As the India-China border standoff worsens, words of wisdom: Get over 1962

In Ian Flemings Goldfinger, James Bond famously said: Once is happenstance, twice is
coincidence, and third time is enemy action.
For the first time since 1967, when their armies fought a short but brutal war, there are serious
tensions between China and India on the Sikkim border. The stand-off began early in June, days
ahead of prime minister Narendra Modis meeting with Chinese premier Xi Jinping in Astana,
and hit the headlines ahead of his US visit. This does not seem to be mere coincidencea clear
pattern is now emerging. Whether it is the Indian side that has provoked the flare-up or the
Chinese side doesnt matter much. The Indian public believes it is China that is ratcheting up the
tensions. The Chinese public thinks it is India. In the new world of mass and instant
communication, perceptions are the truth. In the new world of mass and instant
communication, perceptions are the truth.
However, some light is peeping out from under the closed doors of the two militaries. At the
farthest tip of the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan, the Chinese are building a road
over the Doklam plains, in an area that is supposedly under Bhutans control but over which
China has laid claim. Our military believes that Chinas presence here will seriously threaten
Indian concentrations and communications. It doesnt help much that the Chumbi Valley appears
on the map like a dagger poised not only to rend asunder Sikkim and Bhutan, but also Assam and
the northeast from the rest of India.
So, the Indian Army wants to position itself to challenge the Peoples Liberation Armys
dominance from the Doko-La or Doklam pass. There is nothing wrong in this, considering India
and Bhutan have military ties. Clearly, the two biggest armies in Asia are jockeying for positions
of advantage. This is natural when there are huge concentrations of troops standing cheek by jowl,
and trust is low between the two governments.
More than 40 years after Sikkim formally became a part of India in 1975, China has still not
unequivocally accepted the state as an integral part of India. The two countries are also in dispute
over the territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Despite assurances by former Chinese
prime minister Wen Jiabao in 2005 that Sikkim was no longer an issue in bilateral relations,
many Chinese maps continue to show the Northeastern state as not part of India.

Reality check

Beijings deliberate ambiguity on Sikkim seems to stem from the belief that this could give China
leverage over India in border talks. From the Indian perspective, whether China accepts its
sovereignty over Sikkim is mootthe state is formally a part of the Indian republic, its accession
ratified by a referendum. In this day, with both countries having strong militaries, it would be
wise to forget such old notions and deal with realities.
There are also several other misconceptions between the two countries. Some Chinese experts
claimed the latest standoff showed that India was yet to recover from its embarrassing defeat in
the 1962 war with China, in the backdrop of the growing competition for influence and hostility
between the two countries. Despite their growing economic and trade relations, both sides are
deeply distrustful of each other. According to Beijing, India is playing an active role in forging an
anti-China coalition with the US, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam to counter Beijings diplomatic,
economic, and military assertiveness. Indias conspicuous absence from the Belt and Road
summit in Beijing in May is cited by the Chinese media as further evidence of strained relations
between the two countries.
Once again, there is need of a reality check. The 1962 war was 55 long years ago. As was 1911-12,
when the Tibetans drove the Chinese out of their country, bringing about the downfall of the Qing
Empire. At that time, Chinese troops escaped to India through Nathu La, in present-day Sikkim.
So, by that logic, was the 1962 war waged to avenge Chinas earlier humiliation? These are
ridiculous notions. Much water has flowed under the bridge in the intervening years. As finance
minister Arun Jaitley said last week, amid the growing conflict between the two countries in the
areas near Sikkim, India today is very different from the India in 1962. This, of course, was met by
a retort from Beijing on Monday that China, too, is different from what it was in 1962. In todays
India, innocence and hope have been replaced by a new realism. Chinese experts who hark back
to 1962 are somewhat short of understanding.
India has no role to play in forging any alliance of the US, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam. That is
just a Western wish. We know what is and is not in our intereststhe US, Japan, and Australia
are separated from China by vast oceans and enjoy a sense of security that India (and Vietnam)
cannot. If India knows anything, it is that it stands alone. Both the Asian countries have
large land borders with China and will feel the immediate consequences of an armed conflict. The
US and Japan are too closely economically integrated with China to be taken as credible allies by
India. If India knows anything, it is that it stands alone.
India did not take part in the OBOR summit because there is nothing of interest to it in the
project. When China makes a proposal that will incorporate India into its worldview, India will
respond suitably. Otherwise India has no intention of paying court to the Emperor Far Away.
The fates of India and China in a world of rapid economic, technological and social change are
inextricably linked. In the next two decades, the two countries GDP will exceed that of the G-7
countries. A major global power shift is underway. India and China must wake up to this reality
instead of living out the childish fantasies of their half-baked and under-educated strategic
experts. I think there is a belated realisation of this in China now. The greater economic
integration of India and China is the best hope for the long-term growth of both countries. Lets
hope better sense prevails.

