DOLINA V.

VALLECERA To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is
GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010] based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if
he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The childs remedy is
DOCTRINE: to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is
beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to
support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation. Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file
an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.
FACTS:

G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012

In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro
forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such prayer ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner,
on the latters certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera s employer, to withhold from his pay such vs.
amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.

Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for financial support DECISION
rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the childs father and that
the signature in the birth certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is a harassment suit DEL CASTILLO, J.:
intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial support.
"An order for x x x support x x x must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
RTC dismissed petition. convincing evidence."1

ISSUE: Facts:

Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied her Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively respondents), filed
application for temporary support for her child? before the RTC a Complaint6 for support against Antonio.

HELD: They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for
two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November 11, 1983. However, when
Yes. Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son.
Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy.
RATIO:

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under
which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse
or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a
protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.
She presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth 17 and Baptismal Certificate18 indicating her and Antonio
as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates.19 Antonio supplied his name and birthplace after Erlinda Balmori (Erlinda), the "hilot" who
assisted in Mirasols delivery of Randy, went to his house to solicit the said information. 20Mirasol also
claimed that it was Erlinda who supplied the date and place of marriage of the parents so that the
latter can file the birth certificate. 21 Mirasol likewise confirmed that she is the same "Mirasol Perla"
who signed as the informant therein.22
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 7 Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his own, denied
having fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he averred that she never
became his common-law wife nor was she treated as such. Antonio admitted having sexual
intercourse with Mirasol in February and August 33 of 1981.34 When shown with Randys Certificate of
Live Birth and asked whether he had a hand in the preparation of the same, Antonio answered in the
negative.35
Anent Randys Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio testified as to several inaccuracies in the entries
thereon. According to him, his middle initial is "E" and not "A" as appearing in the said certificate of
live birth.42 Also, he is not a protestant and a laborer as indicated in said certificate. 43 Antonio likewise
alleged that Mirasol only made up the entries with respect to their marriage on October 28, 1981. 44
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision49 dated February 26, 2003 ordering Antonio to support Randy.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld Randys illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies
of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying Antonio as his father. According to
the appellate court, while these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they are proofs that
Antonio is the known, imputed and identified father of Randy.
Issue: WON, Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio has been established
HELD:
It is clear that respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the
order for Antonio to support Randy has no basis.
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.
The Certificate of Live Birth of Randy presented by respondents identifying Antonio as the has no
probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. 60 It is
settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of said certificate."61
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their first
encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and
promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during
his one-week stay in her place, cannot be considered as indications of Randys open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172(1).
"[T]o prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity.1wphi1 Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations
in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously." 62
Anent Randys baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of
Antonios paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed
father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to prove
paternity.65 And "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve
as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x x x baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same."66
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 31,
2005 and Resolution dated May 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79312 are
REVERSED and SER ASIDE and the Decision dated February 26, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 96-3952 is VACATED. A new one is entered DISMISSING the
Complaint for Support filed by Mirasol Baring and Randy Perla against Antonio Perla.
CARAM vs Segui, G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
TOPIC: Writ of amparo
FACTS:
Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became
pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina
mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete
the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and
Moon Home for Children in Paraaque City.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical
Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13,
2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the
DSWD.
 On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as Legally
Available for Adoption. On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was matched with Spouses Medina and officers never concealed Baby Julians whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWDs
supervised trial custody was then commenced.
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to
the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julians adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted
her family back together.
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD
Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for
adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed
of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a
ward of the State.
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the
RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child.
HELD:
The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was
no enforced disappearance in this case.
As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she
filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no
enforced disappearance as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements
are missing.
Christinas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites
to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting
her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody
and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
G.R. No. 206248 : February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone
else.Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors.
The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the
children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande
left for the United States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition
for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the
name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live
Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the
minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to
immediately surrender the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial
court.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the
mother over her illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and
the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in
their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering
Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes
consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD: The petition is partially granted
CIVIL LAW Filation
Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute
an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the
two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande
to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's
surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father
or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law
the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to
mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents
position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may"
is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, vs. DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent. G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUMMARY: Mother of two seeks spousal and child support from rich husband.
