Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v.

NLRC

Gr. No. L- 66006

Facts: The shipboard employment contract was executed in this country between Pancho and
Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation, the local agent of Golden Star Shipping. It was
approved by the defunct National Seamen Board. Pancho was hired as an oiler in the M/V
Olivine for 12 months with a gross monthly wage of US $195.

He had a cerebral stroke. He was rushed to the hospital while the vessel was docked at
Gothenberg, Sweden. He was repatriated to the Philippines and confined at the San
Juan de Dios Hospital and thereafter died

The National Seamen Board awarded his widow, Proserfina, P20,000 as disability
compensation benefits pursuant to the above-mentioned employment contract plus P2,000 as
attorney's fees. Proserfina appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which
awarded her $621 times 36 months or its equivalent in Philippine currency plus 10% of the
benefits as attorney's fees. Golden Star Shipping assailed that decision by certiorari.

Issue: whether or not the shipboard employment contract or Hongkong law should govern the
amount of death compensation due to the wife of Guillermo Pancho who was employed by
Golden Star Shipping, Ltd., a Hongkong based firm.

Held: We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract
provides that the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000 "over and above the
benefits" for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law.

Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the applicable law. The case of Norse
Management Co. vs. National Seamen Board, G. R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117
SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment
contract in that case that the workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in
accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the
vessel is registered "whichever is greater".

The Solicitor General opines that the employment contract should be applied. For that reason,
he refused to uphold the decision of the NLRC.

Bank of America v. C.A

Gr. No. 120135

Facts: Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua (Litonjuas, for brevity) filed a
Complaint[2] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig against the Bank of America NT&SA and
Bank of America International, Ltd. (defendant banks for brevity) alleging that: they were
engaged in the shipping business; they owned two vessels: Don Aurelio and El Champion,
through their wholly-owned corporations; they deposited their revenues from said business
together with other funds with the branches of said banks in the United Kingdom and Hongkong
up to 1979; with their business doing well, the defendant banks induced them to increase the
number of their ships in operation, offering them easy loans to acquire said vessels;[3] thereafter,
the defendant banks acquired, through their (Litonjuas) corporations as the borrowers: (a) El
Carrier[4]; (b) El General[5]; (c) El Challenger[6]; and (d) El Conqueror[7]; the vessels were
registered in the names of their corporations; the operation and the funds derived therefrom
were placed under the complete and exclusive control and disposition of the petitioners;[8] and
the possession the vessels was also placed by defendant banks in the hands of persons
selected and designated by them (defendant banks).[9]
The Litonjuas claimed that defendant banks as trustees did not fully render an account of all
the income derived from the operation of the vessels as well as of the proceeds of the
subsequent foreclosure sale;[10] because of the breach of their fiduciary duties and/or negligence
of the petitioners and/or the persons designated by them in the operation of private respondents
six vessels, the revenues derived from the operation of all the vessels declined drastically; the
loans acquired for the purchase of the four additional vessels then matured and remained
unpaid, prompting defendant banks to have all the six vessels, including the two vessels
originally owned by the private respondents, foreclosed and sold at public auction to answer for
the obligations incurred for and in behalf of the operation of the vessels; they (Litonjuas) lost
sizeable amounts of their own personal funds equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the acquisition
cost of the four vessels and were left with the unpaid balance of their loans with defendant
banks.[11] The Litonjuas prayed for the accounting of the revenues derived in the operation of the
six vessels and of the proceeds of the sale thereof at the foreclosure proceedings instituted by
petitioners; damages for breach of trust; exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Defendant banks filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of
cause of action against them.[13]
Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.
Held: No. The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning the forum is inconvenient,
emerged in private international law to deter the practice of global forum shopping, that is to
prevent non-resident litigants from choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for
malicious reasons, such as to secure procedural advantages,
to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly
venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so;
provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely
to have power to enforce its decision. Evidently, all these requisites are present in the instant
case.
Moreover, this Court enunciated in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals that the doctrine of forum non conveniensshould not be used as a ground for a motion
to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a
ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance; and that the propriety
of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.

Bellis v. Bellis

Gr. No. 23678

Facts: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States.".executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust,
in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely:
Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Issue: Whether or not renvoi doctrine applies.

Held: No. In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said
doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas
and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same
would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Borromeo v. Descallar

Gr. No. 159310

Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines. He met respondent Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz
Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of
additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in
Antoniettas residence at a squatters area in Gorordo Avenue.

Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house. Later, they
transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision,. In the Contracts to Sell
covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground
that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his
signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature as buyer
on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Then, respondent found a new
boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman. Jambrich supported respondents
sons for only two months after the break up.

Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the
real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. Jambrich purchased an
engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the
latter for. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to
petitioner by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." When petitioner sought to register the deed
of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of
respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated and the Deed of
Absolute Sale over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do
not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the
properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the
properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his favor.

Issue: (1) Whether or not Jambrich had acquired the disputed real property.

(2) Whether or not the registration vests ownership.

(3) Whether or not the subsequent sale to petitioner cures the defect.
Held: (1) No. The fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples
cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a
woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case,
respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such
an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each
of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be
able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do
not apply.

(2)No. It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It is only a

means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.22 Certificates of
title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner
of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in
her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on
indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the
title is quiet,23and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire
the subject properties for a valuable consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case.
Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no
income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then
fully supported by Jambrich.

(3) Yes. [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of
the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a
Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the
transferee is valid.

Cadalin vs. POEA

Gr. No. 104776.

Facts: Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant

AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to
1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in several countries in the
Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose In
1984 when their overseas employment contracts were terminated even before their
expiration.

The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the
complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain,
issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law
for the Private Sector. Where some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive
period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the foreign law should apply as to claimants benefits.

(2) Whether or not the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law

Held:

(1) Yes. NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII
themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein.

(2) The Philippine law should be applied. As a general rule, a foreign procedural law
will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder
of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of
the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may
be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given
such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes

irrelevant when the country of the forum has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the
practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A
borrowing statute directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds
of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not
run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section
provides:If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.In the light of the 1987
Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it
ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the
forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on
the protection to labor.
 Cheesman v. IAC

Gr. No. 74833

Facts: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on but have been
separated. A "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando
Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon in favor of "Criselda P.
Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, Thomas Cheesman,
although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.

Thereafterand again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest
by himtax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda
Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property,
leasing it to tenants. Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the
knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. The deed described Criselda as being" of legal
age, married to an American citizen,. . ."

Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance against his wife, Criselda, and
Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had
been executed without his knowledge and consent. 7

Issue: Whether or not a foreigner spouses consent is necessary to dispose a conjugal real
property of the wife.

Held: the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV
of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course,
charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot
in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property
by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In
any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the
same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative
of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would
then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution
does not permit him to have.
 Corpuz v. Sto Tomas
Gr. Mo. 186571

Facts: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce and was granted.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert
went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official
of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him
and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. The RTC denied
Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able
to remarry under Philippine law.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree

Held: No. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse. As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have
his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her
to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

However, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

Frank v. Insular Government

Gr. No. L-2935

Facts: Frank the defendant entered into a contract for a period of two years with the plaintiff in
the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, in the United States, the defendant, through a
respective of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,, by which the defendant was to
receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff,
and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the
said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel. The defendant
left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the
contract. Hence a complaint was filed, the defendant alleged in his special defense that he was
a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced against him.
Issue: Whether or not the contract may be enforced

Held: Yes. The record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of
Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had full authority to contract. Hence
The defendant being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract
was made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being
enforced.

Fujiki v. Marinay

Gr. No. 196049

Facts: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

Thereafter, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married also in the
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case
from its active civil docket. The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of
the said provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of the same which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition." Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and
not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. But the motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence this petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court

Held:

(1) No. Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
of Court is applicable. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the
investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment
of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the
purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims
and issues." Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
(2) Yes. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void.
For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry
of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

(3) Yes. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an

action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.

Hasegawa v. Kitamura
Gr. No, 149177

Facts: Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese

consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure
projects of foreign governments, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement
(ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in
the Philippines. The agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional
services to Nippon for a year. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project
manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines,
following the company's consultancy contract with the Philippine Government.[6]

When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000,
this time for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of the Bongabon-
Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.. Respondent was named as the project
manager.

On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its
International Division, informed respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up
to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on 2000, just in time for the ICA's
expiry.

Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a

negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI
project. Nippon insisted that respondents contract was for a fixed term that had already
expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.

As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent
consequently initiated for specific performance and damages with
the Regional Trial Court

For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and
executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of
respondent'sICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts
of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.[12]

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens.
Held: No. Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion
to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a
ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume
jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a
factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense.

