GARIN, Diana M.

201680075
Criminal Procedure
Atty. Salvador S. Panelo

Homar v. People
768 SCRA 584
September 2, 2015

Facts:

The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. PO1 Eric Tan was the lone witness for the prosecution. As stated in
the RTC decision, he testified that in the evening of apprehension, their Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C.
Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas
Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a No
Jaywalking portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the
pedestrian crossing area.

The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the
recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioners body and found
and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu.

The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy were presumed to have
performed their duties regularly in arresting and conducting a search on the petitioner.

The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTCs findings.

Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest

Held:

The petition is meritorious. The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the
search conducted on the petitioners body.

To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or
not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. There must be a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For this
purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions when a
person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. In the present case, the respondent alleged that the
petitioners warrantless arrest was due to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the
presence of Tan and Tangcoy. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence of or within
the view of the arresting officer.
On this point, we find that aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA in its decision, the
prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the requirements for a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly, the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was
committing a crime. The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly
crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place not
designated for crossing. Aside from this conclusion, the respondent failed to prove that the portion of
Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a no jaywalking area. The petitioner was also
not charged of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have supported the conclusion that
indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the subsequent arrest and
search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to prove this in the present case.

In the light of the discussion above, the respondents argument that there was a lawful search incident to a
lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking appears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless
search conducted on the person of the petitioner. In fact, the illegality of the search for the shabu is further
highlighted when it was not recovered immediately after the alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but
only after the initial search resulted in the recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according to Tan, Tangcoy
conducted another search on the person of the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of
the shabu. Clearly, the petitioners right to be secure in his person was callously brushed aside twice by
the arresting police officers.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
GARIN, Diana M.
201680075
Criminal Procedure
Atty. Salvador S. Panelo

PEOPLE v. LUGNASIN
785 SCRA 120
February 24, 2016

Facts:

The Department of Justice filed an information against the respondents for the crime of kidnapping for
ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. When arraigned, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The prosecutions lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he was abducted while opening
the garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue in the late evening of April 20, 1999 by three armed
men. He identified Devincio Guerrero as the man with a 38 cal. revolver who came from his left side and
pushed him inside the car. The man who came from his right side and identified later as Tito Lugnasin
drove the car with Elmer Madrid riding at the back. After divesting him of his P5,000.00 cash and asking
some questions, he realized he was being kidnapped for ransom. Repeatedly, he declared that he was not a
rich man. Along Libis, another cohort, Celso Lugnasin, rode with them until they reached the South
Superhi[gh]way and after paying the toll fee, they drove on for about fifteen minutes and stopped just
behind an owner-type jeepney before they switched places. The jeepney driver introduced himself as
Commander and drove the car. [Cordero] saw Commanders face. He was later identified as Vicente
Lugnasin. After driving for some minutes more, they alighted, [Corderos] abductors placed the cars
sunvisor around his face and ordered him to walk barefooted towards a small house. [Cordero] was kept
there for four days, while they negotiated with Saleena, his sister-in-law for the ransom money. On the
fourth day, Commander was already angry and threatened to finish him off. He was eventually released,
without ransom money being paid.

RTC found the accuseds-appellantsguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the accused-appellants conviction.

As regards accused-appellant Devincios argument that his warrantless arrest was illegal since it did not
fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended, the Court of Appeals held that
accused-appellant Devincios right to question his arrest and subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation
is deemed waived due to his failure to raise such argument before his arraignment.

Issue: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in not finding the warrantless arrest illegal

Held: This Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the assailed judgment of conviction.

An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move
for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Accused-appellant
Devincio insists that his warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible warrantless
arrests enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. This being the case, accused-appellant
Devincio says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgment over his person. He also claims that there
was no showing that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at the time of his arrest.

As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio raised none of these
issues anytime during the course of his trial. These issues were raised for the first time on appeal before
the Court of Appeals.

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates
that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect
in his arrest. The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who failed
to raise their allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial and posited their
defenses without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are deemed to have
waived their right to question their arrests.