FACTS: On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC. In her prayer for support pendente lite for
herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of Php500,000 as monthly support, citing
respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here
and abroad.
After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the
time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus
also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7months that lapsed).
Respondent filed an Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and
respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well- being in accordance
with familys social and financial standing.
As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the
P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment
of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent. The Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. His second motion also having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA. CA nullified RTCs ruling and changed the amount to P115,000.00.
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses
incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of
tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books,
which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as
well, and thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total
support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It also noted the lack of
contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. Petitioner
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total
support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children.
DECISION:
The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. As a matter of law, the amount of
support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each
other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.
Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Upon
receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu
proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendent lite prior to the rendition of the judgment or final order. Because
of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that affidavits or
other documentary evidence appearing in the record establish the facts. In this case, the amount of
monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was determined after due hearing
and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court
was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite of Php115,000.000 ordered
by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food,
clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses. Petitioners testimony
also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and medicine. As to financial capacity of
the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence, education,
transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his. The Family Court may direct
the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent. Since the amount of the
monthly support pendent lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness.
The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
The amounts already extended to the two children; being a commendable act of petitioner, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
Facts: Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling became a couple in in the last week of January 1993. They
started intimate sexual relations sometime in September 1993. By August 1994 Divina found out she
was pregnant. The couple made plans to marry but later on Charles backed out of the wedding plan.
Divina filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. This was
later on amicably settled.
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 1995. Charles failed to show up and support the child. Divina
sent him a demand letter on July 1995 demanding recognition and support. When Charles did not
answer, she filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. Charles denied
the imputed paternity.
RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation. It found the
respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the
petitioner, i.e., September 1993 in her direct testimony while last week of January 1993 during her
cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the
petitioners initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of support
pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P 10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
CA departed from the RTCs appreciation of the respondents testimony, concluding that the latter
merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioners counsel. It
noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that
the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that
the petitioners allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men remained
unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to
recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child
support.
Issue: WON CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC appreciation of the respondents
testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
Decision: SC affirmed CA.
The burden of proof in paternity cases is on the person alleging. Divina established prima facie case
against Charles through her testimony, corroborated by Charles uncle (dorm owner), that shes only
been involved with one man at the time of conception. Charles did not deny his sexual relations with
her, only that it occurred at a later date.
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. We have held that such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate,
a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. 35 We explained that a
prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had
sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2)
that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
Facts: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to to annul and set aside the Decision of
the CA.
Petitioner (lives in QC) filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura B.
Abad with the RTC. Abad alleged that he is the nephew of Maura. He averred that Maura (living in
Pagansinan), who is single, more than 90 years old is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her
and her business affairs. Due to her advanced age, Maura is alreadly sickly and can no longer manage
to take care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and
exploitation.
Since no opposition at that time, RTC heard the case ex parte. When the case was to be submitted for
decision, Leonardo Biason filed a motion for leave to file opposition.
Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of the pendency of the
Petition for the appointment of the latters guardian. He opposed the appointment of Eduardo Abad
as Mauras guardian as he cannot possibly perform he duties as such since he reside in QC while
Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as
Mauras guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage
her properties.
RTC ruled in favor of Biason as the latter is in a better position to be Mauras guardian.
Abad appeal the case to the CA and contended that he has all the qualifications under the Rules to be
the guardian of Maura. That he was not a resident of Pangasinan should not be a ground for his
disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and properties of his aunt even
if he is residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura to be her guardian.
CA affirmed RTCs Decision.
Issue: Whether Eduardo Abad should be the legal guardian of Maura?
Decision:
No. Circumstances in this case showed, that while the case was pending in SC, Biason died. Thus,
making the issue moot and academic.
Maura also filed an intervention in this case to terminating the guardianship and that she is of sound
mind and that she can competently manage her business affairs.
Ma. Carmina Calderon, petitioner v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, respondents
G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Topic: Persons, Support pendente lite
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were
married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998,
petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The trial court issued an Order granting petitioners application for support pendente lite.
respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support. The trial court rendered its Decision declaring null and
void the marriage, awarding the custody of the parties minor children to their mother, ordering the
respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide support to the children, and dissolving the community
property or conjugal partnership property of the parties. Petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of
Appeal from the Orders.
Issue:
Was it a proper petition to assail the order of support pendent lite?
Ruling:
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears,
as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the
case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the ground of
psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which may be
availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional
Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These include
orders for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection
and administration of common property.
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the
assailed orders pertains only to private respondents motion to reduce support which was granted,
and to her own motion to increase support, which was denied.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action
which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein
pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are
provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action,
and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the
main action. The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the
main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.