HSBC v. Sherman

Gr. No. 72494

Facts: A complaint for collection of a sum of money was filed by petitioner Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as petitioner BANK) against
private respondents Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj,

It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (hereinafter
referred to as COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with, and was
granted by, the Singapore branch of petitioner BANK an overdraft facility in the
maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000.00 (which amount was subsequently
increased to Singapore dollars 375,000.00) with interest at 3% over petitioner BANK
prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility; as a security
for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by petitioner BANK to it through
the aforesaid overdraft facility

both private respondents and a certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors
of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of
petitioner BANK whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and
severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the
aforestated overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:

This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder
shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree
that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes
arising under this guarantee.
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded payment
of the obligation from private respondents, conformably with the provisions of the Joint
and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay,
petitioner BANK filed the above-mentioned complaint.

Issue: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit.

Held: Yes. While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and
that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very
essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all rights,
obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under
and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We
hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes
arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all
rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the
absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in
rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on
some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial. Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK at the outset, the instant case
presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined
to litigate before a foreign tribunal, with more reason as a defendant. However, in this
case, private respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by
them) who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in the
process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a
Philippine court try and resolve the case. Private respondents' stance is hardly
comprehensible, unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment
of a just obligation.

The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in
Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove,
that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or
expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action
here just to harass private respondents.

Moreover, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the
exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined
as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries
subject to certain exceptions.

Japan Airlines v. C.A.

Gr. No. 118664
Facts: Private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in San Francisco,
California bound for Manila.Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana,
Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila via JAL
flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an
overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the
following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the
night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went to the airport to
take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, unrelenting ashfall
blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering it inaccessible to airline
traffic. Hence, private respondents trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound
passengers and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. Much to
the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again cancelled
due to NAIAs indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it would
no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
Private respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from
their personal funds since then. Hence this suit for damages, JAL interpose the defense of force
majeure.
Issue: Whether or not JAL should be exempt from liability.
Held: Not absolutely. To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented
JAL from proceeding to Manila on schedule. Likewise, private respondents concede that such
event can be considered as force majeure since their delayed arrival in Manila was not
imputable to JAL.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because
of force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-
performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the
effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal
expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that
JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay.
We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any liability. It
must be noted that private respondents bought tickets from the United States with Manila as
their final destination. While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents living
expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to
make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available
connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and
convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from transit passengers
to new passengers as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the
necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. Private respondents were
placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. To assure themselves of a seat on an
available flight, they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it
was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date that they were advised that they could be
accommodated in said flight which flew at about 9:00 a.m. the next day.
Kalaw v. Hernandez

Gr. No. 166357

Facts: This case involves the motion for reconsideration for the dismissal of the petition
declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code filed by Tyrone. He
alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1) She leaves
the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2)
She leaves the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following
day; and 3) She committed adultery on in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw half-naked
in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a
Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological
incapacity. Dr. Gates explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder and
that it may have been evident even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family
background and upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated
to perform her marital duties. He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role
as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her
needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary.

Issue: Whether or not there is a psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.

Held: Yes. In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably,
the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and
was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families,
our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a
culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their
needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the
observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that
the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood
experience.

The psychologist need not personally examine the incapacitated spouse

The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the lack of personal examination and interview of
the person diagnosed with personality disorderdid not per se invalidate the findings of the
experts. There is no relaxation of the rules in this respect.

Muller v. Muller

Gr. No. 149615

Facts: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents
but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent.
However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was
purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not Helmut may be reimburse for the purchase of the disputed real property.

Held: No. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a
frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity
shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as
to the controversy in issue.

Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where
it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is
a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit
respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Norse Management Co. v. NSB

Gr. No. L-54204

Facts: Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo,
was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the
course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T.
"Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of
his death was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00 (Petition, page 5).

In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off allowances,
funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the
death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo
alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co.
(PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on
the law where the vessel is registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of
Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take
judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to
pay private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on
the Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case.

