of Araneta[76] as mere clerical errors that could not have invalidated said titles, 4429
Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial being the case number of Decree No. 36455, and the designation and the technical
Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution dated 30 October
description of the land on those titles not having been shown to be erroneous or
2008, DIMSON objected to the admissibility of Exhibits 4-A1A to
7-A1A on the ground that ARANETA failed to submit the original variant with the source title. The Special Division also correctly considered that the
copies of these certificates of title and contended that the
trial court had failed to take into account the several conveyances of TCT No. 26538
originals contain different contents from their own Exhibits M, N
and Q.[[73]]The fact that the entries contained in ARANETAs before it was ultimately transferred to Araneta in 1948, which explain the difference in
pieces of evidence are different from that of DIMSONs do not
area between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538. The imputed overlap of TCT No.
automatically make ARANETAs exhibits inferior replications or a
confirmation of their falsity. Interestingly, the objection regarding 26538 and TCT No. 26539 with the titles held by Dimson was based on a private
the non-submission of the original copy had not been raised by
survey which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. The alleged
DIMSON in their Comments/Objections to Consolidated Formal
Offer of Evidence (Of Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.).[ [74]] In absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the
any case, we find the objections unwarranted considering that
sale of the property between Rato and Araneta did not, according to the Special
certified true copies or certified microfilm copies of Exhibits 4-
A1A to 7-A1A had been submitted by ARANETA in these Division, discount the fact that Rato and Araneta entered into a voluntary agreement
proceedings.
with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. Finally, the
Lastly, on the alleged non-registration of Philippine Land Special Division noted that the titles derived from OCT No. 994, which Dimson had
Improvement Company at the time the special power of attorney
submitted as evidence to discredit the Araneta claim, pertain to properties wholly
was executed by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution
of the deed of conveyances, the same only proves that Philippine different from those covered by the Araneta titles.
Land Improvement Company was not yet registered and this
does not go as far as proving the existence or non-existence of
the company at which time it was executed. In effect, the There is no cause to dispute the factual findings and conclusions of the Special
company was not precluded to enter into contracts and be bound
Division on the validity of the Araneta titles, and we affirm the same.
by them but it will do so at the risk of the adverse effects of non-
registration under the law.
B.
Ultimately, the question of whether the aforesaid
certificates of title constitute as clouds on ARANETAs titles are
not for this Court to rule upon for purposes of the present It appears that the claim to title of the Manotoks is somewhat more controversial. The
Special Division did not discount the fact that there could have been flaws in some of
the intervening titles between the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 and the present titles of
As a result, TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which
the Manotoks. However, the significant event was the expropriation proceedings was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales. Inscribed on the
Memorandum of the Incumbrances Affecting the Property
undertaken by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947. At least some of the
Described in this Certificate was the sale executed in favor of
titles in the name of the Manotoks were sourced from the titles issued to and Francisco Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920,
TCT No. 5261 was issued in the name of Francisco
subsequently distributed by the Republic. The Special Division explained the milieu in
Gonzales.[[78]]
full:
On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No.
35486 in the names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso married to Maria
P. Gutierrez, Consuelo Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to
VALIDITY OF THE MANOTOK TITLES
Alfonso D. Prescilla; Juana Francisco Gonzales y Narciso
married to Fortunato de Leon; Maria Clara Gonzales y Narciso
The notation under Entry No. 6655/O-994, found on page 17 of
married to Delfin Hilario; Francisco Felipe Gonzales y Narciso
OCT 994 of the Owners Duplicate Copy, shows that Lot No. 26
married to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion Andrea Gonzales y
had been a subject of sale in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano
Narciso married to Melquiades M. Virata, Jr.
P. Leuterio.[[77]] The notations reads:
Appearing on the Memorandum of TCT No. 5261 is NOTA: Ap
Ap. 6655/O-994 Venta: Queda Cancelado el
2111 which reads as follows:[[79]]
presente Certificado en cuanto a una
extension superficial de 3,052.93 Metros
A/2111 Adjudicado el torreno descrito en este
cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros Cuadrados y
certificado de titulo, a Rufina Narciso Vda. de
descrita en elLote No. 26 vendida a favor de
Gonzales, a cuenta de la participacion de osia
Alejandro Ruis y Mariano P. Leuterio, el
esta en (not legible) los tienes de la eseledad
primar casado con Diogracias Quinones y el
de genanciales. Habida entre la misma y el
Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido
finado Francisco J. Gonzales, per una orden
el Certificado de Titulo No. 4210, Pagina 163,
del Hon. Fernando Jugo, Juez del Juzgado de
Libro T-22.
Primera Instancia de Manila Sala II, dienada el
20 de Septiembre de 19 (not legible), en el
Date of the Instrument Aug. 29, 1918
Expidiente de intestado del nombrado
Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m.
Francisco J. Gonzales, No. 49034, se cancela
(GD) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds
el presente certificado de tituto y se expide otre
a hombre decha Rufina Narciso, con (not
Ap. 6665/O-994-Venta: Queda Cancelado el
legible) No. 35486, folio 86, Tomo T-168 del
presente Cerficiado en cuanto a una
libro de transferencias, archivando se la copia
extension superficial de 871,982.00 metros
de dicha orden da que se ha heche referencia
cuadrados, descrita en el Lote No. 26,
en al Legajo T-No. 35486.
vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano
P. Leuterio, el primar casado con Deogracias
(SGD) TEODORO GONZALES,
Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y
Registrado de Titulos.
se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No.
4211, Pagina 164, Libro T-No. 22.

Date of Instrument Aug. 21, 1918


The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance
Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m.
with subdivision plan Psd-21154.[[80]] Partitioning the lots among
(SGD.) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds
the co-owners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in
lieu thereof six (6) certificates of titles were individually issued[ [81]] Jose Dionisio, who was issued TCT No. 9853. Dionisios title
to Francisco Gonzaless six (6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. in turn cancelled the Republics TCT No. 36657-63.[[88]]
1368-1373 while TCT No. 1374 was issued in favor of all the
children.[[82]] 5) TCT No. 21107 issued to MRI covers Lot 22 with
an approximate area of 2,557 square meters. MRI acquired
As previously mentioned, the properties covered by TCT Nos. the same by virtue of sale between him and Francisco
1368-1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines Custodio, holder of TCT No. 21040. Francisco Custodio was
and were eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, registered owner of TCT No.
Eighteen (18) lots were obtained by MRI from the years 1965 to 21039 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale between Caina and
1974, while it acquired the lot covered by TCT No. 165119 in the PHHC, the latters certificate of title canceling TCT No.
1988. On the other hand, MEC acquired from PhilVille 36557-63 of the Republic.[[89]]
Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by virtue of
Deed of Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT No. 6) TCT No. 21485 was issued to MRI by virtue of sale
232568 was issue don 9 May 1991. between it and Francisco Custodio, registered owner of TCT
No. 21484. The certificate of title covers Lot 20 with an
The 20 certificates of titles were traced by the MANOTOKS, as approximate area of 25,276 square meters Custodio was in
follows: turn a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, the latter being the
registered owner of TCT No. 21013 by reason of sale
1) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI between him and PHHC.[[90]] Under Entry No. 6277/T-
covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) 21485, it would appear that portions of the property covered
Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters. MRI under TCT No. 21485 and TCT No. 232568 had been
purchased this lot from one Basilio Caina who was issued subject of an expropriation proceedings to which the
TCT No. 7526 which cancelled TCT Nos. 36657-62 Manotok Estate Corporation, et al. interposed no objections
registered in the name of the Republic of the subject to the payment of just compensation.[[91]]
Philippines.[[83]]

