Abeja, Krizia Rae A.

Section 1-I

Knights of Rizal v. DMCI et. al.,

G.R. No. 213948; April 19, 2017

Carpio, J.:

Facts:

On 1 September 2011, DMCI acquired a lot in the City of Manila which was to be
earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDIs Torre de Manila condominium project. It
secured its Barangay Clearance on 2 April 2012 and obtained a Zoning Permit on 10 June
2012. Then, on 5 July 2012, it was officially granted a Building Permit allowing it to build a
49 storey with basement and 2 penthouses.

However, on 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued a Resolution No. 121 to
temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, that based on their development
plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly
dwarf the statue of our hero and would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine
from the frontal view.

Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of Manilas
City Legal Officer on whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121. In his letter,
Legal Officer Dela Cruz stated that there is no legal justification for the temporary
suspension of the building permit issued in favour of DMCI since the construction lies
outside the Luneta Park and is simply too far to be a repulsive distraction of the Rizal
Monument. He also pointed out that there is no showing that the area of the subject property
has been officially declared as an anthropological or archaeological area.

National Historical Commission of the Philippines Dr. Maria Serene Diokno

maintained that the Torre de Manila project is outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and
well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of
the National Monument.
 On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre de Manila
project that garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution
No. 146, reiterating its directive in Resolution No. 121 enjoining the City of Manilas
building officials to temporarily suspend DMCI-PDIs Building Permit.

Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board
Resolution No 06, Series of 2013, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDIs application
for variance, which was later on amended. The City Council resolution later states that the
City Council of Manila finds no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid
recommendation of the MZBAA and hereby ratifies and confirms all previously issued
permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City Council of Manila.

On 12 September 2014, Knights of Rizal, a civic, patriotic, cultural, non-partisan,

non-sectarian and non-profit organization created under Republic Act No. 646, files a petition
for injunction seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent injunction, against
the construction of Torre de Manila condominium project. The Knights of Rizal argues that
the subject matter of the present suit is one of transcendental importance, paramount public
interest, of overarching significance to society, or with far-reaching implication involving the
desecration of the Rizal Monument. Further, they argue that as a National Treasure, the Rizal
Monument is entitled to full protection of the law, the project is a nuisance per se, it violates
the Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes and that the construction was
commenced and continues in bad faith.

Issue: Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City
of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDIs Torre de Manila project.

Held: NO, there is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. The
Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty of property with due
process of law. It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from an
individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The dispossession of
property or the stoppage of the construction of a building in ones own property would
violate substantive due process.

Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila. The Rules on Civil Procedure are
clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or
the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus
has a clear legal right to the performance of such act. In the present case, nowhere is it found
in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction
of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background of
the Rizal Monument. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the
area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is not part of the
Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage.

To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 to
the Torre de Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply
outside of the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the officials of the City of Manila have a
ministerial duty to consider these standards to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can
be no such duty because these standards are not applicable to buildings outside of Rizal Park.
Abeja, Krizia Rae A.

Section 1-I

Hon. Philip Aguinaldo v. President Aquino

G.R. No. 224302; November 29, 2016

Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

Facts:

On June 11, former President Marcos issued PD No. 1486, creating a special court
called the Sandiganbayan which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers
and employees. A few months later, President Marcos also issued PD No. 1606 which
elevated the rank of the members of Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices. RA No. 7975
was approves into law on March 30, 1995 and increased the composition of the
Sandiganbayan from 9 to 15 Justices. PA No. 10660 recently enacted on April 16, 2015,
created two more divisions with three Justices each, resulting in 6 vacant positions.

On July 20, 2016, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star
and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for
applications or recommendations for the 6 newly created positions. After screening and
selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President Aquino 6 shortlists contained in 6
separate letters the names of nominees for the vacant positions, all dated October 26, 2015.

Presidents Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) Musngi; (2) R. Cruz; (3) Econg; (4)
Mendoza-Arcega; (5) Miranda; and (6) Trespeses. The appointment papers were transmitted
on January 25, 2016 to the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, who took their oath of
office on the same day all at the Supreme Court Dignitaries Lounge.

Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., were all nominees for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice and they assert that they possess locus standi to file the instant petition since they
suffered direct injury. Petitioner IBP argues that President Aquino violated section 9, article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution that he did not appoint anyone from the 16 th Associate Justice
shortlist, he appointed two Associate Justices that came from the same shortlist and that the
appointments made were not in accordance with the shortlist submitted thus affecting the
order of seniority of the Associate Justices.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Office of the President
(OP), argues that the President should be dropped as a respondent on the ground of his
immunity from suit, that petitioner Aguinaldo et al. cannot institute an action for quo
warranto because usurpation of public office, position or franchise is a public wrong and not
a private injury, that petitioner IBP can only institute the certiorari and prohibition case, but
not the action for quo warranto because it cannot comply with the direct injury requirement,
that the petitioners erroneously included Jorge-Wagan, et al. as unwilling co-petitioners and
that the petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts by directly filing the petition before
this court.

Issue: Whether or not President Aquino, under the circumstances was limited to appoint only
from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy.

Held: NO, President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of
the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for
the vacancies for the 16th to 21st Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained well-
established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative.
This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the
President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every
vacancy.

The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. This means that the President cannot appoint an
individual who is not nominated by the JBC. A long as the President appoints someone
nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. Hence, the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Associate Justices are valid and do not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
Abeja, Krizia Rae A.

Section 1-I

Lagman v. Medialdea

G.R. No. 231658, 231771, 231774; July 4, 2017

Facts:

Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written report on the factual basis of Proclamation
No. 216. The report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. The
President chronicled in his report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi
City which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus. The report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial
and significant role it plays in Mindanao and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the
report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the control
of the lawless groups.

After the submission of the report and briefings, the Senate issued P.S Resolution No.
388 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding it to be satisfactory,
constitutional and in accordance with the law. Also, the Senate declared that it found no
compelling reason to revoke the same. The House of Representatives likewise issued House
Resolution No. 1050 expressing the full support of the House of Representatives as it finds
no reason to revoke the same.

On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito Villarin, Gary C.

Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones and Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr. filed several petitions under
the third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues:

1. Are the instant petitions the "appropriate proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution?

2. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus,:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National
Defense;
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?

3. Is the power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus independent of
the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately?

4. Were there sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?

5. Is the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?

6. May Proclamation No. 216 be considered, vague, and thus null and void:
a. with its inclusion of other rebel groups; or
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region?
7. Are the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the
President to Congress sufficient bases;
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao region?

8. Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism equivalent to actual rebellion and the
requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus?

9. Will nullifying Proclamation No. 216:

a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless
violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region?

Held:

1. YES, under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant
therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of
the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by
the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The unique features of the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and
different from those enumerated in Article VIII.

2. a. NO. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis,
and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of
the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be
expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of
the situation.
b. NO, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if
the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed.

c. YES, the events must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the
President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are
found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.

3. YES, in reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension,
the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to, or at the
time of the declaration. The Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing
of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. The power of the Court to review
can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

4. a. Yes, section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of
the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety
requires the exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the
President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus must be struck down.

b. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

c. What the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

5. NO, the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions.

6. a. NO, the term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No.
216 refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of
reference.

b. NO, there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing
and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the
proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the said orders
in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights violations,
should be resolved in a separate proceeding.

7. a. YES, a review of the facts available to the President that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power
and prerogatives leading to President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime
of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President, in
issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual
rebellion exists.

b. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a
valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

8. YES, for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public
safety requirement. In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by
the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. Proclamation No. 216 has
sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that
public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.

9. a. NO, the Presidents calling out power is in a different category from the power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. In other words, the
President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of
course, it may also be precluded to a possible future exercise of the latter powers.

b. NO, under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
operative fact before it is declared unconstitutional.
Abeja, Krizia Rae A.

Section 1-I

Grace Poe v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 221697; March 8, 2016

Perez, J.:

Facts:

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant
in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar in 1968. Parental care and custody
over her was passed on to Edgardos relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. Emiliano
reported and registered Grace Poe as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo. Fernando Poe and Susan Roces then adopted Grace Poe when she was 5 years old.