Issue: Whether or not the Singaporean law should apply

Held: Yes. In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse Management Co.
(PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex "C" of the Supplemental Complaint, it
was stipulated that:

In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his
employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring whilst on
board any vessel to which he may be assigned, but not any other time, the
EMPLOYER win provide employee with free medical attention, including hospital
treatment, also essential medical treatment in the course of repatriation and until
EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If such illness or injury incapacitates
the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as
determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided
such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or
misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and
subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the
Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of
the vessel whichever is greater. (Emphasis supplied)

In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon B.
Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of
petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was
offered P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case.

The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of Restituta C.

Abordo and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore Law, the National
Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law.

Northwest Airlines v. C.A.

Gr. No. 120337

Facts: The plaintiff, [Torres], allegedly on a special mission to purchase firearms for the
Philippine Senate, purchased a round trip ticket from defendant [Northwest] for his travel to
Chicago and back to Manila. Via defendant's flight, plaintiff left for United States.

After purchasing firearms and on the way back to Manila, plaintiff checked-in and presented
before defendant's representative his two identical baggage, one of which contained firearms.
Defendant's representative required the baggage to be opened and the supporting evidence to
be presented. Plaintiff showed them his authorization from the Philippine government and the
purchase receipts. Plaintiff thereafter sealed the baggage and defendant's representative
placed a red tag on the baggage with firearms with the marking "CONTAINS FIREARMS".

Upon arrival in Manila plaintiff was not able to claim one of his baggages. Plaintiff was informed
by defendant's representative that his baggage containing firearms was recalled back to
Chicago by defendant for US Customs verification.

After being advised of the arrival of his other baggage, plaintiff claimed and opened the
baggage in the presence of defendant's representative and found out that the firearms were
missing. On account of continuous refusal of defendant to settle amicably, plaintiff then prayed
before the trial court that defendant be ordered to pay actual damages, moral damages,
temperate damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees

After plaintiff had presented its evidence, defendant filed a "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of
Demurrer to the Evidence with Motion for Summary Judgment)" In said motion, defendant
moved for the "dismissal of the complaint in so far as it prays for moral, exemplary and
temperate damages and attorney's fees" and further moved for "summary judgment to be
rendered awarding the plaintiff $640.00 as actual damages." NORTHWEST argued in its motion
for summary judgment that the Warsaw Convention and the contract of carriage limited its
liability to US$640 and that the evidence presented by TORRES did not entitle him to moral,
exemplary, and temperate damages and attorney's fees.

Issue: Whether or not the Warsaw Convention applies.

Held: We agree with both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that NORTHWEST's liability
for actual damages may not be limited to that prescribed in Section 22(2) of the Warsaw
Convention. In Alitalia v.Intermediate Appellate Court, we held:
The [Warsaw] Convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an
airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Such a proposition is not
borne out by the language of the Convention, as this Court has now, and at an earlier time,
pointed out. Moreover, slight reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it should be deemed
a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or
destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended
by any willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of
any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or
extraordinary form of resulting injury. The Convention's provisions, in short, do not "regulate or
exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier" or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage.

Perez v. C.A

Gr. No. 118870

Facts: Petitioner Nerissa Perez (mother) filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent,
Ray Perez to surrender the custody of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of
the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code.

Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and awarded
custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over
the child even under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boys father would be
for the childs best interest and welfare.

Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.

Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that No child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefore.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the child is to be given to the father.

Held: No. The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of age to
their mother was explained by the Code Commission: The general rule is recommended in
order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man
can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child; those
cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in
cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will
ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. The Family Code, in reverting
to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old should not be separated
from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of
the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) which reduced the childs age
to five years.

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

139 SCRA 159

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married. After about three and a half years of
marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany which was granted. more than five months after the
issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the
City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983".

Issue: Whether or not private respondent may sue petitioner for adultery.

Held: No. private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.

Republic v. Iyoy
Gr. No. 152577

Facts: Respondent Crasus married Fely, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of
America (U.S.A.), and barely a year; Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter
from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; Crasus eventually found out that
Fely married Stephen Micklus Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Felys subsequent
marriage.The Court of Appeals in deciding this case sided with Fely. Fely filed her Answer and
Counterclaim with the. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen and was
now married to Stephen Micklus.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree is recognized in the Philippines.