2) TCT No. 7762, covering Lot 1-C, was obtained by


MRI from one Narcisa Buenaventura. The Parcel of land 7) TCT Nos. 26405[[92]] and 26406,[[93]] both
has an approximate area of 2,876 square meters. registered in the name of MRI, cancelled TCT Nos. 9773
Buenaventuras ownership was evidenced by TCT No. and 9774, respectively. TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774 were
7525,[[84]] deriving the same from TCT No. 36657-63.[[85]] registered in the names of Romulo, Rosalina, Lucila, Felix
and Emilia all surnamed Jacinto, [JACINTOS], before the
same were transferred to MRI by reason of sale in favor of
the latter. The JACINTOS certificates of title were in turn
derived from TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 issued in the name
3) TCT No. 8012 in the name of MRI covers Lot No. of Filemon Custodio[[94]] Both TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015
12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.[ [86]] This cancelled TCT 7792/T-39. However, for purposes of tracing
certificate of title was traced from one Filemon Custodio TCT No. 7792/T-39 to the Republics certificate of titles, this
who held TCT No. 7792. Custodio was in turn a transferee certificate of title was not submitted in evidence.
of Guillermo Rivera, the latter having been issued TCT No.
7760 by virtue of sale between him and then Peoples 8) TCT No. 26407[[95]] issued to MRI was traced back
Homesite and Housing Corporation [PHHC]. The latter title to the title of Lourdes Mercado Cloribel who was the
eventually cancelled TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.[[87]] registered owner of TCT No. 8404 by virtue of sale between
the two, thereby transferring ownership to MRI. On the fact
4) TCT No. 9866 issued to MRI covers Lot No. 21 of TCT No. 8404, it would show that it cancelled TCT No.
and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters. 8013/T41 but there is no showing in whose name TCT No.
MRIs certificate of title was derived from TCT No. 9854 8013 was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.
registered in the name of Filemon Custodio, a transferee of
9) TCT No. 33904[[96]] of MRI cancelled TCT No. certificate of title it cancelled.[[103]]
8017 of Filemon Custodio by virtue of sale between the
latter and MRI.[[97]] We note that TCT No. 8017 cancelled 14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects MRI as the registered
TCT No.7792/T-39 but there is no showing whether the owner of Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850
same could be traced back to the Republics certificates of square meters. MRIs certificate of title cancelled TCT No. C-
title. 17234 registered in the names of MRI (27,750 square
meters), Roberto S. David (3,0000 square meters) and Jose
10) TCT No. 34255, covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd- Madulid (500 square meters). It would appear that TCT No.
75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters, reflects MRI C-17234 cancelled TCT No. 53124 registered in the names
as the registered owner. This certificate of title cancels TCT of MRI, Spouses Priscila and Antonio Sebastian and Jose
No. 36557-63 of the Republic.[[98]] Madulid.[[104]] MRI also submitted in evidence a Deed of
Partition between itself, Roberto David and Madulid thereby
subdividing the property into Lots 6-A, 6-B and 6-C as per
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-277091.[[105]] Again, we note
that TCT No. 53124 cancelled TCT No. 21350/T-107 but the
records are bereft of any indication what certificate of title it
cancelled and to whom the same was registered.

15) TCT No. C-35267, covering Lot 56-B of subdivision


11) TCT No. 254875[[99]] bears MRI as the registered plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707
owner of Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters, was a by-product of TCT No. 25146, also
square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. registered in the name of MRI, after the same was
41956 which covers Lot 55, also registered in the name of subdivided into two lots, namely, Lot Nos. 56-A and 56-B.
MRI. It would appear that MRI acquired the lot covered TCT No. 25146 cancelled TCT No. 25145 registered in the
under TCT No. 41956 from one Joaquin Caina who was the name of Quirino Labing-isa by virtue of sale in favor of MRI.
registered owner of TCT No. 25715 being a vendee of In turn, TCT No. 21545 cancelled TCT Nos. (36557) 12836
PHHC.[[100]] to (36563) 12842.[[106]]

12) TCT No. 53268 of MRI covered Lot No. 15,[ [101]] 16) TCT No. T-121428, registered in the name of MRI
which was purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta covers Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315272
who held TCT No. 53155. Villacorta in turn acquired the which has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters. It
same land from one Eufrocina Mackay whose TCT No. was previously registered in the names of MRI (4,650
7827 was eventually cancelled by Villacortas land title.[ [102]] square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and
It would appear that TCT No. 7827 cancelled TCT No. Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters) under TCT No.
7826/T-40 but there is no trace to whom the latter title was 53123 by order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
registered and what certificate of title it cancelled. Caloocan City, Branch XII and as per agreement of the
parties in Civil Case No. C-424. TCT No. 53123 in turn
13) TCT No. 55897 shows MRI as the registered owner cancelled TCT No. 21346 whose registered owners were
of Lot 3 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs- Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941
1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less square meters) and Jesus Hipona (4,650 square
20,531 square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT meters).[[107]] Like some of the other titles, TCT No.21346
No. 53122 in the names of MRI (19,531 square meters) and cancelled TCT No. 21316 but there is no trace of this latter
one Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). TCT No. certificate of title.
53122 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21347 registered in the
names of Jesus Hipona (19,531 square meters) and 17) TCT No. 163902, registered in the name of MRI,
Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). Notably, TCT No. covers Lot No. 4-B-2 and has an area of more or less 6,354
21347 cancelled TCT No. 21315/T-107 but there is no square meters and a by-product of TCT No. 9022, also in
indication to whom TCT No. 21315 was registered and what the name of MRI, after the same was subdivided under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-334454. TCT No. 9022, in turn, by the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose
cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Leon Gonzaels, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph r of the
Filemon S. Custodio whose ownership thereon was Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by TCT
transferred to MRI by virtue of a voluntary sale.[ [108]] TCT Nos.1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Peoples Homesite
No. 8894 cancelled TCT No. 8846/T-45 but this latter and Housing Corporation which were later consolidated and
certificate of title was not submitted in evidence for subdivided into 77 lots for resale to tenants. No sign of protest
purposes of tracing back to the Republics title. was ever raised by CLT on this point.[112]

