ACDIS

Occasional
Paper

Anatomy of Interlinking Rivers in India:

A Decision in Doubt
A.C. Shukla
Visiting Scholar
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Studies
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Vandana Asthana
Natural Resources and Environmental Sciences
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Research of the Program in Arms Control,

Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign
November 2005
This publication is supported by a grant from the John D.
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and by funding
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Anatomy of Interlinking
Rivers in India
A Decision in Doubt

A.C. Shukla
Visiting Scholar
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
and
Vandana Asthana
Natural Resources and Environmental Sciences
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security

University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana
November 2005
 CONTENTS

About the Authors v

Acknowledgments vii

Part One
Introduction 1

Part Two
Historical Background 3

Part Three
Facts about Water 5
Proposed River Links 8
Budget and Cost Estimates 9

Part Four
Challenges Facing the Project 13
The Culture of Expert Knowledge 13
Impact of Global Capital 14
Risk Assessment 14
Implications for Conflicts 15

Part Five
Conflicting Overtones 19
Political Interests, Bureaucratic Positions, and Policy Decisions 19
Agency of Civil Society 20

References 25

iii
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr. A.C. Shukla headed the Biopollution Study Centre at Christ Church College, Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj
University in Kanpur, India. He specializes in environmental sciences and policy planning. Shukla is a Member
and Chartered Biologist of the Institute of Biology in London, and a Senior Visiting Fellow of the University of
New England, Australia. Shukla was on the ISA delegation at the UN Prep Com Meet. He has completed a
major project, the Ganga Action Plan, for the Ministry of Environment and Forests of the Government of India,
and was associated with a Ford Foundation-funded project of the Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS)
in Colombo, Sri Lanka, working on the India chapter of Environment and Security in South Asia. Shukla is
credited with over 250 research publications in journals like Nature, Hydrobiologia, and Revue Algologique,
and several original and edited books. He has traveled widely in connection with participating, chairing
sessions, and acting as discussant at international conferences. His area of current research interest is the
environmental security and politico-economy of water. The work on this Occasional Paper was completed
when Shukla was a Visiting Scholar at the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security
(ACDIS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Dr. Vandana Asthana is head of the Department of Political Science and Environmental Studies at Christ
Church College, Chhatrapati Sahu Ji Maharaj University in Kanpur, India. She specializes in international
relations and environmental security. She is currently enrolled in the graduate program of the Natural Resources
and Environmental Sciences Department at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and received a
Ph.D. Thesis Initiation Fellowship from ACDIS for academic year 20045. Asthana was a member of the ISA
delegation at the UN Prep Com Meet and has traveled widely in connection with Track II diplomacy,
participating in and chairing sessions at international conferences. She has published a large number of original
articles and edited books, and is on the review panel of prestigious journals. Asthana has been associated with
the India chapter of the Ford Foundation-funded project, RCSS, Sri Lanka, on Environment and Security in
South Asia. She has completed a project for the government of India on the water security of India.

v
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A.C. Shukla wishes to place on record grateful acknowledgements to the Program in Arms Control,
Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for providing the
necessary facilities for this research; and to Professor Clifford E. Singer for inviting him to come to ACDIS as a
Visiting Scholar and thereby enabling him to accomplish this endeavor. Vandana Asthana expresses her thanks
to Dr. Parvez Deen, Principal, Christ Church College, Kanpur, India for sanctioning academic leave and to
Professor Clifford E. Singer for his encouragement.

vii
 PART ONE
Introduction

The world is fast running out of usable water. Anthropogenic activities are polluting and depleting this finite
wellspring of life at a startling rate. Industrialization, intensive agriculture, pollution, deforestation, and
construction of large dams have damaged the earths surface water in persistent ways. Quite simply, unless we
change our ways and practices the world will be living with freshwater shortages in the coming future.
Keeping in view the increasing demand for water, the government of India developed a new National
Water Policy, which states that water is a prime natural resource, a basic need and a precious national asset.
Planning, development, and management of water resources need to be governed by national perspectives
(National Water Policy 2002).
While there exists excellent literature on different alternatives to water management since independence
(Hemphill and Bramley 1989; Chambers 1988; Shukla and Vandana 1996; Agarwal, Narain, and Khurana
2001), the national perspective guiding water resource development in India has focused on a supply-based
paradigm as the only alternative to meet water needs for such diverse purposes as irrigation, drinking water,
sanitation, industrial and other uses in a sustainable manner. The policy decision to interlink its rivers
announced by the government of India for managing fresh water resources in the twenty-first century is based
on a linear model of bureaucratic decision-making and its subsequent stages of implementation. This top-down
solution to Indias growing water needs has stirred controversy and debate in one of the worlds largest
democracies. This paper addresses the challenges inherent in the governments policy decision to interlink
rivers as envisaged by the bureaucratic agency of state power, a culture of scientific expertise, a perceived need
to mobilize global capital, and the opposition to such plans engendered by the agency of civil society in a bid to
examine how different actors conceptualize the project through a discursive approach.

1
 PART TWO
Historical Background

The idea of linking rivers for various purposes in the sub-continent is not new. Sir Arthur Cotton conceived a
plan to link rivers in Southern India for inland navigation in the nineteenth century. While the project was
partially implemented, the river-linking canals could not survive the decline of water navigation in the face of
rapid development of railways. Capt. Dinshaw J. Dastur advanced a proposal for the Garland Canal system
that consisted of two canals: (1) the Himalayan Canal and (2) the Central and Southern Garland Canal. They
were to be interconnected at two pointsDelhi and Patna. Central Water Commission studies carried out in
1979 indicated that the project was impracticable, technically unsound, and economically prohibitive. The cost
was estimated to be about twelve million crores in rupees (about 2.6 trillion U.S. dollars) and the scheme was
eventually given up.*
The idea of a Ganga-Cauvery Link was proposed by Dr. K.L. Rao, former Union Minister for Irrigation, in
1975. It envisaged a link taking off near Patna, passing through the watersheds of the Sone, Narmada, Tapi,
Godavari, Krishna, and Pennar rivers, and joining the Cauvery up-stream of Grand Anicut. The link was to
traverse 2,640 km and involved a lift of water 450 meters from the flood flows of the Ganga, withdrawing
60,000 cusecs (60,000 cubic feet per second) of water for 150 days in a year (Iyer 2002). The plan floundered,
as it involved an estimated cost of Rs. 12,500 crores ($2.7 billion) and required a large energy consumption to
operate its pumps. The Central Water Commission examined this proposal and found its costs to be grossly
underestimated. While the proposal was not pursued as such, it still lingers in the minds of people in times of
scarcity of water as a possible resolution to the continuing dispute over Cauvery River water between the states
of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.
The persistent interest by many people sustains the impetus to study inter-basin water transfer proposals.
The then-Ministry of Irrigation (now the Ministry of Water Resources) formulated a plan for National
Perspectives for Water Development in August 1980 (Ministry of Water Resources 1980). This led to the
establishment of the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) in 1982 to study basin-wide surpluses and
deficits and explore the possibilities for storage, links, and transfers of water. Its broad approach, utilizing a
national perspective to evaluate hydrologic resources, was the basis for a plan based on optimum development
of available storage sites, including development of new storages wherever feasible, and the interlinking of
major rivers.
For the scientific development of water resources, the Ministry of Water Resources considered it necessary
that each river basin/sub-basin should be analyzed as a unit. Maximizing the availability of water through inter-
basin transfers would give much needed relief to water-deficient areas, distributing the benefits more evenly
throughout the nation. The assumption is that integrated development of both surface and ground water can
optimize benefits, resulting in the most economical use of water. The NWDA carried out detailed studies,
identified thirty potential links between watersheds for the preparation of feasibility reports, and prepared
feasibility studies of six such links. It produced documentation with special reference to the Himalayan and
peninsular rivers.
The Himalayan Component envisaged transfer of water from the Brahmaputra and Ganga system
westwards to southern Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan, and eventually to the southwest
Peninsular Component. The Peninsular Rivers Component deals with connecting Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna,
Pennar and Cauvery, Ken-Betwa, Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal, Par-Tapi-Narmada, Damanganga-Pinjal, etc.
There was also a notion for partial eastward diversion of certain rivers flowing into the Arabian Sea, linking
them with rivers flowing into the Bay of Bengal. However, before treading into a controversial area, certain
facts about water will give a better understanding of the issue in question.

