33. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS.

ABARCA
G.R. No. L-38581 December 18, 1934

Facts:

The lot now in question was the subject of litigation between Datu Bualan and his coclaimants, on the one
hand, and Ciriaco Lizada, on the other. Juan A. Sarenas and Domingo Braganza were the attorneys for Datu
Bualan and his co-claimants in that suit, wherein a judgment was rendered declaring Datu Bualan and his co-
claimants the owners of the land involved in the litigation. Subsequently, a controversy arose between the
Bagobos and their attorneys as to the amount of fees due the latter, whereupon the attorneys took possession
of the property now in question. Action was brought by the Bagobos against their former attorneys for the
recovery of the land. In this action (civil case No. 607) judgment was rendered ordering the attorneys to
return the property seized by them, and requiring the Bagobos to pay their former attorneys the sum of
P6,000 as fees.

As a result of this judgment Datu Bualan and his coclaimants paid Sarenas and Braganza the sum of
P5,126.13. They also paid to the municipal treasurer of Davao in the name of Sarenas and Braganza, for taxes
and penalties due on the property in the year 1926, while the same was in the possession of the latter, the
sum of P1,035.87. The Bagobos assumed that, by these payments which amounted in all to P6,162, the
judgment rendered against them for P6,000 together with interests due thereon, was fully satisfied. Claiming
that the sum paid to the municipal treasurer of Davao should not be credited on the amount of the judgment
obtained by them, Sarenas and Braganza caused the clerk of the court to issue a writ of execution on the said
judgment. By reason of the writ of execution so issued, the sheriff levied on the property here in question and
sold it to Sarenas and Braganza for the sum of P877.25. Upon the failure of the Bagobos to redeem the
property, they filed their claim in the present cadastral case, alleging that they were the absolute owners of
lot No. 700.

Issue:

Whether or not the sum paid by the Bagobos to the municipal treasurer should be credited.

Held:

Yes, it should be credited. In fairness and equity, which after all are the true aims of the law, the amount paid
by Datu Bualan and his co-claimants for taxes and penalties due on the contested property should be credited
on the judgment obtained by Sarenas and Braganza in civil case No. 607. Such taxes and penalties accrued
while the property was in that possession under a claim of ownership. It follows that the error assigned by
Datu Bualan and his coclaimants against the judgment below, to the effect that the lower court erred in
subjecting the property sought to be registered to a lien in favor of Sarenas and Braganza for P877.25 with
interests, must be sustained.
34. AURORA DE LEON vs. HON. SERAFIN SALVADOR and
EUSOBIO BERNABE
G.R. No. L-30871, December 28, 1970

Facts:

On November 8, 1966 two parcels of land of 682.5 square meters each registered in the names of Bernabe of
Caloocan City was levied on execution for damages incurred to Enrique de Leon by herein respondent-debtor,
the said properties were sold to Aurora (sister of the judgment creditor) as the highest bidder. Thereafter, the
sheriff executed the corresponding certificate of sale of the latters favor, which was duly registered on
February 21, 1967 with the Caloocan City register of deeds.

On February 7, 1968, just about two weeks before the expiration of the one-year period to redeem the
properties sold in execution, the judgment debtor Bernabe filed a separate civil action against Enrique and
Aurora de Leon for the setting aside or annulment of the execution sale for being anomalous and irregular,
and for ordering of a new auction sale. Instead of filing this case to Judge Cruz which had issued the writ of
execution, the other branch of the Rizal Court of First Instance presided by Judge Serafin Salvador, who later
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining therein defendants from taking further proceedings against
the properties of Bernabe. Pending his decision, Judge Salvador issued an order ordering the sheriff to allow
respondent-debtor to redeem the two properties sold at public auction.

Issue:

Which of the courts has the exclusive jurisdiction to set aside for alleged irregularities of the execution sale.