18) TCT No. 165119[[109]] was issued to MRI by virtue of


a Deed of Sale between Spouses Francisca Labing-isa and The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by the
Juan Ignacio [SPOUSES IGNACIO] and MRI, as a result of
State by way of expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever previous flaws may
which, TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO was
cancelled.[[110]] It would appear that TCT No. C-39690 have attended these titles. As Justice Vitug explained in Republic v. Court of
cancelled TCT No. 35266/T-173 but TCT No. 35266/T-173
Appeals,[113] and then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno reiterated in Reyes
was not submitted in evidence.
v. NHA:[114] In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
19) TCT No. T-232568 of the Manotok Estate
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title;
Corporation, covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-
13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters, was thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings
derived from the certificate of title held by PhiVille
provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be
Development and Housing Corporation under TCT No.
197357. MEC acquired the subject parcel of land by virtue obtained by voluntary conveyance.[115] This doctrine was derived from the opinion of
of Deed of Exchange between it and PHILVILLE DATED 9
then Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer in Cadorette v.
May 1991.[[111]] TCT No. 197357 cancelled TCT No.
195730/T-974 but there is no trace what certificate of title U.S.,[116] which in turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v.
the latter title cancelled.
Carmack[117] that [b]y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation
By and large, all the certificates of title submitted by the proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world
MANOTOKS, including their derivative titles, were all traced to
than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.[118]
OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Likewise, they declared
all the lots covered by such titles for taxation purposes. Without
doubt, MRI had successfully traced back some of their
certificates of title to the valid OCT No. 994, they having acquired
the lots from some of the vendees of the PHHC after the same
were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.

The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of TCT
proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No.
No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades
539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Jose Leon before the property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have
Gonzales, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph r of the Majority
attended that particular title would have been purged when the property covered by it
Report noted that the seven properties covered by TCT
Nos.1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Republic from the was subsequently acquired by the State through eminent domain. The Special
Gonzalezes.
Division noted as much:
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation
proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. As it is, the validity of most of MRIs certificates of title
539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated should be upheld because they were derived from the Republics
valid certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS titles With respect to the imputed flaws on the MANOTOKS
can be traced back to the Governments titles as a result of the titles which were based on the Majority Report, we find that the
expropriation in 1947. bases of the alleged defects proceeded from unreliable sources
thus, tainting the veracity of the said report.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-
in-interest of the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of The records of the case between CLT and the
their acquisition resulting from the exercise of its inherent power MANOTOKS reveal that the parties approved the creation of a
of eminent domain that need not be granted even by the commission to resolve only these two issues, to wit:
fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the
certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the State of xxx
its inherent power did not affect or render invalid the subsequent
transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when land has been These issues to be resolved by the 3
acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the Commissioners are as follows:
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner
retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be 1) Whether or not the property
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, covered by the Transfer Certificates of Title of
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired or any defendants pertain to or involve Lot No. 26 of
reversion to the former owner.[119] the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name
of the plaintiff; and

The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of the 2) Whether or not the property
covered by the title of the plaintiff and the
Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been tasked by the trial court to examine
property covered by the titles of the
the validity of the Manotok titles. The Majority Report defendants overlap.[[121]]

Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon which the trial


courts conclusions were based, it would appear that the findings
therein were outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed
had arrived at several conclusions with respect to the TCTs from which the Manotok
upon by the parties. Specifically, the deductions with regard to
titles were derived.[120] The Special Division, however, concluded that such report was the technical infirmities and defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 4210,
5261 and 35486 do not involve the question of whether or not the
in fact tainted by the fact that it was determined outside the scope of the issues
subject properties were identified as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo
framed and agreed upon by the parties. To wit: estate or whether there was overlapping of titles. Records bear
out that the MANOTOKS took exception to the procedure taken
citing therein the ultra vires acts of the two Commissioners.
In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS disproved the
opinion with regard to the alleged defects of their titles inasmuch
In addition, the majority report focused on the alleged
as the majority report submitted before the trial court was made
flaws and inherent technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and
outside the scope of the tasks which the trial court confined them
35486, ranging from the language of the technical descriptions,
to perform. The MANOTOKS also argued that before this
absence of subdivision plan, lot number and survey plan.
proceeding on remand, CLT failed to introduce evidence of such
Evidently, these defects go only as far as the certificates of title
flaws neither were the concerned geodetic engineers presented
issued prior to those of the Republic. Remarkably, no specific
as witnesses. Moreover, the MANOTOKS further maintained that
flaw was found on the MANOTOKS titles indicating any
CLT failed to submit any factual or legal bases to prove the
irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the Commissioners who
authenticity and validity of the Palma and Sayo Orders. They
signed the majority report even concluded that only TCT Nos.
insisted that the Palma Order was a void one for being
4211, 4210, 5261, 35486, 1368 thru 1324 (sic)[[122]] were
conditional and having resulted to the issuance of duplicate
irregularly and questionably issued without any reference to the
certificates of land title.
MANOTOKS certificates of title.[[123]] Otherwise stated, the
imputed flaws affect only those certificates of title issued prior to
those registered in the name of the Republic. No flaw had been Answering the issues assigned by the Supreme Court
specifically identified or established in the proceedings below, relative to the tenability of the respective imputed flaws in the
which would taint the titles held by the MANOTOKS in so far as titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA and whether such flaws
the regularity of their issuance is concerned.[124] are sufficient to defeat said claims, this Court finds that, as
discussed above, such flaws are inconsequential and ineffectual
in invalidating the MANOTOKS and ARANETA titles.
At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold the validity
Significantly, since the respective certificates of title of
of all of the Manotok titles. It took issue with the particular titles which could not be
herein contending parties are contradictory to each other and
retraced to the titles acquired by the Republic of the Philippines by way of stand to refute the validity of their opposing titles, it cannot be
gainsaid that said certificates of title have correspondingly been
expropriation.
subjected to dispute on the basis of separate and distinct
imputed flaws. Still, the crucial difference between the imputed
Although the MANOTOKS had traced their title from the flaws allegedly tainting said contending titles, DIMSON and CLT
vendees of PHHC, there are, however, some certificates of title on one hand, and the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, on the other,
which could not be traced back to the titles previously held by the is that the imputed flaws purportedly beleaguering the respective
Republic specifically, MRIs TCT Nos. 26405 and 26406, 26407, certificates of title of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA relate to the
33904, 53268, 55897, C-17272, T-121428, 163903, 165119 and mechanical and technical aspect of the transcription of their titles
MECs TCT No. T-232568. As to these certificates of title, the and are therefore inconsequential to the import and validity
MANOTOKS failed to make any specific reference to the thereof. Said imputed flaws do not depart from the fact that the
preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose predecessors-in-interest of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA had
names they were subsequently transferred and registered.Thus, been clothed with the right of ownership over the disputed
we find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their portions of the Maysilo Estate.
origins.[125]
On the other hand, the flaws attending the titles of
DIMSON and CLT primarily stem from infirmities attending or
V. otherwise affecting the very crux of their claim of ownership.
Having derived their titles from RIVERA, whose title is
questionable and dubious to the core, DIMSON and CLT cannot
The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise summary of rightly insist on the validity of their titles. Such flaws are hard to
overcome as they delve into the substance of their proprietary
its conclusions:
claims. As stated, DIMSON and CLT miserably failed to
overcome their onus and instead opted to hap on the supposed
In prcis, the factual milieu of the present controversy and flaws of the adverse parties. For these reasons, the titles of
the evidence on record clearly establish the failure of DIMSON DIMSON and CLT should be declared a nullity.
and CLT to substantiate their titles and overcome the onus of
proving that said titles are derivatives of OCT 994 registered on 3 xxx
May 1917, and not 19 April 1917, as what is reflected in their
titles. In contrast, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, both of which From the foregoing evaluation and in conformity with the
had consistently anchored their proprietary claims on OCT No. Supreme Court 2007 Resolution, this Court arrived at the
994 registered on 3 May 1917, have, in this remand proceeding, following conclusions as to the status of the original title and its
been able to support their claims of ownership over the subsequent conveyances:
respective portions of the Maysilo Estate. Except in the case of
the MANOTOKS which had failed to substantiate the validity of 1. As categorically declared by the Supreme Court, there
some of their certificates of title, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA is only one OCT 994, the registration date of which had already
presented evidence proving the identity, the extent and the origin been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April
of their titles. 1917.OCT 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its
registration date is null and void. reasons other than the fact that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 is extant. They
failed to do so. It should be noted that the instant cases arose from separate actions
2. In view thereof and in addition to other grounds we filed by Jose Dimson and CLT seeking the recovery of possession and/or annulment
have already discussed, the certificates of title of the deceased
of title against Araneta and the Manotok Group. Thus, the burden of evidence was on
Jose Dimson and his successor-in-interest, CLT, having been
traced back to OCT 994 dated 19 April 1917, are NULL and Dimson and CLT to establish the strength of their respective claims of ownership, and
VOID and thus vest no legal right or claim in favor of DIMSON
not merely to rely upon whatever weaknesses in the claims of the Manotoks and
and CLT.
Araneta for their causes of action to prosper. The well-settled legal principle in actions
3. The 13 June 1966 Palma Order and the 18 October
for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not
1977 Sayo Order, on which DIMSON and CLT anchor the validity
of their respective titles, do not substantiate their proprietary merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the
claims. While the existence of said Orders are admitted, the legal
land sought to be reconveyed is his.[127] In an action to recover, the property must be
import thereof nonetheless fails to confer a semblance of legality
on the titles of DIMSON and consequently, of CLT, more so, a identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
superior right to defeat the titles of the MANOTOKS and
weakness of the defendant's claim.[128]
ARANETA, respectively.