India-China War of 1962: How it started and what

happened later
On the 54th anniversary of the end of Sino-Indian War of 1962, here are some facts on how the war started and what all happened in the
war.

India never suspected that China would ever launch an attack, but it did. India was attacked on October 20, 1962 in what famously came
to be known as Sino-India war of 1962. The belief of not ever being attacked by China did not let the Indian army prepare and the result
was the standoff between 10,000-20,000 Indian troops and 80,000 Chinese troops. The war continued for about a month and ended on
November 21, 54 years ago, after China declared a ceasefire.

On the 54th anniversary of the end of Sino-Indian War, let us take you through a timeline regarding how the war began and all
that took place during its course:

How did it start?

With the independence of the Republic of India and the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the year 1949, one
of the policies for the Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China

When China announced that it would be occupying Tibet, India sent a letter of protest proposing negotiations on the Tibet issue.
China was even more active in deploying troops on the Aksai Chin border than any other Indian republic was

India was so concerned about its relations with China that it did not even attend a conference for the conclusion of a peace
treaty with Japan because China was not invited. India even strove to become China's representative in matters related to world
since China had been isolated from many issues

In 1954, China and India concluded the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, under which, India acknowledged Chinese rule
in Tibet. It was at this time when former Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru promoted the slogan "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai"

In July 1954, Nehru wrote a memo directing a revision in the maps of India to show definite boundaries on all frontiers; however,
Chinese maps showed some 120,000 square kilometres of Indian territory as Chinese. On being questioned, Zhou Enlai, the
first Premier of People's Republic of China, responded that there were errors in the maps

Top People's Republic of China leader, Mao Zedong felt humiliated by the reception Dalai Lama obtained in India when he fled
there in March 1959. Tensions increased between the two nations when Mao stated that the Lhasa rebellion in Tibet was
caused by Indians

China's perception of India as a threat to its rule of Tibet became one of the most prominent reasons for the Sino-Indian War

Various conflicts and military incidents between India and China flared up throughout the summer of 1962
 On July 10, 1962, around 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian post at Chushul and used loudspeakers to convince the
Gurkhas that they should not be fighting for India

In October 1959, India realised that it was not ready for war after a clash between the two armies at Kongka Pass, in which nine
Indian policemen were killed; the country assumed responsibility for the border and pulled back patrols from disputed areas

Facts on the war:

On October 20, 1962, China's People's Liberation Army invaded India in Ladakh, and across the McMahon Line in the then
North-East Frontier Agency

Till the start of the war, the Indian side was confident that war would not be started and made little preparations. Thinking this,
India deployed only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict, while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned

The Chinese also cut Indian telephone lines, preventing the defenders from making contact with their headquarters

On the first day, the Chinese infantry also launched an attack from the rear. The continued losses forced the Indian troops to
escape to Bhutan

On October 22, the Chinese lighted a bush which caused a lot of confusion among the Indians. Some 400 Chinese troops
attacked the Indian position. The initial Chinese assault was stopped by accurate Indian mortar fire

When the Indian army discovered that a Chinese force gathered in a pass, it opened fire with mortars and machine guns and
killed about 200 Chinese soldiers

On October 26, a patrol from the 4th Sikhs was encircled, and after they were unable to break the encirclement, an Indian unit
sneaked in and attacked the Chinese army and freed the Sikhs

According to China's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in its western sector.

Sikkim impasse: What is the India-China-

Bhutan border standoff?
Sikkim impasse: Indian officials have said that the road construction efforts by the Chinese PLA are aimed at
getting closer to Doka La, the last Indian military post on its border with Bhutan and China.

What is the present controversy around the India-China-Bhutan standoff?

