Chavez v Ongpin (1990)

Chavez v Ongpin
GR No 76778, June 6, 1990

FACTS:
Section 21 of Presidential Decree 464 provides that every 5 years starting calendar year 1978, there shall be a
provincial or city general revision of real property assessments. The general revision was completed in 1984.
On November 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued EO 73 stating that beginning January 1, 1987, the 1984
assessments shall be the basis of real property taxes. Francisco Chavez, a taxpayer and landowner, questioned the
constitutionality of EO 74. He alleges that it will bring unreasonable increase in real property taxes.

ISSUE:
Is EO 73 constitutional?

RULING:
Yes. Without EO 73, the basis for collection of real property taxes will still be the 1978 revision of property values.
Certainly, to continue collecting real property taxes based on valuations arrived at several years ago, in disregard of
the increases in the value of real properties that have occurred since then is not in consonance with a sound tax
system.
Fiscal adequacy, which is one of the characteristics of a sound tax system, requires that sources of revenue must be
adequate to meet government expenditures and their variations.

Tana da v Angara

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for
granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
 Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our
own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not
a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it
is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations
(UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.
What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said
agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the
political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO
remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Tan v Del Rosario

Facts:

1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.

2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following

provisions of the Constitution:

-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
 - Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in

applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of
HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice
of their Profession"(Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually
reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29
of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated
due process.

5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.

6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process

NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power.
No such transgression is so evident in herein case.

1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all
subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the
standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization
is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal,
to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all
those belonging to the same class.

2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shif
the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of
individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on
taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and
inappropriate.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in promulgating

the RR

No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or afer the amendatory
legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax
treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of
those who do it through a general professional partnership.

PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE PHILS., INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN

69 SCRA 460
GR No. L-31156, February 27, 1976

"Legislative power to create political corporations for purposes of local self-government

carries with it the power to confer on such local governmental agencies the power to
tax.

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Pepsi-Cola commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction

to declare Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act, unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare
Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 denominated as "municipal production tax" of the
Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void. Ordinance 23 levies and collects from soft
drinks producers and manufacturers a tax of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo for every
bottle of soft drink corked, and Ordinance 27 levies and collects on soft drinks produced
or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax of ONE
CENTAVO (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity. Aside from
the undue delegation of authority, appellant contends that it allows double taxation,
and that the subject ordinances are void for they impose percentage or specific tax.

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the appellant tenable?

HELD: No. On the issue of undue delegation of taxing power, it is settled that the power
of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter
of right to every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the
people. It is a power that is purely legislative and which the central legislative body
cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department of the government
without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The exception, however, lies
in the case of municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply. Legislative
powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern.
By necessary implication, the legislative power to create political corporations for
purposes of local self-government carries with it the power to confer on such local
governmental agencies the power to tax.
Also, there is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared
unconstitutional on the theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the
delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates the taxes over which local
taxation may not be exercised. The reason is that the State has exclusively reserved the
same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by
our fundamental law, so that double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the
taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity or by the same
jurisdiction for the same purpose, but not in a case where one tax is imposed by the
State and the other by the city or municipality.
On the last issue raised, the ordinances do not partake of the nature of a percentage
tax on sales, or other taxes in any form based thereon. The tax is levied on the produce
(whether sold or not) and not on the sales. The volume capacity of the taxpayer's
production of soft drinks is considered solely for purposes of determining the tax rate on
the products, but there is not set ratio between the volume of sales and the amount of
the tax.

Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Phils, Inc v Tanauan GR No. L-31156, February 27, 1976

FACTS:
Pepsi Cola Bottling Company commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance
of
Leyte for the court to declare Section 2 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) unconstitutional as an undue delegation of
taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos 23 and 27 of municipality of Tanauan, Leyte. Municipal
Ordinance No. 23 (9/25/1962) levies and collects from softdrinks producers and manufacturers a tax of 1/16 of a
centavo for every bottle of softdrink corked. Municipal ordinance no. 27 (10/28/1962) levies and collects on softdrinks
produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax of 1 centavo on each gallon of
volume capacity. The taxes imposed are denominated as municipal production tax. CFI-Leyte dismissed the
complaint. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Is Section 2 of RA 2264 an undue delegation of power, confiscatory and oppressive?