4. Portions of Lot No. 26 pertinent to this controversy,


We now proceed to tackle the recommendations submitted by the Special
particularly that being disputed by the MANOTOKs and CLT,
were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in Division. They are as follows:
1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants.
The MANOTOKS, thus as successor-in-interest of the Republic,
RECOMMENDATIONS
were able to establish that some of their certificates of title had
indeed originated or were derived from said expropriated parcels
of land.
Apropos to said conclusions, this Court hereby
respectfully makes the following recommendations regarding the
5. The evidence on record confirm that the certificates of
validity of the conflicting proprietary claims as interposed by the
title covering the land being claimed by ARANETA were derived
herein contending parties:
from OCT NO. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 thereby ultimately
showing a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said mother
1. To declare with finality that the certificates of title of
title. By reason of which, that is either belonging to or portions of
DIMSON and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their
Lot 25-A-3 as previously owned by RATO, had been well
successors-in-interest, if any, are NULL and VOID, thus
substantiated and proven to be superior to that of DIMSON.
invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land.
6. For reasons above-stated and in view of the
2. To declare LEGAL and VALID the proprietary claims
established rights of ownership of both the MANOTOKS and
the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the
ARANETA over the contested properties, we find that the
following certificates of title:
imputed flaws on their titles cannot defeat the valid claims of the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA over the disputed portions of the
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of
Maysilo Estate.[126]
MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC)
Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
Inasmuch as we agree with the factual findings and evaluation of the Special
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an
Division, we likewise adopt the above conclusions. As we earlier stated, it was
approximate area of 2,287 square meters.
incumbent on the Heirs of Dimson and/or CLT to establish their claim to title for
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1
having an area of 20,000 square meters.
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate
has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters. area of 4,650 square meters.

e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an
approximate area of 2,557 square meters. area of more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product
of TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45
f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an registered in the name of Filemon S Custodio.
approximate area of 25,276 square meters.
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of
Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters. Sale between said Spouses and MRI.

h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with 3.B. MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION
an area of approximately 1,910 square meters.
a) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters.
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of
9,707 square meters. The foregoing certificates of title (3.A and 3.B), failing to
make specific references to the particular certificates of title
With regard to the following certificates of title, namely: which they cancelled and in whose name they were registered,
may be declared NULL and VOID, or in the alternative, subject
3.A. MANOTOK REALTY INC. the same to further technical verification.

4. To declare LEGAL and VALID the title of ARANETA


a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an respecting parcels of land covered by the following certificates of
area of 1,0000 square meters. title:

b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land
area of 1,000 square meters. designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114,
being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an 581,872 square meters;
area of 1,000 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.[129]
area of 1,802 square meters.

e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased


by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of
3,163 square meters.
The first, second and fourth recommendations are well taken as they
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-
subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering logically arise from the facts and conclusions, as determined by the Special Division,
an area of more or less 20,531 square meters.
which this Court adopts.
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an
approximate area of 27,850 square meters.
The third recommendation that eleven (11) of the titles held by the Manotoks
be declared null and void or subjected to further technical verification warrants some Majority Report signifies that the flaws adverted to therein could not form the basis for
analysis. the annulment of the titles involved. Indeed, the Special Divisions rejection of the
Majority Report further diminishes any ground to annul the Manotok titles referred to
The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third recommendation in the third recommendation.
do not, as stated by the Special Division, sufficiently indicate that they could be
traced back to the titles acquired by the Republic when it expropriated portions of the Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok titles
Maysilo Estate in the 1940s. On the other hand, the Manotok titles that were affirmed specified in the third recommendation to those titles acquired by the Government
by the Special Division are traceable to the titles of the Republic and thus have through expropriation puts such titles in doubt somehow. In addition, the Court is
benefited, as they should, from the cleansing effect the expropriation had on aware that the ground utilized by the Special Division in rejecting the Majority Report
whatever flaws that attached to the previous titles. However, although the Special that the determinations were made outside the scope of the issues framed and
Division did not concede the same benefit to the other Manotok titles named in the agreed upon by the parties -- does not categorically refute the technical findings
third recommendation, at the same time it did not conclude that such titles were false made therein. Those circumstances, while insufficient for now to annul the Manotoks
or fraudulently acquired. Absent such a finding, we are disinclined to take the ultimate titles listed in the third recommendation, should be sufficiently made public.
step of annulling those titles.
Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special Divisions third
Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be a valid recommendation, the Court deems it sufficient to require the Registers of Deeds
mother title OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. This is in stark contrast with the titles of concerned to annotate this Resolution on said titles so as to sufficiently notify the
CLT, the oppositors to the Manotoks, which all advert to an inexistent mother title. On public of their unclear status, more particularly the inability of the Manotoks to trace
their face, the Manotok titles do not reflect any error or fraud, and certainly the the titles without any gap back to OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. If there should
Special Division do not point to any such flaw in these titles. Nothing on the face of be any cause for the annulment of those titles from a proper partys end, then let the
the titles gives cause for the Court to annul the same. proper case be instituted before the appropriate court.