In June this year, India accused China of constructing a road in the disputed territory towards Doklam plateau, an objection that the Royal
Bhutanese Army has also raised. India intervened in the crisis supporting Bhutans stand and asking China to halt its construction work. China
claims Doklam plateau, an 89 sq km pasture that falls close to Chumbi valley at the corner of India-Bhutan-China tri-junction and is not very
far from the Sikkim sector.
PTI, quoting sources, subsequently reported that Chinese troops asked India to remove two bunkers that were set up in 2012 at Lalten in
Doklam plateau. The two bunkers were reportedly positioned by the Indian Army as a backup option. Later, sources told PTI, that the two
bunkers were destroyed by the two Chinese bulldozers on the night of June 6 after China stated that neither India nor Bhutan had any claim
over the region.
Soon, there was a standoff between troops of both countries with PLA and Indian Army sending immediate reinforcements to the region. At a
flag meeting later, China asked Indian troops to withdraw from the Doklam region. In the aftermath of the standoff, China refused to allow the
entry of Kailash Mansarovar pilgrims into its territory through the Nathu La Pass on the Sikkim border.
What is the significance of the Doklam plateau and the Chumbi valley?
In an article in the Indian Express, Praveen Swami has lucidly explained the significance of the region to China and the historical precedents
associated with it.
While Chumbi valley has served as a trade route from Sikkims capital Gangtok through Yadong and Gyantse on to Dalai Lamas court at
Lhasa, the enclave for a long time did not fall to the Chinese.
In 1904, the imperial military officer Francis Younghusband had led British forces into the Chumbi, following the epic battle of Karo-La,
fought by Gurkha and Sikh troops at altitudes of 5,700 metres, Swami wrote.
The valley holds strategic significance for India, China as well as Bhutan. India sees it as a dagger pointed towards its so-called chickens
neck sector in the Northeast and rapid Chinese road construction in Tibet could make things difficult for India. At the same time, Sikkim is
one of the few sectors where India has an advantage.
In the event of war, Indias Brigade-sized military presence inside Bhutan, stationed at Ha, allows it to attack the Chumbi valley from two
sides, potentially cutting off Chinese troops stationed facing Sikkim, Swami wrote.
But Chinas recent assertions in the area are portentous for Bhutan which has never faced territorial issues with the the Dragon in the past.
China, citing the 1890 China-Britain treaty, calls Doklam its own while Bhutan has disputed the fact saying the convention applies to the India-
Bhutan border, not Bhutan and China.
How is the dispute affecting India-China ties?
Swami wrote that it was Indias decision to take a military stand in Bhutan that has changed the game for all sides.
Ever since the standoff came to light, there has been a series of arguments, counter-arguments and statements from both sides enough for the
foreign ministries to interfere as well. Indian officials have said that the road construction efforts by the Chinese PLA are aimed at getting
closer to Doka La, the last Indian military post on its border with Bhutan and China.
It also said the construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India. India underlined
that the two governments had agreed in 2012 that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in
consultation with the countries concerned. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this
understanding, it said.
After China asked India to learn from historical lessons, Defence Minister Arun Jaitley hit back saying India of 2017 is different from what it
used to be 55 years ago.
If they are trying to remind us, the situation in 1962 was different and India of 2017 is different, Jaitley said in an oblique reference to the
1962 war.
On its part, China has repeatedly asserted its claim over Donglang (Doklam) and accused Indian troops of trespassing.
In order to cover up the illegal entry by Indian troops into the Chinese territory, Indian side wants to infringe upon Bhutans sovereignty and
they try to confuse right from wrong. This is futile. We have no objection to normal bilateral relations between India and Bhutan but are firmly
opposed to the Indian side infringing on Chinese territory using Bhutan as an excuse, said Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
spokesperson Geng Shuang. He added that China will take all steps to ensure its territorial sovereignty.
As of now, there is no push and shove at the border although tensions are high. Both countries have said they would use official diplomatic
channels to find a solution to the dispute.
Indias National Security Adviser Ajit Doval is scheduled to visit Beijing on July 26 to attend the meeting of NSAs from BRICS Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa. He is expected to raise the issue with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi.

The Indian government effectively offered to engage with China over the Doklam plateau dispute through its
foreign secretarys speech in Singapore. In its initial response, the Chinese foreign ministry signalled it was not
interested. Things may yet change, but there are increasing signs that New Delhi and Beijing are hunkering
down for a long and protracted standoff. But the continuing cordiality displayed at the highest levels and the fact
that the thousands of soldiers involved have not fired a weapon in anger indicates there is no desire for a
genuine military confrontation.

Such a contest of patience is not unheard of between India and China. The Sumdorong Cho incident along the
Arunachal Pradesh border in 1986 saw tens of thousands of soldiers deployed on both sides, lasted militarily for
over a year and diplomatically took eight years to resolve. But it paved the way for over a decade of peace along
the Sino-Indian border and stabilised bilateral relations as a whole.