*
Twelve million crores in rupees is equivalent to 120 trillion rupees (1 crore = 10 million). The exchange rate used to arrive
at the approximate U.S. dollar equivalent here and elsewhere in the paper is 1 U.S. dollar = 45.6 Indian rupees.

3
 PART THREE
Facts about Water

Despite opulent precipitation of 4,000 cubic km annually over India, 3,000 cubic km of the total is confined to
the four months of monsoon, with the remaining 1,000 cubic km falling in the remaining eight months of the
year. Even this precipitation is uneven. Parts of the country have abundant precipitation and others face extreme
water deficits. The bulk of water during the monsoon washes into the oceans unused. Annual water resources of
the country are measured in terms of run-off in the river systems, estimated by the National Commission as
1,953 cubic km. However, the utilizable resources of the country are 690 cubic km of surface water and 396
cubic km of ground water (Ministry of Water Resources 1999a).
Profligate consumption of the limited supply of water is the most pervasive and persistent problem to
contain, accompanied by anomalies of mismanagement and the failure of the population to embrace
conservation of this vital resource. The problem of storage is exacerbated by a faulty distribution system,
differences in consumption, leakage and evaporation, and consumer wastage. The present ineffective
management of water ignores the potential of conservation and embraces the chimeric alternative of increasing
supply. Degraded watersheds, drying local pond systems, shrinking canal networks, and wetland degradation as
a result of anthropogenic activity and climate change relegate water to the status of scarce commodity. The
ever-increasing stress caused by population growth and concomitant increased agricultural and industrial
demands for water have created an apparent scenario of water shortage that requires augmentation. Figure 1
below describes the distribution of water resources for the years 1974 (actual) and 2025 (projected).

Figure 1: Distribution of Average Annual Water Resources 1974 and 2025 (million hectare meters)
(Note: Figures in parentheses are projected figures for the year 2025)

Four monsoon months Eight remaining months

300 (300) 100 (100)

Total precipitation
400 (400)
Immediate SURFACE WATER
evaporation 115 (115)
from soil
70 (70) From rainfall From snowfall
To soil moisture From irrigation 105 (105) 10 (10)
165 (165) 5 (5)

From outside India

Total soil moisture To groundwater +20 (+20)
170 (180) 50 (50) To groundwater from
flood flows
From streams From irrigation -5 (-10)
5 (10) 12 (25)
From groundwater
+45 (+45)
Total groundwater From irrigation areas
67 (85) +5 (+15)

Total surface flows

180 (185)

Total utilization
38 (105)

Source: NOTE
B.S. :Nag and
Figures G.N.are
in bracket Kathpalia, Water
projected figures for the Resources
year 2025 of India, in Water and Human Needs: Proceedings of
the Second World Congress on Water Resources (New Delhi: Control Board of Irrigation and Power, 1975).
Source : B.S.Nag and G.N.Kathpalia 1975, water resource of India, in water and human needs, proceedings of the second world congress on
water resources, control board of Irrigation and Power, New Delhi.

5
6 A.C. Shukla and Vandana Asthana

The simulations of utilizable water scenarios up to 2050 as calculated by the Ministry of Water Resources
are given in Table 1 and 2. These provide a snap shot of the existing and future scenarios. The utilizable surface
water and ground water remains 690 km3 and 396 km3 under both low and high demand scenarios.

Table 1: Utilizable Water

Quantity in km3 = billion cubic meters (BCM)

Particular 199798 2010 2025 2050

Utilizable Water Low High Low High Low High
Demand Demand Demand Demand Demand Demand
a. Utilizable 690 690 690 690 690 690 690
Surface Water
b. Utilizable 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Ground Water
c. Existing 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Augmentation
from Canal
Irrigation
Total of (a+b) 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086

Source: Ministry of Water Resources, Govt. of India 1999

However, total water requirement and return flow are steadily rising in future in terms of the national average,
basin studies, and state studies. Return flow follows similar trends. The data shows a corresponding decline in
residual utilizable water, as demonstrated in Table 2 (opposite page).
The assumptions made in the report of the National Commission on Integrated Water Resource
Development (NCIWRD) concluded that availability of water as calculated in 1997 is 520 BCM and estimated
demand for water in 2025 will be 784 BCM in a low growth scenario and 843 BCM in a high growth scenario.
The steadily rising demand curve shows no signs of decline up to 2025. Unless population control measures,
greater efficiency of use of water as a resource, and new technologies like desalinization and conversion of
marine water into fresh water are accomplished, beyond 2025 water demand will keep soaring. The total
requirement in the year 2050 under a low usage scenario will be 973 BCM, while the total requirement in the
year 2050 under a high scenario will be 1,180 BCM (Ministry of Water Resources 1999b).
In these scenarios, where supply will barely meet demand, the National Commission noted that the
situation will not become a crisis if steps are taken in advance. Water availability needs to be enhanced from the
present 520 BCM, but population growth has to be contained to the low demand scenario of 2050 to match
requirements, along with optimal development of utilizable water resources in the country. If water
requirements reach those projected under a high demand scenario, the estimated resource availability will
simply not be able to match the demand of 1,180 BCM.
A word about the Water Barrier concept of Sustainability will not be out of place here. The water stress
index, as calculated by M. Falkenmark (1989), is based on the annual water resources (AWR) per capita. The
AWR of 1,700 cubic meters (CM) indicates only occasional and local stress; 1,000 CM indicates a condition of
stress; and 500 CM or less means seriously constrained water scarcity. Thus India may not be facing a water
scarcity condition even at the end of 2025 on average at the national level, but conditions of scarcity will exist
in four river basins of India (see Figure 2 on page 22). East flowing rivers between Mahanadi and Pennar, east
flowing rivers between Pennar and Kanyakumari, and west flowing rivers of Kutch and Kathiawar, including
the Luni and Sabarmati, all face a per capita availability of less than 1,000 CM per year.
Anatomy of Interlinking Rivers in India 7