2. Do ordinances nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or specific taxes?

3. Are ordinance nos. 23 and 27 unjust and unfair?

RULING:
 1. No. Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted the autonomous authority to create their
own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes. Section 5, Article XI provides: Each local government unit shall have the power
to create its sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Thus, legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern.

2. No. The intention of the Municipal Council of Tanauan in enacting Ordinance No. 27 is thus clear: it was
intended as a plain substitute for the prior ordinance no. 23 and operates as a repeal of the latter, even
without words to that effect. The tax is not a percentage tax as the volume capacity of the taxpayers
production of softdrinks is considered solely for purposes of determining the tax rate on the products but
there is no set ratio between volume of sales and amount of the tax. Nor can the tax levied be treated as a
specific tax. Softdrink is not one of those specified articles.

3. No. Municipal corporations are allowed much discretion in determining the rates of imposable taxes. This is
in line with the constitutional policy of according the widest possible autonomy to local governments in
matters of local taxation, an aspect that is given expression in the Local Tax Code.

Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No. 130716, December

09, 1998
Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998

Locus Standi

Facts:

Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or
agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The
respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he had asked the
respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.

Issue:

Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?

Held:

The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to government
records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the Philippine
Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's standing i.e

(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT

(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN

we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS INC. vs. FERTIPHIL CORP.

QUESTION: What is Locus Standi? ANSWER: The right to stand before the court to bring action against
another party for collection and damage because it was the affected party.

Petitioner PLANTERS PRODUCTS INC. and respondent FERTIPHIL CORP. are private corporations engaged
in importation and distribution of FERTILIZERS, PESTICIDES & other Agricultural Products.

Then President Marcos issued a Levy Tax through a Letter of Instruction (LOI No. 1465) imposing capital
recovery component of P10 per bag of fertilizer to be remitted to FERTILIZER & PESTICIDE AUTHORITY
(FPA). The levy was to continue till adequate capital was raised to make PPI financially viable.

So FertiPhil remitted the same to said agency, which was then remitted to the depository bank of PPI.
FertiPhil paid roughly P6M to FPA from 1985 to 1986. Ito yung kasagsagan ng EDSA Revolution.

Afer the 1986 EDSA Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. FertiPhil
therefore demanded from PPI a full refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused.

As a result FertiPhil filed a complaint for collection and damages questioning the constitutionality of LOI
1465, claiming that it was an unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and unlawful tax imposition that
amounted to a denial of due process.

PPI argues that FertiPhil has no LOCUS STANDI to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because
it doesnt have a personal and substantial interest in the case. Meaning FertiPhil did not suffer any
damage from the imposition because incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers
themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FERTIPHIL has Locus Standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465. (What is
POWER OF TAXATION & POLICE POWER?)

RULING:

FERTIPHIL has Locus Standi. It suffered direct injury because it was a TAX PAYER.

Actually the doctrine of Locus Standi is a mere procedural technicality which may be waived. In
the Abaya vs. Ebdane case the court even took a liberal stance stating that a taxpayer need not be a
party to the contract in order to challenge its validity

I think this is more of a question of whether the imposition operated under the basis of POLICE POWER
or the POWER TO TAX which are 2 of the inherent powers of the state.

Police Power is the power of the state to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in or to promote the general welfare, while Power of Taxation is the power to levy taxes to be
used for public purpose.

The main purpose of each:

Police Power = Regulation of Behavior or Conduct for the Public Welfare

Power of Taxation = Revenue Generation for the Public Welfare

These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. The lawful subject and lawful means
tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the Police Power. The power of Taxation,
on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

While it is true that the power to tax can be used as an implement of Police Power, the primary purpose
of the levy was revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue then the exaction is properly
called a tax.

FertiPhil wins this case.