The present Doklam standoff is about New Delhi, belatedly, deciding it must put an end to a long-standing
Chinese practice of nibbling away at Bhutans border. Chinese official anger is presumably because it is
surprised at India deciding to stand up for an ally. Beijing cites an 1890 treaty, Thimpu points to agreements of
1988 and 1998, and New Delhi references an understanding of 2012 so the validity of each others claims is best
left to the lawyers.

view that at least in its immediate neighbourhood it must resist Chinas advances. This is not a total mismatch.
Pakistan is roughly a fifth the size of India in economic and territorial terms but still gives New Delhi a run for
its money.

Weiqi is a Chinese board game whose name means game of encirclement. Better known in English as go, a
player wins by seizing territory and surrounding the enemy. Pieces can be captured, but Weiqi is really about
victory through manoeuvre and not direct conflict. Beijing uses Weiqi tactics in its territorial disputes with its
neighbours. The idea is to win by making the other side assume resistance is futile rather than by the actual use
of violence. The Narendra Modi government must recognise that its best weapon is patience and steadfastness
that is not governed by media concerns or even the election cycle. As previous crises have shown, what defines
a loss is a sense, both at home and abroad, that New Delhi sought to find a solution at any cost rather than a
solution that sends a message.

While India has maintained that it will rely on diplomatic channels to resolve the current standoff

with China at Doklam in Sikkim sector near the Bhutan trijunction, the Chinese media seems to be

issuing a warning and stirring nationalist sentiments by republishing photographs from the 1962

Indo-China war along with editorials recalling the conflict.

The month-long tension between the two neighbours began after the construction of a road in Doklam

region after which Bhutan raised its concerns with India.

Peoples Daily, the official mouthpiece of Communist Party of China, in an online article Peoples

Daily to India: Borderline is bottom line republished its editorial from 22 September 1962 titled If

This Can Be Tolerated, What Cannot? which warned India that it would not tolerate the provocation

by the Indian Army.

The newspapers Weibo and WeChat accounts also shared an image of the region that highlights the

area trespassed by India.

According to Indian Express, Sina.com.cn even published 25 rare photos from the war narrating the

sequence of the conflict till the ceasefire.

Chinese news agency Xinhua in its article India must understand borderline is bottom line from 10

July writes that the Doklam area has long been recognised as Chinese sovereign territory with a clear

history and legal basis.

China has every right to build the road within its sovereign territory India should rectify
its mistakes and show sincerity to avoid an even more serious situation creating more
significant consequences.
Xinhua

China Daily, in its piece India's moves demand strict vigil published on 10 July, stated that Bhutan

never asked for Indias intervention and that India is not entitled at all to claim the so-called disputed

territory on behalf of Bhutan.

It is becoming clear that India is ready to serve as an ally of the US rather than a swing
power that honours independent, non-aligned diplomacy. Beijing should remain vigilant
against New Delhis moves while urging it to withdraw its troops from Chinese territory.
China Daily

Global Times called India a hurdle when it comes to diplomatic ties between Bhutan and China. It

said that Indias right to prosper as a nation can only be achieved by maintaining good relations

with neighbours.

In another article, the English tabloid said that India cannot afford to mess up its bilateral

relationship with China.

New Delhi should think more about how to de-escalate the border face-off at this moment.
China is Indias biggest trading partner. For India, with a vast population living in poverty,
peace and opportunities of development are of vital importance.
Insights into Editorial: Step Back
Summary:
China has ratcheted up pressure on India by officially publicising a military standoff at the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-
junction. Though the standoff between both the armies is quite common, events this time have raised concerns. This time
the matter is more contentious. To begin with, it is the first occasion that the Chinese have blocked access to the holy
Mount Kailash through the Nathu-La route since it was opened in 2006 to facilitate both trade and pilgrimage.

Know about the dispute:

Indian troops have blocked a road under construction by China in a part of territory under dispute. Its called the Donglang
region by China, Bhutan calls it Doklam Plateau and India refers to it as Doka La.
The standoff with China is in Bhutans territory and in a disputed area which is controlled by Thimphu but coveted by
Beijing.
The 89-square-km patch of territory in the Chumbi valley sitting between Sikkim and Bhutan is an unresolved
boundary dispute Beijing has with Thimphu. The two countries have failed to resolve it despite 24 rounds of
negotiations since 1984.
The same plateau extends to the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction at the southern tip of Chumbi valley. The border with
China is accepted by India along Sikkim, so there is no dispute between the two.

Importance of Doklam Region:

The region holds immense strategic importance for India and China. Lying east of Sikkim, it has a commanding view of
the Chumbi valley and overlooks the narrow Siliguri Corridor that links the North-East to the rest of India. If the Chinese
gain control of Donglang, they gain the ability to essentially cut off Indias access to the North-eastern states in case of a
conflict. In 1996, Beijing indicated it was ready to swap territorial claims in northern Bhutan in lieu of Donglang.