Table 2: Utilizable Water, Requirement and Return Flow

(Quantity in km3) (BCM)
S. No. Particulars Year Year 2010 Year 2025 Year 2050

2. Total Water Requirement based on:

a. National Average: Surface water 399 447 458 497 545 641 754
Ground water 230 247 252 287 298 332 428
Total 629 694 710 784 843 973 1180
b. Basin Study: Surface water Not Assessed 642 751
Ground water Not Assessed
Total Not Assessed
c. State Study Surface water 448 457 496 546 641 751
Ground water 246 251 287 297 332 427
Total 694 708 783 843 973 1178
3. Return Flow based on:
a. National Average Surface water 43 52 52 70 74 91 104
Ground water 143 144 148 127 141 122 155
Total 186 196 200 197 215 213 259
b. Basin Study Surface water Not Assessed 93 107
Ground water Not Assessed 148 186
Total Not Assessed 241 293
c. State Study Surface water 52 53 70 75 92 104
Ground water 145 148 128 141 122 155
Total 197 201 198 216 214 259
4. Residual Utilizable Water
(4 =1-1-2+3) Balance based on:
a. National Average Surface water 334 295 284 263 219 140 42
Ground water 219 203 202 146 149 96 33
Total 553 498 486 409 368 236 75
b. Basin Study: Surface water Not Assessed 141 46
Ground water Not Assessed 123 63
Total Not Assessed 264 109
c. State Study: Surface water 294 286 264 219 141 43
Ground water 205 203 147 150 96 34
Total 499 489 411 369 237 77

Source: Ministry of Water Resources, 1999

Note: The total utilizable water resources do not take into account a likely reduction in utilizable surface
water resources due to reservoir sedimentation, which is estimated to be about 17 percent of the total live
storage capacity by year 2050.

In addition to the spatial availability of water, the impending crisis in water is also due to inadequate water
management and environmental degradation, rampant pollution, lack of efficiency in water use, and inadequate
attention to conservation. Admittedly, water scarcity to some extent is a social construct, in spite of seasonal
and temporal variations of water availability as reflected in the basic compilation of water demands and yields.
It was this background that caused the National Commission on Integrated Water Resource Development
(Ministry of Water Resources 1999b) to observe that optimal utilization of land and water should be aimed at
fully exploiting intra-basin surpluses before considering inter-basin transfers. The commission did not discuss in
detail the Himalayan Component as data on the Himalayan Rivers is classified as confidential. NWDAs
Himalayan Component thus requires more detailed study and the actual implementation is unlikely to be
undertaken in the immediate future. In the case of the peninsular rivers, after careful examination of the water
balances in the various basins, the commission observed that there was no imperative need for massive water
transfers. The assessed needs could be met with more efficient utilization of intra-basin resources, except in
8 A.C. Shukla and Vandana Asthana

case of Cauvery and Vaigai basins where limited water transfers could take place by transferring water from
Godavari River.
Despite this report, plans were floated to combat water deficits by conveying surpluses to water deficient
locations. Various political parties and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) members in Tamil Nadu felt that linking
river water resources could enhance the realization of water needs. These political pressures pushed the
proposal forward, leading to a Supreme Court direction to the government of India demanding that the
government take steps to interlink certain major rivers of the country by the year 2012, spelling the beginning of
the Interlinking of Rivers Project (see figure 3 on page 23).

Proposed River Links

The interlinking river project is separated into two primary components (see discussion of the Himalayan and
Peninsular Rivers Components at http://wrmin.nic.in/interbasin/perspective.htm). The Himalayan Component
proposes fourteen canals (Table 3) and the Peninsular Component sixteen (Table 4, opposite). In the Himalayan
Component, many dams are slated for construction on tributaries of the Ganga and Brahmaputra in India,
Nepal, and Bhutan. The project intends to link the Brahmaputra and its tributaries with the Ganga and the
Ganga with the Mahanadi River to transfer surplus water from east to west. The scheme envisages flood control
in the Ganga and Brahmaputra basins and a reduction in water deficits for many states.

Table 3: Links Identified in Himalayan Component

1. Kosi - Mechi
2. Kosi - Ghagra
3. Gandak - Ganga
4. Ghagra - Yamuna
5. Sarda - Yamuna
6. Yamuna - Rajasthan
7. Rajasthan - Sabarmati
8. Chunar - Sone barrage
9. Sone dam - Southern tributaries of Ganga
10. Brahmaputra - Ganga (Manas - Sankosh - Tista - Ganga
11. Brahmaputra - Ganga (Jogigopa - Tista - Farakka)
12. Farakka - Sunderbans
13. Farakka - Damodar - Subarnrkha
14. Subernarekha - Mahanadi
Source: National Perspective Plan, NWDA (1980), and Goyal (2003)

In the Peninsular Component, river interlinks are envisaged to benefit the states of Orissa, Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Pondicherry, and Maharashtra. The linkage of the Mahanadi and Godavari rivers is
proposed to feed the Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery, and Vaigai rivers. Transfer of water from Godavari and Krishna
entails pumping 1,200 cusecs of water over a crest of about 116 meters. Interlinking the Ken with the Betwa,
Parbati, Kalisindh, and Chambal rivers is proposed to benefit Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.
The river link network envisages knitting together ten major rivers across the nation, unheard of in human
history. The project is likely to alter the geography of the country, impose ecological risks, and also
inadvertently distribute pollutant loads across the rivers, spreading local contamination problems and raising
questions of accountability for sources of pollution. Recurrent droughts and incessant water shortages are
looked upon as an opportunity to put aside these forgotten problems. While the reasons for drying up of the
Sabarmati remain unaccounted for, diverting the waters of Narmada 225 km upstream has restored its flow. The
Sabarmati recorded an average annual flow of 3,200 cubic meters, instead of creating conditions for recharge in
the 21,674 sq km of its watershed. The assumption op. cit. is based on good rains in Madhya Pradesh providing
enough water to Narmada for sharing it with Sabarmati. The Sabarmati today has been reduced to a canal
dependent on Narmada.
Anatomy of Interlinking Rivers in India 9

Table 4: Links Identified in Peninsular Component

1. Mahanadi (Manibhadra) - Godavari (Dowlaiswaram)

2. Godavari (Inchampalii) - Krishna (Nagarjunasagar)
3. Godavari (Inchampalii Low dam) - Krishna (Nagarjuna Tail Pond)
4. Godavari (Polavaram) - Krishna (Vijayawada)
5. Krishna (Almatti) - Pennar
6. Krishna (Srisailam) - Pennar (Prodattur)
7. Krishna (Nagarjunasagar) - Pennar (Sornasila)
8. Pennar (Sornasila) - Cauvery (Grand Arnicut)
9. Cauvery (Kattaiai) - Vaigai - Gundur
10. Ken - Betwa - Link
11. Parbati - Kalisindh - Chambal
12. Par - Tapi Narmada
13. Damanganga - Pinjal
14. Bedti - Varda
15. Netravati - Hemavati
16. Pamba - Achankovil - Vappar
Source: National Perspective Plan, NWDA (1980), and Goyal (2003)

