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Before the Court are Plaintiffs second motion for summary judgment (Doc. 185) and
Defendants motion for summary judgment (Doc. 186). For the reasons explained below, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiffs second motion for summary judgment (Doc. 185) and DENIES
I. BACKGROUND
The Court laid out the facts of this case in great detail in its November 4, 2016
memorandum resolving Plaintiffs Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) claims.1
(Doc. 172.) The Court will thus forego a recitation of the underlying facts, and focus instead on
In response to the Courts IDEA decision, Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration
(Doc. 176), which the Court denied (Doc. 201), and Plaintiffs filed a motion for an equitable
remedy (Doc. 183), which the Court also denied (Doc. 202). Plaintiffs then filed an unopposed
1
The Court issued its IDEA findings after bifurcating Plaintiffs IDEA claims from
Plaintiffs other claims and conducting a bench trial on Plaintiffs IDEA claims.
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Title II), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act (Section 504), the First Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as their legal damages
claims under Title II and Section 504. The Court granted Plaintiffs motion for partial dismissal.
(Doc. 203.) Plaintiffs then filed an unopposed motion to strike their jury demand (Doc. 204),
Plaintiffs maintain claims of unnecessarily restrictive placement under Title II and Section
504 and seek only equitable, injunctive, and declaratory relief, as well as fees and costs. Both
Plaintiffs and Defendants moved for summary judgment on these remaining claims (Docs. 185 &
186), to which the opposing party responded (Docs. 192 & 191), and the moving party replied
While the summary judgment motions were pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District. The Court invited the parties to provide
supplemental briefing addressing the impact of this decision on any motions pending before the
Court (Docs. 197 & 198), and both Plaintiffs (Doc. 199) and Defendants (Doc. 200) filed
supplemental briefs. Additionally, the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee recently
issued an opinion in I.L. v. Knox County Board of Education, a case which addresses the issue of
discriminatory intent under Title II and Section 504. Both Plaintiffs (Doc. 206) and Defendants
(Doc. 207) filed notices of supplemental authority addressing the impact of I.L. on the pending
Summary judgment is proper when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897
(6th Cir. 2003). The Court should view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Natl Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th
Cir. 2001).
III. ANALYSIS
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims
under Title II and Section 504. The Court will address each motion in turn.
provisions in Title II and Section 504. With regard to the IDEA issue, the Court concluded:
L.H. does not fall within any of the categories of students who cannot be
successfully mainstreamed. He is not a student who could not benefit from being
in the regular-education setting; the non-portable benefits of a non-mainstream
setting do not far outweigh the benefits of the regular-education setting; and he is
undisputedly not too disruptive for the regular-education setting. Therefore, under
the standard set forth by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roncker,
[Defendants] proposal to remove L.H. from a fully mainstreamed setting and
provide him with academic instruction in a separate CDC classroom was
inappropriate.
(Doc. 172 (citing Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiffs argue (1) the Courts factual findings used to support its least-restrictive-environment
decision under the IDEA may be used to rule on the summary judgment motions before the court,
and (2) the factual findings used to support the least-restrictive-environment findings under the
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IDEA also support a finding that Defendants violated analogous provisions of Title II and Section
504.
Normally, a Courts factual findings derived from a bench trial are not binding on a jury at
a subsequent stage of the case, see Lytle v. Household Manufacturing., Inc., 494 US 545, 5253
(1990), and thus could not be used to rule on a summary judgment motion. Here, however,
Plaintiffs have dismissed all jury claims (Doc. 203). Because Plaintiffs Title II and Section 504
claims arise from the same underlying facts as their IDEA claim, and the Court previously made
detailed factual findings regarding Plaintiffs IDEA claim and determined Defendants violated the
preclusion and law of the case to apply these factual findings when ruling on the pending motions
for summary judgment. See United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1990) (Under the
doctrine of the law of the case, a decision on an issue made by a court at one stage of a case should
Defendants argue issue preclusion and law of the case should not apply to the facts in
question because they are part of an interlocutory order, not a final judgment on the merits. Even
assuming Defendants are correct that a final judgment would be necessary to apply issue
preclusion or law of the case in this context, the Courts November 4, 2016 memorandum and
order (Docs. 172 & 173) constitute a final judgment on the merits, as they include detailed findings
of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. See Birgel v. Bd.