Held:

It is patent that such exclusive jurisdiction was vested in Judge Cruz court. Having acquired jurisdiction over
and rendered judgment that had become final and executor, it retained jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts for its execution and all incidents thereof, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers in connection therewith. Execution of its
judgment debtors properties, Eusebio Bernabe as judgment debtor coyld not in the guise of a new and
separate second action ask another court of coordinate jurisdiction, to interfere by injunction with the
execution proceedings, to set them aside and to order the holding of a new execution sale instead of seeking
such relief by proper motion and application from Judge Cruz court which had exclusive jurisdiction over the
execution proceedings and the properties sold at the execution sale.

Aside from the basic lack of jurisdiction of Judge Salvadors court to issue the redemption order, the order per
se suffered from other grave flaw for a reason that Bernabes motions were presented on May 12 and May 15,
1969 and it was self-evident from the record that the one-year period for redemption had long expired more
than a year ago. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that the latter had ever timely made a valid
offer of redemption so as to safeguard his right thereto.
35. JOHANNA HOFER BORROMEO vs. DR. VENUSTANO H. J.
BORROMEO, et.al
G.R. No. L-7548, February 27, 1956

Facts:

Johanna Hofer Borromeo, widow of the late Dr. Maximo Borromeo who died on July 31, 1948, alleged that
during her marriage with the deceased, the latter bought a certain real property situated in Cebu, this
property becoming one of the conjugal properties of her husband and herself, that in June 1948, before his
death and at the time when he was seriously ill and bedridden, her husband signed, or was made to sign, a
fictitious deed of sale of said property in favor of Dr. Venustiano H.J. Borromeo and Dr. Jose Borromeo
purporting to convey said property to them for P3,000 and that the property was assessed at P42,480 and
had a market value of P80,000 and there was a mortgage thereon of P125,000 in favor of the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint made by the wife under a conjugal partnership is a mere expectancy and does
ripen into legal title until a liquidation has been made.

Held:

According to Article 1413 of the Old Civil Code that the husband, as the administrator is given the power to
dispose of conjugal property under onerous title without the consent of the wife, however the second
paragraph thereof states that this power has limited by the reservation that the wifes rights will not be
prejudicated by the assignment or sale made by the husband, when such violates the provisions of the Code
or is in fraud of the rights of the wife. The instances, therefore, to which said refer those eases of sales,
conveyances or assignment which have been made under onerous title, violating such provision. Said contract
have the three essential requisites: a.) Consent of the parties b.) Subject matter and c.) Consideration. In the
latter case, said contract or agreements lack one of the essential elements for their vailidity, namely, cause or
consideration, and therefore, they are considered as non-existent. It is under this category that the fictitious
sale, alleged in the case at bar to have been executed by the husband without consideration or with false
consideration, falls.

Considering that one committed by the husband was of non-existent contract, it is not correct therefore, to
hold that the right of the wife to assail its effectiveness is made to depend upon the outcome of the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.
36. SANTIAGO CRUZADO vs. ESTAFANIA BUSTOS and MANUEL
ESCALER
34 Phil 17, No. 10244, February 29, 1916
Facts:

On September 25, 1913 Cruzado alleged that he was the owner of a certain rural property situated in the
Barrio of Dolores formerly San Isidro, Municipality of Bacolor, Pampanga containing an area of sixty five
balitas which the defendant Bustos together with the other defendant had, since the year 1906 been detaining
the land and refused to deliver possession thereof to the petitioner. Estafania Bustos, herein respondent, in
defense, said that the title of the land produced by the petitioner was not a lawful one, for the reason that only
a simulated sale of the land was made by and between herself and the father of the petitioner. During the
cross-examination set forth, it showed that during the time of the purchased of Escaler to Bustos there was no
record in the property registry to show that the land in question belonged to a third person or any other than
the vendor.

Issue:

Whether or not the deed of sale was simulated not to defraud third party but to show that the father of herein
petitioner owns a real property in order to faithfully discharged his duties as procurador.