Budget and Cost Estimates

The estimated cost (in 2002) of interlinking rivers stands at Rs. 5,60,000 crores (Goyal 2003)equivalent to
approximately $122.7 billionwith an annual outlay over thirty-five years of Rs. 16,000 crores ($3.5 billion).
Another estimate puts it close to 5,56,000 crores ($121.8 billion), out of which Rs. 3,30,000 crores ($72.3
billion) is earmarked for linking the Himalayan rivers with the various peninsular rivers (Sharma 2003). The
Central Government is estimated to need Rs. 20,000 crores ($4.4 billion) a year to execute the project (Goyal
2003). Gujja (2003) estimates Rs. 5,50,000 crores ($120.5 billion) as the cost of completing what would be the
largest civil engineering project ever in India. As a long term project, the actual inflation and potential cost
increases during such a long span are anybodys guess. Long term planning and a sound financial simulation are
required to meet the standard of due diligence for such proposals.

Table 5: Main Budgetary and Other Features of the River Interlinking Plan

1. Estimated cost at 2002 price level Rs. 5,60,000 crores ($122.7 billion)
2. Annual financial outlay Rs. 16,000 crores ($3.5 billion)
3. Number of links 30
4. Independent links 21
5. Interdependent links 9
6. Countries involved India, Nepal, and Bhutan
Based on Goyal (2003)

Yet, the government seems ready to commit this huge expenditure mostly because of popular sentiment.
The economic viability of the project remains questionable. Technical feasibility studies have yet to be carried
out. Raising Rs. 33,000 crores ($7.2 billion) each year over ten years is by no means a small task as this amount
is twice that of current annual tax collections.
Proponents of the river linking project argue that water scarcity or surplus is a result of extreme conditions
of flood or drought that are at the mercy of the vagaries of natural precipitation. To some extent, the scarcity of
water could be overcome by harvesting water locally, but such a strategy cannot solve the national problem of
uneven distribution of hydrologic resources. Local watershed developments are viable as stand alone projects,
since effective conservation of water is possible only at local levels. In supporting the plan, the National Water
Development Agency affirms that it will provide water to irrigate 35 million hectares of farmland and supply 34
10 A.C. Shukla and Vandana Asthana

million kilowatts of hydroelectricity (http://www.wrmin.nic.in/interbasin/perspective.htm). From the basic

compilation of water demands and yields, a National Water Grid seems imperative and the interlinking of rivers
necessary to foster equitable water transfers from surplus to scarce basins of India. In addition to
transferring water from surplus to deficit areas, the scheme to interlink rivers also presumes that water will be
stored and released at the optimal time and place, bringing its availability under human control. It is asserted
that the scheme would provide protection from floods and droughts, while also promoting the availability of
water for nature, agriculture, and industry (Jhunjhunwala 2002). In addition to construction of dams and
barrages, it would promote generation of hydro-electricity, which is linked with industrial growth and quality of
life measurements.
To its opponents, the river interlinking project has been looked upon as an a priori proposition that
undermines conservation of a scarce resource; signals a return to centralized, bureaucratic projects prone to
failure; is potentially fraught with serious environmental consequences; was announced in advance of standard
review procedures of scientific evaluation, appraisal, and approval; and represents a distortion of priorities, pre-
empting resources and attention from other social projects that are a higher priority (Iyer 2002). The National
Commission on Integrated Water Resource Development Plan (Ministry of Water Resources 1999b)
commented, there seems to be no imperative necessity for massive water transfers. The assessed needs of
basins could be met from full development and efficient utilization of intra-basin resources except in the case of
Cauvery and Vaigai basins. Therefore, it is felt that limited water transfers from Godavari at Khampalli and
Polavarum towards South would take care of the deficit in Cauvery and Vaigai basins. The Commission noted
that further studies of inter-basin transfers need to be undertaken to clarify the true costs, benefits, and
drawbacks of such massive projects.
In the Himalayan context, the Commission found the river linking projects implementation is unlikely to
be undertaken because of the huge expenditures and environmental problems involved. Furthermore, its
expansion into the deserts of Rajasthan needs more detailed study (Ministry of Water Resources 1999b).
Besides the above problems, transfers from the Manas, Sankosh, and Kamali rivers need concurrence from
Bhutan, and those from the Brahmaputra and Ganga require agreement with Bangladesh.
While history does offer examples of international joint ventures negating the thorny issues of territorial
boundaries and submerging conflicting interests into settlements with mutual benefits, the ecological and social
costs of these massive projects cannot be ignored. A 179 km Grand Canal was built nearly 3,500 years ago by
the Chinese, from Beijing in the North extending to Hangzhou in the South, connecting the Haihe, Huaihe,
Yangtze, and Qiantang Rivers. Construction began in the fifteenth century BC and the canal became the main
artery of communication in China during the seventh to thirteenth centuries AD. The Suez Canal was opened in
1869, linking the Red Sea with the Mediterranean. Some fish species of Red Sea origin passed through the canal
and proliferated into the eastern Mediterranean, fostering ecological transmigration and displacement of the
original fish species. The impacts of such transmigrations are unknown and impose uncertain ecological risks.
Another example, the Panama Canal, takes water from a river basin in the center of the Isthmus, feeding
locks that carry ships between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. This arrangement is dependent on water
availability from the basin. Since the output of the watershed during the dry season is not enough to support
transfer of ships throughout the year, an artificial lake, Lake Gatun, was created, serving as a buffer to
overcome dry periods. Still, deforestation and negative agricultural impacts are affecting the functioning of the
lake, threatening the viability of the canal. Any human endeavor on such a scale is an artificial intervention in
the ecology, whether it is interlinking of rivers, harvesting rain, making dams, or afforestation. The decisions on
such infringements need to be taken on the basis of a strict social, environmental, and economic costs and
benefits analysis.
Proposals to interlink the rivers of India also entail massive economic, ecological, and social costs. At the
time K.L. Rao first proposed the project decades ago, these watersheds had more water, less pollution, lesser
deforestation, and floods that were not so severe or frequent as now. Since then, the Indian population has
increased enormously; efforts to aid those afflicted by the problems of displacement and rehabilitation that
inevitably accompany such projects must be taken as a prerequisite. Increasingly, the entire socio-economic
strata of affected people are more aware of their rights and know how to protest, agitate, and demand their due.
Such changed circumstances are bound to create impediments to the execution of the project and offer stiff
resistance to it. The involvement of global capital will have its own complications. In recent years, popular
awareness, participation, and empowerment in evaluation of such projects has created an awareness of the
Anatomy of Interlinking Rivers in India 11

merits and demerits they offer, along with recognition of alternative solutions. These conditions present a
number of challenges.
 PART FOUR
Challenges Facing the Project

In an era of scientific and technological advancement, it seems imperative to consider the implications of a shift
towards a supply-driven investment paradigm aimed primarily at asset creation. But the trend towards a
demand-driven alternative which encourages holistic, integrated investment that promotes efficient and
productive use of water also needs to be considered at the decision making levels. Does this underpinning
dictum seem negated in the interlinking river project? Have alternative choices of efficient management of
water use, development of watersheds, harvesting otherwise wasted water, adoption of water conserving
agricultural practices, and recycling of industrial water been tested and found unsuitable? Are institutional
mechanisms that allocate water equitably in social, sustainable, and economic terms working efficiently? Will
the involvement of global capital lead ultimately to commodification of water? Can supply side augmentation as
advocated by experts solve water scarcity problems? In fact, such mind-boggling questions bear examination of
the deeply embedded background of cultural, social and scientific practices that are the dominant mode of
thought and action in matters of policy-making and scientific expertise.