It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt the Majority WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special Division
Report earlier rendered in the case between the Manotoks and CLT, said report and issues the following reliefs:
having exhaustively listed the perceived flaws in the antecedent TCTs from which the
Manotoks derived their claim. The Special Division concluded that such findings had 1) The certificates of title of the DIMSONs and CLT including other derivative
been reached by the Commissioners in excess of their original mandate and, thus, titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if any, are declared NULL and VOID, thus
ultra vires. Assuming that such flaws were extant, they existed on the titles and invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land;
anteceded the expropriation of the properties by the Government. As stated earlier,
2. The proprietary claims of the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the
such expropriation would have cleansed the titles of the prior flaws. But even if the
following certificates of title are declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
Manotok titles enumerated in the third recommendation could not be sourced from
the titles acquired by the Republic through expropriation, still the rejection of the
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI
covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan
(LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of 4,988 square
a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an
meters.
area of 1,0000 square meters;

b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an


area of 1,000 square meters;
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an
approximate area of 2,287 square meters.
area of 1,000 square meters;
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an
area of 20,000 square meters.
area of 1,802 square meters;
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and having
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased
an approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an
approximate area of 3,163 square meters;
e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an
approximate area of 2,557 square meters.
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of
consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of
f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an
the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less
approximate area of 25,276 square meters.
20,531 square meters;
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has
75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters.
an approximate area of 27,850 square meters;
h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of
area of approximately 1,910 square meters.
subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an
approximate area of 4,650 square meters;
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with
approximate area of 9,707 square meters.
an area of more or less 6,354 square meters
allegedly a by-product of TCT No. 9022, which in
3) The following certificates of titles in the name of ARANETA are hereby
turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the
declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit: name of Filemon S. Custodio;

a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land


designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled
10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an
TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by
aggregate area of 581,872 square meters;
virtue of a Deed of Sale between said spouses and
MRI;
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land
with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.
k) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of
subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of
23,206 square meters.
4) On the following titles in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. or
Manotok Estate Corporation, to wit: the Registers of Deeds concerned are ordered to annotate that as determined in the
foregoing Resolution, the registered owners of the said titles failed to make any FIRST DIVISION
specific reference to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to
whose names they were subsequently transferred and registered, thereby leading the
FIDELA R. ANGELES,
Supreme Court to find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their origins.
Petitioner, G. R. No. 142549
Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

- versus -
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION
Promulgated:
AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR
March 9, 2010
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,

Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares
of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En Banc as a vast tract of
land [that] stretches over three cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign
states of Monaco and the Vatican.[1] What we have before us now is touted as one of
the biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history.[2]
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of
infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular petition easy, on one title in the names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of
hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; but land with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-
complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must be determined with Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of
thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, equitable, and fair conclusion to a land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided
controversy that has now lasted for almost forty-five (45) years. among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property.

Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents Secretary The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order[3] dated January 8, 1998 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the Commissioners in
their Joint Commissioners Report dated October 21, 1997 and Supplemental
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424,
Commissioners Report dated December 30, 1997 that the following lots with transfer
entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which certificates of title to be issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in the
names of all co-owners be sold and the proceeds thereof divided among themselves
was issued a Certificate of Finality on March 12, 1998.
in proportion to their respective interest in the property, is approved.

The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby directed to
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be
issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners for the following
the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled lots, namely:
to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in
xxxx
the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this Court
civil action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as
pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. [6]
Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with
the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and
in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120.
Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting
word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the
over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this Court to believe that OCT
Order.
No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals,[4] reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v.
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a letter-
Court Of Appeals,[5] the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not
reply[7] dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1) the 1 st Indorsement[8] dated
May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule.
September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice
(DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted the
Circular No. 97-11[9] issued to all Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part:
partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case; directed the respective
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the directive of and she had in fact questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the
the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement dated 22 September 1997, copy registration of OCT No. 994.[11] (Underscoring in the original.)
enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding
Committee (created under DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only
one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the
1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration
LRA to prevent its alteration and tampering. We quote the last portion of said letter-
Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No.
97-11 to all Registers of Deeds, copy attached, stating the following: reply:

xxxx
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register of
Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that OCT No. 994 was
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement dated 27 issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there were two (2) OCT
March 1998, x x x had recommended to the Office of the Solicitor General the filing of No. 994, resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title
an appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated 8 January 1998. covering the subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land
mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority, as the protector
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate of the integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real
Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its Senate properties and put a stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens
Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x. [10] (Emphasis ours.) system of land registration.

With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance of
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers from certain
deficiencies, to wit:OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the issuance of
dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and various certificates of title in the names of different persons; and that the plan and
Urban Planning came up with the following findings: descriptions of the lands were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the
proper government agency but merely sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD
1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will result to duplication of certificates of
i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was title covering land previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in
issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.] MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did not declare the nullity of the certificates of title
which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely invalidates the
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such
perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of declaration as to the various transfer certificates of title emanating from OCT No. 994.
Caloocan City. Under the law, there must be a separate action in court for the declaration of nullity of
certificates of title pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the
late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed the physical and As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA 874),
genetic impossibility of such relationship[.] there are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of
the government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, this plague that has made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now
acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing certifications and/or written through their loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and
statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered on April 19, 1917 people at large.[12]
when in truth and in fact it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917.

