THE OBJECT-RELATIONS POSITION

Psychoanalytic theory refers to people other than oneself as objects. This oddly impersonal usage
is understandable in Freud, who regarded interpersonal relations in the early years as somewhat
predetermined by instinctual demands and by the inevitable conflict between children and parents.
Also, he regarded the interpersonal relations of adult years as transference phenomena, shadowy
reflections of earlier unresolved conflicts. Originally, Freud believed that the only reason other
people can become at all important is that instinctual energy libido- is projected outward by a
gratification-hungry id onto whoever can facilitate that gratification. This process is supposed to
happen unconsciously, and any ensuing love or regard for objects amounts to a narcissism, or
self-love, called primary or basic (freud, 1927). Thus, although Freud talked a great deal about
interpersonal relations, his theory rendered people other than oneself as surprisingly uninfluential
except as stereotypic objects of ones instincts.

Object-relations theory grew as a corrective attempt to invest interpersonal relations with a more
significant role in personality development. Its general message is that the value of others and the
course and effect of interactions with them are not a programmed, automatic outcome of
instinctual considerations. Personality can be shaped in many different directions, depending on
the specifics of interpersonal encounters.
The early work on object relations was done by Klein (1948) and the founders of ego psychology
notably Hartmann. But this movement has never been a tightly unified enterprise. Modell (1975),
for example, is the most conciliatory toward instinct theory, arguing that Freud (1927) had the
kernels of object-relations theory in his views of secondary narcissism, a process whereby the ego
identifies with the objects originally invested with value (cathected) by the id in order to be loved
itself. Fairbairn (1954), on the other hand, calls for a radical break with Freud. Kernberg (1976),
Mahler (1963), and Bowlby (1969) are somewhere in the middle.
Core considerations
Nothing in object-relations theory is concrete and uncontroversial enough to serve as a core
statement. But if there were, it would probably emphasize the tendency to develop a self. The self
is regarded as a composite of units, each an image deriving from significant interpersonal relations
some units concern self-image (what you think of and expect from yourself), others object images
(what you think of and expect from other people) and still other affect dispositions (tendencies
toward emotional states that reflect how you felt during interpersonal relations). For Kernberg
(1976), the driving force behind interpersonal relations is still instinctual energy, or libido, and
hence self-development occurs parallel to the character development based on psychosexual
stages discussed by Freud. Thus, self-units influence the content by ego and superego. But for
Fairbairn (1954), instincts have receded into the background, because libido is a function of the
ego and the ego is fundamentally object seeking. Object-relations theory can still be classified
as a variant on the psychosocial conflict model, because Kernbergs position is the most common
of theorists of this stripe. But if Fairbairns thinking were to prevail, one would be dealing with
an outright fulfillment position.