The Culture of Expert Knowledge

The culture of expert knowledge was fostered by the need of governments for more technical information as
well as identification of biases in data from non-governmental sources. Scientific and engineering knowledge
occupies a central position in solving the problems and challenges facing the world today. However, scientists
and engineers practice their trade through an inherited set of beliefs and practicesa framework within which
they tend to function. The way scientists and engineers view the world seems severely bounded by particular
interpretations of reality that Kuhn calls paradigms. Paradigm-based research is an attempt to force nature into
the pre-formed and relatively inflexible framework that the paradigm supplies. These paradigms govern, in the
first instance, not subject matter but rather a group of practitioners (Kuhn 1996). Since it is difficult, even
impossible, to see any more than a tiny slice of reality, people depend on interpretations, paradigms, and
mythologies to understand the world (Sarawitz 1996).
In the river interlinking case, the standard engineering response to the temporal and spatial variations in the
availability of water speaks of the intellectual paradigm scientists and engineers work within. This view holds
that projected future demands can be met by a supply side solution in the form of large dams and reservoirs for
storage, to hold water for release during arid seasons, and projects using long distance water transfers from
surplus areas to water-short ones. Guided by this ruling paradigm, science and technology continues to
prescribe more technological growth to correct the consequences of previous growth. The planners nurse the
notion that the solution to temporal and spatial water availability is increased supply for increased demand. But
the consequences of such supply-based paradigms are unknown. The real environment is altogether too big,
complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much
variety, so many permutations and combinations (Lippmann 1922).
The way the engineering mindset views the world determines the way it maps its solution. The river-linking
project speaks of the intellectual beliefs inherent in the engineering mindset that knowledge and innovation of
this kind will unfold the secrets of nature and successfully address crucial challenges of water availability facing
Indian society, thereby creating social benefit. This outlook heavily conditions the worldview of expert
knowledge, affecting macro conceptions about nature. The rules and standards set by these experts in India are
based on the supply side paradigm that has dominated such thinking over the past few decades, in spite of
growing opposition to it by civic activists and environmentalists.
The role of most of the scientific community, therefore, remains questionable given the intellectual
baggage that they have been carrying with them for years in supporting the project as a beneficial one, meeting
societal needs. The role of these experts is to a great extent influenced by their own ways of conceiving and
approaching problems, their own particular attitudes and modes of behavior built into the positions they occupy.
The professional position affects the way a professional looks at a problem.
The government of India formed a task force to evaluate the project, comprised of experts from science,
engineering, economics, and social sciences and including as official stakeholders one member from a water

13
14 A.C. Shukla and Vandana Asthana

deficit state and one member from a water surplus state (http://wrmin.nic.in/interbasin/perspective.htm). The
task force was constituted by the government to address the following broad issues: provide guidance for norms
of appraisal of individual projects vis--vis their economic viability, socio-economic impacts, environmental
impacts, and preparation of resettlement plans; develop a mechanism for speedy consensus amongst states;
prioritize different projects; propose organizational structures for implementing the project; consider funding
modalities for the project; and consider the international ramifications of the project. The completion date for
achieving the goal of the interlinking project is December 31, 2016 (Ministry of Water Resources 2002b).
But once the government has announced a political decision, can we then trust the task force experts to be
objective in reviewing their decision-making? Can technical agencies like the Central Water Commission, the
technical advisory committee, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, its committees, and the river linking
task force objectively examine the project? Water resource projects of this nature are part of the kind of
development that will not only tend to redraw the physical map of Indian rivers by technological and scientific
knowledge, but also herald us into an era of unforeseen disasters as a result of tampering with natural
ecosystems that are complex and about which very little is known of the interactions of their component forces
on a long term transformational basis (Perrow 1999).
Technological expertise may push forward this proposal, but the fallibility of these systems cannot be
ignored in such a mega project as this. The responsibility then rests with these experts. Whether they can move
out of the supply-based paradigm of mega projects in spite of the looming uncertainty of risks imposed on
society and nature remains a difficult question to answer. The science policy paradigm as envisaged by S.
Jasanoff (1990) in the American case study holds true for the Indian scenario, too. She argues that despite the
growing use of advisory committees in regulatory science, their influence is limited by a system where politics
and law prevails. The argument that agencies are often permitted to make regulatory decisions on the basis of
imperfect knowledge is validated by the governments decision to announce this project, quickly followed by
announcement of formation of the governments task force for its evaluation. While the culture of scientific
expertise determines the feasibility of the project, the interests of politicians seem to dominate policy decisions.

Impact of Global Capital

Such a mega project cannot be completed with national funds currently at the disposal of the government. The
huge expenditure implicit in it will likely create fiscal problems that are difficult to manage, stressing the
economy. The maintenance cost and physical position of the dams, canals, tunnels, and captive electric power
generation created as capital assets under the plan will involve huge financial burdens. This implies the need for
the private sector, as well as global capital agencies, to be involved in the project. The Indian economy cannot
finance such an enormous project on its own. To meet the estimated budget of Rs. 5,60,000 crores ($122.7
billion), financing dependent on private sources, the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank is likely to
affect the economic and political independence of the nation. Such a process entails the challenge of having to
abandon regulatory regimes and allow the market to make decisions over water resources under the influence of
the World Bank. If implemented, such a plan should be self-sustaining so that, if the loan liabilities remain
unpaid, the creditor banks do not use it to force entry into India and consolidate the control of foreign interests
over the national economy.
Transnational corporations see the privatization of water resources as a wonderful opportunity to make
money. Taking advantage of this plight, Coca-Cola has gone into India and bought rights to a huge water
system. Coca-Cola is asking local people to pay royalties for access to water (Barlow 2002). The fact that Texan
power engineers led by Sam Kannappan are lobbying the United States to persuade the World Bank to support
the scheme speaks volumes about the vested interests of private groups seeking participation in the interlinking
river project (Pearce 2003). Mobilization of global capital may ultimately entail the risk of abandoning social
welfare measures while allowing capitalist forces to take its place, using the logic of the market to undermine
societal welfare.