v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1 st Indorsement,[13] made a
maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs issued in the substantive modification of the ruling made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of
name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No. 994.
Malice was evident because she had previously issued certificates of title in the Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that [n]ot
names of other individuals which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 even the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an
established ruling made by the highest Court of the land. According to petitioner, 3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the Order
dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in existence at the time the 1st Indorsement was
respondent Guingona claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one
issued.
OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917,
and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court
on what is the valid OCT No. 994.Petitioner contends that [t]he rule is well settled that
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages.[17]
once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less
set aside the same and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did
a prohibited act which rendered the Order of no effect. [14]
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice,
therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being compelled to be
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the issuance by
performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting
the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3, 1997, which had the
from the said position and could not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if
same legal effect on other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice to the
he wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of
parties-in-interest, and that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls for
Justice, he was therefore not a real party-in-interest in this case.
condemnation and reproof of the highest degree.[15]

Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial
No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to several complaints received
duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the
by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the
benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no plain, speedy and
complaints prayed for the investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action.
and personnel in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According
to him, the committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
In his Comment,[16] respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for denial of
the petition:
(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original Certificate(s)
of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal purporting to cover a mass of
land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon City as well as the issuance
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that the latter
is no longer the Secretary of Justice. and regularity of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the
event of a finding of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the
involvement of and to recommend the actions to be taken against person(s) and/or
officials and employees of this Department or its agencies who may appear to have
participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or judicial actions, if
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was pursuant any, that may directly be undertaken by this Department, the Office of the Solicitor
to the report dated August 27, 1997 made by the committee created by Department General, the Land Registration Authority, and other units and attached agencies of
Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting an independent fact-finding this Department, with respect to such irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title,
investigation. It did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable taking into account the final decisions of the courts affecting the Maysilo Estate. [18]
Court.
Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the In her Reply,[21] petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has to be
creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely administrative named as private respondent because he was the cause of public respondents failure
to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the to comply with their ministerial duty. A private respondent is the person interested in
DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private
adopt with regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those respondent to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public
that relate to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committees report respondents affected by the proceedings x x x. He is not charged with any improper
dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1 st Indorsement which spelled out the act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for by petitioner shall
policies, procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, require private respondents active participation. [22]
must follow not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the
Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of title as well. He Anent private respondents argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in any way alter
contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court, petitioner counters that the
thus, it could not be said that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court. 1stIndorsement and pertinent acts of private respondent x x x resulted in the altering
or supplanting of a judgment of this Court. The complaints praying that an
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, investigation be conducted on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate
1997 was issued long before the Order dated January 18, 1998, thus it could not be were made to the private respondent by parties who held titles derived from OCT No.
said that petitioner was denied due process as her rights and interests were non- 994 on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in MWSS v.
existent at that time. Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
accorded due process when the LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioners
counsel to present petitioners case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondents claim, she is entitled to file a
claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies the requirements of due process, as petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been
[19]
the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the
wrongful act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is a factual of Court in support of her argument:
issue which the petitioner must prove in the course of a trial where petitioners claim
for damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of
RULE 65
facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition
for mandamus a claim for damages the amount of which she did not even specify. As xxxx
it is, such claim should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no showing SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. A certified copy of the
that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her claims for damages. On this score judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served
upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
alone, such a claim should be outrightly dismissed.[20] concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be
punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39 Public respondents claim the following as facts:

SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. Execution shall issue as a


matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998,
proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines
been duly perfected. reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not and cannot be true
heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been partitioned
submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y
or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason, Pedro Baos, Maria de la
party. Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua
Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la
Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz,
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz, Benito
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito
Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patio, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia OFarrell
y Patio, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that did not
Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa
belong to the Executive Department, because he had caused the issuance of an LRA Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their respective
shares, as evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA
Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that had already become final and
HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO) consisting
executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex D, and its faithful translation into
English consisting of forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex E, and both made
for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its functions within its
integral parts hereof.
jurisdiction, as it saw fit.[23]
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same subject
parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-enumerated true owners.
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the undersigned
Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed their Comment[24] on
counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order of
November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are the lower court.
not the rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint for partition. Their
The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending before the
allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the resolution by higher courts of
other cases involving the Maysilo Estate.[26]
late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT
No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership, and
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully
possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint,
neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned transfer
is an untrue statement made with intent to deceive. This is because the findings
certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have
embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are
unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed
the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor
right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public
General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are
respondents.
not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names. [25]
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather
than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's
controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not unlawful for public
reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of
respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy
and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of
them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must
registration.
be dismissed.
xxxx

Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal
right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear
and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.[30](Emphasis ours.)
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that
the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent. find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the
Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of
a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance
duty.Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court
which a substantial doubt exists.[27] It is nonetheless likewise available to compel to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the
action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st
the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate
of an action already taken in the exercise of either.[28] Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioners request. [31]
There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994
the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly
substantial doubt exists to justify public respondents refusal to comply with said anchored their rights, did not exist.
Order. Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioners
request? It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority [29] En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
instructive, to wit: Corporation[32] (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution [33] in
the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy
surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their
994 have been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No.
recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now
994, such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga
with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case
said resolutions.
operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.[36]
(Emphases supplied.)
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this
Court[34] which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding
and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of
their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioners the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:
claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings
made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon
affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. the initiative of the parties. x x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or
If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as
such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties.
true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself,
such OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments
rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the
presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly
case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents. [35] the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.

There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. x x x.
April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following conclusions made by this
xxxx
Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended
conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.[37]
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother
title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and
that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by
the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994
resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although said Special Division, and adopted the latters conclusions as to the status of the
such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding
effect.
that there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which had already been
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917 and categorically concluded
void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles
that OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date
made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the
validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x. is null and void.
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-424
Republic of the Philippines
originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several attempts of different
individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be attributed to her SUPREME COURT
advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money, should she get a
favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and Manila

accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for
FIRST DIVISION
can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the very
basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist. G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,


The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus not having
been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of merit. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia
SO ORDERED. Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the
decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426,
entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in totothe decision of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for
confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec.
1256.

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July
20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee
simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively
containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.)
situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p.
14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p. 41,
Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).