Held: No. Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to
the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been
an American citizen. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
Republic v. Miller
 Gr. No. 125932
Facts: Spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, both American Citizens, filed with the
RTC of Angeles City a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Madayag. The DSWD
recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents were
morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to
the minors best interest and welfare. The trial court rendered decision granting the petition for
adoption. In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to
the CA which certified the case to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
Issue: whether or not the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition
under the family code, effective August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July
29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to
adopt.
Held: The Supreme Court held that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right
which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. The
enactment of the Family Code will not impair the right of the respondents who are aliens to
adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for
adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force.
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the
time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the
Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to
adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for
adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force.

Republic v. Orbecido

Gr. No. 154380

Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the Philippines, iprianos wife
left for the United States, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not respondent can remarry.

Held: Yes, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating

him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.

Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. C.A.

Gr. No. 104685

Facts: Plaintiff was a passenger of defendant airline originating from Casablanca to Brussels,
Belgium on her way back to Manila. Plaintiff checked in her luggage which contained her
valuables, She stayed overnight in Brussels and her luggage was left on board Flight SN 284.

Plaintiff arrived at Manila International Airport and immediately submitted her tag to facilitate the
release of her luggage hut the luggage was missing. She was advised to accomplish and submit
a property Irregularity Report which she submitted and filed on the same day. She followed up
her claim but the luggage remained to be missing. She then filed her formal complaint with the
office of Ferge Massed, defendants Local Manager, demanding immediate attention. At the time
of the filling of the complaint, the luggage with its content has not been found. Plaintiff
demanded from the defendant the money value of the luggage and its contents amounting to
$4,265.00 or its exchange value, but defendant refused to settle the claim.

Petitioner airline company, in contending that the alleged negligence of private respondent
should be considered the primary cause for the loss of her luggage, avers that, despite her
awareness that the flight ticket had been confirmed only for Casablanca and Brussels, and that
her flight from Brussels to Manila had yet to be confirmed, she did not retrieve the luggage upon
arrival in Brussels. Petitioner insists that private respondent, being a seasoned international
traveler, must have likewise been familiar with the standard provisions contained in her flight
ticket that items of value are required to be hand-carried by the passenger and that the liability
of the airline or loss, delay or damage to baggage would be limited, in any event, to only
US$20.00 per kilo unless a higher value is declared in advance and corresponding additional
charges are paid thereon. At the Casablanca International Airport, private respondent, in
checking in her luggage, evidently did not declare its contents or value. Petitioner cites Section
5(c), Article IX, of the General Conditions of Carriage, signed at Warsaw, Poland, on 02 October
1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955, generally observed by International carriers,
Issue: Whether or not the Warsaw Convention should be applied as to the liability.

Held: No. The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances
of an airlines liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Such a proposition is
not borne out by the language of the Convention, as this Court has now, and at an earlier time,
pointed out. Moreover, slight reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it should be deemed
a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person, or
destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended
by any willful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness or otherwise improper conduct on the part of
any official or employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or
extraordinary form of resulting injury. The Contentions provisions, in short, do not regulate or
exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Otherwise, an air carrier
would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in bad faith,
to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd. Nor may it for a moment be supposed
that if a member of the aircraft complement should inflict some physical injury on a passenger,
or maliciously destroy or damage the latters property, the Convention might successfully be
pleaded as the sole gauge to determine the carriers liability to the passenger. Neither may the
Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to
a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. It is in
this sense that the Convention has been applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts
presented by each case.

Sameer Overseas v. Cabiles

G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014

Fact: Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan to
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a one-year employment
contract. She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement
fee of P70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract Joy was deployed to work
for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) agreed to work as quality control for one year but
she was asked to work as a cutter.

Barely one (1) month thereafter a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for immediate
repatriation. She was repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her
termination

Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner
and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed She identified Wacoal as
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys foreign principal.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to
her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her failure to comply with the work
requirements.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Joys complaint. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mere allegations. Upon appeal the
National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was illegally dismissed and
awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of salary in accordance with R.A
10022 section 10. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal hence this petition.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not there is a violation of due process and respondent cabiles was
illegally dismissed.
(2) Whether or not the award given by the appellate court affirming the decision of
the NLRC is correct.