Risk Assessment
The water surplus during JulyOctober in the donor area of the Ganga-Brahmaputra basin is not available at the
time needed (JanuaryMay) in the peninsular rivers recipient area. Utilizing surplus waters, therefore, will
require enormous holding reservoirs; the direct transfer of surplus water is not possible. In spite of all
Anatomy of Interlinking Rivers in India 15

conventional safety designs in building dams and reservoirs, the element of risk cannot be ignored where human
interaction with large ecosystems is taking place on such a massive scale. M. Tully (2003) described the
impacts on human activities as the most valid argument against the project. Reductions in flooding by diversion
of water will cause reductions in land fertility and promote desertification. Reduction in flows of rivers as a
result of diversion of water will reduce purging of pollutant concentrations in certain river stretches and
intensify water pollution there. Such transformations will also impose ecological risks of a nature that are bound
to have unprecedented effects. To secure the National Water Grid, the interlink infrastructure will also require
unprecedented security arrangements and enormous resources, stretching defense and police forces thin. The
construction of dams and excavation of thousands of kilometers of canals will cause massive population
displacement. Dams will flood towns and canals will make villages disappear by cutting through thousands of
kilometers of fertile land, leaving millions to a life of uncertainty. Does the present government have the right to
impose these uncertain risks on society? A project that envisages connecting the peninsular rivers will create a
human disaster to rival Mohammed Tughlaks shifting of the capital from Delhi to Daulatabad in the fourteenth
century (Reddy 2002).

Technological Challenges
Basically, the interlinking project aims to transfer floodwaters of the Ganga and Brahmaputra river basins to the
peninsular areas of South India. There are three options to accomplish such transfer of surplus water. First is the
canal option to construct lengthy canals for the purpose; second, the tunnel option allows water to flow
under mountains; and third is the pumping option that will transfer water over mountains by pumping. An
analysis of the engineering options to deal with these challenges in trying to implement the project does not
seem to be an easy task (Vombatkere 2003).
Canals: A canal running along topographical contours will allow water flow in a unidirectional manner. The
donor states will accept this proposition only. Interstate transfer of water will be problematic and issues of inter-
river transfer of water cannot be easily resolved. Canals will interfere with the natural flow of water and divert
part of the flow alongside their embankments as they cut through intersecting watercourses. Canals will
function as catchbasins, easily becoming filled with silt and residue that will reduce their capacity, requiring
regular dredging. Trees and other vegetation will tend to grow profusely in this water-rich zone, necessitating
regular bank clearance work to maintain structural integrity of the canal system.
Furthermore, canals will cause sociological division between upstream and downstream users. People will have
to take long routes to cross over to the other side for grazing livestock, trade, or social interactions. The cost of
construction of roads and bridges for such purposes will be huge. The diversion of water will reduce its
availability in the Ganga delta region, causing decreased agricultural produce and degradation of fertile land,
inducing destitution among farmers there. The land required for two hundred meter wide canals, with total
length of 14,900 km, will amount to 2,980 sq km. Excavation of earth would be not less than 4,000 sq km; land
lost due to inundation behind dams could be about 8,000 sq km (Vombatkere 2003). The process of land
acquisition and resettlement will be so huge that it will take decades to complete. Even after twenty-five years,
refugees from the Karnataka Dam await the award of compensation and those from the Damodar Valley Project
ousters still lament it after fifty years. Such issues will generate stiff opposition by displaced and otherwise
affected people, likely making it impossible to accomplish the job in time.
Pumping: Pumping water over the Vindhya Mountains can transfer the Ganga-Brahmaputra water and its
tributaries to regions in the south. The Ganga-Brahmaputra floodplains are about ten meters above mean sea
level (MSL). The Vindhya Mountains are about 300 m above MSL, separating the floodplains of the north from
the Deccan Plateau, which is 250 m above MSL (Vombatkere 2003). The electric power required to pump water
to such heights will be close to the current power generation of the entire nation.
Tunneling: Tunneling tens of kilometers would involve a huge expenditure. The fiscal accounting of
interlinking rivers makes this option uneconomical. Thus the technological options envisaged have both
economic as well as socio-environmental consequences to deal with.

Implications for Conflicts

A major assumption of this project by the government of India is based on its conviction that, given the problem
of water availability in the region, all states will cooperate and this will not entail any intra-state or interstate
16 A.C. Shukla and Vandana Asthana

conflict. Inter-basin transfers and supply sharing of basin water to fulfill the needs of states in terms of
irrigation, hydropower generation, municipal and industrial uses, and navigation and transport have been a
diplomatic factor since ancient times, since water is a hydrological unit that transcends national and state
boundaries. Thus, water supply sharing between and within river basins often leads to political and economic
conflict. India has twenty-four river basins, big and small, and the sharing of water supplies; constructions of
storage, dams, and canals; and problems of pollution load have remained controversial issues in both intra-state
and interstate relations in South Asia.
Competing demands for water in a region hosting half of the worlds poor and one-fifth of the worlds
population, coupled with problems of urbanization and sanitation, make supplying clear, healthy water a
difficult proposition. The emergence of regional parties and coalition governments has fanned popular regional
sentiments against important national interests. Problems have arisen in Punjab over supply sharing; an existing
controversy prevails between Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh, all fanned by the politicization of
this resource (Garg 1999).
The National Water Development Agency (NWDA) has studied the resources of different basins, assessing
availability for the transfer of surplus in the Mahanadi - Godavari - Krishna - Pennar - Cauvery links and
diverting the west flowing rivers of Kerala and Karnataka eastward, though it is difficult to persuade Orissa and
Andhra Pradesh that there is surplus in the Mahanadi or the Godavari.
Another major issue to contend with is the legal status of water. In the constitution of India, water is subject
to state control, with the national government allowed to intervene only in the regulation and development of
interstate rivers to the extent it is declared by the parliament to be a situation that is in public interest. Under
Article 262, the government of India created the Interstate Water Disputes Act of 1956 to solve interstate
problems, but water has become increasingly politicized on a regional and linguistic basis. Because of the
nature of multiparty coalitions, regional interests can prevent central intervention in issues like those of the
Krishna and Cauvery water disputes. Given that the National Water Resource Council of India has met only
three times since 1987, the limited ability of the council to solve national river problems can well be
understood.
Even managing water within one river basin can bring states into conflict. Envisaging the interlinking of
ten rivers passing through twenty-five states and involving issues of riparian rights between competing nation
states may indeed be all set for a modern Mahabharata fought over water.* In India, ground water user rights
are provided to land owners and there is a general notion that surface water is for consumption locally by user
right. Riparian rights are seldom honored. Given this socio-cultural view of water rights, other realistic water
sharing scenarios have the potential to exacerbate conflicts, inflate water problems, and present nearly insoluble
challenges to interstate and inter-country water sharing. For example, riparian rights and their enforcement are
at the root of the previously mentioned disputes involving sharing Cauvery River waters between Karnataka and
Tamil Nadu, as well as many of those amongst other states of the nation. If Indians are unable to solve conflicts
arising within a basin to share a river, large-scale inter-basin transfers of water by interlinking rivers may lead
to water conflicts on an unprecedented scale.
Even in the international context, supply sharing has been a matter of big vs. small, with problems over
supply in Nepal, Bangladesh, and India. In issues of inter-basin transfers, such diversions do indeed cause the
liveliest concerns, often leading to protests and resistance in the exporting region sparked by the elemental
importance of water for life and the economy (Verghese 1990).
A similar concern has been voiced in the case of the Himalayan basin. A major concern of Indian experts
has been to try and harness the Brahmaputra River by a link canal passing through Bangladesh. This scheme
would take the river westwards and southwards to water-deficient regions elsewhere in India. The mighty
Brahmaputra River flows in a remote corner of the country, then drains the bulk of its water into the Bay of
Bengal without it being tapped as a water resource. A desire to transfer these flows to areas of high water
demand and scarcity seems natural. An initial Indian proposal to Bangladesh in the 1970s, proposing the
construction of a gigantic Brahmaputra-Ganga gravity link canaloriginating at Jogiphopa in Assam,
traversing through Bangladesh, and feeding into the Ganga above Farakkawas summarily rejected by
Bangladesh for many reasons. An alternative link canal through the Siliguri chicken neck would involve large