In 1991, Grace Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident therein. In 2001, she
became a naturalized US citizen. During the first quarter of 2005, she came back to the
Philippines to permanently reside therein. She went back to the US to dispose her family
belongings in February 14, 2016 and on January 18, 2016, she re-acquired her Filipino
Citizenship. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB,
she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement. From then on
she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents are Filipino. The COMELEC cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and
that she committed material misrepresentations in her certificate of candidacy.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to the rule on the issue of
qualifications of candidates.

2. Whether or not Grace Poe is a natural-born citizen.

 3. Whether or not Grace Poe satisfies the 10 year residency requirement.

4. Whether or not Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing
misrepresentations in her certificate of candidacy.

Held:

1. No, Article IX-C, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions
of the COMELEC and deciding o the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is
not one among them. The Constitution provides that only the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal have the sole jurisdiction
over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members,
whereas over the President and Vice President, only the Supreme Court en banc has
sole jurisdiction.

2. Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she
satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural born Filipinos may
run for presidency. There is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos.
Her features are of typical Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos
such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence
on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.

3. Yes, Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus
revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Her domicile had been timely changed as of
May 24, 2005 and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was
approved by the Bureau of Immigration. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree
than an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent
resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit.
4. No, COMELEC cannot cancel her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she
misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to
grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon.
Abeja, Krizia Rae A.

Section 1-I

Saturnino Ocampo v. Executive Secretary Medialdea

G.R. No. 225973; November 8, 2016

Peralta, J.:

Facts:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate
Rodrigo Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President
Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 Presidential
Election.

On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to

AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani. On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral
Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and
Service for President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

Issue:

1. Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave
abuse of discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in
compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election
campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?

2. Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and

directive violated the Constitution and domestic and international laws?
 3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the
Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos
regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at
the LNMB?

4. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of
former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by
which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

Held:

1. NO, there is no grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos
at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting
history as to the Filipino people's act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but
also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the
letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a
"human rights constitution." For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a
clear condemnation of Marcos' alleged "heroism."

2. NO, there is no violation of the constitution, domestic law and international law. In
the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision
considering that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and
effectuate the principle embodied therein. Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art.
XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art.
XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching the values
of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art.
XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the
recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with President Duterte's mandate
under Sec. 1 7, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does
not contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights
laws cited by petitioners.
 FOR RA no. 289

It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal standard by which a
person's mortal remains may be interred at the LNMB, and that AFP Regulations G
161-375 merely implements the law and should not violate its spirit and intent.

FOR RA no. 10368

Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who
were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance,
and other gross human rights violations committed from September 21, 1972 to
February 25, 1986. To restore their honor and dignity, the State acknowledges its
moral and legal obligation to provide reparation to said victims and/or their families
for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they experienced.

FOR International Human Rights Law

The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity, call
for the enactment of legislative measures, establishment of national programmes, and
provision for administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the country's
constitutional processes, that are necessary to give effect to human rights embodied in
treaties, covenants and other international laws. The U.N. principles on reparation
expressly states:

Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not
entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of
existing legal obligations under international human rights law and
international humanitarian law which are complementary though different as
to their norms

3. NO, it has not nullified his entitlement as a soldier and president to be interned in
LNMB. Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and
hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains
interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said
cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed
individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried
therein.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the
LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (
c) Secretaries of National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag
Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include
active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU
Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities;
(g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the
PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized
guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased
persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-
Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G) Former Presidents,
Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former
Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar to AFP
Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB:
(a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service;
and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations
G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and
disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered
to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III,
who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by
expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP
Regulations G 161-375 must, therefore, be sustained for having been issued by the
AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense,
who is the alter ego of the President.
4. NO, the burial is not deemed waived when they entered into an agreement with the
government. The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials.
The PVAO, which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military
shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under
the Office of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement
between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of
Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to
amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to
determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed
wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for
public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and
that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated
until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or
executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located
from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents

The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a secretary, a military personnel , a veteran, and a
Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as
such, satisfies the public use requirement.