of Commrs, 125 F.3d 948, 952 (6th Cir. 1997). Additionally, if any doubt remained as to the
conclusive effect of the Courts IDEA findings, the Court recently denied a motion for
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The Court will thus apply its factual findings from the IDEA stage of this case when ruling
on both Plaintiffs and Defendants motions for summary judgment. Having determined the facts,
the Court need only resolve the outstanding legal questions raised by the parties.
With regard to Plaintiffs claims under Title II and Section 504, Defendants concede L.H.
qualifies for protection under these laws and these laws contain least-restrictive-environment
decision was not sound and thus should not be applied to Plaintiffs remaining claims.
Furthermore, Defendants argue discriminatory intent is required to find a violation of Title II and
Section 504an element not required under IDEA least-restrictive-environment analysis and an
element the Court specifically found to be absent during its IDEA analysis.
With regard to Defendants first line of argument, the Court addressed its confidence in its
reasoning and conclusion under the IDEA when it denied Defendants motion to reconsider. (Doc.
201.) Defendants second line of argument, focused on the issue of discriminatory intent, requires
Section 504, 34 C.F.R. 104.34(a).3 See also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999)
2
Requiring public entities to administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities and defining
the most integrated setting as a setting that enables the individuals with disabilities to interact
with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible. 28 C.F.R. 35.130(d).
3
A recipient to which this subpart applies shall educate, or shall provide for the education
of, each qualified handicapped person in its jurisdiction with persons who are not handicapped to
the maximum extent appropriate to meet the needs of the handicapped person. A recipient shall
place a handicapped person in the regular educational environment operated by the recipient unless
it is demonstrated by the recipient that the education of the person in the regular environment with
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(describing unjustified segregation of persons with disabilities as a form of discrimination under
the ADA). As a result, it is often the case that an IDEA violation at the very least supports, and
often dictates, a finding of a violation under Title II and Section 504. See Andrew M. v. Del. Cty.
Office of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 350 (3d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that
violations of Part B of the IDEA will almost always constitute violations of the Rehabilitation
Act). This case is no exception. Defendants proposed placement of L.H. constitutes a violation
of the least-restrictive-environment requirement of both Title II and Section 504 for the same
reasons it constituted a violation of the IDEA, as quoted from the Courts IDEA opinion above.
to discriminate under Title II or Section 504. Application of the Courts IDEA findings to these
motions for summary judgment cuts both ways, as the Court found Defendants violated the least-
discriminate on the part of Defendantsin fact, the Court found Defendants were operating with
a sincere and heartfelt desire to do what was in L.H.s best interest. (See Docs. 172 & 202.)
Thus, if discriminatory intent is required, the Court will be unable to grant Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment.
set forth in Campbell v. Board of Education of Centerline School District, 58 F. Appx 162, 167
(6th Cir. 2003). Campbell clearly states Section 504 required the plaintiffs in that case to prove
the alleged violation was discriminatory, as either bad faith or gross misjudgment must be shown
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 34 C.F.R.
104.34(a).
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before a [Section] 504 violation can be made out, at least in the context of handicapped children.
Id. (quoting Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982)).