On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development, opposed the application on the grounds that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient 2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not ownership; and
having been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish
Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or 3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he
special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19,
'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or Rollo.)
possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other
recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered
under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.
2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the The petition is impressed with merit.
application.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act
Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.) 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for
approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation: doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the
government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or
Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the
apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as owners for of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
of the applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and their agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until
predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126
application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands
coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480;
fishponds (p. 68, Rollo). Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership
classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107
absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government alleges that: register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648;
Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or SCRA 689 [1984]).
disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not of the courts;
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to
public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded (p. Republic of the Philippines
26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that: Supreme Court
Manila

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving EN BANC
that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he
is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707
to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.) REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,
registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby
dismissed without costs.
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,
SO ORDERED. ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES,

Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD


TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
THE LANDOWNERS OF agricultural land.
BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION, The Antecedents
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 167707


- versus -

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE destination.The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants [4] who live in the bone-
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS shaped islands three barangays.[5]
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Respondents.
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.[7]
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
REYES, R.T., J.: Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay
PTACircular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of titling purposes, respondents-claimants
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition
for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 [3] issued by
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. [12]
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest,
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. [10] of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case
for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda. [13]
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots
they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo,
confirmation of imperfect titles. Aklan.[15]The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition
for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified RTC and CA Dispositions
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public
forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,
Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended. with a fallo reading:

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands
surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
into ownership.
SO ORDERED.[17]

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in

(1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82

Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of

growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. [19] The trial
court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28]
private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22] prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. [30] They allege that
the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. [23] The Republic then have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
appealed to the CA. immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. [31]
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the
DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower
court.[24] island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926,
known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner
for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that
the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve. Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. [25] Hence, the public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the
present petition under Rule 45. claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
G.R. No. 173775 which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria the lots for disposition.
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay
disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on Island.[33]
each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes. Issues
G.R. No. 167707 CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY
AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?[35]
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular (Underscoring supplied)

No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in
acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island. [34]
G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure
titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if
any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do
not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
G.R. No. 173775

Our Ruling
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive


I. to reclassify lands of the public domain
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE
TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in relation to Act
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY
LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;[37] (b)
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.
II. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and
LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
executive acts.
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify
DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE lands of the public domain.
FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions:
OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, [41] giving
V. the government great leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted
to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.[43] Of these, The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
onlyagricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain. which were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an
informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and
with the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adverse,[56] from the date of its inscription.[57] However, possessory information title
adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. [46] had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April
17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. [58]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2)
inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title;
the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to information title.[59]
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what
terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. [49] American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the
public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions,
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.[61] The act provided for, among
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system)
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the
which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. [51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and x x[65](Emphasis Ours)
deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial
as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73]
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June
the Torrens system.[66] 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. [76] Under the decree, all holders of
made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496
the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976.
of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section
domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904
was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. [68] On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise to registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. [79]
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
26, 1894, was required.[69] that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain classified.[82]
other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to
the State.[71] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[83]
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[84] There must still
be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral,
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [85] The had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in
have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. [86] justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.[91] This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released
by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing
disposable.Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to Islands.

disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be xxxx


assumed. They call for proof.[87]
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President
of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber
and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [93]
Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases
were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of evidence to the necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
shown.[90] contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown.[94]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did
not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land
the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it
argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient
disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands. of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa,
by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands
classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of
totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar
[mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes
of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148,
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of
the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public
under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants
domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs.
or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis
ours)
No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian
doctrine, continued to be owned by the State. Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from
the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands.[96] Act

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the

classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or

was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since then,

timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated: courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.[97]

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted
in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral
within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, 1933,[98] did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration
mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of
court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the
the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have
been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in each case it is a courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private ownership.
without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No.
Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S.
926.
Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of
of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,
The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the
The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public land referred to all
general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 property of the government and the friar lands.
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here,
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
agricultural. disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified

old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the

Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they National Mapping and Resource Information Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island

were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as is an unclassified land of the public domain.

agricultural, timber, or mineral.


PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes.
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its
may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial
doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay agricultural land.
appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into
resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801
or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of
industry, do not negate its character as public forest. imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist
zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution [112] classifying private ownership.
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.[113] The discussion in Heirs of into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly instructive: Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private
lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable [118] does not by itself
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to 3 provides:
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. [115] (Emphasis Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
supplied)
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to
its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly
Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
and disposable when it provides:
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of as alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA
Forest Development.
No. 141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public

classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. [121]

intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No.
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain,
1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
President. Courts have no authority to do so. [122] Absent such classification, the land
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]
the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA
to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-
the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the
meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
alienability.[119]
protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-
less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President
four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and
through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such
Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag
classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan,
Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by
Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the
virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring
conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a
public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the
word reclassification. Where there has been no previous classification of public forest
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus: [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject
of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed
for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public
Reform Program: domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code, which have
not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall
be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
the specific limits of the public domain. title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied
lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,

the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or

remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705. through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] and disposable land of the public domain.[128]

the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.


As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did
not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to considered State property.
the same result.In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the
land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. [125]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If
the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes
no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is
Department of Justice[126] on this point:
clear from the wording of the law itself. [129] Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possessory rights.[130] possession and considerable investment in the island.

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under One Last Note
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of

12, 1945. Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry.
The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are

that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession. bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito
ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name
of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply
are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
commenced on June 12, 1945.
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential,
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands.
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title,
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by
bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As law.
the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents.
The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
present land laws. There is one such bill [133] now pending in the House of geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc
and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.[135]
decide.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of
appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not
becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic
progress.
SO ORDERED.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry
v. Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that
should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many
more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For,
forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common
knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces
a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
FIRST DIVISION opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order 10 dated 13
December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.
[G.R. NO. 154953 : June 26, 2008]
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondent's Operations
INC.,Respondent. Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista
(Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since
birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority
DECISION (LRA), Quezon City.

CARPIO, J.: The testimonies of respondent's witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga
(Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the
The Case land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision 2 of executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another
the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of
Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635. Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio's children, Prospero
Dimayuga (Porting).11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to Respondent.

The Antecedent Facts


The Ruling of the Trial Court

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by
T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of
which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The respondent.
land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration
of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondent's
November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12
20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794, 4 and in the 18 June 1945, which possession converted the land to private property.
October 1999 issue of People's Journal Taliba,5 a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:
on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in
a conspicuous place on the land.6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the
and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.7 Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424,
Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007
was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic
the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal office at
1999, the trial court issued an Order8 of General Default against the whole world 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
except as against petitioner.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) registration be issued.
appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999
within which to file his written opposition.9 Carandang failed to file his written SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial The issues may be summarized as follows:
court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the
applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of 1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies
of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area involved,
petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented to 2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous,
corroborate Evangelista's testimony. exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an
owner since June 1945 or earlier; andcralawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the
Public Land Act.
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's
Decision.
The Ruling of this Court
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of the possession and
occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for three The petition has merit.
years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On
Evangelista's failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on Respondent Failed to Prove
the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was
not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunato's relation to Kabesang
Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelista's statement that Fortunato took over the
possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy's death. The Court of Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of
Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner
land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public
the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to domain.
cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness' testimony.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was dominion presumably belong to the State. 14 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application for evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is
registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting. alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. 15

Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of
raises the following grounds in its Memorandum: Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas
City,16certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls
applicant corporation despite the following: within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land
Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, certification17 in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-
12 June 1945 or earlier; andcralawlibrary DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land,
Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land. 13
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18
The Issues dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the
DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
for lands covering over 50 hectares.20 In this case, respondent applied for registration copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to
596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable. prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted
and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not
Technical Director, FMS-DENR: presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not
have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein.
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan; Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they
have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows:
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public
infrastructure projects; andcralawlibrary
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber foreign country;
dealers.
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR: andcralawlibrary

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
rattan; entered therein.