*
The Mahabharata, a famous ancient Sanskrit epic poem of India, chronicles a civil war between Indo-Aryan kings.
Anatomy of Interlinking Rivers in India 17

lifts that present formidable engineering challenges and is not economically viable. Brahmaputra water is likely
to remain out of bounds.
Off and on, Bangladesh has contemplated a BrahmaputraGanga transfer within its own territory. Nepal
has likewise identified certain water-deficient zones that might at some stage import water from surplus basins.
But the question remainshow far is this supply sharing practical in view of the geopolitical, physical, and
economic realities of the region? The sharing of basin waters is preconditioned on mutual understanding, data
sharing, and resolution of differences over water use and sharing within and between basins, as well as finding
the will to cooperate.
The Garland Canal, proposed to connect the Ganga in the north to the Cauvery River in the far south, also
has international ramifications. Under a December 1996 Indo-Bangladesh treaty on the sharing of Ganga water,
India has undertaken to protect the flows arriving at Farakka. The Ganga basin is water-short in the dry season.
Even if India argues that it will only store flood flows for release in the dry season, Bangladesh feels skeptical
that the treaty, in letter and spirit, will be honored. On the other hand, West Bengal still pleads for greater water
flows to sustain its Calcutta Port and feels its interests were bartered away when the national government signed
the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty on Ganga waters. Will it be politically wise to tamper with Ganga waters at
Farakka to augment supply to Hooghly, precipitating a diplomatic row with Bangladesh on the issue of
desertification of fertile land and the drying of the Sundarbans region? In the case of proposals that involve the
flows of the Ganga, there is no doubt that water politics will complicate the regional diplomatic environment.
Periodic floods and droughts already play havoc with the political, social, economic, and environmental
stability of these sister countries in the Indian sub-continent. In many cases, such problems can be addressed by
constructing storages, dams, and reservoirs to store floodwaters on the headwaters of shared rivers and later
release it downstream during droughts. Conflicting demands for a scarce resource such as water make clear that
cooperation is not easily forthcoming amongst these sub-continental neighbors. In such circumstances, vested
state interests can obstruct national or regional co-operation. Beyond a doubt, plans to share water supplies in
international and domestic basins remain a political and diplomatic challenge in the wake of increasing
demands for limited supplies of water.
Advocacy of the need for integrated planning, development, and management of river basins or watersheds
can often seem an idealistic proposition. Rivers must be treated under the basin approach that has been
recognized to be the logical and rational unit for optimum development and utilization of water resources.
However, hydrological boundaries of river basins often do not follow the political boundaries of states, resulting
in conflicting interests and divergent priorities for development. Water resource planning needs to be
formulated with due consideration of the geopolitical problems, in such cases as Himalayan or interstate river
water resources. India is locked in conflicts both with its neighbors and domestically over water problems. The
diplomatic relations of India with Nepal and Bangladesh are good, but issues of water that sometimes form part
of negotiations are a reminder of the influence of relations of other nations vis--vis water. Proposals to
massively interlink rivers are projects with deep interconnections impinging upon relationships between nation
states sharing river basins.
 PART FIVE
Conflicting Overtones

Political Interests, Bureaucratic Positions, and Policy Decisions

Elected officials and bureaucrats in federal, state, and municipal departments make decisions in public policy.
However, political interests are often given increased weight when policy makers have to make a decision. W.
Robinson (1995) emphasizes the desire for reelection as the primary concern of politicians in making a
decision. Political interests shape politicians choices, points of view, final decisions, and even the process
itself. Plans for a river interlinking project remain in the governmental archives and each time consideration of
them was re-opened this enigmatic scheme has failed to find approval. The project formed part of the election
manifesto of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by the BJP. Despite its place as a key issue in the
electoral platform of the NDA, the project still could not take off. The political resolution of the BJP National
Council Meeting at Nagpur (August 2728, 2000) urged the government to consider setting a deadline for
implementation of the river interlinking project. The project also formed part of the document of the ninth plan
of the government, but could never move beyond the planning stage. In 2001, N. Nandhivarman, General
Secretary of Dravida Peravai, attempted to initiate action by filing a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India
(Writ Petition #496, 2001) asking the court to trigger implementation of the project within a specific time
frame.
It is customary that the judiciary has deferred to the executive on matters of dams and water policy. Critics
contend that Justice B.N. Kirpal, on the verge of retirement, pushed the project (Patkar and Arvinda 2002). A
politically lucrative opportunity was provided by the Supreme Court through its direction to the government to
set a date for implementation of the plan and the BJP found it an easy ploy to push through its manifesto.
Common people are taught to accept the verdict of the court as ultimate, conscientious, constitutional, legal, and
beyond question. The river interlinking project therefore became a fait accompli. Accordingly, Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced a task force for its execution. Such a mega-project, heavily promoted as
providing water to the common man, has all the makings of a popular electoral issue attracting millions of
people. Even in the absence of an open debate, water is a sensitive issue that leaves the opposition with no
option but to espouse the project to prove that it was always supportive of the ruling party in matters of national
interest. Congress President Sonia Gandhi wrote to the Congress Partys Chief Ministers in various states in
support of the project.
The project serves the Promethean aspirations of bureaucrats and technocrats that form the rank and file of
the government. According to a government spokesman, the project was given serious consideration even
before formation of a government task force to study the viability of its implementation. However, it still cannot
be denied that the project is unlikely to survive careful independent scientific study, despite the fact that the
state controls the most powerful and persuasive system of evaluation for building public support for the project.
It has the classified and integrated factual information, nearly unlimited consultation access to experts,
scientists, technocrats, economists, and social scientists on its exchequer, forming an advisory group to the
government. This group is responsible for evaluating the merits and demerits of decisions such as approval of a
mega-project like the interlinking of rivers. However, it can be anticipated that the bureaucracy and technocracy
will most likely clear the project on technical feasibility and economic viability, despite the abundant evidence
that these are far from being closed questions. Once a state decision is taken in principle and policy, the
governmental machinery is geared up for its execution. The Ministry of Water Resources remains a dumping
ground for ex-bureaucrats that attached themselves to the project as a God-sent opportunity to occupy a frontal
position in the national political arena. The hype and value associated with the project, declaring its status as
being the greatest engineering magnum opus of contemporary times, offers the promise of prominence to
professionals and administrators in the Ministry of Water Resources.
The policy discourse of mega-projects is usually axiomatic in approach and explores, inadvertently, a
paradigm that directs rationale, arguments, and analysis around epistemological outcomes that negate and
exclude other approaches. In practice, the dominant discourse of the state gradually shapes the innate freedom
accompanying sectarian politics pursued vigorously by political agency. It evolves in relation to social voices,
ultimately shaping political agendas. Such dialogue and debate becomes part of the discourse of civil society. It
can be anticipated that this process is state oriented, even if it is often couched in terms of voicing the interests

19
20 A.C. Shukla and Vandana Asthana

of society at large in search of legitimacy. Nonetheless, the state seeks accreditation of its aims as part of a
broader consultative process.