Held:

It is unquestionable that the contract of sale of the sixty five balitas of land was perfect and binding upon both
contracting parties, since they both appear in that instrument to have agreed upon the thing sold, but it is also
undeniable that the said contract was not consummated, inasmuch as, notwithstanding that the deed of sale
was accomplished and this document was kept by the pretended purchaser, it is positively certain that the
latter did not pay the purchase price and never took possession of land apparently sold in the said deed.

The simulation of that sale was effected by making a pretended contract which bore the appearance of truth,
when really and truly there was no contract, because the contracting parties did not in fact intend to execute
one, but only to formulate a sale in such a manner that, for that particular purpose sought by Cruzado and
Bustos, it would appear to have been celebrated that the former might hold his office of procurador on the
strength of the security afforded by the value of the land feignedly sold.
37. GARDNER v. CA DIGEST
G.R. No. L-59952 ; 131 SCRA 585 ; August 31, 1984

Facts:

The case involve several transfers of the subject real property. It appears that petitioners the Gardner spouse
enter into an agreement with Respondent spouses, the Santoses to subdivide 2 parcels of land and executed
an absolute deed of sale in favor of the latter. The real truth is that what occurred was a sale in trust since
the petitioner obtained an amount of money from the respondents, who in turn promised to improve the
land.

Apparently, the Santoses transferred the properties to the Cuencas who in turn transferred it to the Verroyas
who executive a mortgage over the lot. Then Verroya executed a deed of transfers to the Natividads. Note that
from the titles of the Cuencas (the Second Transferees) to the titles of the Natividads (the Fourth Transferee),
the Adverse Claim of the Gardners continued to be carried, and that throughout the successive transfers, the
petitioners continued to remain in possession, cultivation and occupation of the disputed properties.

In their Answer, the Santoses claimed that the sale to them was conditional in the sense that the properties
were to be considered as the investment of the petitioners in the subdivision venture and that in the event
that this did not materialize they were to reconvey the lots to petitioners upon reimbursement by the latter of
all sums advanced to them; and that the deed of sale was to be registered for the protection of the Santoses
considering the moneys that the latter would be advancing.

Hence, the Gardners filed an action for declaration of Nullity, Rescission and damages against the 5
transferres and mortgagees. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners declaring the transfers null and void. The
CA affirmed in toto the RTC but reconsidered it decision and ruled that the sale of land to Natividads are
valid.

Issue:

Whether or not the admissions made by Santos in the pleadings are admissible

Held:

NO. The testimony of Ariosto Santos is at variance with the allegations in his Answer. As a general rule, facts
alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it, but this is not an
absolute and inflexible rule. An Answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove,
but it is not evidence.

Santos himself, in open Court, had repudiated the defenses raised in his answer and against his own interest,
his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in
his credibility and we find no reason to overturn their findings thereon. Santos likewise admitted against his
own interest that the petitioners did not receive from him any consideration, which corroborated the
declarations of the petitioners. The Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement
express that the true and real nature of the agreement between the parties, which was for a subdivision and
not a sale transaction.

All Five Transfers were absolutely simulated and fictitious and were, therefore, void ab initio and inexistent.
Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect whatsoever where the price, which appears therein as paid,
has, in fact, never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor.
38. ODEGAR vs. GUICO
G.R. No. L-67548 ; December 20, 1989
Facts:

Fermina Maluto and her husband, Isidro P. Guico, to whom one of the five (5) lots in controversy was sold by
Rufino Tamisin on April 10, 1953, supra, took no part. It was not until March 12, 1975-almost twenty-two
(22) years after they had purchased the lot from Rufino Tamisin, and after Fermina Maluto had died-that
Isidro P. Guico, Fermina's husband, and their two (2) children, Emmanuel Guico and Lourdes G. Amoranto,
finally went to Court to vindicate their rights over the land sold to Fermina Maluto. They filed suit, described
by them as one "for annulment of documents and tax declaration and to quiet title to property with damages,"
in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Their complaint named Ambrocio Odejar and Gliceria Gibas as
defendants, but when it was discovered soon thereafter that these two had already died, the pleading was
amended so as to include said spouses' heirs as defendants, namely: Ireneo Odejar, Librada Odejar and
Juanito Odejar. Also named as defendants were Attorney Juan Baes, the Odejars' counsel, to whom they had
conveyed one-half (1/2) interest pro indiviso in the five (5) lots; the provincial sheriff, Cecilio Bituin; and the
Provincial Assessor of Laguna. The complaint prayed that the sheriffs certificate of sale dated June 16, 1960,
and the conveyance to Atty. Juan Baes of an undivided interest over the land sold to Fermina Maluto, be
declared null and void.