2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in
dealers; Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits; the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication 21 of the
areas for public infrastructure projects; andcralawlibrary DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
for public infrastructure projects.
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facieevidence
form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's classification.31 However, respondent
should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents
within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of
of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer's certification
performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not
Registrar22 in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. 23 The explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to
certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the
official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not other certifications submitted by Respondent.
even records of public documents.24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported
by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. 25 Certainly, the certifications There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
cannot be considered prima facieevidence of the facts stated therein.
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove
that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the Petitioner alleges that the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and
DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelista's statement that the
prove the facts stated therein.26 Such government certifications may fall under the possession of respondent's predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous,
class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than
As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to
issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and
exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony
of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein. 27 Here, Torres, a We agree with petitioner.
private individual and respondent's representative, identified the certifications but the
government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the
certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value.28 The Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before
contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified
on the veracity of the contents of the certifications.29 Torres did not prepare the that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy's land. The Court of Appeals took
certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct note of this and ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of Kabesang Puroy's possession
any verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so
Secretary as alienable and disposable. that they were practically neighbors."32 The Court of Appeals observed:

Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not
alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land difficult to understand that people in the said community knows each and everyone.
Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the
December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire,
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them.33

We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he
that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and
disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not
and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista's
merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was
described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonio's children.
the land involved."30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista's testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public
single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelista's domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973
uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent's predecessors-in- Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no
interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987
30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any
Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent's acquisition of the land. While he kind of alienable land of the public domain.36 The Court explained in Chavez:
claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land
was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information. The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. x x x x
of ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty
taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were [I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could
allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations
starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who
possession of the land only in that year. could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain
under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987
Land Application by a Corporation Constitution.

Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the
of the land of the public domain in this case. land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up
of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the
We agree with petitioner. death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of
subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of
farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the
further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting
the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to
leased and the conditions therefor. circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands
are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell
kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,35 alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the
the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban. 37
Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June
by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet
481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members of private property.
the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in
favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of
Constitution which prohibited private corporations or associations from holding alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when its
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by
The Court ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of
from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of
Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not Appeals,41 the Court declared:
exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144
hectares.39
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in
question had already been converted to private ownership through acquisitive
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them
possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal fiction in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. The Court ruled:
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the
1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private
as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute property.
itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character was already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive
and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years
from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from
complete. acquiring lands of the public domain.

x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176) further
statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of applications
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable
that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by
Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. x x x. 40 amended to read as follows:
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time,
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does
this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this Act shall
apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section Republic of the Philippines
shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. SUPREME COURT

Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall Manila
be treated as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
FIRST DIVISION
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares,
consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual
may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply
for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law,
and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot vs.
have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right.
This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12
hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already
private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997. DECISION

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals BERSAMIN, J.:
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of
DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
the current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of
rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up
SO ORDERED. river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration
of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The
property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in
Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot
4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast
by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to
include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the
property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had
been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for
more than 30 years.2
The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND
that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEES FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF
property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard
that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3 III

Ruling of the RTC THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing: OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN
THIRTY (30) YEARS.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A.
SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in
the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00- October 20, 2003.7
000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre, LRC
Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following
technical description, to wit: Issues

xxxx Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for I
the Issuance of the Decree be issued.
RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO
SO ORDERED. THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT
UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR
OWN EVIDENCE.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
II
Ruling of the CA
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit: A PART OF THE PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT
DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF
I RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461
OF THE CIVIL CODE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY III
APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR.
THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER. THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE
AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE
II AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION.
IV which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the
latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE
CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article
SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents evidence
SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE. did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Paraaque River.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; The Republics submission is correct.
and whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to
Registration Decree). establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is
meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in
Ruling opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and
apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that,
The appeal is meritorious. indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

I. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12 The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents benefit adjacent to the banks of rivers.13

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.
the currents of the waters."
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows: the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of
the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio was the dried-up river bed of the Paraaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA
Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the
this application which was previously a part of the Paraaque River which became an Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."
orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same
property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the
through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mothers name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B
with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that: came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Paraaque
River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque River, resulting
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." 9 in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding: The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby
ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform
waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish
Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible
Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that
the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 Acquisitive prescription was
square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the
current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the span of time intervening not applicable in favor of respondents
between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at
which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which
respondents witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to The RTC favored respondents application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B
have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial also because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly
increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Paraaque River. and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being
Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.s own testimony to the effect that the the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the
property was previously a part of the Paraaque River that had dried up and become following ratiocination, viz:20
an orchard.
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own Transfer Certificate of Title thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are
had been formed by the drying up of the Paraaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore,
No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-
lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14 00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services
and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys Division Land
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998- Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court
B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in opts to grant the application.
the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the
Northeast."15
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view
of the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds
that became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are
land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a
land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants
land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.
of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water
level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the
riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that In fine, the application is GRANTED.
the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the
provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is
clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for Both lower courts erred.
application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law. 17

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry
up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper [Regional
Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides
that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person.19
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
II
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court
June 12, 1945, or earlier. opts to grant the application.

xxxx The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of supposed possession to be


"more than thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated
following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the property
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the
bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 21 property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings,
because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payors
ownership of the land the taxes were paid for, 25 the tax declarations and payments
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse
more than thirty (30) years."22 possession.

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil
affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession
be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium
Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of
following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot
or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent
impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot
when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings 4998-B.
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The
by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 24 purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 199928 signified that their
alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their
application for land registration on March 7, 1997.
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings. Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot
4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby
acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government.
possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared: Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public
dominion.
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion
adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads,
fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd- canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State,
and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division Land without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the
development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370
Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion. applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier
was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and,
portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held: hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of
of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of
accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in
Civil Code, the same must fail. the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is
not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 30 No public land can be
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the
State.31Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 32
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1)
of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river
public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as
prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which
creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character. gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river
beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change
xxxx of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of
public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously
declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable,
took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor- respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.
in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which
are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable
adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value. and disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as
alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: 33
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are
applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the NOTE
course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the
Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS
became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation 15 X 60CM
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968. sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299 To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey
plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre. No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on
Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the
map "classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the propertys nature as alienable and disposable public "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
land? oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must
Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
"occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
Resources v. Yap34 that: land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not
a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant supplied)
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable
have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. in the following manner, viz:

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted


by respondent.1wphi1 The government officials who issued the certifications were
not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should
not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated
therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in
evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove
that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the
DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance,
prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class
of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of
issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
(Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B,
Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was
already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not
validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a
total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging
to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

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