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3. It is a right constituted over an immovable by nature (Land and buildings), not over
movables.
4. It limits the servient owners right of ownership for the benefit of the dominant
estate. Right of limited use, but no right to posses servient estate, Being an abnor-
mal limitation of ownership, it cannot be presumed.
6. It cannot consist in requiring the owner of the servient estate to do an act, (servitus
in faciendo consistere nequit) unless the act is accessory to a praedial servitude (obligation propter
rem)
7. Generally, it may consist in the owner of the dominant estate demanding that the
owner of the servient estate refrain from doing something (servitus in non faciendo), or that the
latter permit that something be done over the servient property (servitus in patendo), but not the
right to demand that the owner of the servient estate do something (servitus in faciendo) except if
such obligation to a praedial sevitude (obligation propter rem).
11. It has permanence, i.e., once it attaches, whether used or not, it continues and may
be used at anytime.
C. Classification of Servitudes
1. As to recipient of benefits:
a. Real or Praedial
b. Personal (Art. 614)
2. As to origin:
a.Legal whether for public use or for the interest of private persons (Art. 634)
b. Voluntary
3. As to its exercise (Art. 615)
a. Continuous
b. Discontinuous
a. Apparent
b. Non-apparent
a. Positive
b. Negative (prescription start to run from service of notarial prohibition)
1. No one can have a servitude over his own property (nulli res sua servit)
2. A servitude cannot consist in doing (servitus in faciendo consistere nequit)
3. There cannot be a servitude over another servitude (Servitus servitutes esse nbon
potest)
4. A servitude must be exercised in a way least burdensome to the owner of the land.
5. A servitude must have a perpetual cause.
1. By title-juridical act which give rise to the servitude, i.e. law donations, contracts
or wills.
a. If easement has been acquired but no proof of existence of easement avail-
able, and easement is one that cannot be acquired by prescription
1. May be cured by deed of recognition by owner of servient estate, or
2. By final judgment
3. Existence of an apparent sign considered a title (Art. 624)
a. To use the easement (Art. 626) and exercise all rights necessary for the use of
the (Art. 625)
b. To do at his expense, all necessary works for the use and preservation of the
easement (Art. 627)
c. In a right of way, to ask for change in width of easement sufficient for needs of
dominant estate (Art. 651)
a. To use the easement for benefit of immovable and in the manner originally
established (Art. 626)
b. To change the place and manner of use the easement (Art. 629, par. 2)
b. To change the place and manner of use the easement (Art. 628, par. 2)
(2) continuous easements: counted from the day an act adverse to the
exercise took place.
H. Legal Easements
a. Those established for the use of water or easements relating to waters (Art.
637-648)
f. The easement of distance for certain constructions and plantings (Art. 677-681)
Cases:
1. Dichoso vs Marcos, GR 180282. April 11, 2011
FACTS: On 02 August 2002, petitioners Crispin Dichoso, Jr., Evelyn Valdez and Rosemarie Benito filed a
Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent Patrocinio Marcos. The petitioners were the
owners of Lot No. 21553 in Laoag City while the respondent was the owner of Lot 1. The petitioners al-
leged that they had no access to a public road to and from their property; they claimed to have used a
portion of Lot No. 1, in accessing the road since 1970. However, the respondent blocked the passageway
with piles of sand.
The respondent contends that the petitioners' claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not ne-
cessity since there is an existing easement of right of way granted by Spouses Arce who own the other
adjacent lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the grant of easement of right of way under Articles
649 and 650 of the Civil Code
RULING: No. Articles 649 and 650 provide requisites for the grant of right of way namely; 1) The domi-
nant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) There
is payment of proper indemnity; 3) The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; and 4) The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
The Court finds petitioners' concept of what is adequate outlet a complete disregard of the well-en-
trenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real,
not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satis-
fied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
2. De Guzman vs Filinvest GR 191710 January 14, 2015 (compared with Woodridge School, Inc.
v. ARB Construction Co., Inc., 545 Phil. 83, 91 (2007).
3. Spouses Vergara vs Sonkin GR 193659 June 15, 2015
Sps Vergara vs Sps Sonkin
SPS. FERNANDO VERGARA and HERMINIA VERGARA vs. ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN
G.R. No. 193659, June 15, 2015
FACTS: The petitioners-spouses Vergara (Sps. Vergara) and Spouses Sonkin (Sps. Sonkin) are adjoin-
ing landowners. The property owned by the Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation
than that owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara Property).
The Sps Sonkin constructed a house on their property using a portion of the partition wall as part of the
wall of the masters bedroom and bathroom.
Thereafter, the Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of their property making it even higher than that
of the Sonkin Property. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming from the Vergara
Property was leaking into their bedroom through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to
the paint and the wooden parquet floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara build a re-
taining wall on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had dumped thereon, but the same
went unheeded.
Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The CA on appeal ruled that while the act of the Sps Vergara in elevating their property was the proxi-
mate cause of the water seepage, the Sps. Sonkin were guilty of contributory negligence in building their
house directly abutting the perimeter wall. Thus, it deleted the actual damages ordered by the RTC. It
nevertheless awarded the Sonkins moral damages and attorneys fees.
Hence this appeal by the Sps Vergara.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sps Sonkin are entitled to moral damages
HELD: NO. Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.
The CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the house of Sps. Son-
kin was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perime-
ter wall back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is nevertheless guilty of
contributory negligence for not only failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National
Building Code, but also for disregarding the legal easement (to receive water from higher estates) consti-
tuted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
In view of Sps. Sonkins contributory negligence, the Court deems it appropriate to delete the award of
moral damages in their favor. While moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendants wrongful
act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the
cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are only given to
ease the defendants grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt
caused and the gravity of the wrong done.