Held:

(1) Yes. The abrupt dismissal of respondent by Wacoal manifest violation of the two
notice rule (One of the written notices must inform the employee of the
particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. The other notice must
[inform] the employee of the employers decision).
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in
a different jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we
follow the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract is made). In the case at bar there was no proof that would suffice a just
cause to dismiss respondent as enumerated in Article 282 of the labor
code(memorize). And even if it does, to show that dismissal resulting from
inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set
standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been
communicated to the employee; and 3) the communication was made at a
reasonable time prior to the employees performance assessment. Which was
lacking as to this case.
 (2) No. The law passed (R.A 10022) incorporates the exact clause already declared
as unconstitutional (R.A 8042) without any perceived substantial change in the
circumstances.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services and Marlow Navigation Co. Inc.,58 the
Court, in an En Banc Decision, declared unconstitutional the clause of R.A 8042
or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less and
awarded the entire unexpired portion of the employment contract to the overseas
Filipino worker. A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not
a law. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The reinstated
clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law meant to protect them makes
violation of rights easier and simply benign to the violator
Thus respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of
her contract

NOTE: the unconstitutionality of section 10 of R.A 8042 is discussed in Serrano v.

Gallant Maritime Services and Marlow Navigation Co. Inc.,

Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines

Gr. No. 101539

Facts: The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Northwest
Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and
licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. Petitioner purchased
from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to
Manila via Tokyo and back. No date was specified for his return to San Francisco.

On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco
airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He
therefore had to be wait-listed. The petitioner sued NOA for damages in the Regional Trial
Court. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. it contended
that the complaint could be instituted only in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
before:

1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;

2. the court of its principal place of business;

3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been
made;

4. the court of the place of destination.

Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction.

Held: It has non. The court end up resolving whether the issue involves an issue of jurisdiction
or venue in favor of the former by interpreting the Warsaw Convention. The place of destination,
within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of
carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier.
Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco.
Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties
indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila

The petitioner argues that the Warsaw Convention was originally written in French and that in
interpreting its provisions, American courts have taken the broad view that the French legal
meaning must govern. In French, he says, the "domicile" of the carrier means every place
where it has a branch office.

Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is allowed to
be filed under Article 28(1). By specifying the three other places, to wit, the principal place of
business of the carrier, its place of business where the contract was made, and the place of
destination, the article clearly meant that these three other places were not comprehended in
the term "domicile."

The petitioner alleges that the gravamen of the complaint is that private respondent acted
arbitrarily and in bad faith, discriminated against the petitioner, and committed a willful
misconduct because it canceled his confirmed reservation and gave his reserved seat to
someone who had no better right to it. In short. the private respondent committed a tort.

Such allegation, he submits, removes the present case from the coverage of the Warsaw
Convention. He argues that in at least two American cases, 21 it was held that Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention does not apply if the action is based on tort.

The private respondent correctly contends that the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a
tort is insufficient to exclude the case from the comprehension of the Warsaw Convention. The
petitioner has apparently misconstrued the import of Article 25(l) of the Convention, which reads
as follows:

Art. 25 (1). The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this Convention which exclude or limit his liability. if the damage is caused by his
willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of
the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful
misconduct.

It is understood under this article that the court called upon to determine the applicability of the
limitation provision must first be vested with the appropriate jurisdiction. Article 28(1) is the
provision in the Convention which defines that jurisdiction. Article 22 23 merely fixes the
monetary ceiling for the liability of the carrier in cases covered by the Convention. If the carrier
is indeed guilty of willful misconduct, it can avail itself of the limitations set forth in this article.
But this can be done only if the action has first been commenced properly under the rules on
jurisdiction set forth in Article 28(1).

Saudi Arabia Airlines v. C.A

 Gr. No. 122191

Facts: Herein private respondent Milagros P. Morada is a flight attendant for

petitioner SAUDIA airlines, where the former was tried to be raped by Thamer and Allah
AlGazzawi, both Sauidi nationals and fellow crew member, after a night of dancing in
their hotel while in Jakarta, Indonesia. She was rescued. After two weeks of detention
the accused were both deported to Saudi and they were reinstated by Saudia. She was
pressured by police officers to make a statement and to drop the case against the
accused; in return she will then be allowed to return to Manila and retrieved her
passport. For the second time, she was asked by her superiors to again appear before
the Saudi court. Without her knowledge, she was already tried by Saudi court together
with the accused and was sentenced to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes in
connection with Jakarta rape incident. The court found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and
(3)socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. Morada filed a
Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country
manager. On the other hand, Defendant t herein petitioner assails that : (1) that the
Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not
a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to try the case

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: The Philippine Court has jurisdiction. Weighing the relative claims of the parties,
the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take
cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer
maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.Similarly, the trial court also
possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint
and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the court.