Agency of Civil Society

State policy decisions vis--vis mega-environmental projects affecting the common citizen often stir criticism
by civil society. Grassroots groups, NGOs, the scientific and expert community of technocrats, scientists, social
scientists, and other stakeholders function as civil society actors. Their participation can provide resistance to
ill-advised state projects in the interest of society at large, because their agency looks at the project from a
perspective other than the states. It seems worthwhile to explore the possibilities for considering transparent
and unbiased viewpoints to express this agency on the issue of interlinking rivers in an effort to broaden the
canvas of the debate. The response of civil society in this case is a mixed bag of approval and disapproval.
Independent scientists and engineers have raised questions over viability of the river interlinking project
(Goyal 2003). Much of the engineering community seems skeptical about the scheme. Even engineers in
Karnataka raised doubts about whether the water from the north will ever reach the state (Pearce 2003). They
recognize that nature has linked water itself in a hydrological cycle. For a balanced hydrological cycle,
promotion of forest cover, prevention of erosion, enhancement of ground water development in micro-
watersheds, de-siltation and maintenance of existing canals, lakes, ponds, pools, and other water accumulation
processes are preferable to river interlinking. Many stakeholders have expressed a strong feeling that the plan
will create conflicts, squander money, and result in increased national political divisions (Khosla and Gujja
2003). F. Pearce (2003) calls it ill conceived and potentially a cause of water wars with Indias neighbors. The
former Secretary of the Ministry of Water Resource, Ramaswamy Iyer, dismissed the project as technological
hubris and said India already has incomplete water projects worth billions of dollars that need completion
before launching others (Iyer 2002).
M.S. Reddy, another former Secretary of the Ministry of Water Resources, argues that better use of existing
water resources and increased harvesting of rainfall are viable alternatives to interlinking rivers. Experts raise
doubts on river linking project (Dasgupta 2003) in the context of frontline issues in water and land management
policy. Dr. Tushaar Shah, the head of the International Water Management Institute-Tata Water Policy Program
also expressed doubts on the cost-benefit ratio and pros and cons of the project (Dasgupta 2003). He pointed out
that the country needs re-orientation of its water management policy, linking it to poverty alleviation programs.
Environmentalists like Sunderlal Bahguna, Medha Patkar, and Rakesh Jaiswal have voiced their
reservations against fiddling with nature. The Save Ganga and Narmada movements stand as testimony to the
concerns of environmentalists and grassroots groups. Patkar and L.S. Arvinda (2002) posed the question, Will
a linking of rivers actually prevent drought or merely transfer drought? Environmentalists also attack the
interlinking project for its potential to spread pollution between watersheds (Pearce 2003). River antipollution
movements such as Eco-Friends, Environment India, and Green Friends have expressed critical concerns about
the transfer of polluted water and its potential to lessen accountability for polluters. The growth of slums in
Indian cities, a result of villagers driven off their lands by schemes to increase irrigation, power generation,
railways, and road construction will further intensify due to refugee influx caused by displacement and
acquisition of land needed for the infrastructure for interlinking rivers. Civil society movements in India will
definitely contest these displacements, demanding just compensation for these destitute refugees. It will be a
difficult task to seek concurrence of NGOs on the interlinking issue.
The opinions expressed above are spontaneous reactions of the civil society and portray a potentially grim
scenario. However, an evolving discourse of in-depth thinking, discussion, and debate over the issue is the
present goal of this project. The opposition to large-scale water resource development projects is well-defined
and embedded in the thinking of civil society networks and organizations. Civil society needs to address itself to
these issues that require serious consideration:
Broadening the debate beyond the limits implicit in the governments task force vis--vis Indias
traditional supply driven approach to resource management;
Mobilization of additional intellectual and other resources to balance the presently skewed nature of the
task force;
Anatomy of Interlinking Rivers in India 21

Incorporation of views and aspirations of people that rely on water sector goods and services for
subsistence or other livelihood purposes and other stakeholders; and
Recognition of the task forces need to foster a broadly-based consensus of opinion on any final plan for
the river interlinking project
The project on interlinking rivers is based on the water scarcity paradigm that requires it to build its case
for legitimacy as the only alternative to replenish the supply gap. If water deficiency has to do with water crisis,
then why are villages with less than 200 mm of rainfall during summer not water scarce and why does
Cherrapunji suffer scarcity despite its reputation as one of the wettest places on Earth? While the government
builds a case for this gargantuan water resource development project, academia remains bogged down in
voicing how better research and development on effective optimal use of water could compensate for the
scarcity using low tech, community-based programs for harvesting water. This dichotomy entails the
assumptions of a naturalist and environmentalist approach versus an epistemological approach pursued by the
state along a defined course of thinking, utterly disregarding the cooperative community efforts that can turn a
desert into an oasis. Tarun Bharat Sanghs work in Rajasthan exemplifies the point.
However, the axiomatic dictum remains that the country is experiencing an acute shortage of water because
there is less water. An interactive process can alter the concept of less water availability into socially
experienced water deficiency that finds alternative measures to combat the problem. Instead of creating a
phobia and hype of scarcity, the solutions to the critique may be found in propagating conservation of water,
harvesting of water, and development of watersheds. How do water demands emerge? How are they linked
with consumption? Why is much water used by a chosen fewthe wealthy strata of societynegating it to the
larger population? Can the technology of large-scale water resource development projects like interlinking
rivers solve the problem of availability and access to water in India? These are questions that trouble the minds
of Indian society today.
The success of interlinking rivers depends on the legitimacy of both its structure and its agency in the
publics eye. Is it premature to pass a judgment over whether it is a populist step by government and opposition
parties to float the project? Has the judiciary overstepped its limits in matters of governmental policy decision?
Has despair over water availability prompted the impromptu execution of plans to interlink rivers? These
dilemmas dominate the Interlinking River Project of India, which may have both hope and despair in store.
Perhaps, the time frame set by the Supreme Court for the government of Indias task force evaluation may offer
some insight on the path that India treads to manage this common resource for availability, equity, and
sustainability in the search for water security.
22 A.C. Shukla and Vandana Asthana

Figure 2: River Basins, Water Stress and Water Scarcity

Anatomy of Interlinking Rivers in India 23

Figure 3: Links Envisaged as per the National Perspective Plan

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