PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs.

HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

FACTS:

On September 2, 1976, President Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on
October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues
of martial law, the assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty
days after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending PD 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. PD 1031 repealed Section 4, of
Presidential Decree No. 991. On the same date the President issued PD 1033, stating the questions to
be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in
its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments
to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of
a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum Plebiscite.

Petitioners, father and son, commenced the action for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite
on October 16; to declare without force and effect PDs 991 and 1033, as they propose amendments
to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled. Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite has no
constitutional or legal basis. They further argue that even granting him legislative powers under
Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments
to the Constitution

ISSUE: Whether or not the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the
Constitution
RULING:

Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:

SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an
election.

SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:

SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof.

There are two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by
the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members;
or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However, the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in
an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of
transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National
Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.

The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested
with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the
time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention
voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent
President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly.

When the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged
in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the
fundamental charter itself which is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the
regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly).
While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political
science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a
legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case,
approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the
President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President
has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. The power to
legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period.
However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening
of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special
call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).