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the
dismissal of Moradas Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
Abundante Cautelam. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that
SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial Courts jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

The Court Citing the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos When the appearance is by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it
must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If
his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance
by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person will be held to be a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for
example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or
point of contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines
could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took
place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed
that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with
justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect
her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is
of no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the
fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it
is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.

United Airlines v. Uy.

Gr. No. 127768

Facts: Respondent Willie J. Uy, a revenue passenger on United Airlines for the San Francisco -
Manila route, checked in together with his luggage one piece of which was found to be
overweight at the airline counter. Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2)
causes of action: (a) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's
employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social
humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects amounting
to US $5,310.00.
United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondents cause of action
had prescribed, invoking Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention which provides -
Art. 29 (1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within two (2)
years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft
ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the transportation stopped.

(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court
to which the case is submitted.

Issue: Whether or not the Action has prescribed.

Held: No. Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, we have ruled that the
Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the
carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of
damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary
sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by
said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of
the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from
liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage,
especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established.[18]
Consequently, insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's failure to file
his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention does not bar his action
since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code
which prescribe a different period or procedure for instituting the action, specifically, Art. 1146
thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action based on torts.
As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories of the
Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year limitation
incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various
tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our own
rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local
laws determine whether an action had been commenced within the two (2)-year period, and
within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a
complaint. Since it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-
year time frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted
that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to petitioner, even employed the
services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims, and that the filing of the action itself was
delayed because of petitioner's evasion.
We (the Court) rule upon the circumstances brought before us. Verily, respondent filed his
complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the
Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for damages. However, it is obvious that respondent was
forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround,
answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already
filed an action at the first instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the same could
only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be
faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action
for damages should be filed within two (2) years from the arrival at the place of destination, such
rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by
petitioner airline itself. Thus, private respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered
as time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention.
 United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian

Gr. No, L-34672

Facts: David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a resident of the Philippines for
more than thirty years and up to the time of his death. He left a will in which he "devised and
bequeathed" to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the
Tagdangua Plantation Co., inc. which was incorporated under Philippine law. In Special
Proceeding of the Court of First Instance, Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian disallowed the above-
described legacy on the ground that it was in effect an alienation of private agricultural land in
favor of a transferee which was not qualified under the Constitution of 1935. The finding was
that the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was owned by the United Church Board for World
Ministries (UCBWM) ,the herein petitioner, which was a non-stock corporation organized in the
United States by virtue of a charter granted by the state legislature of Massachussets .

It now appears from the voluminous documents submitted in this case that at the time the will
was executed in 1966, the land on which the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was situated was
already registered in the name of the Mindanao District Conference, an affiliate of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines (PUCC). It was this non-stock corporation, organized in 1949
under Philippine law with a 100% Filipino membership, that owned and was operating the
Hospital at the time of Jacobson's death. Later, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was itself
incorporated as a charitable institution, with Filipinos constituting the majority of its
membership, and on December 16,1970, became the successor-in-interest of the UCCP to the
devised parcel of land.

Issue: Whether or not the sale is invalid.

Held: Yes. Parenthetically, it should be observed, in fairness to Judge Sebastian, that he was
unaware of these circumstances when he declared the legacy invalid to enforce the nationalistic
provisions of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. For his vigilance in the protection of the
national patrimony, he should be, as he is hereby, commenced.

Even on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the owner of the Hospital at the time of the
effectivity of the will and that the devise was for that reason unenforceable, the defect in the will
should be deemed rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property to the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital, Inc. Our consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

Van Dorn v. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States; were married in Hongkong. They established their
residence in the Philippines,the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent may complaint will prosper.

Held: No. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.

Zalamea v. C.A

Gr. No. 104235

Facts: Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana
Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld
Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said
flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than
the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of
passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the
flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were
listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22
names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar
Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not
able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed
passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to
board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied
boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding
his daughter's full-fare ticket.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in
another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred
Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: Whether or not overbooking amounts to bad faith

Held: Yes. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith,
entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of
bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage
even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have
incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its
passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or
would have the choice to ride with another airline.

Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving
less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and
held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before
departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted
tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.

It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of
boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith.
But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not
said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage.
Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present
any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked
condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It
is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its
agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any
qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done
so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts
to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners
under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes
respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in
similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as
well.