Issue:

WON the sale can still be cancelled and be declared null and void even after the lapse of 22 years.

Held:

The facts above detailed, considered conjointly, irresistibly conduce to the conclusion that Rufino Tamisin
and Fermina Maluto never intended to effect a genuine, bona fide transfer of property when they entered into
the sale of April 10, 1953, a reality made manifest and according to which the parties, vendors and vendees as
well as their privies guided their actions, during the period of twenty (20) years or so following the
transaction. The Tamisins' acts clearly show that they considered themselves still the owners of the property
and as never having parted therewith even after the sale, publicly and openly proclaiming their title and
demanding recognition thereof on several occasions. The Guicos, for their part, tacitly acquiesced, at least
never presented any opposition, to such assertions of title by the Tamisins until March 12, 1975, when it had
already become apparent that the latter had exhausted every possible recourse for the recovery of the
property from the Odejars. All indications, therefore, are that the ostensible conveyance was executed solely
to prevent the property of the Tamisins from being levied upon in execution of the judgment in Civil Case No.
9401, or ever applied in satisfaction of the Tamisins' adjudicated liability to the Odejars. Such a stratagem
cannot be allowed to succeed.

The defect of the sale of April 10, 1953 thus produced effects transcending mere rescissibility. The sale could
not be treated merely as a simple conveyance of "things under litigation ... entered into by the defendant
without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority," rescindable by action
within four (4) years. It was in reality "absolutely simulated or fictitious" and hence " inexistent and void" in
contemplation of Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Since, as Article 1411 of the Civil Code provides, the "action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe," the Odejars were not
precluded from invoking such nullity, as they did, even after the lapse of twenty-two years.
39. CASTILLO vs. GALVAN
G.R. No. L-27841 ; 85 SCRA 526 ; October 20, 1978

Facts:

Paulino Galvan was the registered owner of an undivided one- half (1/2) interest over two parcels of land, the
other undivided half is owned by his two daughters by a first marriage herein defendants Josefa and
Natividad Galvan. On 1961, Paulino Galvan died, Maria Castillo (the second wife and their 2 children), out of
"delicadeza" waited for the defendants to initiate the move for the settlement of his estate. But, after finding
that none was forthcoming, the plaintiffs became apprehensive, so that they began to go over the papers
concerning the properties of the decedent. In the office of the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City, they were
surprised to find a deed of sale, signed by the late Paulino Galvan and the plaintiff, Castillo, whereby they had
purportedly sold for P500 the undivided portion of Paulino Galvan over said lots in favor of defendants, so
Maria Castillo remembered that way back in 1953, she and her husband Paulino Galvan were made to sign a
certain document by Josefa Galvan through fraud. Wherefore, they prayed that the deed of sale be declared
null and void; that the plaintiffs be declared the owners of four-sixths (4/6) of the undivided half share
pertaining to Paulino Galvan.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the action is barred by the
statute of stations for the reason that the present action for the annulment of the instrument of sale based
upon fraud which should be brought within four (4) years from the time of the discovery of the same in
accordance with Article 1391 of the Civil Code is already prescribe. The lower court, thereafter, dismiss the
case.