The nuance in the present case arises because Plaintiffs are seeking only equitable
remedies, as opposed to damages. The Sixth Circuit has yet to speak directly to whether
discriminatory intent is required for a plaintiff to obtain an equitable remedy under Title II or
Section 504, and other circuits are split on the issue. Compare S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
729 F.3d 248, 26162 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding a claim for damages under Section 504 was subject
to a requirement of discriminatory intent, but a claim for liability or violation of Section 504 does
not require proof of discriminatory intent) and M.G. v. Williamson Cty, Bd. of Educ., No. 3:15-cv-
946, at *40 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 3, 2016) (However, where a plaintiff does not seek money damages
under [Section] 504 and the [Americans with Disabilities Act], the plaintiff does not need to
establish that the school was deliberately indifferent when it failed to accommodate her educational
needs.) (citing A.G. v. Paradise Valley Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 2016)
with D.B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2012) (requiring plaintiffs to make an additional
showing of disability-based animus to succeed on claims under Title II and Section 504).
The Eastern District of Tennessee recently addressed this very issue in I.L. v. Knox County
Board of Education, 2017 WL 2610505, at *1517 (E.D. Tenn. June 15, 2017). Judge Reeves
extensively analyzed both the statutes and existing case law, and ultimately determined [t]here is
nothing to indicate that a plaintiff must ever prove intentional discriminationor deliberate
indifferenceunder Title II and Section 504.4 Id. As grounds for this conclusion, Judge Reeves
4
This finding actually goes beyond what is required in this case, as Judge Reeves found a
plaintiff could recover damages under Title II and Section 504 without a showing of discriminatory
intent. Here, the Court need only decide whether a plaintiff can receive an equitable remedy
without a showing of discriminatory intent. Judge Reevess decision on that front is covered early
in her discussion of the issue[Plaintiff] maintains that, because she seeks only injunctive relief
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distinguished between Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (Title VI), which provides for the
remedies available under Title II and Section 504, and Title II and Section 504 themselves, on the
ground that Title II and Section 504 provide a right to sue for both intentional and unintentional
discrimination, unlike Title VI, which only provides a right to sue for intentional discrimination.
Id. (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 29497 (1985); Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v.
discrimination to succeed on claims under Title II and Section 504 conflate the requirements of
Title VI, specifically the requirement to show intentional discrimination, with the requirements of
Title II and Section 504, because the remedies available under Title II and Section 504 are drawn
from Title VI via 42 U.S.C. 12133 (the remedies, procedures, and rights of Title II are those of
Section 504) and 29 U.S.C. 794a(a)(2) (the remedies, procedures, and rights of Section 504 are
those of Title VI). While the same remedies, procedures, and rights are available under each of
these statutes, what is required to obtain a given remedy under each statute is not necessarily the
same, as the statutes have different purposes. Title VI provides a right to sue only for intentional
discrimination, while Title II and Section 504 provide a right to sue for both intentional and
unintentional discrimination. I.L., 2017 WL 2610505, at *15 (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 294
97; Ability Ctr., 385 F.3d at 908). There is thus no reason to apply Title VIs intentional
discrimination requirement to Title II and Section 504 when a party is seeking only an equitable
remedy under these statutes. S.H, 729 F.3d at 26162; I.L., 2017 WL 2610505, at *1517; M.G.,
on her Title II and Section 504 claims, she need not prove deliberate indifference. [Plaintiff] is
correct.
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The Court thus concludes Plaintiffs need not show intentional discrimination on the part of
Defendants to succeed on their motion. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment.
Defendants motion for summary judgment mirrors Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment. As a result, the Court has already reached conclusions in Plaintiffs favor on the issues
raised in Defendants motion. The underlying facts which constituted a violation of the IDEAs
analogous requirements. Contrary to Defendants argument, the Court concludes Defendants lack
of discriminatory intent does not prevent Plaintiffs from proving a violation of Title II and Section
504, at least when Plaintiffs seek only an equitable remedy.5 The Court thus DENIES Defendants
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs second motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 185) and DENIES Defendants motion for summary judgment (Doc.
186). The parties may file a status report within seven days of the entry of this order addressing
any further action the Court must take prior to entry of a judgment order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
The Court notes, however, it considered Defendants conduct, specifically Defendants
lack of discriminatory intent, when denying Plaintiffs motion for an equitable remedy in response
to the Courts previous IDEA finding. (Doc. 202.)
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