Lutz vs. Araneta [December 22, 1955, (98 Phil 148)]

Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act was promulgated
in 1940 to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its
preferential position in the United States market and the impositionof export taxes. Plaintiff,
Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by
the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of the Act, alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void,
being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiffs opinion
is not a public purpose for which a tax may beconstitutionally levied. The action has been
dismissed by the Court of First Instance.

Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.

Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the Act that the tax
is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of
the threatened sugar industry.

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is
that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of
similar protection; but the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of
all or none.

Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works and Communications

In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals.
Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose
Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual
claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that
his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would
be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be
restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure
the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a
private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary (1992)

211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed,
in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across
the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was
passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to
be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are
in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than
the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised
by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to
such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff
rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

CERVANTES vs. AUDITOR GENERAL Case Digest

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL
(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)

FACTS
This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners claim for
quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00
NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner
amounting to P1,650 for 1949.
This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise
council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and
concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds:
o a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
o b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the
executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs
operation. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period
given. Petition for review DISMISSED with costs

BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LAGUNA vs. CTA, NWSA

8 SCRA 224
GR No. L-18125, May 31, 1963

"A tax on property of the Government, whether national or local, would merely have the effect of
taking money from one pocket to put it in another pocket."

FACTS: National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NWSA), a public corporation owned by
the Government of the Philippines as well as all property comprising waterworks and sewerage
systems placed under it, took over the Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Bian Waterworks System in 1956. It
was assessed by the Provincial Assessor of Laguna, for purposes of real estate taxes, on the real
properties owned by Cabuyao Waterworks. The respondent protested claiming it is exempted
from the payment of real estate taxes in view of the nature and kind of said property and
functions and activities of petitioner. The petitioner denied the protest arguing that such real
properties are subject to real estate tax because although said properties belong to the Republic
of the Philippines, the same holds it, not in its governmental, political or sovereign capacity, but
in a private, proprietary or patrimonial character, which, allegedly, is not covered by the
exemption contained in section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 470.

ISSUE: Are the real properties owned by the respondent public corporation subject to real estate
tax?

HELD: No. Republic Act No. 470 makes no distinction between property held in a sovereign,
governmental or political capacity and those possessed in a private, proprietary or patrimonial
character. And where the law does not distinguish neither may we, unless there are facts and
circumstances clearly showing that the lawmaker intended the contrary, but no such facts and
circumstances have been brought to our attention. Indeed, the noun "property" and the verb
"owned" used in said section 3(a) strongly suggest that the object of exemption is considered
more from the view point of dominion, than from that of domain.

Moreover, taxes are financial burdens imposed for the purpose of raising revenues with which to
defray the cost of the operation of the Government, and a tax on property of the Government,
whether national or local, would merely have the effect of taking money from one pocket to put
it in another pocket. Hence, it would not serve, in the final analysis, the main purpose of taxation.
What is more, it would tend to defeat it, on account of the paper work, time and consequently,
expenses it would entail.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos 261 SCRA 667 (1996)

Facts:
Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was created by virtue of R.A. 6958,
mandated to principally undertake the economical, efficient, and effective control, management,
and supervision of the Mactan International Airport and Lahug Airport, and such other airports as
may be established in Cebu.

Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from
payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its charter. However, on October 11,
1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer in Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
demanded payment from realty taxes in the total amount of P2229078.79. Petitioner objected to
such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified claiming in its favor the afore cited Section
14 of R.A. 6958. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing
governmental functions, citing Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 133. Common limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.

The exercise of the taxing powers of the provinces, cities, barangays, municipalities shall not
extend to the levi of the following:
xxx Taxes, fees or charges of any kind in the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and LGUs. xxx

Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioners realty tax account, insisting that the
MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been
withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of Labor Code that took effect on January 1, 1992.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a taxable person

Rulings:

Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. MCIAAs exemption from payment of taxes
is withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of Labor Code. Statutes granting tax exemptions
shall be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally construed in favor of the taxing
authority.

The petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under its Charter. It was only
exempted from the payment of realty taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax
is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except
real property tax.