Border disputes between India and China:

India and China share about 3,488-km long border, which is yet to be fully delineated. The border is classified under 14
divisions. There is a Line of Actual Control in Aksai Chin of Ladakh region that China captured during 1962 war.
Till 2003, China claimed Sikkim was an independent country whose monarch had in the past accepted Beijings
suzerainty. This make-believe assertion was finally dropped by China during then Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayees visit to Beijing in 2003. It was also agreed during that visit that the two countries would progress rapidly to
formally delineate unmarked portions of the Line of Actual Control as the first step towards settling the long-standing
border dispute.
India and China appointed two Special Representatives to take the negotiations forward. Informally, the two countries
agreed to demarcate a permanent border without unsettling settled populations. Shorn of diplomatic verbiage, this
was interpreted to mean China giving up its claim on 90,000 sq. kms of Arunachal Pradesh, particularly the district of
Tawang (which was well-populated), in exchange for India officially recognizing Chinas occupation of the
unpopulated cold desert of Akasi Chin, most of which has been under Chine occupation.
This still left the issue of the slice of Indian territory seized by Pakistan and subsequently gifted or ceded to China
by Islamabad. It is through this piece of mountainous terrain that the controversial China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
is being built to give China access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea through the Gwadar port.

Intentions behind Chinas aggressive moves:

Beijing has always aspired to be the Asian hegemon. It is intensely distrustful of its two economically powerful neighbours
Japan across the sea and India across the mountains. India, however, is a huge market for Chinese consumer goods. And
that is an opportunity Beijing does not want to forgo. But Indias growing economic and diplomatic clout ruffles China.
The evident camaraderie between two tough-talking leaders, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi disturbs Chinas
long-term goals.
Indias unflinching opposition to Chinas grandiose One Belt One Road (OBOR) idea marks a setback for Beijings
strategic economic and political pursuits. Clearly, China wants to keep India engaged in territorial issues with it and its
ally Pakistan. Since it has surged way ahead of India in terms of economic development, China wants to zealously
guard the advantage, pricking India from time to time to register its military superiority.
In Beijings view, India is a critical swing State that increasingly is moving to the US camp, undercutting Xis
ambition to establish a Sino-centric Asia through an expanded tianxia system of the 15th century. Given Indias
vantage geographical location, China needs its participation to plug key gaps in Xis One Belt, One Road (OBOR)
project. But India not only boycotted Xis OBOR summit but has also portrayed OBOR as an opaque, neo-colonial
enterprise seeking to ensnare smaller, cash-strapped states in a debt trap.

Why should India be worried?

China is already stepping up its direct and surrogate threats against India. One example is the proliferation of incursions
and other border incidents since the 2005 India-US nuclear deal, which laid out a strategic framework for the US to co-opt
India. China is also waging a psy-war through media. With Chinese forces aggressively seeking to nibble away at Indian
territory, Indias Himalayan challenge has been compounded by a lack of an integrated approach that blends military,
economic and diplomatic elements into a coherent strategy.

Way ahead:
While the latest hostile action on the Nathu La Pass and the verbal conflagration that followed may not escalate into
something bigger, India needs to clearly size up Chinas Big Power aspirations. Arguably, India has to both compete and,
in many cases, cooperate with China and cannot afford permanent hostility. But there is an in-built economic conflict
between the two countries that is bound to spill over into active hostility, spurred mainly by China. Beijing prides itself for
settling border disputes with all its neighbours except India. But these settlements have mostly been among unequals
(barring Russia). Indias status in the world today nettles China but New Delhi too needs to tread cautiously without
escalating tensions. Despite the cosy ties with Washington, India, essentially, is on its own against China. It needs to
bolster its border defences and boost its nuclear and missile deterrent capabilities.
Conclusion:

India and China are the two ancient civilisations, who have had centuries of cultural exchanges but in modern times, their
relationship has been more adversarial than friendly. As big economic and military powers, India and China are key
strategic players in the world. Both nations have several similar attributes and problems including large population, huge
rural-urban, rising economy and conflict with neighbours.
Disruption of the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra may seem humiliating, but if China insists on flexing its muscles in this
manner, we may need to ignore it for the present and await a suitable opportunity to demonstrate our growing clout in the
world. But for that, Indias economic growth must catch up with China at least in the medium term. Resolving the border
issue cannot be our priority till then.