Issue:

WON the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription

Held:

Yes. The court sustains defendants' contention. The basis of the annulment is alleged fraud, and the action for
the. annulment of the document should be brought within 4 years from the discovery of fraud however, the
plaintiffs' action is to declare void and inexistent the deed of sale executed by Paulino Galvan and
Encarnacion Castillo on August 3. 1955 in favor of Josefa and Natividad Galvan, upon 'the grounds that (a)
there is fraud in securing the signatures of the vendors in said deed of sale: and (b) there was no
consideration given at the time of the transaction. In other words, the plaintiffs are seeking a judicial
declaration that the deed of sale in question is void ab initio, which action is imprescriptible.
40. LEOPOLDO DE BELEN vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS
G.R. No. L-22082. September 26, 1924
Facts:

Timoteo Tienzo was a duly accredited customs broker in the City of Manila, and in connection with his
business as such broker, operated a number of trucks for the purpose of conveying merchandise arriving at
the port of Manila to various consignees, his customers, throughout the city. On or about April 7, 1921, Tienzo
procured a permit from the Insular Collector for the withdrawal of 12,500 sacks of flour from one of the piers
for delivery to one Chua Soco, then a merchant in the City of Manila. The bill of lading for said flour was not
produced by Tienzo at the time he procured the delivery permit, and in order to get possession of the flour he
obligated himself, upon his bond as a customs broker, to have the bill of lading forthcoming in due time. Said
bill of lading, however, was never produced by Tienzo or his principal, Chua Soco, with the result that the
collector of customs caused an action of replevin to be begun in the name of the Government on June 10,
1921, to recover the flour which had been delivered as aforesaid, or in case the flour itself could not be
secured, to recover judgment for the value thereof in the amount of P47,816.32. an attachment was sued out
by the plaintiff against the property of the defendant Tienzo, on the ground that he was about fraudulently to
dispose thereof; and on June 13, 1921, the sheriff levied said attachment on seven trucks that had been
operated by Tienzo in connection with his business as customs broker and truckman. After the sheriff had
taken the trucks into custody the plaintiff in this case, Leopoldo de Belen, a brother-in-law of Tienzo, made
claim to the trucks, relying on a document of transfer (Exhibit A), dated June 1, 1921, and executed by Tienzo
and himself, in which Tienzo purports to convey to Belen all of the trucks involved in this controversy. The
consideration stated in this instrument is the sum of P25,000, said to have been advanced upon previous
occasions to Tienzo by Belen. The sheriff having ignored the claim of Belen to the ownership of the trucks, the
present action of replevin was instituted by Belen against the Collector of Customs and the sheriff for the
recovery of the trucks and compensation for the unlawful detention of the same. Upon hearing the cause the
trial judge found that the document referred to (Exhibit A) was evidently a fictitious transfer, conceived and
executed for the purpose of placing the trucks in question beyond the reach of the creditors of Tienzo, and he
held said instrument to be completely without effect. He therefore absolved the defendants from the
complaint, and the plaintiff appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not that the document referred to (Exhibit A) was evidently a fictitious transfer, conceived and
executed for the purpose of placing the trucks in question beyond the reach of the creditors of Tienzo.

Held:

Yes. It is sufficient to refer to the testimony of one Gerardo Garcia, specially deputized by the sheriff to serve
the summons and other papers relating to the case No. 20110, instituted by the Government and the Collector
of Customs against Chua Soco and Timoteo Tienzo. This witness states that in a conversation between himself
and the present plaintiff soon after the service of the complaint, the latter said that Tienzo was owner of the
trucks and that he (Belen) was merely an instrument of Tienzo. This admission of the plaintiff, in connection
with the relation of the parties and the financial difficulties then impending over Tienzo, establish in our
opinion a strong presumption that the transfer referred to was made for the purpose of placing the trucks
beyond the reach of legal process directed against Tienzo. Nor is this presumption overcome by the
documents C to C-6, purporting to be receipts for money advanced by Belen to Tienzo during the years, 1918,
1919, and 1920. The Court thinks the trial judge was right in entertaining the suspicion that these receipts
might have been manufactured to meet the situation, without representing bona fide debts of Tienzo to Belen.
At any rate it is quite clear that Belen was aware of the financial embarrassment in which Tienzo was
involved, and the evidence in our opinion establishes the conclusion drawn by the trial court, namely, that the
transfer of the trucks was a simulated transaction